Journal of Politics

Volume 50, Number 1

Micheal W. Giles
Emory University
Editor

Eleanor C. Main
Emory University
Associate Editor

Thomas G. Walker
Emory University
Associate Editor

Editorial Board

Contents

ARTICLES

RESEARCH NOTES

Officers of the Southern Political Science Association 1987–1988

President
Donald Vaughn
University of Mississippi

Vice-President
Bradley Canon
University of Kentucky

President-Elect
Allan Kornberg
Duke University

Vice President Elect
Charles O Jones
University of Virginia

Executive Director and Treasurer
Michael Maggiotto
University of South Carolina

Recording Secretary
Thomas P Lauth
University of Georgia

Executive Council

M Margaret Conway
University of Maryland
(ex officio)

Susan MacManus
University of South Florida
(1988)

Ronald E Weber
Louisiana State University
(1988)

Maurice C Woodard
APSA and Howard University
(1988)

Pamela Conover
University of North Carolina
(1989)

Robert Montjoy
Auburn University
(1989)

Robert Thomas
University of Houston
(1989)

Marian Palley
University of Delaware
(1990)

Larry Sabato
University of Virginia
(1990)

Dorothy McBride Stetson
Florida Atlantic University
(1990)

Contents

ARTICLES

RESEARCH NOTES

Journal of Politics

olume 50, Number 2 May 1988

Officers of the Southern Political Science Association 1987–1988

Contents

RTICLES

SEARCH NOTES

REVIEW ESSAY

BOOK REVIEWS

Journal of Politics

Volume 50, Number 3 — August 1988

Officers of the Southern Political Science Association 1987–1988

Contents

Southern Political Science Association
Manning J. Dauer Award Endowment Fund

In recognition of the nearly fifty years of distinguished service of Manning J Dauer to the Southern Political Science Association, the Association has established the Manning J Dauer, Jr , Endowment Fund to provide for a biennial award to an individual who has performed exceptional service to the profession of political science in the tradition of the dedicated and able service personified by Manning Dauer

A committee composed of Walter E Beach of the Brookings Institution, Chairperson, Malcolm E Jewell, University of Kentucky, and Naomi B Lynn, Georgia State University, has been appointed to select the winner of the first Dauer Award, to be presented at the 1988 Southern Political Science Association meeting, and to lead the drive to raise an endowment fund of at least $10,000 Nominations for the award are welcome and should be sent to the committee chairperson The committee also invites gifts for the endowment fund Contributions are tax deductible Checks should be made payable to the SPSA Dauer Fund and sent to

Michael Maggiotto
Executive Director
Southern Political Science Association
c/o Department of Political Science
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Journal of Politics

olume 50, Number 4 November 1988

Editorial Board

Officers of the Southern Political Science Association 1987–1988

Contents

ARTICLES

RESEARCH NOTES

REVIEW ESSAYS

BOOK REVIEWS

Articles P

The Deregulatory Snowball: Explaining Deregulation in the Financial Industry

Thomas H. Hammond
Jack H. Knott
Michigan State University

Most theories of regulatory politics have a common implication once regulations are in place, they are exceedingly difficult to remove At best, a particular regulatory regime will remain stable for a long period of time at worst regulation will beget even more regulation Given these theories the *de*regulation that has occurred in the American economy in the past decade is almost *inexplicable*

Several reasons have been suggested for this deregulation In this paper we present an explanation which while not incompatible with these previous accounts suggests a somewhat different perspective on deregulation Our explanation stresses the inherent instability of regulatory regimes We illustrate our argument through reference to the deregulation of the financial industry We demonstrate that several changes in the economics and technology of the financial industry started a snowball of deregulation which gradually picked up momentum as it rolled downhill ultimately sweeping away many of the regulations in its path

I The Regulatory Ratchet

Over the past decades, students of government regulation of the economy have developed a variety of theories to account for the existence and spread of regulation While these theories do not always focus on the same kinds of variables, many reproduce the same dynamic once initiated regulation is difficult to eliminate and almost invariably begets more regulation

An early example of this line of thought was presented by Friedrich Hayek in his classic criticism of centralized economic planning *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) It was widely believed in the 1930s and 1940s that increased economic complexity due to technological change required central direction for the economy to function While Hayek dismissed this technological determinism as a myth, he did suggest that there are economic considerations" and 'social or political tendencies which lead to increasingly centralized control (p 105)

The literature on regulation provides illustrations of the kinds of economic, social, and political factors which maintain or advance the extent of regulation A long line of economists, including such figures as Milton Friedman, Alfred Kahn, George Stigler, Sam Peltzman, and Paul MacAvoy have

We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Tom Galligan, Paul Thomas and the referees including Martha Derthick and Laurence O'Toole

developed theories and data about the distributional economic impact of regulation A central argument is that regulation creates one set of interests economically dependent on the regulations and causes another set of interests to disappear As Noll and Owen (1983, p 34) put it, "When regulation is in effect, the losers will have been weakened and some will have disappeared Meanwhile, interests created by unanticipated side effects will advocate continuation of the regulation, although they did not participate initially Consequently, the effort required by an agency to overturn an outdated or mistaken regulation can turn out to be far greater than the effort required to establish it in the first place "

A variety of political arguments have also been advanced to account for the stability and extension of regulation (Noll and Owen's argument obviously contains a signficant political element) Often stressed, for example, is the strength of relationships among regulatory agencies, congressional committees, and the regulated interests, see Truman (1951), Huntington (1952) Bernstein (1955), McConnell (1966), and Lowi (1969) The regulated interests benefit from policies which maintain profitability The price they pay is campaign support for legislators on the committees supervising the agencies Civil servants on the regulatory agencies benefit from civil service protected jobs, and the appointed commissioners have the prospect of future employment with the regulated interests Agency budgets also benefit from strong congressional and interest group support For these kinds of reasons, it is often thought, members of the subgovernment are inclined to resist outside pressures to deregulate the industry

Other theories of regulation emphasize the role of the regulatory agency itself For example, in *The Public Use of Private Interest* (1977) Schultze paints a Hayekian picture of an ever-tightening regulatory system driven in part by the bureaucracy "Relying on regulations rather than economic incentives to deal with highly complex areas of behavior ... has a built-in dynamic that inevitably broadens the scope of regulation ... [If] specific regulations are the only bar to prevent social damages, the regulating agency must provide a regulation for every possible occasion and circumstance Social intervention becomes a race between the ingenuity of the regulated and the loophole closing of the regulator, with a continuing expansion in the volume of regulations as the outcome" (pp 56–57)

A similar picture is presented in the Bardach and Kagan study of the enforcement process in regulation, *Going by the Book* (1982) Public interest groups pressure officials in regulatory agencies to impose and enforce certain rules and procedures Agency officials respond to this pressure in a typically bureaucratic fashion, by tightening the rules They come to orient their activities toward enforcement and away from informal consultation on how best to meet the goals of regulation Since there are inevitably gaps and inconsistencies in the rules, agency officials address these problems with se

ore rules and stricter enforcement. Due to publicity about these activities it politically more costly to relax the regulations than increase them Bardach nd Kagan summarize this process with the following metaphor "[W]e might ken these forces to a toothed ratchet wheel that allows regulation to turn ward greater stringency from time to time, but then locks it in place, preenting any downward movement except for an occasional notch or two hen political antiregulation pressures are intense" (pp 185–86)

Given these kinds of arguments about the growth and irreversibility of overnment regulation, the events of the past 10 or 15 years should have een completely unexpected in almost every year there has been significant eregulation of some important sector of the regulated economy, see Noll nd Owen (1983, p 4, table 1–1) In 1975, for example, the Securities and xchange Commission abolished fixed brokerage fees In 1978 the Airline eregulation Act was passed by Congress In 1980 statutes deregulating ascts of the trucking, rail, financial, and television industries were all aproved In 1982 the bus industry and additional segments of the banking instry were deregulated

In light of these plausible theories about the irreversibility of regulation, hat accounts for these instances of deregulation? Our central argument is at regulatory regimes are inherently unstable Theories of the spread of egulation are theories of an instability which impels the system toward ore regulation We argue, however that political economic, and legal rces can sometimes tip an unstable regulatory regime toward *de*regulation

In part II we review previous explanations for deregulation In parts III nd IV we present our own explanation Part V illustrates our argument hrough reference to deregulation of the United States financial system nce this case was selected precisely because it provides support for our argument, we close in part VI by sketching out the limits of our argument in xplaining other cases of deregulation

II Explanations of Deregulation

There have been relatively few efforts to account for deregulation The most comprehensive and extensively developed of these, *The Politics of Deregulation* (1985) by Martha Derthick and Paul J Quirk, will be our basic oint of reference

Derthick and Quirk focus their attention on the airline, trucking, and telecommunications industries They choose these cases in part because of the ubstantial deregulation that has taken place in these industries Their real nterest in these three cases, however, is due to the fact that in each case the egulated interests strenuously opposed deregulation but were defeated Cases like these, as Derthick and Quirk put it, raise "the highly significant heoretical question of how particularistic, well-organized interests can

successfully be subordinated to diffuse, far more encompassing, but ill organized interests We seek above all to specify the conditions and pro cesses by which this occurred in a set of important cases" (p. 13)

Derthick and Quirk stress the role of several different factors in accounting for deregulation in their three industries One factor involved the power of "new" ideas about the costs of regulation and the benefits of competition In the 1960s and 1970s scholars in law schools, university economic depart ments, and independent think tanks produced books and papers establishing an intellectual foundation for deregulation Economists working in this tradi tion took jobs with federal agencies and subsequently conducted studies demonstrating the benefits of deregulation In this way deregulation became a respectable idea in the regulatory political network

A second factor involved the efforts of political entrepreneurs to publicize the costs of regulation and the benefits of deregulation This was especiall important for airline deregulation In 1975 Senator Edward Kennedy, for ex ample, initiated a series of hearings on airline regulation and in so doin brought the issue of deregulation to the attention of Congress and th broader public

A third factor involved the fact that presidents Ford and Carter, infl enced by the work of the economists, by the increasing public attention pa to the issue and by macroeconomic management concerns appointed pr ponents of deregulation to regulatory agencies such as the Civil Aeronaut Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission A fourth factor involv the fact that these presidential appointees to the regulatory agencies h legal authority to drastically alter regulatory policies without the formal a proval of Congress

In Derthick and Quirk's account, then this combination of favorable a pointments, legal authority a rich and persuasive intellectual foundation f deregulation, and considerable publicity led regulatory agencies to prom gate procompetitive rules The economic interests affected by these d regulatory moves were brought, often against their wishes into the new pr competitive regime Even Congress came along, if somewhat reluctant after the commissions had initiated the movement Indeed, subgovernm resistance never materialized to the extent that might have been expect from the traditional theories of regulatory politics But even when su governments did mobilize in opposition, they seldom were successful converting economic resources to political use" (p 245)

We will not, for the most part, criticize Derthick and Quirk's explanati for deregulation in the airline, trucking, and telecommunications industri But in focusing their analysis on just three cases—as puzzling and importa as these cases may be—the question must be raised of how general th conclusions are

One of these conclusions is to reject what they call "the economic the

politics " This theory, they contend, "places nearly exclusive emphasis on pursuit of self-interest as the motive of political action" (p. 20) and there-e misses important aspects of political relationships. Derthick and Quirk ticize studies by economists such as MacAvoy (1979) and Eads (1982) ich suggest that technological advances and changes in economic condi-ns led to disparities in competitive positions within and outside the regu-ed industries. These disparities, it was implied, created political pressures deregulation But for airline, trucking, and telecommunications de-gulation, Derthick and Quirk maintain that "this general approach to ex-ining deregulation is unappealing and unpersuasive because there is very le evidence that any of the parties putatively having an economic stake in regulation in fact asked for it or, at any rate, engaged in enough political ivity to have much effect on the outcome" (p 21) The study of deregula- by economists Noll and Owen (1983, ch 2, 9) likewise ascribes de-ulation more to the kinds of political and intellectual factors discussed by rthick and Quirk than to economic forces

rguments presented by Eads (1982), however, deserve more careful con-eration Eads served on President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers n June 1979 to January 1981, he was active in regulatory reform issues l chaired the administration's Regulatory Analysis Review Group Eads wnplays the significance of the role that economists and other intellectual ocates of deregulation played in the deregulatory movement As one of participants he "admits to a certain amount of ambivalence in attacking s myth It is flattering to be told we had such power But a myth it cer-nly is" (p 3) He argues instead that "economic regulation failed—or was ceived to have failed—virtually across the board He maintains that the ncies could not cope with structural changes in technology increases in tor prices (especially energy and capital) and economic growth He esses that this structural change "rearranged the 'winners and losers thin the existing regulatory coalitions generated new potential entrants, ated an environment of customer dissatisfaction with the service being eived, and put customers in a frame of mind to try nontraditional services m nontraditional firms" (p 4)

Eads' argument about the importance of the larger economic context of regulated industries will be a central element of our essay, which will plore deregulation of the financial industry Our view of financial de-ulation is that economic, technical and legal changes in and around the ustry led to altered positions toward the regulatory status quo *within* the ncial industry and generated competitors to the status quo *outside* the in-stry Self-interested political pressures for some deregulation were thus erated both within and outside the regulated industries Moreover, once rtial deregulation occurred, it set in motion forces for further deregula-. This is what we will call the "deregulatory snowball " Interestingly,

Derthick and Quirk (1985, p. 203) hint in passing that something like a deregulatory snowball had occurred even in their cases: "As adopted by commissions and courts, policy change came in fits and starts, with no predictable schedule or end point . . . As the uncoordinated result of separate cases in separate forums, such policy change also contained no careful balancing of interests or equities, but rather imposed burdens on particular firms and industry segments almost randomly. Most importantly, policy change by the commissions and courts, instead of subsiding, accelerated." In the next two sections we develop the logic for this deregulatory snowball argument.

III. Instability in Cartels and in Regulatory Regimes

Important sectors of the U.S. economy have periodically experienced eras of intense competition. Affected firms have sometimes sought to mitigate the rigors of this competition by creating cartels to set prices and/or allocate quantities to be produced. However, private cartels generally proved unstable (even before they were declared illegal): they were occasionally formed but they generally didn't last.

A Private Cartel as a Prisoners' Dilemma Game

An important reason for this instability is that the payoffs a firm receives in a private cartel have the form of a prisoners' dilemma game (see McCloskey (1982, pp. 449–58), for example). Consider the payoffs in a banking cartel which restricts price competition over interest rates paid to savings account holders. If "Gotham Bank" and the other banks cooperate on a cartel price, all will receive "cartel profits." But assume Gotham cheats on the cartel price by offering a somewhat higher interest rate to its savings account holders. In so doing it can attract a larger share of savings deposits and invest these additional deposits in profitable investments. If it can do this without being detected, it can reap a "cheater's profit" above that of the loyal cartel members. These loyal members will consequently suffer a loss in market shares and profits. Once the other members detect Gotham's cheating, however, they may be forced to compete by raising their interest rates, thus giving each bank the lower "competitive profit." If Gotham Bank adheres to the cartel agreement but the other banks renege by offering higher interest rates, Gotham would be left with the "sucker's profit": the other banks all profit at its expense.

If the other banks all cooperate, Gotham is better off defecting since the cheater's profit is greater than the cartel profit it otherwise gains. If the other banks all defect, Gotham is still better off defecting since the competitive profit is greater than the sucker's profit. Hence no matter what other banks

, each bank will be better off by violating the cartel agreement. Since all ayers face this same structure of payoffs, they all have an incentive to de- ct, and the cartel may well collapse. While our depiction of a voluntary rtel focuses just on a single time period and presumes that cheating can be tected, this simple model can account for why voluntary industrial cartels ve generally collapsed. The MacAvoy (1965) study of the collapse of rail- ad industry cartels in the late 1800s is compatible with this explanation of rtel instability.

overnment Regulation as a Solution to the Cartel's Prisoners' Dilemma

ll the firms find voluntary agreements difficult to maintain, a government ency may serve as an enforcer of price and entry restrictions and thereby bilize the cartel It has generally been supposed that this solution is politi- y stable The regulated firms presumably benefit from price stability and trictions on entry The regulatory agency presumably has an incentive to y its role of cartel enforcer While agency officials do not earn any of the ulting cartel's profits in the normal sense (with the exception of any "re- lving door" between agencies and private industry) they do gain valuable ies—the regulated firms—in their relations with Congress and the presi- nt These mutual alliances thus maintain policies which support the prof- bility of the regulated industries

e Potential Instability of the Regulatory Solution

While the conventional wisdom is that these government-enforced cartels ll last for a long time, any political equilibrium is unstable and can be up- . Consider the effects of technological and economic changes in the regu- ed industry If the regulated industry is relatively homogeneous the gulatory agency will try to adapt its policies to the new circumstances in a y which treats each firm equitably But since properly calibrating the new gulations is not easy, the new regulations may have unanticipated conse- ences which some firms will exploit until the regulators can respond If industry is heterogeneous, the agency faces a more difficult problem of commodating individual differences, since some firms may benefit from y new rules while others may be hurt (James 1983) With continuing eco- mic and technological change the agency may find itself in a continuing ch-up game

A further complication is due to the multiple dimensions of regulation In gulated industries such as banking, product lines, prices, and geographic ation of services are all regulated It is reasonable to think that some firms ll have stronger product lines but poorer geographic locations, for ex- ple, while other firms will have weaker product lines but better geo-

graphic locations If changes in the environment affect only one of these dimensions, a regulatory attempt to "equalize" the status of firms on that dimension may lead to inequalities among the firms on the other dimensions, especially if some firms are more constrained by regulations on one dimension than on another The disadvantaged firms may thus find themselves in a situation where either more regulation or less regulation is better than continuing the status quo

Even more threatening to regulatory stability is economic or technological change which produces a competitor on some unregulated fringe of the industry This new competitor may be able to take business away from the regulated firms by undercutting their price or by offering services which they cannot offer The regulated firms here are even worse off than firms in a voluntary cartel because they are not allowed to respond to the competitor by lowering their (regulated) prices. It may be only through cumbersome and time-consuming changes in regulations or statutes that the classical cartel response to a defector—lowering prices—can be made The regulated firms may thus become more and more desperate for either an extension of regulation to the competitor or a relaxation of regulations so that they can compete

The Regulatory Response to Instability

There are two possible responses to this instability The response less disruptive of the established regulatory regime is to extend regulation to the new technologies or markets or, where appropriate, to outside competitors The classic example here occurred in the 1930s when the Interstate Commerce Commission's transportation regulations were extended to the trucking industry, which had come to be a major competitor of the ICC-regulated railroad industry This case involved both outside competition and new technology (high quality roads and large, long distance trucks) not available at the time the regulatory regime for the railroads was established, see Childs (1985)

Extension of regulation to trucking was in good part a consequence of the Depression The numerous and intensely competitive truckers had originally opposed regulatory extension But by 1932–1933 they found themselves in a situation of severe excess capacity made worse by the Depression In addition, state governments had developed an inconsistent array of trucking regulations which made interstate trucking difficult The organization that later became the American Trucking Association began supporting extension of federal regulatory laws to trucking By setting prices and limiting entry those truckers who had not yet gone bankrupt could be protected, the consistency and coherence of federal regulation could also reduce the administrative costs of interstate trucking The railroad industry had preferred the

[ex]tension of regulations all along, since the competition from the trucking [in]dustry was reducing its profitability

Aiding the two industries' inclination to extend regulation was the climate [of] public and intellectual opinion toward markets that developed during the [D]epression It was widely felt that competitive markets had contributed to [th]e onset of the Depression As a consequence, markets were publicly dis[cr]edited as coordination and resource allocation devices For example, on [th]e occasion of passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which extended the [IC]C's regulations to trucking, ICC Commissioner Joseph Eastman remarked [I]t is believed that the experience of the past, not only with the railroads but [wi]th all industry, and not only in this country but in other parts of the world, [sh]ows which course to take We relied upon free competition as the means of [pu]blic protection, and the result was bankrupt and unsafe railroads bad labor [co]nditions, flagrant favoritism in rates with the benefit going to the big ship[pe]r and the big community, and an uncertainty and instability which were [de]moralizing to industry in general" (quoted in Alexis, 1983 pp 120–21)

There is no inevitability, however, to this kind of governmental response [to] instability in a regulatory regime In 1935 the truckers favored regulation. [On]ly a few years before they had opposed extension of regulation to them[se]lves If the economic environment had developed differently would regu[la]tion necessarily have been extended? We cannot answer that question for [th]e 1930s, but the evidence of the 1970s and 1980s suggests that other re[sp]onses are possible

IV The Deregulatory Snowball

Extension of regulation may prove politically difficult for several reasons [Fi]rst, we would normally expect a successful outside competitor to oppose [ex]tension of regulation to itself as did the trucking industry prior to the De[pr]ession The competitor is earning cheaters profits, while the regulated [fir]ms must make do with the lower cartel profits The competitor therefore [ha]s little incentive to favor the extension of regulation

A second reason extension of regulation may be difficult stems from the [ge]neral state of the economy If inflation is rising and productivity is falling, [as] in the 1970s, macroeconomic managers may develop preferences for de[re]gulation as a general, macroeconomic policy prescription The president [po]litical parties, public interest groups, and the news media may all support [de]regulation or, at the least, oppose its further extension for majoritarian [eco]nomic and political reasons A third reason, stressed by Derthick and [Qu]irk, involves the general intellectual climate and public opinion toward [ma]rkets As mentioned in the discussion of trucking, in the 1930s it was mar[ke]ts which had been discredited, whereas by the 1970s and 1980s it was gov[er]nmental management which was being called into question

A fourth reason involves the fact that court decisions may protect the new competitors This happened in telecommunications when a 1977 federal court decision—*MCI Telecommunications Corp v. F C C* (see Derthick and Quirk, pp 68, 192–93)—legalized MCI's entrance into the long-distance telephone market Similarly, a combination of economic pressures and legal challenges accounted for some of the Securities and Exchange Commission's deregulation of the fixed commission rates charged by brokerage firms. Stoll (1981, p 45) argues here, for example, that deregulation "has resulted from underlying economic forces that were undermining fixed rates anyway And in part it has resulted from direct legal challenges of the fixed commission by individual citizens and the Justice Department " Thus under the right circumstances, legal gains of outside competitors may make it difficult for the regulatory commission to restore the status quo ante

If extending regulation is legally difficult or politically impossible, and maintaining the status quo is also untenable or undesirable for the regulated firms, their only recourse is to press for deregulation The regulatory agency officials, responsible for (among other things) industry profitability, may likewise come to feel that an easing of the rules is necessary

Initial moves are not likely to entail wholesale deregulation But these initial moves may not affect regulated firms equally Disadvantaged firms, or those which anticipate greater opportunities in a deregulated regime, may press for further deregulation This anticipation appears to have been the cause of United Airlines shift in favor of further deregulation in the airline industry after several CAB-initiated deregulatory actions United felt it was not being allowed by the CAB to have its fair share of airline traffic, and Noll and Owen (1983 p 33) note that United perceived itself to be in a strong growth position compared with other carriers " It ultimately decided could do better under deregulation

Initial deregulatory efforts may center on only one of the several dimensions of regulation such as product, entry, or geographical restrictions But as already noted, fostering equal competition on only one dimension may make it difficult for some firms to participate effectively on the still-regulated dimensions For the disadvantaged firms deregulation of these other dimensions may be necessary In this way once partial deregulation is begun in a arena of multidimensional competition, pressures may mount for further deregulation of other dimensions

Even if deregulation gets underway, however one should not necessarily expect all firms to support further deregulation at the same time With deregulation proceeding by stages, one should expect to find each firm feeling at times advantaged and at times disadvantaged by further steps For example, if an outside competitor gets established, it might be in the competitor's best interest not only to oppose extension of regulation to itself but also to oppose deregulation of the still-regulated segments of the industry

ICI Telecommunications Corporation was for several years able to undert AT&T's long-distance telephone rates because of the FCC-mandated inexibility of AT&T's pricing structure With deregulation, however, MCI ow faces stiff competition from AT&T as the price differential between longstance rates for the two firms narrows (*Business Week*, 1986a) Indeed, for ese reasons MCI is currently having to cut back its capital investment ans (*Business Week*, 1986c)

Nonetheless, if the status quo is undesirable for some important segments the industry, and if extension of regulation—"reregulation"—is not feable, regulatory authorities may still feel that continued deregulation is the ly possible course to take Thus if deregulation is initiated at all, it may be ficult to stop the deregulatory snowball will have begun to roll downhill, d the final point of equilibrium may entail almost no regulation at all

V DEREGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY

he existence of a deregulatory snowball depends on technological economic, or legal change which makes the status quo untenable for at least ne regulated firms The snowball also depends on the presence of forces ich rule out extension of regulation favor deregulation or both Deulation of the financial industry met these conditions Indeed it provides ost vivid illustration of the deregulatory snowball

e Financial Regulatory Regime

he regulatory system governing the banking and securities industries established in response to a series of financial panics between 1873 and 1930s The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was passed primarily as a response to the financial panics of 1873 and especially, 1907 (West, 1983, 362) The McFadden Act of 1927 had the effect of banning interstate bank. Banks which crossed state lines now had to be subject to the banking s of each state and no state allowed outside banks to open branches in its ritory

he most extensive federal regulations were established in response to the ancial panic which contributed to the Depression of the 1930s Bank profstem primarily from the "spread" between interest payments banks owe deposits and the interest return they receive on loans they make Prior to 3 banks had faced strong interest-rate competition for deposits which ouraged them to make riskier loan investments in order to maintain the ead

ollowing passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 restrictions were imed on the services banks could offer and on the prices they could charge nks were prohibited from underwriting stock offerings The Act thereby

separated investment and commercial banking practices. It also gave the Federal Reserve Board authority to regulate interest payments on deposits. The exercise of this power through "Regulation Q" set low ceilings on interest payments on savings deposits and banned interest payments on demand deposits (checking accounts). The purpose of this regulation was to guarantee banks a cheap source of funds, so that their loans could be made at a lower, and less risky, rate of interest.

The Glass-Steagall restrictions on price and product, combined with the McFadden Act's restrictions on geographic location, made banking one of the most heavily regulated industries in the country. Three federal agencies were given responsibility for regulating banks: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks, the Federal Reserve Board which regulates bank holding companies and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which regulates national banks and most state banks, as well as insuring deposits in them. Several federal agencies regulate the thrift institutions. For example, savings and loans associations (S&Ls), which traditionally have specialized in mortgage lending for housing, are regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and deposits are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Finally, fifty state banking agencies regulate state banks not covered by federal agencies.

These regulations produced numerous local clusters of banks around the country which were relatively protected from competition. State regulatory agencies constructed barriers to entry within the state, and the federal Office of the Comptroller, which grants national bank charters, approved only about half the applications to start new banks (Lehman, 1985, p. 61; Peltzman, 1968). State regulators prohibited not only the intrusion of outside banks into their territories but also the spread of big city banks to other regions in the same state. Local banks thus faced limited competition: outsiders could not enter their geographic domain and the interest rate they might offer to consumers was fixed by Regulation Q.

As a consequence of the financial regulations, features characteristic of cartels began to emerge. Under the regulated regime, banks and S&Ls achieved exceptionally high profit margins compared to other comparably sized industries (Cargill and Garcia, 1982, p. 17). High profit margins were combined with a low probability of business failure. Between 1944 and 19[illegible] fewer than ten banks failed per year in the United States (Cargill and Garcia, p. 10). The 1980 passage of a major banking deregulation statute (discussed below) shows the importance of the these regulatory protections. In 1981 [illegible] banks failed, in 1984, 79 failed. By 1985 a record 997 banks and 434 S&Ls appeared on the regulators' list of troubled institutions (*Fortune*, 198[illegible], p. 74). Similarly, the FDIC processed $9 billion in bank failures through 1980. From 1981 to 84 it processed $30 billion worth of failing banks.

Finally, the interest rate ceilings led to non-price competition similar to at found in the airlines prior to deregulation While airlines had offered ncier meals and bigger seats, banks began using their excess funds from heap deposits "in the form of higher operating costs, especially in branching perations" (Cargill and Garcia, pp 15–16) After interest rate ceilings via egulation Q were applied to S&Ls in 1966, the S&L's after-tax income rose arron (1983, p 71, see also citations in his fn 2) reports that the S&Ls used is extra income "to raise salaries, hire more employees, and construct new fices for themselves " During the era of deposit rate ceilings for S&Ls, expenses grew faster than assets by one-third (Carron, pp 71–72)

Thus during the post–Depression period a cartel-like regime with state d federal regulatory agencies acting as the enforcers was maintained gher profits, stability in prices and bankruptcies barriers to entry and owth in inefficient operating expenses characterized the financial industry

ange in the Environment of Financial Institutions

In the 1960s and 1970s several developments made it difficult for reguors to maintain this status quo The initial challenge came through develments that undermined the impact of Regulation Q's restrictions on the erest paid on checking and savings deposits These developments inded the growth in the Eurodollar market (explained below) interbank rrowing of funds electronic transfers of funds and the invention of other ancial instruments outside the regulatory scope of Regulation Q

ronically, the Fed itself provided the initial impetus for the banks efforts undermine Regulation Q In the late 1960s the Federal Reserve's money arm known as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) became cerned about the inflationary potential of the Vietnam war and the grow domestic expenditures for social welfare The FOMC decided to squeeze dit out of the banking system this would slow the growth in the economy d also reduce the pressure on prices The FOMC did this in 1966 and 1969 raising the discount rate (the rate the Fed charges member banks for ns), thereby increasing other interest rates in the financial system

But while other interest rates went up, the Fed kept the rates on savings checking accounts low via Regulation Q Consequently savers and invess removed their money from the low-interest savings and demand deposin banks (a process known as "disintermediation"), which was the inten of the Fed policy of restricting credit But the Fed had not anticipated t a large number of savers would put this withdrawn money into other ncial instruments such as treasury bills, large denomination certificates eposit (CDs), and commercial paper issued by private corporations This instrument in particular had the effect of circumventing the tight money cy of the Fed by allowing corporations to raise cash outside of banks

The outflow of funds into CDs caused a further problem. Prior to 1966 the Fed had used its authority to allow a rise in CD interest rates to accompany increases in the discount rate, even though this allowance tended to offset the tightening monetary effect of the discount rate rise. By 1969, however, given the growing inflation, the Fed decided to use Regulation Q to extend rate ceilings to include CDs. Banks thus faced even stronger pressures for disintermediation.

The squeeze on bank deposits, including CDs, led American banks to expand their borrowing of funds in the Eurodollar market in order to counteract disintermediation and still be able to make loans at home. The Eurodollar market consists of deposits in dollar denominations in banks outside the U.S. Foreign countries, foreign corporations, and investors made Eurodollar deposits because the dollar was the main form of international reserve currency. Regulation Q also induced private U.S. investors to switch their deposits to European banks to gain higher interest rates but retain the dollar denomination for convenience. Increasingly, domestic American banks borrowed Eurodollars from subsidiaries abroad in order to counter the effect of the Fed's tight money policy at home (Ritter and Silber, 1980, pp. 539–40). The inflow of Eurodollars undercut the effect of interest rate regulation through Regulation Q. In response, the Fed in 1974 was forced to deregulate large-size and longer-term CDs. The Fed hoped that higher, unregulated interest rates on CDs at home would reduce the American banks' propensity to borrow money abroad and that domestic savers would be enticed to keep their savings in domestic bank CDs.

Banks also began loaning money to each other at a lower interest rate, thus establishing the Federal Funds market by the late 1960s. The development of this market, plus the growing use of CDs as a source of funds, allowed banks to switch from a dependence on regulated, low-interest savings and checking accounts (asset management) to the development of a borrowing portfolio from other banks and investors (known as liability management) as a way of sustaining growth and profitability. Banks became less dependent on the Regulation Q-regulated deposits for obtaining money with which to make loans. They simply borrowed the money from brokerage houses, large investors, foreign subsidiaries, or through the big money center banks. Ultimately, this money market supplanted local bank branches (which took money from savings and checking accounts) as their major source of funds.

The electronic revolution offered further opportunities for evading Regulation Q. When the Fed deregulated large-size and longer-term CDs in the early 1970s, banks set up secondary markets in CDs through electronic transfers. A few days before the CDs became due, banks marketed them in the short-term at interest rates exceeding the Regulation Q ceiling. The short-term CD markets worked like demand deposits without price regulation. Banks also began to use electronic transfers to move funds from savings

d CD accounts into and out of demand deposit accounts at the beginning d end of each working day, thereby evading Regulation Q's ban on interest yments for demand deposits. In the late 1970s some banks even began in-lling automatic teller machines (ATMs) across state lines, arguing that se machines were not branches in the traditional sense and thereby did t fall under the McFadden Act. (For narratives on these developments see yer, 1974 and 1984.)

Throughout this period, then, banks developed technical and institutional truments which evaded the price regulation of Glass-Steagall and began ruding on the geographic regulation of McFadden Ritter and Silber 81, p. 214) note that "the effect of rate ceilings (price regulation) has be-e primarily the diversion of funds around the regulated areas and into e that are not yet regulated " Cargill and Garcia (1982, p. 12) also ob-ve, "The structure of the financial system that had been established by 1930s reform legislation became increasingly incompatible with the new ironment "

he single most important development occurred in 1973 with the oil em-o and the skyrocketing price of oil By 1980 the inflation rate had passed ercent Between the first oil embargo and 1980, interest rates rose from over the regulated price for deposits to almost double the official deposit . Banks were still paying only 5¼ percent interest on savings accounts e the money market rate of interest had already exceeded 10 percent by late 1970s Money in savings accounts was thus shrinking in real terms. rowing, and this was of course even more true for money in non-interest-ing checking accounts

e gap between official interest rates and real interest rates encouraged ank financial institutions to offer savings instruments which skirted the latory rules In 1972 the first money market mutual fund (MMMF) was blished In 1978 Merrill Lynch began offering a Cash Management Ac-t which approximated the liquidity of a full-fledged checking account, the account paid rates of interest far in excess of what banks could offer avings accounts Merrill Lynch's success encouraged other financial and erage houses to get into the act The resulting outflow of funds from the lated depository firms was dramatic In 1977 the MMMFs held only billion By 1979 they held $45 billion, and in 1980 over $60 billion. By they had reached $181 billion, and by 1982 these accounts held $223 n, an amount almost equal to half the nation's money supply at the time ns, 1984, p 444, Lehman, p 61, Cargill and Garcia, 1982, p 13) In (before the 1980 deregulation) 18 percent of all funds raised by the five st bank holding companies derived from demand deposits By 1982 this entage had dropped in half to 9 percent (*Business Week*, 1983, p 89)

e last factor affecting the profitability of banks and S&Ls was the out-of court suits by firms wishing to take advantage of loopholes in the

banking regulations In the early 1970s the Consumer Savings Bank of Massachusetts applied to the state regulatory agency for the right to offer checking account which paid interest, which it referred to as a negotiate order of withdrawal (NOW) account, see Meier (1985, pp. 60–61 for a fulle account) The state banking regulators turned down the request, but th bank sued the agency in state court, winning a favorable decision in 1972 Over the next five years authorization to offer interest-bearing checking ac counts was given to banks by state regulators in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and by act of Congress to banks in New York and the rest of New England in 1975 and 1978 Credit unions and S&Ls received similar au thority from their regulators in the mid-1970s

By the late 1970s these kinds of innovations allowed by the Federal Re serve, National Credit Union Administration, and Federal Home Loan Ban Board came under legal challenge These new kinds of services were break ing down the regulatory barriers between banks, S&Ls, and credit union which had been initially established in the 1930s under Glass-Steagall Eac was intruding on the turf of someone else The District of Columbia U S Court of Appeals combined the cases into a single case, *American Banker Association v Connell* considered in 1979 Rather than decide this case out right, the Appeals Court gave Congress until December 31, 1979, to autho rize share drafts by credit unions, remote service units by S&Ls, and auto matic transfer of funds by banks from savings accounts to cover checks draw on checking accounts The huge amount of investment already in these kin of accounts put great pressure on Congress to take some deregulatory acti instead of trying to turn back the clock (Meier 1985 pp 61–63)

In sum not only were some regulated banks acting as cheaters on th regulatory cartel through electronic transfers and liability management b outside competitors were draining away a large amount of money by offeri more favorable terms Only through extension of regulation to new instr ments within the regulatory regime as well as to outside competitors, cou the old regulatory regime be reestablished

The Regulatory Response

Some firms within the regulated financial industry did at first pressure th government to extend regulation to the outside competitors (Carron 198 p 70) For example, Meier (1985 p 60) reports that in 1980 "in response bank pressure" the Federal Reserve briefly imposed a 15 percent reser requirement on MMMFs but withdrew the rule when it became appar that the rule could be easily circumvented

S&Ls supported the retention and extension of Regulation Q restrictio to themselves, banks, and outsiders The reason was that without some go ernment action the S&Ls faced financial ruin They had always had few

antages under the regulatory regime than banks The separation of commercial banking from other forms of financial activity gave banks the exsive right to accept demand deposits Since checking accounts were not rest-bearing, this was a source of cheap money to which S&Ls did not e access Moreover, it was not until 1966 that S&Ls were covered by ulation Q, which meant that competition for savings accounts forced Ls to pay somewhat higher interest rates than did banks (It took S&L-ated court action in 1966 to get Regulation Q extended to themselves, as d, S&L profit margins improved noticeably thereafter) And S&Ls, ch were restricted in their authority to make short-term commercial s, had to concentrate on the long-term, fixed-interest housing mortgage ket If short-term rates went up, S&Ls faced a decrease in profit margins heir long-term loan portfolio Only if short-term rates declined, while -term rates stayed high, did S&Ls make substantial profits In conse- ce, therefore banks had had a consistently higher and less volatile t margin (Carron, 1983, pp 71–75) Other institutions were not as dis- ntaged as the S&Ls, however and did not wish to return to the previous ne

events developed the likelihood of extending regulatory controls to money market funds became dimmer and dimmer The MMMFs had me highly popular institutions large numbers of middle-class savers re- d how much interest they would lose by a return to the old regime Nor the newly established outside competitors political weaklings They rolled a significant proportion of the nations monetary assets and pro- d jobs and growth in many parts of the country Banks consequently orted the removal of Regulation Q so they could compete in the money ets The Federal Reserve also favored deregulation of interest rates be- it wanted to allow the interest rate to rise even further in its fight st the continuing inflation In addition the elements in the subgovern- which favored deregulation had a powerful ally in President Carter

1980 the Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and etary Control Act (DIDMCA). Meier (1985, pp 63–68) describes which ests supported what provisions Large banks for example wanted to be to compete with the MMMFs and so wanted Regulation Q removed ler banks preferred the status quo ante, keeping Regulation Q and elimi- g NOW accounts Larger S&Ls wanted to be allowed to offer checking nts and make a wider variety of loans The Act as ultimately passed ined numerous provisions for deregulating financial institutions the re- l of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings by 1986, the weakening of state y laws (higher interest rates were now allowed) the creation of NOW nts which permit interest payments and checking by banks credit s and S&Ls, permission for S&Ls to exercise greater flexibility in g mortgage loans, to offer consumer loans to hold commercial paper

and to offer credit cards. The 1980 Act thus opened the door for price co[m]petition among banks and other financial institutions It also encourag[ed] competition for deposits among S&Ls, banks, and credit unions.

However, the law did not stem the tide of disintermediation, growth money market funds outside banks continued In 1980 members of Congre[ss] had feared that the S&Ls would not survive full price deregulation betwe[en] banks and brokerage houses But the recession in 1982 had lowered intere[st] rates enough that S&Ls felt they could support further deregulatory move provided they were given more powers to compete against banks Congre subsequently passed the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act 1982 This act gave the S&Ls significant new powers to make short-ter[m] commercial, consumer, and equipment loans and to offer corporate checki[ng] accounts and overdraft checking (which allows funds to be transferred aut[o]matically from a savings account into a checking account to cover chec[ks] when needed) The Act also fully deregulated price competition betwe[en] brokerage money market funds and banks by allowing banks to offer Sup[er] NOW Accounts and money market demand accounts which paid mark[et] rates of interest and had checking privileges

By 1983 the money in nonbank MMMFs dropped for the first time, wh[ile] bank money market accounts soared to $375 billion The most serious thr[eat] to the regulatory regime had finally been met by allowing price competiti[on] Even so, an equilibrium was not yet achieved While banks succeeded [in] stopping the shift in market share to the investment houses, the remo[val] of Regulation Q made their cost of attracting funds much higher With[out] corresponding increases in the return on bank loans, the spread betw[een] costs and revenues declined, especially for the small and medium size ba[nks] (James, 1983, p 420) To maintain the spread many banks began to make [t] riskier loans which carried a higher interest rate Banks such as Michi[gan] National and Continental Illinois were tempted into high-risk oil lend[ing] through Penn Square operations in Oklahoma For some international ban[ks] foreign loans became a source of higher interest rate yet even more ri[sky] accounts It is estimated that in 1986, for example, U S banks had to w[rite] off $21 billion in bad debts (Koepp, 1987, p 72)

The rise in price competition drove many S&Ls into bankruptcy and [se]verely undermined the status of many others The Garn–St Germain [Act] allowed bank holding companies to purchase failing savings and loans ac[ross] state lines and permitted S&Ls to enter commercial lending on a mod[est] scale But these measures did not solve the kinds of pressures pushing further deregulation

Banks and S&Ls must now compete in price with other financial insti[tu]tions, but these other institutions do not labor under the product and [geo]graphic restrictions imposed by the McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts the companies which have begun to move into the financial services

ry, the most notable example is Sears, Roebuck, which bought both n Witter Reynolds to enter investment banking and Coldwell Banker to r real estate. Traditionally, banks have been prohibited by regulation nter either of these fields. Sears also owns a savings and loan company is now issuing a new national credit card The expansion of Sears into cial services is also encouraging imitators Merrill Lynch would like to r full-scale banking, as would American Express These firms, plus at ten other investment firms, now own some form of bank somewhere in country

further development placing banks at a disadvantage is the growing "se-ization" of loans Securitization refers to the process whereby traditional on mortgages and cars are repackaged into securities Using sophisti- computer programs to calculate a profitable bond interest rate, invest- firms such as Merrill Lynch buy multimillion dollar blocks of consumer and resell them as $1000 to $100,000 bond units Since 1984, about hird of all mortgages, or approximately $600 billion, have been re- ged into securities Because of Glass-Steagall, however, banks are pro- d from entering the profitable securitization market The consequence, e investment banker observed, is that "without loan selling and invest- banking products, the big banks will go the way of the dinosaur" (Koepp p 72)

e banks want what they term a "level playing field " They now have the playing field in price, but this also means that the competition in other sions has intensified geographic and product advantages allow other al institutions to bear the risk of price competition As a consequence an (1985, p 63) notes, banks have begun to lobby for changes in the dden and Glass-Steagall Acts "With bank deregulation by price in the big banks badly want deregulation by geography and by prod- they think that price deregulation has increased their risks which kinds of deregulation would spread and reduce " Cargill and Garcia) also observe that 'the legislation [the 1980 DIDMCA] deals only spe- lly with one of the three types of risks facing financial institutions. pressure for this reconsideration [of Glass-Steagall], comes not only the banking industry but also from the securities industry, which has ded the range of its services into the provision of MMMFs having me- of exchange and credit card features that have heretofore been the pre- of banks" (pp 65, 90)

e Glass-Steagall and McFadden Acts were intended to reduce the risks ncial collapses and lost savings of consumers But as Comptroller of the ncy Robert Clark recently remarked "It is ironic that many of the pro- ons that are supported in the name of bank safety and soundness have buted to an increase in the level of risk in the banking system" (Koepp, p 73). Since banks are prohibited from competing fully in all financial

services nationwide, their competitive position is eroding, which plac many banks, including even the large ones, at greater risk.

While these pressures have been building, the regulatory walls have con down in others areas as well. Banks have continued to place ATMs acro state lines. Banks have also used a loophole in the law to set up what a known as "nonbank banks" across state lines. The law defines a bank as a institution that takes deposits and makes commercial loans. Banks started e tablishing institutions in other states that did either one but not both of the things. In a similar vein, New York's Citibank has convinced the South D kota legislature to allow the bank to set up credit card operations in So Dakota; the bank also convinced the legislature in Maryland to allow it expand banking facilities there in order to create jobs.

Further affecting the status of the older banks is a June 1985 Supre Court decision, *Northeast Bancorp vs. The Board of Governors of the F eral Reserve System*, which rejected a suit by Citibank, Northeast Banco and Union Trust Company against states that had tried to keep natio banks out of regional compacts. The decision permitted banks in clust of states to merge while still keeping out the giant New York banks. McFadden Act had previously ruled out these regional mergers. For the f time, then, a bank in Ohio, for example, might merge with a bank i Michigan to form a multi-state, regional bank. The result has been a d matic growth in the assets and stock values of regional banks and an inc ing pressure on the giant banks to pursue geographic deregulation (*Busi Week*, 1986b). The economic pressure for giant banks to expand geogra cally will increase as the regional banks grow.

The 1971 Report of the President's Commission on Financial Struc and Regulation warned against piecemeal and sequential measures of regulation. The Report favored a comprehensive reform because its aut believed that "piece-meal adoption of the recommendations raises the ger of creating new and greater imbalances" (quoted in Cargill and G 1982, p. 23). In other words, the Report expressed the view that it w be difficult to go only halfway in deregulation because partial moves w create new pressures for further change.

This is precisely what happened in the financial industry deregulati the financial industry has come to have all the features of our deregul snowball. Economic and technological change, coupled with important decisions, reduced the value of the regulatory status quo for many regu firms and provided outside competitors with incentive and opportun enter the industry. Initial changes in regulations put pressure on other lations, and these too were modified. Still other regulations now be critical, and pressure to modify these has been building. Thus once it sta moving, the deregulatory snowball has been steadily rolling downhill ing up momentum as it goes.

VI Conclusion

regulation of the financial industry nicely illustrates our deregulatory ball argument. The question remains as to how general an explanation regulation it is In this section we sketch out a series of hypotheses t the conditions under which one should expect a regulatory regime to nstable. We will include in the analysis an evaluation of financial de- tion as well as deregulation in Derthick and Quirk's telecommunica- trucking, and airline industries

r first hypothesis refers to the prisoners' dilemma payoffs faced by ted firms.

othesis 1 Each firm in a regulated industry has an incentive to act in a which undermines the regulatory regime's stability

xt two hypotheses consider the role of technological and economic which we have discussed at length for the financial industry

othesis 2 The greater the technological changes which affect relation- s among firms and between firms and their customers, the greater the latory regime's instability

othesis 3 The greater the economic changes which affect relationships ng firms and between firms and their customers the greater the regu- y regime's instability

our emphasis has been on the role of technological and economic , it seems clear that a third relatively autonomous factor—changes in ctrines due to court decisions—also played a role in changing the uo, and thus changed firms views on the desirability of maintaining us quo Hence

thesis 4 The greater the legal changes which affect relationships g firms and between firms and their customers the greater the regu- y regime's instability

ges in the technological economic, and legal environments—hy- s 2, 3, and 4—clearly played a role in deregulation of the financial y. As for hypothesis 1, we might rest our case by citing the comment r (1985, p 62), in a discussion of the McFadden and Glass-Steagall at " the politics of banking since the depression is a history of s to circumvent these barriers "

elecommunications regulatory regime has also had instabilities which ve been predicted by the hypotheses Derthick and Quirk argue e political activity of the new competitors followed from the Federal nications Commission's grant of competitive rights rather than being e of them" (p 23) The authors are certainly correct about the role

that FCC decisions and court rulings played, these are among the kind actions which can upset an unstable regulatory equilibrium. But prior te nological change also contributed to these events since the ability to c struct a relatively inexpensive microwave repeater network gave MCI e nomic and technological entrée to the long-distance telephone market

Other kinds of economic and technological change affected AT&T's a tude toward deregulation A rapidly growing communications market volves international communications networks for corporations which n to move large bodies of data around the globe However, a 1956 Cons Decree requiring that AT&T limit its business to common carriage ha pered AT&T's ability to enter the information age with advanced commu cations products

Furthermore, in order to nurture competition, the FCC gave MCI a other fledgling long-distance carriers large discounts on connection fees to cal phone networks Given that these fees are the major cost in providing lo distance service, the connection cost gap between MCI and AT&T—at point this gap was as large as 70%—put AT&T at an economic disadvanta

Although AT&T originally fought the Justice Department suit that ev tually forced divestiture, the company's willingness to reach a settlement 1982) revealed a mixed set of incentives The proposed breakup of AT meant that it would lose its monopoly over long distance, where competi would be allowed, as well as over local telephone service, which woul under the control of the newly-independent regional telephone compa (formerly AT&T subsidiaries) But divestiture would also allow AT&T to ter the computer communications industry entry into which it had been nied under the regulatory regime Apparently AT&T's management cam the conclusion that being barred from computer communications was costly than losing a monopoly on telephone service As Derthick and Q themselves remark, "AT&T, which unlike its competitors was still l barred from important markets would have the most to gain from the ex sion [of telecommunications competition] By adjusting the provisions number of specific issues, the proposals for a wide-open procompetitiv icy could be designed to strike a cautious political balance or could ev tilted toward AT&T (p 193)

Hence we would argue that regulatory regime instability (hypoth and the importance of technological, economic and legal changes (hyp ses 2, 3, and 4) also played important roles in telecommunications de tion Noll and Owen (1983) summarize our case nicely initial decis allow some competition "had unanticipated consequences rather like ing a genie from a bottle The prospect of competitive entry, even fringes of the industry attracted a variety of entrants as well as a rich competitive (and anticompetitive) responses by AT&T Within a few the boundary between natural monopoly and competition becam nically and economically indistinct and legally arbitrary (p 157)

garding the trucking industry, it is widely agreed, as Alexis (1983, 9) puts it, that "trucking is an inherently competitive industry, entry are low, significant economies of scale have not been found, and small medium firms compete successfully with much larger ones." At least in ry, then, trucking should have the instability suggested in hypothesis 1 more than, say, the airline or telecommunications industries A direct ator that there was indeed the potential for instability comes in Alexis' nt (1983, pp. 121–27) of the ICC's increasing relaxation of rules gov- g rates and entry In particular, Alexis notes that "whereas applications ew entry in 1970 were running at about 2,500 per year by 1979 they nearly ten times that level The resources of the commission were severely strained to process all the new applications, trucking firms rushing in to take advantage of the new liberalized entry policy No one how long it would last" (p 124) As if to highlight the difference be- collective interest and individual advantage, Alexis states in the very entence that "the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters united in opposition to the commission's new directions" (pp 124–25) s not appear to us that changes in the technological, economic and environment can account for the initiation of deregulation here None- s, the rapid expansion in route authority granted to numerous carriers have made it difficult for Congress to restore the status quo ante in 980 deregulation statute and has contributed to pressures for further ulation

deregulation of the airline industry, the instability of regulatory re- suggested by hypothesis 1 also seems to have played a significant role ences in the interests of the major carriers made it difficult for them to blish some regulatory equilibrium (short of complete deregulation) he CAB had initiated its procompetitive reforms in 1975 Derthick and (pp. 151–64) point out that because the major trunk carriers were to agree on any particular set of proposals for partial deregulation political position was greatly weakened during the ensuing legislative le over deregulation While the authors cite the airlines inability to on a common strategy as evidence which contradicts an 'economic of politics," we would argue that the airlines' inability to agree on imited form of deregulation is precisely what hypothesis 1 suggests at might be predicted by a sufficiently sophisticated economic theory ics.

well do hypotheses 2 3, and 4 fare with airline deregulation? Stan- counts of the airline industry and its deregulation suggest to us that ere was considerable technological change (involving, for example, sition from piston engines to jet engines), these changes neither the relationships among the airlines appreciably nor changed the ships of the airlines to their customers. The major impact of the in- speed and declining per-passenger costs was probably to draw pas-

sengers from other modes of transportation, from the railroad and bus industries

Economic changes—the inflation of the 1960s and the 1970s and the rapid increase in fuel prices due to OPEC—may have had a greater impact on the airline industry MacAvoy (1979) shows that the economic fortunes of regulated industries, including airlines, had declined in the 1970s compared to other sectors of the economy The poorer performance of the regulated industries arose in part from the manner in which the regulatory agencies made decisions on price changes The agencies typically used average historical costs over the previous ten to fifteen years to set the allowable price increase for the next year Since in the 1970s average historical costs lagged significantly behind sharp increases in current costs (which were due to inflation), the price increases allowed did not cover current cost increases While these cost increases affected all the major airlines and did not create life threatening competitive imbalances among them, the increases may have weakened the airlines resistance to deregulation by the CAB

One factor which may have reduced the potentially destabilizing impact technological and economic change in the airline industry involved the relatively low degree of heterogeneity among the major carriers Although Derthick and Quirk do argue that there was some diversity of interests in the airline industry, the major carriers and their affiliated unions were generally considered to be the most important actors, and it seems fair to say that there was a relatively low degree of heterogeneity of interest and opinion among them Had there been a greater heterogeneity of interest, we expect there would have been more pressure from inside the industry for deregulation

For telecommunications deregulation, on the other hand, there was greater heterogeneity of interest among AT&T, MCI, IBM and other potential entrants into the industry For deregulation of the banking industry there was likewise considerable heterogeneity among the firms involved in and attracted to, banking Hence the following hypothesis seems compatible with evidence from the telecommunications, airline and financial deregulation cases

> *Hypothesis* 5 The greater the heterogeneity among the regulated firms and their customers, the greater the regulatory regime's instability

Meier (1985, pp 11–12) briefly mentions the importance of this kind of heterogeneity, see also Posner (1974, p 345)

One factor not yet explicitly discussed seems central to the continued instability in the financial industry It involves the easy transferability —the *fungibility*—of money, the central product of the financial industry We suspect that this fungibility quickens and sharpens the impact both of changes in the economic and technological environment of regulated firms and of the regulations governing the firms Hence

ypothesis 6. The more fungible the regulated industry's products, the eater the regulatory regime's instability.

e rapid and massive outflow of resources due to changes in economic technological conditions (from banks and S&Ls into the money market al funds) was perhaps uniquely characteristic of the financial industry Meier (1985, p. 48) remarks, "The market for money closely resembles economists' free market, money flows to individuals who will pay the est price (interest) for a given level of risk " In none of the cases which hick and Quirk discuss—airlines, trucking, telecommunications—could have been as vast and rapid a change in the assets of the regulated . Capital investments in airplanes, trucks, and telecommunications ment simply cannot be transferred hither and yon and converted into kinds of resources as easily as can money Due to this fungibility of rces, then, we suspect that the deregulatory snowball rolled downhill te much faster than would have occurred in the other industries

se first six hypotheses assert that, under particular conditions, regula- egimes will be unstable If the specified conditions are absent, one expect to see long periods of stability (at least if broad political forces le the regulatory subgovernment do not change appreciably) The con- onal wisdom about the stability of regulatory subgovernments may thus e wrong so much as simply derived from observations made in periods dest technological, economic, and legal change Indeed, as one referee , the pace of technological change may itself be a function of the regu- regime, economists have frequently remarked that regulatory agen- often retard the introduction of new technologies in their regulated tries

t even if the preconditions for instability are present, the hypotheses ly assert that the regulatory regime will be unstable they say nothing what direction—reregulation or deregulation—the unstable regime t take We mentioned at the beginning of part IV several factors that t impel an unstable regulatory regime toward deregulation rather than sion of regulation majoritarian interests in deregulation for macro- omic reasons, a general intellectual and public climate favoring use of etitive markets to regulate activities of business firms, court decisions make reregulation difficult, and resistance by an outside competitor uspect that the source of instability in a regulatory regime is particularly rtant It is especially difficult to extend regulation when new com- ors are able to establish themselves on the fringes of the regulatory e

e case of the financial industry is relevant here Meier (1985, see p 56 ample) documents instances, all prior to the 1970s, in which banks at- ted to exploit loopholes in banking regulations In each case Congress he regulatory agencies ultimately closed the exploited loopholes But

the rise of the money market mutual funds—*outside* the banking industry offering market rates of interest made it essentially impossible to restore the status quo ante. Eads (1982) makes a similar argument about telecommunications deregulation: "The alternative, going back to the *status quo ante*, where [AT&T] had the entire telecommunications show to itself . . . is politically infeasible both because it sacrifices the benefits of competition in long-distance service and in the equipment market and because it would put the politically potent new telecommunications companies out of business" (p. 22). Hence the evidence would tend to support

Hypothesis 7: The more that outside firms are able to enter a regulated industry, the less likely the old regulatory regime can be extended to new competitors.

The obvious counterexample is the extension of the ICC's regulatory regime to the trucking industry in the 1930s. But this case is somewhat unusual for reasons we have already mentioned, chief among them being the fact that the trucking industry ultimately came to favor extension of regulation to itself.

Overall, it is probably fair to say that the seven hypotheses are best supported by the financial deregulation case. The telecommunications, airline, and trucking cases provide somewhat less support. While the instability of regulatory regimes played important roles in these cases, there were fewer manifestations of a deregulatory snowball in the telecommunications industry, and fewer yet in the airline and trucking industries. Yet we do think we have made a case for the continuing relevance of the "economic theory of politics" which Derthick and Quirk were inclined to dismiss. Economic actors may not have been clamoring en masse for deregulation, but the interests of individual firms led (for the financial and telecommunications industries) to destabilization of a long-standing regulatory regime, to an inability to agree on a united front against the deregulators (in the case of the airlines), and to a rapid exploitation of the relaxed rules on entry and price (in the case of trucking).

Any more general theory of deregulation will have to take into account these kinds of factors. This is not to say, however, that the stress which Derthick and Quirk placed on the "politics of ideas" (as they title their concluding chapter) is in any way misguided; our arguments do not contradict this important dimension. Our analysis is also quite undeveloped with regard to the impact of institutional rules on the strategies of economic and political actors; for an excellent paper in which this line of argument is extensively developed for the trucking industry see Rothenberg (1987). Furthermore, we did not extend our arguments to cases of social regulation—health, safety, and environmental regulation—although we believe the same kind of regulatory instability exists there as with economic regulation for ...

’ dilemma interpretation of social regulation, for example, see Scholz
)

ore general theory of deregulation, therefore, may well subsume what ave presented here, what Derthick and Quirk have accomplished, and other scholars have advanced. A more general theory may also provide ars with the opportunity to test propositions in a more rigorous com- ive analysis of a broader set of cases of deregulation.

REFERENCES

Marcus 1983 The Political Economy of Federal Regulation of Surface Transportation oger G Noll and Bruce M Owen eds *The Political Economy of Deregulation* Wash on, DC American Enterprise Institute

h, Eugene, and Robert Kagan 1982 *Going by the Book The Problem of Regulatory asonableness* Philadelphia Temple University Press

in, Marver H 1955 *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* Princeton ceton University Press

Week 1983 The Revolution in Financial Services November 28 88–99

1986a The Long Distance Warrior February 17 86–94

1986b Bankings Balance of Power is Tilting toward the Regionals April 7 56 73

1986c MCI The Long-Distance Runner Stumbles December 15 31

Thomas F, and Gillian G Garcia 1982 *Financial Deregulation and Monetary Con Historical Perspective and Impact of the 1980 Act* Stanford Hoover Institution Press

Andrew S 1983 The Political Economy of Financial Regulation In *The Political Econ of Deregulation* See Alexis 1983

William R 1985 *Trucking and the Public Interest The Emergence of Federal Regula 1914–1940* Knoxville University of Tennessee Press

, Martha, and Paul J Quirk 1985 *The Politics of Deregulation* Washington DC ings

orge C 1982 The Reform of Economic Regulation in Telecommunications and Trans tion Presented at the Conference on the Impact of Regulatory Reform in Canada and nited States May 20 Toronto Canada

ary R 1984 The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Ineffectiveness of Modern tary Policy *Journal of Economic Issues* 18 439 48

, 1985 Banking Reform Looks More and More Likely September 2 74

Friedrich A 1944 *The Road to Serfdom* Chicago University of Chicago Press

ton Samuel P 1952 The Marasmus of the ICC The Commission the Railroads and ublic Interest *Yale Law Journal* 61 467–509

Christopher 1983 An Analysis of Intra-Industry Differences in the Effect of Regulation *al of Monetary Economics* 12 417–32

Stephen May 4 1987 Fight for Survival The Battle Royal over U S Bankings Separa f Powers *Time*

, Nicholas 1985 Change in the Banks *The Atlantic Monthly* 256 60–66

eodore J 1969 *The End of Liberalism* New York Norton

, Paul W 1965 *The Economic Effects of Regulation The Trunk-Line Railroad Cartels e Interstate Commerce Commission before 1900* Cambridge MIT Press

1979 *The Regulated Industries and the Economy* New York W W Norton

ey, Donald 1982 *The Applied Theory of Price* New York MacMillan

ell, Grant 1966 *Private Power and the American Democracy* New York Knopf

Mayer, Martin 1974 *The Bankers* New York Ballantine Books

——— 1984 *The Money Bazaars Understanding the Banking Revolution around Us* New York E P Dutton

Meier, Kenneth J 1985 *Regulation Politics, Bureaucracy and Economics* New York St Martin's

Noll, Roger G , and Bruce M Owen 1983 The Political Economy of Deregulation An Overview (ch 2) and Conclusion Economics, Politics, and Deregulation (ch 9) In *The Political Economy of Deregulation* See Alexis, 1983

Peltzman, Sam 1968 Bank Stock Prices and the Effects of Regulation of the Banking Structure *Journal of Business*, 41 413–30

Posner, Richard A 1974 Theories of Economic Regulation *Bell Journal of Economics* 335–56

Ritter, Lawrence S , and William L Silber 1980 *Principles of Money Banking and Financial Markets* New York Basic Books

——— 1981 *Money* New York Basic Books

Rothenberg Lawrence S 1987 Presidential Management of the Bureaucracy The Reform Motor Carrier Regulation at the ICC Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago Illinois

Scholz John T 1984 Cooperation Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement *Law and Society Review* 18 179–224

Schultze Charles L 1977 *The Public Use of Private Interest* Washington DC Brookings

Stoll, Hans R 1981 Revolution in the Regulation of Securities Markets An Examination of Effects of Increased Competition In Leonard W Weiss and Michael W Klass eds *Case Studies in Regulation Revolution and Reform* Boston Little Brown

Truman, David B 1951 *The Governmental Process* New York Alfred A Knopf

West Robert Craig 1983 The Evolution and Devolution of Bank Regulation in the United States *Journal of Economic Issues* 17 361–67

In Defense of the Politics of Ideas

Paul J Quirk
University of Illinois at Chicago
Institute of Government and Public Affairs

nomic change played a major role in certain cases of pro-competitive deregulation theless the evidence of the cases tends to refute the economic theory of regulation An ate account of deregulation—or theory of policy-making – must incorporate the politics of

damental issues of theory and analytic approach are implicated in the tion of the role of economic change in the politics of deregulation In cent book (discussed in the preceding article by Hammond and Knott , Derthick and I (1985) developed an account of a significant and in-tive set of political events the reform of anticompetitive regulation after, pro-competitive deregulation) in the airline, trucking and tele-munications industries in the 1970s and early 1980s In doing so we criti- the economic theory of politics—especially its application in the eco-c theory of regulation—and defended an alternative perspective that mizes greater diversity in the motives of political action and a wider ar-f effective political forces Indeed in sharp contrast to the economic y, we assigned decisive importance to certain influences and processes we discussed under the rubric of the politics of ideas

e difference between the economic theory and a broader analytic ap-h concerns the importance of economic change—that is change in s, technology, market structure and so on—as a cause of policy change e economic theory, economic change is, though not the exclusive cer- the predominant source of policy change In the broader framework it n important but does not have such a privileged status Derthick and I d that in fact economic change played a subordinate role in our cases of ompetitive deregulation (1985 ch 1) This conclusion however was y an artifact of choosing to examine cases in which it appeared that re-ers had confronted a well-organized politically powerful industry intent eserving regulatory protection We deliberately and explicitly excluded —the securities industry banking, railroads—in which economic fac-eemed to have facilitated the reform effort Thus we did not claim that

rtha Derthick provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article Stella Herriges gave skilled editorial assistance

our cases were representative of all cases But neither did we clarify the im plication of our choice of cases for our critique of the economic theory, or fo that matter, develop the critique itself at length, except indirectly.

In response to our analysis, some commentators sympathetic to the eco nomic theory of regulation (Hammond and Knott, 1988, Noll, 1987) ha cited instances where economic change apparently promoted deregulati to suggest that the economic theory may deserve more credit than we adm In this essay, therefore, I discuss the relation between economic change a pro-competitive deregulation and consider the implications of that relati for theories of policy-making I argue that economic change has ind played a significant role in some cases of pro-competitive deregulation, b that the evidence nevertheless fails to support the economic theory At t end I comment briefly on what our position implies about how best to s general theories of regulation, deregulation, and public policy-making

Economic Change and the Economic Theory of Regulation

The task of identifying the expectations of an economic theory of regulat with respect to the role of economic change or any other issue is complica by the existence of diverse theories that are in various senses economic one, merely formal definition, an economic theory is one that assume tional, goal-directed behavior by all relevant agents and uses argum from economic theory to predict behavior (Noll, 1987) By a more subst tive definition, it is a theory that does those things and also posits spe goals that presume the agents' pursuit of self-interest, that is, making standard motivational assumption of economics (Posner, 1974) Other th being equal, the more fully a theory fits not only the formal but also the s stantive definition—and grounds analysis consistently in a strong concep of self-interest—the more it will belong to a family of economic theories w roughly similar predictions, and, to that extent, the more usefully it is id fied as economic

The classic statement of the economic theory of regulation is in an essa economist George Stigler (1971) Stigler viewed regulatory policy as th sult of a supply and demand for such policy The supply represents the and authority of politicians, while the demand represents the policy pr ences and political efforts of constituents Stigler supposed relentlessly interested behavior on both sides of the relation Thus he stipulated politicians are concerned exclusively with re-election They respond t preferences of constituents only insofar as those constituents are ab effect to purchase policies with electoral support And he assumed that stituents are concerned exclusively with their individual economic wel Any very large group of such constituents—for example, consumers face prohibitive obstacles to generating effective demands It will hav

apita stakes, high information costs, and strong incentives for free Consequently, the only politically significant demands come from icer groups, such as firms, labor unions, and trade associations, that high stakes and low information costs and are organized to pursue colle interests. Such groups restrict their attention to issues that substanaffect their members' interests. On an issue of regulatory policy, theresignificant demands are made only by the regulated industry itself, invariably has the most at stake.

result, Stigler concluded, is that regulation can only be created for the it of the regulated industry. Rather than being designed to cure market es and improve allocative efficiency, regulation is intended merely to er wealth to the industry by protecting it from competition And it can perate in that way (To blame a regulatory agency for serving industry, quipped, is like blaming the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company ling groceries) In the literature Stigler's analysis is referred to as revin, for revising the view that regulation is intended to serve the public st, or as the capture theory. It is also identified simply as the economic of regulation

ler's theory failed to explain a number of regulatory programs whose on had been resisted by the regulated industries, the tendency even of ms supported by those industries to subsidize certain groups of cons, and the wave of consumer, environmental and civil rights regulation as already under way when the article was published in 1971 As ick and I argued, it also fails to account for the deregulation of the and early 1980s In varying degrees, economic theorists have recogthe theory's limitations, and some have proposed corrections

approach has maintained Stigler's essential argument with only limualifications Peltzman (1976) argues that the regulated industry ory will not capture all of the benefits of a regulatory program It will be to share those benefits with other groups of producers or even cons that have sufficient stakes and political resources to make effective nds At the same time Peltzman endorses Stigler's reasons for not atng influence to large, unorganized groups. The effect of his revision is to explain policies that benefit particular groups other than the reguindustry In a study of several cases of deregulation, Noll and Owen go a step further and concede that general interests are sometimes ve in the political process They attribute much of this effectiveness to trepreneurial activities of certain political leaders, who, for political or al motives, wish to be at the forefront of an issue oriented toward genterests But Noll and Owen evidently consider such behavior epiand they appeal to it only as a kind of residual explanation, for cases an interest-group theory seems to fail

tively modest differences aside, Stigler's theory and these revised ver-

sions generally agree in predicting domination of regulatory policy by row interests, especially the regulated industry They seem to spell out v follows—under reasonable assumptions about per capita stakes, informa costs, control of free-riding, and the like—from applying the self-interes sumption to both politicians and constituents Thus I will refer to these any other similar theories as versions of the economic theory of regulat

The economic theory has rather specific implications for the role of e nomic change in producing policy change Because interest groups domi policy-making, policy change will occur only as a result of correspond change in the balance of interest-group demands To the extent that inte groups are rational and well informed about their interests —which, for most part, they are presumed to be —the economic conditions surroundi program will largely determine the groups policy preferences and inten of effort And change in the balance of interest-group demands will o mainly through change in those conditions In short the theory implies economic change is the principal cause of policy change and has its effec altering the balance of interest-group demands [2]

There have also been more drastic revisions of Stigler's theory At leas implication, the resulting theories significantly compromise the assump of self-interested motivation In a proposal to restore a weakened versi the public-interest theory, Levine (1981) argues that politicians and re tory officials do, after all seek mainly to serve the public interest— though they will sometimes make mistakes or be misled by interested ties In another version of a public-interest theory, Becker (1983 1985 lies upon competition among interest groups for political influence to those groups whose proposals are most efficient and impose the least bu on other groups His argument assumes that there are effective group sisting the imposition of general taxes and regulatory inefficiency, and that such groups are willing to invest effort on behalf of general interes an economic analysis of the politics of trade protection Baldwin (1985) in porates a significant role for altruism, arguing that an industry is more l to obtain protection if it can appeal for special consideration on groun equity

These more radically modified economic theories may resemble the tively complex theories and interpretive frameworks typical of the pol science literature more than they do a strict version of the economic th Nor do they have implications for the role of economic change compara specificity to that theory s The criticisms of the economic theory in our were not directed toward such drastic departures from Stigler's formula and I do not assess them in this paper

[2]For an attempt with admittedly limited success to apply these expectations to dere tion see Noll and Owen (1983) The economic theory also allows for other causes of change—for example change in the efficiency with which groups are able to employ resources (see Peltzman 1976)—but such causes are likely to be less important

Economic Change and Deregulation

us to evaluate the economic theory of regulation with evidence on the of economic change in pro-competitive deregulation, it is essential to some distinctions. To begin with, if economic change does occur and otes deregulation, it can do so in at least three ways, each with different quences for the theory First, as the economic theory requires, the of such change may be to alter the balance of interest-group demands akdown in the scheme of regulatory protection may lead a regulated try to demand deregulation to make possible a more effective competi-esponse Established firms on the boundaries of a regulated industry discover a promising opportunity to enter its markets and seek de-tion to facilitate doing so

ond, and in sharp contrast, the effect of economic change may be to he preferences or attract the attention of broad groups—such as con-s or business users of a regulated service—or public officials respon-them If technological change eliminates the condition of natural mo-y in a regulated industry, public officials may adopt deregulation to t competition and achieve lower prices or greater efficiency Even h economic change is involved this case is clearly at variance with the mic theory

rd, the effect of economic change may of course be to elicit some com-on of interest-group and broadly based political support The interest-demand for deregulation may be nearly sufficient to produce action, roadly based forces tipping the balance It may do little more than the attention of those broader forces The interest groups may actually e deregulation, but resist it with something less than maximum effort te the involvement of interest groups in facilitating action, these mixed weaken the economic theory in comparison with a less restrictive is that still allows a substantial role for such groups

se three categories also apply when the economic change at issue con-f or has resulted from prior steps toward deregulation, as in the phe-non Hammond and Knott call "the deregulatory snowball" Important ce, however, the key decisions to explain in a case where this phenome-as occurred are the early ones that initially got the snowball rolling

ddition to the three cases with economic change a fourth possibility is eregulation may occur in the absence of such change or without assis-from it A conceivable variant of this case—where an interest group a new preference for deregulation without change in the objective stances—is consistent with the economic theory (given sufficient nce for imperfect information) But it seems more likely that un-zed groups or elites responsive to general interests will undergo such a of preferences, or that they will give increased attention to a program gin to assert preferences they had already held Just as with a broadly

based demand prompted by economic change, such a case is in sharp conf with the economic theory.

Making these distinctions, one finds that the leading cases of p competitive deregulation—airlines, trucking, banking, and telecommuni tions—provide little support for the economic theory of regulation In ba ing, the best case for the theory, economic change and an interest gro demand for deregulation were indeed instrumental [3] The developmen money market mutual funds as alternatives to conventional savings accou and the dramatic rise of interest rates in the late 1970s led to a massive los savings deposits by banks and savings and loans The resulting distr produced an intense, well organized demand for deregulation of savings terest, mainly on the part of large banks Consistent with the economic t ory, that demand was probably the most important source of support deregulation

But it does not appear to have been sufficient Indeed, the far more merous and geographically dispersed smaller institutions were probably even stronger political force, at least in Congress, and they largely oppo deregulation The role of diffuse interests was crucial As Hammond Knott point out, the money market funds were popular with savers and strong support in Congress largely for that reason Except for that supp the result might have been not to phase out interest-rate ceilings, but to abolish the money market funds or to bring them under the regul umbrella *In short, banking deregulation was what I have called a m case, with diffuse interests playing a decisive role*

In the case of telecommunications, economic change was again centr pro-competitive policy change, at least until a late stage in the conflict ever, it did not work primarily through interest-group demands [4] The de opment of microwave technology made competition feasible in long dist service, and the development of computers made it crucial for explo possibilities for innovation in terminal equipment The changed condi implied markets for new competitors and prospects for cheaper or impr services for business users and consumers

Nevertheless, in the crucial phases of policy change in the early and 1970s, interest-group pressure for competition was relatively inconspic It was by orders of magnitude less powerful than the opposition from established telephone companies, led by AT&T Business users were n tive in pursuit of the widely distributed and speculative benefits of com tion The new competitors, led by upstart firms like MCI, were activ could not begin to match AT&T's political resources The adoption of competitive policies, in this period, reflected mainly the willingness ability of the Federal Communications Commission—prompted at time

[3]For narrative of this case see Hammond and Knott (1988) Carron (1983) and Mey
[4]See Derthick and Quirk (1985) chs 3–5

ourts, and defended by congressional committees against political at-
-to override organized opposition from the telephone companies and
ate the diffuse interests that stood to gain from competition
er losing virtually all vestiges of regulatory protection, in the late 1970s
T reversed field and, instead of resisting competition, sought deregula-
f its own activities It partly succeeded in that objective, though at the
ost of being split up in a huge divestiture And AT&T might not have
ven this consolation prize had there not been a generally favorable cli-
of opinion for deregulation In any case, the main story of telecom-
ations deregulation is one of economic change leading to policy change
gh a response of the political system to diffuse interests

cases of airline and trucking deregulation offer even less support for
onomic theory [5] Economic change played a modest role and not by a
the theory suggests The markets and technology of both industries
ssentially stable The inflation of the 1970s helped put proposals for
lation on the agenda But it did so mainly by increasing their salience
tical leaders, who touted deregulation as part of the battle against in-
, and thus to the general public Because regulated rates and fares
if generally high) tended to lag behind other prices, inflation also
d difficulties for the regulated industries, especially the airlines But
ort-term stress had little effect on their devotion to regulation

h exceptions that were very limited or came late in the debate both
ries strongly opposed deregulation The trunk airlines, with no excep-
opposed deregulation in the first set of legislative hearings And apart
United Airlines (which complained of unfair treatment in route assign-
), they continued to do so until after a clear trend toward passage of a
s already established The debate ultimately led to the radical out-
f total deregulation of rates and fares partly because the airlines failed
ain an energetic and coordinated political effort in the final stages
not to say that most of the industry came to prefer deregulation, or
as Hammond and Knott assume) that it was divided by sharp differ-
of economic interest To a great extent the deterioration of airline re-
e reflected an underlying fragility of collective political organization in
dustry Even airlines that had essentially similar economic interests
reed in opposing deregulation —most of the industry—were unable to
in coordination

trucking industry remained active, unified, and adamantly opposed to
lation In its only significant internal conflicts, a few specialized truck-
oups seeking increased flexibility for their particular modes of opera-
ok dissenting positions on peripheral issues Even they did not seek
obably did not want a more sweeping form of deregulation

[5] On airlines, see also Brown (1987) and Levine (1965); on trucking see also Robyn

with collective interests and so have widely shared opinions that affect th votes.

Politicians' beliefs about the public interest and concern for the appro of broad constituencies are additionally powerful influences, moreover, b cause they often push in the same direction. Indeed, they even affect me bers of specialized units, such as regulatory agencies and congressional co mittees, with opportunity for strong ties to interest groups affected by th jurisdictions. Instead of servicing such groups, for example, a committ leader may find both psychic and political reward in working to develo record of achievement on popular issues.

These sources and patterns of behavior help to define the terms of polit conflict. To a very great extent, the direction of policy change depends the state of opinion about the public interest. That opinion includes the ues and attitudes of the mass public, the general ideologies of the atten public and political elites, the more specific policy and program doctrin practitioners in each area, and the pertinent theories and research finding policy analysts and social scientists—including, not least, economists. processes that define this body of opinion and account for its influence c prise what Derthick and I called, in a serviceable shorthand, "the polit ideas." The main lesson of pro-competitive deregulation for a general th of public policy-making, in our view, is the necessity of taking the polit ideas into account.[6]

References

Baldwin, Robert E. 1985. *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy.* Cambridge: MIT

Becker, Gary S. 1983. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Inf *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98: 371–400.

——— 1985. Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs. *Journal of Pub nomics* 28: 329–47.

Brown, Anthony. 1987. *The Politics of Airline Deregulation.* Knoxville: University of Te Press.

Carron, Andrew S. 1983. The Political Economy of Financial Deregulation. In *The Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Regulatory Process.* See Noll and

Derthick, Martha, and Paul J. Quirk. 1985. *The Politics of Deregulation.* Washington ings Institution.

Hammond, Thomas, and Jack Knott. 1988. The Deregulatory Snowball: Explaining D tion in the Financial Industry. *Journal of Politics* 50: 3–30.

Levine, Michael E. 1981. Revisionism Revisited? Airline Deregulation and the Public I *Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems* 44: 179–95.

[6] A more detailed statement of this position is in Derthick and Quirk (1985), especial Efforts should be made to put the economic theory and one such as ours to rigorous comp tests. Tests of economic theories have generally measured, for example, whether groups have some influence rather than none. Such tests are not pertinent to choosing b the two theories.

, Kenneth J 1985 *Regulation Politics, Bureaucracy and Economics* New York St rtins

Roger G Forthcoming Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation In Richard malensee and Robert Willig, eds , *Handbook of Industrial Organization* Amsterdam evier Science Publishers

Roger G , and Bruce M Owen 1983 *The Political Economy of Deregulation Interest ups in the Regulatory Process*, Washington American Enterprise Institute

an, Sam 1976 Toward a More General Theory of Regulation *Journal of Law and Eco ics*, 19 211–40

, Richard A 1974 Theories of Economic Regulation *Bell Journal of Economics and agement Science*, 5 335–58

, Dorothy 1987 *Braking the Special Interests Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of cy Reform*, Chicago University of Chicago Press

George J 1971 The Theory of Economic Regulation *Bell Journal of Economics and agement Science* 2 3 -21

Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism

Ruth W. Gra
Duke Univers

Locke's anthropological accounts do not depict isolated individuals whose behavior is ... erned by rational calculations of their interests. He is not an "atomistic" individualist. He ... knowledges what communitarian critics of liberalism claim that liberals do not acknowledge, the extent to which men are social beings. Nonetheless, his political theory is individualistic ... normative theory of individual natural rights. Locke seeks to combat authoritarianism by ... ing the relation between admittedly powerful social forces and political rights. The combin... of his individualistic political theory and his recognition of the anthropological record of ... tional authority gives rise to difficulties in his work concerning consent, the rule of law, ... party politics.

Locke was fascinated with travelers' accounts of exotic places, and his li... brary contained a substantial collection of travel journals (Dunn, 1967; ... Laslett, 1963, pp. 149–61). He was interested in tales of the lives and ... toms of primitive peoples, but not merely as a collector of exotic facts ... made use of this material in two important disputes: first, he used the var... of forms of early political organization as evidence against the patriarchal ... and second, he used the variety of customs to be found in different soci... as evidence against the doctrine of innate ideas. In the political disp... Locke's anthropological evidence illustrates how political societies dev... from pre-political family groups.[1] In the epistemological dispute, the an... thropological evidence serves to show not only the variety of customs ... found in different societies, but also the strength of custom everyw... in shaping the opinions that govern men's behavior. In neither case ... Locke's anthropology depict isolated individuals whose behavior is gove... by rational calculations of their interests. Instead, Locke's descriptio... primitive societies acknowledge the strength of traditional social bond... of traditional social norms in our common life. Yet Locke is generally cha... terized both as a political individualist and as a kind of intellectual indiv... alist, an advocate of the independent use of the faculty of reason as ...

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the American Political Science Ass... annual meeting in New Orleans, 1985.

[1] See Batz, 1974, for descriptions of Locke's anthropological sources. Unlike Hobbes, ... considered man "at least semi-social," a view "demanded" by his "anthropological back... according to Batz, p. 666.

ice, custom, and dogmatism. What does Locke's recognition of the th of human communities mean for our understanding of Lockean in- alism, politically and intellectually? In considering this question, we led to reconsider various problems in Locke's thought, the meaning of t and the role of the rule of law among them

re are two additional reasons for examining Locke's individualism in ht of his anthropological accounts First, the opinion persists, despite l agreement among contemporary Locke scholars to the contrary, that s individualism is "atomistic" individualism that Locke envisioned a f nature peopled by dissociated individuals, for example, or that the n individual resembles the model economic man, guiding his actions ulations of his own personal advantage based on his private estimation nterests By looking at Locke's historical and anthropological descrip- hope to assist in dispelling such notions

nd, and more importantly, the argument addresses contemporary nitarian critics of liberalism These critics fault liberal thinkers, ncluded, for their inadequate understanding of the self and in par- for their failure to recognize the simple fact that every individual is ded in social relationships [2] Liberalism is said to depend upon an indi- stic premise which cannot be supported by the facts Liberal indi- sm is "bad sociology" (Walzer 1984 p 324)

urpose is to show that at least one classical liberal recognized fully ent to which human beings are social beings but did not believe that t dictated any particular political conclusions Locke's disagreement ntemporary critics would be not so much about the facts as about port He recognized the social character of human life and the extent h individuals develop beliefs ideas and interests in a social context estion is what that recognition ought to mean for politics The prem- ocke's political argument—that men are born free—is not a socio- laim, but a moral one And to understand that is central to appreciat- t could properly be meant by Lockean 'individualism

investigation must address two questions then the more or less forward question, What is Locke's view of human sociality? and the fficult question, What is the bearing of that view on his normative cal argument? A cursory look at Locke's anthropological description Second Treatise is enough to raise the question of the relation in his tween the "is" or "was" of anthropology and history and the ought cs

e *Second Treatise*, Locke uses anthropological evidence primarily in

cIntyre 1984 esp pp 216-17 250 51 Sandel 1982 1984 whose work addresses eralism Taylor, 1985 pp 187-210 Walzer 1980 p 37 1984 and Wolff 1968 See , 1966 p 46 I wish to thank Steven Kautz for his suggestions on the communitarian beralism

the context of disputes concerning the origin of political society. But Locke's theoretical account of the origin of political society is familiar. Political societies are formed when free individuals agree to incorporate and establish a public authority to protect their property from the violence of other men. Each individual relinquishes to the public authority his private right to punish breaches of the natural law and his right to regulate his property as he sees fit. The society thus comes by the power to make laws regulating property and to punish breaches of those laws. Standing laws are necessary to serve the purpose of this association. The majority of the society determines where to place the legislative power. Since there is no need for constant legislation, but there is a need for constant execution of the laws, a separate executive is created. This arrangement also ensures that the laws will rule; it protects against abuses of lawmakers who might exempt themselves from the laws they make. Finally, since laws cannot always adequately provide for every case that might arise, the executive is allowed certain prerogative powers to supply the defects of standing law. This is the familiar nutshell description of Locke's position.[3]

It can be contrasted sharply, point for point, with Locke's description of the origins of political societies drawn from anthropological evidence, Scripture, and historical speculation (See *First Treatise*, pars. 153–69; *Second Treatise*, pars. 74–76, 105–22). And these accounts ought not to be dismissed as isolated examples. The evidence of travelers' accounts can tell us about the origins of political societies in general. "The Kings of the Indians in America . . . is still a pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe . . ." (*Second Treatise*, par. 108), and "In the beginning, all the world was America . . ." (*Second Treatise*, par. 49).

According to Locke's account, men lived in family groups where children became accustomed to the authority of their fathers. By an imperceptible change, families were transformed into political societies as each son agreed to continue to abide by his father's judgments when he came of age. The father alone exercised his natural executive power. In fact, at this stage there was very little need for domestic government. Some men lived in tribes or troops with no domestic government at all. However, they did elect chiefs or kings to lead them against foreign enemies. So, political societies usually began with some kind of monarchy, either through its origins in the family or through its origins in the need for collective defense. In these monarchies, there was little need for standing laws; government was almost all prerogative. It was only when this authority was abused, a development associated with changes in the development of property, that men began to limit the powers of government through separation of powers, standing laws, special consent to taxation, and a narrowing of prerogative powers.

[3]It is the major line of argument of *Second Treatise*, ch. 7–14.

oretically, it appears that dissociated free individuals consent to form a to protect themselves from each other Historically, government de- out of a pre-existing social situation primarily to deal with foreign Theoretically, government begins with the legislative power A sepa- ecutive is a subsequent development. Historically, government be- one-man rule Legislation is a subsequent development Theoreti- political authority is characterized by the rule of law Historically, al authority appears to be unlimited discretion

point in making this admittedly somewhat overdrawn comparison to show that Locke's writing is hopelessly contradictory on this ques- Locke at least clearly believed that the facts of history and the evi- from the testimony of travelers to the New World were compat- ith his theoretical position He introduced this evidence precisely er to bolster his case against patriarchalism The question rather his theoretical stance ought to be interpreted in light of his appar- ognition of a particular sort of pattern to the early forms of human tion What is the meaning of consent and the rule of law in Locke's ent against monarchical absolutism when Locke allows that tribal chies are legitimate political communities? By examining Locke's view t constitutes legitimate political community, we also take an indirect ch to reflect on what constitutes Lockean individualism Whatever it ust be compatible with what Locke describes as the life of American and Biblical patriarchs We must begin with a full account of those tions

I

e discusses several varieties of social and political organizations here as four distinguishable types First, there are family units often rge, including parents, children, and sometimes servants and slaves refers to the Biblical patriarchs and to a planter in the West Indies as es (*First Treatise*, pars 130–31) The fathers of these families are not nderstood as their kings Even though Abraham led 314 of his family vants in war he had no sovereignty over them Making war in these stances is simply an instance of the exercise of natural executive according to Locke (*First Treatise*, pars 130–32) Similarly the fa- a family, like any other man, could exercise his natural executive to punish a member of his family, just as he could punish any other ven with death if necessary (*Second Treatise*, pars 74, 105) Nonethe- is does not mean that a father's power is equivalent to a king's or that are indistinguishable from political societies In fact, Locke goes to ngths to distinguish them (*First Treatise*, pars 60–67, 160 *Second* , ch 6) He begins with the family, not with either the isolated, in-

dependent individual or with the political community. His beginning po[illegible] is a social, but pre-political stage.[4]

Political society is distinguished from the relationship of a father to [illegible] children and a master to his servants in two ways: first, political society [illegible]cludes a common authority over all members of the society which alone [illegible] legitimately enforce the death penalty for breaches of their common law a[illegible] second, political associations are made for the purpose of preserving [illegible] property of the members from the violence of other men. A family is thu[s] distinct from a political society as is a ship's crew or a church. Each of the[se] an association that must have its own rules and enforcement of them [illegible] none of them is formed for political purposes, nor do they have the sa[me] legitimate means of enforcement at their disposal as does a political soc[iety] (*Second Treatise*, ch. 7, *Letter Concerning Toleration*, pp. 20–21, "Sec[ond] Letter Concerning Toleration," pp. 117–18).

Nonetheless, families may be transformed into political societies "by insensible change" which creates a patriarchal monarchy (*Second Treat[ise]* par. 76, Schochet, 1975, pp. 254–64); this is the second type. The cha[nge] comes about when adult children give their consent, "a tacit, and sc[arce] avoidable consent" (*Second Treatise*, par. 75), to establish political autho[rity] in the father. They merely allow him to be the sole executor of the nat[ural] law among them and join their force with his to execute his judgments. T[his] is an "easie" and "Natural" development; children are accustomed to o[bey]ing their father since childhood; the father has governed them with affec[tion] while they were children; they trust him and with good reason (*Se[cond] Treatise*, pars. 75, 105). Moreover, there is no basis for a conflict of inte[rest] between the father and his sons. Where there is a great deal of land and [few] people, when people are hunters, nomads, or subsistence farmers, [illegible] disputes over property can be settled by simple changes in location (*Se[cond] Treatise*, pars. 38, 74). Since the family is bound by ties of affection and [illegible] and since there is a harmony of interests, the father, upon becoming a r[uler] is allowed a great deal of discretion. His "Government was almost all [Pre]rogative" (*Second Treatise*, par. 162, see par. 110). Nonetheless, this is [a] government by consent: he becomes "Law-maker and Governour over [them]" (*Second Treatise*, par. 105) and his authority extends only so far as he us[es it] for the good of the whole (*Second Treatise*, par. 110). Moreover, by con[sent] the adult members of the society may determine the successor to their fa[ther]. Ordinarily, they allow his heir to succeed him (*Second Treatise*, par. [illegible]). Where a single family is numerous enough to subsist by itself, the tran[sfor]mation of fathers into monarchs is the natural and probable developm[ent] since "Government is hardly to be avoided amongst Men that live toge[ther]"

[4]Contrast Seliger (1968, p. 90) who argues that for Locke "Government is recognized [as a] vital prerequisite of social life."

nd Treatise, par 105, see par. 127) Yet for the same reasons that fathers nlikely to abuse their power, conflicts among all family members are to be limited Domestic government is minimal

ere is a third type of society described by Locke, a similar kind of limpolitical society, where men of several families incorporate for common se but have little or no domestic government among them These s or troops of men select a general or chief either temporarily as the ion demands or permanently, to be their leader in battle These men elected for their heroic qualities, their authority is in no way derived fatherhood They are selected by the people or a council of them who nake determinations of war and peace Locke cites the Biblical Judges mples of this type (*First Treatise*, par 158, *Second Treatise*, pars 102 9) as well as various native American societies He speaks particularly *Second and Third Letters Concerning Toleration* of certain nations of Vest Indies " which have no other end of their society but their al defense against their common enemies In these their captain or e, is sovereign commander in time of war but in time of peace neither r anybody else has any authority over any of the society (Second r," pp 121–22) Locke finds it unsurprising that men to whom the and woods afforded the spontaneous provisions of life and so with no e possessions of land had no enlarged desires after riches and power d live together in society make one people of one language under one ain, who shall have no other power but to command them in time of on war against their common enemies without any municipal laws s, or any person with superiority established amongst them but ended ir private differences if any arose by the extemporary determination ir neighbours or of arbitrators chosen by the parties Third ," p 225)

s the changes that come about in economic life that bring about the ormation of these early types of political society into political societies ully developed domestic governments and with elaborate limitations ose governments ' While men live in hunting and shepherd societies ieties with agriculture, but without money there can be no doubt of no room for quarrel' (*Second Treatise* par 39 see par 51) With a d way of life comes the need for laws to regulate property and for agree to settle territorial boundaries But without the introduction of money lands will remain so that others may graze their flocks without con- Similarly, money alone, without agriculture poses no serious problem

trast Tully (1980 pp 145–48) who argues that money causes the change from the state of to political society rather than transforming one form of political society into another ecraft (1968, pp 910-12) Batz (1974 pp 668–69) and Macpherson (1962 esp pp 208 o argue that money introduces a second stage of the state of nature

as is implied by Locke's acknowledgment that the American Indians "wampompeke" (*Second Treatise*, par. 184). Only the combination o(culture and money produces serious competition for scarce resources the introduction of money, men have reason to enlarge their posses Land becomes scarce, competition increases, and with it the need be(stronger for a common arbiter of conflicts who will judge according to "s(standing *Rules* . by which every man may know what is his" (S(*Treatise*, par. 136, see pars 36–39, 45–51)

The greater necessity for government is coupled with a greater dan abuse of government power, and we are brought to the fourth, and type of political society

> But though the *Golden Age* (before vain Ambition, and *amor sceleratus habendi*, evil Con cence had corrupted Mens minds into a Mistake of true Power and Honor) had more \ and consequently better Governours as well as less vicious Subjects, and there was t(*stretching Prerogative* on the one side to oppress the People, *nor* consequently on the oth *Dispute about Priviledge* to lessen or restrain the Power of the Magistrate and so no betwixt Rulers and People about Governours or Government Yet when Ambition and l in future Ages would retain and increase the Power without doing the Business for whic given and aided by Flattery taught Princes to have distinct and separate interests fro People Men found it necessary to examine more carefully the *Original* and Rights of C *ment* and to find out ways to *restrain the Exorbitances*, and *prevent the Abuses* of th which they having intrusted in anothers hands only for their own good they found w use of to hurt them (*Second Treatise* par 111 see pars 94 107 110)

In response to abuses, the people limit executive prerogatives, create l latures, and introduce other institutional safeguards Locke's familiar order d commonwealth" takes shape (*Second Treatise*, par 143)

Its necessity is associated with the mixed blessing of economic pro While Locke developed principles justifying the colonization and de ment of the great waste lands of America and while it is Locke who t that "a King of a large fruitful Territory there feeds lodges, and is clad w than a day Labourer in England" (*Second Treatise*, par 41) it is also L who observes that modern men face political dangers far beyond an the Indian had to concern himself with It is not that Locke views peoples as noble or virtuous in some romantic sense He does not them for a noble independence, as Rousseau might and Tocquevill They simply have less reason to exploit and oppress one another, as w less sophisticated means *

* He that would have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of America would no bly be much better in a Throne where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be foun justifie all, that he shall do to his Subjects and the Sword presently silence all those th question it *Second Treatise* par 92

There is one passage however where in arguing against the doctrine of innate ide claims that primitive peoples are less virtuous than modern men But yet anyone who the histories both of the old and the new world or the itineraries of travellers will o serve how far apart from virtue the morals of these people are And no one will b

in early communities as Locke describes them are bound first of all of family affection and trust They are social, but not entirely peace- conflicts with other societies are to be expected Internal conflicts and s will also arise; since men are everywhere "biassed by their interest" artial to themselves" (*Second Treatise*, pars 124, 125) But these dis- will be limited, largely because the conditions of life limit competition it greed In primitive economic situations, where men have no rea- unlimited acquisitiveness, selfishness is of limited consequence ically, men in these societies show a kind of conservative disposition nd to accept the authority of those whom they have been accustomed . They habitually form governments ruled by one man and tend to hese monarchies hereditary They change their rulers and forms of ly in response to clear abuses In the case where fathers of families kings, the formation of political societies and changes in them seem place almost without deliberation, but instead by an imperceptible . In short, Locke describes traditionalist authoritarian, paternalistic s He seems to concede to the patriarchalists that they have a point he question is how men have been

II

Locke also remarks that "at best, an Argument from what has been to hould of right be, has no great force" (*Second Treatise* par 103 see *reatise*, par 57) In a very important sense anthropological evidence e historical record are irrelevant for Locke's political argument ' This evidence can be used to contradict Filmer's claims concerning the chal origins of governments and the legitimacy of kings as heirs to divine right It is also useful to provide historical examples that lend t to Locke's theoretical conclusions But it is difficult to imagine what anthropological or historical facts could disprove those conclusions argument is an abstract logical derivation of man's political rights and from the premise of natural freedom The conclusions that he reaches ing the origins of political authority in the consent of the people are cted by knowledge of anthropology or history Their status is like the f the conclusions of a mathematical demonstration *

---

f nature is best known and observed among these primitive and untutored tribes since ost of them there appears not the slightest trace or track of piety merciful feeling hastity, and the rest of the virtues, but rather they spend their life wretchedly among , thefts debaucheries, and murders (*Essays on the Law of Nature* p 141)

's (1963, pp 452-73) critique of social contract theories is largely though not entirely t to Locke's argument for this reason See Herzog, 1985 p 95

Some Thoughts Concerning Education, par 185-186 pp 294-95 and "Some Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman" p 400 for Locke's division of politi

Locke begins with the thought that every man has an equal right to govern his actions as he sees fit. Men are equal in the sense that they are by nature free, there is no natural political authority. It follows then that political authority must be a created condition. Political authority and obligation are man-made, conventional, created by agreement. If political authority is created, there must be a condition without it. That condition is called the "state of nature." The state of nature and political society are mutually exclusive categories, something like the categories "married" and "single." Men are either part of the same political community or they are not, and if they are not, they are in the state of nature with respect to each other. The phrase means nothing more than the relation among any men at any time who have between them no legitimate superiority or subjection, no political authority, who remain in their natural relation as free and equal to one another. The state of nature is a necessary logical inference from the premise of natural freedom, and it also exists in fact whenever and wherever there are men who do not belong to the same political community.

Locke scholars have sometimes proceeded as if the question were whether the state of nature is peaceful or warlike, that is, as if the question were whether Locke's premise is natural sociality or natural selfishness, isolation and hostility.[9] If it were either of these, the anthropological evidence would have a direct bearing on the argument. But it is not, his premise is natural freedom. And the record of life in early communities, peaceful or not, cannot show that there is a natural right to rule. Man's natural sociality and family structure do not imply political authority, and that is the whole point of Locke's discussion of the historical origins of political life. He means to show, contra Filmer, that obedience to fathers is not the same as a natural monarchic right to rule and that the fact that men are born into preexisting social and political groups does not mean that they have a preexisting duty to obey the authorities within those groups (Parry, 1964, pp. 170–77).

We are now in a better position to see what Locke's individualism is. Locke's individualism is a political individualism at the level of normative theory. The term could be used to characterize his response to the question of the origins of legitimate political authority, the central question of the *Second Treatise*. Legitimate political authority arises from individual consent. "Individualism" is not, of course, Locke's term, and it is an unfortunate term in his case. In contemporary discussions, we expect that the opposite of "individualism" would be something like "communitarianism", the implication

cal studies into two parts: the theory of political rights and duties and political practice and history. And see *Essay* III 11 15–17; IV 3 18–20; IV 4 2–10; Ashcraft, 1968, pp. 898–900, 908–9; Grant, 1987, pp. 21–26.

[9]See Ashcraft, 1968, pp. 900–908, for a useful discussion of this controversy. He argues that Locke's state of nature is a condition of "uncertain peace," p. 902.

of the term is that it is somehow in tension with community or society. The opposite of Locke's political individualism, however, is not community, but hierarchy. He is opposing the equality and freedom of men to the idea that there is a natural or divinely ordained hierarchy among them. Lockean individualism therefore is not incompatible with the recognition of the importance of communal ties, family associations, and social norms, though it is a critique of authoritarian political communities.

The core of Locke's individualism is the denial of the paternalistic claim that dependence on a family or membership in a community gives rise to political obligation. And political obligation, after all, is a very serious thing: political power is distinguished by the right to make war and to impose penalties of death (*Second Treatise*, pars. 3, 88). It is incumbent upon Filmer to show how exactly one can infer from the facts of history and family life that one man can rightly acquire this extraordinary power over another. While the historical record shows that sons have traditionally submitted to fathers and subjects to kings, that record is no evidence at all for the claim that they had a duty to do so (see *Second Treatise*, par. 76).

Similarly, the sociological and psychological facts of human interdependence are not sufficient evidence to settle the contemporary argument. Contemporary critics of liberal individualism are in a position somewhat similar to Filmer's: they must show precisely how these facts imply political rights and duties.[10] The claim of the "Lockean individualist" is that only voluntary action can create political obligation for a free individual; the only alternative sources for it are force or the accidents of birth.[11]

That historical evidence is irrelevant to Locke's argument in defense of this claim is both Locke's strength and the source of his difficulties. On the one hand, because his is an abstract normative argument, Locke can provide an accurate anthropological and historical account that does justice to the evidence for early patriarchal government without damage to his argument. He is also able to depart from a particular historical account of the ancient English constitution that had been important for many of the Whigs (Pocock

[10] See Taylor 1985, esp. pp. 203–4, 206. Walzer tries to combine the liberal principle that obligation can arise only from individual consent with a more sociologically "realistic" view of the individual than the "abstract" view he attributes to classical liberalism (Walzer 1970, 1984, p. 324).

[11] Note that Sandel uses "constitutive" rather than "coercive" as the alternative to "voluntary" or "*merely* cooperative" associations (1984, p. 87, emphasis added). The effect is to shift away from the original context of the discussion of voluntary action as the source of specifically political obligations and thereby soften the impression of what is at stake in this dispute. Stephen Holmes has made the general observation that critics of liberalism often distort its original meaning through what he calls "antonym substitution," e.g., the opposite of rights becomes duties, rather than oppression; the opposite of competition becomes brotherly love rather than monopoly, etc. The substitution of community for hierarchy as the opposite of individualism is another example.

1957, pp. 46, 187–88, 234–38, Skinner, 1965). Their arguments for limited monarchy and Parliamentary supremacy relied on the antiquity of English liberties and institutions Locke's departure from this account allows him to adopt an historical approach that permits and even emphasizes the possibility for progress in the development of political institutions (Resnick, 1984) [12] And as we shall see, this historical approach becomes important for resolving certain difficulties with Locke's argument.

These difficulties arise because Locke's contrasting theoretical and historical accounts must somehow be reconciled If he had claimed that men were in fact isolated individuals who come together as rational men to bring about peaceful political associations, his thought would be plagued with very different problems than those we find there Precisely because Locke does recognize the historical evidence for primitive patriarchal monarchies, his problem is to show how such monarchies can be considered legitimate governments where the criteria for legitimacy—drawn from the premise of natural freedom—include consent and the rule of law His task is to reinterpret the historical record in the light of his normative theory, and the way in which this is done reveals in turn the meaning of the theoretical criteria in Locke's thought What can be meant by consent, for example, if it applies to the situation where the sons of a tribal chieftain remain subject to his authority upon coming of age?

The question of the meaning of consent in Locke's thought has been much discussed, and I do not mean to rehearse that discussion [13] I only wish to add two observations first, that by consent Locke cannot mean a fully self-conscious deliberate act, and second, that the requirements of consent can be adequately met by very different actions in different historical circumstances With respect to the first, Locke's consent theory must allow for consent to be something less than self-conscious since he is arguing that men have been mistaken about the grounds of their obligation Men have in fact consented even though they have not understood themselves to have done so Consent has been "little taken notice of" (*Second Treatise*, pars 117, 175), and Locke is bringing it to men's attention Unless Locke were willing to maintain that there have not yet been more than a handful of legitimate governments, he must maintain that there have been governments based on consent throughout history without a full consciousness in their subjects of the true nature of their origins or of the meaning of consent Those young men who first made their fathers into kings certainly did not have the self-understanding of good Lockeans

[12] See Ashcraft, 1986, pp 189–90 214–22 for the argument that Locke was by no means unique among the Whigs in adopting this historical approach

[13] The interested reader might consult Dunn, 1967, 1969, pp 131–47, Grant, 1987 pp 123–28, Hume, 1963, pp 452–73, Pateman, 1979, pp 15–17, 50–80 Pitkin, 1965, 1966, Plamenatz, 1963, 1 220–41, Riley, 1974, Seliger, 1968, pp 224–30, 267–83, and Simmons, 1979, pp 57–100

Theirs is said to have been a "tacit" consent. There are elements common to each of the cases where Locke uses this term [14] By a voluntary action undertaken to enjoy certain benefits, a man consents to the necessary conditions for or consequences of those benefits This consent is tacit in that it is both unstated and implied [15] There must be some voluntary individual action, i e., one that is not coerced (*First Treatise*, par 42, *Second Treatise*, pars. 176, 186, Dunn, 1967, p 157), but it need not be a spoken or written declaration and its implications need not be fully self-conscious

Locke is also quite clear that the content of the agreement establishing political society need never be explicitly stated In his summary chapter distinguishing paternal, political, and despotical power, his definition of political power includes the statement that society and government are established with "this express or tacit Trust," that political power shall be employed for the good of the people and the preservation of their property (*Second Treatise*, par 171) Moreover, men "must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite," and this is done "by barely agreeing to *unite into one Political Society*, which is *all the Compact that* is or needs to be between the individuals that enter into or make up a *Commonwealth*" (*Second Treatise*, par 99) Consent must "make sense", if a man chooses to secure a certain benefit, he can be understood to have acceded to the conditions necessary to secure that benefit regardless of his own understanding of what he has done

Minimally then, consent must be voluntary and rational in this sense But there are points where Locke requires more than the minimum—which brings me to my second observation The requirement of consent takes different forms in different historical situations both in the case of establishing the legitimacy of a government and in the case of establishing an individual's membership in society The transformation of fathers into kings in the early stages of government required only that the sons continue to accept their fathers' authority and join in enforcing their decisions These relatively passive requirements are not sufficient to constitute popular consent to a conqueror or a usurper In those cases, representation in a legislative body is the very least that is required (*Second Treatise*, pars 192, 198) There is a reasonable presumption in favor of the trustworthiness of fathers that does not apply to conquerors or usurpers (*Second Treatise*, pars 75, 107) Moreover express consent is required to make a man a permanent member of a society with an established legitimate government (*Second Treatise*, pars 121–

[14] The others are agreeing to use money which implies agreement to unequal land ownership since that is the consequence of a money economy *Second Treatise* par 50 and presence in a foreign country, which implies agreement to abide by the laws of that country *Second Treatise* par 119

[15] See Simmons (1979, p 89) for the distinction between acts that are signs of consent and acts which 'imply consent His example of the latter is joining a baseball game which implies consent to be governed by the umpire's decisions

22),[16] though Locke certainly knew that few governments have ever made provision for men to give consent expressly and thereby fulfill the Lockean requirement. Locke did include such a provision in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (Art. 117, 118), which suggests that he considered it the best way to meet the requirement of consent to membership in modern societies.

Men are capable of progress in the forms, institutions, and science of government. And the difficulties presented by Locke's acceptance of tacit consent in early times and his more rigorous requirements in other passages in his work are obviated somewhat by this historical perspective. The "Infancy" of government is "negligent, and unforeseeing," weak, infirm, and innocent. And men come to a better understanding of "*the Original* and Rights of *Government*" only after bitter experience with the failure to provide sufficiently for protections of their rights against government (*Second Treatise*, pars. 94, 107, 110–11). Early patriarchal monarchies are legitimate but imperfect forms of government.[17]

This observation also helps to resolve the problem of the role of the rule of law as a criterion for legitimate government, though in this case, as in the case of consent, it may not be possible to resolve successfully all of the textual difficulties. On the basis of Locke's theoretical demonstration, a reader of the *Second Treatise* can get the impression that the rule of law is an essential requirement for legitimacy and that mixed and balanced government is required in turn to maintain the rule of law. But, as we have seen, Locke describes early patriarchal monarchies as governments though kings rule with few if any standing laws and without the consultation and consent of representative bodies or assemblies of the people. There is no separation of powers, no institutional or legal limitation on the discretion of the king. How are these kings to be distinguished from the absolute monarchs who epitomize despotism for Locke and who cannot even be said to be in civil society with their subjects (*Second Treatise*, pars. 90–94)?

One possibility is to argue that there is no distinction and that consequently, Locke is opposed not so much to absolute government, as to arbitrary government (Seliger, 1968, pp. 238–63). Another possibility is to argue that there is no distinction and that consequently, early patriarchies are not true governments but only one stage of the state of nature (Ashcraft, 1968, pp. 911–13). If the first of these were true, it would be difficult to explain Locke's strong statements concerning standing laws and separation of powers (*Second Treatise*, pars. 94, 136) and his tendency to speak of "absolute and arbitrary" power (*Second Treatise*, pars. 23, 135, 172). If the second of these

[16] Membership in early patriarchies may not have been permanent, and on that account, consent to membership need not have been expressly given. See *Second Treatise*, par. 74. But this interpretation may cause additional difficulties for Locke's theory of obligation.

[17] I am indebted to Nathan Tarcov for his observations on this subject.

were true, it would be difficult to explain why Locke goes to so much trouble to show that early patriarchies were governments based in consent, rather than simply dismissing them as illegitimate absolute monarchies. Moreover, to consider these patriarchies as a stage of the state of nature involves the problematic claim that there can be government in the state of nature, and in fact that there can be political societies too in the natural state—certainly a contradiction in these mutually exclusive terms. Locke describes the early patriarchies in a chapter titled "Of the Beginning of Political Societies" in order to explain why people in the first political societies tended to choose monarchy as the first form of government (*Second Treatise*, par. 106).

An alternative possibility, subject I think to the fewest difficulties, finds two distinguishing characteristics that allow Locke to consider the early monarchies as examples of legitimate governments. First, the authority of the king originates in the consent of the people (*Second Treatise*, par. 105). Consent implies that the people are understood to retain the right of resistance and the right to alter their government in response to abuses. The people allow their kings to rule without "express Limitation or Restraint" only until they need to specify limitations (*Second Treatise*, pars. 110, 112, 162). Second, the king's authority is limited to what "the End of Government" requires; he rules only for "the publick Good and Safety" (*Second Treatise*, par. 110). These are the minimal requirements for legitimate government, deriving from natural freedom and the natural right of preservation respectively. Both requirements are necessary; neither alone is sufficient to establish legitimacy. And these requirements may be met for a time in family-like communities without standing laws and separation of powers. Locke requires limited, though not mixed and balanced, government as the minimal standard. Standing laws and separation of powers become necessary only when economic conditions have become such that princes might come to have "distinct and separate interests from their people" (*Second Treatise*, par. 111; see pars. 138, 143, 163, 164).[15] A representative legislature or a popular assembly becomes necessary only when the government needs to raise taxes (*Second Treatise*, pars. 138–39, 142). In developed societies these things *are* necessary for legitimacy, since without them the minimum requirement that government must rule for the public good and with the consent of the people cannot be met.

Lockean liberalism is compatible with various forms of government (*Second Treatise*, ch. 10) suitable to various social and economic conditions. Where rulers are likely to abuse their power, institutional and legal safe-

[15]Additional evidence that they are not necessary under primitive conditions can be found in Locke MS f. 8, July 20, 1670: "Les Mengrelliere n'ont point les lois ecrits, et la justice ne laisse pas d'y etre mieux administree." Locke goes on to describe a system where, in large matters, each party chooses a friend to argue his case before the judges. In small matters, common sense is the rule and the prince judges accordingly.

guards are necessary in order to meet the requirement that government serve the good of the whole community. But these safeguards may be more or less necessary, and might take a variety of forms. As is the case with his discussion of consent, Locke does not take a position that natural law requirements are so strict that there have only been a handful of legitimate governments in the history of political life.[19] Instead, the theory does provide universal standards of right according to which the legitimacy of governments at any time and place can be judged,[20] but the standards allow for a variety of practical applications and for improvements in them.

Men can improve their understanding of government and of their rights and thereby better provide for the protection of their rights against government. And in the *Second Treatise* Locke is teaching them, particularly with regard to the right of resistance.[21] Since he starts from the premise of individual freedom, Locke's theoretical problem is to find a way to justify political obligation. He must answer the criticisms of those who claim that consent cannot be the basis for lasting obligation and that a right of resistance is simply an open invitation to constant rebellion and anarchy (See *Second Treatise*, pars. 203, 223). But practically, Locke's problem is to encourage men to be sensitive to abuses of power and to be watchful of their rulers. Men are likely to be too obedient. This impression is confirmed by the discussion of resistance at the end of the *Second Treatise*. Locke is reassuring his critics, but at the same time he is exhorting men to be the guardians of their rights.

In response to the critics, Locke repeatedly asserts that men will rebel if they are seriously abused or oppressed regardless of the doctrines they are taught (*Second Treatise*, pars. 208–9, 224–25) and that rebellion in these circumstances is the fault of the oppressors who could have ensured civil peace by using their power for its proper ends (*Second Treatise*, pars. 168, 209, 230, see pars. 226–27). When the abuses become obvious and general and only when they become so, the people will rebel.

But it is Locke who teaches that rebellion of this kind often comes too late, that men ought to "make the design visible" (*Second Treatise*, par. 225), and ought to recognize the danger to the community in abuses against a few. This is the thought that stands behind the distinction between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society that structures the chapter on resistance (*Second Treatise*, par. 211, Tarcov, 1981). Governments are dissolved either through breaches of trust (*Second Treatise*, pars. 221–22) or through alteration of the legislative (*Second Treatise*, pars. 212–20). Breache

[19]This would make him vulnerable to the same charge that he levels at Filmer. See *First Treatise*, pars. 65, 70–71, 104–5, 142, 148, *Second Treatise*, par. 113.

[20]"Clearly, the duty of a subject is the same among the Garamantes and the Indians as among the Athenians and the Romans." *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 197.

[21]For Locke's radicalism on this question see Ashcraft, 1986, and Franklin, 1978.

of trust are abuses that indicate a design to subvert the constitution of the government. They dissolve the government, freeing the people from their obligation to it, but do not dissolve the society, allowing the people to resist effectively and to institute a new government. Alteration of the legislative, on the other hand, does subvert the constitution of the government and thus dissolves government and society together. In these cases, an effective response is unlikely. "To tell *People* they *may provide for themselves*, by erecting a new Legislative, when by Oppression, Artifice, or being delivered over to a Foreign Power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect Relief, when it is too late, and the evil is past Cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first be Slaves, and then to take care of their Liberty, and when their Chains are on, tell them, they may act like Freemen. This, if barely so, is rather Mockery than Relief, and Men can never be secure from Tyranny, if there be no means to escape it, till they have not only a Right to get out of it, but to prevent it" (*Second Treatise*, par. 220). Locke is teaching men to "take care of their Liberty", to act before it is too late.

And men need this education. They are only too likely to remain attached to their traditional forms of government, to be resistant to change, to be obedient out of habit to the recognized authorities even in the face of abuses (*Second Treatise*, par. 223). They seem to share the conservative disposition of their tribal forebears. In the *Second Treatise* Locke teaches men what their rights are, but also that they must defend them. His project is prescriptive. And this is what explains the disparity between his theory and his description of what men have been like. Men ought to be different from what they have been until now. Traditional, authoritarian, paternalistic political attitudes ought to be replaced by the political primacy of the concern for individual rights rationally defended.[22]

III

Locke's project has a similar aim in the intellectual realm. In this area too, men have not been as Locke would have them be. And again, the anthropological evidence he uses in his argument can give an impression that differs somewhat from the impression given by the argument itself. Locke uses anthropological evidence in order to refute the doctrine of innate ideas. If moral principles were innate, it would be impossible to account for the wide variety of customs present in human societies. Locke cites evidence of societies with practices that violate the most obvious rules of morality and natural law, for example ritual suicide, infanticide, patricide, and cannibalism. He tells of a people in Peru who breed and fatten children in order

[22] It is worth noting that in the preface to the *Two Treatises* Locke says that the English saved their nation on account of their "love of their just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them," rather than out of their love for England per se.

to eat them (*First Treatise*, pars. 57–59, *Essay* I.3.9–12; *Essays on the Law of Nature*, pp 169–77). Locke emphasizes the strength of custom in leading men away from reason and nature. "And when Fashion hath once Established, what Folly or Craft began, Custom makes it Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to contradict or question it. He that will impartially survey the Nations of the World, will find so much of their Governments, Religions, and Manners brought in and continued amongst them by these means, that he will have but little Reverence for the Practices which are in use and credit amongst Men, and will have Reason to think, that the Woods and Forests, where the irrational untaught inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to give us Rules, than Cities and Palaces, where those that call themselves Civil and Rational, go out of their way by the Authority of Example" (*First Treatise*, par 58, see also *On the Reasonableness of Christianity*, par. 238, *Second Treatise*, par 94)

This stands in sharp contrast to the picture of the Lockean individual as a man who follows the dictates of his nature through a rational calculus of pleasures and pains to maximize the satisfaction of his individual material interests There is evidence for this picture too in Locke For example, "Some (and for the most part the most pressing) *uneasiness* determines the *Will* and sets us upon those Actions we perform" (*Essay*, II 21 31), "And thus we see that our Allwise Maker has put into Man the *uneasiness* of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their Seasons, to move and determine their *Wills*, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their Species" (*Essay* II 21 34, see also II 7 3–4, II 21 42) Men are primarily moved by pleasures and pains in a manner that serves the natural end of preservation

But pleasures and pains can be educated (*Essay* II 21 34–44, 46, 53), and the strongest influence in their education is the praise and blame of those around us The law of opinion or reputation is often the strongest of the moral laws There are very few men, not "one of ten thousand," who can bear the constant disapprobation of their peers (*Essay* II 28 12, see I 3 25, IV 15 6) The pain of shame and the pleasure of esteem are powerful motivators ("Thoughts Concerning Education," pars 48, 53, 56–63) Most men, finally, govern their behavior according to traditional rules and common opinions (*Essay* IV 20 17–18, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p 129, 135, "Thoughts Concerning Education," par 146) These opinions are acquired from infancy, and having forgotten that they were learned, men often mistake them for innate ideas (*Essay*, I 3 23) [23]

As in the case of the political discussion, Locke gives full recognition to the power of the traditional, the habitual, the customary, and the social, and

[23] Does Locke recognize here that a "role or commitment could define me so completely that I could not understand myself without it" (Sandel, 1984, p 86)?

here too he seeks to liberate men from their influence (See Parry, 1964, p. 166–68) But it takes considerable effort to free the mind from the prejudices and opinions of one's associates Locke is interested in encouraging this effort towards independent reason, though he does not expect that most men will succeed in it (*Essay* IV.16 4, IV 20 2–3, 6, see I 3 22–26) Most men need a simple and clear religion for moral guidance since they have neither the capacity nor the leisure for lengthy moral demonstrations (*On the Reasonableness of Christianity*, pars 243, 252) And Locke's own prescription for a gentleman's education relies heavily on habit, custom, praise and blame, and the desire to be respected (Tarcov, 1984, pp 77–123) Yet Locke does seek to destroy the authority of custom and tradition as sources of knowledge or standards of truth despite their influence over men's behavior (*Essay* IV 15, IV 16, IV 20 17, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, pp 127–31) The major thrust of his epistemology is to show that reason alone is sufficient as a source of knowledge of the principles by which men can guide their conduct (*Essay* I 1 5–8, IV 15 1–2, IV 18) His *Conduct of the Understanding* is a primer in how to liberate the mind from the tyranny of prejudice and received opinion Its main principles are that every question must be approached with indifference, without wishing that any particular opinion on the question should turn out to be true and that one's own opinions must be subjected to thorough examination (*Conduct*, pars 11, 12, see *Essay* IV 19 1) No opinion is to be exempted in principle from rational examination

The effort to overcome the influence of authoritative tradition and received dogmas is not only an effort to liberate the individual intellect as far as possible, but also an effort to diminish party conflict, and particularly to replace partisan appeals to orthodoxy with reasoned political deliberation Customs, prejudices and religious dogmas are instruments of political authority, used to give a false legitimacy to the claims of absolute monarchs (*Second Treatise*, pars 92, 94) Received opinions and one's loyalty to them are at the root of party contests (*Essay* II 33 18 IV 20 17–18 see IV 3 20) Partisanship in politics and religion is inherently unreasonable and is a reflection of the partiality in men that a rational politics seeks to overcome Partisanship is the great enemy of civil peace

Locke's animosity towards political parties is sensible precisely because of his understanding of the power of prejudice in politics If Locke had posited a polity composed of self-interested rational actors he might have imagined a politics of bargaining and coalition formation between relatively benign groups But there is nothing of this sort of pluralistic liberalism anywhere in his work The terms of discussion in the *Second Treatise* include individuals the people or society, and the government—without mention of any social or political subgroups And when Locke does refer to party politics, it is to condemn party activity in no uncertain terms For the executive to attempt to corrupt legislators or electors to secure a favorable majority in the assembly

is "as perfect a Declaration of a design to subvert the Government, as is possible to be met with" (*Second Treatise*, par 222) Such corruption of legislative judgment is cause for resistance. The decisions of the government are to be based on "mature debate" (*Second Treatise*, par 222) At the very least, legislators who are not precommitted must engage one another in a deliberative process

Locke knew that the usual thing is party conflict and the use of dogma as an instrument of political power The usual thing is for men to be governed by their prejudices This is what he describes But his theoretical treatment is normative and prescriptive party politics and authoritative dogmas are to be combated, men can do better than this Locke's position is not based upon a faulty sociological claim, but on a certain understanding of man's capacities for reflection and choice and on an argument that it is better for political life for men to cultivate those capacities [24]

IV

By considering Locke's use of anthropological evidence, it has become clear that Lockean individualism is not what it is often thought to be First, it is not social atomism Locke makes no claim that men ever lived in isolation from their fellows Man's natural condition is to be embedded in a series of social relations throughout life Second, men are not rational maximizers of utility. Locke does not describe men according to the model economic man of contemporary theory By and large, their conduct in life is not governed by the independent calculation of how best to satisfy their individual interests On the contrary, their conduct is most likely to be governed by common opinions and beliefs as to what constitutes a happy and respectable life And men are often led to quite unreasonable things on the basis of these powerful social norms [25]

In both the political and the epistemological discussions, Locke gives full recognition to the importance of the social And in both cases, what he does

[24] See Zvesper (1984 p 63) although Locke might escape the charge that his epistemology and his politics were as sociologically innocent as they may seem he would not avoid but would rather insist upon distancing himself from the tendency to displace nature and reason by convention or tradition in politics Locke's insistence on the possibility of enlightened politics leaves him open to the charge that he was in this way too optimistic

On the other hand those who deny the possibility of an alternative to convention or tradition in politics' might not escape the charge that they are politically innocent —that they do not adequately confront the implications of their position for partisanship in politics How are shared understandings' (Walzer 1983 pp 14 29 313 14) and constitutive attachments (Sandel, 1984) to be distinguished from prejudices and blind partisan loyalties? And if there is nothing beyond 'shared understandings how do we deal with the typical political situation where values are not shared?

[25] See Tarcov (1983) for another argument that Lockean individualism has been misunderstood and that Lockeanism is not simply atomistic materialistic hedonistic and self-interested

is to try to alter radically its relation to politics Social bonds are natural and strong, but they do not imply political obligations Political relations can only be created by consent in accordance with the premise of natural freedom Similarly, Locke acknowledges that a concern for the good opinion of others is a powerful motivating force and that men's beliefs and their conduct are strongly influenced by what we would call "socialization " But his response to this is to treat education as the responsibility of the private institutions of family and church, to teach toleration and the authority of reason, to isolate controversial religious opinion from the sphere of politics, and to limit that sphere to the protection of individual rights and the pursuit of the public good understood in terms of peace and prosperity Custom and traditional opinion are to lose much of their political importance Locke depoliticizes the social

In one sense, then, Locke is not so "individualistic" after all His political doctrine is perfectly compatible with community in many forms and with strong communal institutions In another sense, Locke means to make men more "individualistic" more suspicious of authority, less likely to take anything on faith Locke's individualism is to be found in his assertion of individual natural rights and in his encouragement of independent individual thought His object in both cases is to combat authoritarianism to combat the subjection of any man to the will of another politically or intellectually and particularly where intellectual oppression is a tool of political oppression Locke means to make men independent judges of the truth and watchful guardians of their rights

A convincing attack on liberal individualism of this Lockean sort would have to do at least one of the following It would have to attack the true individualistic premise of Locke's thought which is the normative proposition that men are by nature free and equal It might go on to demonstrate how political obligations can be grounded in involuntary social relationships Lastly, the heart of the argument would be a case for choosing a politics based on communal attachments and traditions over a politics that emphasizes voluntary political action based on reflection and choice This is an argument concerning a moral choice The two sides face off not over the question of whether or not men are social, but over the question of the place their social attachments ought to have in their adult lives The challenge to the liberal individualists is to show either that individualism is not identical to egoism or loneliness (that there are liberal forms of community) or that if it is, political freedom is worth the price The challenge to the communitarians is to show either that a communitarianism that attacks liberal individualism can nonetheless produce nonauthoritarian communities [*] or that if it can't community is worth the price A repetition of the facts of human sociality comes nowhere near to settling this argument

[*] "The communitarian critics want us to live in Salem but not to believe in witches" (Gutmann 1985 p 319)

References

Ashcraft, Richard 1968 Locke's State of Nature Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? *American Political Science Review* 62 898–915

——— 1986 *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* Princeton Princeton University

Batz, William G 1974 The Historical Anthropology of John Locke *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35 663–70

Dunn, John 1967 Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke *Historical Journal*, 10 153–82

——— 1969 *The Political Thought of John Locke* Cambridge Cambridge University

The First Set of the Fundamental Constitutions of South Carolina as compiled by John Locke 1836 In B R Carroll, ed , *Historical Collections of South Carolina*, 2 362–90 New York Harper

Franklin Julian 1978 *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Revolution in the Political Thought of the English Revolution* Cambridge Cambridge University

Grant, Ruth 1987 *John Locke s Liberalism* Chicago University of Chicago

Gutmann Amy 1985 Communitarian Critics of Liberalism *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 308–22

Herzog Don 1985 *Without Foundations Justification in Political Theory* Ithaca Cornell University

Hume, David 1963 Of the Original Contract In *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* Oxford Oxford University

Laslett Peter ed , 1963 *John Locke Two Treatises of Government* rev ed Cambridge Cambridge University

Locke, John 1670 MS f 8 July 20 Lovelace Collection Bodleian Library Oxford

——— 1824 A Second Letter Concerning Toleration In *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes*, 12th ed, 5 59–138 London

——— 1824 A Third Letter Concerning Toleration In *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* 12th ed 5 139 228 London

——— 1954 *Essays on the Law of Nature* W von Leyden ed Oxford Clarendon

——— 1955 *A Letter Concerning Toleration* P Romanell ed 2d ed Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill

——— 1963 *Two Treatises of Government* P Laslett, ed rev ed Cambridge Cambridge University

——— 1965 *On the Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures* G Ewing ed , Gateway Editions Chicago Henry Regnery

——— 1968 Some Thoughts Concerning Education In J Axtell ed *The Educational Writings of John Locke* Cambridge Cambridge University

——— 1968 Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman In J Axtell ed *The Educational Writings of John Locke* Cambridge Cambridge University

——— 1971 *Conduct of the Understanding* T Fowler, ed New York Franklin

——— 1979 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* P Nidditch ed Oxford Clarendon

MacIntyre, Alasdair 1984 *After Virtue*, 2d ed Notre Dame Indiana University of Notre Dame

Macpherson, C B 1962 *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Hobbes to Locke* Oxford Clarendon Press

Parry, Geraint 1964 Individuality Politics and the Critique of Paternalism in John Locke *Political Studies*, 12 163–77

Pateman, Carole 1979 *The Problem of Political Obligation* Chichester, England John Wiley

Pitkin, Hanna 1965 Obligation and Consent—I *American Political Science Review*, 59 990–99

——— 1966 Obligation and Consent—II *American Political Science Review*, 60 39–52

Plamenatz, J P 1963 *Man and Society*, 2 vols London Longmans, Green

Pocock, J G A 1957 *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* Cambridge Cambridge University

Resnick, David 1984 Locke and the Rejection of the Ancient Constitution *Political Theory*, 12 97–114

Riley, Patrick 1974 On Finding an Equilibrium between Consent and Natural Law in Locke's Political Philosophy *Political Studies*, 22 432–52

Sandel, Michael 1982 *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* Cambridge Cambridge University

——— 1984 The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self *Political Theory* 12 81–96

Schochet, Gordon 1975 *Patriarchalism in Political Thought The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth-Century England* Oxford Blackwell

Seliger, Martin 1968 *The Liberal Politics of John Locke* London Allen and Unwin

Simmons, A John 1979 *Moral Principles and Political Obligations* Princeton Princeton University

Skinner, Quentin 1965 History and Ideology in the English Revolution *The Historical Journal* 13 151–78

Tarcov, Nathan 1981 Locke's Second Treatise and the Best Fence Against Rebellion *Review of Politics* 43 198–217

——— 1983 A Non-Lockean Locke and the Character of Liberalism In D Maclean and C Mills eds *Liberalism Reconsidered* Totowa NJ Rowman and Allenheld

——— 1984 *Locke's Education for Liberty* Chicago University of Chicago

Taylor, Charles 1985 *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* Cambridge Cambridge University

Tully, James 1980 *A Discourse on Property John Locke and His Adversaries* Cambridge Cambridge University

Walzer Michael 1970 *Obligations Essays on Disobedience War and Citizenship* Cambridge Harvard University

——— 1980 *Radical Principles Reflections of an Unreconstructed Democrat* New York Basic Books

——— 1983 *Spheres of Justice A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* New York Basic Books

——— 1984 Liberalism and the Art of Separation *Political Theory* 12 315–30

Wolff, Robert Paul 1968 *The Poverty of Liberalism* Boston Beacon

Zvesper John 1984 The Utility of Consent in Locke's Political Philosophy *Political Studies* 32 55–67

Southern Partisan Changes: Dealignment, Realignment or Both?*

Harold W. Stanley
University of Rochester

This paper draws on presidential and congressional surveys between 1952 and 1984 in order to survey the extent of southern partisan changes and to evaluate the electoral evidence for realignment or dealignment. The partisan balance in the South has shifted in recent years, but no consensus exists about whether these changes constitute realignment or dealignment. Native southern whites—both young and old—have accounted for the largest share of the changes. Settling on a single term to summarize the changes is an oversimplification since aspects of both realignment and dealignment have characterized the South. Southern Republicans have profited from the decreased importance of parties in a still-Democratic region, but since partisanship means less in some senses, Republican consolidation is constrained and the significance of the Democratic decline restricted.

Students of realignment in the United States have a special concern with the eleven states of the former confederacy. The partisan changes inside the South have overwhelmed the changes outside the South. Between 1952 and 1984, Democrats in the South declined by 22 percentage points, in the rest of the nation by only five percentage points. Independents rose by 13 percentage points in the South but by only two percentage points in the nonsouth. Republicans in the South increased by 18 percentage points, in the nonsouth by only three percentage points.[1]


There can be no doubt about southern partisan change (figure 1), but the significance of such change is uncertain. Do these changes signal realignment or dealignment? For the past two decades, scholars have come to strik-

*An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, Tennessee, 7–9 November 1985. The helpful comments of Larry Bartels, Charles D. Hadley, John McGlennon, Michael Wolkoff and the anonymous reviewers for the *Journal of Politics* are gratefully noted. The data utilized in this work were made available in part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for the American National Election Studies, 1952-1984, were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[1]The gap in the South between the 22 percentage point drop by Democrats and the 31 percentage point gain by Republicans and Independents is attributable to the decline in the proportion of apoliticals, primarily southern blacks, since the 1950s. Following Keith et al. (1986), partisans are defined to include those who initially claim independence but later indicate they lean toward the party as well as those who claim strong or weak identification with a party.

FIGURE 1

PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE SOUTH, 1952–1984



Note: Partisans include weak and strong identifiers as well as independents who lean toward the party.

ingly different conclusions about southern partisan changes. Realignment, dealignment, and continued Democratic dominance have been argued by different scholars, often using the same data base.[2] More Republican victories and the increased Republican identification of recent years make arguments for continued Democratic dominance look increasingly weaker, but at the state and local levels this position has greater merit.

[2]Most scholars utilize the SRC/CPS survey data for presidential election years. The following is a partial list of scholars and positions taken on southern partisan changes: (1) the South has politically realigned (Bartley and Graham 1975, pp. 196–97; Campbell 1977a, p. 37; and

While some may see the realignment or dealignment debate as a disput over mere labels, the labels reflect different understandings about what ha occurred and what this portends (Beck, 1979) The concept of realignmen can be defined to cover more than changes within the electorate (Clubb Flanigan, and Zingale, 1980) but electoral changes alone constitute a com mon focus for analysis Changes within the support coalitions for the parties one strand of thinking about electoral realignment (Petrocik, 1981, Stanley Bianco, and Niemi, 1986), are not explored here in order to concentrate o the components of partisan changes and the attitudes and behavior of par tisans towards the parties Here, "realignment" will signify durable altera tions in the partisan balance of identifiers, "dealignment" a decline in th centrality of parties to citizen political orientations and behavior Dealign ment need not entail abandonment of partisanship A weakening of party ti and of the significance of partisanship can suffice to suggest dealignment

Definitions of the terms vary, but realignment and dealignment are ofte discussed as alternatives Analysts of partisan changes typically conclude tha either one or the other has occurred Some view dealignment as a precurso of realignment, eroding partisan alignments, to make individuals more sus ceptible to realigning forces Ultimately, events, issues and elite response help determine whether a realignment actually occurs Yet dealignmen need not be followed by realignment (Burnham, 1969, LeDuc, 1985) A pe riod of dealignment could endure for years or be followed by a reversion t the previous partisan alignments

Moreover, realignment and dealignment need not be mutually exclusiv (Schneider, 1982, p 451) Realigning and dealigning forces can be simulta neously present One could anticipate that Republican growth in identifier adds less committed partisans to the party's base—unless the partisan zeal o new converts matches that of the old Also, Democratic decline could mea the shedding of less committed partisans for a more intensely partisa base—unless those who remain Democrats share increased disenchantmen with parties in general and the Democratic Party in particular In brief, a the partisan balance shifts, the force and significance of partisanship ma strengthen or weaken

Therefore, a broad review of the evidence on partisan changes in the elec torate is essential in order to assess the relative merits of realignment, de alignment, or a mixed verdict about southern partisan changes The weigh

---

1977b, pp 755–56, Hadley and Howell, 1980, pp 147–48, Petrocik, 1987, Schreiber, 1971 p 161, Seagull, 1975, p 18 Wolfinger and Arseneau, 1978, p 206, and Wolfinger and Hagen 1985, pp 8–9), (2) no southern realignment has occurred Democratic dominance countinue (Converse, 1966, p 212, and 1972, pp 310, 315–16, Prysby, 1980, p 125, and Scammon an Barnes, 1985), and (3) the South has undergone dealignment (Beck, 1977, pp 480, 484, an Gatlin, 1975, p 50) A discussion of these dissonant conclusions and the data management dec sions behind part of them can be found in Hadley (1981)

of the evidence available should guide analysis The fact and firmness of partisan identification can and should be supplemented by consideration of other indicators of the centrality of party to the individual This raises the evidentiary requirements for a dealignment or realignment, but since realignment and dealignment have pervasive implications for parties in the electorate, evidence about the meaning of party in contexts other than identification is germane If the partisan balance has shifted and partisanship remains central to the behavior and attitudes of partisans, then realignment is the sensible conclusion and dealignment can be ruled out Yet if partisanship has become less significant for the behavior and attitudes of partisans than it was before the party balance shifted, the conclusion that both realigning and dealigning forces are present seems apt

This paper draws on congressional and presidential surveys between 1952 and 1984 in order to survey the extent of southern partisan changes and evaluate the electoral evidence for realignment and dealignment The issues to address go beyond partisan identification to include voting choices and general attitudes toward the parties Such attitudes include likes and dislikes of the parties and candidates, feelings toward the parties, the sense of differences between the parties, and the sense that one's party is best able to handle the most important national problem These indicators give more extended readings of attitudes toward the parties to help determine whether partisanship in the South means the same as it did prior to the changes

COMPONENTS OF SOUTHERN PARTISAN CHANGE


The partisan changes exhibited in figure 1 understate southern changes since whites and blacks have moved in opposite directions In the aggregate, as blacks have moved to stronger Democratic sympathies whites have displayed declining Democratic attachments (figure 2) Blacks were responding to the civil rights stances of the Democratic and Republican parties (Campbell, 1979, pp 274–75) Some scholars have attributed the white drift from the Democrats to the same source but, as others have shown, this conclusion has little supporting evidence from the surveys [1]

Rather than reopen this debate about causes direct comparisons of the relative importance of the changes in partisan identification by blacks, whites, natives and migrants can shed helpful light on the components of the change Three groups account for the major southern partisan changes Rela-

[1]Lamis (1984) provides a provocative account of race and partisan change Beck (1977 pp 492–94) as well as Wolfinger and Arseneau (1978 pp 200–202) provide thorough analyses of the available survey data, finding that racial backlash fails to explain the decline in Democratic identifiers Even for 1984 when Jesse Jackson mobilized black voters and Ronald Reagan had special appeal to southern whites two scholars concluded "The 1984 NES data offer no support to the proposition that racial issues were an important feature of the election for southern whites" (Wolfinger and Hagen 1985 p 12) See also Stanley (1986)

FIGURE 2

PARTY IDENTIFICATION WHITE SOUTHERNERS, 1952–1984



Note Partisans include weak and strong identifiers as well as independents who lean toward the party

tively more Republican individuals have migrated into the South Native southern blacks have grown more partisan, particularly more Democratic and native southern whites—both young and old—have grown less Democratic, more independent, and more Republican [4]

[4] One can ask what southern partisanship would have been if blacks and whites who migrated out of the south had remained in the region, assuming the partisanship they hold in the non South is what it would be had they remained in the South The relatively small size of this group and its partisan similarity to those who actually remained in the South help make its impact on regional partisanship minor, accounting for only one-half to one-sixth of the impact of migrants into the South

Measuring the contributions of changes by different groups to the regional changes follows in the steps of Beck, who calculated for 1972 the relative magnitudes of partisan changes by particular segments of the southern population. For example, consider the impact of partisan changes by native southern whites. The partisanship of the South is calculated for each year as if native southern whites retained their partisan loyalties of 1952. That reconstructed figure for each later year is compared with the actual regional pattern for each later year to reveal the difference made by partisan changes among native white southerners. Similar calculations are made as if native southern blacks retained their partisan patterns of 1952 in later years and as if migrants to the South had never arrived.[5]

For intelligibility, rather than chart the actual figures for all 14 election surveys through 1984, the trend lines from regressing the differences on time for each component of change are reported.[6] This smooths the fluctuations that are inevitable in survey sampling (as well as the fluctuations attributable to special circumstances), but presents the trend line best describing the differences each group made between 1956 and 1984. Extrapolating from trend lines is easily done, but nothing restricts the future to resemble the past.

The trend lines are relative to what southern partisanship would have been in the later years without the particular change in question. Thus the baseline (a difference of zero) is not constant over the years but reflects the data points displayed in figure 1 which track Democratic decline and the Republican and independent gains. For the trend lines, negative differences indicate that the change in question reduced the size of a partisan category; positive differences indicate an increase.


The results clearly convey the significance of partisan changes by native southern whites to the regional changes (figure 3). Since native southern whites make up about two-thirds of the southern voting-age population over this period, even small changes by this group would have large regional ramifications. Native southern blacks and white migrants each now make up about half of the remaining third of the southern voting-age population. Since the early 1970s, the movement by blacks toward the Democrats has offset the Republican boost attributable to in-migration.

[5] Following Beck (1977), migrants include blacks as well as whites who moved into the South. Thus the three groups in figure 3 contain all southerners. Blacks made up fewer than 4% of all migrants into the South between 1952 and 1984.

[6] The 1962 survey does not report where respondents were born or grew up, thus cannot be used to analyze changes by natives and migrants. The trend lines in figure 3 accurately reflect the data points, the correlation coefficients for the trend lines averaging 0.7. In figure 4 the correlation coefficients average 0.4, indicating that the trend lines display far more regularity than the data contain. Yet replacing the trend lines with the actual data points would complicate the figure without altering the conclusion—partisan changes within each generation have made roughly similar contributions to the overall changes.

FIGURE 3

BLACK AND WHITE PARTISAN CHANGE AND MIGRATION IMPACTS ON SOUTHERN PARTISANSHIP, 1956–1984



Note The lines indicate the estimated trends for the difference between the regions actual partisan levels each year and what the region's partisanship would have been without the partisan changes since 1952 for each group In the case of migrants, the calculations involve removing the migrants from the population

D = Democrat
I = Independent
R = Republican
B = Native Southern Black
M = Migrant
N = Native Southern White

Migrants, particularly migrant whites, have been considered a key force in southern partisan changes. While this was true in earlier years, it recently has become a relatively smaller force for changes in partisan identification. In-migration made little difference to the growth in independence, but without the migrants Republican identification would have been three to four points lower and Democratic identification higher by the same margin over the 1956 to 1984 period. These flat trends figured prominently in partisan changes in the early years, but the trends by native southern whites soon surpassed them. The migrants may have mattered more than these figures suggest. If the greater Republican propensity of the in-migrants proved infectious, restricting analysis to the partisan difference their presence produced underestimates the effect of migrants on southern partisan changes.

Native southern whites have accounted for most of the decline in Democratic identification. Democratic identification was 20 percentage points lower in 1984 than it would have been if native southern whites retained their 1952 Democratic loyalties. Likewise, native southern whites accounted for the bulk of the movement toward the Republicans and toward independence: the region would have been 7 percentage points less independent and 16 points less Republican in 1984 if native southern whites had retained their 1952 partisan ties.[7]

Changes among native southern whites account for the greatest partisan changes, but which native southern whites have contributed more to the changes? Are the younger generations acquiring patterns of partisanship different from the ones displayed by their elders, suggesting generational replacement is a substantial explanation of southern partisan change? Or are the older generations changing the most, suggesting without proving that conversion accounts for the largest chunk of the native southern white change?

To answer these questions, a similar procedure calculates what regional partisanship would have been without the changes by the younger and the older native southern whites. Unfortunately, young and old are not precise terms, suggesting particular categories. Scholars have divided the generations differently. For instance, Beck used 1946 as the dividing line, demarcating Solid South and Postwar generations. Wolfinger and Arseneau distinguished those who acquired the vote in 1960 and before with those whose first vote for president occurred in 1964 or later (Wolfinger and Arseneau, 1978). The latter alternative is followed here. Events surrounding the presidential election of 1964 marked a watershed in terms of the parties and the South (Pomper, 1972). The Solid South was built around the identification of

[7]The Republican figure is an outlier since the trend line approximates only a ten percentage point difference for 1984. If similarly large changes occur subsequently, native white southerners will be registering an accelerating rate of change toward the Republicans.

the Democratic party with the cause of white supremacy. Events before 1964 gave white southerners pause about the linkage between the Democratic party and white supremacy, but the 1964 election, passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 altered in the minds of most the positions of the national parties on racial issues.[8]

If we split native white southerners into generations as discussed, we find that both generations have contributed substantially to partisan changes (figure 4). The analysis producing figure 4—again, following Beck—involves separate calculations holding each generation to its 1964 level of partisanship, then recalculating the resulting regional partisanship. The differences between the actual regional partisanship and the recalculated regional partisanship in a later year are the changes attributable to partisan changes within each generation. Because the relative sizes of the generations change over the years, a separate calculation takes the partisanship of each generation in the later years, reweighted to reflect the proportion of the population constituted by that generation in 1964, then calculates the difference between the actual regional partisanship and that of the reconstruction. This difference reflects the partisan changes attributable to the shifting size of the generations within the population.


Changes by those native whites entering the electorate before 1964 have made the region more Republican by slightly more than three percentage points. Those changes have made the region four to six points less Democratic, although this impact has declined over the years. Native white southerners entering the electorate in 1964 and later have made an increasingly larger contribution to Republican identification in the region and to the decline in Democratic identification. The trend lines suggest somewhat different impacts, but do not support the conclusion that partisan changes within one generation have made a greater contribution to the overall changes than another.

The effects of within-generation partisan change may be similar in size, but generational replacement has produced additional partisan shifts. The younger generation of native southern whites, even in 1964, has been less Democratic, more independent and more Republican than its elders. By 1984, generational replacement made the South five percentage points less Democratic and two percentage points more Republican. As the younger generation has made up more of the population, the partisan impact of its increasing size has reinforced the effects of its partisan changes after 1964. Thus, region-wide partisan change among southern whites derives in large measure from the younger generation.

[8]Dividing the generations into those of voting age before 1964 and those coming-of age in 1964 and later understates the impact produced by events of 1964 and 1965. Older voters (the younger, the more impressionable) were also affected. As Beck shows, the partisanship of the postwar generation of white southerners differed dramatically from that of the Solid South generation (Beck, 1977, p. 488).

FIGURE 4

PARTISAN CHANGE AMONG YOUNG AND OLD NATIVE SOUTHERN WHITES IMPACTS ON SOUTHERN PARTISANSHIP, 1956–1984



Note The lines indicate the estimated trend for the difference between the regions actual partisan levels each year and what the regions partisanship would have been without the partisan changes since 1964 for each generation For the impact of the shifts in the relative size of the generations the calculations involve holding each generation to their 1964 proportion of the population The young are those who first voted for president in 1964 or later The old are those who first voted for president in 1960 or earlier

D = Democrat
I = Independent
R = Republican

Pre - Able to vote for President before 1964
Post - Able to vote for President in 1964 or after
Size Pre and Post held to 1964 proportions

DEALIGNMENT, REALIGNMENT, OR BOTH. PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

Partisan changes are prominent in the South, but what should they be called? Is realignment or dealignment the appropriate conclusion? Trends in partisan identification (figures 1 and 2) seem to support both dealignment and realignment readings since 1952 the percentage of Democrats has declined, the percentages of Republicans and independents have risen. Yet these trends for 1952 to 1984 mask the more recent pattern. Since 1966, the Democratic percentage has continued to decline, the independent share has remained essentially flat, and only the Republican percentage has increased. Naturally, counting independent leaners with partisans makes the share of independents smaller, but the flat trend since 1966 holds true whether or not we include leaners with partisans. Thus, even though independence—however defined—is greater than it was prior to the 1960s, dealignment seems an inappropriate description of southern partisan changes since 1966.

Discounting dealignment makes realignment look more reasonable. Yet shifts in partisan identification are only one indication pertinent to the realignment or dealignment debate. A larger question concerns the centrality of parties to the political orientation of citizens. Even if more individuals identify as partisans, identification may mean less in terms of evaluating the relative merits of the parties and candidates and voting for party nominees. This underscores the need to go beyond identification to consider voting choices and general attitudes toward the parties: partisan voting loyalties, the perception of general party differences, preferences for partisan handling of the respondent's most important national problem and relative feelings for the parties and candidates.[9]

Should the analysis be extended to all southerners or only a subset? The previous discussion of the components of southern partisan changes suggests the appropriateness of a concentration on all southern whites. Migrants and native whites, young and old, have become more Republican and Independent as well as less Democratic. Blacks stood apart from these trends. Southern blacks have acquired stronger partisan ties since the 1950s and have shown strong Democratic voting loyalties. For this and other reasons, blacks can be considered to have realigned (Campbell, 1979, pp. 274–75). Consequently, the subsequent consideration of the evidence for realignment and dealignment will focus on southern whites.

[9]If different shares of individual partisans identify strongly with a party over the years, differences in the measures explored later may result not from the changing meaning of partisan identification, but from a simple shift in strength of identification. Among southern whites, the proportion of strong identifiers in each party between 1952 and 1984 shows some fluctuations but no shift among Republicans. Among Democrats, strong identifiers are more frequent prior to 1964 (approximately 45%) than afterwards (approximately 33%). This difference suggests the need for caution in comparing the 1950s with later years for the Democrats.

Voting Loyalties of Partisan Identifiers

Whether partisans vote for their party's candidates is one measure of the meaning of partisan identification. Partisan voting by identifiers in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections since 1952 is displayed in Table 1. Except for the special circumstances of the three-way race of 1968 and the Carter candidacy in 1976, self-identified Republicans have cast over 90% of their votes for the Republican presidential candidate. Southern white Democratic identifiers have shown far less loyalty to the Democrat at the top of the ticket. The support of white Democratic identifiers peaked at 76% with the Johnson candidacy of 1964. Democratic loyalty dipped to 40% in the face of the 1968 Wallace candidacy and then to 29% in 1972 with McGovern's candidacy. In other years, southern white Democratic identifiers have cast 59% to 69% of their votes for the Democratic presidential candidate.

Compared with behavior toward the top of the ticket, southern white Democrats have shown greater loyalty to Democratic candidates for U.S. senator, governor, and U.S. representative, while southern white Republicans have been much less supportive of Republican nominees.[10] The lack of serious Republican contenders in some cases undoubtedly accounts for some of the early Republican defection, just as the continued preponderance of Democratic incumbents works to increase Republican defections (Hutcheson, 1975). Consider the figures for the years starting with 1970, years marked by greater Republicans contesting and success. Since 1970, the voting loyalty of Democrats to their party's Senate candidate averaged 81%; the Republican average was a similar but lower 76%. The corresponding averages for gubernatorial voting widen in favor of the Democrats: 88% for Democrats and 81% for Republicans. In partisan voting for the House, the gap is even more pro-Democratic: 82% for Democrats but only 63% for Republicans. This wide gap can be misleading since southern white Democrats have clearly declined in partisan voting for House candidates. In 1966 and before, over 90% of southern white Democrats cast votes for the Democratic candidate. Between 1968 and 1978, 84% to 89% did so. Since 1980, only 72% to 76% have voted Democratic. Even so, these lower figures for the later

[10] Comparable figures for nonsouthern whites reveal that, as in the South, Republicans are more loyal supporters of the party's presidential nominee. However, the gap is much greater in the South. Southern Democratic whites have averaged 15 percentage points lower voting loyalty than their nonsouthern counterparts since 1952. Republican whites in the South have averaged five percentage points more loyalty than those in the non-South. For the lower offices (House, Senate, Governor) the reverse generally holds: southern white Democrats show greater voting loyalty than northern ones; southern Republicans show the same or lower loyalty. Consider voting in gubernatorial elections. Since 1970 Democratic whites have averaged 88% voting loyalty in the South, 74% in the non-South. Republicans in the two regions averaged a similar intermediate loyalty level of 81%.

TABLE 1

PARTY LOYALTY OF SOUTHERN WHITE PARTISAN IDENTIFIERS IN VOTING FOR PRESIDENT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SENATE AND GOVERNOR, 1952–1984

	President			
Year	Democrat		Republican	
1952	59	(139)	96	(24)
1956	67	(162)	98	(42)
1960	67	(196)	91	(64)
1964	76	(381)	93	(126)
1968	40	(224)	86	(100)
1972	29	(164)	95	(96)
1976	69	(343)	87	(226)
1980	60	(119)	94	(86)
1984	66	(129)	98	(118)
Mean	59		93	

	House				Senate				Governor			
Year	Democrat		Republican		Democrat		Republican		Democrat		Republican	
1952	96	(105)	*		94	(51)	*		93	(76)	*	
1956	96	(149)	76	(33)	98	(102)	70	(23)	n a		n a	
1958	96	(111)	*		94	(51)	*		98	(60)	*	
1960	94	(171)	73	(60)	92	(153)	*		n a		n a	
1962	95	(79)	76	(42)	*		*		n a		n a	
1964	92	(348)	70	(111)	82	(183)	62	(78)	92	(264)	*	
1966	91	(70)	78	(27)	59	(44)	*		83	(40)	72	(25)
1968	88	(194)	73	(82)	81	(124)	74	(62)	65	(132)	*	
1970	89	(132)	68	(94)	93	(108)	83	(72)	93	(108)	83	(72)
1972	89	(122)	68	(71)	68	(137)	74	(66)	79	(72)	94	(32)
1974	84	(130)	67	(60)	92	(78)	80	(40)	94	(92)	83	(41)
1976	88	(289)	64	(193)	84	(132)	70	(111)	92	(89)	82	(49)
1978	85	(93)	40	(58)	66	(83)	76	(71)	84	(95)	64	(59)
1980	72	(102)	65	(77)	67	(46)	84	(44)	*		*	
1982	76	(92)	70	(57)	94	(34)	72	(43)	84	(63)	71	(42)
1984	73	(120)	63	(105)	82	(109)	66	(94)	n a		n a	
Presidential Year Mean Since 1970												
	81		65		75		74		86		88	
Nonpresidential Year Mean Since 1970												
	84		61		86		78		89		75	

Note The table entries are the percentage of the southern white partisan identifiers (strong weak, and leaning) who vote for the candidate of their party The sample size for voting partisans is given in parentheses The sample sizes in this and subsequent tables for 1958 1960, 1964 1968, 1970, 1974 and 1976 are weighted figures

An asterisk in lieu of a percentage indicates the unweighted number of respondents fell below twenty N A indicates the pertinent question was not asked in a particular survey

ars compare favorably with the peak points of House voting loyalty by publican identifiers Yet given the almost two-to-one preponderance of :mocratic House incumbents, comparing only favorably is a sign of weak-ss, not of strength If the trend continues, the voting loyalty of southern ute Democrats to House candidates will soon be on a par with that toward :mocratic presidential candidates

The effect of incumbency on partisan voting loyalty can be considered ore explicitly Although small subsample sizes counsel against year-to-year mparisons which would support an analysis of trends, an overview of the 70 to 1984 period confirms that incumbency partially accounts for lower publican party loyalty [11] The presence of relatively more Democratic in-mbents translates into higher Democratic loyalty and higher Republican rtisan defection because of pro-incumbent voting Table 2 reveals high rtisan support for incumbents of one's own party and (except for Demo-its in gubernatorial elections) significant erosions in party loyalty when the umbent is of the opposite party Yet Republican voters find Democratic umbents more attractive than Democratic voters find Republican incum-

TABLE 2

INCUMBENCY AND THE AVERAGE PARTY LOYALTY OF SOUTHERN WHITE PARTISANS IN VOTING FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SENATE AND GOVERNOR 1970–1984

Office (Partisanship of Voter	Democratic Incumbent		Open		Republican Incumbent	
House						
Democrat	94	582	81	64	42	165
Republican	35	278	92	72	90	153
Senate						
Democrat	89	216	76	245	69	107
Republican	59	150	82	(185	92	87
Governor						
Democrat	92	150	85	216	87	31
Republican	58	(59	88	137	88	33

The table entries are the average percentages of the southern white partisan identifiers ong weak and leaning who vote for the candidate of their party The sample size for voting tisans summed across years is given in parentheses The times Senator Byrd of Virginia ran an Independent are excluded

[11]The extent of pro-incumbent voting for the U S House of Representatives is apparently rstated in these surveys for 1978 and later For a discussion of this bias see Gow and Eubank 83 1984) Such bias might account for part of the recent Democratic decline in loyalty as publican incumbents become more numerous but does not explain the failure of Republican alty levels to rise for the same reason

TABLE 3

STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING BY SOUTHERN WHITE PARTISANS IN STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS, 1952–1984

Year	Democrats		Republicans	
1952	80	(131)	44	(23)
1956	89	(157)	44	(41)
1958	88	(93)	*	
1960	84	(182)	60	(63)
1962	73	(88)	33	(51)
1964	71	(372)	40	(120)
1966	73	(85)	35	(34)
1968	43	(220)	46	(96)
1970	70	(152)	45	(102)
1972	34	(157)	37	(85)
1974	64	(128)	27	(68)
1976	n.a.		n.a.	
1978	n.a.		n.a.	
1980	39	(115)	43	(81)
1982	59	(106)	33	(61)
1984	55	(126)	39	(117)
Presidential Year Mean Since 1970				
	43		40	
Nonpresidential Year Mean Since 1970				
	64		35	

Note: The table entries are the proportion of the southern whites in each party who report voting a straight ticket for their party's candidates in state and local elections other than gubernatorial or congressional. The weighted sample size for voting partisans is given in parentheses.

bents, so the pull of incumbency is not the only reason for lower levels of Republican loyalty for these offices.

Southern white Democratic identifiers have become much less likely to vote a straight ticket in state and local elections (table 3). Prior to 1962, over 80% did so. This proportion declined, taking abrupt dives in 1968 and 1972. Figures are unavailable for 1976 and 1978, but the 39% of 1980 has been followed by 59% in 1982 and 55% in 1984, well below the levels of the 1950s and early 1960s. A majority of Republicans, perhaps because of partial contesting at the state and local level, voted a straight Republican ticket only once, in 1960. If a pro-Republican realignment has occurred, it has not boosted straight party line voting by Republicans in state and local elections.

The presidential and non-presidential years made a difference in these partisan voting patterns. A few cases based on small samples pose the risk of overinterpretation, but the figures in tables 1 and 3 show Republicans

tended to be more loyal in presidential election years than in off-years, but the reverse was true for the Democrats.[12]

The patterns of partisan voting in presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, and state and local elections support mixed readings of southern partisan change. At the presidential level, southern white Democrats in 1976 and later are as loyal as they were in the more Solid South years between 1952 and 1960. Below the presidential level, Democrats have shown greater loyalty to Democratic candidates, but in voting for the House of Representatives, Democrats may be converging toward the lower levels of presidential loyalty. Republicans have shown overwhelming loyalty to the top of the ticket but have not behaved the same toward Republican candidates for lesser offices. Election results reflect these patterns, with Republicans making headway at all levels but unable to replicate the gains at the presidential level in congressional or state and local contests. The behavior of Republican identifiers to candidates below the top of the ticket indicates that the growth in Republican identifiers has not raised Republican loyalty levels toward nonpresidential candidates.

The relative loyalty levels mean that despite the 20-point Democratic lead in party identification in 1984 (figure 1), the Republican Party can be considered the majority party in the South for presidential voting. To demonstrate this, assumptions about the expected loyalty of Democrats and Republicans as well as the expected Republican vote of Independents are combined with the size of each group in 1984 to produce rough estimates of vote shares. In 1984, for example, white and black Democratic identifiers made up 52% of the voting-age population, Independents 15%, and Republicans 31%. (Taking turnout into consideration makes only a minor difference: for shares of voters the percentages were 53, 13, and 33, respectively.) These group sizes along with the share of the vote Reagan received from each in 1984 (25%, 71%, and 95%, respectively) or the Republican presidential average for each election from 1952 to 1984 (26%, 60%, and 90%, respectively) mean Republicans can be expected to overcome a 20 percentage point gap in identifiers to reap a majority of the presidential vote in the South. This expected Republican majority is a thin one, ranging from 51% to 53% of the vote. A future Democratic candidate who would attract solid black support while gaining over 40% of the white vote—not even Carter in 1976 secured a majority of the southern white vote—could upset these expectations of a Republican presidential majority in the South.

[12] Presidential years have favored Republican prospects. Of those southern Republicans serving in Congress in 1985, 6 of 10 Senators and 22 of 36 Representatives were originally elected in presidential election years. At the gubernatorial level, the tendency to shield gubernatorial elections from presidential tides by scheduling elections in off-years has meant that only three of the thirteen Republican governors elected in the South between 1961 and 1984 initially won office in a presidential election year.

This expected Republican regional lead for presidential races does not carry over to the lesser offices. Similar calculations for the expected Republican share of the vote for nonpresidential offices generally yield, not an expected majority in the low fifties, but a total in the low forties. Even if we assume a Democratic defection rate similar to that for presidential elections, the generally lower levels of support from Republican identifiers make it tough to marshall Republican majorities. Of course, Republican incumbents can typically expect solid Republican backing and a high rate of Democratic defections (table 2), but electing more Republicans requires inroads into support levels for Democratic incumbents and a rather pro-Republican partisan blend in open seats contests.

Some defection by Democrats remains critical for most Republican electoral successes In pockets of the South, if the relative party proportions are less pro-Democratic or if the partisan turnout differential is sufficiently skewed to favor the Republicans, Republican candidates will be in a position to win without Democratic crossovers Otherwise, future Republican gains below the top of the ticket turn in large part on the success of two opposite tactics courting Democratic voters to defect by downplaying party ties while stressing party ties to encourage less loyal Republican voters to be more faithful The growth in Republican identifiers has not been accompanied by raised Republican loyalty levels toward nonpresidential candidates Republican electoral prospects would be brighter after further dealignment among Democrats if such dealignment did not also affect Republican partisans

General Party Differences and Party Better Able to Cope with the Most Important National Problem

Among southern whites, more Democratic and Republican identifiers have seen important general differences between the parties in the 1980s (table 4) Except for Republicans in 1964 (64%), from 1960 to 1976 only 40% to 49% of each party's identifiers perceived important general differences between the parties But these proportions rose dramatically in 1980 (60% of Democrats, 72% of Republicans) and remained high in 1984 (67% and 72%, respectively)

Another question concerning party differences asks which party is best able to cope with what the respondent identifies as the most important national problem The rising perception of general party differences noted above does not characterize white Democratic southerners in their thinking about which party is best able to handle the most important national problem. Respondents identify different national problems as the most important, but if realignments are issue-based and require opposing stands by parties to which voters respond (Sundquist, 1983), such a question should uncover greater partisan commitment caused by realignment Southern

TABLE 4

GENERAL PARTY DIFFERENCES AND PARTY BEST ABLE TO HANDLE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEM, SOUTHERN WHITE PARTISAN IDENTIFIERS, 1952–1984

	General Party Differences				Party Best Able to Handle Most Important Problem			
Year	Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
1952	38	(247)	35	(43)	n a		n a	
1960	49	(235)	42	(84)	44	(197)	62	(81)
1964	49	(573)	64	(165)	36	(603)	54	(177)
1968	40	(320)	44	(144)	21	(384)	65	(154)
1972	41	(134)	48	(64)	25	(122)	48	(64)
1976	47	(626)	49	(344)	43	(480)	35	(280)
1978	n a		n a		21	(256)	45	(146)
1980	60	(156)	72	(104)	13	(169)	72	(106)
1982	n a		n a		43	(185)	58	(110)
1984	67	(81)	72	(81)	33	(186)	64	(156)

Note The table entries are the proportion of the southern whites in each party who see important general differences between the parties (or think their party is best able to handle the most important national problem they have mentioned) The weighted sample size for partisans is given in parentheses

white Democratic identifiers have been far less likely than their Republican counterparts to think their party is best able to cope with the most important national problem (the sole exception is 1976—table 4) The Democratic highs are in 1960, 1976, and 1982, the Republicans peaks are in 1968, 1980 and 1984 From 1960 to 1968 and in 1980 and afterwards, clear majorities of Republican identifiers think their own party is best able to cope with the most important national problems

The greater perception of party differences in the 1980s by southern white identifiers of both parties is echoed in the willingness of a majority of Republicans to see their party as the one best able to cope with the most important national problem, a tendency not evident among Democrats

Parties and the Candidates Likes, Dislikes, and Feeling Thermometer Scores

When invited to reveal likes and dislikes about the parties and the presidential candidates, the typical southern white Democrat made fewer comments about the parties in 1976 and later than he had previously, but approximately the same number of comments about the candidates (table 5)

Table 5

Evaluation of Parties and Presidential Candidates by Southern White Partisan Identifiers, 1952–1984

	Average Number Mentioned		Net Direction		
Year	Party	Cand	Party	Cand	N
Southern White Democrats					
1952	4.4	3.9	0.9	−0.1	254
1956	3.5	4.3	1.9	0.0	245
1960	3.2	4.5	1.3	0.1	267
1964	3.1	4.4	1.2	1.3	603
1968	3.8	4.5	0.4	−0.1	384
1972	2.4	3.1	0.5	−1.4	304
1976	2.8	4.3	1.1	1.0	626
1980	2.5	4.4	1.0	0.8	206
1984	2.8	4.7	1.4	1.7	235
Southern White Republicans					
1952	5.1	3.9	−2.8	−2.5	43
1956	2.8	3.8	−1.5	3.1	76
1960	3.8	5.3	−2.8	3.4	100
1964	3.7	4.9	−2.3	−2.7	177
1968	4.7	5.9	3.3	4.4	156
1972	2.3	3.8	0.6	2.2	162
1976	3.4	5.2	−1.6	2.5	344
1980	3.7	6.1	1.6	2.6	121
1984	3.5	5.5	2.0	3.5	188

Note: Table entries give the average number of likes and dislikes mentioned about the two parties and presidential candidates and the net direction of those comments. The latter is calculated by summing pro-Democratic responses and subtracting pro-Republican ones. Thus the net direction can range from −10 (pro-Republican) to 10 (pro-Democratic). In 1972 the SRC-CPS coded only the first 3 mentions. Rather than restrict all years to 3 mentions (in some years 10 percent of the respondents had fourth or fifth mentions), all 5 mentions are used for other years, and 1972 results are presented even though 1972 is not strictly comparable.

Comparable figures for white Republican identifiers show greater fluctuation but support the same reading: the average number of comments in 1976 and later for the party are near the low end of the 1952 to 1984 range, but the average number of comments about candidates are at the high end of that range. The tendency of southern partisans to be more voluble about the candidates than the parties has grown since 1952. By the 1980s the average partisan made two more comments about the candidates than the parties. This

is consistent with political evaluations becoming more candidate-based and less party-based, a trend Wattenberg (1985) has documented for the nation.[11]

The net partisan directions of all comments about the parties and the candidates indicate that the average white Republican identifier exhibits a stronger Republican bias in his comments about the presidential candidates than in his comments about the parties (except for 1952). The reverse holds true for the average white Democratic identifier. Except for 1964 and 1984, Democrats commented more favorably about their party than their candidate. Such differences for Democrats are greater prior to 1976 than in 1976 or 1980.

This description of attitudes toward the parties and candidates should be checked with measures more reflective of the intensity of feelings. Open-ended questions about likes and dislikes solicit a number of comments about the parties and candidates, but weighting each comment equally is a convenient but possibly misleading step.

The feeling thermometer ratings offer such a measure of intensity. Starting in 1964, SRC/CPS survey respondents have been asked to rate the parties on a feeling thermometer ranging from zero (cold, unfavorable) through 50 (neutral) to 100 (warm, favorable). In 1968, similar questions about the presidential candidates were introduced. In recent years the average southern white Democrat has felt less warmly toward the Democratic party than he did in 1964 and 1966 (table 6). The partial recovery of 1982 proved short-lived, receding as it did in 1984. Even so, the relative ratings of the parties are only slightly less favorable to the Democrats in the 1980s than they were in 1964. Except for 1976, white Democrats favored their own party over the Republican party to a much greater degree than they did their party's presidential nominee relative to the Republican candidate.

Trends among Republicans resembled those among Democrats except that Republicans favored the Republican nominee over the Democratic one to a greater extent than they favored the Republican party over the Democratic party. Although white Republican identifiers evaluate their party less warmly in absolute terms in the 1980s than in the mid-1960s, the leads over the Democratic party in 1980 and 1984 nearly matched those of the mid-1960s and exceeded those of the 1970s. On average, white Republican identifiers rated Republican presidential candidates warmly and the Democratic one negatively, opening up a consistently greater gap between the candidates than the parties. More polarized feelings for the presidential candidates than the parties caution that despite the growth in Republican identification, when candidate evaluations for elections below the presidency fail to

[11] A logit analysis of the connection between presidential vote choice, partisanship, and feelings toward the parties and candidates in the South showed candidate evaluations typically had stronger impacts on the vote than did party evaluations between 1968 and 1984.

TABLE 6

FEELINGS OF SOUTHERN WHITE PARTISAN IDENTIFIERS TOWARD THE PARTIES AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, 1964–1984

	Parties			Pres Candidates			
Year	Dem-Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem-Rep	Dem	Rep	N
Southern White Democrats							
1964	30	81	51	n a	n a	n a	603
1966	19	80	61				147
1968	21	75	54	−2	60	62	384
1970	25	77	52				356
1972	10	75	65	−22	45	67	304
1974	20	76	56				320
1976	15	71	56	20	75	55	626
1978	22	73	51				282
1980	24	73	49	16	70	54	206
1982	27	79	52				196
1984	26	75	49	17	70	53	235
Southern White Republicans							
1964	−32	50	82	n a	n a	n a	177
1966	−35	49	83				58
1968	−28	49	77	−39	39	78	156
1970	−22	55	77				210
1972	−17	56	73	−53	29	82	162
1974	−21	53	74				152
1976	−20	50	70	−31	44	75	344
1978	−21	48	69				155
1980	−27	45	72	−33	41	74	121
1982	−19	52	71				114
1984	−32	44	76	−48	36	84	188

Note Table entries are the mean feeling thermometer ratings for the parties and candidates and the differences between Democractic and Republican figures Only the presidential candidate ratings are included

mirror the pro-Republican evaluation of presidential candidates, the high levels of Republican voting loyalty that typify presidential voting cannot be expected to prevail below that level

CONCLUSION

Southern partisan changes have been conspicuous Native southern whites have accounted for the largest share of the changes Both younger—those first reaching voting age in 1964 or later—and older native southern whites

have contributed to these changes, although the younger generation has made the greater contribution Settling on a single summary term to describe southern partisan changes is an oversimplification Aspects of both realignment and dealignment have characterized the South A review of the current evidence confirms such a mixed reading

Lately, a larger share of white southerner partisan identifiers have seen important general differences between the parties, fewer have considered themselves Democrats and more have thought of themselves as Republicans The percentage who claim independence from the parties has neither increased nor decreased since 1966 For most offices, both Democratic and Republican white identifiers have recently supported their party's candidates at rates resembling those of the 1950s Both loyalty and defection rates have fluctuated, but neither has increased notably for partisan identifiers during the years of partisan change Although southern white identifiers are less warmly disposed to their parties in the 1980s than in the 1960s, the relative gap between the ratings of one's own party and the opposing party have nearly recovered in the 1980s to the levels that prevailed in the 1960s

Such signs suggest realignment rather than dealignment insofar as realignment covers an altered balance of partisan identifiers, identifiers remaining loyal in voting, and an increased perception of important, general party differences Moreover, the partisan patterns of southern blacks, largely excluded from this analysis, add another component to the case for realignment

Yet these signs coexist with others signaling dealignment The willingness of white identifiers to vote a straight party ticket in state and local elections has declined, as has the level of Democratic loyalty to their party's House candidates Although Republican loyalties to Republican congressional and gubernatorial candidates have not declined, Republican loyalty levels for these offices remain well below the corresponding levels of Democratic loyalty as well as the Republican loyalty toward the presidential candidate Recently individuals have had fewer favorable or unfavorable comments about the parties than previously, but comments about the candidates are as frequent as ever The tendency of Republicans to view the presidential candidates in more polarized terms than the parties has remained strong despite the growth in Republican identification The tendency of Democrats to view the parties in more polarized terms than the candidates declined in 1976 and 1980 and was reversed in 1984 (table 5) If realignment calls for an enduring orientation towards the parties as groups an orientation based largely on feelings towards the current candidates suggests dealignment

Such signs suggest dealignment insofar as dealignment covers decreasing or low levels of partisan loyalty in voting and greater emphasis on candidates than parties

In sum, *both* realignment and dealignment are the unequivocal conclusion to draw from recent southern partisan changes The partisan balance

changed, and the meaning of partisanship strengthened in some ways but weakened in others. Time may reinforce one tendency and reduce the other, but even if the pro-Republican trends continue (figure 1), the significance of party to citizen's political orientations may not increase. Consequently, evidence of both dealignment and realignment does not signify simply an unconsummated realignment (LeDuc, 1985).

Recent elections provide grounds for caution about extrapolating current trends into the future. The sour economy during the second year of Reagan's presidency helped bring about an upturn in Democratic fortunes in the South and in the nation, both in terms of identification and electoral victories. The Democratic resurgence of 1982 after the setback of 1980 is a potent reminder of the forces capable of arresting and reversing trends, just as the election results of 1984 seemed to restore trends to pre–1982 conditions. The Virginia elections of 1985 led to a Democratic sweep including a female attorney general and a black lieutenant governor (Sabato, 1986). The Virginia results indicate in part that politically astute, well-financed Republican campaigns cannot be assumed, nor are the racial divisions within the Democratic party beyond reconciliation or a reason for inevitable decline. In the 1986 elections, Republicans picked up four governorships in the South, but these gubernatorial gains were offset by the loss of four U.S. Senate incumbents.

Partisan changes have left the Republican party in a much improved position in the South. This improvement is not devalued by noting that the position of the Republican party during the Solid South era could hardly have been weaker. The decline in Democratic identification, the surge in independence in the 1960s, and the more recent increase in Republican identification have ended the previous Democratic domination. Further Republican advances are likely. Although dealignment has helped Republicans cope with a dwindling Democratic majority in identifiers, the value of recent gains in Republican identification has been devalued by that same dealignment. The high loyalty levels of Republican identifiers toward the presidential nominee have not been reflected in support of candidates below the presidency, and raising those lower levels of loyalty will require making parties more central to citizen evaluations. The volatility of partisan electoral outcomes one associates with dealignment can, in a context of change from a one-party system, take on the appearance of realignment away from the previously dominant party. Republican gains alone do not prove that realignment rather than dealignment has characterized the electoral process.

References

Bartley, Numan V., and Hugh D. Graham. 1975. *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Beck, Paul Allen. 1977. Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South. *American Political Science Review* 71:477–96.

——— 1979 The Electoral Cycle and Patterns of American Politics *British Journal of Political Science*, 9 129–56

Burnham, Walter Dean 1969 The End of American Party Politics *Transaction* 7 12–22

Campbell, Bruce A 1977a Change in the Southern Electorate *American Journal of Political Science*, 21 37–64

——— 1977b Patterns of Change in the Partisan Loyalties of Native Southerners 1952 - 1972 *Journal of Politics*, 39 730–61

——— 1979 *The American Electorate Attitudes and Action* New York Holt, Rinehart, Winston

Clubb, Jerome M , William H Flanigan, and Nancy H Zingale 1980 *Partisan Realignment Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* Beverly Hills Sage

Converse, Philip E 1966 On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment in the South In Angus Campbell, Philip E Converse, Warren E Miller and Donald E Stokes, eds *Elections and the Political Order* New York John Wiley and Sons

——— 1972 Change in the American Electorate In Angus Campbell and Philip E Converse eds *The Human Meaning of Social Change* New York Russell Sage

Catlin Douglas S 1975 Party Identification Status and Race in the South 1952 - 1974 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39 39 - 51

Gow David John, and Robert B Eubank 1983 The Pro Incumbent Bias in the 1978 and 1980 National Election Studies *American Journal of Political Science* 27 122 - 39

——— 1984 The Pro Incumbent Bias in the 1982 National Election Study *American Journal of Political Science* 28 224 30

Hadley Charles D 1981 Survey Research and Southern Politics The Implications of Data Management *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 393 401

Hadley Charles D and Susan E Howell 1980 The Southern Split Ticket Voter 1952 - 1976 Republican Conversion or Democratic Decline In Robert Steed Larry Moreland and Tod Baker eds *Party Politics in the South* New York Praeger

Hutcheson Richard G III 1975 The Inertial Effect of Incumbency and Two Party Politics Elections to the House of Representatives from the South 1952 - 74 *American Political Science Review* 49 1399 1401

Keith Bruce E David B Magleby Candice J Nelson Elizabeth Orr Mark C Westlye and Raymond E Wolfinger 1986 The Partisan Affinities of Independent Leaners *British Journal of Political Science* 16 155 84

Lamis Alexander P 1984 *The Two Party South* New York Oxford University Press

LeDuc Lawrence 1985 Partisan Change and Dealignment in Canada Great Britain and the United States *Comparative Politics* 17 379 98

Petrocik John R 1981 *Party Coalitions Realignment and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* Chicago University of Chicago Press

——— 1987 Realignment New Party Coalitions and the Nationalization of the South *Journal of Politics* 49 347 75

Pomper Gerald 1972 From Confusion to Clarity Issues and American Voters 1956 - 1968 *American Political Science Review* 66 415 28

Prysby Charles L 1980 Electoral Behavior in the U S South Recent and Emerging Trends In *Party Politics in the South* See Hadley and Howell 1980

Sabato Larry 1986 The 1985 Statewide Election in Virginia History Quietly Writ Large *University of Virginia Newsletter* 62 27 32

Scammon Richard and James A Barnes October November 1985 Republican Prospects Southern Discomfort *Public Opinion* 8 14 17

Schneider William 1982 Realignment The Eternal Question *PS* 15 449 57

Schreiber E M 1971 Where the Ducks Are Southern Strategy versus Fourth Party *Public Opinion Quarterly* 35 157 67

Seagull Louis M 1975 *Southern Republicanism* New York Wiley

Stanley, Harold W 1986 The 1984 Presidential Election in the South Race and Realignment In Robert P Steed, Lawrence W Moreland, and Tod A Baker, eds , *The 1984 Presidential Election in the South Patterns of Southern Party Politics* New York Praeger

Stanley, Harold W , William T Bianco, and Richard G Niemi 1986 Partisanship and Group Support over Time A Multivariate Analysis *The American Political Science Review*, 80 969–76

Sundquist, James L 1983 *Dynamics of the Party System Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, 2d ed Washington Brookings

Wattenberg, Martin P 1985 The Hollow Realignment Partisan Change in a Candidate-Centered Era Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association New Orleans LA

Wolfinger Raymond, and Robert B Arseneau 1978 Partisan Change in the South, 1952–1976 In Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds *Political Parties Development and Decay* Beverly Hills Sage

Wolfinger, Raymond and Michael Hagen October/November 1985 Republican Prospects Southern Comfort *Public Opinion* 8 8–13

The Demand for the Suburban Public Work Force: Residents, Workers, and Politicians

Mark Schneider
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Local governments in the United States are expensive. Since they are also labor intensive, the cost of local government is largely a function of the size of the local public work force and the level of compensation paid. Using a pooled cross-sectional analysis of over 500 suburban governments, the size and wages of the local public work force are examined as a function of the demand of residents, local workers, and politicians, subject to local fiscal capacity, the exogenous influences of the intergovernmental system, and secular trends produced by macroeconomic and general societal changes. Decisions about the local work force reflect local conditions, but these local policy decisions are also wide open to exogenous factors, especially intergovernmental ones. This implies that the already severe limits on the policy-making capacity of suburban municipalities may be even more limited in the future.

Local governments in the United States are expensive: they consume between 20% and 30% of total domestic public expenditures, depending on how intergovernmental transfer payments are counted (Bahl 1984, table 2.1). The size and costs of local government have attracted considerable attention in the last few years as researchers have sought to identify the causes and consequences of escalating local budgets. Because local government services are labor intensive and the bulk of their expenditures are labor related, the analysis of the size and cost of the local public work force is also an analysis of the size and cost of local government. In this article, I analyze the suburban municipal work force.

I begin my analysis with the Tiebout-like assumption that local governments operating in a polycentric system of metropolitan governance must provide service/tax "bundles" responsive to the tastes and demands of local residents (Tiebout, 1956). However, I add necessary complexity to this Tiebout market model, first by adding political and fiscal constraints to the model, and then by specifying how intergovernmental and economic factors affect local policies.

* The research reported in this paper was supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (grant number 5R01HD1727203) and the National Science Foundation (grant number SES8506473). Joseph Lenart provided invaluable research assistance, and James Enelow provided useful comments.

Political demands must be considered in a more fully specified Tiebout model because the interests and goals of politicians may differ from the demands of residents. Furthermore, government workers may also have interests different from residents, and their political power can shift local policy.

Fiscal considerations enter the model because the satisfaction of residential demands must be met within the budget limits of the local government. Empirically, there is wide variation in local fiscal capacity, affecting the ability of individual local governments to deliver services at a reasonable tax cost (e.g., Molotch, 1976; Schneider and Logan, 1981).

Of equal importance to these community factors, the response of local government to the demands of their residents is conditioned by the multitiered structure of federalism. It is well known that intergovernmental grants and intergovernmental regulations affect local policies. Stein (1984) specifically shows that local public sector labor practices in the 1970s were affected by receipt of intergovernmental grants and by changes in local government evaluations of the permanence of such grants. Other research shows how the assignment of functional responsibility inherent to the federalist system affects local policy choices (see, especially, Liebert, 1976; also Clark and Ferguson, 1983).

Furthermore, the responsiveness of municipal governments to local demands is conditioned by macroeconomic and societal trends. For example, extensive secular growth in the size and cost of the local public work force took place between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s. The recession of 1975 derailed this growth (ACIR, 1981). At about the same time, the tax/expenditure limitation movement caused a widespread recalculation of demand and pressured virtually all local governments to reduce the cost of their work force.

In short, the local policy response to residential demands is constrained by identifiable systemic factors inherent to the polycentric multitiered metropolitan market. Components of a more complex model of local decisions are described in detail below. Using this model, an empirical investigation of the size and wages of the suburban public work force between 1972 and 1982 is presented for a pooled cross section of over 500 suburbs.

The Demand for the Local Work Force

Analytically, the demand for the local work force decomposes into two different but possibly related decisions: one sets the number of workers employed and the other the level of wages paid. Given budgetary constraints, governments may hire fewer workers at higher wages or more workers at lower ones (e.g., Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld, 1979). The demand for workers and their wages is derived from forces internal to each community and from the openness of the local political economy to exogenous influences.

Endogenous Demand

Local political decision makers (such as a city council) set the size of the public work force and determine wage rates. In the Tiebout model, these decision makers set policies in response to demands for services from local residents. However, local decision makers also live in a political "market" in which they must cope with demands from other local actors besides residents. When setting public sector labor policies, the most important additional set of actors may be public sector workers who present intense demands for higher wages and for the expansion of the public work force.

Political decision makers may also have their own interests, such as using local policies to maximize their chances of re-election or, relatedly, to minimize conflict with municipal unions. These interests may shift the policy response to demands from residents.

The Demands of Residents

Aggregate residential demand for local workers can be estimated as a function of the distribution of identifiable local demographic characteristics which affect the need for and the perception of local public service costs.

The income of residents may be the single most important characteristic affecting local demand. If the goods and services delivered by local public sector workers are "normal goods," demand will increase with income. Moreover, given the generally nonprogressive nature of local taxes, the cost of local public goods becomes less onerous with higher income, further increasing the demand for services and the workers who provide them. Thus higher community median income should be associated with greater demand for local public services.[1]

The distribution of housing tenure in a community will also affect demand because renters may need more of some services (such as parks and recreation, or sewers and sanitation) than do homeowners. But more importantly tenure changes the way in which households experience the costs of local government. Given the reliance on the property tax to fund local government, homeowners more directly experience the costs of local services than do renters. Since property taxes do not usually appear as a separate item in contract rents, renters may experience a "fiscal illusion" in which they underestimate the true costs of local services and consequently demand more services than would homeowners.

[1]Local public goods might not be normal goods. Since many local public goods are not of interest to higher income residents - wealthy residents use their own swimming pools rather than municipal pools, they do not require public hospitals or public welfare - higher income might be associated with lower demand (Jones et al. 1977; Stein 1984). This issue is addressed empirically later in this paper.

In the following empirical analysis, median income and the relative size of the rental population in a community are used to reflect aggregate residential interests.

The Demands of Public Sector Workers

Local public sectors have strong preferences for higher public sector wages, since the benefits of higher wages accrue directly to them while the costs are diffused throughout the community. Their demand for higher wages is communicated to local decision makers and may be particularly intense when workers are organized into unions (e.g., Spizman, 1980).

As a secondary goal, workers may prefer a larger work force, because it may increase wages. A larger work force enhances the bargaining power of workers and adds potential political pressure for higher wages. Furthermore, wages often increase with the number of people whom a worker supervises, and a larger work force produces more supervisors. But when faced with a choice between higher wages for already employed workers and expanding the work force at potentially lower wages, workers and their unions will likely pursue higher wages.

Higher demand may also result from a concentration of public sector workers in a community. According to the "factor supplier hypothesis," public sector workers will demand larger local budgets than will residents who work in the private sector. Courant et al. (1979) show that if public sector workers represent even a small share of a local population, their concerted interest can produce high wages for local public sector workers (also see Frey and Pommerehne, 1982).

The Demands of Politicians

Identifying the interests of residents and workers is a relatively straightforward exercise; however, the role of politicians is more difficult to specify. Politicians clearly have goals, especially winning election, and they should use their strategic position in local government to manipulate policy in pursuit of these goals. Unfortunately, strong empirical evidence to support this proposition is hard to find.

Political scientists have frequently attempted to measure the policy role of urban politicians by linking structural reform of local government to changes in the goals and responsiveness of politicians and to changes in the cost effectiveness of local service delivery (e.g., Morgan and Pelissero, 1980; Morgan and Brudney, 1985). Based on such evidence it is often argued that reform changes the incentive structure, the electoral strategies, the responsiveness and the policy goals of local politicians. However, despite 20 years of empirical work investigating such propositions first articulated in a testable

manner by Lineberry and Fowler (1967), strong consistent links between reform, the role of politicians, and local policy have not been found

The effects of partisan competition on the policy role of local politicians have also been widely studied. Following V.O. Key, competition was thought to increase the incentives of politicians to respond to lower-class demands. However, empirical research linking competition to actual policy outputs has produced weak and conflicting results (e.g., Cameron, 1978, Lowery and Berry, 1983, Gray, 1976). Further, research into the policy role of urban political parties identifies an impact of competition exactly opposite that postulated by Key. According to Jones (1981), it is only in the noncompetitive environment of machine-dominated cities that politicians actually manipulate local services.

The theoretical waters are muddied even further by the median voter model. Key hypothesized that competition enhances the independent role of politicians; in the median voter model, greater competition actually may limit their role. Facing political competition and with the overriding goal of reelection, the model predicts politicians represent the interests of the median voter, acting as conduits, not originators, of local demand.[2]

Recent research into the importance of service delivery rules further circumscribes the expected policy setting role of local politicians (see, e.g., Jones, Greenberg, and Drew, 1980, Mladenka, 1980) as does Niskanen's bureaucratic monopoly model (1971, 1975; however, see Miller and Moe, 1983). Adding this plethora of conflicting theories to the lack of a rigorously defined demand function for politicians, perhaps not surprisingly, existing research has not documented a strong independent role for politicians in setting local policies. Instead, local politicians may be mediators and conduits of the demands presented by other actors (see Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Morgan and Pelissero, 1981).

Exogenous Demands

The satisfaction of endogenous demands does not take place in a vacuum. To the contrary, the boundaries of local governments are highly permeable.

Local policies are open to intergovernmental influences. Intergovernmental grants strongly affect local policy choices by easing local budget constraints and allowing local governments to hire more workers (Stein, 1984) and to purchase more services (e.g., Gramlich, 1977, Inman, 1979). More recently, higher levels of government have turned to mandates, ordering local governments to undertake policies without necessarily paying the costs for changes in local policy (e.g., Lovell et al., 1979; ACIR, 1984).

[2] Inman (1978) presents a good review of the literature on the median voter model and its robustness.

Local governments are also affected by the assignment of functional responsibility. Liebert (1976) shows that, mostly because of historical circumstances, "older" cities usually have responsibility for many more services, especially social welfare ones, than do newer cities. In turn, the services for which a local government is responsible strongly affect its budget. I link the distribution of functional responsibility, and its subsequent effects on service levels, to other intergovernmental factors, since state laws often determine the level of government which delivers a service (Liebert, 1976).

Intergovernmental factors are not the only exogenous factors affecting local government policies. Local policies are also affected by changes in the economy and society at large, defining the broad parameters within which local governments operate. These macroinfluences include dynamic characteristics of the national and international market (South and Poston, 1982, Schneider, 1986), the rate of general inflation and inflation in the costs of producing local services, and changing expectations about the value of local services. Such macro-factors affect the demand for local services, as well as the willingness and ability of localities to support its local work force.

Other Constraints on Local Decisions

Municipalities face other significant constraints as they seek to satisfy the demand for workers and set local wages. Among the most important are fiscal limits. Given the decentralized system of local finance built around the local property tax, local fiscal capacity is a function of the personal wealth of the local population and the strength of the property tax base. Debt may also constrain local government budgets (Ehrenberg, 1973b).

Objective demand for the public sector work force may also be conditioned by the size of the community itself, although disagreement exists about the direction of this influence. Some studies argue that economies of scale in the provision of local public goods should require a smaller per capita work force in larger cities (e.g., CED, 1966). Others disagree. Hirsch (1967), for example, argues that big cities provide a milieu in which government workers have greater opportunities for organizing and lobbying successfully to achieve their interests. The age of a community may also affect local policy responses. An older city may have greater functional responsibility and may have an aging infrastructure requiring greater upkeep.

In this analysis, the size and wages of the local work force are analyzed as a function of internal demand, intergovernmental influences, other exogenous factors, and other constraints on the local government.

METHOD

A data base for a panel of 529 suburban municipalities greater than 2500 population in 1970 was assembled. Data on public sector employment levels and wage rates were gathered from the 1972, 1977 and 1982 Census of Gov-

ernment Employment, File A. The independent variables are from matching years, creating a three-wave panel design.[1] When analyzing panel data measured over time, pooling cross sections can yield more efficient estimates of structural effects. Many of the known methodological problems of pooling panel data can be addressed using the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) method described by Stimson (1985).[2] Adopting this approach, the following model was estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WORK FORCE}_{ijt} = {} & f(\text{RESIDENTIAL DEMANDS}_{ijt} \\ & + \text{PUBLIC WORK FORCE CHARACTERISTICS}_{ijkt} \\ & + \text{INTERGOVERNMENTAL FACTORS}_{ijt} \\ & + \text{POLITICAL FACTORS}_{ij} \\ & + \text{CONSTRAINTS}_{ijkt} + \text{TIME} + \text{SMSA}_{j}) \end{aligned}$$

Where

WORK FORCE = the size and wages of the local public work force for each suburban municipality, measured at t = 1972, 1977 and 1982, and analyzed in separate equations.

The size of public sector work force is measured by full time equivalent (FTE) workers in the local work force per 1000 residents. This measure counts full-time workers plus an adjustment for the size of the part-time work force. According to Stein (1984), no information is lost by combining these two types of public sector workers into a single measure.

Following Ehrenberg (1973a), the compensation level of public sector workers is measured by the ratio of the average monthly local public sector pay to the average monthly pay of a worker in the local manufacturing sector.[3] This ratio establishes the private sector wage as the baseline labor cost in the local area and adjusts for differences in wage rates caused by inflation and by regional variation in the cost of living.

[1] Some of the data come from the 1970 and 1980 Census of Population, while the fiscal and governmental data come from 1972, 1977 and 1982. The Census data were converted to estimates for the appropriate years.

[2] It is well known that SMSA location affects functional responsibility, fiscal conditions, and other factors with an impact on local government policies (e.g., Liebert 1976, Schneider 1980). This increases the contemporaneous effects endemic to pooled cross-sectional research designs. Given that the sample is "short and fat" (consisting of several hundred cases measured at only three points in time), Stimson (1985) suggests two approaches to error correction: least squares with dummy variables and general least squares. I chose the dummy variable model as an appropriate approach to pooled cross-sectional analysis, including a set of dummy variables representing regional (SMSA) location in the equations.

[3] The pay ratio is constructed on the basis of actual wages paid. Since a significant part of public sector compensation may be in the form of fringe benefits and other forms of deferred compensation not reflected in actual wages, the total compensation package of public sector workers may match or even exceed the private sector package. However, data constraints make the comparison of total compensation packages impossible.

RESIDENTIAL DEMANDS = a vector of 3 community characteristics

Median income is classified as a demand variable, although it is also related to local fiscal capacity. The percent of households in a community renting is measured, since renters may experience fiscal illusion and demand more workers at a higher price than would homeowners. Third, the percent of the local population working in the public sector is measured, since government workers living in a community may demand a larger work force and higher wages.[6]

PUBLIC SECTOR WORK FORCE CHARACTERISTICS = a set of indicators which varies slightly across the two employment equations

Unions represent a potentially powerful force affecting the demand for services, hence, the percent of the local public work force that is unionized is measured. Second, since there may be a trade-off between wages and the size of the work force, the pay ratio is included in the equation estimating the size of the work force and the size of the work force in the equation estimating the pay ratio.[7]

When estimating the pay ratio equation, the percent of the local work force in police work is included. Empirically, police are the highest paid local public workers, and local governments with greater responsibility for police services will experience an upward bias in the pay ratio equation. Including the measurement of the percent in police work limits this bias.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONDITIONS = a set of six indicators of potential intergovernmental influences on local decisions

Intergovernmental transfer payments received by the local government are measured by categorical aid per capita from the state and federal government and by general revenue-sharing type grants per capita from the two higher-level governments. While categorical aid may be more stimulative of local expenditures than less restricted general aid (Gramlich, 1977, Inman 1979), all four types of aid ease local income constraints, potentially increasing the demand for workers.

[6]The usual way in which the factor supplier hypothesis is presented is actually confusing. Government workers may or may not live in the community for which they work. If a local government worker lives and works in the same community, support for higher wages is clearly rational: the benefits of higher wages are concentrated while the costs are diffused across the general population. However, the literature has not developed a clear expectation regarding public workers who do not live in the community for which they work. Such workers may be more receptive to the demands of other public sector workers, but this case is more difficult to evaluate.

[7]Clearly, if the cross effects are as large as theoretically postulated, two stage least squares estimation would be necessary. However, as will be seen later, the effects are in fact not statistically significant.

Mandates can also affect local policy decisions. While there is extensive research on the effects of transfer payments, the literature on intergovernmental regulation is relatively new, and consensus about appropriate ways to measure mandates and their effects has not yet emerged. In this analysis, I rely on research by Hill et al. (1978) reporting the number of state mandates affecting the practices of local government in six categories: form of government, financial administration, administrative operations and procedures, annexation and consolidation, local elections, and personnel management. I *experimented with various combinations of these specific indicators and decided to sum the total number of mandates a state imposes on its local governments. The total number of mandates is assigned to each suburb in a* state.[8]

Functional responsibility will affect local policies. To measure its effects, using current operating expenditures across all categories of services reported by the Census of Governments, I constructed a simple scale counting the number of services for which a suburb had *any* responsibility.[9]

POLITICAL FACTORS = a set of four measures of competition and reform

Two indicators of structural reform are used. First, a "mayor" dummy variable was created, coded 0 for a city manager or commission (reformed) government and 1 for a mayor form of government. Similarly, a "partisan" dummy variable was coded 0 if the city used nonpartisan elections and 1 for partisan elections.[10]

For the specific research at hand, the association of efficiency and reform might produce a leaner local work force. It is difficult to predict the effects of reform on wage rates. On one hand, politicians in reformed cities may prefer to save money by paying lower wages; on the other, the concern for efficiency may produce higher wages to attract quality workers.

Competition can also affect the interests of politicians. Competition is usu-

[8]There is a measurement problem here. Hill et al. measure financial mandates at only one point in time, midway in the decade during which the suburbs in this sample are studied. Hopefully these cross-sectional data reflect relatively consistent patterns of state involvement over time. I do not include federal mandates, assuming their effects are spread relatively evenly across local governments.

[9]I experimented with different functional indices. Stein (1986) shows suburbs vary more across social service functional responsibility than for other services. Consequently, I investigated most extensively the effects of social service responsibility on the public work force. However, the suburbs in this sample do not have extensive responsibility for social services—a point I discuss in the concluding section—and using the more inclusive index of total responsibility seemed appropriate.

[10]Reform is usually indicated by the structural form of government (e.g., mayor versus city manager) and two dimensions of the local electoral system (at-large versus ward elections, partisan versus nonpartisan elections). Some studies investigate these dimensions separately, while others scale these reforms in various ways. Because of limitations in the data I was able to collect, I use only two indicators of reform and do not combine them.

ally measured by the closeness of parties in elections. A party competition measure could not be used here for two reasons: first, most suburban elections are nonpartisan; second, it was virtually impossible to reconstruct the detailed electoral statistics from past local elections necessary to compute such a measure.

But ultimately, if competition affects policies it is because in more competitive situations, politicians fear loss of their jobs and use government resources to increase the likelihood of remaining in office. Given this underlying logic, it is possible to construct an alternate measure of the likelihood the chief political and/or administrative executive in a community will lose his/her job. Specifically, I measure the number of changes in the office of mayor and city manager between 1972 and 1982 in appropriate cities, as indicators of "competition."[11]

These political data are available only by surveying local sources, were difficult to assemble, and constitute a major constraint on the size of the sample.[12]

CONSTRAINTS = a vector of three measures of local fiscal capacity and three measures of other factors potentially affecting policy.

True value per capita measures the property tax base of the community combining all sources of local property wealth, and mediates directly between the taxes charged and the level of local services received.[13] Second, debt per capita may be a particularly salient fiscal constraint on local government decisions setting the local work force, since it was accumulating fiscal strain in many cities reflected in increasing debt that ultimately led to reductions in the local work force and compensation levels after 1975. The third

[11] Similar to the problem noted in footnote 8, the political variables are not measured at the exact same time as the other indicators. The city clerks who provided the electoral data were asked to indicate any changes in the form of election or in local government structure, but virtually none indicated such change. The turnover data are similarly flawed since they represent cumulative change between 1972 and 1982. I assigned that number to each community in each year, hoping these data reflect relatively consistent patterns of turnover in the local community. Finally, these data do not distinguish between voluntary departures from office and mayoral defeat in an election or termination of a manager.

[12] The suburbs used in this study represent a subset of a data base gathered for more than 1600 suburban municipalities in 35 of the nation's largest SMSAs. However, when I add fiscal data (tax rates and tax base), the sample size falls to 1081 cases. When I include the political data, the sample shrinks to the 529 cases for which the results are reported. To test the robustness of the findings reported in this paper, the tables were reconstructed in both larger samples by excluding the variables for which data were limited. In each case, the results (available from the author) were virtually identical to those reported for this smaller set of cases.

[13] Both the true value data and that for the tax rate used in the construction of the median tax bill are from local sources, such as county or state assessors. They are adjusted for differences in assessment practices to reflect true value (as compared to assessed value) and the effective tax rate (rather than the nominal tax rate).

indicator is the local tax bill The demand for local workers and willingness to pay for their services should be constrained by the costs borne by local residents The local tax cost was estimated multiplying the median home value in the community by the effective local tax rate This figure approximates the annual local tax bill of the owner of the median valued home [14]

Among non-fiscal constraining factors, I include the population of community$_{(i)}$ at t=1972, 1977, and 1982, estimated from the 1970 and 1980 Census of Population. I also include two indicators reflecting the age of the community First, distance from the central city is measured from maps as the straight line distance (in miles) between a suburb's innermost border and its central city Density is the number of people per square mile in 1970 (unfortunately the 1980 census did not report the area of communities) While I do not measure age directly, according to standard ecological assumptions newer communities are likely to be further from the central city and less densely settled than older ones

TIME=a vector of two dummies the first recorded one (1) for observations in 1977 and the other for observations in 1982

After 1975, the general conditions facing the local public work force deteriorated, and the two dummy variables summarize unmeasured exogenous factors affecting demand

SMSA=a vector of 38 dummy variables representing the SMSA in which community , is located These dummy variables help control the contemporaneous effects that emerge because 'neighboring' cases usually share the effects of unmeasured variables (increasing the correlation in certain error terms)

Within the pooled cross-section research design it is possible to assess the extent to which the coefficients of the independent variables vary from year to year I initially ran a model in which each variable was allowed to have its own slope in each year By imposing restrictions across panels and using the Chow test, I found the structural relationships did not vary significantly across time Therefore only a final model is presented in which the slope of each variable is constant over time [15]

[14] Assuming that the owner of the home with median value is also the median voter the importance of this variable is evident

[15] Among central cities Stein (1984) shows that by 1977 the increased reliance on intergovernmental aid changed the relationship between wage rates and the size of the local work force However for the suburbs studied here there were no differences in structural relationships over time This stability may indicate differences in the decision processes and conditions facing central cities and suburbs during the decade under analysis while the years between 1972 and 1982 were difficult for all local governments central cities were more exposed to the turbulence of those years and their responses were more dramatically different over time than were the responses of suburbs

Results

In 1972, the suburban municipalities in this sample supported an average of 6 6 FTE workers per thousand population. This jumped substantially to ' 6 FTE workers per thousand in 1977, but then dropped to 7.3 in 1982 As n central cities, the size of the suburban municipal work force may have ɪeaked in 1975, however, because these data are reported only every 5 ears, the exact turn-around year cannot be pinpointed. Overall, the size of he work force in suburbs "tracks" together between 1972 and 1977, 81% of he suburbs increased the relative size of their work force However, beween 1977 and 1982, almost 60% experienced a relative decline This genral trend in part indicates the overall importance of macroeconomic factors utting across local governments

On average, local public workers are paid less than private sector manuacturing workers In 1972, local government employees received 97% of rivate sector wages A general decrease in relative pay took place in the ext five years in 1977, the pay ratio was 95% There was a slight restoration y 1982, when the pay ratio stood at 96% of manufacturing worker wages ,gain suburbs tracked together fully 60% of the suburbs reduced relative ages between 1972 and 1977, while 64% had a higher wage ratio in 1982 ıan in 1977

Within these trends, local governments decide about their own public secɔr work force I turn next to the individual community level

ize of Work Force

Table 1 reports the results of the pooled cross-sectional analysis of the size f local work force in the 529 suburbs for which all data could be collected

At the individual community level, the size of the local work force increases both with higher median income and higher true value per capita he density of a community has no effect on FTEs nor does population size, ut suburbs further from the central city do have smaller work forces Constent with the concept of fiscal illusion, a greater concentration of renters in ıe local population is strongly linked to a larger local work force

Somewhat surprisingly, unionization is not significantly associated with larger work force, nor is there support for the "factor supplier" hypothe·s—a greater concentration of government workers living in a community is ɔt associated with more public workers in that community The effect of the ıy ratio on the size of the local work force is negligible the trade-off beveen the size of the work force and their wage rates is not evident in this ımple However, time had a strong independent effect on the size of the unicipal work force between 1972 and 1982 the size of the local public ork force decreased significantly.

Intergovernmental variables are important While all forms of inter-

TABLE 1

GOVERNMENT WORKERS (FTE) PER CAPITA IN 529 SUBURBS AS A FUNCTION OF LOCAL COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND EXOGENOUS FACTORS, CONTROLLING FOR REGIONAL LOCATION

	B	Std Error	Beta	T Test
Demands				
Median income (000s)	11	00	25	7 25*
Per cent renters	8 64	78	30	11 60*
Per cent gov workers	1 76	9 09	00	19
Local Constraints				
Population	− 00	00	− 02	− 90
Distance	− 00	00	− 05	−2 70*
Density	− 00	00	− 00	− 61
Median tax bill	00	00	02	1 15
Debt per capita	00	00	07	3 29*
True value per capita	05	00	15	5 75*
Intergovernmental Factors				
Categorical federal aid	00	00	03	1 89*
Categorical state aid	00	00	26	12 64*
General revenue sharing	00	00	15	6 36*
General state aid	00	00	12	4 77*
Mandates	00	00	04	− 37
Functional Respons	39	04	21	8 19*
Public Sector Work Force				
Per cent unionized	00	00	03	1 24
Pay ratio	− 00	00	− 03	−1 21
Political Conditions				
Partisan	03	03	03	1 14
Mayor	00	00	01	50
Manager turnover	02	00	05	2 31*
Mayor turnover	00	00	00	38
Time				
Time (1977)	−2 33	02	− 23	−7 94*
Time (1982)	4 72	37	− 49	−12 50*
Constant	02	00		−1 0
Adjusted R square region dummies only		15		
Adjusted R square full model		45		

(*)p<.05

SOURCE *Tables 1 and 2* Number of public sector workers public sector wages Census of Governments Employment 1972 1977 1982 File A Manufacturing Sector Wages (for pay ratio) Census of Manufacturing 1972 1977 1982 Median income population percent renters, percent government workers estimates for 1972 1977 and 1982 based on Census of Population 1970, 1980 Density Census of Population 1970 Distance maps Debt intergovernmental aid Census of Governments Finance File A 1972 1977 1982 Police unionization Census of Government Employment File A 1972 1977 1982 True value local or state reports and reported in thousands of dollars per capita Tax bill tax rate from local sources multiplied by median home value, estimates for 1972, 1977 and 1982 based on Census of Population 1970, 1980 Mandates Hill et al 1978 Political variables surveys of local officials

TABLE 2

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY RATIO IN 529 SUBURBS AS A FUNCTION OF LOCAL COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND EXOGENOUS FACTORS, CONTROLLING FOR REGIONAL LOCATION

	B	Std Error	Beta	T Test
Demands				
Median income (000s)	24	00	13	4 50*
Per cent renters	- 3 40	2 24	– 02	1 23
Per cent gov workers	10 33	30 69	00	33
Constraints				
Population	01	00	16	7 66*
Distance	- 09	04	– 03	2 04*
Density	00	00	01	86
Median tax bill	00	00	00	07
Debt per capita	00	00	06	3 79*
True value per capita	19	03	13	5 58*
Intergovernmental Factors				
Categorical federal aid	– 02	02	01	- 1 07
Categorical state aid	– 00	00	- 01	- 1 13
General revenue sharing	06	04	02	1 31
General state aid	01	01	01	86
Mandates	13	14	06	53
Functional Responsibility	1 02	16	14	6 27*
Public Work Force				
Per cent unionized	07	01	13	6 46*
FTE per capita	66 98	88 55	01	76
Per cent in police	27 46	2 75	18	9 75*
Political Conditions				
Partisan	- 1 36	' 11	02	1 23
Mayor	- 2 11	74	05	2 86*
Manager turnover	30	29	01	1 02
Mayor turnover	12	30	00	40
Time				
Time 1977	9 01	98	23	9 16*
Time 1982	11 29	1 30	29	8 66*
Constant	70 93	7 95		8 92*
Adjusted R square region dummies only		47		
Adjusted R square full model		61		

See notes table 1

overnmental grants push up the size of the work force state categorical aid as the largest effect Not surprisingly, local governments with broader functional responsibility employ more workers In contrast, mandates have no ffect

Higher turnover in the office of city manager leads to a slightly larger local ork force While the effect is not strong, it indicates that new city managers ay have less ability to counter the expansionary demands of long-tenured

bureaucrats and entrenched unions However, other political variables have no effect on the number of public workers per capita.

Public Sector Wages

Table 2 reports the analysis of the public/private pay ratio These data show that larger cities pay significantly higher wages than smaller cities, supporting Hirsch's observations about the diseconomies of their political environment Similarly, wealthier communities pay higher wages than poorer ones While a greater concentration of renters was associated with a larger work force, renters apparently do not (or cannot) support higher wages for these workers Also note that higher debt per capita is associated with higher wages (and a larger work force) Suburban municipalities may be meeting present demands by mortgaging the future—a tactic used earlier (and to disastrous effect) by central cities

Again there is no evidence of a factor supplier effect, nor is there evidence supporting the notion of a trade-off between the number of workers and their wages the effect of the number of local workers on wage rates is insignificant

While unionization did not affect the size of the work force, it is clearly associated with higher wage rates, suggesting that public sector unions are in fact more interested in pay rates for their existing members than increasing the size of the local work force

While the size of the work force was strongly driven by intergovernmental aid, transfer payments from higher levels of government do not increase the local wage ratio And paralleling the size of the work force equation state mandates do not affect the pay ratio But other intergovernmental effects are evident both the general functional responsibility index and the specific measure of the concentration of police in the work force are positively associated with higher wage rates

Over the decade, there was a significant decline in the ratio of the private public sector wage ratio While the 'raw numbers suggest a partial restoration of the wage ratio by 1982, the multivariate analysis indicates a continuing secular decrease in public sector worker wages ceteris paribus

Among political variables only the mayor variable has an effect cities with mayors pay their public sector workers less than cities with more reformed structures Reformed governments may be willing to pay higher wages to attract better qualified workers

Conclusions

Suburban governments determine the size and wages of their local public sector labor force in a dynamic environment created by the interplay of the interests of local actors conditioned by the unequal distribution of wealth and by changes in the general environment in which they operate

Wealthier suburbs, as measured by their property tax base and by the income of their citizens, employ more workers and pay them more than do less affluent suburbs. The suburban public work force thus is a normal good: consumption increases with income. This finding is at odds with the results of Jones et al. (1977) suggesting the demand for central city public services *decreases* with income. The results are even more directly in conflict with Stein (1984), who shows a negative relationship between median income and the size of the central city work force.

This difference is explicable by differences in the distributional implications of the package of goods and services offered by cities and by suburbs. The negative relationship between income and demand found in central cities to a large part results because a significant share of central city expenditures support redistributory services targeted on lower income residents. Given such redistribution, wealthier residents in a city have incentives to oppose higher service levels; in other words, faced with redistribution away from them, higher income residents rationally reduce their demands for local public services (Schneider, 1987). But the typical suburb allocates only a very small budget to redistributory services. Among the suburbs in this sample, only about 2% of their budgets go to social services such as health, hospitals, welfare, and housing/community development. And when these suburbs do spend on any of these social services, it is usually to support community development—the social policy area where community-wide benefits are most likely to be generated. Instead, suburb municipalities budget most of their money on infrastructure and "developmental" services designed to benefit all residents of the community (see, e.g., Peterson, 1981). Higher income residents in suburbs demand more because they get more in return. Thus local government budgets, local responsiveness *and* local demand are driven by the service package local governments deliver. This is a more complex relationship than informed the Tiebout model.

The response of local decision makers to the demands of their residents is shifted by the demands of public sector workers. The political power of these workers, especially unionized ones, inflates the wages of the public work force beyond the objective demand of local residents. Clearly, political considerations must be added to the Tiebout model, which emphasizes residential demands.

But not all potentially important political actors seem to affect responsiveness to local demands. Specifically, there is no consistent evidence that the interests of politicians, at least as conditioned by reform and turn-over in the executive offices of the local government, affect local policy outputs. What independent role, if any, do local politicians play in the polycentric market? This enduring question of research into the political economy of local service delivery is again raised.

Finally, my analysis shows the polycentric metropolitan market is an open market. Non-local influences cut across individual local governments and

affect local policy decisions. In response to such secular influences, the size and wage rates of the public work force across suburban municipalities track together over time.

Of the exogenous influences I have identified, perhaps the most interesting are intergovernmental ones. Intergovernmental transfer payments directly affect the number of local public sector workers in a community. The assignment of functions affects both the size and wages of the public work force. An even more important influence is the assignment of high cost services, such as police, which directly affects the local wage bill. By conditioning labor inputs in the delivery of local services, the general size and cost of local government are driven by the policies of higher level governments.

Strong secular trends produced by macro-level changes in the economy and society limit the policy role of suburban cities. The impact of higher level governments in local decisions further tighten suburban city limits and affect the way in which they respond to the demands and interests of their local residents.

Thus exogenous factors limit and may ultimately define the independent role of suburban governments as service delivery agents in the polycentric metropolitan market.

REFERENCES

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1981. *Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 1981*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1984. *Regulatory Federalism*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Bahl, Roy. 1984. *Financing State and Local Government*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cameron, David R. 1978. The Expansion of the Political Economy. *American Political Science Review* 72: 1243–61.

Clark, Terry N., and Lorna Ferguson. 1983. *City Money*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Committee for Economic Development (CED). 1966. *Modernizing Local Government*. New York: Committee for Economic Development.

Courant, Paul N., Edward M. Gramlich, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1979. Public Employee Marketing Power and the Level of Government Spending. *American Economic Review* 69: 806–17.

Ehrenberg, Robert. 1973a. The Demand for State and Local Government Employees. *American Economic Review* 63: 366–79.

——— 1973b. Municipal Government Structures, Unionization and the Wages of Fire Fighters. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 27: 36–48.

Frey, Bruno S., and Werner W. Pommerehne. 1982. How Powerful are Public Bureaucrats as Voters? *Public Choice* 38: 253–62.

Gramlich, Edward M. 1977. Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature. Pp. 219–40 in Wallace E. Oates, ed. *The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Gray, Virginia. 1976. Models of Comparative State Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 235–56.

Hill, Melvin B., assisted by Jeffery A. Hurley, Robert N. Elkins, and John J. McArthur. 1978

State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration Athens, GA Institute of Government, University of Georgia

Hirsch, Werner Z 1967 *About the Supply of Urban Public Services* Los Angeles Institute for Government and Public Affairs

Inman, Robert 1978 Testing Political Economy's 'As If' Proposition Is the Median Income Voter Really Decisive? *Public Choice*, 33 45–65

Inman, Robert P 1979 The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments An Interpretative Review Pp 270–321 in Peter Mieszkowski and Mahlon Straszheim, eds , *Current Issues in Urban Economics* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press

Jones, Bryan 1981 Party and Bureaucracy The Influence of Intermediary Groups on Urban Public Service Delivery *American Political Science Review*, 75 688–703

Jones, Bryan Sadia Greenberg, Clifford Kaufman Joseph Drew 1977 Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts *American Political Science Review*, 71 148–65

Jones, Bryan, with Sadia Greenberg and John Drew 1980 *Service Delivery in the City* New York Longman

Liebert, Roland 1976 *Disintegration and Political Action* New York Academic Press

Lineberry Robert and Edmund Fowler 1967 Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities *American Political Science Review*, 61 701–16

Lovell, Catherine H Robert Kneisel Max Neiman Adam Z Rose and Charles A Tobin 1979 *Federal and State Mandating on Local Governments An Exploration of Issues and Impacts* Washington DC National Science Foundation

Lowery, David, and William D Berry 1983 The Growth of Government in the United States An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations *American Journal of Political Science* 27 665–94

Miller, Gary and Terry Moe 1983 Bureaucrats Legislators and the Size of Government *American Political Science Review*, 77 297–322

Mladenka Kenneth 1980 The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control *American Political Science Review* 74 991–98

Molotch Harvey 1976 The City as Growth Machine *American Journal of Sociology* 82 309–32

Morgan David R and James R Pelissero 1981 Urban Policy Does Political Structure Matter? *American Political Science Review* 78 999–1006

Morgan, David R and Jeffrey L Brudney 1985 Urban Policy and City Government Structure Testing the Mediating Effects of Reform Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association New Orleans August 28–September 1

Niskanen William A 1971 *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* Chicago Aldine

——— 1975 Bureaucrats and Politicians *Journal of Law and Economics* 18 617–43

Peterson Paul 1981 *City Limits* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Pressman, Jeffrey L and Aaron Wildavsky 1973 *Implementation* Berkeley University of California Press

Schneider, Mark 1980 Resource Reallocation and the Fiscal Condition of Metropolitan Communities *Social Science Quarterly* 61 545–66

——— 1986 The Market for Economic Development The Case of Suburban Retail Trade *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 21 24–41

——— 1987 Income Homogeneity and the Size of Suburban Government *Journal of Politics* 49 36–53

Schneider Mark, and John R Logan 1981 The Fiscal Implications of Class Segregation Inequalities in the Distribution of Public Goods and Services in Suburban Municipalities *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 17 23–36

South Scott J , and Dudley L Poston 1982 The U S Metropolitan System Regional Change 1950–1970 *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 18 187–206

Spizman, Lawrence M 1980. Unions, Government Services and Public Employees *Public Finance Quarterly*, 8 427–42

Stein, Robert M 1984 Municipal Public Employment An Examination of Intergovernmental Influence *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 636–53

——— 1986 Tiebout's Sporting Hypothesis An Intergovernmental Perspective Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 19–21

Stimson, James A 1985 Regression in Space and Time A Statistical Essay *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 914–47

Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: A Double-Edged Encounter

W. R. New
University of Nebraska-Linc

One of the puzzling aspects of Machiavelli's political philosophy is the prominent place cupied in it by Xenophon Machiavelli goes much further than including Xenophon with Pl Aristotle and Cicero, as was common in the Renaissance mirror of princes ' Rather, he cusses Xenophon in *The Prince* and the *Discourses* more frequently than Plato, Aristotle Cicero combined In this essay I argue that the explanation lies in Machiavelli's need to rel at what for him is exceptional length, the classical author whose views of politics most clos resembled his own

One of the puzzling aspects of Machiavelli's political philosophy is t prominent place occupied in it by Xenophon To be sure, this is more pu zling to a present-day reader than it would have been to Machiavelli's co temporaries Castiglione and other contributors to the "mirror of prince genre typically linked Xenophon with Plato, Aristotle and Cicero as bei among the chief ancient authorities on good government But Machiave goes much further than merely including Xenophon Rather, he discus him more frequently in *The Prince* and the *Discourses* than Plato, Aristo and Cicero combined, and often in contexts where those unquestional more influential authors are conspicuous by their absence [1] For examp Machiavelli's famous complaint in chapter 15 of *The Prince* that "many ha imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known exist in reality" would seem especially to evoke the *Republic* of Plato, a "r where" and "pattern in the sky" that St Augustine had adapted to Christia

* I am grateful to the National Humanities Center and the Research Council of the Univers of Nebraska-Lincoln for their support, and to the American Academy in Rome for the use of library, while researching and writing this article Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers their helpful comments

[1] I cite Machiavelli according to the standard form by chapter for *The Prince* by book a chapter for the *Discourses* I use the translations by Musa (1964) and Detmold (1950) occasi ally amended (Machiavelli, 1954) Machiavelli refers to Xenophon in *The Prince*, chs 14 16, and in the *Discourses* 2 2, 13 and 3 20, 21, 22 39 He refers to Cicero in the *Discourses* 1 33, 52 and to Plato and Aristotle once apiece in a minor work, *A Discourse on Remodelling Government of Florence* Two conspirators against a tyrant are identified as students of Plat *Discourses* 3 6

ity as the otherwordly City of God. This statement occurs, moreover, in the midst of Machiavelli's refutation of the traditional catalogue of virtues including liberality, compassion and honesty, a refutation aimed at both the original classical sources and their adaptation by Christian and humanist authors (Gilbert, 1939, pp. 478–83). Here, of all places, one would expect Machiavelli to criticize Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics explicitly and at length. Yet it is Xenophon whom Machiavelli offers as his sole example of traditional "writers" about the virtues.

Why, then, should Machiavelli have chosen as the chief representative of classical thought a figure who, while esteemed by his contemporaries, certainly would not have been chosen as the one name most worth mentioning among the ancient authorities on good government? In the following essay I will argue that the explanation lies in Machiavelli's paradoxical need to refute, at what for him is exceptional length, the classical author whose views of politics most closely resembled his own.

Before beginning, I should explain what I hope to contribute to the existing literature on Machiavelli and Xenophon. Among political theorists, the strongest cases for Xenophon's anticipation of Machiavelli and modern political thought generally have been made by Strauss (1968, 1969, 1970) and Wood (1964). Strauss argues for paying more attention to Machiavelli's use of Xenophon's works, especially the *Hiero*, and for the congeniality of their views (1969, pp. 23–24, 57, 195–97; 1968, pp. 291–93). However he does not develop the parallel at length and, apart from some scattered observations (especially 1970, pp. 203–4), does not set forth the relationship of the *Hiero* and *Oeconomicus* to the most important of Xenophon's writings on princely rule, the *Education of Cyrus*.[2]

On the other hand, Xenophon is neither cited nor discussed in the more historical, source-oriented studies of Machiavelli by Skinner (1980) and Pocock (1975). Given Xenophon's high standing in the Renaissance as a writer on princely *virtù*, this is remarkable in works which claim to give proper emphasis to the humanist context of Machiavelli's thinking. Not only do Machiavelli's references to Xenophon stand out in works which are notable for the paucity of their references to any other authors. In addition humanists like Poggio, Bruni and Pontano who are mentioned by Skinner and Pocock as important for understanding Machiavelli's background were admirers of Xenophon's writings on princely rule and influenced by them.[3]

[2]There is a distinguished strain of French classical scholarship on Xenophon's political thought. See especially Delebecque (1957), Luccioni (1947), Hemardinquer (1872). Classical scholarship in English on Xenophon's political thought has been scantier but not negligible. See especially Breebart (1983) and Higgins (1977).

[3]As a successful general and statesman, Xenophon was particularly admired during classical antiquity and the Renaissance for balancing contemplative and active virtues. Cicero, whom Renaissance humanists admired for the same reason, described the *Education of Cyrus* as a

Accordingly, I have two main aims in this essay. In part 1, I analyze the theme of princely government in Xenophon's political thought, setting forth the grounds for its distinctiveness among ancient political thinkers and its consequent appeal for Machiavelli beyond the valuable but brief suggestions made by Strauss and Wood. This involves showing Xenophon's investigation of the potentialities and liabilities of princely rule in the *Hiero* and *Oeconomicus* and how they culminate in the *Education in Cyrus*. In part 2, I analyze Machiavelli's references to Xenophon in *The Prince* and *The Discourses* and consider how their views of princely rule compare. So far as I am aware, this comparative analysis of Machiavelli and Xenophon has not been undertaken elsewhere by a political theorist. Moreover, I stress more than do other interpreters Xenophon's reservations about the type of monarchy he hypothesizes in the *Education of Cyrus*, and how these reservations make Xenophon as uncongenial to Machiavelli in some respects as he is congenial in others. Thus, as I argue, Machiavelli's purpose in engaging Xenophon's writings is as much critical as commendatory. If I am successful, uncovering the double-edged encounter between Machiavelli and Xenophon should help us to understand more about the thinking of both and more about the complex hermeneutical relationship between Machiavelli and the classical tradition as a whole.

THE THEME OF PRINCELY GOVERNMENT IN XENOPHON'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

According to Castiglione, while Plato is the authority on the perfect republic and Cicero the authority on oratory, Xenophon is the authority on the

model of the just empire and the constant guide of Scipio (*Tusculan Disputations* 2.26.62), descriptions which were echoed many times in humanist literature (see, e.g., Gallet-Guerne, 1974, pp. 182–84). Munscher (1920, pp. 70–75) provides a detailed summary of Xenophon's influence on Greek and Roman literature; for the Renaissance and Enlightenment, see Anderson (1974, pp. 1–8). The *Education of Cyrus*, the *Hiero* and the *Oeconomicus*, all of which deal with princely rule and which I analyze here, were among the first classical treatises to be translated when the knowledge of Greek was reintroduced to the West. Bruni translated the *Hiero* into Latin in 1400–1404 (Gallet-Guerne, 1974, pp. 58–59; Baron, 1955, p. 117). Cardinal Tomaso Parentucelli, the future Pope Nicholas V and founder of the Vatican Library, asked Poggio in 1403 to translate the *Education of Cyrus*. The Cardinal's other translation assignments included Herodotus, Thucydides, Plutarch, Polybius, Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Gallet-Guerne, 1974, pp. 60–63). According to Gilbert (1938, pp. 12–13, 236), Aristotle's *Politics* and Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* were the main classical authorities for Beroaldus, Pontanus, Erasmus and Pigna (see also Butterfield, 1940, p. 56). Thus, Erasmus' *Institutio Principis Christiani* (*Education of A Christian Prince*) was written with the *Education of Cyrus* in mind. In 1470, Vasco Fernandez translated Poggio's Latin *Education of Cyrus* for the young Duke of Burgandy, making it one of the first transmissions of Italian humanism to Burgandian humanism (Gallet-Guerne, 1974, pp. xi–xvi, 27–32). Poggio's Latin version was translated into Italian by his son Iacopo di Messer Poggio in 1521.

perfect monarch (1959, p. xi) What distinguishes Xenophon from the other classical writers on government, and what Machiavelli found so congenial about his writings, is his lengthy and candid exploration of princely ambition as the vehicle for founding stable and prosperous political orders (Wood, 1964, pp 42–47, 50–60)

Xenophon's distinctive approach to princely ambition and rule is clear in a general way from the division between those of his works which focus on Socrates and those which focus on Cyrus For Xenophon, Socrates and Cyrus are the exemplars, respectively, of the philosophic life and the excellence attainable by statesmanship This is not an absolute distinction The Socratic writings certainly concern politics, and philosophy is not wholly absent from the "princely" writings But the division can be made in the following sense, and it is characteristic of Xenophon's way of presenting the relationship between politics and philosophy In Plato's dialogues the figure of Socrates dominates the investigation of the meaning and satisfactions of political virtue While Socrates is most often depicted conversing with well-born boys and political aspirants, even famous politicians like Nicias and Alcibiades are shown that Socrates' own way of life clarifies their yearnings and deficiencies In the *Republic*, Socrates never actually meets Glaucon's challenge to prove that justice pursued entirely for its own sake is preferable to tyranny But he does make a convincing case that philosophy is Since a devotion to philosophy assimilates the passions leading to injustice an education in philosophy is thus shown to perform a signal service to civic virtue (*Republic* 484a–486e)

Xenophon, by contrast, wishes to allow political excellence—the talent of extraordinary statesmen and generals—to unfold in its own dimension, unencumbered by the philosophic alternative An episode from the *Education of Cyrus* will illustrate this difference There, the archetypal ruler Cyrus encounters the archetypal philosopher Socrates only by the shadow of the latter's absence Tigranes a young man who had once been intimate with a Socrates-like "sophist transfers his affections to the great conqueror Cyrus (3 1 14, 3 1 42) Cyrus punishes the young man's father who had executed the sophist for alienating his son's affections from their household by stripping him of his autonomous authority (3 1 23–34 3 1 39) In this way, Cyrus' monarchy effects a reform of the tyrannical kind of politics that allows a philosopher to be put to death But we do not know from Xenophon's narrative whom Tigranes would have preferred between Cyrus and the sophist if the sophist had lived Socrates and Cyrus and the ways of life they embody touch They never—like the two components of the Platonic philosopher-king—coincide Nor is it obvious whom Xenophon himself prefers between Socrates and Cyrus

Indeed, if there is a single premise that explains the distinctiveness of Xenophon's political thought, it is his doubt whether the peaks of human

achievement can coexist in a single person. In other words, he doubts the doctrine of the unity of virtue often associated with Socrates (Irwin, 1977, pp 86–90) Like Aristotle and in contrast with Plato, Xenophon appears to believe that the virtues—particularly political excellence—cannot be assimilated to philosophical virtue, but should be explored and accounted for in their heterogeneity [4] However, while for Aristotle the heterogeneity of the virtues has the primary political consequence of bolstering the claim of republican communities to be able to govern themselves and resist the assimilation of citizen virtue to the Platonic science of monarchy, for Xenophon the political virtues appear to reach their fullest development in a supremely able—but honor-loving, non-philosophic—monarch Monarchy without philosophy and heterogeneity without republicanism This, roughly formulated, is what makes Xenophon's point of departure for assessing the varieties of rule so distinctive, although, as we will see, his assessments are not inflexible

The *Education of Cyrus* is Xenophon's most sustained investigation of princely rule, a monarchical utopia as opposed to the republican utopias of Plato and Aristotle It can be situated within Xenophon's writings by considering two other works, each of which provides a sort of prologomena to it—the *Hiero* and the *Oeconomicus* I will begin with the *Hiero* The *Hiero* depicts a dialogue between the "wise man" Simonides and Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse On the face of it, the *Hiero* provides a more convincing critique of tyranny than Book 9 of the *Republic* (with which it has a number of parallel passages) For while the *Republic* presents a philosopher trying to persuade a politically inexperienced young man of the evils of a life which the philosopher has never experienced, in the *Hiero* the tyrant himself tells a knowledgeable man of the world—as it were, from the horse's mouth—how wretched tyrants are As it transpires, however, Hiero begins by depicting a tyrant of the garden variety—a devotee of bodily hedonism Hiero believes that this is how the average person thinks of tyranny (1 10), and perhaps he thinks, therefore, that this rather vulgar satisfaction can be made to seem unattractive to a sensible and accomplished man like Simonides For Hiero is wary of Simonides as a critic or possibly even as a rival He respects Simonides not only for being wise, but for being a "real man" (*anēr*—1 1) and suggests that Simonides may not remain in private life forever (1 3) As it develops, Hiero also believes that Simonides envies his ability to gratify his friends and harm his enemies (6 12) In general, Hiero distrusts "the wise lest they plot something" threatening to his rule (5 1) Upon consideration, therefore, the *Hiero* may prove to be less persuasive than the *Republic*

[4]See, e g Aristotle *Politics* 1252a1–25 1255b15–23 1260a20–30 1263b5 15 Aristotle's endorsement in the *Politics* of monarchical rule by the individual of superlative virtue poses a problem for interpreting his critique of the doctrine of the unity of virtue For an analysis of this problem, see Newell (1987)

about the undesirability of tyranny, since Hiero is so unwilling to endanger or part with it that he will mount an elaborate stratagem to conceal its full satisfactions.

In characterizing the tyrant as a hedonist, Hiero aims to convince Simonides that there is no pleasure which the private citizen does not enjoy more successfully than the tyrant. A private citizen, he argues, can enjoy the pleasures of sight, sound, smell and taste without the tyrant's burdens of ruling and the tyrant's risk that overindulgence will dull his future appetites Simonides is skeptical of these arguments, but Hiero more or less holds his own (1 11–12). However, when Hiero tries to apply the latter argument to sexual pleasure—the tyrant gets so much sexual satisfaction that he loses the keenness of erotic longing (1.27–30)—Simonides laughs in open mockery (1 31) For tyrants have a manifest advantage over private citizens in "having intercourse with the fairest they see"—their power to get their own way Now that the distinct advantages of tyranny are beginning to come to light, Simonides reveals that he has known all along that tyrants do not care very much about bodily hedonism, but about "honor" and the capacity to execute "great enterprises " It is these masterful qualities which distinguish the few "real men" (*andres*) from the multitude of "human beings" (*anthrōpoi*) who live like "beasts" for the satisfaction of bodily desires (2 1, 7 3)

This accurate characterization of the tyrant's motives forces Hiero to be more candid about the truly troubling aspects of his life (2 4) His omissions of the compensating advantages are correspondingly more revealing The most revealing thing Hiero does is to compare his erotic relationships with his relationship to the city as a whole Having failed to convince Simonides that his passionate longing (*eros*) was dulled by too much gratification, Hiero now says that what he really wants is friendship (*philia*) from a "willing" partner (1 33, 36) He would like to be loved in return, not only by his beloved but by his subjects (1 37–38, 7 5–7, 8 1, 4 1) However, because they fear him or want to curry favor, he can never trust their professions of friendship The tyrant can never know whether he is loved for himself and must be ever on his guard against the flatterers and conspirators who surround him (3 8, 6 3) The life of "citizens" in "the cities" is thus far preferable, Hiero argues, to tyranny For "even the cities," he observes, "do not fail to notice that friendship is the greatest good " What is more, the city's laws provide every man with security—with a "bodyguard" of laws—since the laws forbid everyone equally from harming anyone else (3 3, 4 3, 6 10). As for the poor tyrant, unloved and unsafe, he might as well hang himself

As Simonides wryly notes, the fact that Hiero has achieved and maintained this, by his own argument, most dangerous of stations is convincing evidence that he prizes the honor it bestows more than he fears the dangers and difficulties it entails (7 1–2) Plainly Hiero has omitted some compensating advantages likely to postpone his suicide indefinitely Hiero had re-

marked that taking something from an "unwilling" enemy was to him "the most pleasant of all things" (1.34). Although he meant to contrast this with the friendship of a "willing" partner, in the course of describing the reciprocity of friendship, he admits that the "most pleasant" moments of erotic pleasure come during the "fights and quarrels" on the beloved's part (1.35). It is not so clear, therefore, that Hiero would really prefer the reciprocity of friendship with his lovers and subjects to the unqualified possession of them to do with as he pleases, or even to the struggle he may face in getting his way (1.32–33).

Moreover, the tyrant possesses additional advantages over the citizen in pursuing erotic fulfillment. When Hiero says that "even the cities do not fail to notice" the value of friendship, we sense that, in his view, the life of citizenship is by no means more conducive to making friends than the tyrant's life. There are two reasons for this. First, even family ties, which Hiero considers to be the "firmest" friendships, must, he says, be "compelled by law" to follow the "inclination of nature" (3.7,9). For example, cities protect the right of husbands to slay adulterers (3.3). If, as this suggests, even the strongest natural ties require a degree of political enforcement, the tyrant with his absolute authority is much better equipped than a private citizen to keep his friends and relatives in line. The need to enforce even erotic and familial ties is illustrated in the *Education of Cyrus*, when Tigranes' father compares his execution of the sophist for alienating his son's affections to a husband justly killing his wife's seducer (3.1.39). Second and more important, Hiero omits to mention the vastly superior resources which a tyrant possesses compared with a citizen to gratify his friends and win their loyalty by benefits and honors. After all, his rule can draw upon the resources of an entire city to maintain his personal household. This advantage of tyranny is also made clear in the *Education of Cyrus*. Cyrus' grandfather Astyages, although the king of Media by hereditary descent, rules as a tyrant and "master" (*despotēs*) without legal restrictions (*Education of Cyrus* 1.3.18). He is thus able to lavish gifts and honors on his grandson, and in his affection for him raises Cyrus above his own son and legitimate heir (*Education of Cyrus* 1.3.13–14). Cyrus learns from this egregious favoritism, which would have been promptly suppressed in his Persian homeland with its strict code of republican equality, how to win his subjects' friendship with a skillful mixture of a "master's" generosity and capacity to inspire fear.

It is not that Hiero is lying, then, when he enumerates the drawbacks of tyranny; they certainly exist. But, in omitting the compensations of tyranny and the drawbacks of citizenship, he gives a very one-sided diagnosis. Hiero's belief that Simonides is "jealous" specifically of his "supreme power to benefit his friends and crush his enemies" (6.12) confirms our impression of Hiero's reluctance to expound fully these advantages of tyranny to a potential critic or competitor.

Notwithstanding these omissions, Simonides gives Hiero some advice on how he "might" convert his unwilling subjects into "willing" ones and "friends" (9–11). In order to clarify this advice, we should pause to note the distinctions between kinds of rule which Socrates makes in the *Memorabilia*. Monarchy is rule over willing subjects according to law, while tyranny is lawless rule over unwilling subjects (*Memorabilia* 4.6.12–13). However, when Socrates considers whether "knowledge" (*epistēmē*) might not be a more efficient and beneficent title to authority than conformity to law, an extra category is introduced: rule over willing subjects transcending the law. As Socrates presents it, knowledgeable rule pulls away from the republican standard of a community of shared rule under law and points instead toward a "household" where the monarch rules according to his own will over a ranked division of labor, every class doing the job for which its members are naturally best suited (*Memorabilia* 3.9.10–13). This is the model of rule which Simonides recommends to Hiero.[5] If Hiero follows his advice, Simonides argues, his subjects will become loyal and happy members of a good master's household. Relieved of any need to concern themselves with public affairs, cared for, protected and rewarded by the "ruler" (Simonides delicately avoids conferring on this reformed tyrant the fully legitimate title of king), they will be productive workers increasing their own wealth and the city's (*Hiero* 9.6–7,8, 10.3, 11.4, 11, 12, 14).

The dialogue ends, however, with no evident success on Simonides' part in persuading Hiero to undertake this reform. Though Hiero can doubtless see the advantages of a plan that would bolster his authority without constraining him with laws, we have the feeling that he does not quite want to renounce his unqualified possession of the city even if he would be better off doing so. Hiero's revelation of his own psychology and motives as a ruler suggest two explanations for this reluctance. Hiero may enjoy his recurrent triumph over the "fights and quarrels" of his subjects too much to allow their discontent to evaporate. He may prefer the recurrent sensations of risk and victory to the tranquility of efficient political management. Moreover, Simonides did not claim that the "real men" would be reconciled to the tyrant's rule by his advice, only the "human beings" (11.8, 11.14—see p. 113). Since the "real men" are likely to provide—because of their ambition—the greatest threat to Hiero's power and, because of their love of honor, the kind of friends he would deem most worth having, Hiero may have concluded that Simonides' omission of them vitiates the rest of his advice.

The other route to the *Education of Cyrus* is provided by the *Oeconomicus*, which investigates the correct art of household management. How a gentleman—a "beautiful and good" man (*kalos kagathos*)—ought to manage his

[5]Thus, as Luccioni remarks, the *Hiero* is Xenophon's "development of an idea dear to Socrates"—that rule in the optimal sense should be based on knowledge, not law or custom (1947, p. 77). See also Strauss (1968, pp. 70, 75–79), Wood (1964, p. 63).

household is Xenophon's way of investigating the question: What is a gentleman? His life includes the responsibilities and honors of citizenship, and the responsibilities and pleasures of private or family life. Is one of these pursuits more important, or do they have a common aim? The perfection of the art of household management points to the example of Cyrus, who ruled a vast empire like a household divided into classes of farmers, artisans and soldiers (*Oeconomicus* 4.4–16).[6] Because of his extraordinary talent, courage and splendor, Cyrus appears to be the exemplar not only of the good (in this context, the useful and pleasant) but of the beautiful or noble. Socrates, however, casts some doubt on identifying Cyrus with the perfection of gentlemanliness by recalling a visit to Cyrus made by the Spartan gentleman Lysander, who praised Cyrus as a "good" man (particularly with respect to his talents as a farmer) while omitting any comment on his nobility (4.17–25). The dialogue raises the question, in other words, whether the art of household management—employed in private life or as a monarchical replacement for the political community—can achieve the nobility of citizen life.[7]

But what exactly is the nobility of the life of citizenship? This side of the problem is taken up in Socrates' recounting of his conversation with the Athenian gentleman Ischomachus. Socrates appeared to have acquired from Ischomachus his interest in the art of farming as a guide for understanding gentlemanliness (7.2–3, 15.2–4). However, Ischomachus is also strongly attracted to the life of royal authority over "willing" subjects which Cyrus exemplifies (21.12). It is not clear, however, what the "noble" part of gentlemanliness would consist of either in monarchy or in a private household. For instance, Ischomachus compares his wife's supervisory position over his household with that of the "queen bee," apparently without reflecting that this suggests he has no specific function there himself and may, in effect, be a drone (7.32–40. See Strauss, 1970, p. 139). Moreover, Ischomachus describes his housekeeper in a way strongly reminiscent of Cyrus' characteristics in the *Education of Cyrus*. Like the housekeeper, Cyrus is continent about food, drink and sex and aims at gratifying the rest of the household to win their honor (9.11).[8] Is the greatest king then nothing more than a kind of glorified housekeeper? Ischomachus resists this conclusion when he amends the view stated by Socrates in the *Memorabilia* that royal rule is indeed simply the extension of household management to larger numbers (*Memo-*

[6] In idealizing Cyrus, Xenophon runs together the lives of Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger to present a more impressive composite. For example, Cyrus the Younger was never in fact the "king" of Persia, as Xenophon calls him at 4.16—as Xenophon himself admits immediately thereafter (4.18).

[7] Kritoboulos seems initially surprised by Socrates' suggestion that the king of Persia concerns himself with farming as opposed to the art of war (4.4).

[8] Cyrus has a straitlaced aversion to overeating, drunkenness and sexual passion. His eagerness to win people's honor by ministering to desires he himself does not share is prefigured by his usurpation of the duties at table of Astyages' steward (*Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1, 1.3.4–5, 1.3.10, 1.4.1, 5.2.5, 6.14, 5.1.12).

rabilia 3.4.12) While he agrees with Socrates that ruling is the architectonic art—the knowledge "common to all actions"—he claims that to be a *royal* ruler requires in addition "education" and a "good nature" (21.2, 5, 8, 11–12). The king cannot learn how to rule solely through instruction from an expert—as is the case with arts like farming and smithing—but must possess a good natural character which has been well educated from early life. Royal rule, in other words, cannot entirely be assimilated to rule according to knowledge, but requires an ethics of character development. Ischomachus' resistance to the complete identification of royal rule with household management throws his perplexity about the meaning of gentlemanliness into sharper relief. The gentleman is drawn to being something more than a citizen or the head of a private household, but the knowledgeable monarch toward whom his aspirations are drawn may not be a gentleman.

The *Education of Cyrus* brings together and further develops the approaches to princely government explored by the *Hiero* and *Oeconomicus*. It uses an idealized, pseudo-historical account of the great Persian monarch to depict *ad seriatem* the formation and education of the perfect king's character, his rise to imperial power and his administration of an empire which is a gigantic household embracing the millions of individual households of its subjects. As a king who transcends the law and rules according to "knowledge" (1.1.3), Cyrus perfects the model of rule which Simonides recommended to Hiero.[9]

In this work, Xenophon endorses the view which he attributes to Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus* that the monarch cannot learn how to rule through instruction alone, but must also possess a good character and education. The meticulous education in civic virtue which the Persian youths receive enables Cyrus' natural love of honor and learning to flourish. At the same time, however, Xenophon confirms the low opinion of the republican way of life which he attributes to Hiero by showing that even the best republic imaginable fails to satisfy the natures of its most talented and energetic citizens. Unlike "most cities" (1.2.2–3)—including even the very virtuous example of Sparta—the Persian republic tries to supplement the protection provided for every citizen by the laws and the courage inculcated in the citizens to make them able to defend their country with a feeling of genuine friendship (*philia*) developed by their deliberation on and participation in public affairs.[10] In Xenophon's pseudo-historical narrative, accord-

[9]For a fuller discussion of *The Education of Cyrus*, see Newell (1983). For a discussion of Xenophon's pseudo-historical method, see Breitenbach (1966, pp. 1708–1718), Barker (1951, p. 99), Delebecque (1957, pp. 384–85), Higgins (1977, p. 44). On the centrality of the division of labor to Cyrus' monarchy in the *Education of Cyrus*, see the excellent article by Breebart (1983, especially p. 129). Farber (1979, p. 502) and Breebart (1983, p. 134) note that Xenophon presents Cyrus' kind of rule as the alternative to rule by law or convention.

[10]Hémardinquer (1872, p. 26) compares Xenophon's idealization of the ancient Persians as a foil for criticizing the Greeks of his day with Cicero's later praise of the Germans as a foil for criticizing his Roman contemporaries.

ingly, the Persians have long ago abandoned the Spartan practices of teaching the boys to steal and discouraging them from conversing or expressing their opinions, lest these severities prevent a sentiment of civic friendship from taking root in their characters (1 6 27–34) On Cyrus' return from Media, however, where he spent his adolescence at the luxurious court of his grandfather, Cyrus subverts the Persian education by convincing his own generation of young citizens to cease pursuing virtue as an end in itself and use it as a means of acquisition The lesson Cyrus has learned in Media is that the individualism characteristic of the Median king and his privatized subjects can, by employing the skill and courage of the Persian education, acquire for each Persian "great wealth, happiness and honor" that they would otherwise never experience (1 5 8–12)

Although Cyrus in one sense corrupts the Persian education by arguing that virtue is not its own reward, in another sense he fulfills the aims of that education to produce citizens of "surpassing nobility" (1 2 5, 15) more successfully than the republic had ever been able to do First as imperial commanders and later as heads of splendid households encompassing the provinces and fiefs of the empire, Cyrus' comrades excel at the noble and good in ways that were not possible under the republican rule of law with its restrictions on outstanding personal achievement The *Education of Cyrus* may also be taken as Xenophon's critique of the view he attributes to Simonides that a tyrant can convert, well along in his career, to a more efficient and beneficent method of governing The influence of Cyrus' education on his character remedies the crucial defect in Hiero which may have prevented him from profiting from Simonides' advice Cyrus learned about the household form of rule in Media without losing the immunity from hedonism acquired during his Persian education As a ruler, consequently Cyrus has no erotic passion for the literal possession and consumption of his household and subjects His relations with his subordinates are untinged with the jealousy or suspicion that arise from the competition for pleasures Cyrus can be ruthless, but he takes no pleasure (as does Hiero) in the thrill of "fights and quarrels" for their own sake apart from the cold-blooded goal of expanding his power By resisting the conflation of political authority with a lover's jealous possessiveness, the perfect monarch is, in Xenophons presentation, psychologically distinct from the tyrant [11]

Is Cyrus, then, an unequivocally successful example in Xenophon's eyes of that perfection of the gentlemanly life which citizenship under law may reach for but cannot fully attain? Is his career meant to show a way of transcending the perplexities of Ischomachus? It might well seem so Ischomachus had said that royal rule was a "divine" life (*Oeconomicus* 21 5

[11] This is particularly well brought out by Cyrus dialogue with Araspas, inspired by the beauty of the captive queen Panthera Cyrus likens *eros* to an enslavement which makes us neglect our practical interests (5 1 7–16)

11–12). At the penultimate stage of his conquests, Cyrus' allies present him with a captive queen for his war prize (4 6 11, 5.1.6). Reputed to be the most beautiful woman in Asia, her name—Pantheia—means, literally, the "wholly divine " Her award to Cyrus thus seems to symbolize outwardly his crowning achievement

But as Xenophon presents it, the cumulative answer to these questions remains tentative This can be illustrated with several further observations from the *Education of Cyrus* Cyrus' rule is likened by one of his lieutenants to that of a "king-bee" (5 1 24). Ischomachus' praise of his wife as the "queen-bee," we recall, raised the possibility that the gentleman is useless to his own household The merging of king and queen-bee suggests this problem could be avoided by the extension of household management to kingship, which requires the exercise of political and military as well as productive skills But this remedy does not dispose altogether of the possibility that royal authority is still comparable to the rather mundane managerial skills of a housekeeper—especially after the period of conquests is over and there is no more glory to be won

Furthermore, Cyrus means of acquiring power may be hard to reconcile with "beautiful and good" conduct He "is said," as Xenophon equivocally puts it, to have been the heir to the Persian throne (1.2 1) But this even if true, did not entitle him to subvert the laws of Persia or to usurp the authority of Astyages' heir Cyaxares Cyrus is practiced in many deceptions unknown to earlier generations of Persian gentlemen Although he tells the Persians, for example, that he is interested only in a defensive war against the Assyrian empire (1 5 13), he continues his conquests long after Persia's security from external aggression has been guaranteed [12] Numerous threats, half-truths, executions and transportations take place in the background of Cyrus' marvelous rhetoric of peaceful reconciliation and his magnanimity toward those ready to surrender without a fight (see e g 4 4 5–6 and below, pp 123–25) Eventually the "real men" making up his top command are as much in terror of him as the "human beings" whom they have conquered Xenophon's use of accounts of Cyrus that clearly came after his rise to greatness and his success in inspiring millions with fear of him (1 1 5–1 2 1) must cause us to wonder to what degree an extraordinary conqueror can influence the reputation he leaves behind Who knows what other crimes and usurpations formed the basis for the immense prestige of Cyrus in the mature stage of his life, when the accounts Xenophon drew upon were gaining wide currency? Machiavelli states the implication baldly when he says that a

[12] Cyrus tells the peers that justice will be on their side in the coming war because they are defenders rather than aggressors Immediately after this however in private conversation with his father, Cyrus expresses his contempt not only for the Assyrians but for his supposed allies the Medes and for other peoples poorly governed in comparison with Persia It would be a disgrace he says not to fight them all and reform their slothful inefficient governments (1 6 8 9)

ruler who uses enough force in the beginning of founding a "new order" w silence his enemies, dazzle the half-hearted, and shape a glowing account himself for posterity (1964, pp 43–46).

Finally, it is doubtful whether the distance between Cyrus and his lieute ants permits the reciprocity between them necessary for genuine frien ship [11] Xenophon vividly illustrates this problem when he has Cyrus' frie from boyhood and high lieutenant Araspas fall passionately in love with Pa theia, Cyrus' prize of war Although Cyrus is not possessed by an erotic lon ing for Pantheia and behaves with perfect chastity towards her, as a politi matter he must treat Araspas' passion for the captive queen as a threat to t external majesty of his authority, reducing this once proud associate to a p oxysm of fear (6 1 31–41) Especially when considered in the light of l friendlessness, there is something indiscriminate and egotistical about Cyr "thirst" for the gratitude and honor of millions of people whom he never la eyes on and not one of whom is in a position to earn his gratitude or resp in return (5 1 1) Cyrus' coldness toward any particular erotic attachment after all, not the moderation of a citizen subordinating his desires to the co mon good, but the psychological means he has devised in himself to dev his talents undistractedly to what could be characterized as shameless pa dering to the material needs of the "human beings "

This lack of restraint is prefigured in the *Education of Cyrus* by the you Cyrus' obliviousness to any sense of awe or shame before the gods l cheerfully regards the gods as "friends" who unfailingly reward ambitio effort like his own with commensurate success (1 6 3–6, 2 3 4) By contra Cyrus' father Cambyses tries to moderate his son's ambitions by stressi that there is an inscrutable disjunction between human virtue and the go favor that a prudent ruler should bear in mind before undertaking too a bitious an enterprise (1 6 18, 23–24, 26, 44–46) Cyrus compares an en getic general to a productive farmer, as if every human virtue were a mea to maximum procurement (1 6 18, see also 2 2 24–26 and Farber, 197 p 501) But Cambyses observes that even an energetic general may thwarted by a god, and greets the comparison of generalship to farmi with silence It is as if, in Cambyses' view, the relation between man a the earth illustrates the disjunction between the cultivation of virtue and t order of the nonhuman world especially clearly Despite his admiration l royal rule, Ischomachus likewise remarks in the *Oeconomicus* that the go do not unfailingly reward the diligence that prudent human beings displ through farming and other branches of household management (*Oeconomic* 11 8) Ischomachus' doubts about the power of human skill over nature are a piece with his doubts that possessing the nature of a ruler is synonymo with acquiring a skill Something about nature—be it chance, necessity,

[11]In fact, as Breebart observes "Cyrus favoured mutual envy and distrust amongst the pe so as to prevent threatening concentrations of power within the administrative hierar (1983 p 126)

the gods' inscrutable will—eludes the human capacity for planning and control. A prudent regard for this disjunction appears to be one of the traits which, in Xenophon's treatment, distinguishes a gentleman from a ruler like Cyrus. Xenophon reinforces these reservations about Cyrus' gentlemanliness by frequently likening his knowledge of ruling to feeding pigs, gelding horses and other aspects of the herdsman's art (*Education of Cyrus* 1.1.2, 2.1.28–29, 7.5.62–65).

As the preceding analysis reveals, Xenophon's exploration of the advantages of an imperial monarchy through the pseudo-history of Cyrus has mixed results from his own viewpoint. On the one hand, he allows the ambition for limitless rule to unfold in all its grandeur, appearing to overshadow republican virtue with its narrow restrictions on personal achievement. When allowed to run its course, however, the pseudo-history of Cyrus' rational and benevolent despotism does not prove, in spite of its manifest advantages, to be preferable in every respect to the life of citizen virtue. Initially glorious and optimistic, the *Education of Cyrus* ends, as is widely noted, in a depressing atmosphere of corruption stemming from the avarice and self-absorption of Cyrus' subjects and lieutenants (see, e.g., Higgins, 1977, pp. 57–59). In this way, the imperial monarchy pays a price in the long run for its freedom from republican or philosophical moderation. Xenophon wishes to elaborate the optimal potential of princely virtue for stable and prosperous rule, but also its drawbacks. As we will see in part 2, this open-minded but ambivalent assessment is what makes Xenophon both a suitable precedent and a suitable foil for Machiavelli's own diagnosis of princely rule.

Machiavelli's Double-edged Relationship to Xenophon

We are now in a better position to understand Xenophon's particular appeal for Machiavelli among the classical authorities on princely government. In order to understand this appeal we should step back for a moment from the more equivocal aspects of Xenophon's views and reemphasize what is distinctive about his point of departure for analyzing the varieties of rule. Whereas Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* culminate in prescriptions for the best civic community, the *Education of Cyrus* sets aside this prescription at the outset in favor of an individual's ambition for empire. However, much as Machiavelli wishes to join Xenophon in commending the precedent of Cyrus' success, he also wishes to distinguish "the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon" from his own appraisal of what such a ruler would actually have had to do in order to succeed on this scale. Tracing this distinction will bring the double-edged quality of Machiavelli's interpretation of Xenophon to light. As we will see, Xenophon's reservations about the methods and character of a ruler like Cyrus help to explain Machiavelli's reservations about Xenophon as an analyst of princely success.

The critique of Xenophon's version of Cyrus is undertaken in chapters

15–19 of *The Prince* and in a parallel section of the *Discourses* (3:20–23). While the chapters in *The Prince* examine a catalogue of the traditional virtues one by one, they are linked by an ongoing comparison of princes who have imitated the "virtue" of previous princes. Set up at the end of chapter 14, the comparison is between princes such as Achilles, Alexander, and Caesar—each of whom imitated a forebear directly—and Scipio, who imitated, not Cyrus precisely but "those qualities of Cyrus that Xenophon has written about"—his "chastity, affability, kindness [and] generosity."[14]

According to *The Prince*, the problem with the traditional-minded "writers" whom Machiavelli uses Xenophon to exemplify is that they misinterpret the virtues which people attribute after the fact to princes who have succeeded in bringing them peace and prosperity as the prior causes of their success (*The Prince*, ch. 17). In other words, they "effeminate" virtue by trying to ground it in an "imagined" realm of eternal, preexistent ends of peace and justice. People do not really admire a ruler's generosity, for instance, because of the qualities it reveals in him but because of the benefits they derive from it. Hence, it follows that, faced with the choice between impoverishing his subjects in order to have the wherewithal to practice generosity for its own sake and being stingy, the prince should choose stinginess as the course of action least likely to enrage his subjects by violating their interests (*The Prince*, ch. 16). The best solution of all, though, is like "Cyrus, Caesar or Alexander," to despoil other peoples in order to be able to practice generosity toward one's own people at no cost to oneself or them. When citing this example in chapter 16 of *The Prince*, Machiavelli mentions only Cyrus—not, as he had put it at the end of chapter 14, "the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon." Having detached Cyrus from Xenophon and therefore no longer treating Cyrus as a forebear whom princes imitate through the medium of a "writer," Machiavelli now adds Cyrus to those princes like Caesar and Alexander who are said to have imitated their forebears directly. Generosity on the basis of imperialism, Machiavelli thereby suggests, is the basis of the real Cyrus' success which should be directly imitated, as opposed to Xenophon's interpretation which Scipio imitated.

Machiavelli's description of Hannibal in chapter 17 as a ruler who "united men of all races" plainly likens him to Cyrus, who according to all accounts of

[14]When offering Achilles, Alexander and Caesar as examples of princes who imitated princes as opposed to Scipio's reliance on Xenophon, Machiavelli omits the rather obvious detail that Alexander could only have imitated the Achilles created by Homer. It would seem as if Machiavelli exempts some ancient poets from the criticism he makes of the ancient philosophers, perhaps because Homer, for instance, depicted Achilles in such a way as to minimize his own moral interference and so enable his daring hero to be imitated directly by real life princes. Machiavelli's preference for the ancient poets over the philosophers is evident elsewhere, as when, for example, he cites approvingly the fable of Chiron, the half-human, half animal teacher of Achilles and other ancient princes for communicating the maxim that a prince must be able to use the bestial as well as the human side of his nature (*The Prince*, ch. 18).

his career did the same thing. Machiavelli's contrast of Hannibal with Scipio thus continues his assessment of what a ruler like Cyrus would really be like as opposed to Scipio's emulation of "the virtues extolled by historians and biographers of princes" (*Discourses* 3.20). Hannibal is accordingly contrasted, not with the real Cyrus (whom he resembles), but with Xenophon's Cyrus. "Xenophon takes great pains to show how many victories, how much honor and fame, Cyrus gained by his humanity and affability, and by his not having exhibited a single instance of pride, cruelty, or luxuriousness, nor of any other of the vices that are apt to stain the lives of men. And yet we see that Hannibal, by following the very opposite course, achieved also great fame and great victories." Scipio, on the other hand, practiced only the virtues of "humanity and benevolence" which he had learned from the *Education of Cyrus* (*Discourses* 3.21). Either Hannibal's or Scipio's method is capable of success or failure, Machiavelli concedes, depending on the "virtue" of the one who employs it. But he definitely leans toward Hannibal's method as the more reliable.[15] Scipio's generosity to his troops, Machiavelli believes, inflamed their desires to the point where he could no longer satisfy them or maintain discipline. Hannibal, however, with his "inhuman cruelty and infinite virtue" terrified his soldiers into reconciliation to his rule and gratitude for whatever positive favors he chose to bestow (*Discourses* 3.21; *The Prince*, ch. 17). In other words, it is not enough for a prince to rely on his subjects' own assessment of their self-interest. By contrasting Scipio's failure at ruling with Hannibal's success, Machiavelli suggests that the imitator of the real Cyrus would inspire fear in his subjects so as to make it always in their minimal self-interest to obey him and to inspire their deeper gratitude for benefits beyond the minimum of survival.

But here we must pause to ask: Is it a fair reading of Xenophon when Machiavelli suggests that Scipio was misled by the *Education of Cyrus* into the neglect of tough-minded governance for the pursuit of those gentle virtues admired by philosophers? For in the very first pages of the *Education of Cyrus* we read that Cyrus inspired such fear of himself that he struck all

[15] The comparison of Scipio's reliance on his soldiers' love and Hannibal's reliance on their fear is extended in the next chapter (3.22) to a comparison of the gentle Valerius Corvinus and the harsh Manlius Torquatus. Machiavelli inclines toward Manlius on the grounds that his cruelty prevented him from becoming popular, which helped preserve the rule of law as opposed to parties loyal to the leading men. Machiavelli approves of more gentle rule and the qualities Xenophon attributes to Cyrus when it comes to monarchies strictly speaking, as opposed to republics where leading citizens like Scipio are tempted to imitate monarchical qualities and so undermine the republic's collective vigor. Machiavelli's endorsement of Xenophon, of course, is the Xenophon whom he has told us earlier in *The Discourses* shows Cyrus to be a master of deception. Moreover, I argue below that although Machiavelli gives Xenophon his due for understanding how a prince can gain power through fraud, he believes he must supplement Xenophon with his own understanding of princely virtue in order to show that a prince needs above all to be able to use force.

people with terror and no one tried to withstand him; and he was able t awaken in all so great a desire to please him that they always wished to b guided by his will" (1.1 5) Moreover, Tigranes, the "sophist's" erstwhil intimate, advises Cyrus after his first military victory to make his sub jects "moderate" by inspiring them with "soul-crushing fear"—a polic which he follows with stunning success. In contrasting Machiavelli's diag nosis of princely rule with Xenophon's, it does not seem sufficient to say tha Xenophon's version is candy coated. On closer inspection, moreover, i proves that Machiavelli himself does not believe this In an insightful pas sage of the *Discourses* (2 13), he states his view that Xenophon did no present Cyrus as succeeding solely through his "humanity and affability' "Xenophon shows in his Life of Cyrus the necessity of deception to succes the first expedition of Cyrus against the king of Armenia is replete wit fraud, and it was deceit alone, and not force, that enabled him to seize tha kingdom And Xenophon draws no other conclusion from it than that prince, who wishes to achieve great things must learn to deceive Cyrus als practised a variety of deceptions upon Cyaxares, king of the Medes, his ma ternal uncle, and Xenophon shows that without these frauds Cyrus woul never have achieved the greatness which he did attain "

Machiavelli's interpretation of the *Education of Cyrus* here is amply dem onstrated by the smooth game by which Cyrus strips the pathetic Cyaxare of his power while affecting to do him homage We noted other examples o Cyrus' deceit earlier If Machiavelli is aware that Xenophon is aware of th darker side of a political success such as Cyrus', why does he so strongly impl that Xenophon's version of Cyrus will lead an imitator to failure? The answe lies in the very qualified sense in which Machiavelli concedes Xenophon's po litical realism Machiavelli uses the above-quoted comment on the *Educa tion of Cyrus* to illustrate the point that someone is likelier to rise to a hig position through fraud alone than through force alone He does not, how ever, rule out someone rising through force *and* fraud On the contrary, th Romans are said to have been adept at using both force of arms and the repu tation consequent upon their victories to delude and intimidate their allie (*The Discourses*, 2 13) In chapter 6 of *The Prince*, where Machiavelli dis cusses examples of truly rare ("outstanding") virtue, force is given more em phasis In this chapter, Cyrus—as distinct from Xenophon's Cyrus—is sai to have led the downtrodden Persians in a rebellion against their Media suzerains and thereby begun his rise to empire This contradicts Xenophon more seemly account of how Cyrus, as heir to the throne of an autonomou Persian republic, was asked to lead the Persian part of an allied military forc against Assyria by his kinsman the king of Media (*Education of Cyrus* 1 5 2 5) As these two chapters illustrate, then, when Machiavelli wants to empha size the need to use fraud, he buttresses his argument with Xenophon version of Cyrus When he wants to emphasize the need to use force, how

ever, he ignores Xenophon's version in favor of his own The implication is that while Xenophon teaches well enough the need for fraud, he does not make his readers sufficiently aware of the need to use force Xenophon shows how Cyrus took advantage of his status as heir to the Persian throne to pursue his ambition. But, Machiavelli implies, Xenophon does not make it clear enough that Cyrus' very legitimacy may have been a retroactive rewriting of history, consequent upon victories achieved at even deeper levels of violence and usurpation

This strikes me as being a plausible characterization of the *Education of Cyrus*--certainly from Machiavelli's viewpoint—and it invites a reading of the work that might not otherwise occur to one [16] While Cyrus' use of fraud can be established fairly easily by a comparison of his statements, his use of force lurks more in the background of Xenophon's narrative Its extent and degree have to be inferred from how the foreground events are affected by it Typically in the *Education of Cyrus*, "force" is the discreet background guarantee of the "fraud" consummated in the foreground by Cyrus many lengthy speeches Cyrus always waits until he has deployed his forces in such a way as to achieve overwhelming military superiority before completing, through rhetorical persuasiveness, the conversion of former enemies into "willing' allies and subjects (3 1 1–6, 4 2 32) For example, his defense of his conduct to Cyaxares while based on well-constructed (if self-serving) arguments, is silently guaranteed success by the fact that Cyrus has already lured Cyaxares' troops away from him and reduced him to a powerless figurehead (4 2 11 Cf 4 5 8–12) On another occasion Cyrus deliberately lies in wait for some of his newer allies whom he suspects of wanting to sneak away at night with their possessions Those who attempt it are summarily executed without any chance of repentance This slaughter follows immediately upon, and silently underscores a speech in which Cyrus promises these new followers his friendship in exchange for their loyalty (4 4 9–13 4 5 3–7) The *Education of Cyrus* then does furnish illustrations of Machiavelli's point that a ruler should play on his subjects fears in order to make them see their self-interest as being served by his own It is also true

[16] Most humanists read the *Education of Cyrus* as presenting a paragon of kingly goodness although this was not always thought to be incompatible with martial prowess See for example Poggio's dedication of his translation to Alphonso of Aragon (quoted in Gilbert 1938 p 13) and Vasco Fernandez preface to his translation (Gallet Guerne 1974 pp 182 84 Montaigne however while admiring the work was astonished by the great liberty allowed by Xenophon in his complete emperor for deception (1952 p 13) Sometimes we find Xenophon being read in a more starkly Machiavellian manner as when for example James I in the *Basilikon Doron* refers to the *Education of Cyrus* to establish the maxim that a prince needs to begin his reign by deliberately being cruel so that he can then afford to be merciful (Gilbert 1938 p 101 In the preface to his 1685 English translation of the *Education of Cyrus* Francis Digby recommends the book to the reader on the grounds that it is written indeed much like Machiavel's *Florentine Prince*

however, that in the *Education of Cyrus* we see much more of Cyrus giving than taking, winning consent than coercing obedience, rewarding than punishing The most charming and memorable aspect of Xenophon's narrative is made up of the speeches that establish Cyrus' reputation for benevolence and his subjects' loving gratitude Machiavelli's critique of the *Education of Cyrus*, therefore, is not so much that it contains nothing about the need for force as that this lesson is buried too deeply—is too discreet and indirect—to be of practical use to real-life imitators of Cyrus like Scipio

From Machiavelli's viewpoint, then, it would appear that Xenophon wants to have it both ways As I observed in part 1 of this essay, while Xenophon explores much more extensively than Plato and Aristotle the prospects of princely ambition for achieving political stability and prosperity, in the last analysis he refuses to abandon the distinctions between monarchical and tyrannical authority and between virtuous and vicious, noble and base, gentlemanly and unrestrained conduct He sees in a ruler like Cyrus a high degree of excellence, but also deficiencies that may be balanced by the excellences of citizenship and philosophy This mixture of admiration for Cyrus and reservations about him makes Xenophon unwilling to depict Cyrus either as an out-and-out tyrant or as morally flawless For Machiavelli, as a consequence, Xenophon's not inconsiderable value as a source of advice for princes is undermined by the ancient philosopher's deep-seated ambivalence toward his own paragon of princely success Machiavelli would have us understand the unvarnished truth that successful princes act on their untutored impulses for dominion, wealth, and glory Xenophon, by contrast, holds up the rare example of a monarch educated as far as possible like a gentleman through the most elaborately wrought civic pedagogy—a monarch who, while not exactly legitimate, is not exactly a tyrant either, while not exactly noble, develops his talents and achieves many benefits for his followers Xenophon's unusual and equivocal position—less republican than Plato and Aristotle, less "princely" than Machiavelli—explains the double-edged relationship of his political thought to Machiavelli's Since Xenophon possesses the venerable authority of a classical author, it is convenient for Machiavelli to be able to play up Xenophon's preference for princely rule and his elaboration of its advantages, and so draw his readers' minds away from the strictures placed upon political and military belligerence by Plato and Aristotle Thus, as I observed at the beginning of this paper, Plato and Aristotle are not so much as mentioned when the context (for example, the criticism of those who have "imagined republics") would seem most to require it, and Xenophon is made to stand for all the nameless "writers" about the traditional catalogue of the virtues On the other hand, if Xenophon is correct that a prince can achieve the most glorious success imaginable *and* embody to a high (if not to the highest) degree the classical virtues of liberality, clemency and truthfulness, then he poses a real obstacle to Machiavelli's desire to undermine the classi-

cal tradition as a whole For this reason also, then, Xenophon's views must be dealt with at greater length than the more republican-minded classical authors. It is precisely because Xenophon comes so close among the ancient authorities to Machiavelli's idea of an "effectual" politics that it becomes especially important for Machiavelli to refute him

Although Machiavelli's critique of Christianity is beyond the scope of this essay, his ambivalent relationship to Xenophon is also useful for further consideration of that important theme As I mentioned at the outset, chapters 15 to 19 of *The Prince* are a critique both of the classical catalogue of the virtues and their adaptation by Christian theologians and humanists Accordingly the contrast between the real Cyrus on the one hand and Xenophon's Cyrus and Scipio on the other also develops the contrast made in chapter 6 of *The Prince* between "armed prophets" like Cyrus, Moses, Romulus and Theseus and rulers who are "unarmed" owing to Christianity and ancient moral philosophy

Christianity's assimilation of ancient moral philosophy it is well to remember, had never been smooth or complete Christian orthodoxy could not abide the more full-blooded evocations of civic and martial achievement found in the classics but instead emphasized the classics' concern with transcending politics in the direction of eternal truth Thus Petrarch, for example as a good Augustinian abhorred Cicero's pragmatic advice on statesmanship while admiring his depiction of philosophical contemplation (Baron 1938 pp 72–97) Machiavelli's aim of criticizing Christianity in tandem with his criticism of the ancient philosophers is clear when we bear in mind that his critique of Scipio is also an implicit critique of Scipio's mentor Cicero on grounds the reverse of Petrarch's Cicero allows his grasp of statesmanship to be undermined by his respect for philosophy (Hulliung 1983 p 132 For as Scipio is depicted by Cicero, not only is he guided in his political actions by a Socratic philosopher's idealized monarch, but he prefers philosophy to the world of political action altogether (Cicero *Republic* 6 13–19) Cicero's admiration for philosophy was often cited as a pagan prefiguration of the life guided by Christian revelation (Manetti 1967 pp 83–84 Vergerio 1897 p 105) In criticizing Scipio's excessive gentleness, therefore Machiavelli is criticizing both the tendency of the classics to elevate moral and philosophical virtue over the hard necessities of politics and Christianity's selective reading of the ancients to emphasize still further this transcendence of political action Machiavelli's use of the *Education of Cyrus* illustrates especially well the ambivalent relationship between ancient political philosophy and Christian moralism Xenophon's relatively open-minded assessment of princely ambition made his works useful for Machiavelli when he wished to play upon his Renaissance readers' admiration for classical antiquity in general in order to advance his own anti-Christian views At the same time, for Machiavelli, Xenophon's embellishment of the real Cyrus ruthless drive

with the virtues of peace and justice is a prime example of how "thoughtless writers on the one hand admire" a successful ruler's actions, and "on the other condemn the principal cause of them" (*The Prince* ch. 17).

To pursue the religious dimension a step further: Just as Xenophon's Cyrus and Scipio illustrate for Machiavelli the dangers of being "unarmed" by philosophical and religious morality, Machiavelli implies that a biblical ruler like Moses, once stripped of the Bible's edifying camouflage, could be understood in much the same ruthless terms as other "armed prophets" like the real Cyrus. Conversely, Machiavelli implies, we could start to view great secular rulers like Cyrus as having the same epochal scope for the creation of "new modes and orders"—new peoples, states and moralities—that the Bible reserves for a few of God's appointed. If the linkage of Cyrus and Moses in chapter 6 of *The Prince* deflates the claims of Christian over secular political authority by placing the biblical prince on a level with the pagan one, it also expands the claims of secular authority to an epochal scope formerly reserved for the instruments of God. By contrast, Xenophon even at his most candid never allows that princes could exercise this power to shape "matter ... into whatever form they thought fit" (*The Prince*, ch. 6), to re-create altogether the conditions of political existence. The contrast allows us to see how very far Machiavelli departs from the classical tradition even at its most pragmatic and sympathetic to princely ambition.

A final comparison of Machiavelli and Xenophon will illustrate the restrictions placed by classical political thought on this creative, epochal view of princely rule. Machiavelli adopts the same stance toward the addressee of *The Prince* as Xenophon has Simonides adopt toward Hiero. In both cases, the wise adviser professes his ignorance about the life of high political authority, only to go on to reveal that he knows more about effective ruling than the actual ruler. The parallel between the two works is confirmed when Machiavelli, after criticizing the traditional account of the virtues, offers in chapter 21 a gloss of Simonides' advice to Hiero on how to reconcile his subjects to his rule.[17] Each work tells a prince how he might protect the humble interests of the common people and so win their loyalty against the ambitious maneuverings of the nobility. However, while Xenophon depicts a politically canny poet advising a tyrant, he does not depict Socrates as doing so. Aside from protecting Socrates' reputation, Xenophon may be implying that the poet's concern with "making" or creation (*poiēsis*) is more appropri-

[17] Machiavelli advises the prince to honor and reward the talented, innovative and industrious. The prince should also "encourage his subjects to pursue their trades in tranquility" by allaying their fears of being despoiled or defrauded. The people should also be kept occupied with "festivals and shows," and the prince should make periodic displays of his generosity to the city's various guilds and clans (Machiavelli, 1964, ch. 21). All of these points, frequently worded in similar terms, are found in Simonides' advice to Hiero in the last chapters of the *Hiero* (see especially 9.5, 9.6–7, 9.8, 9.9–10, 10.5, 11.4).

ate for converting a bad ruler into a good one than is the philosopher's concern with what things permanently are. That is, Socrates may be reluctant to admit that nature is so plastic or given to becoming that a ruler can supersede his crimes and transform himself into what he was not before. By contrast, Machiavelli simply merges himself as author of *The Prince* with this adviser Ending *The Prince* with a poetic appeal to Italy's prospective liberator (ch 26), Machiavelli conflates the roles of philosopher, poet, and adviser In keeping with this stance, Machiavelli also rejects the idea of nature as regular, orderly, and limiting of human ambition for the "poetic" idea that corrupt political bodies can be recreated into healthy ones by vigorous princely action (*Discourses* 1.10, 17, 18).

Xenophon's reservations about committing philosophy to the reform of tyranny might be thought to enable him to identify and condemn tyranny more clearly for what it is than Machiavelli can Still, Machiavelli is able to adapt Xenophon's writings to his own purposes by radicalizing their character in a way that Plato's and Aristotle's works do not permit Whereas Xenophon divides the spheres of politics and philosophy so as not to confound their respective excellences, Machiavelli simply lops away the sphere of philosophy by adapting Xenophon's political writings without making any reference to the Socratic ones He thus takes advantage of the greater latitude which Xenophon offers for the separation of politics and philosophy to argue that philosophy as traditionally conceived has nothing to do with "effectual" government

References

Anderson J K 1974 *Xenophon* London Duckworth

Aristotle 1967 *Politics* H Rackham trans Cambridge Harvard University Press

Barker Ernest 1951 *Greek Political Theory* London Methuen

Baron, Hans 1938 Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance *The John Rylands Library Bulletin* 22 72–97

——— 1955 *Humanistic and Political Literature in Florence and Venice at the Beginning of the Quattrocento* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Breebart A B 1983 From Victory to Peace Some Aspects of Cyrus State in Xenophons *Cyropaedia* *Mnemosyne* Vol XXXVI Fasc 1–2 117–34

Breitenbach, H R 1966 *Xenophon von Athen* Stuttgart Alfred Druckenmuller

Butterfield, H 1940 *The Statecraft of Machiavelli* London G Bell

Castiglione, Baldesar 1959 *The Book of the Courtier* Charles S Singleton trans New York Anchor

Cicero 1966 *On the Republic* C W Keyes trans Cambridge Harvard University Press

——— 1971 *Tusculan Disputations* J E King trans Cambridge Harvard University Press

Delebecque, Edouard 1957 *Essai Sur La Vie de Xenophon* Paris Librairie C Klincksieck

Digby, Francis 1685 Preface to his translation of *Kurou paideia Or The Institution and Life of Cyrus the Great* Beinecke Rare Book Room and Library

Farber, J J 1979 The *Cyropaedia* and Hellenistic Kingship *American Journal of Philology* 100 497–514

Gallet-Guerne, Danielle 1974 *Vasque de Lucène et la Cyropédie a la Cour de Bourgogne (1470)* Geneve Libraire Droz

Gilbert, Allan H 1938 *Machiavelli's Prince and its Forerunners* Durham Duke University Press

Gilbert Felix 1939 The Humanist Concept of the Prince *The Journal of Modern History* 11 449–83

Hémardinquer M 1872 *La Cyropédie Essai Sur Les Idées Morales et Politiques de Xenophon* Paris Ernest Thorin

Higgins W E 1977 *Xenophon the Athenian The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* Albany State University of New York Press

Hulliung Mark 1983 *Citizen Machiavelli* Princeton Princeton University Press

Irwin Terence 1977 *Plato's Moral Theory* Oxford Clarendon Press

Luccioni Jean 1947 *Hieron Texte et traduction avec une introduction et un commentaire* Paris Ophrys

Machiavelli, N 1950 *The Prince and the Discourses* Luigi Ricci and Christian Detmold, trans New York Modern Library

——— 1954 *Opere* Mario Bonfantini ed Milano Riccardo Ricciardi

——— 1964 *The Prince* Mark Musa trans New York St Martins Press

Manetti Gianozzo 1967 On the Dignity and Excellence of Man In A B Fallico and Herman Shapiro, eds and trans , *Renaissance Philosophy Volume I The Italian Philosophers* New York Modern Library

Montaigne 1952 *The Essays* Charles Cotton trans Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica

Munscher Karl 1920 *Xenophon in der Griechisch-Romischen Litteratur* Leipzig Dieterichsche Verlagsbuchhandlung

Newell, W R 1983 Tyranny and the Science of Ruling in Xenophons *Education of Cyrus* *The Journal of Politics* 45 889–906

——— 1987 Superlative Virtue The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's *Politics* *The Western Political Quarterly* 40 159 78

Plato 1968 *The Republic of Plato* Allan Bloom trans New York Basic Books

Pocock J G A 1975 *The Machiavellian Moment* Princeton Princeton University Press

Skinner, Quentin 1980 *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Volume I The Renaissance* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Strauss Leo 1968 *On Tyranny* Ithaca Cornell University Press

——— 1969 *Thoughts on Machiavelli* Seattle University of Washington Press

——— 1970 *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Vergerio Pier Paolo 1897 Concerning Liberal Studies In W H Woodward trans *Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Wood Neal 1964 Xenophons Theory of Leadership *Classica et Mediaevalia* 25 33–66

Xenophon 1968a *Xenophontis Institutio Cyri* W Gemoll ed Leipzig B G Teubner

——— 1968b *Cyropaedia* Walter Miller trans London William Heinemann

——— 1968c *Memorabilia Oeconomicus Symposium and Apology* E C Marchant and O J Todd trans London William Heinemann

——— 1971 *Scripta Minora* E C Marchant and G W Bowersock, trans London William Heinemann

Modeling the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: Wygant v. Board

Nelson C. Dometrius
Texas Tech University

Lee Sigelman
University of Arizona

In May, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Jackson, Michigan, school district's policy of protecting minority teachers during periods of mandatory layoffs. This paper models the implications of this decision in an attempt to project its likely impact on black representation in the educational workforce. The results suggest that under most plausible future conditions the decision's impact should be negligible, due largely to the fact that blacks have so few recent gains to protect. On the other hand, the analysis uncovers other trends that may have significant future impacts on black representation among public school teachers.

On May 19, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Jackson, Michigan, school district's policy of deviating from strict seniority criteria when teacher layoffs became necessary—a policy designed to safeguard progress toward equal employment opportunity/affirmative action goals. Immediate reactions from politicians, pundits, and other interested parties centered on the political and legal ramifications of the *Wygant* decision, especially the Court's seeming rejection (solidified a few weeks later in cases involving white firefighters in Cleveland and sheetmetal workers in New York) of the Reagan administration's contention that "reverse discrimination" is warranted only to remedy past discrimination against specific victims (Raspberry, 1986, Will, 1986, Yoder, 1986).[1] By contrast, our concern is the longer-term impact of the *Wygant* decision on black employment in the public schools.

The underrepresentation of minority and female employees takes on a special symbolic importance in the public sector. But beyond symbolism, a growing body of evidence suggests that improved minority representation produces greater governmental responsiveness to minority interests. Research has shown that government spending on programs benefiting minorities tends to be higher in cities run by black mayors (e.g., Keech, 1968

[1]Wendy Wygant, et al., Petitioners v. Jackson Board of Education, etc., et al. *United States Law Week* (May 20, 1986), pp. 4479-94. Hereafter the *Wygant* opinions will be referred to by page number only.

Welch and Karnig, 1978, 1979). In the specific context of public education Meier (1984) reported a strong inverse correlation between the percentage of black teachers in a given school and outcomes indicative of "second generation discrimination" low percentages of black students attending college or channeled into enriched and gifted classes, and higher percentage of blacks dropping out or tracked into classes for the educable mentally retarded By contrast, black representation on school boards seems to have a relatively minor impact on the treatment of black students (Meier and England, 1984, cf Fraga, Meier, and England, 1986) The apparent importance of having blacks teaching in and administering the schools means that if the *Wygant* decision adversely affects black employment in public education, we can anticipate increases not only in the perception that government is unresponsive to the needs of blacks but also in the frequency of racially discriminatory outcomes in the schools

In the past, the Court often upheld the preferential hiring of minorities In *Wygant*, it unanimously reaffirmed preferential hiring, at least under certain circumstances, but splintered on the issue of preferential treatment during layoffs The plurality opinion of Justices Powell, Burger and Rehnquist rejected the Jackson school board's layoff protection plan Justices O'Connor and White concurred in separate opinions Blackmun and Brennan joined Marshall in a ringing dissent from the plurality opinion, and Stevens wrote a separate dissent

The *Wygant* opinions articulate several distinct points of view Our purpose is to explore the implications of these opinions for the integration of the public school workforce To accomplish this, we (1) present a generic model of compositional change in organizations that can be used to formalize the implications of the justices' opinions, (2) highlight the connections between the model's mathematical terms and the justices' standards for evaluating affirmative action hiring and layoff policies, and (3) use the model to simulate the changes in racial composition that would logically follow from each of the *Wygant* opinions

The Model

Sigelman and Dometrius (1986) introduced a model of "organizational regeneration" which they used to project the sexual composition of the state and local government work force ten years in the future The model, with notation changed to reflect our interest in race rather than gender, is [2]

[2] One difference in the model is making the leaving bias a multiplicative rather than additive term This was suggested as an alternative in the original article (Sigelman and Dometrius 1986, p 85) and seems more appropriate in the present context

$$B_{t+1} = B_t + (J * J_b/J) - L * (B_t/N_t * LB_b), \qquad (1)$$

where:

B = the number of black teachers,
N = the number of teachers,
J = the number of teachers who join the system in a given year,
J_b = the number of joiners who are black,
L = the number of teachers who leave the system in a given year,
LB_b = a leaving bias inducing blacks to leave at a higher or lower rate than their current proportion of teachers in the system, and
t = a particular point in time—for our purposes, a year

From these basic terms, it can be seen that the model predicts B_{t+1}, the number of blacks next year, by starting with B_t, the number of blacks this year, adding black joiners ($J * J_b/J$), given by multiplying the total number of joiners (J) by the proportion of joiners who are black (J_b/J), and subtracting black leavers ($L * (B_t/N_t * LB_b)$), given by multiplying the number of leavers (L) by the proportion of leavers who are black ($B_t/N_t * LB_b$). The proportion of leavers who are black is a function of the current proportion of blacks in the system (B_t/N_t) and LB_b, the leaving bias favoring or disadvantaging blacks. For further elaboration, readers should consult Sigelman and Dometrius (1986). For our purposes, we take the model as outlined above and use it to project the potential impact of the *Wygant* opinions.

Given appropriate initial values, Eq. (1) can be used to project changes over time in the racial characteristics of public school teachers. What makes the model useful for our purposes is that several of its terms directly pertain to the debate over affirmative action in general, and to the *Wygant* opinions in particular. That being the case, we can fix a given term in the equation at a value representing the viewpoint expressed in one opinion, run the model through several iterations (representing years), and see what impact the opinion, if controlling, would have on black representation in the public education work force.

The *Wygant* Opinions

The immediate controversy in *Wygant* stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education and the Jackson Education Association, stipulating that if layoffs became necessary seniority would be followed, except that the percentage of minority employees laid off would not exceed the current percentage of minority employees. If, for example, minorities comprised twenty percent of the employees, then no more than twenty percent of those laid off could be minorities. A large portion of the recently hired teachers in Jackson were blacks, and without pro-

tection they would have been among the first to go in a layoff period, diluting the black share of teachers in the system.

The impact of the collective bargaining agreement, stated in the terms of the organizational regeneration model, was to fix one component of the leaving bias at zero; blacks would be laid off only in proportion to their share of the positions at the time of the layoffs. This involves introducing an additional leaving term into the model. The previously defined leaving term—$(L * (B/N * LB_b))$—pertains to those who leave the system voluntarily, but the Jackson bargaining agreement involved those affected by mandatory layoffs. We add one more term—$(LO * (B/N * LOB_b))$—to the right-hand side of the equation, where LO designates the number of employees being laid off, B/N is the current percentage of black employees, and LOB_b is the layoff bias affecting blacks, set at zero by the Jackson plan. The model thus becomes

$$B_{t+1} = B_t + (J * (J_b/J * JB_b)) - (L * (B/N * LB_b)) - (LO * (B/N * LOB_b)) \quad (2)$$

Under a hiring freeze, likely during a situation extreme enough to lead to layoffs, J would fall to 0. During a layoff period, then, Eq. (2) would reflect a system whose racial composition was stable—exactly what the Jackson layoff protection plan was designed to achieve. More generally, the system would operate with a rachet-like effect: the share of positions held by blacks would increase as long as the system was expanding (i.e., as long as the number of joiners outran the number of leavers) and would hold steady if the size of the system decreased as a consequence of layoffs.

As it happened, the Jackson school district suffered layoffs during the 1976–77 and 1981–82 school years, resulting in a loss of jobs by white teachers with more seniority than some of the retained blacks. Displaced white teachers brought suit, but the federal district court denied their claims, finding a racially preferential policy appropriate to remedy societal discrimination and to provide role models for minority children. This verdict was upheld on appeal, but the Supreme Court, as we have seen, reversed it.

Justice Marshall, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, argued that since the Jackson affirmative action *hiring* plan was both unchallenged and clearly constitutional, steps taken to implement and safeguard it must also be constitutional: ". . . [A] hiring policy achieves no purpose at all if it is eviscerated by layoffs" (p. 4490). Under this standard, layoff protections designed to protect legitimate hiring goals would be constitutionally acceptable, and the model represented in eq. (2) would be preserved.

On the other hand, Justice Powell's plurality opinion held that while the burden on non-minorities of an affirmative action hiring policy tends to be widely diffused and thus does not constitute an undue burden, the Jackson

layoff plan imposed "the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive" (p. 4484). The standard of intrusiveness or "narrow tailoring," one of the core elements of the plurality opinion, finds hiring goals acceptable, but not layoff protections. Accordingly, seniority would be the controlling factor during layoffs, and because blacks comprise a larger portion of the newly hired than of the overall pool of employed teachers, the layoff leaving bias introduced earlier would not be zero; blacks could be laid off at a higher rate than their current proportion of professional employees.

The issues become less clear-cut when we turn to the joining bias, but here, too, the *Wygant* opinions staked out different positions. The plurality reiterated the standard expounded in *Fullilove v. Klutznick* that "any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees."[3] In discussing acceptable race-conscious criteria, the plurality referenced *Hazelwood School District v. U.S.*[4] to argue that "nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population from which the employees are hired" (p. 4481). From this perspective, it would follow that a school district should seek to achieve a black joining ratio equivalent to the proportion of blacks in the population and then wait for this gradual replacement process eventually to produce racial parity. This fixes the black joining rate at the black population ratio but does not permit layoff preferences to affect the black leaving ratio.

The plurality opinion in *Wygant* also cited a second perspective from *Hazelwood*, "that the proper comparison for determining the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was 'between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market'" (p. 4481). Nationally, the proportion of blacks in the educational labor pool falls short of the black share of the American population; accordingly, this alternative perspective would target the black joining ratio at a lower level, while again disallowing any racially based layoff policy.

Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality opinion, except for the section that described layoff protections as unacceptably intrusive. To her, layoff protections could be "narrowly tailored" if enacted to preserve progress toward a legitimate hiring goal. However, O'Connor argued that the Jackson plan did not pass this test. "In this case, the hiring goal that the layoff provision was designed to safeguard was tied to the percentage of minority stu-

[3] Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. J.) (cited in *Wygant*, p. 4481).

[4] Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 307 (1977) (Cited in *Wygant*, p. 4481).

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF THE WYGANT OPINIONS

What is the Legitimate Hiring Goal?

		Black Share of the Population	Black Share of the Labor Force	Black Share of the Student Population
Is Layoff Protection Permissable to Achieve a Legitimate Hiring Goal?	No	Powell Burger Rehnquist White		
	Perhaps		O'Connor	
	Yes			Marshall Brennan Blackmun Stevens

dents in the school district, not to the percentage of qualified minority teachers within the relevant labor pool" (p 4487) In sum, O'Connor left the door open to a race-conscious layoff policy if it were tied to a hiring goal targeted on the proportion of blacks in the labor pool, not the general population or student population The O'Connor standard, then, reinstates the layoff constraint to the model while following the second *Hazelwood* criterion (the labor market standard) for affirmative action in hiring

Finally, the Jackson school district's use of the black proportion of students as a target guiding the recruitment of new teachers received implicit approval from Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun and explicit endorsement from Stevens This standard allows a district to peg the black joining ratio at the black student ratio (a proportion typically higher than the percentage of blacks in the general population) and to secure progress toward this goal with layoff protection

At the risk of some oversimplification, the basic issues dividing the Court in *Wygant* can be reduced to a two-dimensional matrix, as shown in table 1 The pivotal role played by Justice O'Connor stands out quite clearly in this matrix. Whereas four justices flatly endorsed layoff protection and four flatly opposed it, O'Connor's opposition to the specific plan adopted by the Jackson school board was premised on what she saw as the board's adoption of an illegitimate hiring goal, her concurring opinion left open the possibility that a layoff protection plan could be acceptable if it were adopted pursuant to a legitimate hiring goal

MODEL SPECIFICATION

Our objective is to determine how the employment of blacks as primary and secondary school teachers would be affected if the ideas embraced in the various *Wygant* opinions were to become controlling. Of course, these opinions were specifically directed toward the Jackson, Michigan, school district, but we are interested in their potential implications for school districts nationwide. Accordingly, we focus on a hypothetical composite urban school district which is statistically typical rather than on the Jackson district itself. We use this typical district to provide beginning values for the regeneration model, and run the model for a six-year period (1986–1991), with year-to-year transitions governed by the model. At the end of this period, the racial composition of the educational work force that would prevail under one *Wygant* doctrine can be compared to that prevailing under alternative interpretations.

To specify the characteristics of a typical urban school district, we rely primarily on data collected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on the racial composition of the primary and secondary education work force in districts with 25,000 or more students, supplemented in certain instances by information from other sources. Since the rationales underlying the calculations that were used to develop starting values for the model were laid out in Sigelman and Dometrius' (1986) analysis of a similar data set, we shall relegate our discussion of these values to the appendix. Based on the procedures outlined there, our simulation begins with a school district that has 3,606 teachers,[5] 20.8% of whom are black. Each year there is a "normal" employee turnover rate of 6% in the district. The rate of exit from the system is much slower for blacks than for others, as reflected in the 50% leaving bias; this means that black teachers leave the system at only half the rate that would be expected from their current share of the teachers in the district. Of the new teachers hired as replacements for those who leave, some 15.6% are black.

[5]The EEOC reports identify classroom teachers separately when listing current employees but identify "new hires" only as professionals or nonprofessionals. Since our joining rate is drawn from the "new hires" data, it was necessary to base our analysis on all educational professionals, not just teachers. This is not particularly bothersome, since these non-teaching professionals do interact with students and are an integral component of the educational process.

The EEOC definition of educational professionals includes principals, assistant principals, elementary, secondary and other teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, librarians and audio visual specialists, consultants and supervisors of instruction, and other professionals (nurses, social workers, etc.). Excluded from the professional category are officials and administrators (other than principals and assistant principals), teachers' aides, technicians, and clerical and blue-collar workers. Teachers constitute about 85% of the total number of educational professionals. For stylistic relief we use the term "teachers" to refer to all educational professionals unless we explicitly specify otherwise.

The purpose of the simulation is to introduce three sources of potential variability into the system and to trace their impacts on black employment These sources of variability are the size of the system, the percentage of joiners who are black, and the leaving bias.

Growth or Decline A layoff protection plan like Jackson's comes into play only during severe declines, since layoffs are not instituted except in dire circumstances Thus, the most pertinent objects of comparison for our purposes are two otherwise identical districts that are both deteriorating, one of which has a minority protection plan while the other does not However, to gain perspective on how urban growth or decline may affect the racial composition of the public school work force, we shall not restrict our analysis to situations of rapid decline, but will consider a wide range of conditions to see how they affect the black percentage of teachers

An annual growth rate of 3% in the number of teachers is a reasonable starting point This increase is factored into the model by maintaining the annual leaving rate at 6% while expanding joiners to 9%—6% to replace the leavers and 3% to expand the work force Modeling a stable system, on the other hand, merely requires holding the joining and leaving rates in balance at 6% For a declining system, we face two different situations—a gradual 3% annual decline, which can be absorbed by restricting the joining rate to 3% while holding the leaving rate at 6%, and a severe short-term decline which requires layoffs We assume that layoffs will not be imposed until a somewhat less drastic policy, a hiring freeze, has been instituted, thus the simulation model imposes layoffs by setting the joining rate at 0 and adding a 6% layoff on top of the "normal" 6% leaving rate It would be unrealistic to leave these measures in force for the entire six-year period, since school districts seldom experience such severe declines year in and year out Accordingly, we progressively relax these first-year conditions, as follows in the second year, the hiring freeze and layoffs remain in effect, but the layoff rate is reduced to 3%, in the third and fourth years, the hiring freeze is removed no one is laid off, and enough new employees are hired to replace the 6% who leave voluntarily, and in the fifth and sixth years the system expands by 3% (via a 9% joining rate and a 6% leaving rate) to recoup some of the losses sustained in the early years Of course, alternative specifications are possible, but our experiments with several indicate that the simulation findings reported below are quite robust

The Black Joining Ratio As noted above the various *Wygant* opinions suggest several alternative black joining ratios

—The Powell and White opinions seemed to view the minority share of the population as a legitimate affirmative action hiring goal In 1980, blacks

constituted 22.5% of the nation's central city population, setting the black joining ratio in our "typical" urban school district at .225.

—On the other hand, Justice O'Connor argued that an affirmative action hiring policy should be based on the percentage of blacks in the appropriate labor market. Blacks currently comprise 8.9% of the nation's education majors (Bureau of Census, 1986, p. 152) and receive 8.6% of the baccalaureate degrees in education (American Council on Education, 1984, p. 161)—figures likely to increase only slightly in the near future, we consider 8.9% a good estimate of the black portion of the market for public school teachers. However, because we are concerned with *urban* districts, we must "correct" this national figure. Lacking hard data, we assume that black urban teachers are to all black teachers as black urbanites are to all blacks nationally. Since the black proportion of the urban population is 1.93 times the black proportion of the national population, we estimate the proportion of blacks in the urban educational labor pool at .172—1.93 times the black share of the educational labor pool nationwide—and take .172 as another alternative black joining ratio.

—The Jackson affirmative action plan, endorsed in the Marshall and Stevens opinions, aimed to set the black share of the teachers in the district equal to the black share of the students. Nationally, blacks comprise 15.3% of the public school population aged 6 to 17. By "correcting" this national figure, as above, to reflect the urban situation, we estimate that blacks account for 29.5% of *urban* elementary and secondary public school students—the third alternative black joining ratio in our simulation.

—Finally, the baseline .156 black joining ratio is derived, as the appendix makes clear, from data dating back to the late 1970s—data that predate the Reagan presidency. Since the Reagan administration has not pressed state and local jurisdictions to meet affirmative action recruitment targets with anything approaching the vigor of earlier administrations, it is reasonable to suppose that the black joining ratio may have slacked off during the last six years.[6] That supposition underlies the final specification of the black joining ratio used in our simulation, .140, a 10% decline in the observed joining rate.

In sum, the simulation assumes five different black joining ratios: the baseline ratio of .156, the slightly more conservative baseline ratio of .140, the ratio that would obtain if blacks joined in proportion to their share of the

[6] The black joining ratio could slack off for reasons other than a weakening commitment to affirmative action. Indeed, a decline in black teacher hires could ultimately be attributed to the success of affirmative action. According to this line of argument, as job opportunities increase for blacks, they can earn substantially more from pursuing occupations that were once restricted to whites, rendering teaching a relatively less desirable career path for blacks. We readily concede this possibility, but doubt that the broadening of the opportunity structure for blacks has been sufficiently widespread to make this the dominant explanation of lower rates of newly hired black teachers.

urban education labor pool, .172; the ratio that would obtain if blacks joined in proportion to their share of the urban population, .225, and the ratio that would obtain if blacks joined in proportion to their share of the urban public school students, .295 These last two figures are admittedly unrealistic, since they far surpass what any reasonably typical school district has thus far been able to accomplish, and, if followed nationwide, would probably deplete the number of blacks in the educational labor pool quite quickly. Our goal, however, is to probe a "what if" question: What would the proportion of black teachers in urban districts be under various interpretations of what constitutes a legally acceptable affirmative action plan?

The Leaving Bias In the simulation the leaving bias remains fixed, except in the situation where layoffs become necessary. During the first year of layoffs, 12% of those in the system leave, half by natural turnover and half by mandatory layoffs, in the second year, 9% leave, two-thirds by natural turnover and one-third by mandatory layoffs In each year the leaving bias favoring blacks remains in effect for voluntary leavers, but a new leaving bias must be calculated for those who are laid off—actually *two* new values, one reflecting the Jackson plan (endorsed in the Marshall and Stevens dissents) and the other the majority view of the Court The Jackson plan is simple to specify the black leaving rate among those laid off can be no greater than the current proportion of black employees. Establishing a leaving rate consistent with the Court's majority opinion is more intricate

Since blacks comprise a relatively small proportion of those who recently joined the system, we might infer that they comprise an equally small proportion of the low-seniority employees who are laid off However, the matter is not that simple, for two reasons First is the depth of the cuts We presume that most black teachers have been hired since the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and have therefore been in the system for less than 20 years So while blacks may constitute 20% of the teachers in the system, they are probably nearer 40% of teachers in the system for less than 20 years Because deep cuts may reach employees with 10, 15, or even more years of seniority, a disproportionate number of blacks will be laid off.

A second consideration is the type of jobs black professional employees fill According to the EEOC data, blacks are numerically overrepresented in positions most sensitive to cutbacks guidance counselors, district consultants or supervisors, and the catch-all category of "other professionals," which includes social and community workers, attendance officers, and so on The black proportion of elementary teachers also outruns the black proportion of secondary teachers Consequently, severe layoffs that cut deeply into low seniority positions, reduce non-teaching staff, and hit elementary grades the hardest should adversely affect the black percentage of teachers and other professional employees in the district On the basis of these considerations

e believe a reasonable estimate is that during mandatory layoffs where lacks have no layoff protection, they will leave the system at *twice* their urrent proportion of the system. (If this specification is in error, it is undoubtedly on the high side, a point to which we shall return when we examine the simulation results.) Our alternative leaving rates for employees affected by mandatory layoffs are thus that blacks will be laid off either in roportion to their current share of positions (the Jackson plan) or at twice heir current share of positions (our specification of the *Wygant* majority's pinion) [7]

RESULTS

he Typical Urban District

Table 2 summarizes the simulation results Most important are the two ightmost columns of the table, where we see that protecting black teachers rom disproportionate layoffs has very little impact on the racial composition f the work force At the baseline black joining ratio of 156, without a minority protection plan in six years blacks would comprise 22 0 percent of the eachers in a district forced to institute layoffs, but a minority protection plan n the same district would raise the black share of positions by less than one

TABLE 2

1991 PERCENTAGES OF EDUCATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO ARE BLACK IN THE TYPICAL URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICT

	District Growth Pattern				
Joining Bias	Steady Growth (+3%)	No Change (0%)	Steady Decline (−3%)	Sharp Decline with Protection	Sharp Decline without Protection
140	20 87%	22 02%	23 42%	22 29%	21 75%
156	21 60%	22 55%	23 71%	22 73%	22 01%
172	22 32%	23 09%	24 01%	23 16%	22 27%
225	24 73%	24 86%	24 99%	24 62%	23 55%
295	27 90%	27 19%	26 29%	26 54%	25 30%

[7] Although this would not always be true tenure was not an important consideration in the ckson case and is thus not factored into the model Our experience admittedly spotty is that protections such as tenure assure that a person is unlikely to be replaced in a given position t do not guarantee employment if the position itself is eliminated due to financial exigency At y rate, in Michigan tenure is governed by state policy and a state court had earlier held that Jackson plan did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act a finding that was not challged in any of the *Wygant* opinions

percent, to 22 7 percent. The differential is larger at higher (and less realistic) black joining rates, but even at the extremely high (and extremely unrealistic) level of a .295 black joining ratio, there remains only about a one percentage point difference in the proportion of black teachers in a district with or without a minority protection plan.

More generally, looking across all the columns in table 2, we see that growth, stability, or decline in the number of positions in the district has little bearing on the racial composition of the teacher corps. We also see that to the limited extent that work force size affects black employment, blacks almost invariably do better in declining rather than expanding districts.[8] The reason is simple the typical urban school district is not recruiting blacks at a rate sufficient to maintain the current black ratio Blacks do tend to stay in the system longer than whites, but this tendency is offset by the simultaneous expansion of the number of employees, only a small proportion of whom are black Consequently, after six years of steady 3% annual expansion, black teachers increase only from 20 8% to 21 6% of the work force in the typical urban district On the other hand, a steady 3% annual decline in the number of teachers means that fewer positions are being filled each year, and therefore that the low 156 black joining ratio does less to offset the black leaving bias After six years of a steady 3% decline in the system's size, the black share of the teaching jobs stands at 23 7 percent—well above both the starting value of 20 8 percent and the 21 6 percent share held by blacks after six years of steady growth Even with a severe cutback, layoffs, and no layoff protection, blacks in the typical urban district are more often advantaged by system contraction than by system expansion Only at its highest value (295) does the joining ratio in effect catch up with the leaving bias and reverse the tendency of blacks to fare better in a declining than in a growing district

The centrality of the black joining ratio as a determinant of the share of teaching positions held by blacks becomes even more obvious as we read down the columns of table 2 At the lower, more empirically based black joining ratios of 140 and 156, the percentage of teaching positions blacks occupy in 1991 never rises more than two percentage points above the 1986 level of 20 8% It is only at the higher black joining ratios, keyed to the black percentage of either the general population or students in the district, that any major six-year changes are registered, with the percentage of positions held by blacks rising as much as seven percentage points above the 1986 level

[8] "Doing better is used here in the relative rather than absolute sense Blacks hold a larger number of positions in the district that has grown steadily for six years than in the one that has declined steadily, but this is because the district that has grown is substantially larger than the one that has shrunk Issues of representativeness, equity, fairness and the like are questions of *relative* outcomes, and the relative success of blacks—the percentage of teaching positions they hold—is therefore taken as the focus for the comparisons drawn from the simulation

As for the various opinions in *Wygant*, the simulation results suggest that the permissibility of a minority layoff protection plan is simply not a momentous issue in terms of its impact on the employment of black teachers in a typical urban district. However, the second dimension of discord in the *Wygant* opinions does have potential implications for the racial composition of the public school work force. If, as Justice O'Connor posited as the appropriate target, black teachers were recruited in proportion to the black share of the labor pool, after six years one would witness relatively little change in the black percentage of public school teachers. That percentage would increase dramatically only if the typical district were able to recruit blacks at a much higher rate—at the black percentage of the population (22.5 percent), as apparently endorsed in the Powell opinion, or at the black share of the student population (29.5 percent), as endorsed in the Marshall and Stevens opinions. Since achieving even the 17.2% O'Connor standard has outrun the ability or the determination of the typical district, prospects for large-scale change based on a massive influx of new black teachers seem remote at best. Thus the disagreements that divided the Court in *Wygant*—whether minorities can constitutionally be protected against the effects of layoffs and what the appropriate target for affirmative action hiring programs is—have a certain aura of unreality about them, a sense that these abstract legal points really make very little difference in terms of their real-world implications for the employment of black teachers.

Jackson Revisited

Why, then, all the hue and cry over the *Wygant* decision? We believe that there are two reasons. First, no matter how few black teachers the decision may actually affect nationwide, *Wygant* brought the spotlight to bear on a vexingly difficult series of legal, political, and moral issues on which feelings run very high. Abstract questions of justice and equity may take on a special significance when they directly affect thousands, or even millions of lives, but can also occasion equally heated debate when their concrete impact is felt by only a mere handful. When the Court refused to sanction the Jackson layoff protection plan, it stepped back, as it had done in the *Bakke* case, from a long series of decisions advancing the cause of minorities and women. In this context *Wygant* assumed a symbolic significance far out of proportion with its potential impact on the tangible social and economic standing of blacks.

Second, we are modeling the impact of the *Wygant* decision beginning with the 1986 work force and projecting into the future, while the origins of the *Wygant* case extend back into the late 1960s, when blacks were rapidly being integrated into the educational work force. Even though the condi-

tions that gave rise to the *Wygant* case are now rather rare, at the time the layoff policy was enacted these issues were not merely academic. If the conditions then prevailing in Jackson now prevailed in the typical urban district the *Wygant* decision could have very important implications indeed.

To see how the impact of *Wygant* differs between Jackson's situation in the late 1960s and the contemporary urban district, let us rerun the simulation model based on the Jackson situation. According to the *Wygant* record, blacks comprised only 3.9% of the teachers in Jackson during the 1968–69 school year. Following an NAACP complaint to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the district agreed to "take affirmative steps to recruit, hire and promote minority group teachers" (p. 4488), and the percentage of minority teachers increased to approximately 8 8 percent in only two years In 1971, layoffs wiped out most of this black gain, which led to the adoption of the minority layoff protection plan the following year.

In rerunning the model, we leave certain beginning values in place· a size of 3,606 professional employees, a turnover rate of 6% and a voluntary leaving bias for blacks of 5 This time, however, we peg the first-year black percentage of teachers in the system at only 3.9%, as was true of Jackson in 1968 A few simple calculations reveal that, assuming no change in the size of the system and a constant 6% turnover rate, blacks must have comprised approximately 43% of all new teachers hired for the black share of the teaching positions to jump to 8.8% in only two years This 43 joining ratio is extremely high—much higher than any employed in our simulations of the typical urban district—but it was made possible by conditions that then existed in Jackson With blacks so glaringly underrepresented among the teachers in the system, the district made exceptional efforts to correct this condition as quickly as possible

In 1971, 1974, 1976, and 1981, the Jackson school district was forced to lay off teachers and other educational professionals We incorporate this off-again, on-again pattern into the model by keeping the system in a no-growth pattern for two years of the simulation, followed by a 12% decline (a hiring freeze, 6% voluntary leavers, and 6% layoffs) and then repeating this three-year cycle. With layoffs occurring at such regular intervals, they are presumed to cut deeply into the newly hired Accordingly, blacks, who constitute 43% of recent joiners, also constitute 43% of those laid off. If a minority protection plan is in force, blacks are laid off in proportion to their current share of the positions in the system

Using these figures, we model the changing racial composition of a Jackson like district's teacher corps over a ten-year period, 1969–1978.[9] Because the

[9]The availability of data on the situation in Jackson during the late 1960s and 1970s permits us to employ a ten-year rather than six-year time frame in this part of the analysis, since several of the values specified for the model of the typical urban district are rough approximations it seems prudent to restrict the earlier part of the analysis to six-year estimates

assumptions guiding this model differ in several respects from those underlying our simulation of the typical urban district, the two sets of results are not comparable, our interest here is on what impact a layoff protection plan might have had under conditions similar to those experienced by Jackson

The simulation results reveal differences far more striking than any we have yet encountered. With a layoff protection plan buffering the impact of the four layoffs, the racial mix of the district's teachers changes all the way from 3 9% black in 1969 to 20 78% black in 1978 With no layoff protection plan, the proportion of teachers who are black still rises perceptibly, to 14.74%, but remains far below the level attained with layoff protection

As a cautionary note, the projections presented in the last paragraph probably overstate the effects of a layoff protection plan, since they are premised on the assumption that the district will continue to attract new black teachers at the prodigious rate of more than four out of every ten new recruits The 6% annual turnover rate may also err on the high side, since mobile teachers would probably depart very early from a district facing Jackson's recurring layoffs, leaving a system staffed disproportionately by those with the greatest difficulty finding other jobs A lower black joining ratio and a lower turnover rate would both lessen opportunities for racial change. Even so, our experiments with alternative specifications that rely on a milder set of assumptions point in the same direction as the results in table 3 in a district that, like Jackson in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has been making rapid progress toward integrating its professional work force, a minority protection plan can make a real difference

Given the number of terms in the model and the interactions between them, it is difficult to pinpoint either the number or the types of contemporary school districts that may at some point be affected by the *Wygant* decision. The Jackson illustration, however, leads us to suggest three conditions that would make a school district a likely candidate for being affected (1) Obviously, there must be a decline in the district serious enough to require layoffs rather than simply restricting the number of joiners (2) The district should have been especially laggard in either hiring minorities or inducing them to stay, so that the minority proportion at senior levels is low. (3) Through local or federal impetus, the district should have recently begun a large-scale effort to recruit more minorities. Stated more dramatically, school districts that have only recently registered affirmative gains should be hardest hit, while those that either made progress early or have never made such progress should not be greatly affected The more general result derived from our analysis of the typical urban district still stands, however the conditions that prevail in the mid 1980s are such that a minority protection plan will be relatively ineffectual in the typical urban district

CONCLUSION

To reiterate, the Court's resolution of the central issue in *Wygant*—whether a layoff protection plan for minorities is constitutionally permissible—should have only a very marginal bearing on the employment of blacks in a typical urban school district. Even so, some issues raised in *Wygant* will merit continuing attention because of their potential impact on the racial integration of public school teachers.

The simulation results imply that if the *Wygant* decision had come a decade or so earlier, the inroads that blacks made into the public school work force during the 1970s might have been severely retarded. The Jackson school district was beset by layoffs during the heyday of affirmative action, when attracting new black teachers was at its height; these layoffs therefore cut into gains blacks had recently registered. The *Wygant* decision, coming as it did in the mid-1980s, when the Reagan administration's overt hostility had helped dampen whatever momentum affirmative action may have gained, had less potential for turning large numbers of black teachers out of their newly achieved positions. As Justice Marshall put it, the purpose of the Jackson layoff protection plan was to safeguard recent progress toward affirmative action goals, but all indications are that such progress had slowed by the mid-1980s. Ironically, then, the anti-layoff protection decision in *Wygant* could do little to retard black progress because progress was already so slow; had the black joining rate been substantially higher, then the *Wygant* decision might have had a major effect, but this was simply not the case.

However, it should not be concluded from our simulation of the typical urban school district that the *Wygant* decision will have little or no tangible impact in any district. Districts that face problems similar to what occurred in Jackson could be seriously affected. For example, some Southwestern school districts have had reasonable success in bringing the racial composition of their teacher corps into balance with their rapidly expanding Hispanic populations. Should the economic setbacks many Southwestern cities are currently experiencing lead to teacher layoffs, then the lack of a minority protection plan could, as the Court's minority in *Wygant* feared, undo this recent progress.

Finally, given the relatively low rate at which blacks are gaining employment as public school teachers, it is only blacks' low leaving rate that keeps the black share of public school teachers in the typical urban district reasonably close to the black share of the urban population. We suspect that the reason the black leaving rate is so low is, in essence, that blacks as a group are relatively new to the system and thus constitute a disproportionately small percentage of those who exit via retirement, disability, or death. If true, this situation is bound to change over time. The "graying" of the black teacher corps should put the black leaving rate on a par with the white lea-

ing rate, and when this happens the sluggish black joining ratio will not be sufficient to maintain the current black share of public school teachers The current level of black representation among public school teachers may mark a temporary high point, to be followed by a gradual movement of the black share of public school teaching positions downwards toward the black joining ratio The black joining and leaving ratios, then, are potential "time bombs" that may need to be defused, raising anew a set of perplexing political and legal issues about the legitimacy of mechanisms designed to make the public sector in general and public education in particular more racially representative

APPENDIX

The point is to develop 1985 values for starting the model, which will then run for six years (1986 through 1991) Our primary data sources are EEOC reports on public elementary and secondary education for 1978 and 1979, though we occasionally refer to the 1974 and 1975 reports (there were none for 1976 or 1977) as well as other sources to verify the reliability of the figures used The EEOC reports describe public educational employment by race, sex, job position, and district size To model an urban district, we used data for districts with 25,000 or more students

Using these data for year-to-year comparisons introduces some amount of noise since districts move into and out of this population category To enhance reliability, we performed most of our preliminary calculations on the most basic unit possible—the individual school—by dividing the 1978 and 1979 data by the number of schools covered in each year's survey (14,445 in 1978 and 15,350 in 1979) We later aggregated by multiplying by the mean number of schools per district, 172

The size of the average urban district, N, was calculated as described above, using only professional employees (defined in note 5) from the 1979 report A 1985 report of the National Education Association showed a decline in instructional staff of only about 0 7 percent over the 1975–85 decade, so we consider the N calculated from the 1979 data a reasonable estimate for our 1985 starting point ("School enrollments ")

We take the number of blacks in the system—20 8% of the professional work force—from the 1979 data This figure remained remarkably constant across the four years detailed in the EEOC reports Moreover Office of Education (1985) statistics show a modest 0 3% decline in black teachers between 1971 and 1981—again considerable stability Consequently, pegging the percentage of blacks in the system at 20 8 for 1985 should not be far from the mark

Blacks comprised 15 5% of newly hired educational professionals in 1978 and 15 75% in 1979 Both figures were down somewhat from the 17% figure

for 1974 and 1975, a difference that seems reasonable in light of the declini emphasis on affirmative action We shall peg the black joining rate at 15 6% midway between the 1978 and 1979 values.

The next value sought is the turnover rate, the extent to which teache voluntarily leave the system and must be replaced by new joiners. Our ir tial estimate of this figure is obtained by (a) taking the total number of er ployees in 1978, (b) adding new joiners in 1979, and (c) subtracting the tot number of employees for 1979 The result identifies the number of er ployees who left the system between 1978 and 1979 This figure, 7 77% the 1978 N, strikes us as unusually high The average urban district declin in size between 1978 and 1979, so our turnover estimate may partially refle forced layoffs Comparing the 1975–78 figures which reflect a period growth provides an estimated turnover rate of 3.99% From these estimate we consider an in-between value of a 6% annual turnover rate reasonabl that is, even in a stable system, 6% of the employees will leave and ne to be replaced by new joiners. While this figure may not perfectly repr sent any individual year, it is a reasonable estimate over the six-year run the model.

Estimating the black leaving bias is similar to estimating the turnover rat we add 1979 black joiners to the 1978 number of blacks and subtract the 19 number of blacks to identify the number of black leavers For 1974–7 blacks constituted 15 93% of all leavers, a figure approximately 75% of t then-current proportion of blacks in the system (20 9%) For 1978–7 blacks were only 5 62% of the leavers, or about 25% of their proportion teachers In both cases, blacks constituted fewer leavers than would be a ticipated from their proportion of the system The 1974–75 rate is probab inflated by redefinitions on the EEOC's part (making some blacks appear have been leavers when they were really recategorized into a different rac ethnic group), and the 1978–79 rate may be somewhat deflated by the enac ment of minority layoff protection plans in some urban districts Cons quently, we estimate the black leaving bias at 5, meaning that the black pr portion of leavers equals half the proportion of blacks in the system, a val midway between the extremes identified above

These constitute the bulk of the starting values for the model, other valu are drawn from the *Wygant* opinions, and their justifications are present in the text

REFERENCES

American Council on Education 1984 *1984–85 Fact Book on Higher Education* New Yo Macmillan

Fraga, Luis R , Kenneth J Meier, and Robert E England 1986 Hispanic Americans and Ed cational Policy Limits to Equal Access *Journal of Politics*, 48 850–76

Keech, William R 1968 *The Impact of Negro Voting* Chicago Rand McNally

Meier, Kenneth J 1984 Teachers, Students, and Discrimination The Policy Impact of Black Representation *Journal of Politics*, 46 252–63

Meier, Kenneth J, and Robert E England 1984 Black Representation and Educational Policy Are They Related? *American Political Science Review*, 78 392–403

National Association of Elementary School Principals 1984 *The Education Almanac* Reston VA National Association of Elementary School Principals

Raspberry, William May 28, 1986 Reynolds Misreads Again *Washington Post*

School Enrollments Down 12% but Staff Size Drops only 1% April 14, 1985 *New York Times*

Sigelman, Lee, and Nelson C Dometrius 1986 Organizational Regeneration and Political Change A Model with Applications to Affirmative Action *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 79–107

U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1981 *1980 Census of the Population Supplementary Reports Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Standard Consolidated Statistical Areas, 1980* PC80-S1-5 Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

——— 1986 *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986* Washington DC U S Government Printing Office

U S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1977a *Employment Opportunity in the Schools Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools 1974* Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

——— 1977b *Employment Opportunity in the Schools Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1975* Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

——— 1981a *1978 Report Minorities & Women in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools* Washington DC U S Government Printing Office

——— 1981b *1979 Report Minorities & Women in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools* Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

U S Office of Education Division of Education Statistics 1985 *Digest of Educational Statistics 1983–84* Washington DC U S Government Printing Office

Welch, Susan, and Albert K Karnig 1978 Representation of Blacks on Big City School Boards *Social Science Quarterly*, 59 162–72

——— 1979 The Impact of Black Elected Officials on Urban Social Expenditures *Policy Studies Journal*, 7 707–14

Wendy Wygant, et al, petitioners v Jackson Board of Education, etc, et al 1986 *United States Law Week*, May 20 4479–94

Will, George F May 25, 1986 The Court Will Not Forbid Reverse Discrimination *Washington Post*

Yoder, Edwin M, Jr May 25 1986 Colorblindness is not enough—for now *Washington Post*

The Christian Right in the Republican Party: The Case of Pat Robertson's Supporters

John C. Green
University of Akron

James L. Guth
Furman University

Using the results of an extensive mail survey of donors to Republican presidential candidate and party committees, we compare contributors to Pat Robertson's campaign with donors to right-wing and mainstream Republican committees. While measures of salience, ideology, religiosity, demography and partisanship show Robertson supporters to be distinctive in expected ways, they are remarkably similar to other kinds of Republicans in many other respects. These findings suggest that the Christian Right will be eventually assimilated into the Republican party.

The candidacy of Rev. Marion "Pat" Robertson for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination poses important questions about the role of conservative Christians in the Republican party. Conventional wisdom claims the Robertson campaign is doomed to one or another kind of failure, either by fracturing the GOP or fading into obscurity (Edsall 1987). Even the potential for realignment among conservative Christians is seen as unproductive, creating intense demands for unpopular issues or a quarrelsome new bloc in the Republican coalition. Indeed, to many observers the Christian Right represents the newest wave of Republican "purists," activists willing to risk electoral defeat rather than compromise on important issues or cooperate with the more pragmatic party "professionals."

Our study of Republican presidential activists offers a broader assessment: some remarkable similarities between Robertson's key supporters and more conventional Republicans suggests the eventual assimilation of Christian activists into the GOP. Whatever friction the Robertson campaign generates within the party, and it could be intense, may well preview sharper conflict between Republicans and Democrats over "traditional values."

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 9–11, 1987. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and Sharon B. Smith, our Dana Research Fellow, for her invaluable assistance. Financial support for this project was provided by the American Political Science Research Grant Program and Furman University.

The Politics of the Christian Right

The advent of the "New Christian Right" in the late 1970s produced a heated debate over its size, organization and political impact. To this point, scholarship suggests that Christian conservatives have neither the numbers nor the unity allies hoped and foes feared (Sigelman, Wilcox and Buell, 1986, Guth and Green, 1987a) And despite impressive grass-roots activism, the Christian Right's political impact has been modest while some observers credit Christian conservatives with adding to President Reagan's margin of victory in 1980 and 1984 (Smidt, 1985) and with influencing Congress on social issues (Johnson and Tamney, 1985), others dispute these claims, pointing to alliances with larger, more moderate groups as the basis for any success (Hertzke, 1986, Wald, 1987, ch 6) The question of political impact aside, however, most analysts believe that Christian activists have become increasingly involved in the Republican party, where they are reminiscent of the Goldwater and Reagan insurgencies of the last two decades (Smidt, 1986 Baker, Steed and Moreland, 1986, Guth, 1985–86) Thus, Pat Robertson's presidential bid represents a new, and perhaps inevitable, stage of political activity To be credible the Christian Right must have some influence in Republican politics, and, beyond credibility, a major role within the GOP is a prerequisite for influencing public policy

At the risk of oversimplification, several roles suggest themselves Most obviously, the Christian Right might act as a pressure group in Republican politics, much as the Right to Life movement and other 'single issue' groups have done in both parties (Hershey, 1984) Pat Robertson might well be a 'charismatic" Ellen McCormick In addition to pressure politics, the Robertson campaign might solidify conservative Christians as a distinctive Republican constituency While the Democrats are better known for "ethnic" blocs, Northern evangelical Protestants were once such a Republican constituency (Kleppner, 1985)

Beyond constituency building, Christian activists might be assimilated into the ideological alignment in the GOP, complementing and bolstering the Republican right Both major parties have recently experienced an influx of new kinds of ideologues via presidential politics, and "confessional" conservatism may be compatible with other strains of conservatism crystallized by recent Republican candidates (Blumenthal, 1986) Of course, these roles are not mutually exclusive we will present some evidence for all three, though the latter is most clearly indicated

Data and Methods

This essay is based on data drawn from a mail survey of contributors to state and national GOP committees and to multi-candidate PACs sponsored

by prominent presidential hopefuls The survey instrument was a 10-page, 426-item questionnaire designed to distinguish among varieties of Republicans (Guth and Green, 1987b) A stratified random sample of 3400 donors was drawn from the records of the Federal Election Commission in August 1986 The survey was conducted between September 1986 and June 1987, producing 1145 usable questionnaires, for a return rate of 37% (excluding 275 forms returned as undeliverable). There was no serious response bias by gender or region, but the Robertson donors responded at a slightly higher rate than other contributors (44%)

To explore the relationship of Christian Right activists to the GOP, we divide the sample into four categories donors to Robertson's Committee for Freedom, the base of his pre-nomination campaign (n = 143), donors to a New Right PAC, Citizens for the Republic, founded by Ronald Reagan and the launching pad for his 1980 nomination drive (n = 132), donors to Republican party committees, such as the Republican National Committee, the House and Senate Campaign Committees and seventeen state party committees (n = 400), and lastly, donors to the PACs of other Republican presidential hopefuls, including Bush's Fund for America's Future, Baker's Republican Majority Fund, Dole's Campaign America, Kemp's Campaign for Prosperity and the Pete DuPont for President Committee (n = 451) (cf Miller and Jennings, 1986)

In tables 1–5 we compare the Robertson donors to the other categories of Republican contributors In each table the first column contains correlation coefficients associated with cross-tabulations of the four donor categories (Robertson followed by Reagan, Republican party and other candidate donors) and each of the independent variables (Because of the skewed distribution of the marginals on the opinion questions, gamma was chosen for the correlation coefficient) The second column on each table ("Robertson vs Republicans") contains standardized structure coefficients of the principal multiple discriminant function using all four donor categories (in the same order as above) and the independent variables (Klecka, 1980) In the last column, multiple discriminant analysis is applied to the Robertson and Reagan donors only All independent variables have been coded so that positive coefficients indicate higher scores for the Robertson donors, higher scores generally represent more conservative positions or attributes associated with conservatism (see appendix for coding)

Measures of salience, ideology, demography and partisanship usually vary systematically across our donor categories, as shown by the gammas in each table And as the canonical correlations indicate, there are significant differences between the Robertson donors and other categories of Republicans when all variables are taken into account Comparison with the Reagan donors indicate where the largest differences occur between Robertson and other right-wing Republicans

Agenda and Opinion Cleavages

Many observers believe the Christian Right has brought a new agenda and ideological edge to the GOP (cf Green and Guth, 1986) Social and foreign policy issues are seen as central to this agenda, contrasting sharply with the economic concerns of mainstream Republicans. Such differences in priorities are a prerequisite, and indeed the motivation, for pressure groups in party politics

We approached the agenda question from two different angles First, we asked donors to name the most important problem facing the country As the gammas and discriminant coefficients in table 1 show, the Robertson donors do have a strikingly different agenda than even the Reagan loyalists A majority of the Robertson donors name a social problem, as opposed to less than a fifth of the Reagan donors and even fewer GOP and candidate contributors The other Republican activists clearly perceive economic problems as most salient, and surprisingly, are twice as likely to name a foreign policy problem as Robertson's supporters

A slightly different perspective, however, is provided by respondents' assessment of how much specific issues influence their vote (table 1) Concern for social issues, especially pornography, school prayer and abortion, most clearly differentiate the Robertson donors However, on economic issues, and to a lesser extent foreign policy, there are fewer and smaller differences Indeed, only on inflation do the mainstream Republicans show markedly greater concern Thus, Christian activists have an expanded—not a foreshortened—agenda

Salience measures do not, of course, reveal activists' stances on the issues If Robertson donors have a "compleat" conservative shopping list do their attitudes conform to the conservative line? Much analysis of the Christian Right stresses the economic populism or even liberalism of the conservative religious community (Shafer, 1985) Does this caveat apply to the Robertson activists?

Apparently it does not The ideological profile of Robertson donors is consistently conservative As table 2 shows, there are few major differences between the Robertson donors and other Republicans on economic issues in either the bivariate or multivariate analysis Indeed, where a gap exists Robertson donors are often to the right For example, they are more enthusiastic about the gold standard (even more than Kemp donors) and are far more concerned about the federal deficit (particularly compared to Reagan donors)

Large divisions do appear on social issues, where the Robertson donors are much more conservative than other Republicans As the discriminant coefficients indicate, however, the most important differences are on school prayer and sexual issues public provision of birth control, abortion and regu-

TABLE I

ISSUE SALIENCE
MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND INFLUENCE ON VOTE

	Robertson vs Republicans (Gamma)	Robertson vs Republicans (Discriminant)	Robertson vs Reagan Only (Discriminant)
Most Important National Problem	36*	39	32
Much Influence on Voting			
Pornography	41*	32	27
School Prayer	38*	35	45
Abortion	33*	30	48
Drug Enforcement	29*	21	25
Nicaragua	26*	17	− 11
Defense Spending	24*	09	− 21
USSR Policy	17*	11	− 07
Affirmative Action	10*	13	04
Arms Control	06	19	07
Tax Rates	02	09	− 03
Budget Deficit	02	14	23
Trade Restrictions	01	04	05
Interest Rates	01	− 03	− 05
Unemployment	− 08	− 16	05
Inflation	− 12*	35	− 32
Canonical Correlation	—	68	53

Positive signs indicate Robertson donors have higher scores
*Chi square = p< 05 level For all discriminant functions p< 05 See appendix for variable codings

ation of adult sexual behavior Indeed, Reagan and party donors are mark dly more moderate on these issues and candidate donors dramatically so or example, a quarter of the Reagan activists and nearly half of the candidate onors accept abortion on demand compared to 3% of the Robertson sup orters Robertson donors are also very conservative on foreign policy, from eaving the United Nations to deploying Star Wars, when compared to the arty and candidate contributors, though Reagan's supporters are often the nost conservative on such issues

Thus, the Christian Right could well function as a pressure group in the GOP, but the pressure would be on a broad front While social issues are far nore salient to the Robertson elite, these priorities do not preclude concern or economic and foreign policy issues equal to that of more conventional Re ublicans And social traditionalism is combined with economic and foreign olicy conservatism every bit as intense Indeed, there is a striking lack of ymmetry in these cleavages the Christian Right is even more consistently

TABLE 2

OPINION CLEAVAGES
IDEOLOGY AND ISSUE POSITIONS

	Robertson vs Republicans (Gamma)	Robertson vs Republicans (Discriminant)	Robertson vs Reagan Only (Discriminant)
Anti Birth Control	50*	35	24
Anti Abortion on Demand	47*	39	39
Anti United Nations	40*	26	19
Self-identified Ideology	37*	25	− 11
Regulate Adult Sex	38*	49	41
Pro Drug Enforcement	35*	06	06
Anti Pornography	35*	13	11
Pro Gold Standard	33*	26	22
Pro Star Wars Deployment	31*	06	01
Anti Affirmative Action	24*	03	01
Anti Arms Control	22*	24	08
Pro School Prayer	23*	33	22
Pro Contra Aid	18*	11	− 23
Pro Afghan Resistance	16*	05	− 04
Restrict Immigration	13*	01	07
Anti S Africa Sanctions	13*	17	26
Anti Federal Deficit	08*	13	31
Anti Aid to Business	06*	09	16
Pro Trade Restrictions	07*	07	05
Pro Poland Sanctions	03	01	− 18
Pro Supply Side Tax	04	15	25
Pro Tight Money Policy	05	01	02
Pro Flat Tax	02	06	− 14
Inflation over Jobs	02	18	− 14
Canonical Correlation	-	57	55

Positive signs indicate Robertson donors have higher scores
*Chi square = p< 05 level For all discriminant functions p< 05 See appendix for variable codings

conservative than the other New Right activists, who display more moderation on, and less concern for, social issues

RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

The agenda and ideological leanings of Robertson activists may well be rooted in demographic traits, creating a distinctive "Christian" constituency the GOP The common assumption is that the Christian Right threatens GOP unity by introducing social heterogeneity (Freeman, 1986) Some ana-

TABLE 3

RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOGRAPHY

	Robertson vs Republicans (Gamma)	Robertson vs Republicans (Discriminant)	Robertson vs Reagan Only (Discriminant)
Religiosity			
Biblical Literalism	50*	13	23
Life After Death	40*	11	12
Religious Salience	38*	04	16
Denomination	35*	13	16
Church Attendance	30*	03	08
Denomination Change	28*	18	21
Religious Self-Identification			
Charismatic	80*	55	52
Born Again	77*	35	27
Evangelical	75*	04	13
Fundamentalist	53*	04	03
Other	− 42*	− 10	02
Mainline	− 28*	− 23	− 11
Conservative	− 23*	− 08	− 09
Civil Religion			
God Blessed America	40*	15	13
Religion Influences Vote	40*	24	12
Churches in Politics	31*	19	16
Demography			
Income	− 37*	− 16	− 14
Sex	− 32*	16	14
Education	− 22*	22	− 11
Size of Place	− 16*	09	− 08
Region	13*	08	17
Age	11*	− 13	− 38
Occupation	− 06*	04	05
Canonical Correlation	- -	84	84

Positive signs indicate Robertson donors have higher scores
*Chi square = p< 05 level For all discriminant functions p< 05 See appendix for variable codings

lysts, however, have found few social differences between Christian Rightists and conventional Republican activists a slight bias in favor of rural and Southern origins, lower levels of education, and sharply higher levels of religiosity (Hauss and Maisel, 1986)

Do "evangelical Christians" indeed confront a "three-martini, country club set" in the Republican party? In one sense, yes the Robertson contingent displays an intense and distinctive religiosity As the gammas in table 3 indicate, they are more likely to accept a literal interpretation of the Bible

believe in an afterlife, consider religion important to their lives and regularly attend church services in conservative denominations They are also more likely to have changed denominations in an unusual way, moving "downward" from mainline to charismatic churches In addition, they exhibit greater support for "civil religion," believing that God has blessed America above other nations and that religion should play an important role in politics

Other Republicans, including the Reagan donors, are progressively less devout, with substantial minorities regarding the Bible as a collection of fables, rejecting notions of an afterlife and rarely darkening a church door—at least not of a Protestant church Very few have changed denominations, and when they have, it was in the more common "upward" direction, from sectarian to mainline churches And even fewer are willing to recognize a special role for religious beliefs or churches in politics

However, as the discriminant coefficients indicate, Republicans are hardly a secular lot When all religiosity measures are taken into account most differentiate poorly Indeed, the Robertson donors are distinguished best by their strong self-identification as "charismatic" Christians paralleling Robertson's sectarian background Even the impact of "civil religion" is reduced Thus, the Robertson activists by and large represent one segment of conservative Protestantism while most other Republicans partake of more conventional, mainline Protestantism (Reichley, 1985)

The demography of Robertson activists differs modestly from other donors in ways consistent with their greater religiosity (cf Conover, 1983) While their incomes are quite impressive, Robertsons donors are less affluent than other Republicans They are less well educated and include twice as many women as the other groups They are also somewhat more likely to come from rural areas and the South and are somewhat younger, particularly compared to Reagans supporters

Of course, social differences may be muted by the nature of our sample, since campaign contributors are social elites by most definitions Nevertheless, Robertson activists are clearly in the correct party most would be greatly out of place among Democratic donors (Guth and Green 1986) The Robertson supporters are not so much a distinctive constituency as the more traditional members of social groups long attracted to the GOP

The Christian Right in the GOP

Given the limited, yet intense, ideological and religious distinctiveness of Robertson's supporters, how strong is their attachment to the GOP? In fact, they have looser ties than the Reagan or party donors—but, as it turns out, equal to those of other candidate donors And Robertson donors are much less likely to be "Strong Republicans" at the state and local level, a trend which appears with less clarity among other Republicans (table 4) They are

TABLE 4

PARTISAN ATTACHMENTS
IDENTIFICATION, LEADERS AND ISSUE POSITIONS

	Robertson vs Republicans (Gamma)	Robertson vs Republicans (Discriminant)	Robertson vs Reagan Only (Discriminant)
Partisanship			
Natl Self-Identification	– 15*	– 15	– 20
Local Self-Identification	– 07*	– 07	– 11
Party Leaders			
President Reagan	.31*	50	– 18
Natl GOP Party Leaders	– 08*	– 19	– 45
State GOP Leaders	– 11*	– 33	– 13
Local GOP Party Leaders	– 08*	– 01	– 10
Senate GOP Leaders	– 03*	– 24	– 10
House GOP Leaders	– 01*	– 19	– 06
Support GOP Policy on			
Abortion	36*	46	94
School Prayer	29*	15	22
Pornography	29*	13	17
Affirmative Action	22*	09	23
Nicaragua	21*	41	– 12
Arms Control	20*	26	– 10
Defense Spending	18*	08	– 02
Drug Enforcement	18*	01	– 22
USSR Policy	16*	13	– 46
Budget Deficits	13*	09	– 09
Trade Restrictions	12*	21	– 02
Unemployment	10*	13	– 37
Interest Rates	09*	04	– 02
Tax Rates	06*	– 03	– 06
Inflation	01*	18	07
Canonical Correlation	–	48	40

Positive signs indicate Robertson donors have higher scores

*Chi square = p < 05 level For all discriminant functions p < 05 See appendix for variable codings

also far less positive in their evaluation of Republican leaders—with the exception of President Reagan—when compared to other Republicans These findings hint that for many activists, national personages and issues rather than more parochial concerns influence attachment to party Robertson's candidacy may represent just such a phenomenon for Christian Rightists

In fact, the Robertson donors, like other Republicans, seem to have been drawn to the GOP by their special issues We asked respondents how strongly they agreed with Republican policy on key issues, and their responses mirror

our asymmetrical findings on agenda and ideology (table 4) The Robertson contributors are more satisfied with Republican policy on most social and foreign policy issues, but differ only modestly on GOP economic policies even when partisanship is controlled While not as satisfied as the Reagan donors, they often exceed the party and candidate donors by large margins Thus, approval of party economic stands links the Christian Right and the GOP regulars, though the latter are less enthusiastic about the party's social and foreign policies

These findings raise two other questions first, are Robertson's followers new to politics and, second, are they newcomers to the GOP? Both assertions are frequently made by journalists and scholars—and both are partially true Almost 30% of the Robertson donors report becoming active in the last ten years compared to 7 to 12% of the other groups A similar situation holds for partisanship Although stand-pat Republicans are a plurality in each camp, Robertson's adherents are the most frequent party switchers 19% are Democratic and 16% Independent converts for a total of 35% compared with 30%, 27% and 26% for the Reagan, party and candidate donors respectively And the Robertson donors are no less likely to vote Republican in presidential elections matching closely the 90% support level of other donors The only exceptions are the 25% who voted for fellow evangelical Jimmy Carter in 1976, and for Lyndon Johnson in 1964—when comparable numbers of other Republicans defected as well Thus Robertson has mobilized activists who have always been at least "proto-Republicans"

Given their growing attachment to the GOP do the Robertson people fit into the long-standing GOP factional divisions (Reichley, 1982)? Generally speaking, yes as a group the Robertson donors are and have been strongly attracted to the Republican right We asked contributors to specify their active preferences in Republican pre-convention struggles since 1952 and as table 5 indicates, Robertson activists were more supportive of conservative candidates as far back as 1964 even when other measures of factionalism are taken into account Indeed only the Reagan donors show greater consistency

In the present, the Robertson donors are more fully aligned with right-wing politicians and groups than the Reagan donors (table 5) They report greater proximity to Jack Kemp Jesse Helms and Pat Robertson himself The other Republican contributors progressively prefer more moderate candidates, such as Bush, Baker and former President Ford Much the same can be said for proximity to GOP interest group allies The Robertson donors strongly prefer New Right groups the Moral Majority, Eagle Forum and Right to Life movement Other Republicans, including the Reagan donors, prefer business groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers Chamber of Commerce and American Bar Association

Note, however, that Robertson is by far the most divisive leader and the Moral Majority, emblematic of the entire Christian Right, is the most di-

Table 5

GOP Factionalism
Nominees, Politicians and Interest Groups

	Robertson vs Republicans (Gamma)	Robertson vs Republicans (Discriminant)	Robertson vs Reagan Only (Discriminant)
Supported Right-Wing Candidate for			
1980 GOP Nomination	32*	18	− 17
1976 GOP Nomination	34*	12	− 12
1968 GOP Nomination	20*	01	− 05
1964 GOP Nomination	33*	14	− 29
1952 GOP Nomination	10*	11	− 19
Close to Politicians			
Robertson	64*	83	78
Helms	39*	21	− 19
Kemp	12*	26	− 33
Dole	− 11*	− 05	− 18
Bush	− 14*	− 14	− 27
Baker	− 15*	− 19	01
Ford	− 18*	− 20	− 26
Close to Groups			
Moral Majority	48*	25	06
Eagle Forum	45*	29	07
Right to Life	41*	23	18
NCPAC	19*	17	36
Natl Assn Manufacturers	− 06*	08	− 18
Chamber of Commerce	− 06*	− 06	− 23
American Bar Assn	− 16*	− 19	− 11
Political Purism			
Compromise is Betrayal	31*	05	08
Controversial Platforms	12*	06	09
Pluralistic Parties	11*	06	06
Canonical Correlation	-	82	74

Positive signs indicate Robertson donors have higher scores

*Chi square = p< 05 level For all discriminant functions p< 05 See appendix for variable codings

visive group Large numbers of other Republicans, including the Reagan donors, hold negative evaluations of the Christian Right—a level of hostility the Robertson donors do not extend to more mainstream leaders and interests. This lack of symmetry, reminiscent of our findings on salience and attitudes, is also revealed in donor preferences for the 1988 GOP nomination Robertson's donors overwhelmingly pick him as their first choice (84%), but he receives virtually no backing from the Reagan (6%), party or candidate

donors (less than 1%). Nor does he pick up support from donors' second and third choices, (about 2% across the board), though his supporters' subsequent choices include moderate (27%) and conservative (30%) candidates Also, significant numbers of other Republicans claim they could not support Robertson on the GOP ticket under any circumstances. In contrast, 71% of the Robertson donors claim there is no Republican nominee they could not support

Full participation of the Robertson donors in internal party politics may be hindered by their lesser commitment to the conventional rules of coalition building, however Past insurgent movements in the GOP have been characterized by "purists" (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1968), activists whose commitment to political principles over electoral success produced conflict with the more pragmatic and instrumental party "professionals" Classic purist traits include refusal to compromise on issues, willingness to take controversial platform stands, and distaste for pluralism within the GOP Robertson donors show such tendencies to a greater extent than do other Republicans (table 5), reinforcing factional alignments with differences in political style

However, as the discriminant coefficients indicate, once other measures of factionalism are taken into account, Robertson donors are only modestly more purist than other right-wing Republicans Hence, Robertsons backers are likely to reinforce existing divisions between purists and professionals within the GOP rather than create new ones And participation in party affairs may render the Robertson donors less "pure" It is worth noting that representatives of the most recent GOP insurgency, the Reagan donors show somewhat greater professionalism than Robertsons supporters perhaps the result of their longer sojourn in party politics

Thus, Robertson's followers are by and large caught up with their own candidate who represents their special priorities, attitudes and background Still, taking into account agenda, ideology and demography, Robertson's activists are enough like other Republicans to suggest their eventual assimilation into the right wing of the GOP

Conclusions

Our findings support the conventional wisdom on the Robertson candidacy on several points—and offer counterpoints as well Clearly, Robertson is a divisive force in the GOP, even for New Right activists, having yet to attract significant support beyond his own special following The Robertson campaign could well be a bitter one, pitting a small group of intense, religious "purists" against a mass of equally hostile "professional" moderates A general conflagration may be averted largely by the limited appeal of the Christian Right's social agenda

Thus, immediate accommodation with mainstream Republicans is un-

likely, unless it comes from conservative Christians themselves. Even if other GOP influentials could be pressured to accept further platform concessions, electoral realities will militate against such a move. The Christian Right differs from mainstream Republicans precisely where GOP differs most from the Democrats and the public at large: sexual regulation and intervention abroad. And Christian Right activists are neither distinct enough demographically nor independent enough in partisan terms to be effective on the periphery of the GOP.

If short-run prospects for harmony are dim, the future appears brighter. Many characteristics of the Robertson donors suggest that assimilation into the GOP is possible and likely. On the economic issues the Robertson and regular Republicans are in agreement—the very issues on which the GOP has recently competed successfully with the Democrats for votes. Further, the cleavages between the Rightists and Republicans are not symmetrical: the latter are far more hostile to Robertson's candidacy, issue-positions and agenda than Robertson's followers are to mainstream Republicanism. In addition, Robertson donors show considerable attachment to the GOP and a willingness to support other candidates if his campaign fails. And political experience may enhance their willingness to compromise and cooperate. The Reagan donors are perhaps an example of this kind of political maturation: while they belong to a distinct faction in the GOP, their partisanship and "professionalism" rivals that of the party regulars, far exceeding that of the followers of other candidates.

Hence, the full impact of the Robertson campaign may not be felt for many years, as Christian conservatives become part of the Republican right and perhaps the party establishment. Like Ronald Reagan and "movement" conservatism, the Christian Right may find the GOP a more effective vehicle for organization and a more efficacious channel for political activity. If so, Republicans will be further identified with "traditional values" and given the secular drift of Democrats, sharper partisan conflict will ensue.

Appendix: Variable Codings

Table 1

MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEM: dichotomous variable
1 = social issue, 0 = other issues
INFLUENCE ON VOTE: five point scales
5 = very important to vote, 1 = not important

Table 2

SELF-IDENTIFIED IDEOLOGY: seven point scale
7 = extremely conservative, 1 = extremely liberal

ALL ISSUE QUESTIONS seven point scales
7 = most conservative position, 1 = most liberal position

TABLE 3

BIBLICAL LITERALISM three point scale
3 = Bible literally true, 2 = Bible inspired,
1 = Bible a book of fables
LIFE AFTER DEATH seven point scale
7 = believe in afterlife, 1 = do not believe in afterlife
RELIGIOUS SALIENCE seven point scale
7 = religion very important, 1 = religion not important
DENOMINATION nine point scale (cf Stark and Glock, 1970)
9 = charismatic churches, 8 = fundamentalist, 7 = evangelical, 6 = Lutherans and Presbyterians, 5 = Methodists, 4 = Other mainline, 3 = Roman Catholics, 2 = Jews, 1 = None
CHURCH ATTENDANCE seven point scale
7 = more than once a week, 1 = seldom or never
DENOMINATIONAL CHANGE dichotomous variable
1 = move to more sectarian denomination, 0 = to mainline or no change
RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION dichotomous variables
1 = checked identification 0 = did not (multiple answers possible)
CIVIL RELIGION seven point scales
7 = strongly agree 1 = strongly disagree

INCOME 1 = less than $15,000 a year, 7 = over $500,000 a year
SEX 1 = male, 0 = female
EDUCATION 1 = less than twelve years, 7 = postgraduate degree
SIZE OF PLACE 1 = rural, 9 = suburb of city of 250,000 or more
REGION 1 = South, 0 = non-South
AGE 1 = under 35, 4 = over 65
OCCUPATION 1 = blue-collar, clerical, farm, 2 = small business 3 = corporate officials, 4 = professionals

TABLE 4

SELF-IDENTIFIED PARTISANSHIP seven point scales
7 = strong Republican, 1 = strong Democrat
PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS seven point scales
7 = very good job, 1 = very poor job
SUPPORT FOR GOP POLICIES five point scales
5 = strongly agree with policy 1 = strongly disagree

TABLE 5

GOP NOMINATION PREFERENCES. dichotomous variables
1 = supported conservative candidate, 0 = supported other candidates
PROXIMITY TO POLITICIANS. five point scales
5 = feel very close, 1 = feel very far
PROXIMITY TO INTEREST GROUPS. seven point scales
7 = feel very close, 1 = feel very far
PURISM MEASURES seven point scales
7 = strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree

REFERENCES

Baker, Tod A , Robert P Steed, and Laurence W Moreland 1986 The Emergence of the Religious Right and the Development of the Two-Party System in the South Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D C

Blumenthal, Sidney 1986 *The Rise of the Counter-Establishment* Times Books New York

Conover, Pamela Johnston 1983 The Mobilization of the New Right A Test of Various Explanations *Western Political Quarterly*, 36 632–49

Edsall, Thomas 1987 The Political Impasse *New York Review of Books* 34 8–14

Freeman, Jo 1986 The Political Culture of Democrats and Republicans *Political Science Quarterly* 101 327–44

Green, John C , and James L Guth 1986 Big Bucks and Petty Cash Party and Interest Group Activists in American Politics In Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis eds , *Interest Group Politics* 2d ed Washington CQ Press

Guth, James L 1985–86 Political Converts Partisan Realignment Among Southern Baptist Ministers *Election Politics*, 3 2–6

Guth, James L , and John C Green 1986 Faith and Politics Religion and Ideology Among Political Contributors *American Politics Quarterly*, 14 186–99

——— 1987a The Moralizing Minority Christian Right Support Among Political Contributors *Social Science Quarterly*, 67 forthcoming

——— 1987b Robertson's Republicans Christian Activists in the GOP *Election Politics* 4 forthcoming

Hauss, Charles S and L Sandy Maisel 1986 Extremist Delegates Myth and Reality In Ronald B Rapoport et al , eds , *The Life of the Parties* Lexington University Press of Kentucky

Hershey, Marjorie R 1984 *Running for Office* Chatham, NJ Chatham House

Hertzke, Allen D 1986 Representing God in Washington The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity Unpublished Ph D dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Johnson, Stephen D , and Joseph B Tamney 1985 The Christian Right and the 1984 Presidential Election *Review of Religious Research*, 27 124–33

Klecka, William 1980 *Discriminant Analysis* Beverly Hills Sage

Kleppner, Paul 1985 *The Third Party System, 1853–1892* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press

Miller, Warren E , and M Kent Jennings 1986 *Parties in Transition A Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters* New York Russell Sage

Polsby, Nelson, and Aaron Wildavsky 1968 *Presidential Elections Strategies of American Electoral Politics* New York Scribner's

Reichley, James 1982 The Reagan Coalition *The Brookings Review*, 1 6–9

——— 1985 *Religion in American Public Life* Washington Brookings
Shafer, Byron E 1985 The New Cultural Politics *PS*, 28 221–31
Sigelman, Lee, Clyde Wilcox and Emmett Buell 1986 An Unchanging Minority Popular Support for the Moral Majority, 1980 and 1984 Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Washington, D C
Smidt, Corwin 1985 Evangelicals and the 1984 Election Continuity or Change? Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Savannah
——— 1986 The Partisanship of American Evangelicals Changing Patterns Over the Past Decade Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Washington, D C
Stark, R , and C Y Glock 1970 *American Piety The Nature of Religious Commitment* Berkeley University of California Press
Wald, Kenneth 1987 *Religion and Politics in the United States* New York St Martins

Research Notes

The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections

Peverill Squire
University of Iowa

Eric R. A. N. Smith
University of California, Santa Barbara

How does partisan information affect individual voting behavior in nonpartisan elections? Using data from a 1982 California Poll survey on state supreme court confirmation elections we demonstrate that nonpartisan elections are easily turned into partisan contests in the minds of voters. Partisan information increases the probability of an individual holding an opinion on the elections and results in votes which are based on the respondent's partisan identification and opinion of the governor who appointed the justice. The implications of these results for nonpartisan elections in general and merit retention contests in particular are also discussed.

Political scientists do not know a great deal about individual voting behavior in nonpartisan elections. In such contests voters must decide for whom to cast their ballots without the benefit of partisan labels, usually the most important bit of information. Much of what we do know about voting behavior in these elections has been generated by analyses of aggregate level data (e.g. Lee, 1960, Salisbury and Black, 1963, Hawley, 1973). Among other things, these studies have suggested that not all voters in nonpartisan contests lack partisan information about the candidates.

In this paper we concern ourselves with how the introduction of partisan cues affects individual voter behavior in nonpartisan elections. Survey data collected on the November 1982 California state supreme court confirmation contests present an excellent opportunity to investigate this question.[1] In August 1982, the California Poll asked 1007 respondents whether they would vote to keep or remove each of four justices on the bench. What makes these data most useful for our investigation is that the Field organization split their sample. Roughly half of the respondents (N = 502) were asked simply if they would vote to confirm or remove each individual justice.[2] The other half of

We thank Gregory Caldeira, Robert Y. Shapiro and John Wright for their comments on various drafts of this paper. As always, any errors are our responsibility.

[1] Data for this study, originally collected by the Field Research Corporation, were provided by the University of California State Data Program, Berkeley. These organizations are not responsible for the analysis and interpretation of the data appearing here.

[2] The wording of question 24b of California Poll 8205 is: "In the November election voters will be asked to vote for or against a number of State Supreme Court Justices who are now serving in

the sample (N = 505) was asked the same question but also told whether then Governor Jerry Brown or his immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, appointed the justice [3] Given the partisan information contained in the second question we might expect the responses it elicits to differ from those given to the first one But in what ways do the two contrast?

The quasi-experimental nature of this survey allows us to demonstrate that nonpartisan elections are easily turned into partisan contests in the minds of voters. We find that the provision of partisan information increases the probability of an individual's holding an opinion on the election Moreover, where a respondent's education level largely determines whether an opinion is held or not with no information given, partisan variables become most important when partisan information is present A similar relationship holds with support or opposition to confirmation Providing partisan information turns a previously unstructured response into one which is dominated by a respondent's party identification and, in this particular case, opinion of the appointing official

Voters and Merit Retention Elections

The elections under examination are nonpartisan, uncontested confirmation contests Voters are presented with the choice of confirming or removing a justice The voting decision is not between two or more candidates [4]

Almost all candidates in merit retention elections are retained, usually by substantial margins (Griffin and Horan, 1979, pp 79–80, Jenkins, 1977) But most judges receive some negative votes typically between 20 and 30 per cent of the total, regardless of their record (Griffin and Horan, 1979, p 80) It may be that negative ballots are just protests against an incumbent that people evaluate judicial candidates on their records and arrive at different conclusions, or that some are voting on the basis of partisan information

Most voters in any sort of judicial election know very little about the candi

---

office As I read each one please tell me as of now whether you would vote to have that person remain on the court or be removed The first is (READ NAME OF PERSON CHECKED) Would you vote to have him stay on the court or be removed?

[3]Question 24a is the same as 24b except that the name of the appointing governor is also given For example the phrase used under this format was Justice Cruz Reynoso appointed by Governor Jerry Brown or Justice Frank Richardson appointed by Ronald Reagan when he was governor

[4]The California state Supreme Court has a chief justice and six associates, all of whom are appointed by the governor and approved by the Commission on Judicial Appointees The justices serve twelve year terms Their appointments are submitted to the voters for approval at the first gubernatorial election following their selection and again at the end of their terms (Historically justices have little trouble getting electoral approval although three justices were denied confirmation in the November 1986 election)

dates (Johnson, Shaefer, and McKnight, 1978, Lovrich and Sheldon, 1983). Lack of knowledge appears to characterize California supreme court confirmation elections. When asked by the California Poll in October 1982 to name the chief justice of the state supreme court, only 43 percent of the respondents correctly stated Rose Bird, despite the fact that she has a memorable name, was the first woman appointed to the court and was very controversial (e g , Stolz, 1981) This certainly suggests that Bird's less newsworthy colleagues were much less well known [3] We can expect that most voters did not know the names of the four justices on the ballot, much less anything substantive about their records

On what basis, then, do voters make their decisions on such races? Adamany and Dubois (1976, p 760) report that "where neither formal election arrangements nor political resources are partisan judicial electorates do not divide along party lines " California's merit retention elections are of this sort What substitutes for partisan information or cues in these elections?

The answers produced by studies point to many different factors most prominently, bar poll ratings, incumbency newspaper endorsements and voter pamphlets (Dubois 1979, 1984, Goldstein 1980, Lovrich and Sheldon, 1982, Volcansek, 1981) All of these cues probably do influence voting decisions, but the relative weight of each varies among elections and electorates The most important thing from our perspective, however, is that partisan ues are very rarely discussed in the context of nonpartisan judicial elecons The data presented here allow us to examine the influence of partisan ues in a nonpartisan election where voters have only minimal information

Other aspects of the elections being examined make them of additional terest to our investigation Of the four justices up for confirmation three ere recent appointees of then Governor Jerry Brown, Jr The other justice s placed on the bench by Brown's immediate predecessor Ronald Reagan e Brown appointees were Cruz Reynoso the first Hispanic to serve on the te Supreme Court, Allen Broussard, the first Black justice to face the ters, and Otto Kaus The Reagan selection was Frank Richardson, who d served on the court for eight years Thus the four justices on the ballot re appointed by prominent partisan politicians about whom people held ering opinions, and represented a varied ethnic and racial mix

THE EFFECTS OF PARTISAN INFORMATION

What difference does the provision of partisan information make in a nontisan election? A first answer to this question is provided in table 1, which

[3] check of the number of entries under each name in *Bell and Howell's Index to the Los les Times* for 1982 shows 48 stories involving Bird 31 on Reynoso 24 on Broussard 24 on , and 16 on Richardson

TABLE 1

SUPPORT FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION WITH AND WITHOUT PARTISAN INFORMATION, IN PERCENT

Justice	Confirm	Remove	No Opinion
Reynoso	31	11	58
Reynoso (Brown)	34	27	39
Kaus	29	7	63
Kaus (Brown)	33	21	45
Broussard	31	8	61
Broussard (Brown)	32	22	46
Richardson	36	5	59
Richardson (Reagan)	41	15	44
N (no information) = 408			
N (information) = 402			

Source Data collected by the Field Research Corporation, California Poll 8205, Augu 23–27, 1982

shows the simple frequencies for each question.[6] The addition of partisan in formation produces a substantial reduction in the number of respondent having no opinion This drop ranges from 15 to 19 percentage points Whil the increase in respondents wishing to confirm the justices rises only be tween 1 and 5 percentage points, the growth in the numbers seeking re moval is more impressive 10 to 16 points Thus information about who ap pointed the justices results in much greater opposition to confirmatio regardless of whether the appointing executive was a liberal Democrat or conservative Republican [7]

The evidence from table 1 indicates that partisan information in nonpa tisan elections helps crystallize opinion This finding is interesting, if not su prising Larger questions, however, still loom What is it that the partisa information triggers? Do voters take that knowledge and evaluate judic confirmation in relation to their opinion of the appointing official, their pe sonal political ideology or partisan identification? What role does the respo dent's education play in the use of this information?

[6]Only respondents who claim to be registered to vote are used because we are interest the behavior of voters, not all citizens

[7]A subsequent survey taken in late October, just before the general election, showed a si lar phenomenon The responses to questions asking whether to confirm or remove eac tice—without the provision of additional information - -produced a ten-point drop in no opi for each justice compared to the same questions in the August poll Like the August re discussed here the increase in opinion was skewed toward removal We might speculate this is due to the circulation of partisan information about the nonpartisan election

The resolution of these questions requires multivariate analysis. Because the dependent variables—opinion holding and position on confirmation—are dichotomous, we have employed probit analysis.

Under any circumstances we would expect the probability of an individual holding an opinion to increase with education, particularly when no information is supplied (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960, p 175) Education might also be related to the opinion which is held with better educated people more supportive of the idea of an independent judiciary, less apt to be swayed by partisan concerns and more likely to favor confirmation

The strength of party identification may be related to opinion holding Individuals who are strong party identifiers may already be predisposed to support or oppose confirmation based on partisan criteria, without being provided such information We might also expect that the stronger the party identification the more likely an individual is to cue off partisan information when given

The direction of party identification should matter on confirmation position We would certainly expect Democrats to favor confirmation of Brown's appointees and Republicans to be opposed, with the positions reversed on Reagan's justice With no information provided, however, these relationships may not manifest themselves

Similarly, evaluation of the appointing politician may determine if an opinion is held and what that opinion is [a] Those who rate Brown or Reagan favorably will likely support their appointees, those who do not may oppose them but these attitudes may not surface without providing information about the appointing official.

It might also be the case that personal ideology, not party identification or opinion on Brown or Reagan proves important The exact relationship between ideology and opinion holding or confirmation position is not clear Perhaps liberals may be willing to confirm all four justices and conservatives not because the former are more favorable toward the institution than are the latter But it might also be the case that liberals, regardless of party identification, will support Brown's judges and not Reagan's while conservatives of any partisan stripe will have the opposite reaction

Finally, being Hispanic or Black may have an independent effect on opinion holding and support for confirmation Pomper (1966) has found that ethnic and racial considerations can substitute for party labels in nonpartisan elections Hispanics, given the ease with which Cruz Reynoso's name can be identified, are likely to have both an opinion on his confirmation and to favor

[a] The questions used to rate Brown and Reagan are, "What kind of job do you think Jerry Brown is doing as Governor of California—an excellent fair poor or very poor job?" and "Over all, what kind of job do you think Ronald Reagan is doing as president of the U S — an excellent job, fair, poor or very poor job?"

TABLE 2

PROBIT EQUATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT PARTISAN INFORMATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE HOLDING AN OPINION OR NOT

	Reynoso		Broussard	
Variables	No Info[a]	Info	No Info	Info
Education	217*	064	147*	056
	(060)	(060)	(060)	(058)
Strength of Party Id	− 099	060	186*	129
	(074)	(072)	(075)	(071)
Ideology	− 013	− 024	022	− 011
	(041)	(043)	(041)	(042)
Reagan Rating	− 060	− 086	− 014	− 047
	(066)	(063)	(066)	(061)
Brown Rating	− 178*	− 139*	− 158*	− 179*
	(066)	(066)	(067)	(065)
Hispanic	725*	634*	517*	182
	(239)	(265)	(232)	(240)
Black	376	038	310	235
	(243)	(260)	(243)	(261)
Constant	483	598	− 925	205
	(435)	(446)	(438)	(261)
N	389	384	389	384

	Kaus		Richardson	
Variables	No Info	Info	No Info	Info
Education	128*	− 026	116*	006
	(059)	(058)	(059)	(058)
Strength of Party Id	097	061	239*	038
	(074)	(071)	(075)	(072)
Ideology	− 004	− 049	005	− 040
	(041)	(042)	(041)	(042)
Reagan Rating	018	− 103	004	038
	(065)	(062)	(065)	(061)
Brown Rating	056	− 128*	057	146*
	(066)	(064)	(065)	(064)
Hispanic	231	092	257	100
	(230)	(239)	(230)	(239)
Black	216	113	188	181
	(243)	(260)	(241)	(260)
Constant	− 908	585	− 1 145	670
	(436)	(440)	(425)	(440)
N	389	384	389	384

Source Data from California Poll 8205

[a]The column entries are probit coefficients The numbers in parentheses are standard er

* Statistically significant at p < 05 or better

it before being provided with the additional information. These tendencies may not carry over to the other judges on the ballot. Blacks may not be aware of Justice Allen Broussard's race, and consequently may not provide him the same level of support expected from Hispanics for Reynoso.

The probit coefficients for eight separate equations on opinion holding—one on the sample with partisan information and one on the sample without partisan information for each of the four justices—are presented in table 2. (The coding of the independent variables is given in the appendix.) The most striking finding across all four sets of equations involves the role of education. As we expected, education has a large and statistically significant impact on the probability of holding an opinion when no additional information is given. The better educated the respondent, the more likely he or she is to have some position on confirmation. The addition of partisan information, however, almost removes this relationship. In every case the size of the coefficient for education is reduced—in one case it takes the wrong sign—and is statistically insignificant.

On average, an individual who did not graduate from high school has only a 30 percent probability of holding an opinion without additional information, while a college graduate has a 47 percent probability.[9] Provision of partisan information changes those probabilities to 55% and 58% respectively, reducing the gap from 17 to only 3 points.

In the no-information equations for Reynoso and Broussard a few other variables influence the probability of holding an opinion. Evaluation of Governor Brown is negatively related to opinion holding: those who do not like the governor the most are 19% more likely to have a position on confirmation than those who rate him highly. A similar relationship appears between strength of party identification and opinion holding, particularly in the Broussard and Richardson equations. The strongest party identifiers are 23% more apt to have an opinion than Independents.

As expected, Hispanics are more likely to have a position on Reynoso's confirmation, even without the benefit of partisan information. Indeed, Hispanics have a 68% probability of expressing an opinion while non-Hispanics have only a 42% likelihood. On Justice Broussard, Hispanics are also 20% more likely to have an opinion than non-Hispanics. Blacks come close to exhibiting the same relationships, but the coefficients are both smaller and less significant. In regard to their failure to express opinions on Broussard, these results probably evidence a lack of information about the justice's minority status.

What changes with the addition of partisan information? As noted above, education no longer influences opinion holding. That is, the introduction of partisan information erases the advantage of the better educated. What does

[9]These probabilities and others reported below are calculated from the equations in tables 2 and 3 using the procedure explained in Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, p. 123).

TABLE 3

PROBIT EQUATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT PARTISAN INFORMATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE· POSITION ON CONFIRMATION

	Reynoso		Broussard	
Variables	No Info[a]	Info	No Info	Info
Education	169	172	059	130
	(109)	(089)	(107)	(091)
Party Id	122	199*	− 042	131*
	(077)	(058)	(077)	(058)
Ideology	− 014	− 019	− 022	070
	(080)	(063)	(079)	(064)
Reagan Rating	− 180	066	− 165	− 094
	(143)	(096)	(139)	(098)
Brown Rating	423*	630*	467*	419*
	(134)	(105)	(142)	(106)
Hispanic	293	034	239	− 135
	(397)	(331)	(405)	(376)
Black	− 375	2 913	− 580	2 832
	(484)	(4 760)	(445)	(5 345)
Constant	− 546	−2 951	360	−1 604
	(830)	(637)	(799)	(621)
N	171	236	159	211

	Kaus		Richardson	
Variables	No Info	Info	No Info	Info
Education	210	016	158	082
	(116)	(093)	(118)	(092)
Party Id	107	042	− 009	− 024
	(079)	(062)	(073)	(063)
Ideology	116	068	046	− 110
	(089)	(069)	(081)	(060)
Reagan Rating	− 025	− 104	− 032	458*
	(161)	(101)	(145)	(101)
Brown Rating	226	614*	130	037
	(141)	(115)	(139)	(104)
Hispanic	363	289	038	324
	(465)	(447)	(435)	(374)
Black	240	2 723	− 373	730
	(610)	(4 972)	(438)	(375)
Constant	− 973	−1 361	376	− 475
	(924)	(628)	(845)	(594)
N	150	213	168	218

Source Data from California Poll 8205

[a]The column entries are probit coefficients The numbers in parentheses are standard errors

* Statistically significant at p< 05 or better

appear to matter is the respondent's opinion of the current governor. In every equation, evaluation of Brown is negatively related to position on confirmation, with those who think the governor is doing a very poor job an average of 23% more likely to have a position on confirmation than those who rate the governor's performance highly

What determines the content of these opinions? The results of four sets of probit equations addressing this question are reported in table 3 Overall, very little structures the position on confirmation with no additional information Only 2 of the 28 independent variables in the four no information equations are statistically significant, evaluations of Governor Brown are positively related to confirmation position on his appointees, Reynoso and Broussard Coefficients for several other variables in the equations approach traditional levels of significance, but they do not fit any recognizable pattern and can be considered flukes

The addition of information on who appointed the justices provides structure to positions on confirmation In all four information equations evaluation of the appointing governor is related to support of or opposition to confirmation Those who gave Brown an excellent rating are 93% likely to favor confirming his appointees, while those who give the governor a very poor evaluation are only 35% likely to support those justices Moreover in two of the equations—Reynoso and Broussard—party identification is substantively and statistically significant, and the coefficients are in the right direction in the other two equations The more Democratic the respondent, the more likely he or she is to favor confirmation of Brown's appointees and to oppose Reagan's selection

In none of the information equations is education or ideology important Likewise, being Hispanic or Black fails to matter with other characteristics controlled, a surprising finding Given that evaluation of the appointing governor and party identification matter and other variables do not, it appears that individuals in low information elections will use available information to structure their position or vote In this case, indirectly partisan information can be used to key a partisan response to a nonpartisan contest

CONCLUSION

We have no evidence on how much partisan or other information about nonpartisan candidates voters take with them into the voting booth We can expect, however, that most voters will know little about the candidates or issues and that some number of them will pick up on partisan cues in the environment, such as the one used in this study The evidence uncovered and analyzed here suggests strongly that voters will use partisan information to structure their voting decisions on nonpartisan contests. This finding has important implications for nonpartisan elections in general and merit retention elections in particular.

Nonpartisan elections were, of course, instituted as a means of removing political parties from the electoral process. Voters were supposed to make their decisions on the basis of other information, ideally the candidates qualifications and platforms This is a rather heavy burden to place on voter because rational behavior dictates that they attempt to minimize information costs (Downs, 1957) Party identification is the most important savings device, consequently it is not surprising to learn that, when possible, people employ it, even in nonpartisan elections

Nonpartisan elections do not fulfill their promise if voters approach them with a partisan orientation This is a particularly serious problem for merit retention elections Because they are designed to remove the taint of partisan politics from judicial selection, they are failures if it turns out that voters cast their ballot on the basis of evaluation of the appointing official or party identification, not on the justice's merits Given the low profile of judicial elections, we may have electorates in merit retention contests which have no basis for making decisions Learning who appointed the justice help structure their voting response and indeed, may provide them more information about the justice's record and credentials than other cue

The findings presented here also have implications for practical politics The data in table 1 show that the provision of partisan information produces a drop in the number of respondents having no opinion and a resulting increase in the number of voters opposed to the justices The final election results also show this trend, only 52% voted for Reynoso's confirmation, 56% for Broussard, 57% for Kaus, and 76% for Richardson All three of Brown's appointees had over 40% of the voters opposed to their staying on the bench The direction of these shifts suggests that an organized campaign opposing confirmation can prove successful Voters respond to partisan information and any predisposition toward approving confirmation can be overcome The recent defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues evidences the power of organized opposition, even in merit retention contests Consequently, future confirmation elections may be the sort of partisan campaigns we suggest are possible based on the findings reported here

Appendix

Coding of Independent Variables

Black 0 = non-Black, 1 = Black

Brown Rating 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent

Education 1 = less than high school graduate, 2 = high school or vocational school graduate, 3 = some college, 4 = college graduate, 5 = some graduate education

Hispanic 0 = non-Hispanic, 1 = Hispanic

leology 1 = strong conservative, 2 = not very strong conservative, 3 = conservative leaner, 4 = middle-of-the-road, 5 = liberal leaner, 6 = not very strong liberal, 7 = strong liberal

arty Identification 1 = strong Republican, 2 = weak Republican, 3 = Republican leaner, 4 = independent, 5 = Democratic leaner, 6 = weak Democrat, 7 = strong Democrat

eagan Rating. 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent

trength of Party Identification 1 = independent, 2 = Republican or Democratic Leaner, 3 = weak Republican or Democrat, 4 = strong Republican or Democrat.

REFERENCES

damany, David, and Philip Dubois 1976 Electing State Judges *Wisconsin Law Review* 1976 731–79

ampbell, Angus, Philip E Converse Warren E Miller and Donald F Stokes 1960 *The American Voter* New York John Wiley

owns Anthony 1957 *An Economic Theory of Democracy* New York Harper and Row

ubois Philip L 1979 The Significance of Voting Cues in State Supreme Court Elections *Law and Society Review* 13 757–79

—— 1984 Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections A Multivariate Assessment *Law and Society Review* 18 395-436

oldstein, Joel H 1980 Bar Poll Ratings as the Leading Influence on a Nonpartisan Judicial Election *Judicature* 63 376-84

riffin, Kenyon N and Michael J Horan 1979 Merit Retention Elections What Influences the Voters? *Judicature*, 63 78–88

awley Willis D 1973 *Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for Party Politics* New York John Wiley

nkins, William Jr 1977 Retention Elections Who Wins When No One Loses *Judicature* 61 79–86

hnson Charles A Roger C Shaefer and R Neal McKnight 1978 The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections *Social Science Quarterly* 59 371–78

ee, Eugene C 1960 *The Politics of Nonpartisanship* Berkeley University of California Press

ovrich Nicholas P, and Charles H Sheldon 1983 Voters in Contested Non Partisan Judicial Elections A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public? *Western Political Quarterly* 36 241–56

omper, Gerald 1966 Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30 79–97

lsbury, Robert H, and Gordon Black 1963 Class and Party in Partisan and Non Partisan Elections the Case of Des Moines *American Political Science Review* 57 584–92

olz, Preble 1981 *Judging Judges The Investigation of Rose Bird and the California Supreme Court* New York Free Press

lcansek, Mary L 1981 An Exploration of the Judicial Election Process *Western Political Quarterly*, 34 572–77

olfinger, Raymond E and Steven J Rosenstone 1980 *Who Votes* New Haven Yale University Press

The Politicization of Security Policy

William O. Chittick*
University of Georgia

This article compares differences in militarism among government and nongovernment elites. It is based on a mail questionnaire sent to representative samples of both government and nongovernment officials with foreign affairs responsibilities as well as to four more specialized populations of nongovernment leaders in 1984. The study finds that although military officers consistently rank higher on militarism than other groups, they are not significantly more militaristic than either civilian officials in security positions or businessmen. The politicization of security policy within the government manifests itself both in the militarism among all groups that deal directly with security policy and in the disproportionate number of Republicans and Independents in security positions. The article concludes that we cannot depend on civilians, partisanship, bipartisanship, or even professionalism to check or balance excesses in the use, or threat, of force. In the end there is no substitute for sound judgment and constant vigilance.

Civil-military relations in America have become increasingly complex in the age of deterrence. The traditional gulf between the liberal ethos of American society as a whole and the functional requirements of the military remains (Huntington, 1957). However, the influence of the military has been extended by a military-industrial complex that includes civilian officials as well as military and industrial leaders. This armament complex has, in turn, produced an armament culture that is now relatively autonomous of it and embraces militaristic values that are sometimes identified with those of liberal democracy (Luckham, 1984, p. 14).

The American military does not threaten democratic government directly as it does in so many developing societies. The idea of civilian control is fully accepted by American armed forces. Rather, the danger is that the armament culture will have undue influence in making United States foreign policy. Militarism, as we shall employ the term in this paper, refers to an excessive reliance on the use, or threat, of force as a legitimate means of pursuing foreign policy goals (Skjelsbaek, 1979). This armament culture is naturally associated with the military, but it is in no way identical to it.

*The research reported here is part of a larger study of non-state actors in foreign relations. The project is supported by a faculty research grant from the Office of the Vice President for Research and by secretarial and other assistance from the Center for Global Policy Studies and the Department of Political Science, all at the University of Georgia. I am especially indebted to Doug McLeod for computer programming assistance and to Keith Billingsley for methodological advice as well as to Paul Diehl, Martin Hillenbrand and Sara Shlaer for insightful comments on an earlier draft.

In this sense militarism is perceived as a problem in the military, in government, and in civil society as a whole From the beginning, the concerns about a large standing army that were expressed both during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and during the debates over ratification that followed were not directed solely at the military These concerns were quickly subsumed under the more general fear of the usurpation of absolute power by the central government The federal system for dividing powers between a national and several state governments as well as the elaborate checks and balances built into the national government itself were designed to prevent any one faction in society from gaining control of the government and exercising absolute power over society

Whatever lingering suspicions there were of the military are probably reflected in the American idea of separating the military from society This Great Divorce (Hadley, 1986, p 22) continues to play a key role in the contemporary concept of civilian control over the military According to Sarkesian (1981, p 238), both Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) base their views of the proper relationship between civilian and military professionals in government on the premise that the military is "a system outside of the existing political-social structure " Huntington's model for objective civilian control emphasizes the formal separation of the civilian and military functions of government It calls for the military to be politically neutral and restrict itself to giving advice on the military implications of decisions Janowitz contends that the distinctions between political and military functions are imperceptible in the international security environment and urges military professionals to develop political-social insights to deal more effectively with these issues Only Sarkesian, however, goes so far as to propose an equilibrium model in which military officers are full-fledged political actors in a liberal democracy

Although the growth of an armament culture could undermine civilian control over the military, there is relatively little empirical evidence on the extent of militarism in American society (Russett, 1974, p 80) In a study of the *behavior* of soldiers and statesmen in decisions on whether or not to commit American armed forces since World War II Betts (1977, p 5) finds that "military advisers were usually divided and their recommendations echoed civilian advice more often than they differed " Betts' study, which ends prior to the most recent military buildup, tends to discount the idea that military officers are more militaristic than civilian officials However, Betts refrains from making a judgment about whether the policies actually pursued are militaristic, and although he deals with both solider and statesmen, the book is mainly concerned with the soldiers

In a study of the *attitudes* of military and business elites, Russett (1974, p 83) finds that military officers are more hawkish than business elites, particularly on questions dealing directly with military functions, although he

concludes that the differences between them are not very striking. Similarly, Mennis (1967, pp. 177–80) shows that although there tend to be more hardliners among political-military officers than foreign service officers, most individuals in both groups congregate around a "pragmatic-middle" position. None of these empirical studies would support a stereotypic view that all military officers are hardliners.

This study focuses on differences in militarism among governmental and societal elites. It builds on two more recent studies. One by Russett and Hanson (1975) finds that businessmen and substantial segments of the Republican party leadership as well as military officers constitute the most hawkish elements in the American elite. The other, by Holsti and Rosenau (1984), concludes that a high proportion of military officials and business leaders are "Cold War Internationalists." Both studies indicate that military officers, business executives, and Republican leaders are more militaristic than other elites.[1] Russett and Hanson, however, do not compare these elites with relevant others, and Holsti and Rosenau do not focus primarily on militarism. Neither study marshals the evidence necessary to address the problem of militarism in foreign policy.

The present study includes a wide range of elites. The results show that civilian officials in security positions in the National Security Council and in the Departments of State and Defense as well as businessmen and military officers generally are more militaristic than other government and societal elites. The evidence also suggests that professional appointments to security positions have been politicized. These findings raise questions about militarism in foreign policy decision making, especially in the Reagan administration.

The Data on Militarism

The study is based on a mail questionnaire administered to two large elite samples and four more specialized elite populations in the summer and fall of 1984.[2] The two samples represent government and nongovernment elites respectively, whereas the four populations tap special elites not fully represented in the nongovernment sample. The composite samples and populations include a total of 779 respondents.[3] Each of these samples and populations will be described briefly below.

[1]This study deals with military attitudes as distinct from military behavior. The author acknowledges that militarist attitudes do not always result in the use of military force.

[2]A fuller description of these samples and populations is available (see Chittick 1986). Because the period in which the survey was conducted spans the presidential election of November 1984, an effort was made to correlate the date of return mail with various attitudes. There is no evidence of significant effects. The election results may have been anticipated by the respondents.

[3]There is some overlap between the NGO sample and the PVO populations.

The government sample represents all those individuals in Washington, D C., who have formal responsibility for some aspect of America's official relations with other peoples and governments. These individuals were identified in the *Federal Yellow Book* (Cook, 1984) and supplementary telephone directories A representative sample of 750 officials were drawn from these lists, 377 or 50% of them completed and returned the mail questionnaire

Most of these individuals are professional civil service, executive service, foreign service or military service officers in charge of specific bureaus, offices or divisions within the government About 25% of them are located in the Department of State, another 32% in agencies related to the State Department, such as AID and USIA, 13% in the Department of Defense, 17% in other departments and agencies in the government, and 13% on the staffs of appropriate congressional committees Most of the military officers were located in the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

There is no comparable way of sampling nongovernment elites holding responsible international positions This study is based on a representative sample of organizations drawn from *The Encyclopedia of Associations* (Akey 1984) Although two-thirds of this sample of 1,014 responded, only about a quarter of these organizations have a primary or strong secondary interest in foreign affairs Consequently, the subsample used in this part of the study includes only the 141 executive directors from those organizations that have a strong interest in foreign affairs They represent public affairs, trade, educational, religious, cultural, social welfare, scientific, agricultural, athletic, fraternal, chamber of commerce, health and labor organizations in that order of frequency

Since these associations do not adequately reflect many nonmembership organizations in American society, four specific populations were added to our composite samples to reflect these other organizations Two of these populations were business organizations One population is composed of the chief international officer for those top 100 American banks that had significant overseas exposure (*Business Week*, April 9, 1984) plus other banking institutions making foreign loans of at least $15 million in 1983 Another business population includes the chief international officer for those top 200 United States corporations (*Fortune Magazine*, April 30, 1984) that have subsidiaries in at least six foreign countries There were 291 individuals in these two populations, of which 117 responded for a response rate of [illegible]ut 40%

[illegible]e other two populations added were private voluntary organizations [illegible]Os) One such population consists of the executive directors of religious [illegible]ions and overseas service agencies Ninety Protestant groups with mis[illegible] budgets over $1 million or with at least 100 American missionaries sta[illegible]d overseas are included (Wilson, 1979), as are the 22 most active Catho[illegible]ission groups at the national and provincial level (U S Catholic Mission

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGES OF INDIVIDUALS HOLDING VARIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARISM

How positive or negative would you personally consider the effects of the following goals to be on *long-term relationships* with other peoples and nations?	Very Positive +2	Positive +1	Don't Know (Undecided) 0	Negative −1	Very Negative −2	N	Don't Know* (Uninformed)
A Preventing Soviet expansion into Third World areas	29.5	48.1	7.5	12.2	2.7	746	33
B Matching Soviet military strength	23.2	46.5	5.5	16.6	8.0	747	32
The U.S. government should become more involved in doing the following	**Agree Strongly +2**	**Agree Somewhat +1**	**No Opinion (Undecided) 0**	**Disagree Somewhat −1**	**Disagree Strongly −2**	**N**	**No Opinion (Uninformed)**
C Providing military aid to Third World countries	5.4	34.8	5.4	28.6	25.8	739	40
D Strengthening local police forces in unstable countries	4.9	26.3	12.0	27.5	29.3	741	38

*The total number of respondents is 779: N plus Don't Knows.

Association, 1983) and eleven Jewish organizations that provide relief and assistance overseas (*American Jewish Year Book*, 1981). The other population involves the executive directors of PVOs who are formally registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development (1984) to distribute government food and other materials overseas. There were 146 PVO respondents out of a total of 291 for a 50% response rate.

Together, these two samples and four special populations represent a ve

broad array of American elites with a significant interest in foreign affairs Although these elites are physically located in the United States, they are responsible for a wide range of American programs and activities abroad

The questionnaire included 12 questions on foreign policy goals and 8 questions on foreign policy means A factor analysis of these 20 foreign policy questions yielded five dimensions with four items loading on the third dimension whivch we have labeled militarism Each of these four items had coefficients above 70 on this dimension

Two of these items were concerned with foreign policy goals Respondents were asked "How positive or negative would you personally consider the effects of 'preventing Soviet expansion into Third World areas' and 'matching Soviet military strength' on *long term relationships* with other peoples and nations?" Respondents could choose "very positive," "positive," "negative," "very negative," and "don't know" The latter responses were later recoded as "undecided" if respondents indicated that their response was somewhere between positive and negative in less than half of those items or "missing data" if this response was used for half or more of the items

The other two items were concerned with foreign policy means Respondents were asked whether or not they believed "The United States government should become more involved in 'strengthening local police forces in unstable countries' and 'providing military aid to Third World countries?'" The response categories were "agree strongly," "agree somewhat," "disagree somewhat," "disagree strongly," and "no opinion" The "no opinion" responses were coded as "undecided" or "missing data" as in the case of "don't knows" in the first set of questions

The overall responses to these items are shown in table 1 Although our respondents were generally positive about the effects of implementing militarist goals, they are divided over the idea that more military assistance should be extended abroad In order to compare militarism among various groups within our composite sample, standard scores are created for the overall sample such that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is ±1

THE ANALYSIS OF GROUP DIFFERENCES

One way analysis of variance is used to compare the mean values for various groups of elites in this study on the four items used to measure militarism An F value is used to determine whether there are significant differences among the groups considered as a whole [4] Tukey's Test is employed to compare each pair of groups separately This test is particularly appropriate when the groups being compared are unequal in size (SAS Institute, 1985,

[4] The F values within each subtable may be compared but the F values on different subtables are not comparable

TABLE 2

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON GROUP MEANS, USING STANDARD SCORES

Groups	N	QUESTIONS Preventing Soviet Expansion A	Matching Soviet Mil Strength B	Providing Mil Aid to Third World C	Strengthening Local Police Forces D
Sub-Table 2 1 All samples and pop					
1 Military Officers	36	5918	5607	1 0836	9327
2 Non-mil officials	289	2767	2549	1253	1028
3 Businessmen	117	1098	2470	− 0208	− 1752
4 PVO Leaders	146	− 3062	− 4900	− 3044	− 2821
5 NGO Sample	141	− 5202	− 3875	− 2244	− 0716
F-values		25 25*	27 12*	17 97*	13 03*
Tukey s Test**		1>4 5***	1,2 3>4,5	1>2 3 4 5 2>4 5	1>2 3,4 5 2>4
Sub-Table 2 2 Govt officials only					
1 Military off	36	5918	5607	1 0836	9327
2 Civil-executive officials in security pos	52	3828	5091	6492	4699
3 Civil-executive officials in non-security pos	224	2229	1915	0126	0217
4 Civil-Congressional Officials	50	0787	0688	0659	1694
F-values		3 70*	4 61*	17 72*	10 82*
Tukey s test		1>3,4	1 2 >4	1 2 3 4	1 >3 4 2 4
Sub-Table 2 3 Govt Officials only					
1 Republicans	88	5362	5283	6543	6366
2 Independents	111	3122	3515	2120	0092
3 Democrats	96	1614	0734	1124	0603
F-values		4 43*	5 91*	10 80*	8 38*
Tukey s Test		1 >3	1 2 >3	1 >2 3 2 >3	1 2 3

*The F-value is significant at the 05 level

**Tukey s Range Test controls for Type I error All differences reported are significant at the 05 level

***Group 1 scores are significantly greater than Group 4 scores and Group 1 scores are significantly greater than Group 5 scores

pp 471−76) Chi square is employed to determine whether the party identification of those observed in each occupational group is different than expected

In the literature on elite attitudes toward militarism, two occupational

groups have been singled out as having more positive attitudes than other such groups toward militarism. They are military officers and businessmen We shall begin by comparing the attitudes of these two groups on our four measures of militarism both with each other and with the larger governmental and nongovernmental samples to which they belong We have also included our populations of PVOs because they would be expected to be less militaristic than business executives

The results of these comparisons are shown in table 2 1 As expected, military officers consistently rank higher than the leaders of private voluntary organizations in particular and nongovernmental organizations in general on all four items used to measure militarism In each case civilian officials and businessmen rank just below military officers in their support of militarism, although both groups are significantly less militaristic than military officers when it comes to providing more military aid or further strengthening local police forces overseas At the same time civilian officials and business elites are significantly more likely than PVO and NGO executives to favor matching Soviet military strength, although only civilian officials are more likely than NGOs and PVOs to favor military assistance and more likely than PVOs to favor strengthening police forces abroad Thus, the most surprising finding in this overall group comparison is the extent of militarism among civilian officials in the government

Given the strong support for militarism among civilian as well as military officials in government, it is important to determine more specifically where in government this support is coming from Accordingly, we shall examine possible differences between four types of officials (1) military officers, (2) those civilian officials, especially in the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense, who hold security positions (3) those civilian officials, largely in other departments and agencies who hold nonsecurity or economic, social, administrative and information positions in the executive branch, and (4) congressional officials

The results in table 2 2 show that although military officers consistently rank higher on militarism than officials in security positions, the differences between them are never statistically significant There are significant differences, however, between both these groups and (1) all other government officials on increasing military aid, (2) other executive officials on strengthening local police forces, (3) congressional officials on matching Soviet military strength Only military officers are (1) more positive than officials in nonsecurity positions about preventing Soviet expansion into Third World areas and (2) more positive than congressional officials about strengthening local police forces in unstable countries

These findings show that civilian officials in security positions are only marginally less supportive of possible military goals and means than military officers themselves The extent of militarism among civilian and military pro-

fessionals with security responsibilities is quite different from the attitude congressional officials and occasionally other executive officials on the qu tions dealing with military means. Although we have emphasized the dif ences between those holding security and nonsecurity positions, the c also reflect differences. (1) between civilian and military officers within Defense Department, (2) between the State Department and the Defe Department, and (3) between foreign service and military service personn

Previous studies (Russett and Hanson, 1975, Holsti and Rosenau, 19 147–53) indicate that militarism is also related to the ideological, or pa orientations of individuals In addition to Republicans and Democrats, th are a rather large number of government officials who are nonidentifier Independents [5] The results in table 2 3 show that Republicans consisten rank higher than Democrats on all militarist items and rank higher than dependents on the need for more military means Independents are m militarist than Democrats on two of these items matching Soviet milit strength and providing military aid to the Third World These results c firm the correlations that others have found between Republicanism, con vatism, and militarism

Both party and position are related to militarism in our overall gove ment sample When we control for the type of position held by an official relate party identification to militarism, however, the results are surprisi Among those in security positions, party differences are unrelated to n tarism, except for the item on strengthening local police forces Howev party differences on all four measures of militarism are significant amo those holding nonsecurity positions This same result emerges when compare individuals in the State and Defense Departments or the Fore Service and the military services As long as our comparisons include th in nonsecurity positions, party differences in militarism are statistically s nificant, but, once we focus exclusively on those in security positions, pa differences are less important

Similar results are obtained when we control for the party identificatio officials and relate differences in position to militarism Among Democr and Republicans we find significant differences between type of position a militarism only with respect to strengthening local police forces abro Among Independents type of position is related to all four measures of mi tarism This suggests that Independents in security positions are quite diff ent from Independents elsewhere in the government [6]

Since Republicans consistently rank high on militarism, it is import to note that they along with Independents are heavily represented in s

[5] There are an unusual number of Independents among military officers (Mennis 1967 [illegible]

[6] It has been suggested that nominal independents in the American bureaucracy lean to left ideologically (Aberbach Putnam, and Rockman 1981, p 169)

curity positions Although the relationship between party and position is not strong (Cramer's V = .16), it is significant at the 05 level (chi square = 7 65) Thus, the politicization of security policy manifests itself both in the militarism among all groups that deal directly with security policy and in the disproportionate number of Republicans and Independents in security positions.[7]

Implications

This study has been concerned with the extent to which the armament culture has spread beyond the military to other officials in government and other elites in society The data confirm that military officers consistently rank higher than all of the other groups studied on militarism although they are not significantly different from other government officials or business elites All three of these groups are represented in the military-industrial complex, they either produce, manage or deploy armaments The evidence also indicates, however, that militarism extends well beyond the individuals who have an immediate stake in the armament complex and that there is some opposition to militarism in all the groups studied, including the military itself

A special effort is made in this study to examine militarism among government officials The data show that militarism in government is correlated with two factors type of position and party identification These two factors can either help socialize individuals to militarism, or they follow from the self-selection or recruitment of militarists (Mennis 1967, pp 152–53) Although our data do not allow us to determine causation, it is important to know how these data can be interpreted and what implications they may have for excessive use of force in foreign policy

The traditional American approach to preventing excesses in government is to divide and share power among a number of functionally discrete groups or institutions Huntington's (1957) model of direct civilian control over the military is an illustration of this method During the period studied, the efforts of Burt, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and later European Affairs, to overcome the more militarist views of Perle the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, is a good example of one of these institutional checks in operation (Talbott, 1984)

Although such checks are essential our data indicate that they may not be sufficient to prevent excesses in the threat or use, of force The attitudinal differences among those in various types of security positions are not sufficiently distinctive to ensure that these checks will always operate as

[7] It appears that many of the officials in this study may be what Betts (1977 p 39) describes as "politicized professionals."

lanned. There are simply too many instances in which a civilian, such as ecretary of State Shultz, will be more militaristic at least on some issues ian those over whom he is expected to exercise some constraint

The fusion of political-military responsibilities among both civilian and ilitary officials gives some credence to the balancing mechanisms proposed y Sarkesian (1981) He suggests that military and civilian officials be treated s equivalents so that the excesses in any one group can be checked by the ther Indeed, something like that seems to have occurred during the period f this study Secretary of State Shultz has been more militant than Secretary f Defense Weinberger when it came to using force against terrorists, such as ie attack on Libya, whereas Weinberger has consistently been more mili- nt than Shultz on issues dealing with strategic arms Since the Reagan ad- inistration frequently resorted to the more militarist policy, however, we ight question the reliability of this natural balancing mechanism

The data in this study show that government officials, particularly in secu- ty positions, are more prone than others to emphasize force in foreign af- irs One interpretation of this data is that militarism is more prevalent nong security specialists precisely because the willingness to use force may e one professional criterion used to recruit individuals into security posi- ons It is noteworthy that McFarlane, Poindexter, and North, all military ficers, occupied the key positions in the National Security Council during e period in which this study was conducted

The possibility that militarism is identified with professionalism is further mplicated by the role of partisanship in security policy The data show that ere is a relationship between Republican identification and militarism iven this fact, it is only natural for the president to appoint members of his vn party to political positions in the area of security policy Our data sug- st that there is also a tendency to politicize top professional positions in the curity area Although both parties may engage in this practice, it is some iat more serious under a Republican administration because of the link be- een Republican identification and militarism

To the extent that partisanship is the problem, then the obvious solution ould be to make bipartisan appointments to key security positions Indeed ie respondent from the National Security Council staff suggested on our rvey instrument that in order to "get to the root of the inherent tensions tween government departments and agencies, [you should] explore the ed for a bipartisan national security policy" Given the important role that curity policy has come to play in American politics, however, this solution ould be very difficult to implement

The whole notion that one could balance party appointments assumes me stability in partisan identity However, there is evidence that mili- ists are actually willing to change party labels in order to gain control of urity policy The Committee on the Present Danger was largely created

by Democrats who were dismayed by their own party's security policy. When President Carter refused to appoint them to security positions in his administration, many of these individuals switched parties and later obtained important security positions in the Republican administration (Sanders, 1983, pp. 7, 18).

Much of the literature on militarism places an emphasis on formal checks and balances. The data in this study indicate that as important as these safeguards may be, they will not always prove adequate to the task. We cannot depend on civilians, partisanship, bipartisanship, or even professionalism to check or balance excesses in the use, or threat, of force. In the end there is no substitute for sound judgment and constant vigilance.

References

Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Burt A. Rockman. 1981. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Akey, Denise S., ed. 1984. *Encyclopedia of Associations*. 18th ed. Detroit: Gale Research.

American Jewish Year Book. 1981. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America.

Betts, Richard K. 1977. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chittick, William O. 1986. The Three-Headed Eagle Reconsidered. Paper delivered at the Conference of the International Studies Association/South.

Cook, Betsy K. 1984. *Federal Yellow Book*. Washington, DC: Monitor.

Hadley, Arthur T. 1986. *The Straw Giant*. New York: Random House.

Holsti, Ole R., and James M. Rosenau. 1984. *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.

Huntington, Samuel. 1957. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Janowitz, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Luckham, Robin. 1984. Armament Culture. *Alternatives* 10: 1–44.

Mennis, Bernard. 1967. *An Empirical Analysis of the Background and Political Preferences of American Foreign Policy Decision Makers*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms.

Russett, Bruce M. 1974. Political Perspectives of U.S. Military and Business Elites. *Armed Forces and Society* 1: 79–108.

Russett, Bruce M., and Elizabeth C. Hanson. 1975. *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Sanders, Jerry W. 1983. *Empire at Bay: Containment Strategies and American Politics at the Crossroads*. World Policy Paper Number 25. New York: World Policy Institute.

AS Industries Inc. 1985. *SAS Users Guide: Statistics*. 5th ed. Cary, NC: SAS Institute.

arkesian, Sam C. 1981. *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism*. New York: Pergamon.

gelsbaek, Kjell. 1979. Militarism, its Dimensions and Corollaries: An Attempt at Conceptual Clarification. *Journal of Peace Research* 16: 213–29.

lbott, Strobe. 1984. *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*. New York: Knopf.

S. Catholic Mission Association. 1983. *Mission Handbook*. Washington, DC: U.S. Catholic Mission Association.

son, Samuel. 1979. *Mission Handbook: North American Protestant Ministries Overseas*. 12th ed. Monrovia, CA: Missions Advanced Research and Communications Center.

Have Gubernatorial Elections Become More Distinctive Contests?

Mark E. Tompkins
University of South Carolina

Gubernatorial and presidential elections over the period 1947–1986 are examined, using a previously reported process for decomposing partisan electoral outcomes series into their long term and short-term components. These measures are employed to examine the proposition that gubernatorial elections have become increasingly isolated from outside forces. It is found that presidential coattails appear to be declining in importance (but not only because a number of states have moved to off-year elections). Gubernatorial elections have converged around a national pattern of relatively close competition, unlike state-level presidential contests, which have shifted in favor of Republican candidates. The pattern of gubernatorial outcomes varies more from state to state, however. In specific elections, the short-term forces remain in rough equilibrium between the parties in gubernatorial contests, but not in presidential contests, where the average short-term shifts favoring one party or the other fluctuate from one election to the next. On the other hand, gubernatorial elections respond less uniformly than presidential elections to these election-specific, national-level forces. This evidence suggests that the gubernatorial election contest has, in general, become more distinctive from the national context, reflecting a more fully autonomous office.

Recent electoral history is marked by the substantial influence of new technologies on the electoral contest, new demands on the political system and a political environment in flux. It has been suggested that these changes are associated with a number of changes in elections, including a growing incumbency advantage, a changed candidate pool, and a transformed electoral process. Parties are declining and news media are growing in importance, while voters are becoming more fickle—or perhaps more moved by the whimsies of celebrity status and media image. Observers worry that elections are increasingly shaped by national forces, not by the immediate electoral contest. These and related controversies about the nature of elections are typically assessed in the context of national survey data on presidential and congressional elections and in aggregated data on congressional elections.

This national focus neglects the important arena of state elections, which has also changed substantially in recent years. The gubernatorial office pro-

*An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1985 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. I am grateful to Sarah McCally Morehouse, David Olsen and Ronald Weber, and to the referees for the *Journal*, for their helpful criticism and comments on earlier versions. The resulting analysis and its interpretation remain my sole responsibility.

vides a particularly important focus for raising these questions, since it offers a set of quasi-autonomous but highly visible contests for analysis. Candidates for an executive office are far more vulnerable to voters' judgments about policy proposals and responsibilities than legislators are, while the gubernatorial office offers us a substantial number of cases for analysis.

The important presumption of a quasi-autonomous contest underlying such arguments has not been sufficiently tested however. Governors may, after all, ride the coattails of their party's candidate for president. They may be constrained by the persisting partisan divisions in their state, allowing them few opportunities for change, or, alternatively, they may be subject to the prevailing tides of national opinion, with little opportunity to distinguish themselves within their states. Many states have acted as though these concerns were realized in electoral experience by moving to isolate their gubernatorial elections from presidential contests and by allowing governors to run for a second term as a means of enhancing their influence (Tompkins, 1987).

Have State Elections Been Nationalized? In the gubernatorial context, a number of arguments are advanced in favor of the conjecture that state elections are increasingly influenced by national electoral forces. It is suggested that the media has been increasingly nationalized—with national news and its coverage coming to dominate the individual voter's consciousness. Campaigns are increasingly dominated by sophisticated strategies and the consultants required for their execution. These consultants are nationally based, shaping their strategies toward more universalistic themes and practices (e.g., Sabato, 1981). Campaigns have grown more costly, partly as a result, and their successful execution seems to require more extensive, often nationally focused fund-raising. State political organizations have lost much of their patronage power, and direct primaries have replaced the organizational forum of party conventions, which provided them with critical resources for shaping their political environment (Bibby et al., 1983, p. 86). At the same time, organized interest groups, with national ties and interests, seem to have grown in importance (Beyle and Muchmore, 1983, p. 17). The modern world increasingly seems focused on the nation and its experience, in any event, so that states seem to be submerged in the larger forces affecting the nation as a whole. Partly as a result, the importance of the president and the presidency seems to have been magnified, so that stories about the impact of presidential fortunes on gubernatorial candidates abound.

Or, Are State Elections More Autonomous? Conflicting arguments are advanced in favor of the view that state elections are increasingly autonomous. The decline of partisanship has increasingly personalized campaigns and campaigning (e.g., Wattenberg, 1984, ch. 6), while the national party is per-

ceived as having few resources to use in attempting to influence state contests and little impact, in any event (Beyle and Muchmore, 1983, pp. 17, 47–48). Indeed, Claggett, Flanigan and Zingale (1984) fail to find any increase in the nationalization of party voting for congressional candidates over the 1842–1970 period. Moreover, Eldersveld argues that state parties have always had a limited opportunity to influence events and that there is little evidence of change (Eldersveld, 1982, p. 417). As the terms of office have improved, so have its seekers. Sabato bid "Goodbye to Goodtime Charlie," heralding the emergence of the modern governor in recent years (Sabato, 1983). The modern governor is viewed as more capable and as having more responsibilities, underscored by a growth in administrative functions (Beyle and Muchmore, 1983, p. 18). Even if presidential contests have an important impact on gubernatorial elections, term reform has successfully disentangled most governors, with only twelve states now forcing the governor to stand for election at the same time as the president (Tompkins, 1987).

In short, no uncontested prediction can be made about the role national forces play in gubernatorial elections. Moreover, there has been little systematic work on this subject, perhaps, in part, because data limitations hinder any such exploration. Feigert (1985, p. 99) argues that states are "virtually immune from Republican presidential successes," but he relies on a data base of aggregated measures of party competition, which provides only a weak test of the conjecture. Morehouse (1981, p. 75) suggests that "state politics are becoming independent from presidential politics," but she employs split state-level decisions between gubernatorial candidates and presidential candidates as evidence. Sabato (1983, pp. 139–41) relies on similar evidence for his claim that the "coattail effect" has "generally declined" in states where the governor runs on the same ticket with the president. Still these often aggregated results may conceal important national trends in the share of votes received by one party or the other, even though the outcomes suggest increasing denationalization. Selection biases may also cloud these results, since both studies report results for all states treated, not accounting for changes in the pool of states whose governors run at the same time as the president. More disaggregated studies of coattails appear in Kritzer and Eubank (1979), then Calvert and Ferejohn (1983), and Ferejohn and Calvert (1984), but they focus on congressional elections. Campbell (1986) reports evidence that presidential coattails extend to the division of seats in state legislatures, and finds that gubernatorial coattails have some independent impact. All of this evidence suggests that presidential coattails have not been lengthy, but it cannot be said to be conclusive. As a result, Weber and Parent (1985) argue that the pattern of evidence is such that "coattails" should not be ignored in "any comprehensive analysis" of state elections.

Clearly several questions are involved. (1) The most specific involves the impact of presidential coattails. Are the fortunes of gubernatorial contestants

ed to the presidential election result? More generally, the questions of iationalization" emerge have gubernatorial elections become nationalized,) either converging in the pattern of results considered across the states in ie long term, (3) becoming more stable in the national pattern of short-term ianges, or (4) becoming more uniform in their responses to immediate itional-level election year trends and issues? All these factors bear on the rger question Is the electoral contest for governor increasingly autono-ous, or is it increasingly shaped by external factors?

Analytic Approach

These questions cannot be addressed without a dynamic model of elec-oral outcomes. An analysis focused solely on specific electoral outcomes onfounds the immediate forces influencing a particular election with the nger term patterns which shape it If there is an underlying pattern of par-sanship in the state, for example, any association between votes for a presi-ential candidate and a gubernatorial candidate running at the same time ill confound the long-term relationship between partisanship and vote ioice and the more immediate tie between votes cast for one candidate and otes cast for another

Elsewhere, I have reported on a method for disaggregating gubernatorial ectoral series which attacks this problem In it, particular election results e decomposed into a "long term" component, reflecting the underlying attern of outcomes, and a "short term" component, reflecting the difference etween this pattern and the results of a particular election The long-term easure is developed by "seasonally adjusting" gubernatorial election re-ilts for surges associated with presidential or 'on-year' elections, where ie adjustment appears appropriate, then taking a twelve-year backcast mov-ig average of the previous election results, beginning with the current elec-on The proportion of votes cast for the Democratic candidate is used as a easure of the partisan division, since this measure is more robust across all iodern elections (notably those in the South) the procedure is applied to ections beginning in 1932 This adjusted moving average, or long-term omponent, thus reflects a pattern of results over a twelve-year period, hich is related to the underlying partisan division within the state [1] The

[1] This long-term component may be viewed as an indicator of partisanship but it is con-unded by the office-specific nature of the measure Alternative measures based on the pat rn of outcomes for a number of offices within a single election year confound election specific rces with the underlying (and, as a result presumably more long-term) pattern of outcomes easures based on several offices are also confounded by the problem of selecting a compa-ble slate of offices in states with short ballots This long-term component in short must be wed as an imperfect indicator, which nonetheless has more desirable properties than other ssibilities

more immediate forces associated with a particular election, the short-term component, are then measured by taking the difference between this "long term" component and the adjusted election result.[8] This measure appears to tap the relatively immediate features of the electoral contest—those connected, for example, with incumbency (Tompkins, 1984) or, in this case, with the influence of issues and candidate specific appeals, while excluding the more persistent features of the contest.

For this inquiry, we are also interested in presidential election outcomes Accordingly, twelve-year backcast moving averages are also computed for statewide presidential election outcomes (based on the percentage of the vote cast for the Democratic candidate), again beginning with the current year's result The moving average provides a comparable long-term component measurement, and the difference between this long-term component and the actual election result provides a comparable short-term component measure The separate treatment of these series allows for the possibility that the contests for the two offices are distinctive, even when the long-term pattern of outcomes is considered.

Four basic propositions are raised by these questions.

(1) Presidential Coattails When contenders for governor face the electorate at the same time as the presidential candidates, are the results of the gubernatorial election influenced by the presidential election?[9]

Apart from the ties to presidential elections, are the results of gubernatorial elections shaped by prevailing national trends? Do the trends affecting the election in one state also tend to affect those in others? As Claggett Flanigan and Zingale point out, two related issues are raised Have levels of support "converged" across constituencies (considered in the long term), and are the constituencies responding uniformly to more immediate national political forces? Their distinction evokes another possibility outcomes, considered across the nation, may vary around a stable national pattern, while these national patterns may, themselves, vary to a greater or lesser extent

[8]The adjustment is not incorporated in states with no on-year elections, of course It is also not used in five states with a small number of on-year elections, where the results of the procedure appear problematic It is worth noting that it accounts for a noticeable surge in on-year participation but has far less consequence for the measures of electoral results The procedure explained more fully in Tompkins (1984 appendix 1, also 1980)

[9]Strictly speaking, presidential election outcomes may be influenced by the presence of particularly strong (or weak) gubernatorial candidates, as in Ferejohn and Calvert's (1984) assessment of bidirectional causation between president and House candidates—assessment of the more complex problem presupposes significant correlations between the two results (which Morehouse and Sabato argue against) and requires a substantial model of presidential election outcomes at the state level (which has not been developed in the literature at this writing Accordingly, assessment of this possibility will not be pursued in this analysis

(2) Long-Term Convergence If convergence is taking place, then the "long term components" of electoral outcomes should vary less over time around a national mean (which reflects the typical outcome for that office)

(3) National Short-Term Stability Whatever happens in the long term, the state-level contests may nonetheless vary in the short term One question involves the stability of overall results, considered across the nation If the overall pattern of changes in outcomes revolves around some relatively stable balance between the parties nationally, then state-specific forces are important, but national forces have little impact on the contests, suggesting that these remain in some rough equilibrium. If this pattern is less stable, the average level of change should vary from one election to the next, which would imply that national forces are playing a more important role in shaping the contests within specific states

(4) Short-Term Response Uniformity If responses to political forces are increasingly nationalized, then the variability of the "short term component" of various constituencies' electoral outcomes about the national average response should be reduced, reflecting an increasingly uniform pattern of response to the national forces acting on any election These might reflect national issues, the influence of the national party (or the president), other factors expressed at the national level, or simply more homogeneous election outcomes On the other hand, if this variability increased, it would suggest that the features of a particular contest, such as candidates' personal appeals and state-specific issues, had become more important in shaping outcomes

In the analysis which follows, the 48 contiguous states are taken as the unit of analysis over the period 1948–1986 The two components of the electoral series of Democratic vote shares are examined for the relevant presidential and gubernatorial elections, each measured at the state level (employing data reaching back to 1932, as in earlier reports)

Analysis and Findings

Presidential Coattails?

Are the results of gubernatorial elections influenced by a coincident presidential contest? One approach to this problem employs a calculation of split decisions (e.g Morehouse, 1981, Sabato, 1983, Wattenberg, 1984, p 19, note the reference in the latter to Burnham's work): Where the candidate of one party wins one office, but the candidate of the other party wins another office, it presumably reflects the distinctiveness of the two contests. If state and national party organizations, their images, or voters' loyalty to them, are

FIGURE 1 A

PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS IN GUBERNATORIAL RACES





FIGURE 1 B

NUMBER OF STATES ELECTING GOVERNOR IN ON-YEAR ELECTIONS



istinctive objects of evaluation, then this strategy will prove inadequate ,ince split outcomes may simply reflect these differences) If voter loyalties re closely divided, and races for one office prove more volatile than the ther, then a relatively large change at the margin may be required to shift ,oth offices simultaneously

The method employed here, using the short-term component of the overll result, should provide more telling evidence for the presence of presiential coattails The simple correlation between the short-term component f the presidential election and the short-term component of the guberatorial election is r = 254 (computed over 227 coincident elections), sugesting that presidential coattails have a modest impact on gubernatorial lections The distinctive methodology has some impact, but even the unadisted Democratic vote shares are only modestly correlated (r = 225)

In figure 1 A, where the correlation between short-term components f the two series are reported for each election, two features appear note-vorthy One is that there is noteworthy variation in the role played by presilential coattails from one election to another and that these variations appear o have grown in importance in the latter portion of the period under study 'he 1964 election, then the 1976 election (with a resurgent Democratic arty), are associated with substantial coattail forces In 1980, a modest "reerse coattail" appears, suggesting that candidate Reagan's appeals (and the ncumbent president's lack of appeal) did not carry over to Republican guberatorial candidates By 1984, a modest linkage reasserts itself Apart from his variation, the influence of coattails appears to be diminishing as a general natter—the correlation coefficients of the 1950s (449 and 436, respectively) ave generally declined, except for the dramas of 1964 and 1976 After 1964, nly the 1976 election involved a correlation greater than r = + 3

These results are clouded by the impact of gubernatorial term reform As igure 1 B indicates, the number of states electing their governor in the "onear" has declined dramatically—in 1988 only twelve states will be electing eir chief executive during the presidential election cycle Since the pool of ·s has narrowed substantially, an assessment of the impact of these reıs is undertaken elsewhere (Tompkins, 1987)

onalization

gubernatorial elections are influenced by presidential coattails, then 'r national forces may also shape the outcomes of a particular contest hypotheses of long-term convergence, short-term stability, and short-ı response uniformity involve an assessment of the pattern of two compots of electoral outcomes across the states

ong-Term Convergence If gubernatorial elections are becoming "nalized," the variability of the pattern of election outcomes will decline.

FIGURE 2 A

LONG-TERM CONVERGENCE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS





FIGURE 2 B

LONG-TERM CONVERGENCE IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS



To assess this proposition, we can examine the value of the interstate mean of the long-term component of the partisan outcomes (which taps the underlying pattern in electoral outcomes) and, more importantly, a measure of dispersion about these means for the period under investigation If convergence occurs, the standard deviations should decline, reflecting reduced interstate variation around the national pattern

To assess the possibility of convergence, the average value of the long-term component, and the dispersion (measured by the standard deviation), of *presidential* elections is displayed in figure 2 A The figure shows the clear decline of Democratic fortunes over the 36 years considered (as the mean state value of the long-term component declines.) It also shows some modest convergence across the states, as the standard deviation of the long-term component by state declines from 8 75% in 1948 to 5 27% in 1984

In figure 2 B, comparable figures for *gubernatorial* elections are reported (based on the average result over the four years of a presidential term, for each state, thereby focusing on the presidential term and state as the unit of analysis) The figure shows that there has been little change in the average of the long-term component, across the 48 states, but that the dispersion has decreased dramatically, as the standard deviation declines from 19 26% in 1948 to 7 17% in 1984 In short, there has been substantial convergence in gubernatorial election results, in the sense that the differences between the long-term pattern of election results in the states have narrowed substantially, which has, of course, been reported elsewhere

At the same time, states remain more varied in the pattern of gubernatorial results than they do in the pattern of presidential election results Moreover, when we correlate the four-year long-term component average for gubernatorial elections with the long-term component for presidential elections, we find that the relationship is nearly zero (for example, for the full four-year period 1980–1983, r = 10)[4] In short, in important ways gubernatorial contests remain distinctive from presidential contests

National Stability Stability in the average level of short-term change suggests a "nationalization" in the sense of a national equilibrium between the parties, which is expressed in a balance among the changes encountered in specific state-level contests To assess this, we can examine the national average of the short-term changes associated with each state contest, does the average level of change remain constant (evidencing increasing national stability), or does it vary over time? Since the evidence for this proposition is closely related to the evidence for the uniformity of responses, which involves the variations about these national patterns, the two are considered together, in figures 3 A and 3 B

[4]It is important to remember that interstate variability has been reduced, however which means that the interstate correlation is restricted to this limited range and therefore attenuated

FIGURE 3 A

STABILITY AND RESPONSE UNIFORMITY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS





FIGURE 3 B

STABILITY AND RESPONSE UNIFORMITY IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS



Short-Term Response Uniformity. Nationalization would also imply that ie electoral contests reflected greater uniformity in their immediate re- ›onse to specific, election-year forces This uniformity should be reflected ı lowered variability in short-term changes across the participating states, om the national average Accordingly, we can examine variability around ie national average of the short-term component of each series as a measure ; the uniformity of states' responses to election-specific forces

In figure 3 A, the average level and the variability of state's short-term ›sponses in *presidential* elections is displayed Expected swings in the for- ines of the parties appear, favoring the Republicans in 1948 (compared with ie earlier elections involving Roosevelt), 1952, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1980 and 984 The regional variations in their fortunes produce noteworthy increases ı variability in 1948, 1964 and 1976 Still, the overall picture is one of rela- vely modest variability around the central (national) tendency In addition, ie average level of short-term change in the states has diminished substan- ally in the last three elections (down to −1 60% in 1980 and −2% in 1984, ›wer than in any election from 1948–1972) This suggests greater stability, nd a continuing pattern of relatively uniform responses to these national lections (interrupted in some noteworthy cases) Nonetheless, this proce- ure is not directly comparable to evidence based on other offices cast over ›nger time periods (e g Claggett, Flanigan and Zingale, 1984)

Figure 3 B displays the average level and the variability of the four-year verage (computed within a presidential term) for each state's gubernatorial lection Two quite distinctive patterns appear the average of these short ›rm components is nearly zero[5] (implying that the factors which would be ttributable to national level but immediate electoral forces have little over- ll impact on gubernatorial elections) On the other hand the variability of iese short-term forces in gubernatorial elections is growing It is, to be ure, at its peak in 1964 and 1972, but it is generally greater in recent years han it was decades ago In short, gubernatorial election outcomes are in- reasingly subject to state-level forces, but they also reflect a relatively stable alance between the parties considered across the nation

Further, presidential elections reflect a less stable balance between the rties across the nation than do gubernatorial contests, but short-term re- ılts vary more than the presidential results from state to state For ex- nple, for 1980–1983, the standard deviation of presidential results (5 94%) smaller than the gubernatorial results (7 61%), and in the 1984–1986 riod, the difference grows (presidential S D = 2 14% Gubernatorial D = 9 64%)

It is largest in 1964 at 3 65% a level smaller (in absolute value) than the average level for sidential elections in all years save for 1960, 1980 1984 and just barely larger than the value the 1976 presidential contest (3 63%) In five terms the average gubernatorial change is ller than it is in any presidential case and in three more the gubernatorial average is ller in absolute value than it is in all but one presidential case

THE SALIENCE OF THE GUBERNATORIAL OFFICE

The preceding propositions all have implications for our perspective on the gubernatorial office more generally. Sabato argues that the candidates for the office are increasingly capable and experienced, while I have argued that most gubernatorial term reform efforts have been aimed at separating the state's chief executive from the national arena (by moving elections to the off year) and "buffering" the incumbent to some degree (Tompkins, 1987). These arguments suggest that the salience of the office to the electorate should have grown as a result. Has it?

We have seen that the influence of presidential coattails appears to have declined in the modern era. The increasing separation of gubernatorial elections may, however, have played some role in this decline.

Gubernatorial contests have converged around a pattern of relatively close national competition. The balance continues to favor Democratic candidates modestly, but the range of variation is noticeably diminished. The balance in presidential contests has shifted in favor of Republican candidates, but the decline in variation is less clear and dramatic. The pattern of change remains relatively constant for gubernatorial contests, but it continues to vary for state presidential contests. On the other hand, responses to gubernatorial contests appear to have become less uniform, while presidential contests vary in the uniformity of their responses in specific years (although a case can be made for greater uniformity interrupted by unusual elections). The fact that Democratic party fortunes have remained strong at the gubernatorial level, resisting the increases in support for Republican presidential candidates, provides further evidence that the gubernatorial contest has become more completely isolated from national elections.

In a variety of respects, the electorate voting for governor must be viewed as responding differently from the electorate voting for president. It is apparent that we are slow in gathering evidence which would allow us to understand these differences better and to assess their implications.

REFERENCES

Beyle, Thad L., and Lynn R. Muchmore, eds. 1983. *Being Governor: The View from the Office*. Durham, NC: Duke Press Policy Studies. In particular, "Governors in the American Federal System," ch. 1, and "The Governor as Party Leader," ch. 4.

Bibby, John F., Cornelius P. Cotter, James L. Gibson, and Robert J. Huckshorn. 1983. "Parties in State Politics." In *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, eds. Boston: Little, Brown.

Calvert, Randall L., and John A. Ferejohn. 1983. "Coattail Voting in Recent Presidential Elections." *American Political Science Review*, 77: 407–19.

Campbell, James E. 1986. "Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections." *American Political Science Review*, 80: 46–63.

Claggett, William, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale. 1984. "Nationalization of the American Electorate." *American Political Science Review*, 78: 77–91.

lersveld, Samuel J 1982. *Political Parties in American Society* New York Basic Books

gert, Frank B 1985 Postwar Changes in State Party Competition *Publius The Journal of Federalism*, 15, Winter 99–112

ejohn, John A , and Randall L Calvert 1984 Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 127–46

tzer, Herbert M , and Robert B Eubank 1979 Presidential Coattails Revisited Partisanship and Incumbency Effects *American Journal of Political Science*, 23 615–26

rehouse, Sarah McCally 1981 *State Politics, Parties and Policy* New York Holt Rinehart and Winston

bato, Larry J 1981 *The Rise of Political Consultants New Ways of Winning Elections* New York Basic Books

—— 1983 *Goodbye to Good-time Charlie The American Governorship Transformed* 2d ed Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly Press

npkins, Mark E 1980 Sense and Non-Sense in the Analysis of Electoral Series Revised version of a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta

—— 1984 The Electoral Fortunes of Gubernatorial Incumbents 1947–1981 *The Journal of Politics*, 46 520–43

—— August 1987 Changing the Terms Gubernatorial Term Reform in the Modern Era Revised version of a paper first delivered at the 1981 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association

ttenberg, Martin P 1984 *The Decline of American Political Parties 1952–1980* Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

ber Ronald E and T Wayne Parent 1985 National Versus State Effects on State and Local Elections Paper delivered at the 1985 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association

Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review

Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina

The past two decades have witnessed an increasing number of empirical analyses of the votes of judges in the lower federal courts (e.g., Richardson and Vines, 1970, Carp and Rowland, 1983, Atkins, 1972, Goldman, 1966, Goldman, 1975, Vines, 1964, Dolbeare, 1969, Johnson, 1979, Kritzer, 1978, Howard, 1981, Songer, 1982, Walker, 1972). Although great variety in the methods employed may be found in these empirical studies, virtually all of them share one approach common to Supreme Court studies: their analysis of judges' decisions and votes is restricted to data obtained from the published opinions of the courts.

While the focus of empirical analysis has been on the published opinions of courts, a large number of cases are decided without an accompanying published opinion. The phenomenon is most evident in the district courts where fewer than 10% of cases terminated by court action have published opinions (Vestal, 1970). A vast body of data on the outputs of the federal courts therefore remains largely unexplored by public law scholars. As Carp and Rowland suggest, "We know very little about the contents or impact of these many unreported opinions" (1983, p. 17). The present study attempts to shed some light on the similarities and differences between published and unpublished district judge decisions by analyzing the treatment of each on appeal.

The primary outlet for the publication of federal trial court opinions is the *Federal Supplement* compiled by West Publishing Company. The rates of opinion publication vary widely among judges. A study of opinion writing in 1968 uncovered one district judge who had 36 opinions published during the year, while at the other extreme 30 judges published four or fewer opinions (Vestal, 1970, pp. 676–77).

The criterion for publication decisions of federal judges was stated succinctly by the Judicial Conference in 1964: "The judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential value." It is assumed that district and appeals court judges are called upon to decide many cases that require only the

lear extention of a prior rule of law Such cases are assumed to have little or o precedential value, contribute little to the development of public policy, nd to involve no significant exercise of discretion by federal judges (Fra, 977) Proponents of limited publication plans argue that nonpublication of uch trivial cases will make it easier for the judges to accomplish their imporint work This argument for selective publication is based on three prem,es The first assumption is that there is a clear distinction between "law naking" opinions and "dispute-settling" opinions Dispute-settling opinions o not deserve publication because they apply uncontroversial rules of law) ordinary cases and have no value to the public The second premise for mited publication is that the cost of full publication is excessive The third nd most crucial premise of the argument is that judges can determine be-)re writing an opinion whether it will be a 'law making" opinion or simply a dispute-settling" one (Reynolds and Richman 1979 p 808)

Most studies which are based on the analyses of lower court decisions • g , Richardson and Vines, 1970 Goldman 1975, Songer 1982) apparently ssume that these criteria for nonpublication can be accepted at face value ecause they do not even bother to offer any justification for limiting their nalyses to published opinions Carp and Rowland, who offer one of the few houghtful discussions of the limitations of reliance on published opinions re nevertheless satisfied that their data derived from the *Federal Supplement* represents the overwhelming majority of the more important policymaking ases that came before the lower federal judiciary (1983 p 18)

One recent study of nonpublication in the Fifth Circuit appears to support his traditional reliance of scholars on published opinions According to the uthor of the study "The conclusion is reached that the judges of the Fifth Circuit were in fact able to discern which civil appeals could be summarily ffirmed without great concern for the effect that the omission of those opinons would have on the development of case law Moreover, they suggest hat the instances of decisions not published which have precedential value are probably quite infrequent' (Shuchman and Gelfand 1980 p 202) No imilar studies have examined unpublished district court decisions

But not everyone shares these assessments Reynolds and Richman mainain that from the beginning there has been some skepticism concerning judges ability to distinguish correctly between dispute-settling and awmaking opinions ' Their own subjective evaluation of 100 unpublished Fourth Circuit opinions led them to conclude that 'several appear to merit ublication' (1978, pp 1192–93) Vestal concurs, noting that without a oubt, some written opinions which might contribute much to the corpus ris are not sent in by the writing judge and are not picked up by the pubshing companies" (1966, pp 188–89) This skepticism is further supported y Fra (1977), whose examination of 150 unpublished orders of the Seventh

Circuit uncovered twenty-four important cases in the areas of first amendment rights, criminal procedure and race discrimination which she concluded met the criteria for publication.

Research Design

A significant part of the justification for the nonpublication of opinions is that most decisions have little or no precedential value, contribute little to the development of public policy, and involve no significant exercise of discretion by federal judges. The literature reviewed above raises suspicions about the validity of these assumptions, but these suspicions have never been subjected to systematic empirical testing. Comprehensive examination of unpublished district decisions is difficult because the data are not readily available. Collection of even a random sample of such decisions would be quite expensive. Consequently, the present study proceeds to test the implications of the justification for nonpublication with data from published sources.

The principal set of data to be analyzed was derived from the published decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals. Substantial numbers of the decisions of the courts of appeals originate in cases in the district courts decided without published opinions.[1] The availability of these cases permits an indirect test of the assumptions about the characteristics of unpublished decisions of the district courts. The rationale typically provided for nonpublication leads to the prediction that all district court cases without published opinions should be what Goldman (1969) has labeled "consensual" cases.[2]

Goldman (1969) and Songer (1982) argue that such consensual cases in the courts of appeals are characterized by the unanimous affirmation of the decision of the district court. Therefore, the rationale provided for nonpublication leads to the prediction that district court decisions without published opinions which are appealed to the courts of appeals should be consensual cases which are unanimously affirmed by the courts of appeals. This expectation leads to several specific hypotheses.

First, it should be expected that the overwhelming majority of the decisions of the courts of appeals which result in either the reversal of the district court or in a divided vote among the appeals court brethren originated in cases accompanied by published opinions in the district court.

[1]In two recent years examined, 1976 and 1981, 81.3% of a random sample of decisions reported in the *Federal Reporter* were appeals from decisions of the district court without published opinions.

[2]The fact that such cases were appealed should not negate the assumption that they are consensual. In fact, Richardson and Vines (1970, pp. 118–19) argue that consensual appeals are the "bread and butter" of the caseload of the courts of appeal.

Second, it should be rare for a district decision without opinion to be reversed or to engender dissent in the courts of appeals A minimum expectation is that the rates of reversal and dissent in cases appealed from unpublished district decisions should be low relative to the rates in decisions on appeals originating in district court decisions with published opinions

Third, if district cases without published opinions are truly consensual, then even judges with different values and backgrounds should reach the same decision Therefore it is hypothesized that there will be no significant differences in the votes of Republican and Democratic judges on the courts of appeals in cases without published district court opinions

Fourth, cases decided with full opinion by the Supreme Court are assumed to have precedential value, policy significance, and (usually) to present the justices with a choice situation that permits substantial discretion in decision making Consequently, it may be hypothesized that few cases originating in the district courts which are decided with full opinion by the Supreme Court will have come from district court decisions without opinions

In order to test the first three hypotheses, a random sample of 150 criminal cases per calendar year was collected from the *Federal Reporter* for the years 1976 through 1984 (total N = 1650) Criminal cases were defined to include appeals of convictions challenges to procedural rulings made by the district judge, and appeals of denials of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus An examination of all published antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals during 1976 and 1977 and a random sample of 134 labor cases decided during the same years were used to supplement the main analysis of criminal decisions

The appeals court data used to test these hypotheses were collected as part of a larger study on judicial impact The types of cases and the years included in analysis were determined by the needs of that larger study However, there are no obvious reasons to anticipate that data on district court decisions in any recent year are more or less likely to provide support for the hypotheses than in any other year Moreover when the criminal decisions were analyzed separately for each successive two-year period in the sample, no significant changes over time were evident

The three case types chosen for analysis are not a representative sample of all district decisions [3] Therefore, one cannot generalize with confidence the findings below to all opinion writing decisions by district judges Each of the three case types is of more general political interest than many of the routine

[3] Most empirical analyses of the published decisions of district judges are also limited to a small number of non-random case types (e g Carp and Rowland 1983 Richardson and Vines 1970, Giles and Walker, 1975) In part this is due to the infeasibility of analyzing all case types and to the widespread perception among political scientists that many district court case types are not politically relevant

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF REVERSALS AND NONUNANIMOUS DECISIONS OF COURTS OF APPEALS WHICH WERE APPEALED FROM FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT DECISIONS

A. Reversals

Policy Area	Proportion from Federal Supplement	N
Criminal	8.2%	510
Antitrust	35.6%	45
Labor	25.0%	44

B. Nonunanimous Decisions

Policy Area	Proportion from Federal Supplement	N
Criminal	4.6%	174
Antitrust	45.0%	20
Labor	27.3%	11

decisions of district courts, and each has been the focus of previous empirical analyses of published federal court decisions.

The fourth hypothesis was tested by examining all the decisions announced with full opinion by the Supreme Court during its 1980 term. The year 1980 was randomly selected from among the years included in the analysis of *Federal Reporter* decisions. Each Supreme Court opinion was read to determine whether the case originated in the district court and if so to determine whether an opinion was published in either the *Federal Supplement* or the *Federal Rules Decisions*. *Shepard's United States Citations* were also consulted to determine whether the district decision was reported in a published opinion.

Findings

The first test of the prediction that the unpublished decisions of the district court should be consensual cases involved the examination of the origin of appeals court decisions which reversed the district court or which were decided with dissent. The rationale for nonpublication led to the hypothesis that an overwhelming proportion of such appeals court decisions would be appeals from district court decisions with opinions published in the *Federal Supplement*. However, the data in table 1 dramatically disconfirm these expectations.

The proportion of reversals in which the original district decision was published was less than 40% in all three policy areas examined. The findings are most striking for criminal appeals where only 8.2% of all district decisions reversed had been published. The smaller samples of labor and antitrust decisions confirm the findings derived from criminal appeals.

Similar results are obtained from the analysis of dissent in the courts of appeals. Only 4.6% of all criminal appeals with published dissent originated in the published decisions of the district courts. Larger proportions of the nonunanimous labor and antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals were derived from cases with published opinions below, but neither reached even 50%.

The second hypothesis derived from the traditional assumptions about the nature of cases resulting in nonpublication of opinions is that the reversal rates and the dissent rates in appeals from decisions published in the *Federal Supplements* should be significantly higher than the corresponding rates in appeals from unpublished decisions.

The data in table 2 provide very limited support for the hypothesis. For criminal cases, the 39.6% reversal rate in appeals from published decisions was significantly higher than the 22.3% rate noted in appeals from decisions without published opinions. However, even this lower reversal rate for appeals from unpublished decisions is substantially higher than would be expected from traditional assumptions about unpublished decisions. More-

TABLE 2

DIFFERENCES IN REVERSAL RATES AND DISSENT RATES IN APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS WITH AND WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS

A. Reversal Rate By Court of Appeals

Policy Area	District Decisions: No Opinion	N	District Decisions: In Federal Supplement	N	Z	Significance
Criminal	23.3%	(554)	39.6%	96	2.13	P < .02
Antitrust	33.3%	87	34.0%	47	0.08	NS
Labor	34.7%	95	37.9%	29	0.05	NS

B. Proportion of Appeals Court Decisions With Dissent

Policy Area	District Decisions: No Opinion	N	District Decisions: In Federal Supplement	N	Z	Significance
Criminal	10.7%	(554)	9.3%	96	0.44	NS
Antitrust	12.6%	(87)	19.1%	47	1.41	NS
Labor	8.4%	(95)	10.3%	29	0.32	NS

TABLE 3

PARTY DIFFERENCES IN VOTES OF APPEALS COURT JUDGES IN APPEALS FROM DISTRICT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS

Policy Area	Party Differences—Proportion of Votes Supporting the Liberal Position					
	Democrats	(N)	Republican	(N)	Z	Significanc
Criminal	23 6%	(2040)	14 2%	(2595)	8 55	P < 001
Antitrust	28 6%	(98)	19 0%	(163)	1 81	P < 04
Labor	38 6%	(101)	31 0%	(184)	1 30	NS

over, the differences between the reversal rates in published and unpu lished decisions of the district courts in antitrust and labor cases are triv and statistically insignificant For both case types this absence of differenc due to the unexpectedly high rate of reversals of appeals from unpublish decisions The findings for dissent rates offer even less support for the h pothesis. While the dissent rate in appeals from published decisions of an trust and labor cases in the district courts is higher than the rate in appe from unpublished decisions, it is lower in criminal cases More importan none of the differences reach generally accepted standards for statistical s nificance It might also be noted that in all three case types, the dissent r on appeals from unpublished decisions is higher than the dissent rate of a proximately 6% for all published opinions of the courts of appeals Overall thus appears that the proportion of nonconsensual appeals from unpublish decisions of the district courts is roughly similar to the proportion from de sions with published opinions

The third hypothesis is based on the assumption that in cases which a truly consensual, the background characteristics and attitudes of the judg should be unrelated to their decisions The specific hypothesis tested v that there should be no party differences present in appeals court voting cases lacking published opinions in the district courts

The data do not support the hypothesis Only in labor cases were the d ferences between the votes of Democratic and Republican judges stat tically insignificant And even in labor cases, the observed differences we in the direction which would be predicted if the judges perceived a suffici choice situation to enable them to vote their policy preferences (i e , Dem crats were more pro-labor) On appeals from both the criminal and antitr decisions of district judges which were not accompanied by a publish opinion, the voting tendencies of Democratic and Republican appeals co judges were divergent to a significant degree In both categories of cases t Democratic judges more frequently supported the liberal position (i e pr defendant in criminal cases and pro-plaintiff in antitrust cases) These diffe ences parallel earlier findings (Goldman, 1975) on the relationship of party

the voting decisions of appeals court judges in nonconsensual cases These data suggest that in a significant number of the district cases without published opinions the judges faced a choice situation which permitted them discretion to make decisions consistent with their personal values and policy preferences

The final hypothesis to be tested was that almost all Supreme Court cases which originated in the district courts and which were settled with full opinions (either signed or per curiam) by the Supreme Court came from district decisions with published opinions Analysis of all decisions of the Supreme Court during its 1980 term with opinions published in *United States Reports* fails to support this hypothesis Of the 88 cases receiving full Supreme Court treatment which originated in the district court, district judges published opinions to explain and justify their original decision in only 44 That is to say, in exactly half of the district court cases which, at least in the opinion of Supreme Court justices, had the greatest precedential significance and importance for public policy, the district judge originally hearing the case failed to publish an opinion

Conclusions

The indirect methods utilized above to analyze the nature of cases which resulted in decisions without published opinions by the district courts have some obvious limitation The cases analyzed do not represent a random sample of all decisions without published opinions All decisions which were not appealed and all appeals which were decided by the courts of appeals without published opinions were excluded from analysis Such cases may possibly differ in significant and systematic ways from the cases examined in the present study Nevertheless the findings presented above clearly indicate that there are a substantial number of unpublished district court decisions which cannot be assumed to be trivial or consensual cases A substantial number of such unpublished decisions appear to have presented the district judges with potential law making opportunities in which their values could shape the outcomes

These findings further suggest that either district judges are unable to consistently make the distinction required in the official criteria for publication, different judges (e g , appellate vs trial) have different perceptions of the law making potential of cases, or district judges deliberately refuse to write opinions in some cases which they perceive to be nontrivial Judges might decide not to write an opinion for any one of a number of reasons including lack of time caused by heavy caseloads a desire to evade a disliked precedent a desire to prevent an intra-circuit conflict from being recognized, or as part of a strategy to avoid reversal

The findings reported above suggest the need for a systematic study of the

unpublished decisions of federal courts At a minimum we need to understand why judges publish opinions in some nonconsensual cases but not in others If there are systematic reasons why certain types of nonconsensual cases do not result in published opinions, then some of the previous research based on published opinions mav be fatally flawed For example, it may be speculated that most judges who make a noncompliant decision will decline to publish in order to reduce the visibility of their defiance If so, the conclusion of most studies of the impact of the Supreme Court on the lower federal courts may be seriously misleading On the other hand, if the decision not to write an opinion is made in a haphazard, ad hoc fashion in response to caseload pressures, published opinions may still contain a representative sample of all nonconsensual cases

Although the focus of the present study was district court decisions without published opinions, it is certainly reasonable in light of these findings to question the untested assumption that unpublished appeals court decisions represent trivial and consensual cases Therefore, future research might also examine unpublished decisions of both the district and appeals courts to determine (1) the relative frequency with which cases resulting in published and unpublished decisions presented judges with a choice situation permitting the judge's values to exert a decisive influence on the outcome, (2) whether there are systematic differences in the decisional trends among judges in published and unpublished decisions, (3) whether the frequency of publication and the nature of the decisions published varies with changing environmental factors (e g , do judges publish fewer decisions in cases likely to evoke hostile public reaction) and (4) whether there is evidence that the decision to publish or not is related to strategic concern with the likelihood of reversal (e g , do liberal judges write opinions to justify an increasing proportion of their liberal decisions as the court above becomes more conservative)

References

Atkins Burton M 1972 Decision making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals *Western Political Quarterly* 25 626 42

Carp, Robert A and C K Rowland 1983 *Policy Making and Politics on the Federal District Courts* Knoxville University of Tennessee Press

Dolbeare Kenneth M 1969 The Federal District Courts and Urban Public Policy An Exploratory Study In Joel B Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus eds *Frontiers of Judicial Research* New York John Wiley

Fra Pamela 1977 A Snake in the Path of the Law The Seventh Circuits Non Publication Rule *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 39 309 40

Giles Micheal W , and Thomas G Walker 1975 Judicial Policy Making and Southern School Segregation *Journal of Politics* 37 917 36

Goldman Sheldon 1966 Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals 1961 1964 *American Political Science Review* 60 370 85

——— 1969 Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges: A Comment on Joel Grossman's Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions. *Journal of Politics*, 31: 214–22.

——— 1975 Voting Behavior in the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited. *American Political Science Review*, 69: 491-506.

Howard, J. Woodford 1981 *Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, Charles A. 1979 Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A Quantitative Explanation. *American Journal of Political Science* 23: 792–804.

Kritzer, Herbert M. 1978 Political Correlates of the Behavior of Federal District Judges: A Best Case Analysis. *Journal of Politics* 40: 25–58.

Reynolds, William L., and William M. Richman 1978 The Non-Precedential Precedent: Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals. *Columbia Law Review* 78: 1167–1208.

——— 1979 Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. *Duke Law Journal* 1979: 807-41.

Richardson, Richard J., and Kenneth N. Vines 1970 *The Politics of Federal Courts: Lower Courts in the United States.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Shuchman, Philip, and Alan Gelfand 1980 The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"? *Emory Law Journal* 29: 194–230.

Songer, Donald R. 1982 Consensual and Nonconsensual Decision in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals. *American Journal of Political Science* 26: 225–39.

Vestal, Allan D. 1966 Reported Federal District Court Opinions: Fiscal 1962. *Houston Law Review* 4: 185–220.

——— 1970 Publishing District Court Opinions in the 1970s. *Loyola Law Review* 27: 673-86.

Vines, Kenneth N. 1964 Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South. *Journal of Politics* 26: 338–57.

Walker, Thomas G. 1972 A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making. *Law and Society Review* 6: 645–49.

Review Essay

Political Science Confronts the Book: Recent Work on Scripture and Politics

Clarke E. Cochran*
Texas Tech University

Secular culture drives a wedge between political philosophy and scripture. For medieval thought the Bible had been a primary source for doctrines, principles, and examples to be woven into the fabric of political speculation. Theorists in the modern period also felt compelled to engage the scriptures. Machiavelli tells his readers to study Moses; Hobbes devoted two books of *Leviathan* to political theology; Locke refuted the scriptural arguments of Filmer and employed biblical examples to discuss conquest and tyranny. Yet incorporation of Scripture in political thinking largely died out by the twentieth century in academic political science and political philosophy.

A series of recent works may signal an end to the divorce of political philosophy and scripture. In 1979 David C. Rapoport published his challenge to Weber's concept of charisma through a reexamination of the leadership of Moses.[1] Steven Brams (1980) considered game theory and the Bible the following year.[2] The year 1980 also saw the beginning of a long series of articles on the Book of Genesis by Robert Sacks (1980–1984). The leadership of Moses and its significance for the theory of political leadership were ex-

*I am grateful to Texas Tech University for a Faculty Development Leave and to the Earhart Foundation for a Fellowship Research Grant that made this research possible during the 1986–87 academic year. I wish to express my thanks also to Stephen J. Brams, Daniel J. Elazar, W. Carey McWilliams, Hubert Morken, David C. Rapoport, Neal Riemer, Robert Sacks, Glenn Tinder, and Aaron Wildavsky for most helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] My concern here is with works directly interpreting the Bible. Other important work has been done by those seeking inspiration from biblical concepts or exploring the use of the Bible by various political movements or thinkers. Particularly significant in this vein is the work of Daniel J. Elazar (Elazar and Kincaid 1980; Elazar 1983; Elazar and Cohen 1985) on the idea of covenant and on the Jewish political tradition. See also Riemer (1984) and McWilliams (1984). Of course, scripture scholars and theologians within various religious traditions have done significant work on the Bible and politics in recent years, but these also are not part of my concern. They have, with the possible recent exception of liberation theology, little impact or salience in political science. There has been an encouraging burst of new interest in religious themes in modern political theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The literature is too lengthy to list here.

[2] Brams (1985) contains a chapter on the book of Esther, and Brams (1983) uses the Bible extensively but does not focus on political problems.

plored by Aaron Wildavsky (1984). Michael Walzer (1985) entered the field most recently with a book on Exodus and revolutionary literature.

Moreover, whether inspired by these works or independently generated, other publications also point to a modest revival. *Political Theory* published three articles touching on Scripture and politics in its May 1986 issue. The 1986 APSA meeting featured a paper on liberation theology by Mark Roelofs and a panel on politics in the book of Esther sponsored by the ASPA's newly formed Religion and Politics Section, which had sponsored a panel on power and authority in the Bible at the 1985 meeting.[3]

So there seems to be a burst of interest in biblical political themes. What is not clear is why this revival is occurring, especially now, and what it promises for improving our understanding of politics or Scripture. This paper attempts to answer these questions. The particulars of these interpretations of the Bible will receive less attention than the question of why such diverse authors have now turned their attention to the Bible, the methods of interpretation employed, their confrontation with the Bible as a religious book (which raises the issue of God and faith in political philosophy), and the promise of this confrontation.

Political Science and the Bible

Steven Brams and Biblical Games

Brams contends that game theory can bring to interpretation of biblical materials a discipline not otherwise available. It allows the application of "modern scientific theory" to "classical humanistic material," facilitating a more rigorous analysis of the actions of biblical figures (Brams, 1980, p. xi). Puzzling behavior, divine and human, becomes explicable when subjected to the critical tools of game theory.

Biblical Games proceeds by summarizing numerous stories from the Hebrew Scriptures, then modeling each by constructing simplified representations of the actors' strategic situations, that is, the choices available to them and the interaction of the consequences of these choices. Brams primarily employs "noncooperative" theory, making use of matrix and game tree forms of games, principally 2 × 2 and 2 × 4. He assumes preferences for each actor, attaching ordinal ranks to them. He uses no mathematical calculations. After each game is laid out in this fashion, Brams compares the actual choices made by the actors with the choices a perfectly rational game player would make, assessing both the rationality of the biblical actors and the applicability and validity of the game theoretic models themselves.

In most of the stories God is an actor involved in games with humans.

[3]Wolin (1986), Brown (1986), and Shulman (1986), Roelofs (1986).

Brams treats Him as an actor like human actors, appraising His rationality and ability as a game player.[4] The games analyzed include the stories of creation, the temptation of Eve, the punishment of Adam and Eve, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, the conflict between Jacob and Esau, various stories from the Exodus narration, Solomon's decision concerning the child claimed by two mothers, and Saul's conflict with David.

In most cases the actors, including God, behave as rational game players would in the same situation. Most games have a rational outcome, often with a dominant strategy for one player. These conclusions confirm the applicability of game theory to humanistic materials like the Scriptures and generate insight into the Bible itself. God is revealed to be fundamentally concerned for His reputation and the future games He will play with human beings. Brams concludes that biblical characters do play games, for game theory provides a natural explanation of the events, an explanation often more natural than the standard types of biblical commentary. Additionally, he argues, game theory brings rigor, fruitfulness, and parsimony to analysis of the Bible.

Brams succeeds modestly in his goal of demonstrating game theory's fecundity for biblical analysis. Though the games quickly begin to sound very much alike, the game matrices reveal elements of rationality obscured in other interpretations. Clearly the impression of sameness is partly a result of admittedly highly simplified game analysis; perhaps more complex applications would reveal differences in the games. Brams accepts that there are many legitimate interpretations of each story; his is not privileged.

Robert Sacks and the Book of Genesis

Sacks's title is misleading and too modest. His work begins as a detailed commentary on Genesis; it soon becomes a commentary on all of the historical books of the Hebrew Scriptures, particularly the Torah but also the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, and important passages of the prophets. Sacks examines Genesis in light of the other books in order to read its meaning and to establish the fundamental coherence of the Bible from Genesis through Kings.

That coherence lies in the author/editor's account of how the recalcitrance of the earth, including man, frustrates God's original plan for creation. God begins by requiring the highest from creation but has to be satisfied with the highest possible. The Bible is the search by God and men for a way to reconcile God's high vision with human limitation. God grants His people a "New Way" through such compromises as law and kingship in order to "lift" human

[4] Brams and the other authors specifically employ the masculine, capitalized pronoun. Since the biblical authors were male, the authors use the masculine pronoun to refer to them. I shall follow both conventions.

desires to a higher level According to Sacks, the book of Genesis tells the story of this lifting, but only by constant references backward upon itself and forward to other incidents in the history of Israel. The constant interweaving of past, present, and future, and the constant forgetting and remembering that such weaving creates, are the material of Genesis, which cannot be understood apart from the other books.

For example, Sacks argues that a central theme of Genesis is the struggle against primordial chaos, symbolized by the Giants, by the Philistines and, in part, by the "wild ass," Ishmael. The Bible teaches that this chaos must be faced constantly It cannot be eliminated. The need to sacrifice, which plays so large a role in Scripture, is related to this struggle and to the transformation of human desires that must take place for the highest possible to be realized The great political symbol of the successful struggle is the Jubilee Year The Covenant, with the Jubilee as a central component, establishes political order within the chaos of human affairs, thereby abandoning the way into which all were born for a New Way, a way which is still God's accommodation to human imperfection but at a higher level As carriers of the New Way, Abraham must learn about justice, Isaac about how to sustain the New Way through generations without great leaders, and Jacob that prophets, priests, and kings will be needed Genesis tells, through constant reference to the future history of their descendants, how they learned these lessons The profound wisdom of the author of Genesis was to see as a whole the greatness and the danger of the New Way

Sack's interpretation of Genesis and the other books to which he finds it deeply united is both enlightening and disturbing It produces, as do all highly idiosyncratic interpretations of the Bible, profound insight into particular passages and their connections as well as doubts about the coherence of the whole interpretation

Aaron Wildavsky and Moses

Wildavsky firmly situates his book in the leadership literature of political science He intends it to be a contribution both to that literature and to the interpretation of the Bible Social science studies of leadership, he asserts (1984, p 1), are focused on the character of leaders and on the micropolitics of leadership situations "Only the Bible, however, is fundamentally concerned with the macropolitics of regimes—the grand politics that guide and shape the behavior of leaders and followers " Wildavsky argues that the context of macropolitics is critical to understanding leadership, for different kinds of regimes call forth different kinds of leaders Thus *The Nursing Father* has two primary theses first, that understanding of the Torah may be enhanced by treating it as a teaching on political leadership and, second, that understanding leadership may be improved by considering it as an integral

part of different political regimes Both purposes are to be achieved by interpreting the events in Exodus through Deuteronomy as successive challenges to leadership by four different types of regimes, termed by Wildavsky slavery, anarchy, equity, and hierarchy Like Sacks, Wildavsky delivers more than he promises, for he does not limit himself to the Mosaic stories alone, but includes rich interpretations of Genesis, as well as a meditation on the survival of the Jewish people

Wildavsky, like Brams and Sacks, fully considers God an actor in the biblical drama Human leaders cannot contravene the will of God to advance their own interests without His intervention They learn that leadership is difficult and uncertain, for the essence of Mosaic leadership is "the going forth to serve people without knowing exactly where it will lead or how it will end" (Wildavsky, 1984, p 49) Moses must learn different types of leadership A passive leader in the experience of slavery, he must learn as the regime changes to "be a leader without being told directly what to do or how to do it" (Wildavsky, 1984, p 65) Next he must learn the limitations of leadership, avoiding the dangers of permanent revolution and the temptation of special authority outside the people Finally, he must learn to pass on leadership without becoming a permanent leader According to Wildavsky, Moses never entirely overcomes error he remains human learning from his mistakes, as God does from His Moses hardest task is to allow his people the same freedom

Wildavsky writes a profound meditation on the identification between a leader, his people and God opening an avenue to the paradoxical depths of leadership "Moses teaches, then what he himself has learned the ultimate act of leadership is to bind oneself to a people who cannot be expected to reciprocate (Wildavsky, 1984 p 179)

Walzer and Exodus

Exodus and Revolution is about an idea of great presence in Western political thought, the idea of deliverance from suffering and oppression this-worldly redemption liberation and revolution (Walzer 1985 p ix) Walzer explains why revolutionaries endlessly retell and reinvent the story by moving back and forth between the Bible (and its commentaries) and the historical literature (tracts, treatises pamphlets slogans and songs) of radical politics

Exodus, according to Walzer, is particularly relevant to the oppression of a people, as opposed to individual injustice Since the Jews in Egypt were in bondage as a people, their liberation was a collective one The Exodus story, moreover, is the great alternative to apocalyptic, millennial thought Exodus politics is radical, but not messianic for the promised land is not perfect and must itself be open to redemption There is a tension in the idea of the prom-

ised land, for the Bible develops significant parallels between it and the land of slavery, Egypt, teaching that liberation is needed even in the land of promise. For God's promise is always forgotten. The milk and honey of Palestine correspond to the fleshpots of Egypt. The story of Exodus is always realistic; it knows failure, backsliding, and grumbling. Redemption does not come instantaneously, but through God's people marching through the wilderness to make a better place in the world.

Finally, Walzer argues that Exodus exhibits the eternal appeal of radical and democratic politics. God makes the Covenant at Sinai with each person and with the whole people, who must accept it and renew it continually. The Covenant fashions a politics of commitment, instruction, prophetic complaint, and public recommitment, an achievement founded on the moral competence of ordinary people. The new land falls short of its promise as long as its inhabitants fail their promise to be a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.

These are the great lessons of the Exodus story, and they are the reason for its lasting appeal and its prominent place in the radical, revolutionary literature of modern times. Like Wildavsky, Walzer furnishes a marvelously insightful account of the great themes of the Exodus, especially new discernment about the paradoxical tension in the promised land itself. Moreover, Walzer generates insight into freedom. Freedom in Exodus is not a goal, but a precondition for the choice of the Covenant. Exodus requires a "discipline of freedom" (Walzer, 1985, p. 53), for the meaning of deliverance from bondage is not freedom from limits. Rather, it is the deeper freedom of a priestly people and a holy nation. Thus, the great crisis of Exodus is the story of the Golden Calf, for it represents the desire to end disciplined freedom and return to Egypt's similitude of freedom (Walzer, 1985, pp. 52–61 and ch. 3).

CONVERGENCES

Each of these books places itself in a secular context, establishing them as appropriate to political science and political theory and distinguishing them from political theology and from biblical studies within denominational traditions. Brams's application of game theory is in strict accord with its canons and his primary purpose is to illustrate and develop that secular, scientific tool. According to Wildavsky, the subject of *The Nursing Father* is the "secular subject of leadership." Indeed, for Wildavsky, the secular meaning of the Exodus story is critical not only to contemporary leadership theory, but also to Moses' achievement itself. "Only when Moses frees himself from [divine intervention] . . . and accepts the human need to wrestle with history can he begin to free his people from the moral and mental fetters of slavery" (1984, pp. 18, 181). Divine intervention, he contends, diminishes as the Bible proceeds.

Walzer goes quite far in the secular direction, for he analyzes not only a religious book, but also revolutionary writings inspired by the book, many of them fashioned by religious figures. Walzer contends that even "within the sacred history of the Exodus, they discovered a vivid and realistic secular history that helped them to understand their own political activity I shall repeat that discovery I don't mean to disparage the sacred, only to explore the secular" (1985, p x)

Despite these statements and the undoubtedly substantially secular purpose of the writers, especially Brams, Walzer, and Wildavsky, each of these works is written by an author of Jewish heritage about a book or books of the Hebrew Bible This fact is neither coincidental nor separable from the methods or findings of their research

Brams represents something of an exception to this generalization, although only a partial one All but Brams include explicitly autobiographical passages accounting for the genesis of their works Sacks was inspired by *Shabbat* discussions with Leo Strauss in Jerusalem in the early 1960s (1980, p 8 29) Walzer resolved to write about Exodus during an inspiring sermon by a black preacher in a southern church during the Civil Rights Movement (1985, pp xi 3-4) But he also traces the book's inspiration to his reading from the account of the Golden Calf during his bar mitzvah Wildavsky traces his inspiration to a sabbath service reading on the Golden Calf, but also to the campus disruptions of the 1960s (1984 pp 3 4)

Moreover, each author, including Brams places more interpretive emphasis on rabbinic sources commentaries and stories than on conventional biblical scholarship, religious or secular Indeed, Walzer (1985 p 103) and Wildavsky (1984, p 165) confess to giving Jewish accounts of their material despite their strong insistence that they are writing secular works

To one degree or another each of the four works is more akin to meditation or commentary on a religious text than to traditional political science scholarship The authors share a profound respect and love for the scriptural texts and their teaching Wildavsky displays the greatest familiarity with the scholarly literature of biblical studies The other authors use it little or not at all Instead their common method is to read the biblical text itself carefully and in relation to other biblical texts and to traditional Jewish commentaries and stories in order to tease out the Bible's significance Interpretation of the meaning of the text rather than form source or historical criticism is central To one degree or another modern biblical criticism is explicitly rejected in favor of imaginative, meditative respectful insight

Sacks, Walzer, and Wildavsky believe historical and form criticism have fragmented the text, interfering with its meaning and power In opposition to the form critics who find multiple sometimes ill-fitting strands throughout the Torah, they consider it a remarkably coherent narrative" (Walzer 1985, p 8, see Wildavsky, 1984, pp 11-16) Sacks disdains the scholarly

apparatus in favor of a more Straussian method of casting about for possibilities in the text to reach the mind of the author and his intentions (1980, pp. 30–32). As the analysis proceeds, he becomes more critical of scholars who divide and fragment the wonderful unity of the account not only in Genesis, but also throughout the Torah.

Each work succeeds in breaking through the crust of scholarship that has formed around the Old Testament itself and each of its passages to reveal direct moral, political, and religious experience. The "rabbinic" method they hold in common greatly facilitates this accomplishment, an achievement at least as significant as the insight gleaned about the secular topics providing the original justification for going to the Bible.

Conclusions

Why the Turn to Scripture?

The first and simplest explanation is that the Bible is a rich text that has always inspired interpretation. This massive understatement should not obscure the simple truth that the Bible represents a fertile and recently unplowed field for scholarly analysis within political science. In short, one might go to the Bible as to any other classic text, religious, literary, or philosophic, because one can make a contribution to its study. In Wildavsky's case, for example, the contribution is a new insight into Mosaic leadership and its place in Israel's history. This perspective gives unity to apparently conflicting accounts, such as the two accounts in Samuel of the institution of Kingship. These accounts reveal that the Bible is of two minds, approving both of equity and hierarchy and unable to settle on one regime or the other as unqualifiedly better. They must exist together in tension. This theme, Wildavsky contends (1984, pp. 214–16 and appendix), runs throughout Scripture and remains in Judaism today. This perspective sheds new light on the Bible itself as a classic text. Thus, at the most simple level, there is a revival of interest in the Bible just as there are periodic revivals of interest in other classic texts and authors. Scholars decide that received interpretations are lacking and that better ones are available.

Deeper than this reason, however, is the motivation to interpret a classic because the text itself has a contribution to make to a perennial political concern. In times of terrorism or revolution, for example, when the legitimacy of violence grips public attention, classic texts containing profound treatments of these subjects become newly relevant. Walzer shows how the incident of the Golden Calf (Exodus 32) figures prominently in the history of political thought about the legitimacy of violence (1985, esp. pp. 61–70). As Eldon J. Eisenach puts it, "Some of the boldest and most original political argument formulated by Hobbes and Locke was in their interpretation of the

Bible" (1981, p 10) Classic works of religion, art, or philosophy are public inheritances of a culture that have the power to disclose and transform truths in a way that transcends ordinary argument (Tracy, 1986) Walzer (1987) argues that social criticism is primarily *interpretation* of a tradition within which one lives and to which one is committed His principal example is the prophet Amos The prophet's radical interpretation of a fundamental cultural text leads the way out of conventional ideological traps

Thus the return to Scripture may reflect the terrible political dilemmas of the contemporary world and the realization that the ideologies at hand for confronting them are empty These ideologies have mutated and inbred so completely that they have lost touch with ordinary life with personal and political reality Scholars perceive a need to return to sources directly in touch with fundamental realities such as violence oppression and liberation leadership, courage, and sacrifice More than this they sense the urgency to return to sources evincing a wisdom beyond ideology The Bible is such a source For example, Rapoport (1979) returns to the Bible to examine the original inspiration for Weber's concept of charisma Reforming this fundamental social science concept requires return to its original scriptural source

No doubt current fears about religious and moral decline also contribute to reexamination of scripture Moreover radical weakening of the authority of science produces a search for new (and old) sources of authority Disintegration of the social contract leads to renegotiations of the compact and thus to texts central to the negotiation of the original contract The political movements of the 1960s specifically mentioned by Walzer and Wildavsky are the contexts for all these biblical interpretations

Finally the growing intensity of the debate over the roles of church and state demands delving below their institutional surfaces to the meanings of religion (even deeper of faith) and of political power in human life Roelofs examination (1986) of liberation theology and its scriptural sources leads him to reflect on the poverty of institutional and jurisdictional debate on church and state The relation between faith and political action is far more dynamic than an institutional discussion can capture Political theorists going to the Scriptures discover not the impossibility of separating church and state but of separating public and private religiosity

The Literature of Biblical Scholarship

For the most part, as I have shown these works ignore or criticize most contemporary biblical scholarship particularly source criticism Whether despite or because of this attitude toward biblical studies, the four works principally discussed succeed relatively well in explicating the text It is not clear, however that further scholarship within political science or political theory can proceed without attention to this literature

Wildavsky himself, though critical of this literature ("I am not in favor eliminating profound problems by attributing them to editorial errors" does use it And Wildavsky's approach to interpretation suggests the need be aware of this literature's findings He says, "The standards [for interpr ing the Bible] are the same as for any intellectual inquiry—cohesivene persuasiveness, inclusiveness in subsuming sufficient episodes under a giv theory, and power in leading to more interesting future investigatior (1984, p. 9) It would be presumptuous to argue that the field of bibli scholarship itself does not meet these tests of scholarship Moreover, the clusiveness criterion suggests that consulting the scholarly literature on va ous biblical episodes might help to suggest similarities among them a allow the interpreter to link seemingly disparate episodes

Consulting the literature might also indicate that apparently original fin ings are not entirely so Walzer, for example, clearly distinguishes vario meanings of covenant, various kinds of covenants, and different forms of pression But the concept of different forms of covenant, their meaning a importance, as well as the notion of different forms of bondage, is standard the field of biblical literature Consulting that literature could save int pretative time and solidify personal discoveries To the extent that int pretative methods depend on the discovery of the intentions of the auth of particular books, familiarity with biblical criticism is essential How is possible to understand an author's purpose or intention without understan ing the historical context of his writing, his sources, and the forms of writi available to him with their conventions? These are the very things discuss in historical, form, and source criticism

The would-be interpreter of the Bible faces a paradox The Bible is r much read generally, so the text to be interpreted will be largely unfamil to the audience At the same time, there is a massive, specialized literatu on every part of the Bible The would-be commentator may likely drov in it before discovering new political meaning Under these twin circu stances, summary of the text and the critics may well exhaust the space av able How can these obstacles be overcome? The specialized scholarsh does tend to fragment the text and make holistic vision difficult A key, I b lieve, is to become familiar enough with the scholarship to deflect easy a erroneous assumptions about authorship and historicity, to diminish t number of mistakes and false leads, and to suggest possible lines of int pretation, but not to become enmeshed in the interpretative web The oth key is to bring to the texts one's own active engagement and, therefore, on own theoretical perspective Dependence on commentaries lulls one to slee

The purpose of interpretation should govern use of conventional schol

[5] Wildavsky, 1984, p 157 see also pp 212–13 Sacks (1980–1984) is even more critical of th scholarship Rapoport (1979), on the other hand relies exclusively on it, finding the Rabbi sources problematic for political scientists

ship. First, an in-depth, scholarly interpretation of a specific section of the Bible should consider the scholarly literature on the section in the same way that a similar interpretation of, say, Plato requires consultation with the conventional platonic scholarship On the other hand, a meditation on the meaning of a book or theme in the Bible may not require such extensive consultation with the literature, although there must be enough familiarity to prevent egregious errors The balancing act is not simple, the distinction between scholarly interpretation and meditation not easy, and the province of meditation on a text not as established in political science as in biblical studies, but I believe that the distinction is a useful one

The kind of literary analysis advocated by Robert Alter (1981) represents a creative balance Alter is highly critical of the conventional scholarship for fragmenting the text and assuming a primitive mentality in the biblical authors and redactors He stresses the importance for literary analysis of uncovering narrative unity even in seeming digressions and interpolations Yet he demonstrates his own familiarity with the critical literature and does not advocate bypassing it The literary approach is not identical to meditation or to the methods of political philosophy, but each can make a defensible accommodation with conventional biblical scholarship

God and Faith

Political scientists confronting the Bible must confront God and take Him seriously As Brams argues, biblical interpreters cannot neatly separate natural from supernatural events and stick only to the former "In any biblical analysis or interpretation, then, God must be given His due He is the central character in the Bible" (1980, p 4) All of the political scientists discussed give God His due, yet they properly insist that there are legitimate reasons of secular scholarship and politics to go to the Bible However modernity and its scholarship isolate God in revelation and faith Secular scholarship provides no access to that realm To enter is to introduce bias into scholarly inquiry Or so the conventions of the discipline have it How can a political scientist interpret the actions of God and still remain faithful to the canons of secular, academic scholarship?

I suspect that this dilemma has played a large role in the neglect of the Bible by recent political theory It is not easy to see one's way through it though the route taken by Walzer Sacks, and Wildavsky is apt They confront and discuss openly their own religious motivations and inspirations The Bible precludes separating private belief from public scholarship Both scholarship and faith are callings in a deep sense and no calling can be isolated from other vocations No successful interpretation can dispense with rational understanding of human action and motivation, but no successful interpretation of the Bible can explain God away Neutrality with any great

text is a chimera, for it demands commitment and respect, as I argue below. This is particularly true of great texts recounting God's relationship with human beings. Therefore, interpreters must give up illusions of neutrality, but not the responsibility to themselves, their audience, scholarship, and the text itself. These responsibilities allow the successful interpreter to be aware of, to acknowledge, and to hold openly the tensions created by a scholarly account of God's political action.

In the same way that God cannot be explained away, the political theorist cannot be neutral or agnostic to the truth of Scripture. For the truth of a text is the only justification for taking it seriously. But there are different levels of truth, and the secular scholar must distinguish and balance them carefully. The scholar cannot be neutral to the existential truth of scripture, its correspondence to and insight into the human condition and the human experience of transcendent meaning. Such neutrality would cut off the interpreter's access to deep levels of political teaching. On the other hand, the secular interpreter must be neutral to doctrinal claims about the nature of God contained within a text and particularly in sectarian interpretations of the text. The doctrinal truth of a text and its experiential truth are not the same. Lack of neutrality on doctrinal truth cuts off the interpreter from the discipline and vitiates the effort to discover experiential truth.

How to address God is intimately linked to the issue of how to treat faith. The Bible's actors display faith (among other qualities) and its God demands faith (among other responses). Faith is not the primary focus of any of the works discussed here. Brams, however, does pay considerable attention to it, and his account of faith is among the least satisfactory aspects of *Biblical Games*. He argues, for example, that the games of sacrifice played by Abraham and Jephthah show there is a trade-off between faith and rationality: "The more rational the calculations, the less need for 'blind faith in God,' and vice versa" (1980, ch. 3, also p. 172). In this light, argues Brams, rational interpretations of the Bible are no more farfetched than faith interpretations; rational interpretations, in fact, are more credible. Yet Brams's idea of faith is shallow, appearing even to contradict his notion of an inverse relationship between faith and reason. "Being faithful means having preferences such that one's rational strategy is independent of the strategy of other players—that is, one's own values completely determine how one acts" (Brams, 1980, p. 37, see also p. 43). Such a definition may correspond to faith in oneself, but it does not plumb the depths of biblical faith in God. In the Bible, faith is not preference, and it is not lodged in oneself. Brams's definition misses the element of trust and loyalty essential to the idea of faith. Faith in another means that one trusts the other to act in promised ways and that one is loyal to the other even when such loyalty seems misplaced, as in the case of God's command to sacrifice Isaac.

Faith-testing and faith-building, on the part of Moses and the people, are

major themes of Exodus according to Wildavsky, for leadership is related to such faith. He stresses Moses' doubts, errors, weakness, and lack of faith. Moses must learn to be a leader, and God must learn to deal with Moses; each must learn faith in the other. Wildavsky understands that faith is not blind obedience: "Faith, in Judaism, means accepting the moral mission as one's own, not just following orders from above" (1984, p. 44; see also pp. 37–38 and 85ff.). This gets it right. Faith often goes against one's preferences. Abraham decidedly prefers not to sacrifice Isaac; his faith overrides that preference, not because he has learned to follow orders from God, but because he trusts that God's mission is the right one, even if it appears obscure and contrary to his own. Despite Wildavsky's profound treatment of faith's centrality to Mosaic leadership (1984, pp. 68, 120), faith is absent from his concluding chapter on leadership theory. Is faith (what kind? in whom or what?) a necessary component of secular political leadership? The answer should be affirmative if Moses is a teacher of leadership. What are the implications of an affirmative answer?

Brams argues that one possible interpretation revealed by game theory is that Abraham, though Isaac's life is his paramount concern, makes the rational calculation that God will prevent the consummation of the sacrifice.[*] This interpretation mirrors Wildavsky's argument that Abraham knows that if Isaac is allowed to die, God's promise to make him a great nation cannot be kept. Abraham puts his faith on the knife-edge of God's promise. On the other hand, Brams argues, Abraham may prefer blind obedience to God over Isaac's life. He makes a rational ordering of his preferences. Either way, Brams contends, Abraham's faith appears as a rational strategy based on his preferences.

This argument is creative, but I believe that it misses the essence of faith. "Preference" and "rational calculation" are simply too weak to describe the agonizing dilemmas confronted by Abraham, Moses, and other biblical actors. Wildavsky's image of the knife-edge captures more of the experience of faith. Admittedly, Genesis does not say that Abraham agonized over the decision, nor does it say that he calculated. But it is difficult to imagine anything other than an anguished father given the context of the story. Moreover, Genesis does describe numerous incidents of Abraham's calculation (for example, his deceptions of foreigners), and it tends to remain silent when he trusts God in the face of a mysterious command (for example, when he leaves Ur). Thus, I believe, the context of faith in the Hebrew Scriptures goes beyond preference to commitment, trust, and loyalty. These indeed may be interpreted in terms of calculation, but something is lost in the translation. It is precisely the story form of the Torah that allows it to communicate truths and experiences incapable of formulation in propositional, calculative terms. The Bible

[*] In a personal communication, May 11, 1987.

echoes Plato's decision to tell stories. Stories express his insight that philosophy ultimately must step beyond rational persuasion. One must tell the story of a life and invite others to follow.

Faith is not just a substantive topic in the biblical text The text also demands trust that it has something essential to say about human existence Despite the necessity of probing the Bible's secular, political teaching, interpreters must inevitably trust the text, even love, appreciate, and admire it They must try empathically to get inside the text/author, as they must for any interpretation of a classic text Interpreters cannot be neutral or cold to the words of the author

I believe that sympathetic understanding is essential for any classic text, but even more so for the Bible For the Bible is not a systematic work of politics or political theory by a single author, but a collection of books by many authors with various intentions. Moreover, it contains elements that are fantastic and miraculous, repulsive and exalted, sublime and ridiculous So the requirement of trust in and loyalty to the text is extremely difficult without faith in a reward for the effort to go below the surface, to touch the unity, and to allow oneself to be pulled inside the text and its author's experience of reality Note that the authors, especially Wildavsky, Sacks, Walzer Rapoport, and Wolin, do not feel free to criticize the political ideas of the Bible as they might the ideas of, say, Locke, Mill, or Plato Though they criticize particular biblical actors, they stress what the biblical text has to teach That is, for them the Bible has a certain authority *for secular political life* that other texts lack. For them it touches direct political experience and reflects on that experience in ways that other books do not The Bible reflects what it means to be called out of oppression into freedom, what it means to lead a recalcitrant, "stiff-necked" people This attitude to the Bible is not a violation of the canons of secular scholarship, but a necessity for sympathetically reading the text

Promise and Potential

What parts of Scripture are appropriate for analysis? Are any parts more appropriate than others? I have already commented briefly on the fact that the works considered here deal with the Hebrew Bible Indeed, all focus principally on the first five books, the Torah The Jewish background of the authors certainly has something to do with this fact Yet the narrative structure of these books plays a vital role as well The Torah, plus the primarily historical books of Judges, Joshua, Samuel, Kings, and the minor historical books, tell stories of leadership, crisis, revolution, war, founding, intrigue and power. These subjects are particularly appropriate material for political scientists, and it is not surprising that they have received first consideration

The Wisdom literature and the prophetic books are less amenable to analysis by political scientists, for they are more poetic (though occasionally

commonplace), spiritual, pious, and transcendent. Political theorists might find them more suitable for analysis, for these books concern the highest things, including justice, power, the relationship between politics and eternity, and the meaning of human suffering. The prophetic material is as challenging and potentially fruitful for political philosophy as Plato, Rousseau, or Nietzsche. But it takes courage and insight for political theorists not committed to writing within a particular religious perspective to tackle this material.[7]

The same is true of those who would approach the New Testament. Though it certainly contains substantial narrative material, its direct political content superficially looks minimal. Moreover, while the Hebrew Scriptures are common ground for both Jewish and Christian heritages, the New Testament clearly is not. Confronting it carries the additional possibility of involving the interpreter in denominational squabbles that can only detract from scholarly analysis. Yet in secular history the words of the New Testament have inspired sublime political thinking and action. It makes most significant claims about the relationship between human action and transcendent meaning, and it calls for revolutionary changes in human behavior, public and private. This paper cannot settle how political theorists or political scientists might approach the New Testament. But it seems worth pointing out that one political leader, at least, made most creative use of themes from both scriptures without either minimizing or falling prey to sectarian disputes. Abraham Lincoln appealed profoundly to the justice of God and the meaning of suffering to interpret the deepest public significance of the national experience of Civil War. Both canons of the Bible contain a wealth of material for political philosophy.[8] Their return to political science is welcome. Perhaps the works reviewed here will point the way to a much-needed new form of civic speech in which the Bible once again can appear in public.

References

Alter, Robert. 1981. *The Art of Biblical Narrative.* New York: Basic.

Brams, Stephen J. 1980. *Biblical Games: A Strategic Analysis of Stories in the Old Testament.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

———. 1983. *Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game Theoretic Implica*

[7] Walzer (1985, pp. 90–98) does consider briefly the prophets as covenant teachers, and he sees (1987, ch. 3) Amos as an interpretative social critic. Eric Voegelin, among the past generation of political philosophers, has confronted the prophetic material (1956) and some of the New Testament materials (1974).

[8] For example, the New Testament picture of Jesus as a leader displays numerous parallels with Wildavsky's interpretation of Mosaic leadership. Both learn as they go; both leave their followers to make their own ways. Yet Moses clearly stays behind in death (though his Book goes with the people). Jesus, however, promises to go ahead of his followers. In what ways do these similarities and differences affect the structure of Jewish and Christian political theory and behavior?

tions of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility New York Springer-Verlag

——— 1985 *Rational Politics Decisions, Games, and Strategy* Washington CQ Press

Brown, Norman O 1986 Philosophy and Prophecy Spinoza's Hermeneutics *Political Theory,* 14 195–213

Eisenach, Eldon J 1981 *Two Worlds of Liberalism Religion and Politics in Hobbes, Locke, and Mill* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Elazar, Daniel J , ed 1983 *Kinship and Consent The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses* Washington University Press of America

Elazar, Daniel J and John Kincaid, eds 1980 Covenant Polity, and Constitution *Publius,* 10 1–186

Elazar, Daniel J , and Stuart Cohen 1985 *The Jewish Polity Jewish Political Organization from Biblical Times to the Present* Bloomington Indiana University Press

McWilliams, Wilson Carey 1984 The Bible in the American Political Tradition In Myron J Aronoff ed , *Political Anthropology, Vol III Religion and Politics* New Brunswick, NJ Transaction Books

Rapoport David C 1979 Moses Charisma, and Covenant *Western Political Quarterly* 32 123–43

Riemer Neal 1984 *The Future of the Democratic Revolution Toward a More Prophetic Politics* New York Praeger

Roelofs, H Mark 1986 Liberation Theology The Recovery of Biblical Political Radicalism Paper presented at the APSA annual meeting Washington DC

Sacks Robert 1980–1984 The Lion and the Ass A Commentary on the Book of Genesis *Interpretation* 8 29–101 9 1–81 10 67 112 273 317 11 87-128 249 74 353 82 12 49–82, 141–92

Shulman George M 1986 The Myth of Cain Fratricide City Building and Politics *Political Theory* 14 215–38

Tracy David 1986 Particular Classics Public Religion and the American Tradition In Robin W Lovin ed *Religion and American Public Life Interpretations and Explorations* New York Paulist Press

Voegelin Eric 1956 *Order and History Vol 1 Israel and Revelation* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

——— 1974 *Order and History Vol 4 The Ecumenic Age* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

Walzer Michael 1985 *Exodus and Revolution* New York Basic

——— 1987 *Interpretation and Social Criticism* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Wildavsky Aaron 1984 *The Nursing Father Moses as a Political Leader* University AL University of Alabama Press

Wolin Sheldon 1986 Contract and Birthright *Political Theory* 14 179–93

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Cecil L. Eubanks, Editor

The Founders' Constitution. Edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. xiii, 3,250 in five volumes. $300.00.)

1787: Drafting the U.S. Constitution. Edited by Wilbourn E. Benton. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987. Pp. ix, 1559 in two volumes. $85.00.)

One of the longest lasting benefits of the bicentennial focus on the origins of the American Constitution will be the expanded and improved store of documentary materials available to scholars. The two collections under consideration here will be foremost among these new resources. *The Founders' Constitution*, in five volumes and over 3,500 pages, is a remarkably rich collection of original materials bearing on the intellectual origins, development, and early interpretation of the American Constitution. The collection includes "a sample of intelligence focused on the problems of establishing and maintaining free popular government" drawn from two centuries between the beginnings under the early Stuarts and the end of the Marshall era (vol. 1, p. xiii). Volume 1 is given over to an investigation of some of the major themes that structured the discussion and understanding of early American constitutionalism; volumes 2 through 4 provide materials relating to each article and clause of the original Constitution, while the fifth volume treats the first twelve (Founding Era) amendments.

The great strength of this set is that it draws together and presents in historical sequence a selection from among the most important materials framing the thoughts and arguments of the Founders as they conceived, constructed, and refined the American Constitution. Volume 1 treats a series of eighteen major themes, including but not limited to the popular basis of political authority, the right to revolution, republican government, union, energetic government, separation of powers, representation, rights, equality, and property. In addition, Kurland and Lerner provide a brief but valuable introductory essay for each topic (unfortunately these essays only occur in volume one). Few of the selections really surprise; almost all are familiar, even common. The power of their presentation derives from the editors' careful collection of materials to show both common themes and alternative formulations or understandings of each major topic. For example, twenty-two selections (twenty-five pages of double column text) on the "Separation

of Powers" are offered, beginning with observations of Clement Walker (1648), Marchamont Nedham (1656), Locke (1689), Trenchard (1698), Montesquieu (1748), Blackstone (1765), and concluding with a series of prominent Americans of the Founding and early national period, including Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and others.

The key to the selections on separation of power is to see the historically available understandings of the nature, meaning, and requisites of separation of power change and develop in the century leading up to American independence. Clement Walker's understanding in 1640 involved a simple separation of "functions," legislative, governing (executive), and judicative. Nedham and Trenchard argued forcefully that both "functions" and "persons" must be separate if liberty is to survive. With Montesquieu, separation begins to give way to the need for each power to check or balance the other. Blackstone carries the development forward to the point that, as Kurland and Lerner point out, "balance is to be sought not in total separation but in the artful involvement and mutual interactions of the several branches of the civil polity" (vol. 1, p. 312). From these sources and traditions Madison and others of the Founders drew the understanding that a pure and simple separation was insufficient if not buttressed by the "auxiliary precautions" represented by the complex series of checks and balances that were included in the Constitution.

In volumes two through four Kurland and Lerner divide the Constitution into its major articles and sections and present historical selections upon which the Founders drew, selections which highlight the Founders' understanding of what they were trying to achieve in particular facets of the constitution-making process, and selections from criticisms of and commentaries on the Constitution drawn from the ratification debates and the early national period. For example, article one, section one, which reads "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives," is elucidated by ten selections. Two of these are classics, selections from Locke's *Second Treatise* and Blackstone's *Commentaries*; five are from the Founding decade, with selections from Adams' *Thoughts on Government*, the Federal Convention, and the New York and North Carolina ratifying conventions; two are Supreme Court cases and the last is a selection from James Kent's 1826 *Commentaries*.

The collection proceeds "clause by clause" through the Constitution and its first twelve amendments. In the middle volumes the selections narrow somewhat, drawing less heavily on traditional background theorists such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, and much more heavily on the early state constitutions, the debates of the Federal Convention, the *Federalist* and the anti-federalist opposition, and Supreme Court decisions and legal commentary from the early national period. The selections show both the

precedents upon which the Founders drew, what they hoped to achieve with the language finally chosen for inclusion in the Constitution, what problems and oppressions opponents feared might result from the language, and how surviving Founders evaluated and contributed to this dialogue over the Constitution and its meaning.

Unfortunately, reaction to *The Founders' Constitution* has, to some degree, been contaminated by the argument between liberals and conservatives over how to, or even whether one can, divine the meaning or the "original intent" of the Constitution. The current liberal criticism of this and similar efforts is to the effect that our modern Constitution (if not the "Founders' Constitution," can only be understood with reference to recent Supreme Court decisions in such areas as affirmative action, freedom of choice, and the right to privacy, and to changing public mores and expectations. To offer only late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century understandings of what this nation's intellectual foundations mean is inherently and unrealistically limiting and conservative. Kurland and Lerner clearly anticipated this criticism and attempted to deal with it in their general introduction. They propose to "present arguments of yesteryear that are worthy of reexamination and reconsideration today either because they were weighty then or because they are still telling or might yet lead to further reflection on the problems under discussion" (vol. 1, p. xiii). I think that Kurland and Lerner are right that these materials can be appreciated on their own merit and for their inherent interest. In addition, I think that few of our fellow citizens will be intellectually damaged or otherwise led astray by the contents of this set. Persons likely to delve into a five-volume set entitled *The Founders' Constitution* probably know that discussion and debate over the meaning of the Constitution and its several provisions continued after 1835. Those who do not know this, or who are sufficiently rudderless as to be misled concerning the current meaning of our Constitution by the contents of these volumes, can be expected to give such a set particularly wide berth.

Wilbourn E. Benton, in *1787: Drafting the U.S. Constitution*, has provided us with a new look at notes taken by members of the Constitutional Convention. As Professor Benton indicates, previous editions of the Convention's debates, whether of Madison's notes alone or of all of the notes taken by Madison and the other delegates, have been organized on a session-by-session basis. In this traditional approach, as used by Max Farrand, Gaillard Hunt, Charles Tansill, and others, the debates of a given day, whether they deal with a single topic or range across a variety of issues, appear together. In Farrand's classic *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, for instance, the materials for each day begin with the official *Journal* entry including the roll-call votes, if any, taken that day, followed by Madison's fairly extensive notes of the day's debates, followed by any notes that might have been taken by other delegates on that day.

Benton's concern is that the standard session-by-session presentation of the notes makes it difficult to follow the development of particular issues or principles in the Convention's work. Benton's strategy is to disassemble the debates and reassemble them as annotations to each article, section, and often each clause of the finished Constitution. Benton explains that he "decided to annotate the original U.S. Constitution—consisting of the Preamble and seven articles—with the notes of the delegates on the convention debates, so that the provisions of the Constitution would evolve chronologically from May 14 to September 17, 1787, or from the beginning to the end of the convention" (vol. 1, p. 10). This approach, Benton contends, allows one to "concentrate on the evolution" of a particular provision of the Constitution from its first formulation early in the convention to its final form as the convention neared adjournment.

Benton is certainly correct to argue that this constitutional annotation approach aids in following or understanding the development of thinking in the convention on certain issues. Farrand's four-volume collection is now classic and will not be displaced. Nonetheless, Benton's annotation approach does allow one to trace the development of particular clauses without the need to wade through material that, for an immediate and narrow purpose, might be extraneous. This is particularly the case when interest focuses on secondary issues, or minor clauses of the Constitution, where debate might have been both limited and scattered over the entire course of the convention. The article-by-article organization also gives a clearer picture of the convention's concentration of time and attention on Article 1, dealing with the structure and powers of the legislature, when compared with the other six articles making up the rest of the Constitution. Benton presents over 900 pages of debate on Article 1 and less than half that on Articles 2 through 7.

Care must be taken with regard to Benton's approach, however, because context and previous decisions often affected the way delegates thought about other issues. First, opinions held and decisions made in the convention, even when apparently on quite diverse issues, were not independent of each other. For example, early in the convention, delegates from the small states were quite reluctant to give great power to the national government because it was not at all clear that their states would have much influence there. However, after passage of the Connecticut Compromise on July 17 which gave the small states an equal vote in the Senate, the delegates from the small states became noticeably more willing to establish broad powers at the national level. In the traditional (as in Farrand) session-by-session rendering of the Convention's work, it is quite clear that having been guaranteed influence through what they thought would be control of the Senate the delegates from the smaller states were willing to grant great power to the national government. In the annotated (Benton) version, when the arguments of the delegates from the smaller states (wary of great national power

in mid-June) are strung together (comfortable with great national power in mid-August), the reasons for this turnabout might not be clear. Second, the sheer amount of the debate on some issues, such as the method for apportioning and reapportioning seats in the House (Article 1, section 2, Clause 3), which runs for nearly 150 pages (vol 1, pp 276–420), almost overwhelms the logic of pulling scattered and seemingly incoherent pieces of debate together into meaningful discussions.

Finally, we must note how well the Kurland and Lerner volumes mesh with Benton's volumes. Both Kurland and Lerner (in vols 2–4) and Benton (in his two volumes) present material by article, section, and frequently, by clause of the finished Constitution. Therefore, the wide-ranging selections, from John Locke to Justices Marshall and Story, provided by Kurland and Lerner, which include only selections from the Convention's debates (almost exclusively from Madison's notes), can provide a rich background to the complete presentation of the conventions debates by article, section, and clause of the finished Constitution that is provided by Benton. The two collections, taken together, provide a full and rich picture of the Convention's developing thinking on each of the major problems and issues confronting them.

Calvin Jillson, *University of Colorado, Boulder*

The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality, and Liberty. By Peter L. Berger (New York: Basic Books, 1986. Pp. 262. $17.95)

The Capitalist Revolution is an important book; it is also a flawed one. Peter L. Berger undertakes the herculean task of developing a theory of capitalism that examines the "relation between capitalism and society in the modern world" (p. 3). As the subtitle indicates, he generates fifty propositions about this relationship, which are to be treated as falsifiable hypotheses awaiting empirical testing. Thus, *The Capitalist Revolution* is a social scientific endeavor; it is not a "book of philosophy or ethics" (p. 9). Nonetheless, the eventual assessment of capitalism and socialism at the book's conclusion is embedded in a normative framework which belies his pretension to "science."

The central concept that informs this theoretical enterprise is "economic culture." Berger's central argument is that economic institutions are embedded in an economic culture which represents a matrix of social and political structures, cultural patterns, and structures of consciousness (values, ideas, belief systems). The key elements of economic culture are the relationships between a particular mode of socioeconomic organization and social stratification, forms of polity, and value systems. The important contributions of *The Capitalist Revolution* are the effort to differentiate the intrinsic and extrinsic elements of the economic cultures of capitalism and so-

cialism, and the effort to disentangle the sociopolitical dislocations generated by modernity from those generated by a particular form of socioeconomic organization. Unfortunately, Berger never categorically identifies the intrinsic characteristics of modernity and therefore fails to provide a basis for judging the differential impacts of capitalism and socialism on society; rather, modernity takes on the character of a residual category which explains dislocation and inequalities commonly (and by no means correctly) associated with capitalism (e.g., class, income inequalities, alienation).

The Capitalist Revolution challenges those who would diagnose all the ailments of advanced capitalist and developing nations as endemic to capitalism. Towards this end, Berger compares Western industrial capitalist systems with industrial socialist systems and seeks to determine empirically the better form of socioeconomic organization. He finds that the economic culture of capitalism is intrinsically linked with class stratification, whereas the economic culture of socialism is intrinsically linked with a system of stratification based on class and political patrimony. There is an elective affinity between capitalism and democracy, whereas socialism is intrinsically linked with authoritarian governance, and individual autonomy is intrinsic to capitalism, whereas there exists an "intrinsic affinity between socialism and the totalitarian project for modern society" (p. 181).

The phenomenon of East Asian capitalism is employed as a second case for testing the universality of the propositions developed about the economic culture of occidental capitalism. The findings are mixed, but East Asian capitalism demonstrates that government intervention in the economy is compatible with capitalist development, gross inequalities of wealth are not necessarily associated with capitalist development, and democracy is encouraged by capitalism. The empirical evidence, namely the recent successes of East Asian capitalism and the enduring success of Western industrial capitalism, leads Berger to make the unqualified argument that capitalism is a superior strategy for development in the Third World; socialism as a development strategy is rejected outright.

The rejection of socialism is emphatic. Berger finds intrinsic linkages between socialism and the bureaucratization of the economy, economic inefficiency, and authoritarian governance. The propositions about the economic culture of capitalism show no similar certitude; they remain hedged or qualified—Berger is even unwilling to propose that private property is an intrinsic characteristic of the economic culture of capitalism. I find this disparity in treatment troubling—it reveals his prejudices and undermines his claim to dispassionate social scientific inquiry. Furthermore, his treatment of industrial socialism neither expands our understanding of the economic culture of capitalism nor aids in the differentiation of either capitalism or socialism from modernity.

A particularly disappointing chapter in *The Capitalist Revolution* deals

with the legitimation problem faced by capitalism Berger puts forth the questionable proposition that unlike socialism, which is capable of self-legitimation, capitalism "depends for its legitimation upon traditional values, such as those furnished by religious morality" (p 207) This proposition is arrived at by definition, rather than by convincing argument First, Berger initially distinguishes capitalism from socialism with the "differentiating criteria of market mechanisms and mechanisms of political control" (p 23) Capitalism retains its narrow definition as 'an economic system and nothing else," while socialism is redefined in a way that 'conflates the allocative process of socialism with the promises of Marxism and the ideals of the communitarian tradition of Western Christianity" (p 197) Berger then distinguishes between legitimations 'that sustain an institution in ordinary, everyday life, and legitimations that command a high degree of commitment" (p 195) It is probably true that socialism, broadly defined, commands a higher degree of commitment than capitalism, narrowly defined, yet it is not true that capitalism is not sustained by an equally potent combination of ideology and myth Berger missed an opportunity to make an important contribution to our understanding of the role played by myth and ideology in the legitimation of contemporary capitalism

The positive case for capitalism is made in the final chapter of *The Capitalist Revolution* Berger collects the fifty propositions scattered throughout the book and argues that these propositions are neither procapitalist nor anticapitalist rather they form the basis for a scientific theory of the economic culture of capitalism Berger assumes the position that moral argumentation is not within the purview of the social scientist the results of social science however may be used for advocacy (without the imprimatur of science, of course) which is exactly what Berger does in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism He identifies seven *commonly* held values the world over the material well-being of people equality political liberties and democracy the protection of human rights, individual autonomy preservation of tradition and community These values are not given precise meaning by Berger mean different things to different people, are not rank-ordered hierarchically and are generally treated as if they are positively correlated These normative criteria and the fifty propositions about prosperity liberty, and equality lead Berger to the inexorable conclusion that capitalism, reinforced by the family and religion is the best form of socio-economic organization Thus Berger makes in the end a normative argument in *The Capitalist Revolution*, the book is transformed from a serious effort to develop an economic culture theory of capitalism into a thinly veiled polemic advocating a capitalist revolution

The Capitalist Revolution would have been a better book had Berger jettisoned those propositions extraneous to the development of an economic culture theory of capitalism developed fewer and more carefully drafted

propositions that clearly identify the intrinsic elements of the economic culture of capitalism, presented a more elaborate and systematic treatment of the normative framework informing the analysis, and titled his book *In Defense of Capitalism*.

James Clyde Sperling, *James Madison College, Michigan State University*

Why ERA Failed By Mary Frances Berry (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1986 $22 50)

Rights of Passage. The Past and Future of ERA Edited by Joan Hoff-Wilson (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1986 Pp 140 $22 50 cloth, $6 95 paper)

Why We Lost the ERA By Jane J Mansbridge (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1986. $35 00 cloth, $9 95 paper)

The failure of the Equal Rights Amendment to gain ratification in 1982 provided an opportunity for several different types of scholarly postmortems One type has stressed the systemic difficulties in gaining support for any amendment, drawing conclusions regarding the possibilities for systemic change via the amendment process Such analysis helps to place the ERA within a framework of strategic possibilities for feminist action A second approach is to examine the actual consequences of the defeat for American feminism by examining both the larger context of the political system and the internal workings of the feminist movement itself From this latter perspective, historical analysis and questions regarding the goals of contemporary feminism are brought to bear on discussions of the amendment s defeat

Mary Frances Berry's *Why ERA Failed* falls largely into the first category It is an examination of the conditions for successful passage of constitutional amendments Berry posits two basic criteria for success via the amendment process, which has in fact produced only 26 amendments out of over 5,000 which have been proposed First is the sense of national necessity, a perception that change cannot or will not be remedied by government in the absence of an amendment Berry provides a particularly useful comparison between the ERA and the defeated Child Labor Amendment, which also passed Congress but failed to achieve state ratification A particular insight offered by Berry's comparative approach is that if what has been viewed as a primarily symbolic issue becomes perceived as an amendment that in fact has broad social consequences, its possibilities for ratification are likely to be threatened

Rights of Passage The Past and Future of the ERA, edited by Joan Hoff Wilson, presents a series of historical and contemporary essays, falling into the second category we have suggested These are loosely organized around

two philosophical approaches to feminism. They are "feminist individualism" (or egalitarianism) versus the "familial" or "relational" concept of feminism, the latter based on "equality in difference" or the view that women's cultural and social identity must be recognized by government policy. Hoff-Wilson and several other essayists in the volume appear to argue that the ERA was at least a partially misguided effort because it failed to comprehend the "familial" consciousness of the anti-ERA opposition. Essays focus on the importance of leadership (such as that offered by ERA proponent Alice Paul in the past) and, according to Berenice Carroll, the costs inherent in the failure to "incorporate tactics of civil disobedience and non-violent direct action on a substantial scale" by ERA activists in the 70s and 80s (p. 65). Yet, these assessments may appear less than convincing given the conclusions of a number of writers even in this volume (Boles, Pleck) who essentially argue that the ERA was an unwinnable issue, which ERA activists could not turn around despite their overwhelming Congressional support on two occasions.

Probably the most inclusive of the books under review and the one which seeks most comprehensively to utilize the two approaches suggested is Jane Mansbridge's *Why We Lost the ERA*. In what is at once both a scholarly and personal account, Mansbridge reminds us at the outset that the ERA would have affected only state and federal jurisdiction, not privately based gender inequality. Nor, as Hoff-Wilson suggests as well, would the ERA automatically have altered public policy based on sexist premises. But the Mansbridge book is primarily concerned with the causes and consequences of the ERA's defeat. Mansbridge, like Pleck and Boles in the Hoff-Wilson book (and Berry as well), places much of the blame on strategic errors and misperceptions by ERA activists. Buoyed by congressional success, they failed to look beyond national politics to develop the state and local consensus necessary for victory. The belated boycott of unratified states and an excessive television advertising budget were but two of the factors that contributed to poor planning. By 1977, it was probable that the early momentum was gone and that no efforts could lead to victory.

Mansbridge argues insightfully that several other factors also contributed to the ERA's defeat. Successful amendments have been ratified in periods of reform, hardly typified by the post-reform conservative era represented by Reagan's victory (1980 election). In addition, ERA proponents underestimated and initially discounted the role of the opposition, particularly in the first years of unqualified optimism. The opposition actually had the easier task, to prevent states from ratifying, not to produce mass consensus. Schlafly's STOP ERA and other groups organized effectively from the grass roots up, not, as pro-ERA forces did, from the top down. The nature of ERA support, measured as consistently high by pollsters, failed to probe beyond abstract support for "rights" to specific attitudes relating to substantive change (such as the draft, which in fact elicited highly negative response).

Mansbridge argues that the only way to have prevailed was to have persuaded legislators that in fact the ERA would make little difference and have little impact (a view with which she in fact concurs). But such a pragmatic strategy was unacceptable to the core of ideological activists, who in the absence of tangible benefits, focused exclusively on symbolic and necessarily long-term outcomes which the amendment would have created

What the ERA would have accomplished in fact is open to question These three books lead us to question as well whether the fight was worth the effort, especially after 1979 when the prospects of victory appeared dimmer than ever Mansbridge reminds us that region (Southern and Mormon, except for Illinois which required a ⅗ vote for approval), economic and political culture (poor, conservative and populist), and partisanship distinguished those states in which ratification was still pending, auguring poorly for ERA success

Did the struggle for the ERA produce any positive gains? As Mansbridge (and Jo Freeman and others earlier) suggest, the movement raised feminist consciousness, helped women to organize politically first at the national level, and later in the states and communities and stimulated legislative and judicial action Those portions of the Economic Equity Act which have passed the U S Congress as well as dozens of state legislative enactments relating to gender are in part attributable to the ERA Similarly the Supreme Court's stepped-up role regarding gender discrimination is rooted at least in part in the ERA struggle

Did the ERA's defeat demonstrate the failure and limitations of the "feminist individualist" approach to feminism? To this reader these books demonstrate instead the limits of our political system in responding to conflicting demands, rather than sounding the death knell of feminist vision

Joyce Gelb, *City University of New York*

Waltzing with a Dictator The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy
By Raymond Bonner (New York Times Books, 1987 Pp 416 $19 95

Raymond Bonner has written a sensationalistic account of the tortured relations between the United States and the Philippines during the last twenty years He makes no secret of his intentions to use that relationship as a model for a critique of American policy more generally in the Third World Though there are many interesting details in his account, it ultimately fails to convince on evidential and analytical grounds

First, Bonner makes the important assertion that President Nixon approved of Ferdinand Marcos' declaration of martial law in 1972 The usual explanation of the U S role during that period is that it was caught by surprise The author argues that this is not true He posits that Nixon and Mar

cos had two key telephone conversations in which the American president acquiesced, if indeed he did not encourage, the end of democratic government, no matter how imperfect, in the Philippines Nixon had denied this Bonner rests his assertion on three key pieces of evidence

The first is his interviews with the U S ambassador of the period, Henry Byroade Yet he demonstrates that Byroade was arguing to Washington that the possibility of martial law had "lessened" at the exact time that it was being put into effect (p 99) There have since been news reports that Byroade does not remember telling Bonner anything but the "surprise" explanation and that the telephone calls are not included in the Nixon White House records Thus the evidence remains controversial, to say the least

The second piece of evidence is the assertions by an anti-Marcos exile and unnamed Filipino interviewee that Carlos Romulo, the Foreign Minister at the time, told them that Marcos had informed him of the two conversations and Nixon's approval When asked directly about these assertions by Bonner, Romulo, who has since died, would neither confirm nor deny them It seems not to have occurred to the author that Marcos, whom he later correctly labels a "consummate liar," might have been lying to his aides, especially one as close to the U S as Romulo to gain internal support for the martial law decree In short, even if Marcos told Romulo that Nixon had approved and there is as yet no direct evidence that he did it does not follow that his statement is true But in this instance and most others alternative explanations that may challenge the author's thesis are not explored or even dealt with in cursory fashion

The third piece of evidence is the assertion by an unnamed "senior CIA official" that Marcos would never have declared martial law without Nixon's direct approval This is pure speculation on that official's part and he admitted he had no direct knowledge of the alleged phone conversations My own guess is that since Nixon and Henry Kissinger made quite clear that they were most reluctant to interfere in the domestic politics of allied nations such phone calls were unnecessary In any event the author hardly "proves" that the U S directly gave approval to martial law

The book, however has other more serious analytical shortcomings in its generalizations about political development and U S policy in the Third World Bonner argues that his critique of U S policy is not moralistic but based on *realpolitik* Yet he demonstrates a naive moralistic faith in the effects of, and the desire for democracy in the developing nations He makes the simplistic universal claim that revolutions come about when the avenues of democratic evolution have been closed using Cuba Vietnam Iran and Nicaragua as examples (p 165) One wonders why there have been no subsequent revolutions in those nations which are hardly democratic Or for that matter, why there have been no revolutions in communist dictatorships at all Indeed, since there are relatively few democracies in the

world, it is difficult to explain, according to this view, why revolutions are such rare occurrences He chastises the Carter administration for not cutting off aid to Marcos, arguing that even if it did not have any effect at least the U S "would have backed democracy instead of a dictator" (p. 240) This is arguably a valid moral point, but is it in any way *realpolitik* as that term is usually understood? In viewing Bonner's ideas on revolution and claims of *realpolitik*, there is the clear impression of an author out of his depth.

An even greater problem, however, is that the author never makes clear exactly what type of intervention he is favoring He is adamantly against "interfering" in the domestic politics of other nations, yet consistently criticizes the U S for not doing so The distinction he attempts to make is between "standing for democratic principles," which is positive, and "interference " which is negative In their effect, however, the two are indistinguishable If the U S makes its support contingent upon democratic political processes, it is interference in the domestic politics of other nations If, for example, the U S could have used its influence to prevent martial law in the Philippines in 1972, Marcos would have had to leave office in 1973 To claim that this is somehow "staying out of" the domestic politics of the Philippines is ingenuous at best and certainly would not have been seen as "non-interference" by the Filipinos By creating this false distinction however, Bonner can criticize the U S for interfering in the poitics of the Philippines *and* for not interfering What is thus created is a moralistic diatribe within a deeply flawed analytical framework in both descriptive and prescriptive terms

Lastly, there are numerous contradictions and questionable assertions in the book Bonner chastises the Koreans and Japanese for desiring U S bases in the Philippines while not wanting them in their own nations, apparently oblivious to the fact that there are U S bases in those two nations He accuses policymakers of "arrogance" in attempting to decide what form of government the Filipinos may have, yet wanted the U S to prevent the declaration of martial law in 1972 even though he concedes that most Filipinos welcomed it at the time To assert that an "overwhelming majority" of the Filipino people wanted their nation to become the fifty-first state in the late 1960s is, at the very least, highly questionable And one might ask whether American military leaders in the 1970s actually tried to impress visiting congressional delegations of the necessity of the bases by providing statistics on how inexpensive Filipino prostitutes were The list could go on

In sum, this is a highly moralistic and analytically flawed book If one desires to read about the decadence of the Marcos regime, and there was much, it is all here in depressing detail If, on the other hand, one desires a balanced, *realpolitik* account of U S. policy in the Philippines and the Third World, one is advised to look elsewhere

Douglas J Macdonald *Colgate University*

Remembering Who We Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative By M. E. Bradford (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985. Pp. 178.)

In his preface, the author explains that this book was written over a period of twenty years and consists of fifteen addressses delivered in many places at different times. One of the remarkable things about this author is his consistency. He is totally unlike a Ronald Reagan who changed his position from New Deal Democrat to conservative Republican or a Reinhold Niebuhr who changed his position so often during his lifetime that it is impossible to categorize him. Bradford's position on fundamentals has remained unchanged, and changes in lesser matters are always in the same direction. This kind of life is good insofar as he is right and a comfort to the one who lives it in any case.

The literary style of the book is surprising, coming as it does from a professor of English and author of many books and articles. The sentences are long and involved, contain many parts which are clear when considered separately but foggy when considered as a whole. The reader is often left to wonder what the author has actually said. The general effect is controversial and even conservatives are uncomfortable with many of his assertions while in hearty agreement with others.

The fundamentals to which I referred are: (1) a thorough dislike of ideologies and abstract propositions imposed on people by governments, which Bradford calls millenialism; (2) the undemocratic character of the framers of the Constitution in contrast to the contemporary advocacy of the one-man-one-vote formula; (3) a dislike of liberty and equality as political ends; (4) a total rejection of Abraham Lincoln and what he stood for.

Bradford's position on the first point is very similar to Edmund Burke's. You cannot take abstract propositions and advocate them without regard to the context in which they arise and the probable consequences which trying to realize them would entail. Failure to heed this truth is widespread, afflicting both church and state.

The second position refers to the dislike—if not the hatred—of democracy by the framers of the Constitution. Bradford quotes several outspoken denunciations of democracy by several of the most important framers. More important still is the construction of the Constitution itself, e.g., the provisions on constitutional amendments, the ratification of treaties, overriding the presidential veto, approval of presidential appointments by the Senate, the basic difference between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the principle of federalism which divides powers between the federal government and the states. The comparison between the handiwork of the framers and what most Americans urge for South Africa, not to mention our own politics, is truly stark: there is absolutely no room for the one-man-

one-vote formula The only way in which what the framers did and what democracy demands can be reconciled is to say that the framers expected majorities to be so large and so enduring as to amount to government by consensus This is what Bradford asserts, and practically all conservatives would agree with him

The third position is highly critical of liberty and equality mainly because of their consequences—the fragmentation of the country into conflicting minorities, the inherent contradiction between liberty and equality, excesses like racial quotas and affirmative action Aside from these points, much of liberty and equality are incompatible, for equality demands the suppression of liberty and liberty results in inequality, if either one is treated as an ultimate The only solution is accommodation—a process which no millenialist will accept

The fourth and last position which Bradford takes is a thoroughgoing denunciation of Abraham Lincoln Bradford contends that the bullet which killed Lincoln created "the myth of the 'political messiah' " There is some truth in this statement when we remember how Lincoln was vilified during his administration and that practical politics made the "myth" highly useful to unprincipled Republicans in Congress and the country Beyond that, Bradford antagonizes those of us who are glad that the Union was preserved From that objective, Lincoln never wavered He was antislavery but not an abolitionist, and rightly so He was in no way responsible for the Gilded Age which followed his death There is not enough space in this review to discuss the details of Bradford's argument His nostalgic comments on the Southern Agrarians and his belief that the election of General McClellan "might have produced an armistice and a negotiated peace" strongly suggests that Bradford is not glad that the Union was preserved and wishes the prewar plantation South had won its independence

Rene Williamson, *Louisiana State University*

Political Parties in the American Mold By Leon D Epstein (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1986 Pp 440 $27 50)

For the past decade and longer, literature describing contemporary American electoral politics has been beset with uncertainty of direction and change Politics has seemed to be awash in a flood of confusing indicators about parties, alignments, citizen identifications and ideological developments Leon Epstein's latest book seems likely to produce a quieting effect on many readers Where some scholars have discovered political turbulence and significant change—decomposition and volatile electoral outcomes—Epstein finds adaptation and modest change

As the title indicates, Epstein begins with the premise that American poli-

ties is an exceptional case in the Western world. The American mold that has shaped our parties refers to our unique cultural setting and history. He stresses especially our individualism and the separation of powers and federal arrangements. Individualism in the American setting generates an intermittent progressivism that compels political actors to adapt. Some of these adaptations produced antiparty outcomes, while others resulted in *pro-party* or mixed effects. Throughout the book the exposition concerning American parties is cast in the vocabulary of accommodation, resilience, and adaptation in response to "circumstance."

Epstein accepts the view that the porousness or permeability of America's major parties has facilitated adaptation, and thus has assured their survival while constraining the efforts of pro-party reformers to restructure them. In the context of the American mold, Epstein addresses such themes as (1) the trend toward candidate-centered campaigns, (2) the prospects for state and national party organizations, (3) the seriousness of the decline in voter identification with parties, and (4) the dynamics of party and campaign finance.

Using comparative, historical and legal materials in his commentaries, the author proceeds much like the essayist in suggesting new questions and tentative interpretations without purporting to speak with finality. The form of his exposition, organized into nine substantive chapters and a summation, is thoughtful verbal discourse. The book employs no models or formulae, and makes no use of quantitative methodologies. The text contains one table and the appendix a few more. However, the author makes extensive use of the voluminous literature of historical, institutional, legal, and quantitative studies and materials. The sixty-five pages of footnotes and explanatory comments attest to the breadth and the thoroughness of the enterprise of the author, and add significantly to the merits of the book.

In one of the most rewarding chapters, on state regulation of parties, he offers a metaphor of parties as public utilities. He argues that under state legislation enacted during the post-Civil War decades, parties were partially transformed from private to public associations. They came to be regarded as affected with a public interest because they had a monopoly on nominations. Through enactment of direct primary laws, states bestowed a legitimacy on partisan nominations and facilitated the dominance of the two major parties while impeding party control of candidate selection. The tension between these competing perspectives toward state party organization—private vs. public status—is given careful treatment by Epstein as he comments on the impact of (1) the Australian ballot, (2) the direct primary, (3) judicial action in the white primary cases, and (4) recent cases dealing with intrusion on the associational rights of the major parties.

In two chapters concerned with private and public funding of campaigns and parties, Epstein grapples with the recent dynamics of campaign finance. He offers a non-pejorative view of PACs as chiefly extensions of interest

group lobbying. Although conceding some new impetus toward greater candidate-centered campaigning from recent developments, the author is not pessimistic about the ability of parties to again adapt to new circumstances. He notes that state parties might be strengthened through laws providing public funding for candidates who conform to restrictions on PAC contributions within an expenditure ceiling. On the other hand, he concludes, the popularity of public funding remains uncertain.

His commentary on party identification expresses concern about problems of measuring and interpreting the outcomes from survey research on identifiers, while acknowledging that there has been some weakening of citizen attachment to parties. In explaining the decline in the use of party as a cue for voting decisions, Epstein places little weight on the impact of new technologies such as media campaigning and polling. He assigns the most significant role to fundamental factors that, in his view, long ago made candidate-centered campaigns a feature of American politics: the separate election of executive and legislative officials. In like manner he explains enduring citizen attachment to the major parties in institutional terms: "the statutory recognition of the major parties and statutory control of their nomination practices" (pp. 263–64). Epstein briefly acknowledges that the aging of the New Deal alignment and the emergence of new issues have contributed to the decline of party identifiers, but he gives scant attention to these issues and to the evolving context from which they emerge. War, economic depression and hostage seizures have recently dominated the agenda for political discussion, affected political alignments, and determined some electoral outcomes. Epstein might have clarified for readers his view of the impact of events in the modern period on the continuing cultural and institutional context.

In chapters on the presidency, Congress, and national party organization readers will find much useful history. The author's comparative frame of reference and his sensitivity to historical context have a moderating effect on political concerns that seem more threatening in other hands. He notes that the nature of the presidency was ambiguous from the start, and therefore it is not surprising that it has retained partisan and nonpartisan aspects. This powerful office—the product of the separation of powers arrangement—has generated the distinctively American presidential party. Though amorphous, the presidential party, according to Epstein, is the most coherent national party phenomenon in American politics. His discussion of the presidency, however, fails to convey the sense that the presidential nomination process is now virtually out of control. This lack of control is due in part to the vacillating inclinations of state legislative and party leaders concerning the form and scheduling of delegate selection events.

Epstein is reluctant to assign much significance to the role of the media in explaining both the trend toward candidate-centered campaigns and the prospects for parties. Admittedly, easy attribution of political change to me

dia influence is in vogue, and admirably, Epstein's interpretive essays are free of any trace of such faddishness. Nevertheless, the enhancements of media influence on political discourse, the fortunes of candidates and parties, and the arousal of public opinion are confirmed in many quarters The author's institutional perspective takes little notice that the media have become political institutions of primary significance

No area of political science is so heavily researched as party and electoral politics It is easy for authors to err in trying to cover too much in a single volume, and for readers to expect too much Epstein makes effective use of his materials and of an institutional approach in explaining the features of American parties that emerged and developed in the American mold of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries But has the mold—the cultural and institutional context—remained unchanged in its essential features during the decades since World War II?

As noted earlier, the author's framework appears less satisfactory in addressing features of the contemporary political landscape Epstein is silent concerning the arousal and mobilization of population aggregates, especially as they bear upon the building and maintenance of political coalitions Readers must look elsewhere for commentary on these aspects of American electoral politics

Robert L. Ross *University of Northern Iowa*

Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution By Donald C Hodges (Austin, TX University of Texas Press 1986 Pp xiii 378 $27 50 Cloth $11 50 Paper)

This is a frustrating and fascinating book that, like some of the revolutionaries it considers succeeds only after a long and arduous struggle It is too early to place the Nicaraguan revolution among the ranks of those in France, Russia, China, and Cuba, however it has generated a cottage industry almost as impressive The literature that seeks to explain and understand the revolutionary process in Nicaragua is deep and wide One rather curious omission, however, has been a critical assessment of the thought of Augusto Cesar Sandino and its influence on his present-day followers, the Sandinistas

To remedy this omission, Donald Hodges has set as his task the examination of the intellectual sources and foundations of the Nicaraguan revolution This is accomplished by scrutinizing the writings of Sandino and the Sandinistas That is no simple matter and Hodges does not deal with it altogether successfully In the case of Sandino there is a dearth of material (450 pages total, according to Hodges), which creates some rather serious problems In contrast, the Sandinista leaders have written extensively, offering more opportunity to gain insight into their political thought

The first section of the book is driven by Hodges' conviction that the very undations of the Nicaraguan revolution are located in and can be traced to ndino's "formation as a revolutionary" (p 3) This overstatement sets the ne for the chapters that trace Sandino's development as a revolutionary, nsider the ideologies that influenced him, assess his strategy for "sub-rsion," and detail the war he fought against the U.S. Marines in Nicara-ia Hodges' discussion is frustrating, often speculative, and occasionally triguing

The frustration comes from the continual speculations and assumptions at dominate this section The lack of hard evidence and an apparent con-ction that revolutionary leaders necessarily "disguise" their true program ads to such speculation Hodges further invites this speculation by arguing at Sandino's sparse writings "leave us guessing about his underlying be-fs" (p 18) and by suggesting that Sandino "disguised" his goals to the point at both the Sandinistas (p xi) and scholars (p x) have failed to recognize em As a result, Hodges strings together circumstantial evidence and left-political thinking in the region at the time to buttress his claim that he has cerned the "real" Sandino missed by other scholars An example of the ficulties inherent in this strategy can be seen when Hodges decides that, ice the Freemason Grand Lodge in Monterrey had a "Bolshevik" Grand dge offshoot, Sandino "may have joined a similar lodge in Tampico in 23" (pp 6–7)

Hodges portrays Sandino as a "philosopher-general," a guerrilla-warrior iose influence has been felt by revolutionaries (Mao, Bayo, and Che) und the world Sandino is the educated synthesizer of complex philoso-ies, weaving together strands from Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism am, Freemasonry, the "austere rational communism" of the Magnetic-iritual school, anarcho-communism, and Mexican Spiritualism into a rich estry that would cover the world Indeed, he is the charismatic figure io envisioned changing the world from his base in Nicaragua

That much, if not all, of this was missed by Sandino's previous biographers s not concern Hodges Sandino, according to Hodges, "hesitated to re-l himself to even his most sympathetic biographers" (p 18) Hodges ims to have penetrated the surface of Sandino's thought by examining his tellectual sources" and the "revolutionary currents that made an indelible pression on him" (p 18) The result is a discussion that offers intriguing mpses of leftist political thought in Central America during the first third the twentieth century but often reads like various interpretations of stradamus quatrains in which only those who *really* understand the mas-can fathom the hidden meaning of his words

The second section of Hodges book is a welcome relief to the murky first tion His discussion of the Sandinistas' intellectual roots in Christianity irx, Lenin, Mao, Sandino, and Che is outstanding Hodges carefully and

systematically charts the threads which have been woven together to create the revolution in Nicaragua. Although hampered somewhat by a continued overemphasis on Sandino, Hodges neatly and thoroughly traces the resurrection of Sandino's thought by the early Sandinista leaders and the influence traditional Marxist-Leninism and its Third World variant, "New Marxism" (which he identifies with the work of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Antonio Gramsci, p. 179), had on their interpretation of it. Hodges follows this with useful and interesting discussions of the Sandinistas' political assessments (i.e., their theoretical guidelines, and the choices they made about the proper strategy to adopt in their pursuit of victory). The last chapter in this section considers the ideologies of the revolution and the pluralism of ideologies that Hodges believes exists in Nicaragua today. The entire section is interesting, informative, and useful.

This is a book with a split personality. The first section, although extensively, perhaps excessively, footnoted, is largely a work of speculation. Hodges seeks to uncover the political thought of a man whom he contends told little and actively sought to hide what he did tell. It is a jumbled, often confusing portrait that offers valuable insights into leftist thinking in Central America in the early twentieth century, which may have influenced Sandino. It adds little, however, to our understanding of Sandino's impact on the Nicaraguan revolution. The second section, in contrast, is rich with detail and insight into the political thought of the Sandinista leadership. This thorough and systematic assessment pulls together in one place all the contrasting strands which have been bound together in the unique revolution that has occurred in Nicaragua.

Eric Selbin, *University of Minnesota*

Leadership at the Fed. By Donald F. Kettl. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 218. $22.50 cloth.)

This impressive volume chronicles the evolution of the Federal Reserve Board from its origins as an agency with an uncertain mandate to its contemporary status as the preeminent monetary policymaker. The key variable explaining this organizational metamorphosis is the chairman, and Kettl devotes his study to the four most important men who have held this office: Marriner S. Eccles (1934–1948), William McChesney Martin (1951–1970), Arthur F. Burns (1970–1978), and Paul A. Volcker (1979–1987).

The author draws upon the existent literature, documents in the relevant presidential libraries, and his own extensive interviews. What results is a beautifully written and academically powerful study of executive leadership within a critical agency of government. His concern is to determine how bureaucratic power is achieved, protected, and used. By "*managing* the risks

the agency faces," the chairman helps "the Fed adapt to changing economic circumstances, technical uncertainties, and political demands" (p. 13)

The Fed was born in controversy Farmers and small business wanted a government-managed banking system to counter the power of Eastern bankers, but Wall Street feared that a politicized central bank would allow cheap money The Fed struggled to find a "mission" given these contending forces, with the consequence that by 1933 the agency was in peril "It did not know what it ought to do, why it ought to do it, and just as important, who ought to direct policy" (p 42) The election of Roosevelt gave the Fed a new opportunity to assert monetary leadership

That task fell upon Marriner S Eccles He urged that the Fed play an activist role in economic management, that authority be shifted from the reserve banks to its Board of Governors, and that monetary policy-making be integrated with fiscal policy The political challenge facing Eccles was the need to achieve Fed independence from the Treasury Department The Fed agreed to "peg" interest rates low enough to assure Treasury a steady supply of funds to pay for World War II, though Eccles was opposed to this policy for reasons economic and political "Legal independence meant nothing if it could not be exercised if the Fed, hobbled by the Treasury's peg, allowed inflationary pressures to build up. For its survival—and for the health of the economy—the Fed needed to recapture a unique turf" (p 66) In the postwar era, the famous "accord" accommodated Treasury's credit needs while allowing more autonomy to the Fed

William McChesney Martin created an era of good feeling which lasted almost twenty years In his famous declaration of 1956, Martin said "Our purpose is to lean against the winds of deflation or inflation, whichever way they are blowing" (p 83) In these terms he justified discretionary monetary policy, and then set out to achieve consensus within the Fed and regular contacts with political outsiders The Quadriad advisory group of OMB, Treasury, CEA, and the Fed began informally during the 1950s and was routinized under Kennedy and Johnson And though criticism of his anti-inflation stance heightened when tight money was viewed as hurting industries like housing construction, Martin survived "The Fed's tightening in 1966, ease in 1967 through 1968, and renewed tightening in 1969 were thus the product of an elaborate political minuet in which Martin struggled to accommodate the Fed to a turbulent environment" (p 109) Martin's legacy was a Fed whose power base had been strengthened by his insistence on nonpartisanship, technical competence, policy flexibility, and consultations with the executive

Arthur F Burns was an unabashed partisan who worked so closely with the White House that "a rich lore had developed" that he collaborated with Nixon to manipulate the economy to insure a GOP victory in 1972. Kettl assesses this allegation but concludes that Burns "as not an accomplice in

Nixon's reelection campaign" (p 128). Nor did Burns become Nixon's operative at the Fed. Instead Nixon angrily viewed Burns' strident advocacy of an income policy as an act of personal disloyalty Under President Ford, the White House did not try to interfere with the Fed's operations, and Burns' tight money policy won quiet applause from Gerald Ford

In 1975, new legislation required the Fed to report to Congress on "ranges of growth or diminution" of monetary and credit aggregates "Never before . . had the agency suffered with prolonged and serious congressional attack," but Burns ("a daunting figure on Capitol Hill") was able to contain the political damage (pp 159, 161) No doubt Burns understood, as Kettl points out, that Congress ultimately would prefer to make the Fed a political scapegoat during periods of high interest rather than actually to take over monetary policy

Reacting against Burns' anti-inflation rhetoric, President Carter replaced him with G William Miller Before long Miller's "armor started to rust" (p 169), because his opposition to tighter money in the face of inflation undercut his position within the Fed and with the financial community By 1979 even the Carter administration sensed something had to be done Carter named Miller Treasury Secretary and appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chairman Volcker inherited double-digit inflation, but he undertook a masterstroke by targeting bank reserves and not interest rates in order to tighten credit "He cleverly developed tactics to help build a consensus with the Fed for the plan and to deflect direct attack about high interest rates from the Fed's door" (p 178) When the supply-siders came to Washington in 1981 Fed-bashing began anew, and in 1982 Volcker again used his 'shield of flexibility"—monetary targets but this time to achieve an easing of credit

Henry Kaufman has called Volcker the most effective Fed chairman of the postwar era" (p 192), but all four men were adroit leaders who coped with political challenges confronting the Fed Their leadership styles did vary according to circumstance and Kettl concludes his fine study by summarizing the modes of presidential and congressional relations In sum this book is an invaluable addition to the growing literature by political scientists on macroeconomic policy-making

Raymond Tatalovich, *Loyola University of Chicago*

Nixon and the Politics of Public Television By David M Stone (New York and London Garland, 1985 Pp xxi, 370 $30 00)

Public broadcasting has always been a problematic policy in the United States Unlike what was once observed about commercial television, it is not a license to print money Nor has it been free of political controversy as was originally intended. In fact, public broadcasting, which includes noncom-

mercial radio and television, has lacked a secure source of funding from the beginning, as it has also been enmeshed in continuing ideological politics In addition, the general public has not been conspicuous as listeners or viewers of programming from public broadcasting sources—with the honorable exception of legions of children raised on *Sesame Street, Mister Rogers*, and *The Electric Company*

As a student of bureaucratic politics, this reviewer may be forgiven for making a couple of observations about the administrative nature of public broadcasting First, none of the programming on noncommercial stations is produced by the federal government Indeed, the principal conduit of federal funding, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), is barred by statutory provision from producing programming Second, CPB is not a government agency and its employees are not civil servants, it is a publicly chartered corporation (although one whose stock is owned by the federal government and which receives a congressional appropriation for its operations) Third, the funds from CPB have always represented only part of public broadcasting expenses, with the major burden carried by local authorities and subscribers Fourth, the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), which is a private production and distribution organization supported by CPB and the noncommercial stations, was never meant to be a "fourth network" competitive with CBS, NBC, and ABC

The great fear, expressed by both supporters and opponents of public broadcasting, was that "politicization" would follow from federal government support As David M Stone's *Nixon and the Politics of Public Television* makes abundantly clear, however, political controversy has been endemic to public broadcasting and has been most often manifested in efforts to reduce CPB's funding and to vitiate the principle of "forward funding" Providing for multiyear appropriations was intended to give public broadcasting a measure of financial and administrative independence from the politics of the budgetary process However, public broadcasting's long-range financing problems have never been solved, nor even adequately addressed The original legislation carried no appropriation, and CPB has often had to subsist on continuing resolutions Rather than insulating public broadcasting from the political fray, funding questions have been a lightning rod for disputes about the purpose and accountability of programming on the noncommercial stations

Stone makes extensive use of newspaper accounts, material gained through the Freedom of Information Act, and interviews It might also be noted that this book began as an undergraduate thesis in the Princeton Politics Department Stone's relentlessly chronological presentation, however, is numbing and distracts from his central analytical point "Each successive program controversy boiled down to the same old question, who should define the public interest in this publicly-supported institution, the local station, the national program agency, the producer, the politically appointed trustees or the government itself?" (p xx)

Informing Stone's analysis, and permeating the organization of American public broadcasting, is the principle of "localism" that the Carnegie Commission identified as the bedrock upon which the system rested. Stone correctly points out that localism has proven an evanescent foundation as it has been used to justify various conceptions of the public interest. For the noncommercial stations, localism was the justification for greater federal support; others saw it as the best guarantor of the diversity of differences that characterize the broadcasting spectrum. Whether from a concern for station autonomy or social pluralism, localism is, at least arguably, a rational basis for administering a national public broadcasting policy (although very different from the British and Canadian models). As Stone describes the machinations of the Nixon administration, however, localism became a code word for undercutting the already limited federal commitment to public broadcasting and curtailing the "liberal bias" of news programs like the *MacNeil-Lehrer Report*. Indeed, no dispute over the suitability of programming has been so heated as the matter of news and public affairs. This is the real focus of Stone's book: a detailed account of the Nixon administration's war on CPB and PBS for allegedly harboring ideological biases.

The uses and abuses of localism could have been used with greater rigor in Stone's study. Localism, after all, is a structural arrangement that reflects a compromise among diverse institutional and ideological interests. As the basis of a public policy, it was seemingly designed to elicit controversy. Stone, however, has chosen to recount the particulars of the Nixon administration frontal assault on the nascent public broadcasting system. It is a tawdry tale of the substitution of ideological invective for reasoned analysis and a case study of what amounted to a presidential vendetta against an administrative agency. Stone is not free of some polemical excesses of his own but overall his is a cautionary tale in reminding us of the dangers associated with governmental interference with the free expression of ideas.

As an account of the early years of public television, David Stone's book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the historical record. What we still lack is a formula for resolving the central issue of whose conception of the public interest in broadcasting becomes public broadcasting policy.

Kevin V. Mulcahy, *Louisiana State University*

Interpretation and Social Criticism. By Michael Walzer. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. viii, 96. $12.50.)

Michael Walzer here defends his "way of doing moral philosophy": the interpretation, or criticism from within, of a particular existing morality. Interpretation is especially vulnerable to the charge that it is inherently conservative, that it "binds us irrevocably to the status quo—since we can only

interpret what already exists—and so undercuts the very possibility of s criticism" (p 3). Walzer denies that interpretation is conservative, inc he argues that it is the only basis for even radical criticism, because those who share a moral or cultural horizon can engage in serious mor gument. Detached philosophers cannot be effective social critics, bec they cannot participate in the argument. they will not be heard because cannot speak a different moral language (p. 78, cf pp 35, 14).

In the first two chapters, Walzer commends interpretation while cri ing the "conventional view" (pp. 38, 50) of philosophy, according to w philosophy is the attempt to "discover" or "invent" universal moral ciples "against which we can measure any person's life, any society's tices" (p 13, cf p 5) This aspiration to "liberate" oneself from "the bon particularism" (p. 12, cf pp. 81, 21) is a mistake, because there are no versal moral truths that are not "minimal" (pp 24–25), the interesting n questions are always questions about the complex meaning of the exi moral world (pp. 22–23) Interpretation addresses precisely these quest Indeed, interpretive social criticism is perhaps best understood not as a cies of philosophy, but rather as "one of the more important by-produc a larger activity—let us call it the activity of cultural elaboration and mation," which is the work of "priests and prophets" and "poets," ar others, but not of philosophers (p 40, cf p 17) Thus, Walzer's model s critic is the prophet Amos, a "connected critic" who is contrasted, in the chapter of the book, with the "detached critic" Jonah (see especially pp 94) Walzer is a critic of philosophy or of the "conventional view" of phi phy in the name of social criticism or cultural affirmation, more preci Walzer is an enemy of philosophy because he is a partisan of communit

According to Walzer, philosophy is mostly useless in moral argume teaches only what we already know, and does not teach what we nee know Objective moral principles are always like Nagel's principle that should not be indifferent to the suffering of other people " Walzer is impressed "I acknowledge the principle but miss the excitement of re tion I knew that already" (p 6). Moral communities demand more adherence to such "minimal" principles, but the stronger moral opi ("Love thy neighbor as thyself") that constitute communities cannc demonstrated by philosophy (p 8, cf p 47) Moral life requires opinio the kind more likely to be found in sacred texts and myths than to be di ered by philosophers (cf pp 4–5, 48, 29) Philosophy can, perhaps, ar late "a kind of minimal and universal code" (p 24), a morality for "stran (pp 14–16), especially applicable as a "law of nations" (pp 93, 79, cf. p but these universal principles do not constitute a "livable morality" (p "a dense moral culture within which [people] can feel some sense of bel ing" (p 16) "It is as if we were to take a hotel room . . as the ideal mod a human home" (pp. 14–15; cf. p. 20) Walzer is a critic of philosophy i name of the "moral comfort" (p. 15) of "home" or community.

Philosophy is also sometimes dangerous. "It presses its practitioners toward manipulation and compulsion" (p 64, cf p. 52) Knowledge of universal principles, if these principles make more than minimal claims (pp. 7–8, 65), can give rise to a temptation to "intervene" in the political community and to "'compel the people to an enforced awakening'" (pp 62–63, quoting Gramsci, cf. pp 18–19). This "dangerous presumption" (p 21) has led too often, especially among radical thinkers (pp 58–59, 62–63) to "one or another version of an unattractive politics" (p 64) But according to Walzer, interpretation is not dangerous, but friendly, criticism, even radical interpretive critics share with the orthodox a commitment to the deepest values of the community (pp 39, 60–61, 75, 80–81, 90–91)

For this very reason, interpretation has appeared to be conservative, confined within the limits of a tradition Walzer responds that moral and cultural traditions, including our own, are not as univocal as his critics imply (cf pp 21–23) Every moral world contains ambiguity, complexity, and even "contradiction" (pp 29–30, 41, 42) We do not, it turns out, share as much as the comforting picture of the community as a "home" suggests we may differ as much as Marxists and liberals differ about the meaning of equality (pp 43–44), or as much as the critic Amos and the apologist Amaziah differ about whether "justice" or "worship" is the "core value of the Israelite tradition" (pp 88–89) In such cases, there are only "minimal" standards to help the citizen who must choose between competing interpretations (cf pp 28–32, 48–49, 60–61, 82–83), it is not surprising that most will remain obedient to the ruling opinions (cf p 89)

Ultimately, Walzer cannot escape the charge that interpretation is conservative, and even illiberal, because the contest between critic and apologist remains an argument about the meaning of an authoritative tradition Their argument takes the form of claims to orthodoxy and charges of heresy, rather than appeals to what is reasonable or just The interpretative social critic may oppose those authorities who actually wield power (pp 60, 22), but the authority of the tradition altogether can never be doubted Liberalism teaches that real criticism requires a standpoint from which to question the authority of tradition however interpreted But Walzer argues that the existing moral world "is authoritative for us because it is only by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are" (pp 20–21, cf pp 17–18, 62) for Walzer, the moral world is authoritative merely because it is ours This argument virtually concedes the charge of conservatism, and it yields too much to the various authorities, intellectual and other, that have accidentally or historically secured power in particular communities

For the same reason that Walzer's position is conservative it is also potentially dangerous Interpretive social critics can be no more than partisans, since the critic cannot claim to be more "objective" than the apologist (pp 37, 44, 50, 60), and there are no judges between them, even in principle, but the members of the community themselves (p 30) When the argument is

about which prejudice will be the reigning prejudice, "there is no definitive way of ending the disagreement" (p. 28, cf. pp. 26, 30, 49, 65, 88). Or rather, there is no principled way to end the disagreement; civil war is surely a definitive way to settle the quarrel (as Walzer himself suggests, by making the French Revolution the outcome of an interpretive struggle—p. 42, n. 5, cf. p. 45). Interpretation is no less dangerous than philosophy, and it deprives the citizen of the chance to oppose orthodoxy in the name of true principles of justice, and not just prejudice or taste.

Ruth W. Grant, *Duke University*
Steven Kautz, *University of Chicago*

Articles

The Politics of "Ideational Policy"

Paul R. Schulman
Mills College

Increasingly, technical models or "idea sets" are playing a prominent role in the crafting of public policy. Few frameworks exist in political science for the categorization and analysis of such models, yet their impact upon the policy process may someday be profound. This essay argues that the organization of policy ideas—as systems of central definitions, axioms, and deductive propositions—can be as important to the policy process as their content. In particular, idea sets that feature vague core concepts surrounded by formalized and long-linked deductive chains can be a source of considerable policy instability. This possibility is examined within the context of nuclear weapons procurement policy conducted under the intellectual rubric of deterrence theory. An argument is made for a "protected ambiguity" in connection with the use of technical models in public undertakings. This argument has important implications for the future of policy analysis as an effort to "rationalize" the process of public policy making.

In his exploration of the new politics of "issue networks," Hugh Heclo observes that in many public policy disputes "any direct material interest is often secondary to intellectual or emotional commitment" (Heclo 1978, p. 102). Perhaps as never before abstract concepts and ideas now march across the American policy-making landscape. We are witness to ideas not as mere assertions of economic and social interest, but as powers in themselves—organized, systematized and formalized into models of deductive rigor. The character of these "intellectual commitments" is coming to have an increasingly dominant effect upon the crafting of public policy.

Consider the following examples.

1. A mathematical model of photochemical interactions in the upper atmosphere *projects* a deterioration of the ozone layer in the presence of chloro-fluorocarbons such as those released as propellants in ordinary aerosol cans. Such deterioration would, under present models of the atmosphere, permit significantly larger amounts of ultraviolet solar radiation to penetrate the biosphere, leading in turn (according to a statistical model) to higher incidences of cancer, particularly the dangerous skin cancer, melanoma. On the basis of this mathematical simulation, major public debate focuses upon aerosol can safety leading to both federal and state regulatory responses.

* The author would like to thank Tom Anton, Brian Cook, Terry Hopmann, Martin Landau, Fred Lawson, Eric Nordlinger, Francis Rourke, Larry Shrader, Ken Waltz, Diana Watts, Darrell West and Aaron Wildavsky for their helpful comments and criticisms of the ideas in this essay.

2. The Reagan administration attempts to implement a "supply-side" revolution in federal fiscal policy Arguing largely upon a theory of public expenditure "drags" on private sector investment, the administration lobbies successfully for major tax cuts and at the same time imposes significant cuts upon the size or growth rate of a variety of domestic programs Large follow on budget deficits prompt subsequent efforts, some unprecedented, to further reduce federal spending Much of the deficit debate centers around forecasted future deficits (arrived at by econometric projections) and a theory of deficits which asserts their link, through federal government incursions in the credit market, to inflation and to a dampening effect upon corporate investment

3 The United States conducts its nuclear weapons procurement policy under a formalized doctrine of deterrence This doctrine has served as a prescriptive model of how to avoid nuclear war It has influenced strategic planning and targeting, and has structured policy debate and decision making over the development of new weapons systems and their deployment in our offensive arsenal

In each case, we see an abstracted definition of a public problem In each, logic has become a more compelling policy foundation than direct experience These examples, moreover, merely hint at the growing power of ideas in the design and implementation of public policy [1]

A Policy Transformation

Traditional debate over public policy has generally been debate about conflicting demands for policy goods Each expressed interest or "want" has come complete with an explicit means to its own end This has been possible because of the relatively short causal links (indeed, mostly experiential understanding) connecting a problem and a remedial strategy As often as not, the very *definition* of a problem has included the means for its policy redress

But instead of decomposing larger, more abstract issues into discrete demands, each with short means-ends chains (the cognitive as well as political foundation of "distributive" politics) the policy process is increasingly acting in reverse It is connecting discrete group-defined wants to larger and more abstract issues An economic subsidy to farmers, for example, is now "captured" conceptually and politically by the larger question of the appropriate economic "shake-out" of the agricultural sector or the impact of subsidies within the larger context of federal deficits and their macro-economic effects So too, discrete regulatory issues in air pollution or industrial waste disposal

[1]Two recent works in an enlarging number which recognize this phenomenon are Herson (1984) and Medcalf and Dolbeare (1985) A preliminary effort to consider the structure of policy ideas can be found in Sabatier (1986)

now become enmeshed analytically and politically within the literally global context of planetary ecologies or thermal balances [2]

The "environment" is, just as the "economy," an abstraction We are witnessing a shift in political focus—from narrow wants to abstracted needs, from short means-ends chains to long-linked deductive chains connecting a given action to a broader effect More often than not, these effects cannot be represented by a group. Instead, they are portrayed by a model

Interestingly enough, no real frameworks exist within political science for the categorization and analysis of technical models or "idea sets " Yet these technical models are assuming increasing importance in the crafting of public policies This essay investigates certain properties of long-linked deductive idea sets and explores the effects of their ever-closer association with public policymaking

WHAT IS A POLICY IDEA?

The idea sets of interest here are technical ones of a relatively specialized type We do not consider generalized political concepts such as "representation" or the "public interest " Nor is the focus on affective symbols which convey general feelings of allegiance or legitimacy, nor political "attitudes" such as liberalism or conservatism, nor grand-scale normative ideologies such as Marxism or Maoism

Instead, the concentration here is on formalized deductive propositions which address the behavior of complex systems from an avowedly analytic perspective For our purposes we define a *policy idea* as a set of concepts, axioms, and deductive inferences directed toward the analysis of a public problem. This set offers a causal explanation for a given social condition or problem "state," a forecast regarding future states, and a prescriptive inference for policy intervention on behalf of a desired outcome This definition covers doctrines, strategies, and models which might be applied to the analysis of policy problems and the formulation of policy designs

The intent here is to show that the *organizational character* of ideas—as much as their content—can have important implications for public policymaking Consider a very primitive categorization of policy ideas It is based upon two components of an idea set—(1) core definitions, concepts, or central axioms, and (2) an outflowing set of deductive inferences or propositions The core concepts can be precisely (even mathematically) defined (such as a definition of inflation in an econometric model or a mathematical description of the ozone layer in an ecological model) On the other hand core concepts (such as "deterrence," "acceptable risk," or "equal opportunity") may be

[2]The "aggregating" quality of environmental issues is nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in recent concerns over global temperature changes under projected greenhouse effects (Barth and Titus, 1984)

only vaguely specified in other policy idea sets Some idea sets, in other words, may feature core concepts which are expressable in artificial language (i e , mathematics) while others have core concepts of indelible ambiguity, whose expression is confined to natural language

Secondly, idea sets might be distinguished on the basis of deductive inferences which flow from central concepts or axioms These inferences may follow a tight logical chain or they may be only loosely or highly conditionally linked Deductive inferences usually take the form of "if then" propositions ("if oil demand rises, then prices will increase")

Some deductive linkages may be precisely specified in logic—following tight syllogisms and forming transitive chains A mathematical model of the ozone layer is likely to display a tight deductive consistency Other idea sets, however, may have only weak or highly conditional linkages between a conceptual core and subsequent propositions ("if unemployment continues to rise, there might well be an increase in the incidence of urban crime") Indeed, some ideas may have few, if any, deductive linkages flowing from central concepts or definitions Simple frameworks for the categorization of elements (i e , for distinguishing between "capital" vs "operating" budget items or "eligible" vs "ineligible" policy recipients) are examples of this latter case

A summary of these differences among policy ideas can be found in the following figure

FIGURE 1

THE CATEGORIZATION OF POLICY IDEA SETS

		Deductive Linkages	
		Loose	Tight
Definitions or Core Concepts	Vague	Maxims aphorisms ("poverty is an educational problem")	Policy analysis risk assessment (cost-benefit deterrence analysis)
	Precise	Categorizations (Budgeting personnel categories)	Mathematical models symbolic logic (mathematical model of the ozone layer)

The range of categories runs from (1) idea sets with both vague central concepts and extremely tenuous deductive linkages, such as simple aphorisms about a policy problem (e g , "poverty is an educational problem"), to (4) the extreme of mathematical models formally describing a system subject to policy intervention In between are (2) formal categorization frameworks related to policy frameworks which feature well-defined core definitions, but loose (and extremely short) deductive chains, and (3) certain policy analytic

models, such as those devoted to cost/benefit or risk assessment which feature tightly-drawn deductive propositions flowing from vague core concepts regarding "cost," "social benefit," or "acceptable risk."

As basic as such a categorization is, we might well expect quite different political and institutional frameworks to surround policies influenced by ideas of each type. For example, when aphorisms dominate the understanding of a policy problem (as in the "poverty problem") we might expect to see a multiplicity of agencies addressing the problem through overlapping or even conflicting approaches. There will be no agreed-upon falsification or exclusion rules by which a single agency might gain control and rival policy approaches be condemned as erroneous or misconceived. (It is useful to remember in this regard the failure of the Office of Economic Opportunity to consolidate control over all of the diverse and often overlapping programmatic approaches that constituted the "War on Poverty.")

On the other hand, policy ideas which feature precise core concepts or definitions and few if any deductive linkages might well encourage quite specialized organizations and relatively "neat" lines of political differentiation. Haven't formal yet truncated categorizations applied to budgeting facilitated a long-time separation of revenue from expenditure politics in the Congress, with the development of highly-specialized revenue and expenditure committees?[3]

Long-linked deductive idea sets imply a very different policy-making configuration. Where these gain ascendence we might well expect frameworks of standardization or centralization to emerge in order to protect the ideational coherence or "logic" of a model in application to policy. Such frameworks allow true believers to follow a policy idea where it leads—to gain control over relevant variables addressed by a tightly-integrated set of causal inferences. Standardization exists in many public health policies, for instance, when these policies address a dominant causal model of disease the elements of which cut across federal, state, or local governmental jurisdictions.

For our purposes, a key feature of long-linked idea sets is the balance they achieve between the *clarity* of core concepts and definitions and the *tightness* of deductive chains connecting this core to an outward flow of consistent propositions. In particular, an important imbalance can occur in which a set of formalized and explicit deductive propositions are derived (frequently in artificial language) from a vaguely specified central concept (expressible only in natural language). In relation to policy making, idea sets of this latter category can have profound implications.

[3]Of course, as more formal economic models have gained ascendency in recent years we see a shift away from this decentralized and disaggregated budgetary pattern toward more centralized control by the House and Senate Budget Committees, as well as the use of the budget reconciliation process.

Analytic Models and Policy Instability

A major issue posed by idea sets in which tight deductive chains flow outward from vaguely specified central concepts is the difficulty of specifying "stopping rules" which limit or contain the deductive connections The vagueness of central concepts precludes the formulation of formal exclusion principles which "bound" the idea set, contain its area of application, and limit the scope of its deductive inferences In the absence of such boundaries, policies coupled to a given idea set can experience considerable drift away from initial moorings. In fact, close coupling between a prescriptive analytic doctrine and a public policy can lead to a kind of "resonance" in which policy developments can push the doctrine further along a deductive chain and doctrinal displacements can in turn modify the focus of a policy

Just such a relationship can be observed in the evolution of American nuclear weapons policy in relation to the doctrine of deterrence It is highly instructive to examine weapons policy as an "extreme case" phenomenon—an "idea-focused" policy in which key evaluations and decisions have been made on the basis of long-linked deductive arguments This analysis will illustrate how the coupling of procurement policy and doctrine has led to mutual displacements Further, these displacements have led to what we might term "paradox points " While each step in the link has followed more or less logically from its predecessor, the chain ultimately reaches paradoxical or contradictory conclusions

From a review of weapons policy it is possible to draw some interesting conclusions about the potential risks of the ideational current in American public policy making These conclusions suggest a cautionary approach to the "rationalizing" of certain policy efforts and highlight the reciprocal benefits of a kind of "strategic ambiguity" in our approach to policy undertakings and their analysis

Weapons Policy as Ideational Policy

It might seem a dubious assertion that nuclear weapons policy is an idea centered undertaking After all, no less a strategist than Henry Kissinger has characterized that policy as "weapons in search of doctrine " It is also obvious that the construction of weapons means jobs, career advancements and political benefits Indeed, a variety of studies of weapons procuremen decisions have attributed those decisions to economic or institutional self interest (Melman, 1970, Sapolsky, 1972, Kaldor, 1978; Kaplan, 1983).[4]

Yet, in a larger sense, nuclear weapons policy is a uniquely hypothetic undertaking (Wildavsky, 1965) This is so because of a general recognitio

[4] A recent analysis, for example, of the Congressional approval process regarding the MX missile indicates that it was the requirements of coalition-building as much as analytic logic wh[ich] led to the funding level and basing mode actually approved for the weapon (Drew, 1983)

that the power of nuclear weapons has detached their utility from war itself Once policymakers realized that in a nuclear age war could be over in a matter of days or even hours, prior preparation and strategy became the controlling factors in nuclear defense policy, as opposed to more traditional "real-time" war-fighting variables, such as production efficiency or battlefield tactics and management (Brodie, 1959)

The enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons changed fundamentally the focus of weapons strategy The "purpose" of nuclear weapons is that such weapons *not* be used Indeed, their utility in war-fighting is highly problematic, their actual performance (in delivery, triggering, and explosive characteristics) highly uncertain (Bundy, 1984, Hopmann and Anderson, 1986). The major objective of strategy centers on the *prevention* rather than the conduct of war

All of this exerts a profound effect on the character of nuclear weapons policy The essence of that policy has come to be the public endorsement of a *theory*—a theory connecting the existence of a weapons system to a set of conditions that rationally foreclose its use Despite the physical hardware of weapons systems, and the economic and institutional gains that flow from their production, the weapons are in place to serve a uniquely hypothetical end

This theoretical meaning of nuclear weapons has led to the formal coupling of weapons policy to a doctrine of "deterrence"—a prescriptive/analytic model which gives meaning to the weapons systems in our strategic arsenal, even as it significantly influences procurement decisions regarding these weapons This is the idea set within which nuclear weapons policy is conducted Those who stress only the interest-serving aspects of weapons policy ignore the larger theoretical context—indeed the overarching theoretical *meaning*—attached to weapons decisions In fact, no nuclear weapon system can escape an implication under deterrence theory It is an ordering framework subscribed to by two sides of an arms competition

Deterrence as a Policy Analytic Framework

Deterrence The Conceptual Core In its broadest formulation, deterrence is a theory of the causes of war and the prevention of war (Morgan, 1983, Powell, 1985) Its conceptual core centers around an axiom "The probability that an individual will be in a given situation or type of situation may be affected by the beliefs of others about what that individual would do in that situation" (Gauthier, 1984)

From an international relations perspective this means that if one nation (A) can demonstrate to another (B) that an aggressive action against it would elicit a response imposing costs that exceed possible gains, such aggressive action by B becomes unlikely (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). In decision theory vernacular, the "expected value" (costs or gains times their probability) regarding the consequences of using force is the controlling element in deci-

sions about the initial use of such force. If the expected value is negative, rational calculation leads away from aggressive attack. Where the expected values associated with war are overwhelmingly negative, and where they are shared by all potential aggressors (as is the case with nuclear weapons) the likelihood of the outbreak of war is reduced dramatically This reduction in probability is the meaning which can be attached to the concept of "deterrence" (Snyder, 1961, Schelling, 1961)

There are some important assumptions embedded within this conceptual core First is the assumption that the outbreak of war is a function of calculation. At the very least, aggressive acts will reflect purposive and "sensible" choice and this choice will be strongly tempered by a recognition of unfavorable expected values (Morgan, 1983) Secondly, there is an assumption that A understands the relative distribution of risks and rewards for B, otherwise A might err in the design of its deterrent capabilities Thirdly, both A and B must agree on what constitutes an aggressive, i e , a "deterrable" act Finally, the concept assumes as well that all parties can distinguish between an aggressive act and the retaliatory capacities to respond to an aggressive act In other words, deterrence requires that the development of capacities to punish an aggressor does not in itself constitute an aggressive, war-triggering event

Each of these assumptions has been challenged in critical attacks upon deterrence theory (Green, 1966, Jervis, 1984) For our purposes there is no need to explore these theoretical challenges We are not interested in the accuracy of deterrence as a theory about the outbreak of war Instead, we are interested in deterrence as a policy analytic framework for the guidance of weapons procurement decisions

It is evident that the core of the theory has an indelible imprecision concerning what constitutes an aggressive act and how much retaliation constitutes a "deterring" punishment This has not, however, prevented the attachment to this core of a long-linked chain of deduced prescriptive propositions These have come to comprise a formal "doctrine" of deterrence used for analytic purposes in weapons procurement (Bundy, 1984).

It is important at this point to distinguish the core concept of "deterrence from an alternate concept, namely "defense " Defense refers to the ability of A to resist an aggressive action from B *in spite of B's effort to pursue it* (Art and Waltz, 1971) [5]

Deterrence and defense are reciprocal concepts One focuses on the prevention of aggression, the other on its resistance and containment One is directed exclusively at avoiding war, the other must encompass war-fighting as a realistic strategy.

[5]Both deterrence and defense may be further differentiated from an additional concep known as 'compellence ' Compellence is an aggressive use of a nuclear threat not simply t secure inaction but to force an opponent to adopt positive forms of compliant behavior (Morga 1983)

Interestingly, a policy centered around one concept tends to undermine a commitment to the other A deterrence-based policy in effect "front-loads" weapons threats in such a way that few rational options may remain should deterrence fail (Schell, 1982) On the other hand, a commitment to realistic options for defense may make initial war-provoking actions (up to and including a pre-emptive first-strike) less costly and thus more likely

A pure strategy of nuclear deterrence will focus weapons on the targets of highest value to the enemy irrespective of their war-fighting utility Thus the deterrence-based policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is founded upon counter*value* targeting—namely cities, with their concentrations of industrial resources and population On the other hand, a defense-oriented policy will be characterized by counter*force* targeting against missile installations and other military targets

From a brief historical review we will see that, despite the contradictory nature of these concepts, they have become connected to each other in American nuclear weapons policy by a set of deductive linkages, each of which has seemed entirely plausible on its surface Coupling weapons procurement decisions to deterrence doctrine has pushed both along what has amounted to a paradoxical deductive chain There have been no conclusive "stopping rules" within the doctrine to halt this outward progression

Deterrence Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons The United States emerged from World War II with a small number of relatively low-yield atomic weapons and a monopoly over all such weapons While a few academic analysts foresaw major strategic implications in these weapons and their destructive force, U S military planners initially integrated atomic weapons into conventional war-fighting strategy (Kaplan, 1983)

Even the development of a nuclear capability by the Soviets did not at once lead American military planners to place the analysis of weapons capacities within a deterrence perspective Both British and American officials continued to discuss plans for a "broken back" war between the two superpowers, in which fighting would continue despite major destruction of national industrial infrastructures (Brodie, 1959, Beaufre 1966)

But the development of the lighter and more efficient hydrogen bomb by both sides made deterrence an inescapable concept for rational military planning While defense and war-fighting perspectives were still influential in inter-service competition and procurement decision making, deterrence had to be the formal objective of nuclear weapons policy Soon deterrence would be translated from a general policy objective to an applied weapons-analytic framework This translation occurred because of an important deductive extension of the basic concept—an extension promoted by a set of strategic analysts within the Rand Corporation (Kaplan, 1983)

The concept of deterrence demands that a negative expected value regarding aggressive action be maintained as the best hope of forestalling such

ction. In situations of mutual deterrence such perceptions must be maintained by both sides. Given the costs of deterrence failure in a nuclear age, each side has an interest in erring on the side of caution in its evaluation of the strategic balance. Indeed, it was quickly argued that each side must always assume aggressive intentions on the part of the other, up to the limits of their capabilities. For deterrence theorists, capabilities and not intentions became the crucial factor in strategic analysis

In its most formalized, game-theoretic formulations, actors in deterrence "games" follow a "minimax" strategy, that is, they attempt to minimize the maximum loss which could be suffered through competitive interactions In their analysis of relative weapons balances, Rand analysts assumed that rational weapons policy meant countering the Soviet's "worst-case" military capabilities, rather than hoping for a restraint in the employment of those capabilities based upon moderated intentions In the game-theoretic formulation of deterrence, each player must assume that the other side is playing its best game against them.

This worst-case approach to deterrence analysis leads inevitably to a special perspective on weapons technology From a worst-case orientation almost every weapon can have a dual purpose It can have a potential offensive as well as defensive utility This leads to what has been termed a "security dilemma"—"most means of self-protection simultaneously threaten others" (Jervis, 1976, p 63) Even such seemingly defensive measures as bomb shelters or the hardening of industrial production facilities illustrate the dilemma From the worst-case perspective such measures might well indicate the presence of a first-strike strategy on the part of a nation, founded upon hitting first and surviving a weakened retaliatory response [6]

The worst-case perspective on deterrence analysis, combined with the security dilemma, means that virtually no technological development can escape doctrinal meaning Missiles that can be targeted against cities might also be targeted against other missiles, thus endangering an enemy's deterrent capacity Even research programs must be taken seriously as a potential displacement of the strategic balance [7] New weapons or weapons modifications, whether strategically or bureaucratically inspired, must all be assessed from the standpoint of their potential to disrupt strategic balances and convey unilateral advantage

The worst-case branch of deterrence theory was perhaps first formalized in a major Rand study of overseas base vulnerability. Here, intricate analysis revealed the theoretical possibility that the Soviets could strike first at our overseas bomber installations and seriously disable our retaliatory force This study eventually altered the distribution of homeland to foreign-base

[6] It is for such reasons that ABM systems were viewed by both the United States and U S S as a potentially threatening weapons technology

[7] It is from this perspective that the Soviets have publicly condemned the Reagan administration's "strategic defense initiative" research program

aircraft, but more importantly, it connected the worst-case perspective formally to nuclear weapons analysis Among strategic planners, the Rand study "fostered the notion that imbalances and vulnerabilities that were revealed through complex calculations changed everything about the likelihood of war and the meaning of victory. It helped reinforce the assumption that once the Soviets acquired a theoretical capability to launch a dazzling first-strike, they might very well launch one, despite the many uncertainties and risks involved" (Kaplan, 1983, p 108)

The worst-case extension of the deterrence concept led to its close coupling as a prescriptive/analytic framework to weapons acquisition decision making At its weakest, it has served as a means by which weapons deployment pressures could be rationalized (Gray, 1978) More than this, however, it has functioned as a prism through which each Soviet weapons acquisition has been evaluated As a result, deterrence doctrine has served at key times as a linkage which has locked our own weapons policies into those of the Soviets Under worst-case reasoning, doctrine and technology have displaced one another in an outward direction, along a deductive track

Policy Coupling and Doctrinal Drift

The broad track of policy, technological, and doctrinal movement in nuclear weapons procurement can be depicted in the following sketch

Figure 2

Weapons Policy Transformations

Doctrine				
Deterrence	→		→	Defense
Policy				
Massive Retaliation	→	Graduated Deterrence	→	War-fighting (Nuclear defense)
(SIOP-62)		(SIOP-'63, "no-cities")		(NSDM-242, PD-59, "Reagan-13")
Technology				
High yield, low accuracy	→	more missiles, more accuracy	→	more warheads, low yield, high accuracy
(Titan-II, Polaris)		(Minuteman-II, Lance)		(MIRV Minuteman-III, Cruise, S.D.I.)

Stage I Formal Doctrinal Coupling

As mentioned, the development of hydrogen weapons led to the formal injection of deterrence theory into strategic analysis and weapons policy The greater efficiency and lighter weight of these weapons cheapened their manufacture In addition, their higher yield and lower weight gave a rapid boost to the deployment of missile delivery systems since even their relatively low targeting accuracy could still yield decisive effects against population and industrial centers.

The Eisenhower administration found in these weapons a prospect of significantly reduced defense costs This fit well with its general commitment to federal budget austerity As part of the administration's "new look" in defense, a policy of Massive Retaliation was publicly announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954 This policy threatened a massive nuclear assault upon the Soviet Union as a response to a wide variety of aggressive acts, even conventional military aggression in Western Europe or Asia

This massive retaliation policy represented an extreme application of the deterrence concept The nuclear deterrence umbrella, it was hoped, would extend even to Korean War-type military actions, thus preventing Soviet involvement in such situations, and substantially cheapening the defense bill that the United States would have to pay in pursuit of a global policy of communist containment

Here was the idea of deterrence applied with almost zealous intensity Such an extreme extension of deterrence thinking was possible because the Eisenhower administration at this point believed only in a unilateral rather than a bilateral deterrence relationship with the Soviet Union Administration officials, including the president himself, did not believe that the Soviets were in a position to threaten equivalent destruction upon the Unitec States

Ultimately, the development of a Soviet missile capability (demonstrate graphically by the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957) and a report of special National Security Council committee (the Gaither Committee) that same year convinced Eisenhower that a nuclear war was no longer acceptable or indeed survivable national option Ironically, the Gaitl Committee in its report had attempted to persuade the president to com his administration to a wide range of nuclear war defense measures, incl ing fallout shelters The costs were so extreme, however, and the numbe projected deaths so high that Eisenhower realized there could be no win in a nuclear war (Killian, 1977, Halperin, 1961)

This was a period of high concentration on countervalue as oppose counterforce targets This is not to say that there were no counterforce sures within the armed services but the general logic of deterrence sway and "the idea of 'pure counterforce' or 'counterforce/no cities' tar failed to catch on " (Friedberg, 1981).

Ironically, it was during this period of deterrence preeminence that the foundations were laid for a doctrinal "drift." This drift occurred because, first, the effort to translate deterrence into a more precise analytical framework coupled it closely to actual weapons capabilities and to shifts in those capabilities, as interpreted from a worst-case perspective. Secondly, the doctrine itself, and the concept upon which it rested, set no stopping point for weapons deployments on a scale which ultimately threatened to contradict the logic of deterrence itself.

A telling indication of things to come occurred in the period 1959–60 as the Navy attempted to promote a set of stopping points or limiting rules for weapons procurement under a conception of "finite deterrence." Naval officials hoped to have such a doctrine imposed upon the formulation of the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nuclear targeting guidelines for the United States. The Navy had an institutional interest in limiting the increase of the nuclear arsenal. That arsenal consisted generally of bombers and missiles that were the province of its arch rival, the Air Force. The Navy was also anxious to assure a prominent role for its new Polaris submarine in the emerging strategic plan. This submarine would carry nuclear missiles but of significantly less accuracy than those land-based ICBMs of the Air Force.

Institutional interests prompted a strong effort to promote a set of end points on weapons acquisition within the framework of deterrence. Because Polaris missiles would only be accurate enough to be effective against cities, the Navy stressed a pure deterrence cities-only doctrine that rejected counterforce. It argued further that "once an effective basic force level is deployed, it does not make much difference whether increments of one system or another are added in the retaliatory force" (Kaplan, 1983, pp. 259–60).

Here was a clear effort to bound the deterrence concept in relation to its weapons requirements. Yet it failed as a restraint on continued nuclear weapons building within the armed services (particularly by the Air Force). It also failed to keep counterforce elements out of the SIOP. The SIOP adopted in 1960 (for implementation in fiscal year 1962) contained both urban/industrial and counterforce targets in what was termed an "optimal mix." Further, it attached high reliability standards to the counterforce targeting—standards which required multiple strikes at each target. This, combined with the very large number of overall targets (more than 600) laid the groundwork for continued expansion of U.S. nuclear forces.

One explanation for the Navy's failure to gain acceptance for finite deterrence is certainly the countervailing bureaucratic interests of the Air Force. But a more fundamental explanation lies in the character of deterrence theory itself—as an idea set. In the vagueness of its core concept, deterrence theory did not allow the specification of how much of a deterrent threat was enough—only that the prospect of retaliation should be "overwhelming" in order to protect against errors of misestimation.

At the same time, the analytic extensions of the core concept—toward the worst-case estimation of military capacities and the vulnerability of retaliatory forces—were all carried out under the rubric of formal calculation. In other words, the weapons "sufficiency" aspects of the deterrence threat were unspecifiable while the "insufficiency" and vulnerability aspects could be readily identified and calculated with seeming precision

Ultimately, a paradox was generated by the coupling of deterrence concepts to large-scale weapons deployments The deployment of weapons with destructive power on the order of magnitude to be "overwhelming" in relation to possible enemy objectives rendered the actual use of such weapons (in a situation of mutual deterrence) less than credible. As it turns out, the larger the threat on the deterrence side of a deterrence/retaliation equation, the more irrational the execution of this threat becomes should deterrence fail.[8] It was this paradox which was to lead to a major modification of deterrence doctrine and a subsequent escalation in weapons procurement policy

Stage II The Credibility Crisis

The failure to locate a deterrence-based limiting rule for the growth of the American nuclear arsenal led rather quickly to a weapons-induced doctrinal "shock" for American nuclear strategy Our retaliatory capacities pushed deterrence theory to a paradox point regarding the credibility of nuclear threats

Deterrence theory stipulates that a negative expected value is the key to precluding aggressive action There are two components to an expected value. costs and the probability of their imposition The threat of more assured destruction meant on the surface that there would be an inescapably negative expected value associated with any potential act of aggression But ironically, the very nuclear capability which made these costs unambiguously clear to the enemy also undermined the rational credibility, and thus the probability, attached to their use The SIOP called for the firing off of all of our nuclear forces at once against the Soviet Union (as well as Eastern Europe and China) in the event of a Soviet attack This, it was hoped, would maximize the deterrent threat of our offensive arsenal Yet as a number of strategic analysts noted, such a threat seemed to raise more questions than answered

The massive retaliation threat was an inflexible option Would a nation really react so strongly if the aggressive action taken against it was vastly smaller in costs and consequence—if an ally were invaded or if a single missile were launched against it? To react so strongly would violate all conceptions of proportionality (Brodie, 1959) Further, it would invite a stronger counter-retaliation by the aggressor nation in return

[8]This paradox has become even more pointed, given speculations on the prospect of "nuclear winter" following a large-scale nuclear exchange (Schell, 1982, Sagan, et al , 1983

Imagine that the Soviets were to initiate a military invasion of Western Europe Would the United States really respond with a massive nuclear retaliation against the U S.S.R ? To do so would result in the destruction of U S. cities in return.[9]

The threat of massive retaliation might seem rational as a means of deterrence, but is the carrying out of the threat really a utility-maximizing or rational exercise? If not, can the *threat itself* really be rational and thus believable to the other side? As one logician has put it "The argument against the rationality of nuclear retaliation, or more generally against a deterrent policy, has this structure: it is not utility-maximizing to carry out the nonsubmissive, retaliatory intention, therefore it is not rational so to act, therefore it is not rational to form the intention, therefore a rational person cannot seriously express the intention, therefore another rational and informed person *cannot be deterred* by the expression of the intention" (Gauthier, 1984, p 107 [emphasis added])

The irony of a deterrent policy founded on massive retaliation is all too apparent The greater the promised nuclear response the less its credibility when proportionality would be violated With credibility undermined, the less deterred is an opponent in undertaking an aggressive act Indeed, an aggressor might be tempted to undertake actions which he has reason to expect lie below a rational retaliation threshold Under such circumstances, it might well be that the greater the retaliatory force the *higher* the risk of war based upon misestimation between two parties in a deterrence relationship

It was doubts such as these that led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to undertake revision of our massive retaliation policy (and the SIOP) in the first days of the Kennedy administration Speaking before a group of NATO officials, McNamara asserted "Our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war" (Kaplan, 1983, p 284) McNamara's substitution, a policy of "graduated deterrence," was announced at a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1962

Graduated deterrence was an attempt to cope with the doctrinal shock introduced into deterrence by its close association with massive nuclear arsenals. It focused upon the attempt to provide a set of "intra-war" restraints and controls should deterrence fail This rescue effort relied heavily upon counterforce In so doing it shifted strategic doctrine significantly away from deterrence and toward its reciprocal concept "defense"

The cornerstone of the new strategy was intensive counterforce targeting against those weapons which could be used against the United States This would have the effect of allowing a limited strike against the Soviet Union

[9] Even our British and French allies came to question such deterrence as was indicated in the development of individualized nuclear forces

while simultaneously minimizing the capacity of the Soviets for escalating nuclear war in return. It would avoid at the outset high-value targets such as cities which would be in effect "held hostage" in order to discourage further Soviet escalations.

In his Ann Arbor speech, McNamara committed the nation to a graduated nuclear response to Soviet aggression NATO also adopted a doctrine of "flexible response " Strategic analysts like Herman Kahn attempted to formalize the concept of intra-war deterrence by specifying "thresholds of violence" and detailing multiple "ladders of escalation " (Kahn, 1964).

This doctrinal shift had dramatic implications as far as weapons procurement was concerned The exacting counterforce requirements associated with graduated deterrence called for many more missiles (several to each target in order to assure reliable results) The number of American ICBMs rose from 424 in 1963 to 1,054 by 1967 At the same time, counterforce strategy created a strong demand for tactical nuclear weapons to make war-fighting a credible prospect in Europe [10] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the counterforce strategy created a doctrinal "pull" for major improvements in missile accuracy McNamara approved the development and deployment of new inertial guidance systems to upgrade significantly the accuracy of the next generation of Minuteman missiles

Ironically, not long after his commitment to graduated deterrence "Mc Namara began to fear that the counterforce strategy presented *no* logical lim to the size of the arsenal, that as long as targets of potential military val could be found or as long as the Soviets added more weapons to their o arsenal, someone could always claim that we did not have enough, that own endorsement of counterforce was promoting an unlimited nuclear a buildup that he had gone out of his way to suppress" (Kaplan, 1983, p 3

Confronted with seemingly uncontrollable pressures for weapons de ments, McNamara "gradually and progressively backed away from the p of damage limitation in a nuclear war, reportedly instructing the na military leaders to ignore his earlier statements on the concept in the ture planning" (Herken, 1984, p 21)

Yet there was no easy return to a pure deterrence doctrine, once w coupling had forced its logical extension More than simple bureaucra mentum was at work here "Having, in effect, let the camel's no the doctrinal tent, McNamara—and his successors—would find it ingly difficult to keep a war-fighting strategy from insinuating itself into the thinking and planning that concerned nuclear weapons" (1984, p. 2[illegible]).

[10]One such weapon, the "Davy Crockett" could be jeep-mounted and was of su that it threatened to erode the threshold between nuclear and conventional war In later doctrinal revision it was withdrawn from service in the mid-1960s (Gray 197

Stage III Retaliatory Insecurity

Despite McNamara's efforts to back away from graduated deterrence, he could not restore the doctrinal credibility of assured destruction Instead, the new round of weapons procurement that graduated deterrence unleashed pushed the process of doctrinal drift even further forward in the direction of defense and nuclear war fighting. Graduated deterrence itself became endangered by a weapons-driven contradiction and was increasingly displaced by prescriptive/analytic frameworks of extended nuclear war-fighting and even nuclear "victory" (Gray, 1979)

As our missile and warhead production increased, that of the Soviets also increased offsetting the counterforce capability which the American weapons could mount against them For each new Soviet military site, multiple American weapons would have to be targeted against it in order to assure high counterforce reliability Ultimately, the point was passed at which a "restrained" counterforce strike *could be distinguished* from a massive strike threatening the continued existence of the Soviet Union Counterforce had ceased to be a *limited* option and "graduated" deterrence became a logically questionable possibility Former Nixon/Ford administration Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who himself had endeavored to carve out limited nuclear war fighting options, later came to admit that 'the number of missiles involved washes out all discrimination" (Herken, 1985)

In the meantime one of the weapons developments approved by McNamara (in an effort to hold down the growth in both land- and sea-based nuclear missiles and to counter the potential deployment of a Soviet antiballistic missile system) was a system of multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) MIRV technology was a direct outgrowth of the space program which had dramatically advanced "post-boost'-phase altitude and reentry control systems for spacecraft MIRV allowed a radical increase in the number of warheads which could be delivered by means of a single missile

Yet this increased number of warheads, coupled with major accuracy improvements which were being achieved during the late sixties and early seventies, raised the specter that counterforce capabilities could threaten the retaliatory security of the enemy Matching Soviet weapons technology began to threaten our own retaliatory capabilities The development of these technical capacities again accorded, under worst-case analysis a plausible status to the possiblity of a nuclear first strike [11]

[11] This issue was publicly debated within the context of a window of vulnerability which reportedly threatened the security of the American retaliatory arsenal Such concerns ultimately played an important role in the refusal of the Senate to ratify the SALT II agreements negotiated by the Carter administration An influential expression of these concerns can be found in Nitze (1976)

A set of new weapons, developed to serve a doctrine by creating a set of credible and graduated war-fighting options, has actually destabilized deterrence analysis itself. What we have witnessed in United States nuclear weapons policy is a set of doctrinal and technological transitions. The progression has run from a relatively pure concept of deterrence to one of defense and actual nuclear war fighting. More recently, there has even been the emergence in weapons policy of distinct elements of nuclear *compellence,* that is, using an active nuclear threat to pressure the Soviets into altering their international behavior or, through the pressure of a nuclear arms competition, to alter the character of Soviet society (Pipes, 1984).

In the Nixon/Ford, Carter, and Reagan eras preemptive, first-use nuclear strategies and targeting have all been prominent (Kaplan, 1983, Herken, 1984) President Nixon signed "National Security Defense Memorandum-242" which stressed the importance of "flexible options" including the first use of nuclear weapons against conventional aggression This in turn triggered the deployment of more warheads with even higher delivery accuracies, as did McNamara's graduated deterrence doctrine of an earlier era President Carter signed "Presidential Directive-59" which further elaborated a set of nuclear war-fighting plans, extending over a period of weeks or longer

President Reagan, in a document now known as "Reagan-13," also endorsed publicly a plan of nuclear war fighting which, like PD-59, was predicated on the concept that nuclear war might not be that different from conventional war—it could be extended in time and it might be winnable (Herken, 1985) Further, his commitment to strategic defense or "star wars" technology represents the most explicit substitution yet of defense and war-fighting concepts for those of deterrence

It is important to understand this set of doctrinal and technological displacements Each has been driven by interaction with the other Defense analysts often stress the predominance of bureaucratic predispositions for incremental weapons development (Art, 1968, Gansler, 1985) Yet incremental growth in the number or capability of weapons systems has led to periods of dramatic and logically-undermining doctrinal shock. Doctrinal modifications, in turn, have opened the door for *non-incremental,* qualititative shifts in weapons technology Simple models of bureaucratic momentum or institutional self-interest do not account for such a complex pattern of policy change.

Weapons Policy and Doctrinal Coupling

Within the policy history presented above it is important to realize how the original concept of deterrence has been deductively extended The extension has run from a conceptually vague idea concerning behavior under threat to a worst-case perspective on threat assessments to ultimate

poration of counterforce or first-strike capacities in a deterrent "equation." This has all occurred under the rubric of increasingly more formalized and quantified analysis.

Both the United States and Soviet Union continue to employ worst-case deterrence analysis to compute the circumstances under which a nuclear first strike could become a "rational" option Irrespective of the accuracy of such calculations, ***both sides appear to take them seriously*** When weapons balances threaten to shift toward a point of "instability" as determined by deterrence-based analytic models, action by one or both sides is taken

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, for example, was signed by both nations in order to prevent the deployment of thick ballistic missile defenses around major cities It was clearly recognized that such defensive measures would have resulted in more missiles or warheads being deployed by both sides in order to preserve the effectiveness of their deterrent forces The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) agreements with the Soviets (particularly SALT-I) occurred when U S officials wished to halt numerical increases in Soviet ICBM (and MIRV'ed warhead) superiority Further increases would have approached analytic "boundaries of stable deterrence" and provoked a corresponding arms build-up by the United States as a consequence

Deterrence doctrine, as a weapons analytic framework, has tied the meaning of our weapons inventory much more closely to perceptions of the Soviet inventory than would otherwise have been the case It has set a bounds on weapons balances beyond which weapons policy has not been allowed to stray

As it turns out this has been a very powerful coupling between policy and doctrine Deterrence models have amounted to much more than abstracted exercises in technology assessment They have actually functioned (because of their bounding effects) as an extremely dynamic mechanism of ***policy intensification***

In an effort to contain the U S -Soviet missile balance within the margins of safety portrayed by deterrence analysis, the balance points have shifted constantly upward in terms of weapons capabilities The analytic "tie" which connects both nuclear arsenals in a deterrence relationship couples each nation's weapons policy at the same time to extremely dynamic processes of technological innovation New technologies can hardly be predicted or contained, and yet they cannot be ignored by analysts ever concerned about displacements away from a mutual deterrence configuration Under a constant "amplification of meaning" provided by deterrence analysis, the arms race has actually amounted to a multi-dimensional process of technological intensification.[12]

[12] A critique of single-dimensional models of the nuclear arms race can be found in Wohlstetter (1974)

WEAPONS POLICY AND IDEATIONAL AMBIGUITY

The description of weapons policy offered above carries some unusual implications. We have witnessed the development of a set of ideas—concepts and propositions—which address a specific public problem. These ideas have been further developed and extended under standards of analytic precision and deductive consistency. They have been applied to public policy by means of a relatively formalized prescriptive/analytic model which gives "meaning" to the configuration of weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Yet this effort to "rationalize" policymaking yields surprisingly unstable, even paradoxical results.

Indeed, it is even plausible to argue that doctrinal *ambiguity* and *vagueness* rather than specificity and formalization might have led to more stable, and perhaps even safer, weapons procurement policy. How could this be?

Early on in our description of idea sets, it was noted that perhaps the most unstable form of policy idea is one in which a relatively imprecise conceptual core is surrounded by a set of formalized propositions. In such cases it is extremely difficult to formulate explicit stopping rules to limit the chain of deductively plausible extensions. This seems to be precisely the problem associated with deterrence as a policy idea.

Deterrence is a concept indelibly rooted in vagueness. In fact, it is probably definable only in natural language expressions. To formalize its analysis (frequently in the artificial language of mathematics) and couple it closely to weapons assessments is to invite its extension along a deductive chain whose ultimate consistency cannot be guaranteed. This is precisely what we have witnessed during distinct periods in the evolution of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Technology coupled to doctrine has pushed the "logic" of policy to points of contradiction. New technological responses have then been generated as a means to rescue the policy from logical inconsistency or paradox.

To put the problem another way: an analytic framework for risk assessmen has itself become a *risky actor* in the design and implementation of a publi policy. To couple policy to such a framework is to invite a process of displace ment which can lead to radically skewed and unpredictable policy outcome Ironically, rational policymaking in the context of nuclear weapons procur ment may well require discounting a set of analytic conclusions regardi risk on the basis that the very process of formal risk assessment is *itself* uncontrollable and unpredictable aspect of policymaking.

What would this mean for weapons procurement policy? Perhaps fir all a recognition that uncertainty is at the heart of the policy objec In reality, *it is not the precision of calculation by an enemy that leads deterrent-level expected value*. Instead it is fundamental *uncertainty* what might happen—in weapons performance and adversarial respo

that forms the psychological basis for deterrence. To attempt to clarify risks and compute them precisely is to open the door for offsetting strategies and for new weapons technologies in support of them

Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy has made just this argument in asserting the need to treat deterrence as an "existential" concept Existential deterrence, he argues, "should be distinguished from the kind that is based on strategic theories or declaratory policies or even international commitments . . . It rests on uncertainty about what *could* happen, not on what has been asserted" (Bundy, 1984, p 9) [13]

A policy which recognizes that analytic frameworks can be inherently risky elements will "protect" the ambiguity of key concepts [14] Its practitioners will discount heavily attempts to surround such concepts with formal deductive postulates Such policy might well feature plural and competitive approaches to even the assessment of error and risk Efforts would be made to avoid "capture" by one analytic approach, and a point of diminishing returns would be recognized in efforts to sculpt policy along tight boundaries of deductive consistency [15]

It is even possible to imagine an arms reduction process conducted under an existential conception of deterrence Here either nation would have greatly expanded unilateral options to pursue arms shifts Each would even be able to relocate weapons ratios outside formal worst-case deterrence boundaries, trusting in basic uncertainties to maintain security against actual weapons use

Such an approach would require a recognition that, while deterrence as a policy analytic framework may have created its own reality in regard to weapons *procurement* decisions, it is an altogether different assumption that such a framework would function as a trigger or prompt for actual weapons *use* [16]

Preserving the ambiguity and imprecision of the deterrence concept also would mean that the rather stringent international agreement requirements currently associated with arms reduction might be substantially relaxed In fact, unilateral arms reductions might well be used as a means to *test* the Soviet reaction, rather than resulting from agreed-upon or presumed Soviet behavior

[13] For another exploration of the role of uncertainty in maintaining deterrence see Betts (1985)

[14] For a general exploration of the importance of ambiguity in social policy see Levine (1985) An important exploration of ambiguity within the context of organizational design can be found in Cohen and March (1974)

[15] Such a policy framework is not far from that proposed generally by George (1972) in his case for "multiple advocacy" in foreign policy

[16] It is interesting to note the paucity of evidence for the assumption that calculated weapons imbalances would actually be the cause of the use of nuclear weapons by one nation against another Indeed, in one historical period in which a nuclear first strike appeared analytically to

Of course, it is important to recognize that it is extremely difficult in policymaking, once conceptual extensions occur and are translated into formalized prescriptive/analytic frameworks, to backtrack in the direction of ambiguity This renders even more pressing the need to examine and analyze closely the emerging ideational current in American public policymaking

On the Future of Ideas and Policies

This analysis of nuclear weapons policy under the ideational framework of deterrence represents itself a "worst-case" example of the coupling of deductive idea-sets to public policymaking In few policy undertakings are basic objectives and scenarios as "hypothetical" In few do doctrinal couplings produce such dramatic policy escalations, nor are the mutual displacements between policy and doctrine as readily evident.

Yet, if anything, an argument can be made that nuclear weapons policy stands as a likely precursor of things to come in a variety of policy settings Its analysis provides a cautionary tale regarding the new world of ideational policy

The fact is that public policies in the future are likely to be increasingly conducted within the realm of the hypothetical This is so because the interests they are patterned to serve are likely to be increasingly entangled within conceptions of larger systems—complex technologies, ecologies, or economic systems These systems will be appreciated and understood more through the medium of formal models than through basic statements of constituency demand Logic will increasingly displace experience

Public policy is likely to be increasingly *anticipatory* regarding the breakdown or failure of complex systems because such failures threaten to produce ever more catastrophic results (Perrow, 1984, LaPorte, 1982) A great deal of regulatory policy is even now directed toward the anticipated risks of new technologies or industrial processes The risks run from public health "disasters" to potentially irreversible damage to fragile ecosystems Regulatory policy is increasingly crafted not in the context of trial and error learning (which can scarcely be tolerated) but under the rubric of formalized models of risk assessment (Lowrance, 1982)

It would seem a reasonable prophecy that (1) the more complex the problem to be addressed by policy, and (2) the more decision makers confront action-forcing situations under uncertainty, and (3) the more threatening become the risks associated with policy error, then the greater is the likelihood that policy will be conducted under hypotheses derived from formal id

be a feasible option for the United States (during 1961–62) apparently not a single official U S policy-making circles (even during a major international crisis with the Soviets over Ber ever proposed the use of nuclear weapons (Kaplan, 1983 Legault and Lindsey, 1976)

sets rather than from specialized expressions of material interest In the future, idea-based policy, closely wedded to formalized doctrine and worst-case analytic models, is likely to be increasingly common rather than an exception to conventional policy practice

Further, it is likely that such policy will surround what are essentially natural language concepts ("quality of life", "reasonable safety", "acceptable risk", etc) with formalized extensions expressed in quantitative terms

Doctrinal Coupling and Political Institutions

One important set of issues raised by the prospect of ideational policy is institutional The promulgation of idea sets under constraints of deductive consistency runs counter to long-standing practices of institutional pluralism Such pluralism after all reflects an American tradition of pragmatism—a suspicion of doctrine and a rejection of rigidly formal principles promulgated under a "foolish consistency" (Hartz, 1961) Plural, even competing, institutions are a method for containing doctrinal error They represent a kind of parallel construction to policymaking, a "hedging" of bets, so that if one institutional approach fails alternative measures remain intact (Landau, 1972)

Deductive consistency assaults pluralism It is equivalent to connecting the elements of a system in series rather than in parallel (Landau, 1969) If one element fails, all are implicated Thus the threat of doctrinal contradiction threatens to undermine an entire intellectual edifice and, of course, any public policy undertaking to which it might be coupled

It is no coincidence that where we see formalized prescriptive/analytic frameworks surrounding policy making we tend to see centralized institutions This has certainly been the case in nuclear weapons procurement, despite inter-service rivalries No one should really mistake bureaucratic bargaining and competition within the Defense Department, conducted under secrecy and organizational hierarchy, as an example of institutional decentralization Indeed, the outcome of many of these competitive inter-service disputes has turned heavily upon "official" acceptance of particular doctrinal "logics" (Kaplan, 1983, pp 263–270)

It is possible to imagine a future of *implicit* policy centralization—a sharing of key prescriptive/analytic assumptions which constrain policy options and dictate policy design across a wide range of nominally independent institutions Already a number of state environmental and public health standards have come to mirror federal ones There are also increasing pressures for uniformity in the adoption of accounting, budgeting, and scheduling procedures as well as in the use of policy measurement and cost/benefit methodologies (Botner, 1985)

Economic policies, which are increasingly model-intensive, raise new pressures for agreement upon the basic assumptions which underlie models

and economic forecasts. Forecasts, in turn, are likely to become the foundation upon which budgetary politics comes to rest It is revealing, in this regard, that a growing number of government officials, both in the executive branch and the Congress, have come to stress the need for consensus on basic economic forecasts *before* budgetary politics can commence (Benn, 1982) It is also interesting to note that as budgeting becomes more forecast-dependent, it has become institutionally more centralized within the Congress The role of specialized appropriations subcommittees has declined in importance relative to both the budget committees and the reconciliation process conducted on the floor of each house (Schick, 1983).

To be sure, as Heclo (1978) notes, politics often surrounds the crafting of analytic models There is extensive debate over "numbers" and appropriate methodologies But there is also a real likelihood that political officials will feel increasingly pressured to "sign-on" to numbers, projections and models *before* the politics of policy making proceeds

Former Budget Director David Stockman argues that just such a process occurred within the executive branch with the adoption of "rosy scenario" revenue projections prior to the formulation of the Reagan administration's 1982 budget (Stockman, 1986) The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment seems to require its own forecasting "sign-on" prior to the commencement of congressional budget cutting measures

The development of ideational policy could threaten the error containment which institutional pluralism provides To the degree that a wide variety of policy participants, regardless of their institutional location, sign on to prescriptive/analytic models the costs of policy error are likely to increase At the same time, pinpointing political accountability for such error may be a much more difficult process In its worst case, ideational policy could lead to major public undertakings at high levels of investment conducted upon unstable foundations of analytic illusion

Doctrinal Binding and Decision Rationality

In a book entitled *Ulysses and the Sirens*, Jon Elster explores the extent to which it is a rational strategy to bind decisions to frameworks which allow decision makers to "rise above themselves"—that is, to act against their own short-term dispositions in favor of long-term, collective benefits (Elster 1979) Just as Ulysses tied himself to the mast of his ship to prevent his succumbing to the seductive song of the sirens on shore, so too, Elster argues, can decision makers bind themselves to doctrines, constitutions, commitments, and strategies in order to transcend their own motivational limitations and thus realize a higher-level (if delayed) decisional return In these cases it is rational to couple policy as closely as possible to doctrinal frame-

works which can ensure decisional rigidity on behalf of an ultimately desirable outcome.[17]

Yet what we have seen of doctrinal coupling in weapons policy calls into serious question the wisdom of such a strategy. For certain doctrines, under tight decisional binding *the mast itself can move*—that is, doctrinal displacements can occur along a deductive chain in unforseeable and even uncontrollable directions. Further, there is no guarantee that the end result of such motion will not be paradoxical or contradictory relative to the original objectives of a public policy. The rationality of doctrinal coupling might well be undermined by the inherent riskiness and instability of linking many formal idea sets closely to the conduct of public policy.

Interestingly, scholars and practitioners alike have long been aware of such dangers in the area of *normative* doctrine. There is widespread distrust of coupling explicit ideological or philosophical idea sets to public policy precisely because of suspicions of where such doctrines may lead upon processes of transformation.

Thus, for example, the banning of pornography has been resisted because of fears it may lead through doctrinal extension to the banning of a wide variety of additional literature, or even to restricting non-literary expressions of free speech. Passive euthanasia has both been opposed by many on the basis that the acceptance of such arguments and their coupling to public policy would lead down a "slippery slope" to active euthanasia in a variety of forms.

These fears mirror the displacement and transformation processes we have actually seen in nuclear weapons procurement policy. Moreover, such transformations are by no means confined to weapons policy.

In the regulation of food additives, for instance, we have witnessed the transformation of safety testing protocols from "extensive" strategies (in which dose levels analogous to projected human consumption are administered to large samples of laboratory animals over long-time periods) to "intensive" strategies (in which massive doses are given to small numbers of animals over concentrated periods). This represents an extension of methodological assumptions regarding risk measurement.

This extension has been perfectly consistent with worst-case reasoning regarding the modeling of risk. Yet it has had an important impact on food and drug regulation policy. It has helped to shift the orientation of analysis toward "safety" as a provable characteristic in its own right, not a quality assumed in the absence of specified risks. Similar analytic extensions have occurred in other regulatory policy areas, such as the focus on "proxy" or

[17]The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment, noted earlier, would seem to be an example of this strategy employed by the Congress in regard to its appropriations and budgetary decision making.

correlated variables as indicators of primary risk in food packaging or in occupational health and safety (Bardach and Kagan, 1982, pp. 70–71).

It is interesting to note that while we readily accept a "domino theory" regarding the transformation of normative doctrine in association with policy, we all too often regard the effort to impose analytic doctrine as a "rationalizing" process for public policy making Indeed, an entire profession of policy analysis rests precisely upon this latter assumption

Doctrinal Drift and Policy Analysis

This essay has argued that the risks associated with the application of certain formal analytic idea sets to public policy can in some cases outweigh any rationalizing benefits The danger is that these idea sets in close policy application may be subjected to successive extensions and displacements along deductive chains These displacements may in turn cause policy to drift in unexpected, and potentially contradictory, directions Ironically, it is not the rigidity of closely applied doctrines that threatens to undermine the rationality of policy, *it is instead their fluidity and incompleteness, and the subsequent transformations to which they are subject*

Standing in opposition to this cautionary argument is the ever-widening spread of policy analysis (employing risk analysis, systems analysis and/or cost-benefit studies) Such analysis is indeed committed to rationalizing policy—to clarifying policy choices through formal means of measurement and assessment

Certainly, policy analytic exercises can aid in the process of conceptualizing policy problems They can enlarge the set of issues which arise in public deliberation and debate (Quade, 1982, Wildavsky, 1979) But the use of policy analysis to add consistency and precision to the design of public programs particularly in addressing "hard" or risky problems, is likely to be an inherently illusory and indeed dangerous undertaking Policy analysts and practitioners have perhaps not fully appreciated the nature of the risks They often have little tolerance for the recognition of potentially important analytical ambiguities—even when, as under deterrence, these may lie at the heart of a policy theory

What we have witnessed in nuclear weapons procurement policy is a *diminishing returns to specificity* which seems to raise a fundamental challenge regarding the linkage of policy analysis to policy practice It is perhaps time for us to think anew about both ambiguity and inconsistency as potentiall positive conditions for public policy undertakings We may want to tre them not as simple "default states" in which policy practices fail the needs "good analysis," but instead as potential buffer states which protect agai conditions under which analysis could destabilize policy

Ultimately, in an era of ideational policy the question may become H

rational are formal analytic and risk-assessment models, when these frameworks themselves can become risky actors in close conjunction with actual public policy making? This is a question to which analysts and scholars, no less than practitioners, will have to be ever more attentive

References

Afheldt, H, and P Sonntag 1971 *Stability and Strategic Nuclear Arms* New York World Law Fund

Art, Robert 1968 *The TFX Decision* Boston Little, Brown

Art, Robert, and Kenneth Waltz 1971 Technology, Strategy and the Uses of Force In Art and Waltz, eds, *The Uses of Force* Boston Little, Brown

Bardach, Eugene, and Robert A Kagan 1982 *Going by the Book The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness* Philadelphia Temple University Press

Barth, Michael, and James Titus eds, 1984 *The Greenhouse Effect and Sea-Level Rise A Challenge for This Generation* New York Van Nostrand

Beaufre, Andre 1966 *Deterrence and Strategy* New York Praeger

Benn, Robert 1982 The Receding Mirage of the Balanced Budget *The Public Interest* 67 18-30

Betts, Richard 1985 Conventional Deterrence Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence *World Politics*, 37 153-79

Botner, Stanley 1985 The Use of Budgeting/Management Tools by State Governments *Public Administration Review* 45 616-20

Brodie, Bernard 1959 *Strategy in the Missile Age* Princeton Princeton University Press

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 1981 *The War Trap* New Haven Yale University Press

Bundy McGeorge 1984 Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences In Douglas MacLean ed *The Security Gamble* New York Rowman and Allenheld

Cohen, Michael D, and James G March 1974 *Leadership and Ambiguity* New York McGraw-Hill

Drew Elizabeth 1983 A Political Journal *The New Yorker* June 20 59 39-74

Elster, Jon 1979 *Ulysses and the Sirens Studies in Rationality and Irrationality* New York Cambridge University Press

Friedberg, Aaron 1981 A History of the U S Strategic Doctrine—1945 to 1980 In Amos Perlmutter and John Gooch eds *Strategy and the Social Sciences* New York Cass Publishing

Gansler, Jacques 1980 *The Defense Industry* Cambridge MIT Press

—— 1985 The U S Technology Base Problems and Prospects In Franklin Margiotta and Ralph Sanders eds *Technology Strategy and National Security* Washington National Defense University Press

Gauthier, David 1984 Deterrence, Maximization and Rationality In Douglas MacLean ed *The Security Gamble* New York Rowman and Allenheld

George, Alexander 1972 The Case For Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy *American Political Science Review*, 67 751-85

Gray, Colin 1978 Does Theory Lead Technology? *International Journal* 33 506-23

—— 1979 Nuclear Strategy The Case for a Theory of Victory *International Security*, 4:54-87

Green, Philip 1966 *Deadly Logic The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* Columbus Ohio State University Press

Halperin, Morton 1961 The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process *World Politics* 13:360-84

Hartz, Louis 1961 *The Liberal Tradition in America* New York Harcourt, Brace

Heclo, Hugh 1978 Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment In Anthony King, ed , *The New American Political System* New York American Enterprise Institute

Herken, Gregg 1984 The Nuclear Gnostics In Douglas MacLean, ed , *The Security Gamble* New York Rowman and Allenheld

——— 1985 *Counsels of War* New York Alfred A Knopf

Herson, Lawrence 1984 *The Politics of Ideas* Homewood, Ill Dorsey Press

Hopmann, P Terrence, and J Edward Anderson 1986 Vulnerability, Uncertainty and Priorities for Strategic Arms Control In Joseph R Goldman, ed , *Issues and Choices Defense and Public Policy in America* Lexington University of Kentucky Press

Jervis Robert 1976 *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* Princeton Princeton University Press

——— 1984 *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press

Kahn Herman 1964 *On Thermonuclear War* New York Greenwood Press

Kaldor, Mary 1978 *The Baroque Arsenal* London Hill and Wang

Kaplan Fred 1983 *The Wizards of Armageddon* New York Simon and Schuster

Killian James 1977 *Sputnik Scientists and Eisenhower* Cambridge MIT Press

Landau, Martin 1969 Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap *Public Administration Review* 29 346–58

——— 1972 Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability *Publius*, 3 173–96

LaPorte, Todd 1982 On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems In David Sills et al eds *Accident at Three-Mile Island* Boulder Westview Press

Legault Albert, and George Lindsey 1976 *The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance* Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

Levine, Donald 1985 *Flight From Ambiguity* New York Basic Books

Lowi Theodore 1964 American Business Public Policy Case Studies and Political Theory *World Politics* 4 677–715

Lowrance, William 1982 Choosing Our Pleasures and Our Poisons Risk Assessment for the 1980s In Albert Teich and Ray Thornton eds , *Science Technology and the Issues of the Eighties* Boulder Westview Press

Medcalf Linda and Kenneth Dolbeare 1985 *Neopolitics* New York Random House

Melman Seymour 1970 *Pentagon Capitalism* New York McGraw Hill

Morgan Patrick 1983 *Deterrence A Conceptual Analysis* Beverly Hills Sage Publications

Nitze, Paul 1976 Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente *Foreign Affairs* 54 207 32

Perrow, Charles 1984 *Normal Accidents Living with High-Risk Technologies* New York Basic Books

Pipes Richard 1984 *Survival Is Not Enough* New York Simon and Schuster

Powell Robert 1985 The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence *Political Science Quarterly*, 100 75–96

Quade, Edward S ed 1974 *Analysis For Military Decisions* Santa Monica CA The Rand Corporation

——— 1982 *Analysis for Public Decisions* New York North Holland

Sabatier Paul 1986 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research *Journal of Public Policy*, 6 21–48

Sagan, Carl et al 1983 Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe *Foreign Affairs*, 62 257 92

Sapolsky Harvey 1972 *The Polaris System Development* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Schell, Jonathan 1982 *The Fate of the Earth* New York Alfred A Knopf

Schelling, Thomas 1961 *The Strategy of Conflict* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Schick, Allen 1983 Incremental Budgeting in a Decremental Age *Policy Sciences* 16 1 25

Snyder, Glenn 1961 *Deterrence and Defense Toward a Theory of National Security* Princeton Princeton University Press

Stockman, David 1986 *The Triumph of Politics* New York Basic Books

Wildavsky, Aaron 1965 Practical Consequences of the Theoretical Study of Deterrence *Public Administration Review*, 25 90–103

——— 1979 *Speaking Truth to Power The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis* Boston Little Brown

Wohlstetter, Albert 1974 Is There a Strategic Arms Race? *Foreign Policy*, 15 3–33 and 16 48–81

York Herbert 1970 *Race to Oblivion* New York Simon and Schuster

Budget Reform as Strategic Legislative Action: An Exploration

Charles Stewart III
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

By using the development of the appropriations process in the House between 1865 and 1921 to generate a series of cases, this paper explores one way in which two congressional research paths, rational choice theory, and historical analysis can be joined The theory section specifies four types of structural strategies that rational members of Congress might pursue in order to make particular substantive outcomes more likely expansionary fragmentation, retrenching centralization, expansionary centralization, and retrenching fragmentation

The empirical section of the paper examines episodes in the House between 1865 and 1921 when each of the four structural strategies was pursued Expansionary fragmentation is the most common strategy during this period, confirming conventional wisdom concerning congressional budgeting But the exact opposite strategy—retrenching centralization—had its persistent supporters who were frequently successful at instituting reform Finally, the other two strategies—expansionary centralization and retrenching fragmentation—were pursued less frequently during this period, but their pursuit still demonstrated a rational response to different decisional contexts

The general findings of the paper suggest that the marriage of rational choice and historical analysis in the study of Congress can be a fruitful one, with each mode of inquiry elucidating and extending the other

In recent years congressional scholars have begun to explore two very promising research paths The first is the renewed interest in the historical development of Congress The second path is the mining of the rich implications of a theoretical school variously referred to as "rational choice," "public choice," "purposive behavior," and "new political economy " Until now the two paths have been largely independent The purpose of this paper is to explore one way in which the two can be joined

The empirical case that I use in this exploration is the development of the appropriations process in the House from 1865 to 1921 This case is particularly appropriate for showing how historical analysis and purposive behavior theory can be wedded together The appropriations process is one of the most important facts of congressional life, understanding its historical development will greatly help us understand current budgetary woes Studying

*This is a significantly revised version of a paper originally presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association I would like to thank Kathryn H... and Richard Valelly for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper They, of course, are absolved from any of the shortcomings in this article

the appropriations process is *theoretically* interesting because the allocation of societal goods is inherently conflictual and is the activity to which rational choice has most frequently been applied.

This paper relies on two theses First, budget reform in the House between 1865 and 1921 can generally be explained by treating members of Congress (MCs) as rational actors The implication behind this thesis is that congressional behavior across the last two centuries has exhibited important fundamental similarities These behavioral similarities remain, even when we consider the epiphenomenal differences over the years in areas such as congressional parties, salient policy concerns, and career patterns Across the last two centuries, MCs have acted rationally and strategically, and have been constrained in their goal pursuit by an institution that has shown variations of *degree* along many dimensions but variations of *kind* along very few

Second, our understanding of MCs as rational politicians can be advanced by examining the ways in which they evaluated a rich set of reform proposals over an extended period of time An attention to extending the rational choice perspective across time is important because generalizing about Congress can become woefully time-bound if the frame of reference is chronologically constricted (Brady and Cooper, 1981) Even the most cursory review of the congressional literature reveals that time-bound research has limited our ability to generalize about Congress's structural development The advantage of taking the long view—even if the view is of another era—is that the idiosyncracies of particular years, Congresses, and decades may be put in their proper perspective

I take the long view in this paper by examining certain budget reform attempts in the House between 1865 and 1921 which have been selected from all such cases during this period The period is ripe for study not only because it represents the beginning of budgetary institutionalization and modernism in Congress, but also because both the means and ends of budget reform varied substantially over these seven decades

Thus, this paper is explicitly dialectic It uses the historical record to help us develop a deeper understanding about what it means to be a rational politician, it uses the precepts of purposive behavior to help us reach a deeper understanding of the development of the House appropriations process to its maturity In the end we will be on the way to understanding the full evolution of congressional appropriations politics through assessing (1) the conditions under which rational MCs choose to change budgetary structures, and (2) why they choose to change in particular ways

Beliefs about the Relationship between Budgetary Structure and Spending

The budgetary process produces such excitement in Congress because politicians and those who study them believe that congressional spending decisions are dependent upon the types of structures used to make them At

the risk of vastly oversimplifying the rich and copious literature on the subject, the nature of this dependent relationship can be stated succinctly.

The first assumption is that "structure matters." If one manipulates structure, one can induce a different set of spending outcomes.[1] There are a number of ways to characterize the structural parameters that are open to manipulation (e.g., the committee system and floor amendment rules), but changes in those parameters can usually be characterized as being more or less centralizing, or alternatively, as being along a continuum ranging from fragmentation to centralization.[2]

The second assumption maps expected spending outcomes onto the characteristics of the spending regime. Simply put, there is a positive relationship between structural fragmentation and levels of spending passed by Congress.[3] These two assumptions define the "conventional wisdom" about budgetary structure, and I have schematized its predictions in figure 1. Although there have been notable deviations from the conventional wisdom (*which will become a centerpiece of this paper*), *its resilience over time* demands that this be the starting point for my theoretical discussion.

If the conventional wisdom is correct about the relationship between structure and outcomes, then the basic contours of budget reform battles are easy to predict. MCs will be aligned along a structural preference continuum according to their spending preferences, with those who prefer higher spending at the "fragmentation" end of the continuum and those who prefer lower spending at the "centralization" end. MCs themselves have been a major source of information about the existence of this alignment, expressions of which have been common in budget reform debates over the last two decades.

For example, in 1973, when the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control (JSCBC) made its first report to Congress, it identified continuing budget deficits, caused by a fragmented appropriations process that generated


[1]The earliest congressional expressions of this assumption were evident when the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) was created in 1865. Expressions of this belief gained wide dissemination in the progressive reform literature at the turn of the century. Recent attention paid to structure-induced equilibriums continues in this spirit. See Stewart (1985, forthcoming), U.S. President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency (1912), and Shepsle and Weingast (1981).

[2]The term "centralization" is a very slippery one in political science, so I want to make clear what I mean when I use it, relying on the work of Smith (1985), who provides the best discussion of the concept in the congressional context. According to Smith, legislative centralization can be defined as an organizational arrangement that minimizes the number of effective participants *and* the number of effective decision-making units; decentralization maximizes both elements. Upon reflection, it is clear that the absolute states of centralization and decentralization have never been reached in the American Congress, as they describe an institution that is either run by a dictator or is entirely laissez faire. The most useful way of utilizing the notion of a centralization-decentralization continuum is typically as a *relative* one, taking the status quo as the frame of reference, rather than using the concept in absolute terms.

[3]Expressions of this second belief have been prominent whenever budget reform has been considered in Congress. See Stewart (1985, forthcoming), Fisher (1975), and Schick (1980).

FIGURE 1

SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPENDING PREFERENCES AND STRUCTURAL PREFERENCES ACCORDING TO THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM



excessive spending, as the basic problem to be addressed by reform To this study committee the diagnosis was obvious The fact that no legislative committee has responsibility to decide whether or not total outlays are appropriate appears to be responsible for much of the problem' (U S Congress, 1973, p 4) Therefore, the JSCBC called for some sort of centralized congressional budgeting authority to make these decisions presumably to yield lower spending and deficits This diagnosis was countered in the response of the Democratic Study Group, which opposed the centralizing mechanisms that the JSCBC's report implied, because they would "lock the congressional budgetary process into a conservative mold for generations to come" (quoted in Ippolito, 1981, p 62)

Using new analytical tools, the rational choice literature has continued the analysis offered by the conventional wisdom However, rational choice has generally focused on only half of the conventional wisdom, which predicts that fragmentation will result from a desire to increase spending, while minimizing attention to the other half, which predicts that centralization will result from a desire to retrench In other words, the rational choice focus has been on the northeast portion of figure 1

The tendency of "spenders" to prefer a fragmented appropriations process has been a key component of the rational choice literature at least as far back as Niskanen's (1971) work. According to Niskanen, the appropriations process is typified by the concentration of "high demand members" (i.e., members with ideal spending points significantly above the chamber median) on legislative committees Although the verisimilitude and conclusions of Niskanen's seminal work have been criticized (Margolis, 1975, Miller and Moe, 1983), the tendency of high-demand members to drive the budgetary process through their membership on congressional committees has become a key component of the distributive politics literature (Ferejohn, 1974, Arnold, 1979, Weingast, 1979, Shepsle and Weingast, 1981)

The distributive politics literature begins by positing that MCs are most responsive to dispersed geographic constituents who care intensely about the provision of a limited range of public and private goods by government, and who know or care little about the costs of those goods Because MCs are risk averse reelection-seekers, they provide these goods by eschewing minimum winning coalitions and engaging in unconstrained logrolling This logrolling is facilitated by a committee system in which the personnel are largely self-selected (Shepsle, 1978)

The distributive politics literature formalizes half of the conventional wisdom by explaining why fragmentation leads to greater spending If members were randomly distributed on committees, fragmentation would not necessarily lead to greater spending (Niskanen, 1971, p 48) In practice however, the dynamics of the committee system allow high-demand MCs to control most of the decision-making process and agenda related to their most cherished programs MCs who are high-demand in relation to x are permitted to submit a proposal to spend a superoptimal amount of money on x the same applies to legislators who are high-demand in relation to y and z Because the grand decision rule is universalism, the superoptimal proposal for x is accepted, along with like proposals for y and z Constituency responsiveness, therefore, leads to systemic irresponsibility

Although the rational choice perspective has drawn attention to the logic of congressional fragmentation and the resulting expansion of government spending, it has not spent nearly the same energy exploring the converse Why and how it is that low-demand members periodically manage to concentrate their memberships on "control" committees, resist fragmentation and bring spending back toward the chamber median This inattention probably stems from the interpretation of budget control as a public good, which is therefore inherently underproduced (Mayhew, p 145)[4] Nevertheless analysis of how low-demand legislators actually work to effect centralization

[4]Another reason why rational choice treatments of Congress have minimized attention to centralizing activity is that the literature was built up primarily relying on evidence from the 1960 and onward, which has not been representative of all strategic situations in which MCs have

ıuld be useful, since so much legislative energy has been put into pursuing ntralizing reforms and because a large percentage of modern congressional dgeting has taken place within essentially centralized regimes

The most recent attention by the social choice school to the activity of low-mand members in producing spending control has been paid by Kenneth epsle, who argues that despite the (putatively centralizing) 1974 Budget t, other events have transpired to unleash the "growth tendency" in Con-ɜss (Shepsle, 1984, pp 200–202). Shepsle's prescription for overcoming ıs growth tendency provides symmetry to the typical distributive politics guments, and thus is a more modern restatement in the spirit of the whole nventional wisdom. He recommends strengthening centralizing institu-ns such as the executive, the budget and appropriations committees, and rty leaders in order to counter the structural fragmentation brought about the twin tugs of the "jurisdictional" and "geographic" imperatives, in der ultimately to reduce spending (see also Jacobson, 1983, pp 157–98)

Although expressions of the conventional wisdom in both the political and ademic worlds are quite common, it has by no means been impervious to ack, both from those who say that the conventional wisdom is *logically* omplete and those who contend that it is *historically* narrow For in-ınce, one could argue that the agenda control of unrepresentative commit-ɜs, which help perpetuate superoptimal spending, can easily be overcome the floor when political sentiments are strong enough (Rivlin, 1981, hick, 1986) In other words, structure frequently does not matter when it mes to important issues or when universalism and logrolling are under-ıned by changing political currents Or, one could contend, borrowing in-ıration from Simon (1950), Lindblom (1959), and Wildavsky (1964), that ıgmentation might actually keep spending down by simplifying decision aking It may be that federal budgeting is so complex that at a certain level centralization, the task would overwhelm centralized decision makers, re-lting in inefficient allocational decisions

Theoretical attacks on the rational choice version of the conventional ısdom, especially that portion which predicts that Congress is always deter-ıned to fragment, can also rely on a key piece of historical evidence A ma-rity in each house has periodically ratified reforms that were proposed plicitly to retrench spending. The result has been that congressional bud-tary regimes since the Civil War have been equally divided between cen-lized arrangements, dominated by low-demand members, and fragmen-ry ones, dominated by high-demand members One final historical point is

en called on to make structural choices over time The 1960s provided the proper context for gh-demand members to get what they wanted through fragmentation But key environmental tors that obtained in the 1960s (e g , an expanding economy) have not obtained during all ıs in which MCs have made structural choices

also relevant If one extends one's evidence beyond the few well-known reforms, such as the Budget and Accounting Act and the 1974 Budget Act, one discovers that MCs have periodically justified fragmentation in order to *reduce* spending, as they have also justified centralization as a way to maintain or extend high spending levels

Therefore, while one can make a compelling case that the conventional wisdom captures important aspects of budgetary reform politics in a parsimonious way and that the rational choice literature has helped to formalize at least part of the conventional wisdom, it is plausible to argue that the conventional wisdom and its formalization still leave out important pieces of the puzzle, even as far as parsimonious explanations go First, the conventional wisdom in its more formal version leaves the southwest sector of figure 1 underexplored Second, the conventional wisdom, in both its formal and informal versions, leave unexplored the possibility that the slope of the line in figure 1 may be negative under certain conditions, or in other words, that the relationship between fragmentation and spending levels may be negative

It is my theoretical belief that MCs do indeed choose their most preferred appropriations process and decide whether to support or oppose reform efforts based on their spending preferences However, unlike the conventional wisdom, I argue that the translation of spending preferences into structural preferences occurs in a slightly more sophisticated and less straightforward manner Structural preferences are a function not only of spending preferences, but also of a set of conditions that comprise what I call "the decisional context " There are certain decisional contexts in which legislators who prefer higher spending will also prefer increased fragmentation, but there are other times in which identical spending preferences lead to support for increased *centralization* If MCs find themselves typically trying to fragment structure in order to drive spending up, it is because contextual conditions are most often conducive to "expansionary fragmentation," not because there is something inherently expansionary about fragmentation

One major purpose of the following case exploration is to discover more explicitly the specific conditions that may comprise the decisional context but before beginning I can specify some of its probable constituents The decisional context may include such factors as (1) the stated position of party leaders and their ability to use the resources of their offices to influence legislative behavior, (2) the array of existing committees and the bargaining resources held by their members, (3) the spending preferences of those who nominate committee members, (4) the condition of the macroeconomy (5) the nature and fragility of existing spending coalitions and logrolling arrangements, (6) the workload level of components of the existing appropriations regime, (7) spending preferences of the president, and (8) the willingness of bureaus to pursue budget maximizing strategies Under certain

conditions the rational response to spending preferences, given how conditions defining the decisional context array themselves, may fit easily within the predictions of the conventional wisdom Under other conditions, however, following the dictates of the conventional wisdom may be irrational, and therefore the conventional wisdom may need to be turned on its head

The rest of this paper explores the structural choices that MCs made (individually and collectively) under a variety of conditions between 1865 and 1921 Because this is a theoretical exploration and space does not permit otherwise, the exposition is largely nonchronological A more detailed and chronological account of the entire period is contained in Stewart (1985, forthcoming), which are the sources from which the following accounts are taken

The Cases Budget Reform in the House, 1865 to 1921


The story of the development of the House appropriations process after the Civil War is one that is easily accessible in a growing literature on the history of legislative budgeting (Fisher 1975, Wander, 1983 1984, Brady and Morgan, 1983, Brady and Kursman 1984, Schick 1984, Stewart, 1985 1987, forthcoming) Yet this literature only scratches the surface in examining the full range of budget reform politics between 1865 and 1921 The conventional history of budget reform has concentrated on instances in which proposals to change structure succeeded (reform "successes"), ignoring a larger class of episodes in which proposals actively entered the agenda only to fail (reform "failures") Because I am not interested in the development of the budgetary process per se but in the behavior of legislators evaluating reform proposals in light of their spending preferences and decisional contexts, the full universe of reform attempts including failures, is the empirical base of this paper

During the time period bounded by the creation of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) in 1865 and the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act in 1921, there were at least thirty attempts made in the House to change the budgetary process (Stewart 1985, pp 84–86) Most of the reform episodes occurred during periods of intense reform activity and those periods, along with important reform successes are shown in the time line in figure 2 To orient the discussion that follows I will briefly review the history of reform in this period

The period opened with the creation of the HAC in 1865 following complaints that the Ways and Means Committee, which had handled appropriations, banking, and taxing up until then, had been overwhelmed by the budgetary task imposed by the Civil War Except for the institution of the "Holman Rule" first in 1876 (44th Congress) the secular structural trend

Figure 2

Timeline of Major Budget Reform Successes Involving the House, 1865–1921



Source Stewart (1985)

after 1865 was toward fragmentation.[5] Thus, in 1878 (45th Congress), the Commerce Committee seized control of the rivers and harbors appropriations bill from the HAC. This was followed, in 1880 (46th Congress), by the Agricultural Committee gaining control of the agriculture bill.[6] The Rivers and Harbors Committee was created in 1883 (48th Congress) to oversee the appropriations bill with the same name, by splitting the jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee.[7] The trend toward fragmentation and independence for constituency-sensitive appropriations climaxed in 1885 when six other appropriations bills (army, consular and diplomatic, Indian affairs, military academy, navy, and post office) were taken from the HAC and given to the appropriate legislative committees. After 1885, the HAC had jurisdiction over only the fortifications, legislative, executive, and judicial, pension, sundry civil, deficiency, and District of Columbia bills.

Reform efforts toward reconsolidating the decentralized "regime of 1885" began around the turn of the century. Congress approved the creation of the Taft Commission in 1909 to study economy and efficiency in government. The Commission started a national debate about the creation of the "executive budget," by which the president would submit annual spending requests to Congress, and it also managed to begin the movement toward reversing the House committee fragmentation that had been instituted in the 1870s and 1880s. The 1885 committee fragmentation was eventually overturned in 1919 (66th Congress), and in 1921 (67th Congress), the Budget and Accounting Act was passed, creating the executive budget, the Bureau of the Budget, and the modern federal appropriations process.[8]

In addition to these reform episodes, which have been well-documented in the literature, this period is replete with reform activity that has not been so well-documented. These undocumented episodes are of two types. First, there is a set of failed reform attempts that were preludes to the better-known, successful ones. Second, there is the set of failed reform attempts that were proposed in a particular Congress or over a series of Congresses that never came to fruition.

[5]The gist of the Holman Rule was to allow only amendments to appropriations bills that would retrench spending. The actual implementation of the rule over the next several decades had a definite partisan cast, which was to the favor of the Democrats. Between 1876 and 1921, the rule was primarily championed by Democrats because it allowed them to use the threat of legislative riders to appropriations bills to influence behavior of the largely Republican administrative state. For more detail about the rule's enactment and implementation, see Stewart (1985, pp. 143–50).

[6]More accurately, an annual agriculture appropriations bill was created by removing agricultural spending from the legislative, executive, and judicial bill.

[7]The Commerce Committee's jurisdictional loss in this case apparently came with its general consent.

[8]This process was obviously augmented by the provisions of the 1974 Budget Act, but the formal aspects of the *appropriations* process have remained virtually unchanged since 1921.

To give an example of the first category, although the Commerce Commit tee was able to assert a monopoly over the rivers and harbors appropriation bill in 1878, party leadership nevertheless opposed this transfer of power Thus, in the 46th Congress (1879–80), the Commerce Committee had to de feat two separate efforts by the Rules Committee to essentially undo the gai from the previous Congress. Another example is from the 1910s, during th efforts to develop and pass a consolidative budget reform. Committees of th Democratic Caucus tried twice to formulate a plan acceptable to a majorit of the party, but to no avail One plan got as far as the caucus floor in the 63r Congress (1913), only to be defeated by a narrow margin.

An example of the second category is the series of attempts to carry th fragmentation of water project oversight even further in the 1870s and 1880s After Commerce claimed the rivers and harbors bill for itself in 1876, othe committees wanted in on the action, too One committee, Railways and Ca nals, tried twice unsuccessfully to take the entire water project bill awa from Commerce The Mississippi River Committee was unsuccessful in fou attempts to claim the portion of the rivers and harbors bill that pertained t the Mississippi Yet, even with all these challenges to the authority of th Commerce and Rivers and Harbors Committees, none was successful

There were other unsuccessful reform efforts, besides those concernin water project spending For instance, at the same time agriculture spendin was handed over to the Agriculture Committee in 1880, the House also re jected taking spending for public buildings, military affairs, and the paten office from the HAC and giving it to the relevant legislative committees And, in 1890 (51st Congress) a failed attempt was made to require that an bill to raise military pensions be accompanied with a tax bill to pay for it

Rather than examine the intricacies of all of these (and other) episodes se riatim, I have chosen to discuss relevant cases in more detail by arrangin them in a way that facilitates examining the notion of the structural contin gency raised in the previous section Previously I argued that there is in fac no a priori relationship between an MC's spending and structural prefer ences Rather, an MC's structural preference is a function of his or he spending preference and its interactions with elements of the decisiona context Under most conditions, big spenders will prefer fragmentation, bu under some conditions they will prefer centralization Likewise, while re trenchers will usually prefer centralization, there are conditions under whic they will prefer fragmentation This type of relationship between spendin and structural preferences implies a two-by-two classification, with each ce of the table denoting a structural strategy that MCs, individually and collec tively, might choose to take (figure 3) These four structural strategies are (1) expansionary fragmentation, (2) retrenching centralization, (3) expansion ary centralization, and (4) retrenching fragmentation The discussion that fol lows is arranged according to these four strategies. It must be emphasized

FIGURE 3

STRATEGIC BUDGETARY STRUCTURAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

		Spending preference: Expansion	Spending preference: Retrenchment
Structural preference	Fragmentation	Expansionary Fragmentation*	Retrenching Fragmentation
	Centralization	Expansionary Centralization	Retrenching Centralization*

*Elements of the conventional wisdom

that in no way do the cases discussed below exhaust the examples that could be pursued under each heading.

EXPANSIONARY FRAGMENTATION

Expansionary fragmentation is the structural strategy most often said to be associated with congressional budgeting. Purposive behavior theories of congressional behavior have usually used elements of the "electoral connection" to explain this. Those hoping for the consequences of electoral particularism to show through during this period would be very pleased. Indeed, between 1865 and 1921 the most frequently heard argument in reform debates went along these lines: "My constituents are not receiving enough federal largess and the problem can be best solved by decentralizing existing spending structures." The effects of this argument manifest themselves both cross-sectionally and longitudinally.

One of the most important series of examples concerning the use of expansionary fragmentation during this period involved water projects in the 1870s and 1880s. Conflict over water projects took a structural form at least eight times between 1877 and 1885. These eight episodes generally involved high-demand legislators trying to claim higher spending for their constituents through structural change. Six of these eight episodes involved some dispute about committee jurisdictions.[9] In turn, these six jurisdictional fights can be further divided into two categories. First, through a sequence of events, the Commerce Committee was able to extract water project spending from the Appropriations Committee, initially by forcing the HAC to

[9] The other two involved rules about floor consideration.

share spending oversight through a serial referral mechanism, and later through the severing of that mechanism altogether. Second, after Commerce had achieved a monopoly over water project spending, a number of committees challenged that monopoly, attempting to divide the water project pie into a number of pieces The most persistent of these latter committees was the Committee on the Levees and Improvements of the Mississippi River

The best-known fights over internal improvement jurisdictions involved the Commerce and Appropriations Committees The Commerce Committee managed to wrest effective control over rivers and harbors spending from the HAC in 1878 The mechanism used to assert sole control in that year was through suspension of the rules John Reagan (D-TX, chair of the Commerce Committee) simply moved that the rules be suspended, that the serial referral procedure be circumvented, and that the rivers and harbors bill be passed. This tactic aroused considerable animosity among those who opposed an ambitious internal improvements program, and leadership attempted to prohibit Commerce from using the suspension route in the future Thus, Reagan had to lead an effort to consolidate his committee's gain in 1879 In this second effort, he not only beat back the leadership attempt to prohibit Commerce's use of suspension to bypass Appropriations, but Reagan was successful in acquiring the right of the Commerce Committee to report the water project appropriations bill at any time, a right enjoyed only by the HAC and Ways and Means

This second episode provides us with a rare opportunity to test the relationship between structural and spending preferences among the rank and file, because the issue was decided by a roll call vote I have analyzed the final vote on Reagan's 1879 motion using logistic regression, modeling it as a function of a member's party, region, and committee membership (table 1) [10] The most theoretically important coefficients in this model are those associated with region, which show that members from the former Confederacy and prairie states were the strongest supporters of strengthening the power of Commerce to oversee water project appropriations It is not surprising that these should have been the most supportive regions, since the Confederacy and prairie states were the ones that stood to gain the most from increased water project appropriations.[11]

After the HAC was safely removed from the internal improvements pie

[10] There was unfortunately no direct measure of member spending preferences for water projects Thus, party and region were chosen as surrogates This is admittedly an indirect measure of spending preferences, but water project politics during this time were fought along clear regional and party lines, so that we can reasonably infer the relationship between substantive and structural preferences using region and party as surrogates

[11] Part of the deal embodied in the Compromise of 1877 was that the South would get more internal improvements See Woodward (1966, 1971) and Seip (1983) Also, Brady and Morgan (1983, table 3) report that between 1870 and 1880, the amount spent in the South on wate

TABLE 1

LOGISTIC IN 1979

LOGISTIC REGRESSION. EFFECT OF PARTY, REGION, AND COMMITTEE ON VOTE TO GIVE THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE PRIVILEGED STATUS TO REPORT THE RIVERS AND HARBORS BILL, 46TH CONG , 1879

Effect	Estimate	Chi-square	Prob	Std error
Intercept[a]	−0 483	1 937	0 164	0 347
Democrats	−0 894	5 292	0 021	0 388
Regions				
Prairie	2 953	12 666	0 0004	0 830
Confederacy	2 162	16 464	0 0001	0 533
Midwest	0 745	2 936	0 087	0 435
New England	0 570	0 882	0 348	0 607
West	0 463	0 121	0 728	1 328
Committees				
Appropriations	−1 337	3 529	0 060	0 712
Commerce	2 699	5 656	0 017	1 135

Note The dichotomous dependent variable is defined such that a vote in favor of the Commerce Committee is coded 1 and a vote against the Commerce Committee is coded 0

Regions *West* Oregon, California, Nevada, Colorado, *Confederacy* South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Texas, *Prairie* Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota Iowa, Missouri, *Midwest* Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, *East* West Virginia Maryland Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, *New England* Connecticut Rhode Island Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine

[a]Excluded categories are Republicans, members of the eastern region, and non-committee members

ture, the focus of conflict over water project spending shifted Between 1878 and 1885 the most common conflicts occurred between members of the Mississippi River and Commerce Committees (and Rivers and Harbors Committee after 1883), in each case involving an attempt on the behalf of the Mississippi River Committee to claim jurisdiction over spending for its favorite river [12] Among members of the Mississippi River Committee, the link between spending and structural preferences does not have to be inferred.

projects increased about 730 percent, the border states increased about 710 percent, western states increased about 1,200 percent, while the Midwest increased only 25 percent, and the East, 100 percent Brady and Morgan's regional divisions are different from those used in this paper, but the results are generally consistent

[12]In the section on 'expansionary centralization," I will use this series of episodes as an example of that strategy as well This series of episodes actually contains elements of both expansionary centralization and expansionary fragmentation For the *leaders* of these attempts the strategy was expansionary fragmentation For the *rank and file*, who decided the fate of these attempts, it was a story of expansionary centralization

many Mississippi River Committee members complained about the decisions reached by the Commerce Committee, and argued directly that if they were successful in changing the process, spending to benefit the Mississippi would go up. J. R. Chalmer's (D-MS) comments as the leader of the pro-Mississippi forces when the question was raised in 1880 (46th Congress) were typical "[Members of the Commerce Committee] have spent millions and millions of dollars upon other rivers and other harbors, while these great navigable waters . have been comparatively neglected We ask you to place this great interest in the hands of a committee friendly to it, that we may be enabled to improve those waters as they demand and desire to be improved" (*Congressional Record*, vol 10, p 732 [1880, 46–2])

The same sentiments were expressed two years later when J Floyd King (D-AL), also a member of the Mississippi River Committee and from a district bordering on the Father of Waters, moved to transfer Mississippi River spending oversight from the Commerce Committee to his committee He argued " there is a timidity experienced by committees who have large subjects to handle, a timidity that is not warranted by the boldness and onward spirit of the American people [Last year] the committee on Levees and Improvements [of the Mississippi River] reported an appropriation of six millions to carry out the plans laid down by the Mississippi River Commission for the improvement of that stream The Committee on Commerce cut down the grant to one million " (*Congressional Record*, vol 12, p 493 [1882, 47–1])

The argument that justified fragmentation as a means to greater spending was not confined to water projects For instance, when the HAC lost the right to oversee eight of the twelve annual appropriations bills in 1885, support for this devolution was expressed by members who complained that the HAC's funding recommendations were biased Westerners especially expressed their outrage at what they viewed as the unresponsiveness of the HAC toward the West James Laird's (R-NE) anger was typical "While the center of population of the United States has passed a thousand miles westward from the Atlantic coast, the center of appropriations and expenditures of public money will be found on a line drawn from this Capital through the City of Philadelphia to Boston by way of New York To my mind the despotism of the Committee on Appropriations, as constituted in the last Congress, is in keeping with the domination which the East has exercised over the West, since there was a west " (*Congressional Record*, vol 17, p 324 [1885, 49-1])

The association between decentralization and increased appropriations did not escape the attention of other interests who wanted to convince the federal government to send some tax dollars their way An example of the belief among social reformers that budgetary centralization thwarted progressive spending policy is an article written by Harlan Updegraff, of the Bureau of Education, in 1912 Updegraff laid the lack of large national ap-

propriations for education at the feet of the HAC "... had the last 40 years [of educational appropriations] been referred in the House to the Committee on Education ... there would undoubtedly be to-day [sic] a far different story to tell. If such a reform in the procedure of the House could be carried out to-day, an increased participation of the National Government in the educational development of the country would probably result" (*American Schoolboard Journal*, 1912, reprinted in *Congressional Record*, vol. 59, p. 8117 [1920, 66-2]).

The cases addressed so far in this section have shown a cross-sectional relationship between spending and structural preferences. The willingness to fragment House structure in order to produce greater spending also revealed itself across time, and in such a way that the part of the conventional wisdom that relates fragmentation to the "electoral connection" can be illustrated.

As mentioned previously, the appropriations process became more fragmented in the 1870s and early 1880s. But not only did spending oversight become more fragmented, but this fragmentation developed according to the logic of the electoral connection hypothesis. The more particularistic the spending, the more likely it was to be removed from central oversight, and the sooner it was removed. This pattern emerged even before the Civil War, when decisions about levels of military pension spending (one of the government's most expensive programs and one that directly affected the lives of thousands of voters) were not made by the Appropriations Committee. In what was an incipient version of modern entitlement legislation, the various pension committees were charged with setting pension rates, while all the Appropriations Committee did was make sure that the pension fund was solvent, given legislated benefit levels (Glasson 1918, p. 61).

The two other spending items with the clearest constituency orientation (internal improvements and agriculture) were the first to escape HAC oversight after the Civil War. When the wholesale transfer of appropriations authority from the HAC to the legislative committees took place in 1885, the items that remained with Appropriations were clearly of less utility in servicing particularistic constituencies than the ones that were farmed out to the legislative committees.

Retrenching Centralization

The second half of the conventional wisdom is the strategy of retrenching centralization. Although the "natural" tendency of MCs is to strive to increase fragmentation, there were still several members who consistently pursued a constituency-sensitive retrenching goal between 1865 and 1921.[11] These consistent retrenchers were also consistent centralizers.

[11] It should not be surprising that some representatives consistently tried to reduce spending during this period, even spending that conceivably could have helped their constituents. As with the modern federal budget, there were many citizens who benefited directly when the

The preference for centralization among low-demand members was evident in a number of ways. First, when given the opportunity, they voted for it. One example of this voting pattern was seen above in table 1, which analyzed the vote to grant the Commerce Committee its privileged reporting status in 1879. In that vote, eastern members, who were represented in the intercept term, voted to uphold the HAC's authority in setting water project spending levels More generally, easterners, frequently joined by midwesterners, voted most consistently on the side of centralization, as is indicated in the voting patterns revealed in the five roll call votes between 1865 and 1921 which both concerned the appropriations process and directly pitted fragmentation against centralization (Stewart, 1985, pp. 172, 182, 183, 201, 330)

The most important example of how retrenchers worked to effect centralization, however, was the series of events culminating in the reforms of 1919–1921 A careful reading of how these reforms emerged reveals that plans to restore the HAC's former authority and to create a presidential bud get were both germinated and developed through the continued activity of few low-demand members of the House (Stewart, 1985, pp. 269–341) How ever, because they were a clear minority during most of the decade precec ing 1919, low-demand members were required to think strategically in ord to finally enact reform Thus, activity leading to the events of 1919–19 were masterminded by low-demand House members, but the necessities r lated to crafting a reform that would pass required them to compromise w other House members over the degree of consolidation to be pursued T details of how this happened are beyond the scope of this paper, but a f comments may reveal the patterns that emerged

The House did not embrace reform in the late 1910s because there near-unanimous congressional sentiment that an increasingly complic fiscal world demanded centralization and coordination A consensus ha be constructed where there was once none, and the road from reform rl ric to action was long and rocky Low-demand politicians got their first l when the Taft Commission began to agitate for congressional and exec branch consolidation, justifying reform in part with predictions that cha the appropriations process would yield gargantuan savings (see *New Times*, 29 Sept. 1912, p 2) After the Taft Commission's demise, that tion was continued by senior members of the Ways and Means and Apr ations Committees, such as Swagar Sherley, John Fitzgerald, Joseph and James Good Good, who chaired the HAC during the 66th Co also chaired the Select Budget Committee that finally developed

federal government *did not* spend, such as those who believed that increased spend also increase their taxes, or the others who had a particular interest in the federal gov solvency (i.e , bond holders)

ported out the 1919–1921 reforms. Good was the dominant player in developing the strategy that finally enabled them to pass. Thus, although low-demand members reached out to draw more MCs into a final reform coalition, agenda control over strategy and substance remained ensconced among retrenchers.

The perpetual minority status of the low-demand members required them to include many higher demand representatives in their plans. Ways in which spending interests were accommodated by low-demand members include the following: (1) Restoration of the HAC and the creation of the executive budget process were separated, so that opposition to committee consolidation would not doom the less controversial Budget and Accounting Act, (2) partisans of reform continually reassured House members that the creation of a "presidential budget" would in no way prevent MCs from raising spending levels should they disapprove of the requests, (3) the party caucuses assured legislative committees' representation on the HAC after 1919, and (4) after the passage of all the reforms, the legislative committees were still able to actively pursue higher appropriations by including spending authority levels in legislation (Stewart, 1985, pp. 323–41).

All of these trades and compromises represented movements away from reform purity in order to placate those who were inclined to oppose spending control. Attention given to meeting some of the objections of high-demand members finally paid off when the rules change which restored the HAC's authority reached the floor by a vote of 158-154, and the rule change itself passed by a healthier 200-117 margin.[14]

Finally, although low-demand members had a difficult time convincing spending sympathizers to support centralizing reform, they were positively aided in their efforts by the conduct and outcome of World War I, which ultimately led to a change in the mix of representatives for a couple of crucial years. The prosecution of the war brought the first permanent income tax, tremendous government expansion, and exponential deficit increases. As the war wound down, the eight-year reign of Democrats in Congress ended, and Republican "return to normalcy" Congresses were elected. These post-World War I Congresses underwent a dramatic infusion of low-demand members who were more likely to support centralization than their immediate predecessors. The combination of concessions to high-demand members and the influx of low-demand members after the war resulted in easy passage of the Budget and Accounting Act and the razor-thin Appropriations Committee restoration.

[14]Passage of the Budget and Accounting Act was less problematic. When first passed by the House in 1919, the margin of approval was 285-3. When Wilson vetoed the bill in 1920 because of provisions relating to the Comptroller General, the override failed, 178-103. The bill was finally passed in 1921, overcoming a vote to recommit (59-297), before being endorsed 344-9. The conference report cleared the House on a 335-3 vote.

Expansionary Centralization

As well as following the more conventional strategies of centralizing in order to effect control or decentralizing in order to expand spending, MCs during this period also occasionally pursued quite different strategies—centralizing in order to expand (or maintain) spending levels and decentralizing in order to control spending When these strategies were revealed, the circumstances were admittedly extraordinary Still, those unusual circumstances help to illuminate the ordinary, as well as help us to understand how budgetary structure was chosen strategically

The first type of inversion of the conventional wisdom occurred when MCs preferred to maintain a relatively centralized spending regime because they believed it would help to maintain existing spending levels In order to examine the pursuit of this strategy of expansionary centralization, we must return to water projects Previously I argued that southerners and prairie-staters were more likely to favor the Commerce Committee in its battles with the HAC and with leadership concerning the oversight of the rivers and harbors bill. And I also showed that later attempts to fragment water project spending oversight even further, by granting the Mississippi River Committee a significant proportion of the water projects bill for itself, were led by MCs who had a particular fondness for the Mississippi What was left out of that account—and what is frequently left out of accounts of spending jurisdictional squabbles of this period—is that House members rejected most fragmentation proposals offered them In particular, the failure of the House to fragment water project oversight even further occurred because many MCs who were strong supporters of water project spending often *opposed* further fragmentation

Thus, when we consider together the six disputes over the water project jurisdiction between 1875 and 1885, two stories emerge The first, considered in an earlier section, primarily involved the *leaders* of these six disputes Proposals to fragment water project spending oversight were invariably offered by men who had an *institutional* interest that augmented their separate interest in aiding the river of their choice The second story, to be considered now, involves the *rank and file*

This tendency of water project supporters to divide on some structural questions was a result of different analyses of how to handle a difficult coalitional situation One difficulty was simply producing a bill that supplied more spending rather than less This problem had been partially solved by the earliest action in this saga, by taking the water project bill away from the HAC and giving it to the Commerce Committee The second difficulty was more dogging. While a House majority clearly supported an active federal internal improvements program, a portion of this majority had even grander plans, especially for the Mississippi At the other end of the issue was a significant yet powerful House minority centered in party leadership and in the

TABLE 2

VOTES IN 1887
VOTES TO PASS THE RIVERS AND HARBORS BILL IN THE HOUSE, 45TH–49TH CONGRESSES, 1878–1887

Congress-session	Year	Vote	% yes
45-2	1878	166-66(s)	71
45-3	1879	186-67(s)	74
46-2	1880	179-48(s)	74
46-3	1881	163-84	66
47-1	1882	120-47	72
		122-59(v)	67
47-2	1883	112-91	55
48-1	1884	156-104	60
48-2	1885	192-88(s)	69
49-1	1886	142-102	58
		102-135(c)	43
49-2	1887	178-89(c)	67

Note: (c) = vote to approve a conference report, (s) = vote to suspend rules and pass legislation, and (v) = vote to override a presidential veto.


finance committees and reinforced by the attitudes (and vetoes) of several presidents, who opposed almost any active program of water projects. This minority probably approached one-third of the House membership at any given time. It is at least the case that majorities passing the rivers and harbors bill averaged around two-thirds (64.7 percent) between 1876 and 1887 (table 2). Because extraordinary majorities were often needed to pass the water projects bill, either to suspend the rules or override the president's veto, the minority that opposed water projects loomed large in the thinking of many water project supporters.

The most important coalitional problems facing water project supporters can be clarified if we greatly simplify the debate and cast it in terms of a simple hypothetical spatial voting model. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the reversion level, if no omnibus bill passed, is no spending for either Mississippi River projects or for other projects, indicated by the ordered pair $(0,0) = x_1$. One legislative bloc, called the Leadership Coalition, has this reversion level as its ideal point. Also assume that the ideal point for both pro-water project blocs is spending only for that particular bloc's projects, with nothing going to the other bloc. The ordered pair representing the ideal outcome for the "Mississippi Coalition" is $(1,0) = x_M$, and the analogous ordered pair for the "Non-Mississippi Coalition" is $(0,1) = x_N$. Finally, assume that voting is by bloc, that each bloc consists of one-third of the chamber, and that voting is based on simple Euclidean distances.

Figure 4a graphs out this series of simple relationships. If the Mississippi and Non-Mississippi Coalitions are to agree to a mixture of projects, this

Figure 4

Spatial Representation of Efforts to Alter Jurisdiction ovei Water Projects, 1870s and 1880s



mixture would have to lie within the shaded area in figure 4a The shaded area is the win set of the reversion level (0,0), and will be denoted as $W(x_L)$ If the mixture is chosen by a committee composed equally of Mississippi and Non-Mississippi Coalition members, it is most likely that the mix would lie along the Pareto contract curve, possibly at point $x_1 = (.5,.5)$, representing the compromise between the two blocs necessary to get the recommendation out of committee and onto the floor for ratification

It is clear from this example that there were many other points in $W(x_L)$, all of which would be preferred by the two pro-spending coalitions, half of which would make the Mississippi Coalition better off than x_1 and vice versa The Mississippi Coalition might recognize this fact and try to take advantage of it by separating the consideration of the two bloc's projects, making it more likely that the mix considered on the floor would be even more favorable to the Mississippi, for example, at $x_2 = (.8, .5)$ [15]

Note what such a move would do, however First, while the Non-Mississippi Coalition would still support x_2 in a vote over the reversion level, it is clear that this bloc would be less enthusiastic in its support than it would be in its support for x_1 [16] Now, relax the assumption that all blocs vote entirely together Also, assume that the probability of the bloc voting together on the floor is a function of the distance between the proposal and the bloc's ideal point Then, this lower level of enthusiasm might translate into a greater probability that Non-Mississippi Coalition members would defect on the floor or abstain, moving the majority that finally approved the spending package to a level of less than two-thirds Second, the Non-Mississippi Coalition would be tempted to pad its own projects in this disjointed arrangement, perhaps proposing point $x_3 = (.8, .8)$ While this would still be in $W(x_L)$ and represent a result resembling universalism, (1) point x_3 would now make the Mississippi Coalition less enthusiastic, again raising the chance that the coalition would fall below two-thirds, and (2) the leadership-led coalition preferring the (0,0) point would have almost total latitude in the next round of amending to build a new coalition closer to its own most-preferred outcome (figure 4b)

The discussion in the last paragraph holds hints of cyclical, indeterminant

[15] The location of x_2 takes into account (1) the fact that the Mississippi Coalition realizes that it must offer a mix of projects to the other pro-spending coalition within the shaded area in Figure 4a, and (2) the assumption that the Mississippi Coalition would probably not offer a mix that reduced the other's projects in absolute terms

[16] This is because members of the Non-Mississippi Coalition measure their utility loss from a mix of projects as a function of the distance of the mix from its ideal point (0,1) Here, it is clearly the case that $|x_1 - x_m| < |x_2 - x_m|$ One can easily imagine that what we call "enthusiasm" for a mix of projects is a function of the utility received from the mix Enthusiasm is much more than a psychological construct here, because one could plausibly go on to posit that the willingness of a bloc to stick together and see that a mix gets passed (rather than abstain, work behind the scenes for its failure, etc) is a function of the enthusiasm of the bloc's members for that particular mix

outcomes should the two blocs be cut loose from each other in committee, but more significantly, the last point brings the special problems of agenda control to the fore. To return to the historic case, during this period, party leaders exercised considerable control over the House agenda. However, with slightly more than two-thirds of its membership arrayed and organized against it on this particular issue, it was unlikely that leadership would try too strenuously to manipulate the voting agenda to bring final outcomes closer to the southwest corner of the graphs in figure 4.[17] However, if the pro-spending coalition were to be split up, there would be a greater chance that leadership could manipulate the voting agenda, thus producing the series of votes like those graphed in figure 4c, resulting in significantly lower spending in the end.

This account is obviously an over-simplified rendition of the spatial voting issues involved in these water project jurisdictional battles. However, this simplification helps to clarify what the issues were that pro-water project members were fighting over, and to predict beforehand the outcomes of those fights. Members of the Mississippi Rivers Committee were offering a gamble to all water project supporters: the chance for higher spending in return for an increased probability of cycling, indeterminacy, failure to produce needed extraordinary majorities, and agenda manipulation by those who were unfavorable to any spending whatsoever. For members on the Mississippi Rivers Committee, obviously less risk averse than the rest, this gamble was worth taking. The decision about whether the rest of the House would accept the gamble depended on whether others were willing to take the risk.

Concern with building stable coalitions was the common theme among those pro-spending members who nevertheless opposed further committee fragmentation. Counter-arguments were frequently made that "if we don't all stick together, we will all hang together." One of the most surprising of these speeches was made in 1881 by Mark Dunnell (R-MN), who had chaired a regional commission in 1879 that had recommended increasing spending to improve the Mississippi by $5 million. Dunnell argued that removing Mississippi projects from the ommibus bill and giving them over to a more narrowly-focused committee would rob the bill of "much of its strength and to a certain extent a great element that must enter into a rivers and harbors appropriations bill" (*Congressional Record*, vol. 12, p. 519 [1881, 47 special]).

[17] Those who are skeptical about whether leadership was wary of their pro-water project spending followers should consider the findings of Wilson (1986), who discovered that leaders fared worse than the rank and file in receiving pork barrel benefits during this period. If followers were willing to deny a "fair share" of pork barrel benefits to their party leaders, one can imagine what would have happened if party leaders had tried to use their agenda control power more than they did to reduce water project spending.

TABLE 3

LOGISTICS IN 1884

LOGISTIC REGRESSION, EFFECT OF COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP, DISTRICT, AND PARTY ON VOTE TO REFER INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON LEVEES AND IMPROVEMENTS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, 48TH CONG., 1884

Effect	Estimate	Chi-square	Prob	Std. error
Intercept[a]	1.383	24.67	0.0001	0.278
Democrat	−2.510	55.10	0.0001	0.338
District	0.177	0.09	0.763	0.587
Committee				
Mississippi River	2.950	7.22	0.007	1.098
Rivers and Harbors	−2.454	4.44	0.035	1.164

Note: The dichotomous dependent variable is defined such that it is coded 1 if the member voted to refer the report to the Mississippi River Committee and 0 otherwise. The variable District is defined such that it has a value of 1 if the member came from a district bordering on the Mississippi River, 0 otherwise.

[a]Excluded categories are Republicans, members whose districts are not along the Mississippi River, and members of neither the Mississippi River or Rivers and Harbors Committees.

The outcomes of clashes between Commerce/Rivers and Harbors and the other "water" committees were usually resolved without a roll call vote. That was not the case in the 48th Congress (1884), when the Mississippi River Committee made another attempt to raid Rivers and Harbors' spending jurisdiction. The particular issue in this case was over which committee would get to receive a presidential report recommending that $1 million be spent on improvements to the Mississippi River and thus over who would get to report legislation back to the House. The analysis of that vote is in table 3. What the analysis suggests is that this jurisdictional raid was mostly of interest to the Mississippi River Committee itself, and that support for further fragmentation did not extend more generally to members that came from districts along the Mississippi.[18]

This specific roll call, along with the other non-roll call votes and the floor

[18]The strong negative coefficient associated with the Democrats in table 1 deserves some interpretation. The simple explanation is that Democrats were in a majority during the 48th Congress, control of the chamber was predicated on control over the rules, and therefore Democratic party leaders were diligent in rallying their followers at the same time Republicans were uniting to oppose majority party leadership. Support for one's leadership in votes on the rules is a consistent finding from this period (Stewart, 1985, forthcoming). However, note a twist to this argument about party control. The representatives leading the charge against the Democratic leadership were also Democrats (the same can be said about John Reagan's activities previously discussed). Thus, party was a potent force during this period, but the interaction of the jurisdictional and geographic imperatives could produce an even more potent one.

activity of pro-Mississippi River MCs generally, suggests that high-demand members were willing to forgo the *chance* to increase water project spending in order to maintain an internal improvements regime that was satisfactory and predictable in the face of uncertainty

RETRENCHING FRAGMENTATION

While high-demand members periodically expressed a preference for some degree of consolidation, low-demand members also showed occasional support for fragmentation The most important example of this was the creation of the House Appropriations Committee in 1865 It is the consensus among scholars that the creation of the HAC was a consequence of financial problems encountered during the Civil War Partly because the Ways and Means Committee was vastly overworked, it is arguable that nobody in Congress realized the severity of the financial situation until the war was well over (Kimmel, 1959, pp 61–65, Ratner, 1967, pp 61–99) After the war the House leadership concluded that the government's finances could only be handled if the task was broken up The consensus to divide the financial labor in the House was implemented by removing the appropriating and banking functions from the Ways and Means Committee and giving them to two new committees

Thus, the task overload was met by fragmentation, but it was fragmentation aimed toward giving greater fiscal control over budgeting to House leaders Samuel Cox (D-OH), who reported the rules change to the House, defended this fragmentation as follows "I need not dilate upon the importance of having hereafter one committee to investigate with nicest heed all matters connected with economy The tendency of the time is to extravagance in private and in public We require of this new committee their whole labor in the restraint of extravagant and illegal appropriations

"Each member of the Ways and Means has his specialty—each Olympian. And yet, sir, powerful as the committee is constituted, even their powers of endurance, physical and mental, are not adequate to the great duty which has been imposed by the emergencies of this historic time (*Congressional Globe*, vol 83, pp 1312–13 [1865, 38-2])

The support for fragmentation among low-demand House members is also evidenced by the fact that Ways and Means did not voice a strong protest to this division of its power Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA), who chaired Ways and Means, did express some reservations about the plan, but he bowed to the reality of his committee's overwhelming workload (*Congressional Globe* vol 83, p 1513 [1865, 38-2]) To emphasize that the new HAC was to continue in the spirit of Ways and Means' *efforts* to control spending, in the next Congress Stevens was appointed to be the HAC's first chair

Discussion

The purpose of this paper has been to specify more accurately the relationship between structural and spending preferences The case exploration has been aimed at revealing the contingencies that led MCs with equivalent spending preferences to prefer fundamentally different structures under different conditions As this exploration has revealed, the conventional wisdom, and its formalization through the rational choice literature, can be used to explain much of what happened from 1865 to 1921. Spenders (savers) usually preferred fragmentation (centralization) But occasionally spenders (savers) preferred centralization (fragmentation) What were the decisional contexts surrounding these cases that led the House and its members to make these structural choices?

Expansionary fragmentation Fragmentation as the vehicle for greater spending is the preferable choice when the economy is robust [19] Fragmentation can also be justified more easily when the status quo regime is overworked A strong economy facilitates expansionary fragmentation because the oversupply of governmental goods and services can be absorbed by the economy more easily without being noticed by voters If the status quo can be charged with being overworked, division of labor arguments can also be brought to bear to justify fragmentation

These two conditions, a healthy economy and committee overwork, were present in varying degrees in the cases of expansionary fragmentation we have discussed Both 1878 and 1885, years of major successful expansionary fragmentation, were relatively good ones for both the federal government and the general economy The growing surpluses in the late 1870s and 1880s, coupled with a fiscal dividend as interest payments receded, eventually prompted more MCs to use government spending to their advantage. As well, in 1885 the overwork issue was clearly salient and not entirely contrived Appropriations bills had become chronically late the previous two years (*Congressional Record*, vol 17, p 170 [49-1]) In fact, during the last two years before decentralization occurred committee business had become so chaotic that appropriations bills frequently reached the House floor without being printed [20]

[19] By robust economy I mean either (1) that the economy is growing or not in a recession or (2) that the government budget is in a surplus

[20] Upon careful analysis it is probable that the more important reason why the HAC actually had become late in reporting appropriations bills was not because of overwork, but because of strategy It appears that the HAC would withhold appropriations bills from the floor until the end of session, and then monopolize floor time in the end-of-session crush This tactic could forestall undesired legislation from getting on the floor and also make it more likely that appropriations bills would be passed unamended However this tactic apparently backfired on the

Retrenching centralization The functional utility of centralization and formal coordination has been conceded, even by devout incrementalists, under conditions such as rapid changes in an organization's environment, overwhelming concern with a few pressing problems, situations involving a long series of weak causal relationships that have a strong cumulative effect, and the scarcity of key resources (Lustick, 1980) These were certainly the types of problems confronting Congress immediately after World War I, when the choice was made by low-demand members to aggressively pursue centralization The war had brought about a rapid change in the congressional environment, preoccupation with survival as a nation, scarcity of key resources, and a realization that the baroque administrative apparatus of the federal government—including the budgetary process—was inadequate to handle these problems Yet, these generic conditions also described Congress after the Civil War, and the structural remedy chosen then was fragmentation Thus, the problems alone confronting the House in the 1910s cannot fully explain why centralization was chosen after World War I

What set 1865 and 1919 apart from each other was the fact that the incumbent regime in 1865 was obviously overworked while the legislative committees of 1919 were not This helps to explain the choice of fragmentation at one point and centralization at the other The question in 1865, when low-demand members chose fragmentation, was whether the components of the budgetary system could be provided for at all By 1919, the functionality of the individual parts of the budgetary process was not questioned, the ability of the parts to operate together was in question, however, in a situation in which it was imperative that the parts act in concert

Expansionary centralization Although it is conceivable that a system of universalism could be maintained tacitly, in most legislative situations some mechanism is required to maintain the agreement by which everybody votes for everybody else's programs Some sort of formal mechanism is necessary because regardless of the long-run advantages of universalism, its maintenance is hazardous in the short-run, including temptations to free ride perils of agenda control, and tendencies toward outcome cycling Therefore some sort of formal mechanism is often necessary to maintain universalism fulfilling such tasks as reminding potential defectors of the long-run costs of defection, reducing outrageous spending requests which could alienate the support of large numbers of coalition partners, and placing agenda control in

committee in the long run The strategic withholding of appropriations bills until the end of the session could easily be interpreted publicly by the Rules Committee and other rank and file members as a breakdown of proficiency on the HAC's part But strategic withholding aside perusal of the Appropriations Committee's original records in the National Archives suggest that in the 48th Congress at least, overwork was a real issue

the hands of spending proponents (Stewart, 1985, pp 52–55). The specific type of formal arrangement that has been used in Congress to maintain universalism is the single "logrolling committee "

Single-committee oversight of universalism operates primarily through fashioning omnibus bills An omnibus—especially one considered under a closed rule in the House—solves the defection problem, making a vote for any one part of the bill contingent on a vote for the whole thing The utility of centralized vote trading is increased all the more when extraordinary majorities are required to pass the omnibus (e g , when there is a veto threat), because the allowable margin of error in those instances is considerably reduced

It was especially difficult to build coalitions that could pass water projects in the 1870s and 1880s, suggesting the usefulness of expansionary centralization for water projects A significant and powerful minority of the House opposed all water project spending, and they had particular power when the bill had to garner an extraordinary majority The existence of these perils in forming winning water project majorities during the 1870s and 1880s explains why most proponents of internal improvements refused to follow their more risk acceptant colleagues Split jurisdictions might have produced higher committee recommendations for improving the Mississippi and other rivers, but those higher recommendations would have had a harder time surviving the scrutiny of the House floor, ultimately threatening the ability of all interested parties to obtain water projects for the folks back home regardless of the locations of their home districts

Retrenching fragmentation The utility of fragmenting in order to control spending comes across most clearly in the early work of Wildavsky (1964) Fragmentation to achieve retrenchment is the most appropriate strategic choice when the status quo is clearly overworked and issues of coordination are not problematic

There were two major times during this period in which fragmentation was supported and effected not to raise spending but to control it better The first was when the Appropriations Committee was created in 1865 It was clear in the debate preceding the HAC's creation that the principals would have preferred to have kept the Ways and Means Committee's jurisdiction intact Yet it was also clear that twelve men could no longer handle the job Under these conditions, adherence to strict centralization was abandoned in favor of a form of decentralization, which still could be coordinated by leadership

The second episode was when the Rivers and Harbors Committee was created in 1883, splitting the Commerce Committee's jurisdiction in half One might object to characterizing this episode as fragmentary centralization, because while it was clearly *fragmentary* it was not so clearly *re*-

trenching. Yet the floor debate indicates that the reason for the committee creation was not to expand rivers and harbors spending any more. Commerc simply found itself with too many responsibilities (recall that utility regul tion was occupying the committee's time in the 1880s) and it was unable scrutinize the water project bill with any degree of attentiveness. In this cas as with the creation of the HAC in 1865, "control" was gained over spendi by granting a new committee part of the old committee's responsibilities

I have argued in this paper that structural preferences among members the House are determined by an interaction of their spending preferenc with the decisional context In most instances between 1865 and 1921, th interaction produced straightforward results and strategies of expansiona fragmentation and retrenching centralization In other, less common i stances, that interaction produced strategies of expansionary centralizati and retrenching fragmentation. The reform cases I have explored in th paper were products of a particular time in the history of Congress, but t lessons to be drawn from them are general ones Most importantly, leg lators choose formal rules with an eye on their potential consequences legislative outcomes Yet the translation of substantive preferences into fo mal structures is not always a direct one, but is an activity that takes i account much of the richness of legislative life

REFERENCES

Arnold R Douglas 1979 *Congress and the Bureaucracy* New Haven Yale University Pr

Brady, David, and Mark Morgan 1983 Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriati Process The Effects of the 1885 and 1919–1920 Reforms on Money Decisions Paper p pared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Associat Chicago

Brady, David, and Nancy Kursman 1984 The House Agriculture Committee Struct Change and Policy Shifts 1880–1970 Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meetin the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC

Brady, David, and Joseph Cooper 1981 Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress *Am Political Science Review* 75 988–1006

Ferejohn, John 1974 *Pork Barrel Politics* Stanford, CA Stanford University Press

Fisher, Louis 1975 *Presidential Spending Power* Princeton Princeton University Press

Glasson, William H 1918 *Federal Military Pensions in the United States* New York O University Press

Ippolito, Dennis 1981 *Congressional Spending* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Jacobson Gary 1983 *The Politics of Congressional Elections* Boston Little Brown

Kimmel, Lewis 1959 *Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy 1789-1958* Washington, DC Br ings Institution

Lindblom Charles 1959 The Politics of Muddling Through *Public Administration Re* 19 79–88

Lustick, Ian 1980 Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism Four Pro tions *American Political Science Review*, 74 342–53

Margolis, Julius 1975 Comment *Journal of Law and Economics*, 18 645–59

Mayhew, David 1974 *Congress The Electoral Connection* New Haven Yale University

Miller, Gary, and Terry Moe 1983 Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government *American Political Science Review*, 77 297–322
Niskanen, William 1971 *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* Chicago Aldine-Atherton
Ratner, Sydney 1967 *Taxation and Democracy in America* New York Wiley
Rivlin, Alice 1981 Rejoinder *The Brookings Bulletin* Spring 1981 11–13
Schick, Allen 1980 *Congress and Money* Washington Urban Institute
—— 1984 *Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets The Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress* Washington Congressional Research Service
—— 1986 *Crisis in the Budget Process Exercising Political Choice* Washington American Enterprise Institute
Shp, Terry 1983 *The South Returns to Congress* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press
Shepsle, Kenneth 1978 *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* Chicago University of Chicago Press
—— 1984 The Congressional Budget Process Diagnosis, Prescription, Prognosis In W Thomas Wander, F Ted Hebert, and Gary W Copeland, eds *Congressional Budgeting* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast 1981 Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice *Public Choice* 37 503–19
Simon, Herbert 1950 *Administrative Behavior* 2d ed New York Macmillan
Smith, Steven S 1985 New Patterns of Decisionmaking in Congress In John E Chubb and Paul E Peterson, eds , *The New Direction in American Politics* Washington Brookings Institution
Stewart, Charles 1985 The Politics of Structural Reform Reforming Budgetary Structure in the House, 1865–1921 Ph D thesis Stanford University
—— 1987 Does Structure Matter? *American Journal of Political Science* 31 584–605
—— forthcoming *The Budget Reform and Institutional Development The House 1865–1921* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
U.S. Congress House 1973 *Improving Congressional Control over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt Totals*, 93rd Congress 1st sess H rpt 93
U.S. President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency 1912 *The Need for a National Budget* Washington Government Printing Office
Wander W Thomas 1982 Patterns of Change in the Congressional Budget Process 1865–1974 *Congress and the Presidency*, 9 23–49
—— 1984 The Politics of Congressional Budget Reform In W Thomas Wander F Ted Hebert, and Gary Copeland eds *Congressional Budgeting* Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
Weingast Barry 1979 A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms *American Journal of Political Science* 23 243–62
Wildavsky, Aaron 1964 *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* Boston Little Brown
Wilson, Rick 1986 What Was It Worth to Be on a Committee in the U S House 1889 to 1913? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11 47–63
Woodward, C Vann 1966 *Reunion and Reaction The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* Boston Little, Brown
—— 1971 *The Origins of the New South 1877–1913* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

Changing Partisanship among Southern Party Activists

Dorothy Davidson Nesbit
D D B Needham, Chicago

Although some research provides evidence that party conversions are most common among the uninformed and may even be random, more recent work suggests that there is a strong ideological congruence between converts and their new party. This analysis uses data collected by the 1984 Comparative Party Activists Project to predict partisan conversion among activists, focusing on the South. After taking into consideration previous political socialization and accumulated political experience, it is attitudes on issues that best predict party switching.

From V O Key's blockbuster on electoral politics in the South, to more recent treatises on partisan dealignment and Republican surges, political scientists have attempted to quantify and analyze that "something different about the South.[1] From a practical political standpoint, what is happening in the South matters because of the large number of electoral college votes vested in the region. From an academic perspective, it is in the South where much of the debate over current political phenomena is being waged. At issue is whether the country as a whole, or regions within it, are in a realigning or dealigning phase of the political cycle. The realignment question is perhaps the most hotly debated research question in contemporary political analysis.

What are the changes in southern politics spurring this debate? Since the 1950s the region that was once solidly Democratic has become increasingly competitive in races for the presidency, House, Senate, and governorship. Polls taken since 1980 show individual partisan attachments shifting. While many have seen shifts, few have been able to empirically demonstrate th

* An earlier version of this article was prepared for delivery at the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, Chicago, Illinois, April 9-12, 1986. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Kathleen Frankovic, Mikel Wyckoff, Paul Beck, Kent Jennings, and the anonymous reviewers in refining it. Responsibility for the final interpretation presented here rests with the author.

[1] Some of the work which focuses on electoral politics in the South includes V O Key, *Southern Politics* (1949); William Havard, ed., *The Changing Politics of the South* (1972); E Schreiber, Where the Ducks are: Southern Strategy versus Fourth Party, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1971); Donald S Strong, Further Reflections on Southern Politics, *The Journal of Politics* (May 1971); Paul Allen Beck, Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South, *American Political Science Review* (1977); Paul Allen Beck, Realignment Begins: The Republican Surge in Florida, *American Politics Quarterly* (1982)

connection between partisan shifting and issue attitudes This seriously undermines the arguments of those who would identify the shifts as realignment Realignments have historically been defined as turning on some issue or issue bundle Carmines and Stimson's (1984) work on issue evolution neatly explains the gradual movement of individuals into the Republican party It doesn't provide a very convincing account of the sudden surge in conversions reported in the South since 1980 This article examines partisan switching among activists. Party activists are an appropriate focus for exploring changes in party identification, since they may be the precursors of similar changes in the mass public (Stimson, 1986) While many have been quick to call the southern shifts realignment, no one has yet identified the issue, or issue bundle, which is stimulating the Republican gains This research extends earlier work by developing a model of partisan conversion which reveals the weight of three separate issue factors in the decision to convert, relative to political socialization and accumulated political experience

Conversion Among the 1984 State Party Convention Delegates

The data for this analysis were collected by the Comparative Party Activists Project, conducted under the auspices of the Citadel University [2] A single survey instrument was developed and administered to the Republican and Democratic state party convention delegates by field representatives in thirteen states Given the distinctive nature of southern politics, the preponderance of evidence of realignment in the South and obvious inconsistencies in the proportion and direction of conversions in the southern and nonsouthern states, this analysis is restricted to the southern states

By analyzing the South and non-South together, the prominence and direction of the changes taking place are underestimated In previous analyses based on the 1980 state party convention delegates 12 9 percent of the Democratic delegates and 23 4 percent of the Republican delegates report having switched parties [3] In the 1984 delegate data for the southern states

[2] The convention delegates do not represent a sample of activists since they are usually elected committed to a particular candidate This may produce a configuration of the population of activists with consequences for the number of converts especially among the Democrats Neither the Citadel nor any of the field representatives in the states bear any responsibility for the interpretations contained herein Details of response rates are available from the author or from the Citadel

[3] See Mary Kweit, Ideological Congruence of Party Switchers and Nonswitchers The Case of Party Activists *American Journal of Political Science* (1986) The 1980 State Party Convention Delegate Study was not used in this analysis for several reasons First coding on some key items was not consistent in the two data sets making the data sets awkward to combine Second the number and wording of issue items was not comparable Third the number of southern states included in each year was not comparable Finally the 1980 data set has been written about extensively See *The Life of the Parties Activists in Presidential Politics* Ronald B Rapoport Alan I Abramowitz, and John McGlennon eds 1986 Findings from the 1984 data set are yet unpublished

the average number of Democratic converts is 11.5 percent, in the non-South it is 20.2 percent. The average number of Republican converts reported in the 1984 data in the South is 31.4 percent, in the non-South the number of Republican converts average 17.0 percent. Clearly, the national forces at work which are pressing people toward conversion are operating at different magnitudes and in different directions in the South and non-South. The timing of partisan conversions is particularly important.[4] A signal characteristic of realignment is sharp movement disproportionately into one party. Gradual movements indicate secular change of the type described by Carmines and Stimson (1984). Among Democrats, a surge in conversions occurred around the 1980 election. Surges in Republican conversions took place in 1964 and 1980. What happened in these elections to exert a stronger than "normal" pull, causing these activists to switch?

The surge in 1964 is probably indicative of the importance of the race issue in the presidential contest that year. Goldwater, the Republican candidate, took a strong and quite vocal position on "state's rights," which in the South may have been interpreted as "white rights." The surge in 1980 conversions is also identified with a particularly appealing Republican—Ronald Reagan. Reagan combines winning personal charm with the articulation of conservative racial views, a decidedly noninterventionist federal role in most social policy areas, and a militant stance with respect to national defense. Of course, the converts to the Democratic party in 1980 would be expected to see Reagan, and his articulation of these issues, in a much different light.

Delegate Motivations for Converting


There are two primary motivations that may drive state party activists to abandon their national parties—candidates and issues. Although conceptually distinct, these motivations are inextricably linked because issues typically do not articulate themselves. Even the most issue-conscious activist must rely on a candidate as spokesperson for the positions of the party. Despite the difficulties in separating candidate and issue effects, political scientists have built careers debating whether issues or candidates promote partisan conversion. Given that both candidates and issues are important and that they are linked, which has the edge as an influence on individual attitudes and behavior?

It is possible, but unlikely, that the state and local Democratic candidates are superior to the party's candidates for national office. This explanation has a certain appeal when one examines the results of a single election. It loses its persuasiveness when one tries to explain the outcomes of several ele-

[4]Personal communication from James A. Stimson makes the point that recall data from political activists is quite accurate, in contrast with mass electorate recall data which Richard Niemi and others have demonstrated to be somewhat inaccurate.

FIGURE 1

DELEGATE'S REASONS FOR CONVERTING



tions over a long period of time Parties do not deliberately nominate candidates who will lose Candidates are therefore not a satisfying explanation of party fortunes over the long run

The extensive literature on issue voting demonstrates that voters are capable of making fairly sophisticated judgments retrospectively and on certain types of issues—mainly peace and prosperity (Kessel, 1972, Fiorina, 1981) Research on party images provides convincing evidence that the impressions which people form about the parties are long lived These images also tend to be event or issue based Thus, issues may have the explanatory edge in attempts to evaluate the long-run success of the parties

Based on the self-reports of the southern party activists themselves Republican converts are by far more issue oriented than Democratic converts Figure 1 shows that less than half of the Democratic converts (44 percent) cite issues as the main reason for their decisions to switch, but more than three-fourths (78 percent) of the Republicans do More than one-fourth (27 percent) of the Democratic converts but only 9 percent of the Republican converts, attribute their party switches to better candidates Very small proportions in each group associate their conversions with other factors such as personal advancement, better organization or the persuasion of family and friends Issues are clearly the magnet pulling most new supporters into the

ttitudes toward abortion, marijuana, homosexual behavior, and school rayer. A conservative response was considered to be opposition to abortion, upport for school prayer, and agreement that marijuana use and homosexual ehavior are wrong [9]

The conservative response on each of these issues was coded "5" and the beral response was coded "1" Each scale is a simple additive index which anges between 1 and 5 The individual's score on each issue, added together nd divided by the number of issues in the factor, provides a standardized easure

Converts can then be compared to loyalists of the parties which they have eserted Simple additive indices were created by combining respondent ores on those issues which loaded above .5 on a dimension Indices were en standardized by dividing by the number of issues used to build them he higher the score, the more conservative the response The greatest differences occur between Democrats and Republicans This type of polarizaon is expected (Miller and Jennings, 1986) [10]

esults

A probit analysis of the influence of socialization, accumulated experience, d political agenda on party switching gives some indication of the relave importance of the issue dimensions in partisan conversions A probit alysis is appropriate because the dependent variable, party switching, is chotomous [11]

The dependent variable is coded "0" for loyalists and "1" for converts The odel predicts delegate conversions Table 1 compares converts to loyalists the party which they abandoned (i e , Democratic converts are compared Republican loyalists, and Republican converts are compared to Demoatic loyalists)

[9] An examination of the religious behavior and attitudes of Republican converts shows that ey more closely resemble the lifelong Republicans than the lifelong Democrats whom they serted Fifty-one percent of the converted Republican delegates report that they attend urch every week, nearly half (44 percent) report that they have had a born again experience d 52 percent agree that the Bible is God's word and is all true Among lifelong Democrats ghtly more than a third take these positions among lifelong Republicans, roughly half

[10] Democratic delegates who had converted from the Republican party are slightly more libal than lifelong Democrats on all three issue dimensions (Difference of means test significant $p < .05$) Republican delegates who had converted from the Democratic party are no differt than lifelong Republicans on the Reagan Agenda dimension but are slightly more conser tive on the American Nationalism dimension and much more conservative on the Keep Amer- Moral dimension (Difference of means test significant at $p < .05$)

[11] The constant term in the probit analysis reflects the tendency to switch or not switch, conolling all other variables in the equation A negative constant indicates the tendency toward nversion *The maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) provide the relative weights of the vari*les in predicting respondent decisions to convert or remain loyal The MLEs represent prob ilities that a unit change in issue scores would result in a party switch

TABLE 1

PROBIT ANALYSIS PREDICTING PARTY SWITCHING BY PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION, RESPONDENT'S POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN STATE, AND ISSUE DIMENSIONS

COMPARISON OF CONVERTS AND THEIR DESERTED PARTY

	Democratic Loyalists & Former Democrats		Republican Loyalists & Former Republicans	
Variables	MLE	Error	MLE	Error
Mother's PID	24	04	− 24	05
Father's PID	27	04	− 29	05
Interaction PID	− 05	006	04	007
Years Active	− 65	13	− 18*	14
Residency	− 93	13	22*	15
Reagan Agenda	1 30	07	1 18	09
American Nationalism	1 04	06	− 69	07
Keep America Moral	16	05	− 23	05
Constant	−2 89	31	−11 96	37

Note *Not significant at $p < 05$
Dependent Variable is coded 0 = loyalist 1 = convert
Mother's and Father's Party Identification 1 = Strong Democrat 7 = Strong Republican
Interaction Party Identification 1 = Both Strong Democrats 49 = Both Strong Republicans

The joint effects of parental party identification are negligible in all cases (We expect the signs to be reversed because of the way the partisanship variable is coded—Democratic identification is low and Republican is high) The relationships between parental identification and switching are moderately weak, implying somewhat weak influence [12]

Among those who left the Republicans the influence of previous political participation is insignificant Among those who left the Democrats the relationship is stronger and negative That is, converts have not been politically active for long Those leaving the Democratic party also appear to be new residents of the South Residency is insignificant among those who left the Republican party

When converts are compared to loyalists of the parties which they have abandoned, the issue dimensions appear strongly related to the decision to switch (table 1) When those who have left the Democratic party and those who remain loyal to the Democrats are compared, the Reagan Agenda and

[12]To minimize the loss of cases due to missing data in cases where the respondent reported the partisanship of one parent but not the other the missing parent was recoded as nonpartisan Obviously, if the respondent didn't know the partisanship of the parent the parent probably did not exert an influence in either direction In cases where neither parent's partisanship was reported it was unclear whether that was the result of refusal to answer the question parental absence or lack of parental partisanship These cases remained missing in the analysis

American Nationalism dimensions outweigh all other variables as predictors of conversion. When those who have left the Republican party and those who remain loyal to the Republicans are compared, these same two issue dimensions also emerge as having the greatest impact on conversion


Split-Ticket Voting Among Converts and Loyalists

To what extent can the new, issue-motivated activists be counted on as the new party foot soldiers? Not much. Delegates were asked, "Was there ever a time when you thought that your party's supporters would have been justified in splitting their ballots between Democratic and Republican candidates?" Figure 2 displays delegate attitudes toward split-ticket voting for converts and loyalists

Lifelong Democrats are most likely to oppose split-ticket voting, followed by lifelong Republicans Converts of both parties are most supportive of splitting their ballots in national, state, or local elections However, nearly half (42 percent) of the Democratic converts (former Republicans) agree that splitting their ballots in national and state elections may be justified, but only 33 percent of the Republican converts think so Thus, Republican converts are probably less likely to split their ballot than Democratic converts

FIGURE 2

ATTITUDES TOWARD SPLIT-TICKET VOTING BY PARTY SWITCHING



Conclusions: Harbingers of Change for the Southern Party System

Large numbers of southern activists have switched parties, moving disproportionately into the Republican party. The conversions surged in 1980. The activists claim that their participation in politics and partisan conversions are motivated by the issue appeal of their adopted parties. Among Democrats, conversions are most likely among those without a long history of participation and among those who have not lived a long time in the South. Among Republicans, conversions are unrelated to residency or participation.

Republicans, on the whole, are more motivated by issues than the Democrats, but the converts in both parties are markedly more concerned with issue articulation than lifelong loyalists. The issues with which they are most concerned, and the ones which influenced their movement into the opposite party, are the issues which represent long-term forces in American politics—the Reagan Agenda (traditional left-right distinctions) and American Nationalism. This is quite consistent with the irony of Democratic losses at the national level combined with success at the state and local level. It is, quite simply, easier for state and local candidates to avoid articulating many of these issues. Defense spending and American military presence abroad simply do not cut very deeply in races for state offices.

Kweit (1986) has argued that because of the strong agreement of the converts with the positions of their adopted parties on the issues, the primary effect of the converts will be to reinforce the status quo. This analysis also finds strong issue agreement between converts and loyalists in the adopted parties. However, the delegates voice strong support for split-ticket voting. This implies an alternate interpretation of the impact of the converts.

Because of their strong issue orientation and willingness to defect if unsatisfied, the converts may encourage an increasing issue articulation role for, and polarization of, the parties. To the extent that the Republican party continues to better articulate the public sentiment on nationalism issues, it will continue to win converts. However, the very nature of the issues which have engendered Republican success nationally may preclude them from enjoying the same kind of success at the state and local levels.

To the extent that converts are motivated by the issues in their loyalties and in their participation, the parties must increase their articulation of the issues in order to retain that support. Issue articulation carries with it the possibility of polarization. The more clearly stated the differences between the parties, the more likely that the mass electorate will perceive and act upon those differences. If indeed party activists serve as cue givers or opinion leaders to the mass public, then attitudes and behaviors documented here among these delegates may be harbingers of change in the electorate in the coming elections.

APPENDIX 1
MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY

Standardizing Measures

To assess the importance of previous political activity on party switching it is necessary to standardize for age Obviously, a seventy-six-year-old respondent has had more opportunity to participate than a twenty-five-year-old respondent The actual number of years in which the respondent reported being active was divided by the respondent's age minus seventeen (to give the number of years active since political maturity) For example, if the respondent was twenty-eight years old, he/she had an opportunity to be active for eleven years. If the respondent reported being active for eleven years, he/she received a score of 1 0 Respondent scores ranged between 1 and 0

A small number of respondents reported being active long before they were eligible to vote Thus, their scores were above 1 0 After examining such respondents case by case, it was decided to recode all values over 1 0 as 1 0 Primarily these cases involved respondents reporting they had been active exactly the same number of years as their age The variable "years active" is the number of years the respondent reported being politically active, expressed as a proportion of age

A similar method was used to standardize for age the number of years the respondent had lived in the state The number of years which the respondent reported living in the state was divided by age Thus, if the respondent reported living in the state for thirty-five years, and reported that he/she was thirty-five years old, the respondent would receive a score of 1 0 The variable "residency" is the length of time the respondent lived in the state expressed as a proportion of age Again, a small number of persons reported living in the state longer than their age Case-by-case examination of these individuals suggested that some were shaving a year or two from their ages Thus values above 1 0 were recoded to 1 0

APPENDIX 2

FACTOR SCORES OF ISSUE ATTITUDES AMONG SOUTHERN STATE PARTY CONVENTION DELEGATES, 1984 (VARIMAX ROTATION)

Issue	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
· Equal Rights Amendment	63	39	35
overnment sponsored national health insurance gram	69	33	07
rmative Action programs to increase minority rep- ·ntation in jobs and higher education	71	34	08
re intensive negotiations with the Soviet Union on is control	57	15	22
uclear freeze agreed to by the United States and Soviet Union	65	30	16
across-the-board tax increase to reduce the fed- l deficit	63	− 13	21
cter legislation to control handguns	60	23	24
ublic works program to reduce unemployment n if it means an increase in inflation	70	26	06
road-based tax to increase funding for public ication	69	20	11
itinued increase in defense spending even if it uires cutting domestic programs	− 54	62	25
re rapid development of nuclear power	40	67	16
reasing America's military presence in the Mideast	16	73	20
reasing America's military presence in Latin erica	36	72	23
ernmental Action to increase energy resources n though it might decrease protection for the ironment	02	64	16
onstitutional amendment to prohibit abortion ept when the mother's life is endangered	11	17	76
· use of marijuana is morally wrong	16	17	77
mosexual behavior is morally wrong	25	23	77
onstitutional amendment to permit prayers and le reading in the public schools	22	31	69

REFERENCES

Beck, P A 1982 Realignment Begins The Republican Surge in Florida. *American Politics Quarterly*, 10 421–38

——— 1977 Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South *American Political Science Review*, 71 477–96

Carmines, E G , and J A Stimson 1984 The Dynamics of Issue Evolution The United States, and Methodological Appendix 5A, The Limits of Reconstruction In R J Dalton, S C Flanagan, and P A Beck, eds , *Electoral Realignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton Princeton University Press, 134–58

Drever, E C 1971–72 Media Use and Electoral Choice Some Political Consequences of Information Exposure *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 544–53

——— 1973 Change and Stability in Party Identifications *Journal of Politics*, 35 712–22

Fiorina, Morris P 1981 *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Havard, W 1972 *The Changing Politics of the South* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

Kessel John H 1972 Comment The Issues in Issue Voting *American Political Science Review*, 66 459–65

Key, V O 1949 *Southern Politics* New York Vintage Books

Kweit, Mary 1986 Ideological Congruence of Party Switchers and Nonswitchers The Case o Party Activists *American Journal of Political Science* 30 184–96

Kweit R W , and M G Kweit 1986 The Permeability of the Parties In R B Rapoport, A I Abramowitz, and J McGlennon eds *The Life of the Parties Activists in Presidential Poli tics* Lexington University Press of Kentucky 188–214

Miller W E and M K Jennings 1986 *Parties in Transition A Longitudinal Study of Part Elites and Party Supporters* New York Russell Sage Foundation

Rapoport R B A I Abramowitz, and J McGlennon 1986 *The Life of the Parties Activis in Presidential Politics* Lexington University Press of Kentucky

Schreiber, E M 1971 Where the Ducks Are Southern Strategy versus Fourth Party *Publ Opinion Quarterly*, 35 157–67

Stimson, J A 1986 The Process of Perception of Party Issue Positions A Longitudinal a Regional Perspective Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Ass ciation, Chicago

Strong D S 1971 Further Reflections on Southern Politics *Journal of Politics* 33 239–

Partisan Manipulation of the Economy: Another Look at Monetary Policy with Moving Regression

John T. Woolley
University of California, Santa Barbara

This research addresses a paradox. While there appears to be a significant partisan effect on economic outcomes, there is little or no persuasive evidence of partisan differences in the manipulation of policy instruments. This paradox appears to result from uncertainties about the specification of reaction functions for policy instruments. One implication of these uncertainties is that studies of policy instruments are biased against finding partisan differences. The proposed remedy for this situation is further empirical and theoretical work that could improve reaction function specifications. An example of this is moving regression. Results presented here from moving regressions are consistent with a model of partisan policy that does not involve large average differences in policy instruments.

The Macropolitics Paradox

There is a paradox in the literature on political manipulation of macroeconomic policy. On the one hand, Hibbs (1977, 1983) and Alt (1985) have presented sophisticated time-series models of unemployment showing that partisan changes have a significant and sustained impact on levels of unemployment. Beck (1982a) has offered the counterproposition for the United States that administrations are as significant as parties in accounting for unemployment changes.

On the other hand, analyses of policy instruments have been inconclusive about partisan influence. Ironically, some of the best evidence of partisan impacts on the use of policy instruments involves monetary policy, supposedly less politicized than fiscal policy. For convenience, I shall refer to this state of affairs as the macropolitics paradox.

Golden and Poterba (1980, pp. 706, 708) found no partisan impacts on fiscal policy (by any of several measures) and modest, but statistically insignificant partisan differences in monetary policy—where they expected to find none. In two recent contributions, neither Lowery (1985) nor Hicks (1984) discov-

*Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the 1985 meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, to the 1987 meetings of the Western Political Science Association, and in lectures at Washington University and the University of California, Santa Barbara. I wish to acknowledge helpful comments of various participants in those events, those of James Alt, Christian Aubin, Dennis Quinn, and those of the anonymous referees for this journal. None of them is responsible for what remains.

ered any partisan differences in fiscal policy. Since Lowery's exhaust study was addressed to precisely this point, his conclusion is yet another j ring contrast to the Hibbs/Alt results. These results are striking also becau partisan politicians have the most direct and continuous control of the pol instruments of fiscal policy

Analysts' expectations about the impact of politics on monetary pol have varied greatly Several have argued that the president is the domin influence on monetary policy (Weintraub, 1978, Beck, 1982b, Auerba 1985, Woolley, 1984) This might suggest that we should expect to find cl partisan effects in monetary policy But other analysts have justified excl ing monetary policy on the grounds that elected officials do not have "a rect and legitimized role" in the conduct of monetary policy as compared fiscal policy (Lowery, 1985, p. 430)

True to his position on macroeconomic conditions, Beck (1982b, p 4 reported that monetary policy appeared to vary by administration. not par However, in a later paper, Beck (1984, p 813) concluded that "when a Dem crat is in the White House monetary policy is easier than when a Republica there" except for the administrations of Nixon and Kennedy [1] The Nixon a Kennedy administrations represent one-third of the administrations B studied, and nearly one-third of the observations in his time series, so thi a major caveat Moreover, these administrations mark the beginning of p tisan periods, exactly the time when the Hibbs/Alt studies would lead u expect clear evidence of partisan policy Beck also reported that the parti differences have not been due to systematic differences in partisan respon to economic conditions (e g , such as Democrats being more responsive unemployment or Republicans to inflation) Thus, Beck's papers do not solve the macropolitics paradox Nor has this ambiguous state of affairs l resolved in work by Frey and Schneider (1981) or Woolley (1983) Only C art's (1978) study stands as a clear, unqualified demonstration of partisan ferences in monetary policy

In short, despite the care and thoroughness of various studies, the p doxical contradiction still remains we do not have convincing quantit studies that explain how partisan differences at the aggregate level are st lated at the level of policy instruments [2]

[1] Beck's explanation for this difference is that the 1982b study examines a shorter ti riod—and fewer administrations—than the 1984 study (Beck 1984 p 791) Beck's two differ in other ways too, although Beck did not discuss their consequences the policy ment is different, the independent variables are different, and the data are comprised terly, not monthly, observations in the second study

[2] Also note the total absence of highly sophisticated studies that support the simple p business cycle (PBC) hypothesis (Nordhaus 1975 and Tufte 1978) with aggregate level the level of policy instruments, the PBC hypothesis has also been repeatedly examin rejected by political scientists For fiscal policy Lowery (1985) and Hicks (1984), for m and fiscal policy Golden and Poterba (1980) and Brown and Stein (1982), for monetar Woolley (1984) and the meticulous analysis by Beck (1987)

In this paper I argue that there are a number of reasons why scholars night have difficulty discovering partisan differences at the level of policy nstruments Ultimately, these reasons all boil down to an argument that we eally do not know how to specify the partisan difference hypothesis for testng at the level of policy instruments An implication of these difficulties is nat we need further extensive work, both empirical and theoretical, to jusfy our model specifications One quantitative, empirical approach that may e helpful is moving regression The balance of the paper uses moving reression to examine the case of monetary policy

Reasons for the Paradox

Why is there a macropolitics paradox? It is possible, of course, that Hibbs, Alt, and Beck are wrong, and that there are not important partisan effects on nacroeconomic outcomes However, this view has yet to be persuasively arued If the Hibbs/Alt argument is more or less correct, then it must follow hat policymakers are doing something with policy instruments to bring bout this result Why might scholars have trouble observing what that omething is? There are several important reasons, most having to do with ur inability to specify precisely enough the appropriate hypotheses for conometric testing

Timing We do not know exactly when partisan stimulus should occur Hibbs's model assumes a sustained partisan stimulus beginning only after the irst quarter of an incumbency But Hibbs speculated in a footnote (1977, p 1476, fn 24) that the onset of partisan stimulus or restraint might come ven later, especially in the U S Alt proposed a strikingly different model hat appears to be especially appropriate for competitive two-party systems n Alt's model, the partisan stimulus lasts only for the first two quarters of a artisan regime (Alt 1985, pp 1035–36) Do the important stimuli come in ursts, the Alt view, or are they sustained systematically across regimes, the Hibbs view?

The conventional means of testing for partisan differences in the use of olicy instruments has been with dummy variables specified to reflect an asumption that partisan differences are sustained But as Alt's work points ut, this need not be true In a world characterized by partisan bursts there ould not be, on average, large partisan differences in instruments

Partisan bursts might occur at times other than at the outset of a partisan egime Alt's (1985, pp 1020–21) model of strategic party competition anticiates that immediately after taking office, partisans produce a burst of policy order to provide rewards to core supporters and to prove their credibility or many reasons, as Alt explains, the burst is likely to be transitory One portant reason is that a party's core supporters may be too few to guarantee electoral majority in the next election Consequently, incumbents must try

not to give their competitors issues that could be exploited to sway marginal voters, such as weak economic performance. In such circumstances, sustained partisan policy may be electorally risky. Indeed, a reasonable extension of Alt's model would suggest that if there has been a significant deterioration in economic conditions during the course of an incumbency, we might expect to see a pre-election burst of policy addressed to solving those problems. This defensive burst would be, quite likely, in the opposite direction of the first burst.

Thus, in a world characterized by a short-run Phillips curve trade-off and by relatively stable differences in partisan preferences about inflation and unemployment, we might see similarities in the settings of policy instruments on both sides of a partisan change. We would still observe partisan differences in outcomes, resulting both from any concluding burst associated with one party and the initial bursts of the successor. In policy systems based on policy bursts, however, one would not expect to find large average partisan differences in policy instruments.

Policy Mixes. Similarly, mixes of policy instruments may change through time, so that the main location of political manipulation may change from one instrument (e.g., fiscal policy) to another (e.g., monetary policy) with a change from one partisan period to another. In theory, a given level of economic stimulus or restraint can be created in various ways with different combinations of instruments. Since studies of policy instruments cannot anticipate all the possible combinations of actions, it is likely that some partisan effects will be missed or misinterpreted. Since studies examining multiple policy instruments have usually tested identical hypotheses for each instrument, any partisan strategies that utilize shifting combinations of different instruments have inevitably been missed.

What Differentiates the Parties? Some problems arise out of the logic of the reaction function itself. A familiar specification of the reduced form reaction function looks something like this:

$$Y_t = a + b_1(P_t - P^*)^e + b_2(U_t - U^*)^e + v$$

where Y represents an instrument that changes as a function of the deviation of target variables from their desired levels, designated by *'s, in this case inflation (P^*) and unemployment (U^*). The response as specified is stabilizing at the target level, and large deviations from the target are weighted more heavily than small deviations according to the unknown exponent e, assuming $e > 1$.

Partisan differences could be manifested in various ways. Partisan differences could have to do only with targets, only with respect to the overall policy responses (b_i), only with respect to weighting large deviations from

the targets (*e*), or with combination of these. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate these three parameters at once. Moreover, we do not know how partisan differences have been expressed at particular times, and we have no particularly good reason for asserting that partisan differences have been expressed in the same way at all times. If there are complex differences between incumbents of the same party in the way partisanship is expressed as well as between incumbents of different parties, then familiar dummy variable techniques cannot be relied upon to give correct answers about partisan differences in the use of policy instruments. If there are important shifts in target levels by one or both parties, this problem will only be magnified.

Changes in Policy Techniques and in the Economy. We know from Beck (1982b), DeRosa and Stern (1977), and Froyen (1974) that there have been significant changes in the structure of the monetary policy reaction function and in the way the Federal Reserve responds to key variables. It is at least plausible that efforts to discover partisan differences are confounded by these other changes. It could even be that partisan differences are evident within, not between, these different policy-making structures.

Of course, even if there were no partisan differences, policymakers might still change their targets, overall responses, and weighting schemes as the economy itself changes. Almost no one using reaction functions attempts to specify the policymakers' model of the world. Absent such a model showing how policymakers believe their actions to be linked to their targets, we cannot be certain why changes occur (Wood 1967, Abrams, Froyen and Waud 1980, Alt and Woolley, 1982). Thus there is always the danger that we will confuse partisan and nonpartisan policy changes. We might falsely conclude that there was no partisan difference in the use of instruments when, in fact, there really was, or vice versa. If there were both technical and partisan changes, we might be unable to distinguish them in a statistical test.

I do not mean to argue that any one of these reasons in particular explains why we have not found clear evidence of partisan differences in policy instruments. Nor do I mean to suggest that scholars working on this problem, both those cited here and those uncited, are ignorant of these problems or unduly cavalier about them. I do wish to argue that we are a long way from being able to specify the reaction function with great confidence. Our inability to do so almost certainly has the effect of biasing our studies in the direction of falsely concluding that there have not been partisan differences at the level of policy instruments.

AN APPROACH WITH MOVING REGRESSION

In principle the solutions to some of these problems are fairly straightforward. We could look more intensively at data, especially documents, to try to discover what combinations of instruments policymakers used, what infor-

mation they monitored, and how they responded to incoming information. Partisan transitions would deserve special emphasis as would times of apparent policy change. We may also need more theory about how variables such as administration (Beck, 1984), class interests (Hicks, 1984), or advisory structure (Weatherford, 1986) interact with partisanship.

Obviously the work to be done is demanding, but scholars have already taken some promising steps (e.g., Weatherford and McDonnell, 1985, Weatherford, 1986). It is by no means clear at this point that such work naturally extends to econometric estimation, or that with such work in hand we should expect to gain much more confidence in our knowledge as the result of further econometric estimates. In any case, the problems to be surmounted are clearly daunting. Without the benefit of hindsight, what factors predicted the Nixon economic policy mix of 1971–1972, or that of Ronald Reagan? What hypothesis would have led us to anticipate that Jimmy Carter's Federal Reserve would launch a wrenching new experiment in monetary policy at the outset of an election year?

Moving Regression

Despite these cautions, I believe there is value in further quantitative work prior to getting the results of intensive documentary research. Of course, we must be careful to recognize how hard it is to be confident that the model is correctly specified. The most useful approaches will be those that make it possible for us to proceed intelligently even though we have low confidence about the precise specification of our model. The balance of this paper is addressed to exploring one possible approach, moving regression. Moving regression involves the estimation of identical reaction functions over subperiods, usually overlapping, of an existing time series.[1]

The most sophisticated uses of moving regression have been in the context of efforts to test for sharp breaks in econometric models. The seminal statistical analysis was by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975, henceforth BDE). A well-known political science application is by Beck (1983). The approach relies heavily on visual inspection of graphical displays and has been justified in terms similar to other forms of exploratory data analysis (Hartwig and Dearing, 1979).

The BDE techniques for detecting a sharp structural change should probably be of greater interest to political scientists than they appear to be. However, there is no reason to believe that these techniques can resolve the macropolitics paradox. Most importantly, partisan manipulation of the sort implied by Alt's model does not require a protracted change in the structure of policy decision rules sufficient to produce evidence of change according to

[1] Also of potential interest in searching for inter-partisan differences may be variations on the ARIMA-transfer function methods. For example, see Yantek (1985).

the BDE measures. Even if we believe that partisan differences in policy are systematic and enduring, there are some problems with using the BDE procedures. The computer algorithms are not widely available, and the procedures are based on the assumptions of classical linear regression that are often violated in economic time series.[4]

Moving Regression Applied to U.S. Monetary Policy

Moving regression has many appealing features. First, the technique is readily available with many refinements to users of mainframe statistical packages. Second, the technique does not require us to assume fixed policy target variables. In studying policy responses over a long time series, scholars using reaction functions have always been forced to arbitrarily designate a set of right-hand-side variables, knowing that real world policymakers sometimes change the set of variables they monitor. Within narrow limits, and when collinearity is not great, it may make sense in a moving regression format to include both indicators, and thus to examine whether it is possible to detect shifts in attention from one variable to another. Given an awareness that reaction function coefficients reflect a mix of policymakers' preferences and their models of the world, it may be possible to speculate on the factors accounting for apparent shifts from monitoring one variable to monitoring another.

Third, moving regression does not impose the same coefficient estimates—including the estimates of autoregressive parameters—on the whole time series, as does the conventional approach. If we really believed that policymakers used unchanging decision rules with unvarying relative weights on targets over long time periods, then moving regression would primarily be useful for determining the robustness of our estimates. However, if we do not believe that, then moving regression is an obvious way of looking for patterns of change evident in the data.

[4]The BDE procedures are not implemented as part of standard (unmodified) statistical packages for mainframe or microcomputers, but this is an obstacle that can be surmounted. Statistical packages producing a wide range of diagnostic tests will eventually become widely available. Reports on use of such a package to discover a strikingly high frequency of specification errors in econometric work may be found in Bikker et al. (1986) and Krämer et al. (1985).

The BDF approach assumes that data conform to the assumptions of classic linear regression including uncorrelated error terms. However, autocorrelated error terms are exceedingly common in econometric time series. BDF do not explore the consequence of autocorrelation for their procedures, but there is discussion of this in Dufour (1982). The common approach to dealing with autocorrelation in the context of the BDF procedures (i.e., applying the procedures to an appropriately transformed data set) requires an additional (possibly dubious) assumption that the autocorrelation parameter is stable over the entire time period—despite the suspicion that other parameters are not. As Dufour (1982) points out, even if the autocorrelation function is stable, the BDF test statistics derived from the transformed data set may be unreliable if the estimated autocorrelation coefficient is not "sufficiently close" to the true coefficient.

Finally, the process of trying to understand the substantive meaning of the moving regression results promises to push us to examine policy-making closely in real historical contexts rather than in some imagined model with constant reactions and unchanging problems.

The Reaction Function

In this initial effort, I defined a reaction function for monetary policy using monthly data that seemed reasonably to incorporate variables that observers believe have been significant for monetary policy during at least some portions of the estimating period, January 1957–December 1984. The instrument (or indicator) of policy is the federal funds rate, the rate charged on overnight loans between financial institutions. Throughout the period, this interest rate has been either the policy instrument or one of the most closely-watched indicators of the stance of monetary policy.

The right-hand side of the model includes a combination of targets and constraints. The variables selected have been commonly used in reaction function estimates and are defined to reflect concepts frequently mentioned in Federal Open Market Committee records.[3] Following convention, the reaction function is specified as an additive model as follows:

$$F_t = a + b_1 P_{t-1} + b_2 U_{t-1} + b_3 I_{t-1} + b_4 X_t + b_5 B_{t-1} + b_6 R_{t-1} + b_7 M_{t-1} + e$$

The targets (and their expected signs, assuming a policy of counter-cyclical stabilization) are: P, the rate of inflation in consumer prices (+); U, the rate of unemployment (−), I, the rate of change in the index of industrial production (+), X, the change in the dollar/deutsch mark exchange rate (+), and B the level of the merchandise trade balance (−). Also included, interpreted as constraints, are R, the value of free reserves (−), representing short-term demand and supply conditions in money markets, and M, the rate of change of M_1 (+), interpreted as representing long-run inflation expectations—a growing money supply suggests future expected inflation (assuming the neutrality of money) and thus an inflation premium in interest rates. The interest rate would increase in response to higher inflation, lower unemployment,

[3]There is ample precedent in previously published work for including all the right-hand side variables considered here. Measures of fiscal policy have often been included in monetary policy reaction functions. In experiments adding a measure of the full employment budget to the 48-month models coinciding with presidential terms, there were no significant coefficients on the budgetary variables. Overall, the statistical results were very similar (sometimes marginally worse) with the inclusion of the full employment budget. The variable had little impact on the estimated magnitude of the inflation and unemployment coefficients. This result parallels those of Beck (1984) reported in his table 1. Beck's more recent (1987) results suggest that in some alternative specification fiscal policy could be more important. This is a topic for further investigation.

higher industrial production, a weaker dollar, a trade deficit, a shrinking supply of bank reserves, and a higher rate of growth of the money supply.

RESULTS

When a single model was estimated over the entire sample period, all but one of the hypotheses regarding the signs of the coefficients seem to be confirmed. The exception, the change in industrial production, is not significantly different from zero (see table 1). Given the preceding analysis, I have little interest in testing political hypotheses using dummy variables in the context of this long-period model. Readers who are interested in tests of the sort that could be made should consult Beck (1984) or Woolley (1983).

Using a statistical test defined by BDE, the homogeneity test, we can confirm that parameters estimated in my initial long-period model are, in fact, not stable. The homogeneity test for parameter stability over the regression period supports a decision to reject the null hypothesis of stability at a confi-

TABLE 1

REACTION FUNCTION FOR MONETARY POLICY, 1955.1–1984.12
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FEDERAL FUNDS RATE

Variable	Regression Coefficient	Std. Error
Intercept	5.607	0.979
U	0.361	0.144
P	0.201	0.057
X	0.0096	0.0068
I	0.011	0.0131
B	0.00083	0.00045
R	0.00068	0.00011
M	0.0342	0.049
Summary statistics		
R^2	.28	
SSE	155.6	
df	327	
ρ_1	.89	

Correction for autocorrelation by the two-step full transform method.

U = rate of unemployment (%); P = rate of inflation in consumer prices (% over six months at annual rate); I = the rate of change in the index of industrial production (% over six months at annual rate); X = change in the dollar-deutsch mark exchange rate (% over six months at annual rate); B = merchandise trade balance ($ millions); R = free reserves (reserves in excess of required reserves minus borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks, $ millions); M = rate of change of M_1 (moving three-month averages of six-month rates of change at annual rates).

All, except the exchange rate, are lagged one period. All of the data are drawn directly from or are algebraic transformations based on data from the Citibase Data Archive.

dence level <.01.[6] That is, the regression appears to have significant instabilities over the estimating period.

My efforts to analyze this instability will focus on the results of 48-month moving regressions. I favored this length on a priori grounds because it coincides with the period of a normal presidential term in office. Another statistical test suggested by BDE confirms that this is probably the correct subperiod length to examine.[7] In the 1957–1984 period, there are twenty-five 48-month periods if estimation is begun in January of each year. The analysis below is based on the estimated coefficients from these twenty-five models.

Correction was made for autocorrelation in separate estimates for each submodel.[8] Analysis of the submodels indicated troublesome collinearity in only two submodels (one covering 1958–1961, the other covering 1980–1983.)[9] In each of those models, the estimated inflation coefficient (but not the unemployment coefficient) appeared to have an incorrect sign. However,

[6]According to Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975, p. 156), the homogeneity test is distributed as F. My test compared non-overlapping 24-month estimates and a single long-period model. In this case, the calculated $F_{108, 221} = 3.46$, $F_{0.01, 100, 200} = 1.39$. The hypothesis of constant parameters can be rejected with a high degree of confidence. Degrees of freedom were adjusted to account for significant autocorrelation parameters estimated in two 24-month submodels.

[7]Four different regression lengths—24, 36, 48, and 60 months—were compared for appropriateness using another BDE test (1975, p. 156) based on the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) one period ahead. In this test, the means of the squared forecasting errors for one period beyond the estimated submodels are compared to determine the best subperiod length. My results favored the 48-month period (MSPE = .0021), but the distinction between the four lengths was not great (in ascending order by length, the other MSPEs = .0023, .0028, .0023). As executed here, the MSPE test differs from the implementation envisioned by BDE. They assume that the regression will be moved one period at a time through the entire sample period. I have moved it in 12-month steps, and as a result, the number of observed prediction errors is smaller than might have been obtained.

[8]All models were estimated with SAS 82.3, and correction for autocorrelation was made with Proc Autoreg. Tests were made for autocorrelated errors up to lag six. I expected to find primarily p_1 but also expected some significant p_3, reflecting a quarterly lag. In twenty-two of the twenty-five models, either there was no significant autocorrelation parameter (six times), or first-order only (thirteen times), or third-order only (three times). The other three cases involved estimates of two significant autocorrelation parameters, two involved lags one and four, one involved lags one and two. Each case occurred in periods that we know were ones of policy turmoil: 1970–1974, 1972–1976, and 1977–1980.

[9]Collinearity is not expected to produce systematic variation. For immediate purposes, troublesome collinearity is indicated by two rules of thumb: insignificant *t*-tests on inflation or unemployment coefficients, and R-squares in a regression of inflation or unemployment variables on all other independent variables greater than the R-square for the overall model (see Kennedy, 1985). The measures developed by Belsley et al. (1980, esp. ch. 3) indicate there is moderate to strong collinearity in only a few of these submodels. The presence of this collinearity suggests the appropriateness of examining the estimated coefficients without much regard to their specific *t*-tests, as anonymous referees suggested. The results presented by Bikker et al. (1986) suggest that caution is warranted in interpreting the Belsley collinearity tests when data have been corrected for autocorrelation.

incorrect signs on the inflation coefficient were also found in adjacent models (1957–1960, 1979–1982), where tests did not suggest that collinearity was problematical. There was also one incorrect sign on the unemployment coefficient in the model covering the period 1978–1981 The t ratio in this case shows the coefficient to be insignificantly different from zero, tests do not suggest strongly that this result is due to collinearity I will discuss these results further below

In short, efforts to discover the effects of collinearity on the subperiod estimates show that it is, for the most part, not problematical Whatever the effects of autocorrelation and collinearity are in these estimates, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that they would produce the relatively systematic variation apparent in figure 3.

Shifting Decision Rules

My central focus for the balance of the paper will be on the behavior of the inflation and unemployment coefficients from the moving regressions First however, I shall make a couple of observations about some other coefficients In the estimated submodels the money supply enters significantly in only nine of twenty-five models, and only six times with the expected sign These six models include all the submodels covering the year 1980 and after From the viewpoint of policy-making history, this is a gratifyingly reasonable result, given that protracted and serious monetary targeting began only in October 1979 It might be suggested that since the Federal Reserve essentially follows a two-stage policy process that involves setting long-run monetary targets and then adjusting instruments appropriately between meetings it is incorrect to include both conventional economic targets and the money supply However based on these results it appears that during this period both the money supply and the other variables supplied valuable information to policymakers

Second, the estimated coefficients for targets relating to the external economy were consistently significant but they changed over time in ways that suggest important changes in external policy objectives For the most part the estimated coefficients for the exchange-rate variable were statistically significant, but those for the foreign trade balance were not The results of the moving regression suggest a policy of defending the exchange value of the dollar in the early 1960s late 1970s and early 1980s However they suggest a readiness to see the dollar weaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s There is also evidence that during the upheavals of the early to mid-1970s, Federal Reserve policy stopped responding to exchange-rate developments and turned to other indicators —in this case the trade balance

I mention these results in passing, both because they are intrinsically interesting and because they are generally consistent with known history of

vmaking I draw encouragement from the latter, and I believe that it)nstrates how moving regression may be of interest to researchers with · substantive interests.

employment The inflation and unemployment coefficients from each of 8-month moving regressions are plotted against the mean levels of infla- and unemployment for the same 48-month periods in figures 1 and 2 e 1 plots the unemployment coefficient against the average unemploy- rate for the estimating period. The entries in figure 1 are labeled with servation number that is the first of the two central years in the estima- eriod Thus, for the period 1957–60, the entry is labeled "58." Entries lso given a partisan designation If three out of four years were years one party controlled the White House, then that year is designated by r a "D" or "R" to reflect the partisan orientation Other entries, repre- ıg mixed partisan periods, are designated with an "X "

figure 1, one can see something that looks like an overall negative rela- ıip between the unemployment level and the monetary policy reaction employment (r about −0 5) There is only one obviously odd observa- already noted, for the period 1978–81 (labeled 79) it appears to be pro- al with respect to unemployment The standard error of the estimate is arge, and the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero The mean stan- error of all twenty-five estimates is 0 25, the median is 0 19


nay be worthwhile persuading readers that there really is some in- ty in the coefficients at the outset of the period—the points labeled 58 gh about 70 in figure 1 I have calculated *t* ratios for the differences en adjacent coefficients only, using, in view of the possible collinearity nall sample size, a weaker-than-usual level of significance All of the ıng pairs of observed coefficients can be distinguished statistically 60 1, 63 and 64, 64 and 65, 68 and 69, 69 and 70 Interestingly enough, pairs coincide with models that mark transitions from one administra-) another [10]

arly, the estimated unemployment coefficients were not stable over me period Periods of strong responses to unemployment appear to alternated with periods of less vigorous responses to unemployment, s with Beck's (1984) results, the instabilities have not conformed to a view of partisan differences (e g , Democrats do not have bigger un- yment responses than do Republicans on average) The estimates are more consistent with the notion of partisan policy bursts In partisan ions from Republicans to Democrats, (at observations 60 and 76), the oloyment response either became stronger, or was stronger than re-

level used was 2 In fact, the pairs noted would all pass at a significance level of 1 for 60-61 In the appendix are the estimated coefficients and their standard errors for employment and inflation for each time period

FIGURE 1

MOVING REGRESSION COEFFICIENT FOR UNEMPLOYMENT VS AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 48-MONTH MOVING REGRESSIONS



KEY: D Democratic president for 36 of 48 months or more
R Republican president for 36 of 48 months or more
X Divided partisan control of presidency
Numbers indicate the first of two mid years of the associated 48 month interval, e.g., 81 denotes 1/81–12/83

cent Republican responses at similar levels of unemployment. One of the two transitions from Democrats to Republicans began with moves to weaker unemployment responses. Thus, three of four transitions fit the partisan burst story. When elections approached and when unemployment was getting worse, emphasis on fighting unemployment increased (observations 71, 72, 75, 76), consistent with the modified partisan burst view sketched above.

In general, moves leftward in figure 1 (toward lower unemployment) occurred during Democratic administrations, and moves rightward (toward higher levels of unemployment) occurred during Republican regimes. This sometimes occurred under the different parties even though unemployment was at a similar level and the monetary policy response coefficient was of similar magnitude. This points to the importance of examining other policy instruments, and to the possible importance of changes in the underlying economic model.

It is not my goal here to try to propose a specific interpretation of these findings in terms of the reaction function variants discussed above. The general negative association between unemployment levels suggests that responses are nonlinear. The inconsistencies in that association suggest that targets changed significantly during the period. The general patterns of policy responses at the time of elections and partisan transitions is strikingly consistent with an account emphasizing "bursty" partisan manipulation of the economy.

Inflation. In figure 2 the moving regression inflation coefficients and the mean inflation rate are plotted for the estimating period. The labeling of these points is identical to the unemployment case. What we see here is intriguing. Overall, the correlation between inflation levels and the estimated inflation coefficient is zero. The mean standard error of the twenty-five coefficients was 0.11, the median, 0.10. The results from the 1960s show a very close relationship between the strength of inflation and the strength of the monetary policy response to inflation. This finding is consistent with the results produced by Barth et al. (1982) by a different method. In the 1970s there was a wild looping shift to the right, followed by an even wilder loop that ended up back near the original response pattern. The link between inflation levels and inflation responses was so powerful in the early period that apparently some systematic nonlinear response rule was being followed.


More attention must be given to the peculiar loops evident in figure 2. We can, in fact, see evidence of three loops: one in the late 1950s (of which we see the tail end), one in the mid-1970s, and one in the early 1980s. Each is moving clockwise, and each represents an inflationary cycle: inflation accelerates, slows, and finally falls. Indeed, the first and last loops were periods of disinflation. At the end of these cycles, what looks like a small or procyclical response to inflation may be more reasonably viewed as indicating a policy of keeping interest rates high and stable—or of letting them increase—while inflation rates fall. It reflects a policy determined to alter inflationary expectations.[11]

It is quite obvious that there was no consistent average difference between Democrats and Republicans in responding to inflation during this time period. However, following transitions from Democrats to Republicans, there was, in fact, an increase in inflation fighting. Policy in the first years of the

[11] Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker was quite explicit about this concern. He told Congress in 1982, for example, that high interest rates reflected "concerns that recent gains against inflation may prove to be temporary." Volcker added that "... policies need to remain strongly sensitive to the need to maintain progress against inflation - uncertainty on that point will ultimately be self-defeating in terms of the interest rate environment we want. An improved climate for work, for savings, and for investment—the objective of the tax changes introduced in 1981—should also materialize in an economic climate of recovery and disinflation helping to keep the process going" (Volcker, 1983).

FIGURE 2

MOVING REGRESSION COEFFICIENT FOR INFLATION VS AVERAGE INFLATION RATE, 48-MONTH MOVING REGRESSIONS



KEY D Democratic president for 36 of 48 months or more
R Republican president for 36 of 48 months or more
X Divided partisan control of presidency
Numbers Indicate the first of two mid years of the associated 48-month interval (e.g., 81 denotes 1/81–12/83)

first Nixon administration was vigorously anti-inflationary and in the first years of the Reagan administration policy was deflationary. The transition from Republicans to Democrats is less clear. Following the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy the inflation response diminished, exactly as we would expect. The transition from Ford to Carter was more ambiguous, again consistent with Beck's (1984) findings. The real comparison of interest, of course, is between Carter's policy and what a reelected Ford would have done—something that is necessarily speculative. In any case, three of four transitions fit the model of "bursty" partisan policy.

When elections approached under Democrats, and when inflation had increased substantially, there was increased inflation fighting, exactly as we might expect. Under Republicans, results were not so clear. Eisenhower fought inflation even as it fell, despite the approaching 1960 election. To the extent that the Nixon/Ford reactions indicated a reduction in inflation fight-

ing as the inflation rate decelerated, this would be consistent with the notion of reversing thrust in the context of partisan elections. But this relaxation may be overstated if there was, as I have just proposed, a shift from focusing on current inflation rates to focusing on inflationary expectations [12]

Note that while both parties have governed during periods of increasing inflation, the deceleration of inflation and its actual fall occurred primarily under Republican administrations, and its increase, under Democrats. As with unemployment, inflation sometimes fell even though the inflation level and the monetary policy response coefficients were of similar magnitudes (compare observations 73 and 77) Again, this points to the possible importance of other policy instruments in producing partisan effects and to the possible importance of changes in the underlying economic model


To summarize, in the early periods of the data, we see evidence of a generally positive association between inflation levels and the inflation response, indicating a nonlinear policy response There is also evidence here consistent with the view that targets were increased during periods of persistently high inflation, that would explain why response coefficients fell as inflation rose These observations, too, are overwhelmingly consistent with an account stressing "bursty" partisan manipulation of the economy

Tradeoffs Part I Partisan manipulation of macroeconomic policy is usually analyzed in terms of the inflation-unemployment tradeoff Because policy priorities could be reflected in the responses to inflation or unemployment or both, it may be that tests of the partisan change hypothesis should focus on the apparent tradeoff, not on the separate responses As outlined above, the conventional view is that the relative emphasis on unemployment and inflation will differ on average between party periods Thus, Democrats would tend to emphasize unemployment relatively more than Republicans for a given objective combination of inflation and unemployment In models like Alt's, based on ideas about partisan policy bursts, partisan effects would be evident only at the outset of the partisan period, and the direction of the burst would be consistent with our usual expectations of partisan preferences In my amendment to Alt's model, one would also expect to see changes in policy priorities prior to the election in response to significant policy problems emerging during the administration period

[12]This is confirmed in a test of an alternative specification with the inflation variable replaced by either the contemporary rate of inflation (one lag) or a six-month moving average of inflation lagged three months), whichever was greatest The lagged moving average is supposed to proxy for inflationary expectations, and, as one would expect, falls much more slowly than the inflation rate With this specification the inflation coefficients for the observations 73-82 are larger but the same general pattern of rise and fall remains As presented in figure 2 there are significant differences (at $p < .1$) between the following pairs of coefficients during the late Nixon/Ford early Carter years 73-74, 74-75, 76-77 Obviously these results raise doubts about my initial interpretation of M_1 as an indicator of inflationary expectations

FIGURE 3

TIME PATH OF APPARENT POLICY TRADEOFF AS MEASURED BY THE RATIO OF THE INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT COEFFICIENTS FROM 48-MONTH MOVING REGRESSIONS



KEY D Democratic president for 36 of 48 months or more
R Republican president for 36 of 48 months or more
\ Divided partisan control of presidency
— Denotes estimated tradeoff values as discussed in text

Consider the policy response tradeoff as it appears in these data Figure 3 plots the ratio of the inflation and unemployment coefficients through time Under conventional (Keynesian stabilization) expectations about the signs of these coefficients, the ratio should be negative, approaching zero when the unemployment coefficient is relatively much larger than the inflation coefficient, and becoming large (and negative) when the inflation coefficient is large relative to the unemployment coefficient Except as noted in the next two paragraphs, I have plotted on the Y axis the ratio of the inflation and unemployment coefficients as estimated and plotted in figures 1 and 2

In plotting the tradeoff, it was necessary to decide how to treat the years associated with disinflationary or procyclical policy—especially those at the first and last of the time series One option would be simply to omit those observations Instead, I have tried to define reasonable but admittedly speculative values as follows For observation 79 (1978–1981), when the unem-

ployment coefficient was estimated to have an incorrect sign, insignificantly different from zero, I have acted as if the actual unemployment response was zero. I have assigned the inflation/unemployment ratio a view of −2, equal to the largest observed value in the time series.

For observations 58 (1957–1960), 59 (1958–1961), 80 (1979–1982), and 81 (1980–1983), the estimated inflation coefficients are all negative. I have analyzed this as indicating a policy of deflation. In each case I substituted a reasonably large positive inflation coefficient to suggest a very strong emphasis on fighting inflation For observations 58 and 59 these values are both 0 4, larger than the estimated coefficient for observation 60, the nearest peak value of the inflation coefficient For observations 80 and 81, these values are both 0.9, a value slightly larger than the peak observed in observation 69 The resulting entries in figures 3 and 4 can only be regarded as speculative, and accordingly the observations are marked and appropriately noted Nonetheless, the plots are generally quite reasonable

In figure 3, as adjusted, we see the following At the outset of the time series, there is a substantial emphasis on fighting inflation that marks the partisan transition from Republicans to Democrats The early direction of Kennedy administration policy appears to be a move toward a greater relative emphasis on unemployment. With time, this emphasis is reversed, and the Johnson administration closes with more relative emphasis on inflation The Nixon years begin with significant additional stress on inflation fighting, but that emphasis is also gradually reversed By the end of the Ford administration, there appears to be a very strong emphasis on fighting unemployment [13] This effort to fight unemployment coincides with the transition to the Carter administration, and there follows a swift and decisive shift toward relatively more inflation fighting The time series at this point involves significant uncertainties, as noted, but it appears that the vigorous emphasis on inflation that marks the late Carter years and the subsequent partisan transition is replaced fairly quickly with more relative attention to unemployment under Reagan In all regimes, strong anti-inflation policy has been relatively short-lived

These results are consistent with Alt's general view of "bursty" partisan policy sketched above These results appear to be those suggested by the Hibbs/Alt/Beck findings about macroeconomic outcomes, but previously seemingly absent in the literature Big moves in the policy tradeoff do coincide with partisan change, but sometimes they occur before and sometimes after In more recent periods, significant moves occurred prior to, rather than after, elections Many reasons could explain this The post-election burst in monetary policy may have been very small or very short because the

[13]The experiment described in footnote 12 would suggest that the final position of the Ford administration relative to earlier Republican years was less pro-employment than this model indicates However, the peak would still be reached in observation 75, and the general pattern through time would be the same


post-election burst was based mostly in fiscal policy It is conceivable that pre-election bursts accomplished most of what the new government's core constituency wanted, although not fast enough to save the outgoing government. Or, post-election economic shocks may have required a diminution of post-election partisan bursts we otherwise would have seen

Tradeoffs, Part II These general results may reflect nothing more than the changing conditions of the objective tradeoff This can be investigated directly from figure 4, in which I have plotted the ratio of the inflation and unemployment coefficients (*Y* axis) against the ratio of the average level of *inflation and unemployment for the estimating period (X axis)* The entries are labeled in a fashion identical to those of figure 3

Bearing in mind the problems in interpreting inflation coefficients at the

FIGURE 4

APPARENT POLICY TRADEOFF AS MEASURED BY THE RATIO OF THE INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT COEFFICIENTS VS OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AS MEASURED BY THE RATIO OF THE AVERAGE LEVELS OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 48-MONTH MOVING REGRESSIONS



KEY D Democratic president for 36 of 48 months or more
R Republican president for 36 of 48 months or more
\ Divided partisan control of presidency
— Denotes estimated tradeoff values as discussed in text

outset and end of the time period, we can use the results in figure 4 to determine whether a model of partisan policy usefully improves on the notion that policy was merely responding to changes in objective conditions

Once again, figure 4 does not present a simple image of stable policy tradeoffs periodically punctuated by partisan-generated bursts, nor do we see stable partisan differences Rather, we see what appear to be two general systems of responses—one covering roughly the period up through observation 70 and the other covering the period after observation 71. The anti-inflation push of the early Nixon years (observation 69) did not succeed in significantly reducing the objective inflation/unemployment ratio, and gave way to what appears to be a redefined policy response system—the tradeoff shifts to the right

However, independent of the two systems, the relative emphasis of policy did shift in the predicted direction after partisan change three out of four times The shift from Eisenhower to Kennedy (observations 59–61) looked like a textbook example of a partisan shift, as did that from Johnson to Nixon (observations 67–69) The shift from Ford to Carter appeared not to be consistent with the partisan model However, following Carter, Reagan monetary policy was relatively more resistant to inflation than at any time in the prior decade, clearly more so than under Carter with similar objective tradeoff conditions

Before elections, policy shifted in the expected way four out of six times (not in observations 72 and 76) The two apparent exceptions may still be consistent with the general model because of the relative emphasis in both cases on unemployment—not the core partisan issue—after periods of significant increases in unemployment

Overall, during periods of Democratic policy dominance, inflation always increased relative to unemployment, consistent with our view of Democratic policy priorities During periods of Republican policy, inflation always fell or was stable relative to unemployment, consistent with our view of Republican policy priorities

Because of the shift between the two systems, the differences in the partisan use policy instruments is obscured Nixon's policy shift in the early 1970s to accept higher inflation relative to unemployment is especially remarkable This shift may account for Beck's (1984) conclusion that Nixon's policy looked easier than expected for a Republican For all this, in an era of economic shocks, the apparently easier Republican policy still accompanied falling inflation relative to unemployment This striking fact points again to the problem, often noted, of interpreting reaction function coefficients independently of a model of the economy

There is another apparent puzzle in these data It looks as if there is little or no difference between the Democratic administration of Carter and the preceding Republican administrations—again consistent with Beck's (1982a) findings But it is what Carter did not do that distinguishes him from the

Republicans. Carter's monetary policy did not move the tradeoff leftward, that did happen under Reagan.[14] Carter's monetary policy shifted aggressively to deal with rising inflation after G. William Miller's resignation from the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve. But at the outset of the Carter years, a similar monetary policy tradeoff, in response to an objective tradeoff similar to that in the prior partisan regime, was followed by rising instead of falling relative inflation. Was this due to the developments in other policy instruments, or to changes in the economy?

Did the shift to a new system of policy responses in the early 1970s originate in the economic structure or in politics? It is still not sufficiently clear exactly what we mean by a change in economic structure. It could be that some kind of change in the economy made it technically impossible to achieve—or achieve stably—the inflation and unemployment combinations that were available earlier. Thus, any rational policymaker would not try to achieve those combinations. It could also be that some set of economic shocks, or changes in expectations, or other evolutionary changes in economic behavior, simply made it much more costly to reach certain inflation and unemployment combinations.

The latter case seems most likely to me, and it is essentially a political explanation. My examination of the entries in figures 1 and 2 suggests that major accommodations were made to inflation, not unemployment. To have extended the trend of the policy response to increasing inflation from the Democratic 1960s to the mid-1970s, would have implied response coefficients for inflation roughly twice as large as those actually estimated. If the Republicans had tried to continue fighting inflation with the same vigor exhibited in the period of observations 69–70, the response coefficients for observations 74–75 would have been greater by a factor of three or four or even more.

What these alternatives imply, of course, is much higher interest rates. The costs of much higher interest rates undoubtedly loomed large in an institutional environment much less flexible than that of the 1980s. The apparent movement leftward (observation 82, figure 4) in recent years suggests not only that costs of achieving certain tradeoff combinations have been lowered since the early 1970s, but also that lower tradeoff combinations have been possible all along for politicians willing to incur the costs of getting to them. It seems dubious to me that we can understand that lack of will without putting it in the context of partisan electoral politics. At the same time the movements of the monetary policy instrument in the 1970s are hard to interpret not only because we are looking only at one (monetary, not fiscal) policy instrument, but also because those movements occurred in an unstable economic environment.

[14] On this general period, see the narrative in Kettl (1986, pp. 169–91).

CONCLUSION

One possible objective of an exercise such as this could be to try to specify a revised reaction function that might be better in the sense that it is stable over the estimating period. Unfortunately we do not yet have the information necessary for that task. Moreover, if we think the parameters of the reaction function are not stable, and especially, if we think they may vary in response both to political and economic factors, then this is probably not a goal we can realistically aspire to reach at this point. There is evidence here of instability, and support for the idea that partisan differences are manifested in short-term parameter instability. In my view, much more experimentation and close-up examination of the policy process are required before we can justify presenting another set of long-period reaction function estimates with fixed coefficients.

Even so, there are several suggestions here for ways to specify the reaction function better. Of course, there are a large number of plausible response curves and target specifications that could be consistent with the data plotted in figures 1 and 2. I believe, as I have pointed out above, that the results presented here can be thought of parsimoniously as being the result of nonlinear reactions and shifting targets. The intercept term in the twenty-five submodels changed significantly over time (ranging from 0.3 to 30, mean = 9.23), consistent with changing targets. Further, the data presented in figure 4 suggests that the reactions to unemployment and inflation are each conditioned not only by the magnitude of the deviation from target, but also by the relative magnitude of the other problem—for unemployment, inflation, for inflation, unemployment. As noted above, the inflation results suggest that the definition of the inflation target changes during the business cycle from inflation, during periods of rising inflation, to inflationary expectations, during periods of falling inflation.[15]

Overall, the research provides additional confirmation of the partisan difference hypothesis, while accounting for previous difficulties in obtaining clear confirmation of the hypothesis at the level of policy instruments. At the outset of partisan regimes, unemployment and inflation coefficients—and the implicit tradeoff—move generally in the direction we would expect under a partisan difference hypothesis. This directional difference is rarely sustained, consistent with a view of partisan policy coming in bursts. The relative weight put on different policy targets has changed during in the

[15] An experiment with such a specification has been encouraging. See footnote 12. The specification appears to reduce error variance particularly in submodels covering the early and mid to late 1970s. However it has precisely the opposite effect in some other periods. The general pattern evident in tradeoff plot is unchanged by this respecification. Of course, it is immediately obvious that if we are to use this specification seriously, we must give further attention to the issue of how to accurately gauge inflationary expectations.

course recent partisan periods as elections approach This is something we would expect to see under responsive partisan regimes with changing popular preferences about policy problems when core support is not sufficient to guarantee reelection (Alt and Chrystal, 1983, p 105)

There are differences between partisans of the same party—as Beck found This is consistent with systematic policy change from one partisan regime to the next However, intra-partisan differences present problems for common dummy variable tests of partisan differences in instruments What matters for the hypothesis is that the policy mix at the end of one partisan regime and/or the start of the next should differ systematically from the policy mix at the end of the second partisan regime and/or the start of its successor And as figure 3 shows, this is the case

This analysis shows the complexity of these issues, and the problems of seriously testing the partisan difference hypothesis at the level of policy instruments Carter, for example, may have benefited substantially from the pro-employment policy reversal of the Nixon-Ford administration The timing of the election and Carter's accession probably limited the disinflation that would have been produced otherwise by a Republican president Carter's administration also suffered severe external shocks After similar shocks under a Republican administration in the early 1970s, the monetary policy tradeoff apparently became more tolerant of inflation, yet the rise of inflation stopped Neither happened under Carter Rather, while the monetary policy tradeoff apparently became less tolerant of inflation, the clear halt to inflation occurred only after Carter's term in office was over

These differences could be explained in various ways Perhaps through time, partisans learned to respond more forcefully and more swiftly to new conditions Perhaps with changes in the economy, the politically feasible set of policy combinations had changed Perhaps the policy mix changed These differences may also reflect the problem the administration addressed first Thus, Nixon started out with a burst of fighting inflation and ended up fighting unemployment, Carter's journey was the reverse Perhaps when there is convincing evidence of a new problem after an initial effort to solve a different problem, the logic of partisan competition provides a strong incentive to "declare victory," and to raise the target associated with the initial problem up to about its current level How such dynamics might work is an interesting question for future research It is worth noting again, relative to the issue of Carter's exceptionalism The Republican administration following Carter was more restrictive than Carter under approximately similar objective tradeoff conditions

In a few instances, these results are not entirely consistent with hypotheses about partisanship It remains possible that a closer examination of several policy instruments simultaneously would lead to greater clarity Nonetheless, it is very difficult to understand this history without recourse both to

the fact of the partisan electoral environment and to the preferences of core partisan supporters Examining the results of moving regression reaction functions helps us to see this far more clearly than does a simple long-period reaction function

Appendix

Coefficients and Standard Errors from Moving Regressions

Obs	Unemployment Coefficient	Unemployment Standard Error	Inflation Coefficient	Inflation Standard Error
58	−0.4566	0.1831	−0.2140	0.0975
59	−0.2860	0.2018	−0.2161	0.1430
60	−0.2568	0.0949	0.2721	0.0970
61	−0.4064	0.1121	0.1320	0.1012
62	−0.4514	0.1066	0.1153	0.0847
63	−0.4042	0.1194	0.0574	0.0778
64	−0.6058	0.0795	0.1410	0.0542
65	−0.4575	0.0591	0.1516	0.0343
66	−0.2547	0.1711	0.2307	0.0693
67	−0.6118	0.4286	0.3269	0.0855
68	−0.7584	0.1432	0.5701	0.0991
69	−0.3971	0.1390	0.7963	0.1778
70	−0.7193	0.2034	0.4781	0.2083
71	−1.4983	0.2610	0.6175	0.1109
72	−1.4161	0.3464	0.4637	0.0839
73	−0.5867	0.1492	0.3321	0.0701
74	−0.8264	0.1929	0.1729	0.0969
75	−1.0285	0.1007	0.0171	0.0425
76	−1.3564	0.2245	0.0740	0.0649
77	−1.0432	0.3023	0.4339	0.1054
78	−0.5369	0.4517	0.5386	0.1475
79	0.7617	0.6642	0.1505	0.2018
80	−1.1026	0.5372	−0.2483	0.2074
81	−2.3288	0.4910	−0.2555	0.1745
82	−1.8261	0.4373	0.4702	0.1597
MEAN		0.2480		0.1114
MEDIAN		0.1929		0.0974

REFERENCES

Abrams, R., R. Froyen, and R. Waud. 1980. Monetary Reaction Functions, Consistent Expectations, and the Burns Era. *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*, 12: 30–42.

Alt, J. E. 1985. Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity. *American Political Science Review*, 79: 1016–40.

Alt, J. E., and K. A. Chrystal. 1983. *Political Economics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Alt, J. E., and J. T. Woolley. 1982. Reaction Functions, Optimization and Politics: Modelling the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy. *American Journal of Political Science* 26: 709–40.

Auerbach, R. D. 1985. Politics and the Federal Reserve. *Contemporary Policy Issues* 3: 43–58.

Barth, J., R. Sickles, and P. Wiest. 1982. Assessing the Impact of Varying Economic Conditions on Federal Reserve Behavior. *Journal of Macroeconomics* 4: 47–90.

Beck, N. 1982a. Parties, Administrations, and American Macroeconomic Outcomes. *American Political Science Review* 76: 83–93.

———. 1982b. Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s. *American Journal of Political Science* 26: 415–45.

———. 1983. The Use of Time Varying Parameter Models in Political Science. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27: 557–600.

———. 1984. Domestic Political Sources of American Monetary Policy. *Journal of Politics* 46: 787–815.

———. 1987. Elections and the Fed: Is there a Political Monetary Cycle? *American Journal of Political Science* 31: 194–216.

Belsley, D. A., E. Kuh, and R. E. Welsch. 1980. *Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Bikker, J. A., W. C. Boeschoten, and M. M. G. Fase. 1986. Diagnostic Checking of Macroeconomic Models: A Specification Analysis of Markmon. *De Economist* 134: 301–50.

Brown, R. L., J. Durbin, and J. M. Evans. 1975. Techniques for Testing the Constancy of Regression Relationships over Time. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* Series B 37: 149–63.

Brown, T., and A. Stein. 1982. The Political Economy of National Elections. *Comparative Politics* 14: 479–97.

Cowart, A. 1978. The Economic Policies of European Governments. Part I: Monetary Policy. *British Journal of Political Science* 8: 285–311.

DeRosa, P., and G. H. Stern. 1977. Monetary Control and the Federal Funds Rate. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 3: 217–30.

Dufour, J. M. 1982. Recursive Stability Analysis of Linear Regression Relationships: An Exploratory Methodology. *Journal of Econometrics* 19: 31–76.

Frey, B., and F. Schneider. 1981. Central Bank Behavior: A Positive Empirical Analysis. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 7: 291–315.

Froyen, R. T. 1974. A Test of the Endogeneity of Monetary Policy. *Journal of Econometrics* 2: 175–88.

Golden, D., and J. Poterba. 1980. The Price of Popularity: The Political Business Cycle Reexamined. *American Journal of Political Science* 24: 696–714.

Hartwig, F., and B. F. Dearing. 1979. *Exploratory Data Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Hibbs, D. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. *American Political Science Review* 71: 1467–87.

Hibbs, D. 1983. Comment on Beck. *American Political Science Review* 77: 447–51.

Hicks, A. 1984. Elections, Keynes, Bureaucracy and Class: Explaining U.S. Budget Deficits 1961–1978. *American Sociological Review*, 49: 165–82.

Kennedy, P. 1985. *A Guide to Econometrics*, 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Kettl, D F 1986 *Leadership at the Fed* New Haven Yale University Press

Krämer, W , H Sonnberger, J Maurer, and P Havlik 1985 Diagnostic Checking in Practice *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 67 118–23

Lowery, D 1985 Keynesian and Political Determinants of Unbalanced Budgets U S Fiscal Policy from Eisenhower to Reagan *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 428–60

Nordhaus, W 1975 The Political Business Cycle *Review of Economic Studies*, 42 169–90

Tufte, E R 1978 *Political Control of the Economy* Princeton Princeton University Press

Volcker, P 1983 Statement to Congress *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, 69 169

Weatherford, M S 1986 The President and the Political Business Cycle In J P Pfiffner, ed *The President and Economic Policy* Philadelphia ISHI Press

Weatherford, M S and L M McDonnell 1985 Macroeconomic Policy Making Beyond the Electoral Constraint In G C Edwards III S A Shull, and N C Thomas, eds , *The Presidency and Public Policy Making* Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press

Weintraub R 1978 Congressional Supervision of Monetary Policy *Journal of Monetary Economics* 4 341–62

Wood J H 1967 A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior In G Horwich, ed *Monetary Process and Policy A Symposium* Homewood IL Irwin

Woolley J 1983 Political Factors in Monetary Policy In D R Hodgman ed , *The Political Economy of Monetary Policy National and International Aspects* The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston et al Conference Series No 26

——— 1984 *Monetary Politics The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy* New York Cambridge University Press

Yantek T 1985 Government Popularity in Great Britain Under Conditions of Economic Decline *Political Studies* 33 467–83

On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court

Thomas G. Walker
Emory University
Lee Epstein
Southern Methodist University
William J. Dixon
Emory University

The early 1940s marked a period in which the consensus norms of the Supreme Court experienced a radical and apparently permanent change. The consistent pattern of relatively high cohesion characteristic of the Court's earlier years gave way to surging rates of concurring and dissenting opinions. The present research is an examination of the factors possibly contributing to the justices' sharply increasing tendency to express their individual views rather than to defer to the opinion of the Court. Using both historical and quantitative methods, the authors evaluate the impact of the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, changing caseload, associate justice characteristics, and judicial leadership. The evidence presented points to the conclusion that in combination with other factors the leadership style introduced by Harlan Fiske Stone in 1941 had a dramatic effect on the consensus norms of the Court.

Patterns of social behavior occasionally experience abrupt changes that defy explanation by apparent cause. When precipitous deviations from the norm are experienced by politically important institutions, they should be treated not as idiopathic curiosities, but as perplexing phenomena worthy of systematic analysis.

Figure 1, which illustrates the rate of dissenting and concurring opinions on the Supreme Court since 1800, presents such a mystery. From John Marshall's appointment as chief justice to the end of the Charles Evans Hughes era, the Court exhibited relatively stable, cohesive behavior. These years are marked by individual justices accepting the Court's majority opinions. Although the nation suffered through turbulent periods of war, rebel-

* The authors are indebted to Professor James Stimson for his generous assistance on this project and to the anonymous referees for their very helpful comments.

[1] Dissent is measured as the number of dissenting opinions per 100 opinions of the Court; concurrence as the number of concurring opinions per 100 opinions of the Court. These particular measures were employed because the issuance of a dissenting or concurring opinion represents behavior clearly inconsistent with traditional consensus norms. Our measures are based on data provided by Blaustein and Mersky (1978) and the *Supreme Court Reporter's* annual summaries.

lion, economic depression, and political cleavage, the high court maintained the norm of consensus. Individual expression was kept at a minimum and within a relatively consistent range In the early 1940s, however, the conventions of the Court radically changed. The incidence of individual justices separating themselves from the majority by articulating dissenting and concurring opinions surged to unprecedented levels. Not only was the increase dramatic in magnitude, but it represented an apparently permanent alteration in the Court's decision-making regime [2] Consider, for example, that prior to 1941 an average of 8 5 dissenting opinions were issued for every 100 majority opinions, but after 1941 that figure rose to seventy-three dissenting opinions This evolutionary development presents the following research question What transformed the practices of the Supreme Court from a regime in which individual views were suppressed in deference to the majority into a decision-making system in which individual expression became the rule rather than the exception?


The answer to this question is of no small consequence C Herman Pritchett has argued that the increase in dissenting and concurring opinions weakened the Court's "institutional ethos" (Pritchett, 1954, p 22) The Court moved from a decision-making process based on consensus to one characterized by individual decision making, or what Justice Lewis Powell recently claimed to be decisions emanating from nine separate law offices Ironically, this particular change is precisely what John Marshall sought to avoid when he eliminated the practice of seriatim opinions that allowed each justice to voice his individual views on every case According to Bernard Schwartz "if carried to its extreme, the right to concur or dissent leads back to the practice of *seriatim* opinions" (1957, pp 356-57) Surely, Court norms since the 1940s approximate such a reversal today a decision announced by a single, unanimously supported opinion is a rarity

Not only did the decade of the 1940s irrevocably alter the institutional norms of the Supreme Court but the skyrocketing dissent and concurrence rates of that period radically changed the way scholars viewed the judiciary Prior to 1941, traditional legal approaches provided satisfactory explanations for a Supreme Court whose institutional practices led to consensus decisions with relatively low levels of expressed disagreement Pritchett was the first to recognize the scholarly implications of the Court's post-1941 abandonment of strong consensus norms Writing in 1954, he argued, "it is precisely because the Court's institutional ethos has become so weak that we must examine the thinking of the individual justices " (1954, p 22) At Pritchett's urging, scholars such as Nagel (1961), Ulmer (1962), and Schubert (1962) initiated the exploration of factors that affect the decisions of individual judges

[2] We use the term 'regime' to refer to shared norms and rules governing the actions of individuals engaged in an established collective decision-making process Our usage is similar to that proposed by Kegley (1987) in a different context

FIGURE 1

DISSENT AND CONCURRENCE PER 100 MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1800–1981



on federal and state courts. These efforts propelled the field of public law into the behavioral revolution, a theoretical perspective that continues to dominate our perceptions of the American legal system. All this, it seems, occurred because after 1941 there were huge variations in judicial voting behavior begging to be explained.

Consequently, unravelling this mystery involves confronting questions of substantial importance. Although the much studied Warren and Burger Courts have led contemporary scholars to take individual judicial expressions for granted, a mere glance at figure 1 indicates that such an assumption ignores 140 years of Court history. Whoever or whatever was responsible for the abrupt and dramatic increase in dissenting and concurring opinions not only changed the norms of the Supreme Court but also altered the way in which an entire cohort of political scientists now view the judicial process.

How do we identify the causes of change? As any good investigator knows, the first steps in solving a mystery are to establish a list of suspects and set criteria by which to eliminate them from culpability. In creating our list we are aided by two important factors. First, we are able to determine with some precision the point at which the Court's behavioral patterns were altered. As figure 1 shows, consensus norms did not gradually erode, but were abruptly shattered. Table 1, which presents in numerical form dissent and

TABLE 1

DISSENT AND CONCURRENCE RATES, 1935–1946

Term	Dissent Rate	Concurrence Rate
1935	14	03
1936	11	01
1937	17	07
1938	25	08
1939	15	04
1940	16	03
1941	29	11
1942	43	16
1943	54	13
1944	51	20
1945	51	27
1946	57	22

For data source and methods of calculation see footnote 1

concurrence rates from 1935 to 1946, isolates the 1941 term, the first under Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, as the turning point This evidence allows us to focus our efforts on a particular historical period Second, there is a body of scholarly research that has sought to identify the causes of dissent This literature provides theoretical grounding for the identification of factors suspected to have contributed to the demise of the Court's strong consensus norm Following these leads we have constructed a list of five possible causes and tested their viability as explanations for the Supreme Court's regime change

1 Congressional enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925
2 Changes in the Court's caseload
3 The promotion of a sitting associate to be chief justice
4 Changes in the Court's composition
5 The leadership of the chief justice

THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1925

Perhaps of all our suspected causes, most scholarly fingers point to congressional passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925 In essence, this legislation, known as the "Judges' Bill," changed the Court's docket from one of obligation to one of discretion The statute allowed the justices to avoid hearing frivolous cases involving well-established legal issues and to concentrate instead on questions of true significance There is reason to believe that a discretionary docket will contain a relatively large number of controversial cases that generate divisions of opinion (Halpern and Vines, 1977, Grossman and Wells, 1980, p 232). Therefore, grounds exist to hypothesize that the

Act, which began to affect the ratio of obligatory to discretionary cases in 1927, had a permanent impact on patterns of individual judicial expression

In an article published in 1977, Stephen Halpern and Kenneth Vines tested this expectation and concluded that the Act had "contributed" to the behavioral patterns depicted in our Figure 1 [3] Their analysis rests largely on a comparison of dissent behavior for nearly equal periods shortly before [1922–1925] and after [1927 through the first sixty-five cases of the 1929 term] passage of the statute (pp 472–73) The results revealed a slight overall increase in dissent following the implementation of the legislation The change occurred almost exclusively in the Court's obligatory cases (an 8 2 percent dissent rate prior to enactment and a 25 1 percent dissent rate after), leading the authors to explain that the Act eliminated appeal as a matter of right in numerous classes of cases which generally raised straightforward legal issues (1977, p 475) The dissent rate in the Court's discretionary docket showed virtually no change (7 6 percent before the Act and 8 3 percent after) To substantiate their position further, Halpern and Vines presented a series of graphs illustrating the incidence of dissenting behavior longitudinally From these data, the authors concluded that "1925 stands out as a starting point in the evolution of a new trend of dissenting votes" (1977, pp 479–80)


While granting the Court broad discretionary jurisdiction surely affected the nature of the institution, a closer examination of the data leads us to doubt that the Judges' Bill alone can account for the massive increases in individual judicial expression First, the changes in the Court's ratio of obligatory to discretionary cases do not coincide with the justices' patterns of increasing dissent activity As figure 2 demonstrates the discretionary share of the Court's docket rose dramatically immediately following the Act and remained relatively stable thereafter, a phenomenon also observed by Halpern and Vines (1977, pp 475–76) However, as is also readily observable in figure 2, significant escalation in both the dissent and concurrence rates did not occur until almost fifteen years later

Second, an analysis of the terms immediately surrounding implementation of the Judges' Bill indicates, contrary to Halpern and Vines, that 1925 was not the beginning of a sustained upward trend in dissent By focusing on that portion of figure 2 which illustrates the Court's dissent patterns for the years immediately preceding and following the 1925 statute, we readily observe that Halpern and Vines were correct in noting a slight increase in individual expression following passage However, dissent clearly leveled off to prestatute rates shortly thereafter and remained relatively low for another

[3] Halpern and Vines clearly indicate that their work did not seek to explain all the causes that have produced the increased division of opinion commonly found on the high court in recent decades " Rather, they "attempted to assess to what extent and in what ways the 1925 Act may have been one of the starting points (1977, p 472)

FIGURE 2

DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION, DISSENT AND CONCURRENCE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1923-1981



decade Simply stated, a radical jump in dissent following 1927 is not evident Dissent rates did not begin their major upward move until the early 1940s We have no theoretical or empirical reason to suspect that a fifteen year lag existed between passage of the Act and its putative effect on the incidence of individual judicial expression

Based upon this evidence, we must dismiss enactment of the 1925 statute as the primary factor in the alteration of the Court's consensus norms Certainly, it is possible that a discretionary docket may be one factor and a necessary one at that, in maintaining high levels of conflict once such patterns are established Little support exists, however, for the position that the Judges' Bill alone initiated the significant elevation in individual judicial expression

CHANGES IN THE COURT'S CASELOAD


It is reasonable to suspect that docket changes can affect the level of decision-making consensus on the Court Two possibilities exist First, we might anticipate that marked increases in caseload volume are associated with heightened levels of individual expression As demands on the Court increase, the justices lose the luxury of ample time to build consensus and

construct the compromises that hold the Court together Constant pressure exists to arrive at a decision and move on to address the next case It is no longer as advantageous to expend substantial resources to convince a dissenting or concurring justice to join the majority opinion Second, the Court's docket can change in terms of case mix Some issues obviously tend to provoke disagreement and others present questions attracting broad-based consensus If the Court undergoes an abrupt alteration in the kinds of cases the public brings to it for resolution, we might witness a corresponding change in consensus levels. Both of these caseload factors can be examined as possible causes of the increased levels of individual judicial expression which began in the 1940s

To test our first suspicion we superimposed the number of case filings each term on a graph of dissent and concurrence rates for the years 1900 to 1981 The result, which is displayed as figure 3, reveals that the increasing caseloads observed over this period are not likely to be responsible for the marked rise in individual expression occurring after 1940 In the first place, it is apparent that dissent rates are not systematically affected by caseloads since the surge in the former actually *precedes* the period of strongest growth in case filings More generally the shapes of the curves in figure 3 are inconsistent with the caseload hypothesis since the extraordinary rise in

FIGURE 3

CASELOAD DISSENT AND CONCURRENCE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1900–1981



lissents and the smaller but still dramatic jump in concurrences are rather nlikely consequences of the comparatively more uniform growth in case ilings Additionally, by using the transfer function technique (Norpoth, 1986), we attempted to determine whether caseload "drove" up dissent or oncurrence rates The results corroborated our initial conclusion that the eries follow independent processes Thus, by visual consideration of figre 3, as well as results based on a more powerful analytic tool, we can conlude that caseload levels and individual expression are not causally associted with one another [4]

Our second docket hypothesis prompts us to examine changes in case mix lecause the precipitous increase in dissent began with Harlan Fiske Stone's irst term as chief justice in 1941, we can best evaluate our suspicions by aking a "snapshot" of the relationship between case mix and dissent during he last two terms of the Hughes Court (1939–1940) and the first two terms f the Stone Court (1941–1942) [5] For every case decided with a full opinion, e recorded the issue brought to the Court and the number of dissenting pinions, if any Specifically we were looking for particular issues during the st two terms of the Hughes era that produced unusually high or low levels f dissent If changes in case mix are responsible for the surge in dissenting pinions, we would expect the 1941–1942 Stone Court to have been faced ith larger numbers of issues associated with high levels of dissent, and corspondingly fewer cases with issues associated with high levels of consenis Such changes in case mix might be attributable to an alteration in the ariety of issues the public brought to the Court or a change in the kinds of ises the justices granted review

The results of the Hughes/Stone comparisons are illustrated in table 2 In rder to control for personnel changes, the dissent data in this table are ased only on justices who served during both the Hughes and Stone years xamining the Hughes Court portion of the table, we note a rate of fifteen issenting opinions for every 100 opinions of the Court Anti-trust cases conituted the most dissent-prone issue (dissent rate = 43 n = 7) closely folwed by issues involving banking and stocks (both dissent rates = 33, = 6) Cases bringing questions of criminal procedure, Indian rights, the ederal Communications Commission, and maritime and patent law failed yield any dissenting opinions Thus, knowing that dissent behavior ineased tremendously after Stone took the reins of the Court and knowing

[4] In addition to total filings as a measure of caseload, we did a similar set of analyses using umber of cases decided with full opinions' as the independent variable There was no evince to suggest that increasing numbers of decided cases were associated with the abrupt rise nonmajority opinions In fact the number of cases decided declined over the years studied

[5] Realizing that issues would vary tremendously from one Court era to the next this snap t view provides the best mechanism for determining the most and the least conflictual ues for this particular set of justices

TABLE 2

ISSUES AND DISSENT 1939–1942*

Issue	Hughes Court (1939–1940) Dissenting Opinions[a]	Hughes Court (1939–1940) n=	Stone Court (1941–1942) Dissenting Opinions[a]	Stone Court (1941–1942) n=
Anti-Trust	43	7	50	8
Banking	33	6	50	2
Stocks	33	6	33	3
Labor	27	26	43	28
Civil Liberties	25	8	38	16
Jurisdiction/Procedure	21	14	20	10
Civil Rights	20	5	0	3
Insurance	17	6	40	10
Taxes	16	86	26	51
Miscellaneous[b]	9	53	28	50
Bankruptcy	9	23	28	18
Railroads	7	14	36	11
Commerce	6	17	39	23
Criminal Rights	0	13	52	27
FCC	0	4	80	5
Indian Law	0	2	27	11
Maritime	0	2	57	7
Patents	0	8	38	16
Total	15	300	35	299

*Data collected by authors

[a]Dissenting opinions per 100 majority opinions counting only dissenting opinions written by justices who served on both the Hughes and Stone Courts

[b]Includes case types appearing infrequently in both Court eras (e g utilities issues involving Puerto Rico)

what case types tended to produce dissent we would expect to find a sharp increase in the number of anti-trust, banking and stock cases during the Stone era

Scrutiny of the Stone Court's first two terms however, does not meet our expectations. The numbers of cases in the three most dissent-prone categories either decreased or remained relatively stable during the first two years of the Stone era The dissent rates in these three issue categories either remained unchanged or increased slightly

What about the consensual issues of the Hughes Court? Since certain cases acted as non-dissent stimuli during the Hughes era, we would expect to find fewer such cases during the Stone period, or, at the very least similarly low dissent rates Again this was not the case Not only did cases in these categories increase in number, but every issue evoking unanimity in the Hughes Court surpassed a dissenting opinion rate of 25 during Stone's

first two terms FCC cases illustrate the most extreme example of this phenomenon, with the dissent rate moving from 0 to 80 Consider also issues of criminal rights, which failed to evince a dissenting opinion from 1939 to 1940, but increased to a rate of 52 during the 1941 and 1942 terms.

Although changes in the number of cases falling within the various issue areas were insufficient to have caused the sharp increase in conflictual behavior, it is possible that our aggregated scheme may be masking the effect of differences within issue categories Take, for example, civil liberties cases They doubled in number from eight during the 1939–1940 terms to sixteen during the 1941–1942 period, presenting squarely the possibility that the Stone Court was faced with more complex and/or wholly different kinds of civil liberty cases than its earlier counterpart Based upon an examination of the twenty-four civil liberties cases, however, we must eliminate this explanation Five of the eight Hughes Court cases involved solicitation, picketing, or loitering, nine of the Stone Court cases raised similar issues. In fact, the Jehovah's Witnesses were responsible for bringing the majority of these cases to both Courts Even more illustrative of the parity of issues raised were the Flag Salute cases, one of which was heard in each of the two periods The only litigation presenting substantially different civil liberties claims were the Japanese internment cases decided in the 1942 term However, no dissenting opinions were issued in these disputes

These data lead us to reject the notion that case mix changes ushered in the dissent-prone period after 1941 It is clearly not the case that dissent-producing issues increased in frequency concurrently with Stone's assumption of the chief justiceship, nor is it true that consensus-prone issues decreased in number On the contrary, it appears that dissent-prone cases remained relatively stable and that the consensus-producing issues of the Hughes years began producing dissent on the Stone Court Whoever or whatever was responsible for increasing the level of individual judicial expression beginning with the Stone years was a powerful force indeed, for it was able to produce judicial conflict over issues that during the previous two terms were associated with unanimity

The Promotion of a Sitting Associate to be Chief Justice

Because the incidence of widespread individual expression began with the New Deal Court, the judicial selection policies of Franklin Roosevelt clearly demand attention One of the more commonly expressed possibilities is that Roosevelt's elevation of Harlan Fiske Stone, a sitting associate justice, to be chief justice created an internal condition not conducive to consensus decision making The rationale is that internal promotions lead to intra-Court conflict and cause acrimony prompted by jealousies or prior interpersonal conflicts (see Mason, 1968, p. 52) Inside candidates are saddled with the scars of past battles and are unable to discard them Consequently, Stone's

bility to lead the Court as a cohesive whole may have been impaired by his revious Court service

If the hypothesis that internal promotions disrupt consensus norms is cor-ect, we would expect that the pattern of increasing individual expression haracteristic of the Stone era would also be found on the Court during the eadership years of Edward White, the only other individual to have com-leted a tenure as chief justice after having been promoted from a sitting ssociate position [b] White, who like Stone had sixteen years of prior service s an associate justice, assumed the chief justiceship in 1910 At that time the Court was plagued with personality conflicts (Abraham, 1986, p 206) and arried a high potential for internal divisiveness White however, was uickly able to overcome what on the surface appeared to be insurmountable roblems He was "plainly anxious to create an atmosphere of friendliness nd to promote agreement in the disposition of cases' (Goldman, 1982 262) Through the institution of various practices, White was able to main-ain good relations with and among his colleagues

It is obvious from the data examined thus far that White's efforts suc-eeded in maintaining the Court's consensual norms The mean level of dis-ent exhibited by the Court for all years prior to White's promotion was 8 3 vhile during his first five years as chief justice this figure declined to 3 8 tone's record is radically different The Court's mean dissent rate of 8 5 be-ore Stone's leadership ballooned to 45 2 during his five-year tenure as chief ustice Similar patterns hold for the concurrence data We also examined rends in the Court's behavior by regressing our measure of dissent on the erm number for the first five years of each internally-promoted chief justice Because slope estimates from these regressions indicate the average annual hange in dissent large positive slopes for both Courts would lend some cre-lence to the internal promotion hypothesis Our results reveal the expected ipward trend in dissents under Stone (b = 4 5 t = 3 4) but virtually no hange during the five years following White's promotion (b = − 25 t = − 37) It is possible, of course that the promotion of a sitting associate was in unwise decision because of particular conditions inside the Court in 1941 However, given the contradictory consequences of the White and Stone ap-ointments, we are unable to accept the general validity of the internal pro-notion hypothesis

Changes in the Court's Composition

Although the leader of any group influences the relations among its mem-ers, "it is difficult to imagine any judge even a Marshall dominating a

[b] Conclusions put forward in this section must obviously be tentative since only two cases exist or analysis The 1986 appointment of William Rehnquist to replace Chief Justice Warren Bur-er will allow us the opportunity at some future date to evaluate the internal promotion hy-othesis with a third case

Court composed of brilliant, individualistic, and strong willed . . ." justices (Murphy, 1964, pp 40–41, but see Roper, 1965) Thus, in searching for the causes of the Court's rejection of consensus norms, we must take into account the role of the associate justices. It is quite possible that Stone was faced with a Court composed of associates who were to a significant degree "unleadable " Four possible conditions merit examination·

1 The associate turnover rate was unusually high
2 The associates were disproportionately young and inexperienced
3 The associates were deeply divided ideologically
4 The associates were abnormally dissent prone

High Turnover We first need to address the possibility that the Stone Court experienced unusually high levels of turnover. The Supreme Court is a continuing institution averaging only one new member every two years This gradual rate of membership change allows the institution to socialize new justices into the acceptance of its internal norms However, a rapid and large influx of new members can disrupt the Court and stunt normal socialization processes It is possible that the Court was faced with just such a condition, making the enforcement of traditional consensus norms impossible

The first column in table 3 indicates the number of justices appointed during the 1941 to 1946 Stone era as well as during the tenures of the four chief justices preceding him, Melville Fuller, Edward White, William Howard

TABLE 3

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES UNDER FIVE CHIEF JUSTICES

Chief Justice	New Justices[a]	Turnover Rate[b]	Mean Age[c]	Mean Youngest/ Oldest[d]	Inexperience Index[e]
Fuller (1888–1910)	11	50	63 9	54 0–74 4	18 8
White (1910–1921)	7	64	63 0	53 0–75 4	26 1
Taft (1921–1930)	4	44	66 7	57 7–84 0	16 7
Hughes (1930–1941)	7	64	67 0	53 8–80 6	19 3
Stone (1941–1946)	4	80	61 6	50 0–70 0	32 5

[a]Total number of associate justices added to the Court during the period from the date of a chief justice's confirmation to his death or resignation Associates confirmed between May and September were coded as joining the Court at the beginning of the October term

[b]Mean number of new associate justices per term

[c]Mean age of associates calculated for each term and averaged over the tenure of the chief justice

[d]Age of the youngest and oldest associate justice each term averaged over the tenure of the chief justice

[e]Percentage of associate justice seats occupied by justices with three or fewer years of experience, combining all terms of a chief justice's tenure

Taft, and Charles Evans Hughes. The number of new associates joining the Court during these periods ranged from a high of eleven under Fuller to a low of four for Taft and Stone. Turnover rates, however, place matters in a different perspective. The Court under Fuller, White, Taft, and Hughes averaged .55 new associates per term, with only modest deviations from the mean. Stone, on the other hand, experienced a turnover rate of .80, considerably higher than his four predecessors. The addition of four associate justices in a five-year period certainly carries with it the potential of creating a disruptive situation.

Youth and Inexperience. It is possible that Chief Justice Stone was asked to lead justices who were unusually young, inexperienced and resistant to the norms of the Court's old guard. One author has alluded to this problem, noting that "Stone presided over a Court consisting primarily of new, inexperienced justices" (Goldman, 1982, p. 339). And, as Pritchett claimed, the justices were not only "inexperienced," but youthful as well (1948, p. 13). It is conceivable that the comparatively large number of new justices and their relative youth presented Stone with conditions conducive to dissension that were not faced by chief justices who served before him. The third and fourth columns of table 3 portray the mean age and age ranges for the Court during the time Chief Justices Fuller, White, Taft, Hughes, and Stone served. The average age of the justices during the Stone years was the lowest of the five eras, but the differences are not substantial. Moreover, we cannot verify an argument that it was an unusually large "spread" in ages (young vs. old) that affected levels of disagreement. In fact, the range of ages during the Stone era was the smallest of the Courts examined.

High levels of inexperience may also provide conditions conducive to a breakdown in decision-making norms. Veteran group members with loyalties to existing behavioral customs must exist in sufficient numbers to inculcate less experienced members into acceptable patterns of behavior. A disproportionately inexperienced Court may have difficulty maintaining allegiance to ways of the past. For purposes of this analysis, we defined as inexperienced any justice with three or fewer full terms on the Court. This defining criterion is admittedly somewhat arbitrary since justices have individually different rates of adapting to the demands of their new positions. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that after three years on the bench a justice will be fully acclimated and can no longer be labeled as inexperienced or under the influence of a "freshman effect."

The final column in table 3 illustrates the percentage of associate justice seats occupied by inexperienced justices over the full tenures of Chief Justice Stone and his four immediate predecessors. The Stone Court associates distinguish themselves by having the highest inexperience rates of the five courts examined. When Chief Justice Stone first convened the Court in Oc-

tober 1941, five of the eight associate positions were filled by justices falli into the inexperienced category Conditions such as this make the transiti of decision-making values susceptible to interruption

The Stone justices not only had a lack of experience on the Suprer Court, but an extremely low level of judicial service at any level. Of the t men who served as associate justices under Stone, Wiley Rutledge's thr years on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia represents t only prior appellate court experience Consequently, Stone associates h almost no exposure to the "no dissent" traditions common to appellate t bunals Furthermore, the backgrounds of these men were not such that th would naturally value the practice of deferring to the views of others matters of public and legal policy Like Chief Justice Stone, Frankfurt Douglas, and Rutledge had devoted the bulk of their careers to universi teaching, an occupation which encouraged them to articulate their indivi ual theories of law and legal institutions Black, Byrnes, and Burton h come to the Supreme Court directly from the United States Senate whe free debate was valued Roberts had come from private practice, and Ja son, Murphy, and Reed had been high ranking Justice Department att neys Consequently, the Stone Court associates not only possessed relative low levels of Supreme Court experience, but came from occupational tra tions that encouraged individual expression

Ideological Division The third possibility is that the associate justic were deeply divided ideologically, forcing a large amount of individual e pression To evaluate this contingency, we examined the configuration ideological voting blocs among the justices of the Hughes and Stone Court We expect, of course, that all Courts are divided to some degree along ide logical lines That is, scholars have consistently found that during most er at least two voting blocs exist liberal and conservative If these blocs ha high degrees of internal cohesion, dissenting opinions occur at modest leve and concurring opinions are very infrequent On the other hand, when t ideological subgroups themselves are highly fractionalized internally d senting and concurring opinions proliferate

In *The Roosevelt Court*, Pritchett examined agreement scores of t Hughes and Stone Court justices in "every nonunanimous opinion" (s Pritchett, 1948, pp 242–47) His findings are startling between the 19 and 1940 terms "the existence of well-defined groups, referred to as left wi and right wing, was clearly evident " That is, strong intra-bloc agreeme existed According to Pritchett, however, " [A]fter 1941, a marked d cline was apparent in the cohesiveness of the judicial bloc on the right, a later in that on the left" (p 241) In sum, "In 1941, divisive forces of so kind hit the Court in full force" (p 251) This occurred in spite of the fact th the Stone Court had the potential of being one of the most ideological united in the history of the institution After all, except for the seat held fi

by Roberts and then Burton, every Stone Court justice was an appointee of Franklin Roosevelt who placed a priority on nominating justices loyal to New Deal policies

Pritchett's findings are certainly pertinent to our inquiry The future Stone Court justices while serving under Hughes were not divisive within their ideological blocs Well-defined subgroups existed, but justices of the same ideological leanings agreed After 1941, however, agreement was not even evident within blocs of justices sharing the same ideology Given that it is well established that judicial attitudes are stable, there is no reason to presume that beginning with the 1941 term the justices underwent radical fragmentation of their ideologies Instead, it appears reasonable to conclude that a significant and generalized decline in norms of cohesion occurred

This point is reinforced by examining the concurrence data To some extent, concurrences control for ideology That is, concurring opinions denote a general agreement with the directional outcome of a case Standard ideological divisions do not necessarily result in increased numbers of concurring opinions In fact, it could be convincingly argued that as ideological divisions deepen, concurring opinions should decline A mere glance at either figure 1 or table 1, however reveals a much different situation As Chief Justice Stone took lead of the Court both dissenting and concurring opinions rose dramatically Almost overnight, the justices began expressing their personal views at extraordinarily high levels, demonstrating little compulsion to defer to the opinion of either the Court majority or of their own attitudinal subgroups This indicates that ideology alone cannot account for the sharp rise in individual judicial expression

Dissent-Prone Associates The decline in the Court's consensus norms may have occurred because the Stone Court associates regardless of ideology, were particularly prone to state positions at odds with those articulated by the Court's designated spokesmen To test for this possibility we examined the proportion of total dissenting votes and dissenting opinions for which the Stone Court associates were responsible before Stone assumed the leadership position If these justices had consistently high levels of individual expression, then we would have reason to believe that consensus norms deteriorated because a particular set of judicial mavericks happened to be on the Court at a specific point in time The findings which are illustrated in table 4, suggest a different conclusion If we expect each justice to carry 11 (1/9) of both categories (dissenting votes and opinions), then prior to Stone's ascension, the justices did not demonstrate particularly high propensities to dissent Excluding Stone, only two of the future Stone associates had disproportionately high dissent rates Roberts and Black The Roberts case is clear-cut—he grew increasingly conflictual following the Court's 1937 shift in constitutional philosophy Black however, started his tenure with relatively high proportions, which declined slightly until the Stone ascen-

Table 4

Proportions of Dissenting Votes Cast and Dissenting Opinions Written by Future Stone Court Justices, 1925–1942*

Dissenting Votes**	Pre-Stone-Terms																Stone Terms	
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
Stone	11	14	19	08	21	13	24	20	19	18	22	03	05	03	05	05	14	09
Roberts						04	07	04	06	05	05	09	03	11	27	26	11	18
Black													17	14	05	13	13	14
Reed														06	01	07	09	10
Frankfurter															02	02	10	12
Douglas															05	13	18	13
Murphy																05	11	15
	11	14	19	08	21	17	31	24	25	23	27	12	25	34	45	71	86	91
							[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	22	22	22	33	44	66	77	77	77
													[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	– 06	+ 09	+ 14

Dissenting Opinions***

	Pre-Stone-Terms																Stone Terms	
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
Stone	09	14	16	23	46	16	37	29	27	43	30	00	00	08	05	15	16	09
Roberts						08	00	05	11	07	15	11	04	11	50	34	06	12
Black													32	19	11	15	23	18
Reed														05	05	07	14	06
Frankfurter															00	07	14	19
Douglas															05	11	14	10
Murphy																00	00	15
Actual	09	14	16	23	46	24	37	34	38	50	45	11	36	43	76	89	87	89
Expected[a]	11	11	11	11	11	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	33	44	66	77	77	77
Deviation[b]	− 02	+ 03	+ 05	+ 12	+ 35	+ 02	+ 15	+ 12	+ 16	+ 28	+ 23	− 11	+ 03	− 01	+ 10	+ 12	+ 10	+ 12

*Data depicted here represent the proportion of the Court's dissenting votes and opinions for which each of the future Stone Court justices was responsible

**Data sources 1925–1938 terms annual summary *Harvard Law Review* (1928–1939) 1939–1942 terms Pritchett (1948)

***Data sources 1925 1938 terms annual summary *Harvard Law Review* (1928 1939) 1939–1942 terms, collected by authors

[a]Expected totals = 11 × number of justices

[b]Deviations = total proportion − expected total

sion Even more interesting, perhaps, are the proportions of Justices Douglas and Frankfurter Although both would later be known as dissenters, they were relatively quiet until 1941 Thus, the associate justices were not a particularly dissent-prone group prior to Stone's assumption of the center chair

A final observation centers on the "bottom line" figures provided in table 4 For each Court term, we computed the total proportion of dissenting votes and opinions for which the Stone Court justices accounted and the deviation from our expected proportions (actual proportion less expected proportion), where the expected proportion equals the number of justices × .11 As is readily observable between 1926 and 1935, the two Stone Court justices generally accounted for more than their fair share of dissent solely because Stone well exceeded his expected values This situation quickly changed as more justices were added Between 1936 and 1940, the associates who would later staff the Stone Court cast dissenting votes at lower rates than expected Their propensity for writing dissenting opinions was slightly elevated, but this was due primarily to the high rates exhibited by Roberts and Black Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy expressed minority viewpoints at relatively low levels If these judges possessed a desire to articulate their individual views more freely, the prevailing norms of the Court kept such tendencies in check This situation, of course, radically changed when Stone assumed the mantle These same generally "quiet" justices began to dissent at relatively equal high proportions

In sum, the Stone Court associates do not appear to have been especially divided ideologically nor do those who initiated their service during the Hughes era seem to have been unusually prone to dissent Yet there were ample signs that the possibility of high rates of individual expression existed Because of their low levels of Supreme Court experience, the Stone associates had not been firmly tutored in the norms of consensus, indeed as table 4 indicates Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy had only served a short period under Chief Justice Hughes The great turnover rate left the Stone Court with few justices who were schooled in and committed to the traditional ways and who had moved beyond the "freshman" experience The Stone associates were relatively young They came from the ranks of professors senators, and private or government attorneys rather than being promoted from lower court service Because of these conditions, the caliber of leadership and the quality of group socialization efforts carried the promise of exerting an even greater than normal impact on the future of the institution

The Leadership of the Chief Justice

Many scholars have noted that the character of leadership provided by the chief justice has a great influence on the operating norms of the Court Pritchett claimed that in court periods prior to the "Roosevelt Court," "there [were] vital conformist effects in the operating methods of the Court itself

Probably the most important of these is the discussion which goes on around the judicial conference table, out of which consensus can often be achieved. The influence of a strong and skillful Chief Justice is of great importance in leading to the discovery of solutions satisfactory to all members of the Court" (1948, p. 24). In his seminal work, *Elements of Judicial Strategy*, Walter Murphy (1964) developed Pritchett's argument, suggesting that chief justices can design special tactics to "marshal" or "mass" the Court. According to Murphy, chief justices can employ an array of strategies during conference deliberations and in the opinion-assignment process to create the illusion of unanimity even when great splits of opinion exist among the justices.

Chief justices who best perform these functions have been, in the words of David Danelski, good social and/or task leaders. Social leaders are those able to "counterbalance" the "negative aspects of conference" through activity "which relieves tension, shows solidarity, and makes for agreement" (Danelski, 1980, p. 237). Task leadership, on the other hand, concentrates on the business of the Court. According to Danelski, the chief justice has the best opportunity to emerge as both a task and social leader, thus preserving his role as a "first among equals," or the most influential member of the Court. If a chief plays both roles, then the Court members should be socially cohesive, satisfied with conference, and generally less conflictual among themselves.

Since the breakdown in the Court's consensus behavior coincided with his chief justiceship, we must consider Harlan Fiske Stone a major suspect. Consequently, we need to address Stone's leadership qualities and compare them to those of his predecessors who presided over courts with much lower rates of individual expression.

The biographical and historical works on Stone are of one voice. Stone, in spite of his generally acknowledged intellectual greatness, was an ineffective leader. According to Danelski, debates in conference were heated in the Stone Court and a social leader was needed to smooth ruffled tempers, relieve tensions and maintain solidarity. The conflict was not friendly as in Taft's day, rather it was acrimonious, and, at times, descended to the level of personalities (Danelski, 1980). Others, including Mason (1958), Abraham (1986), Murphy (1964), and Wasby (1984), agree with Danelski's view.

Alpheus Mason persuasively argues that Stone was capable of bringing cohesion to the Court; he simply thought that such leadership was not only unnecessary, but harmful. In Stone's own words, "The right of dissent is an important one and has proved to be such in the history of the Supreme Court. I do not think it is the appropriate function of a Chief Justice to attempt to dissuade members of the Court from dissenting in individual cases" (1956, p. 608). Dissent, he believed, was critical because "[s]ound legal principles . . . never sprang full-fledged from the brains of any man or group of men. They are the ultimate resultant of the abrasive force of the clash of competing and sometimes conflicting ideas . . . ." (1956, p. 629).

Clearly, we cannot eliminate Stone as a possible cause in the erosion of the

Court's consensus norms. Not only was he ineffective at using task and soci leadership to forge consensus, but he believed that those who had been su cessful were detrimental to the Court. Moreover, the historical eviden suggests that no member of the quartet of twentieth century chiefs imm diately prior to Stone (Fuller, White, Taft or Hughes) was as ineffective building consensus as he, nor did any share his views on individual judic expression

Melville Fuller was chief justice from 1888 to 1910 By almost every ava able account, both by scholars and his colleagues, Fuller was an excelle social leader He desired harmonious relations among the justices ai seemed well equipped to accomplish this task because he was "blessed wi conciliatory and diplomatic traits" (Goldman, 1982, p. 178) Others ha noted that he was "an extraordinary Chief Justice in his relations with l colleagues" (Frank, 1958, p 85), creating a "warmth and closeness" on t Court (Schiffman, 1969, p 1480)

Justices certainly agreed with these scholarly assessments. According Justice Holmes, Fuller was "extraordinary He had the business of the Cou at his fingers' ends, he was perfectly courageous, prompt, and decided Fuller was the greatest Chief Justice I have ever known" (quoted in Go man, 1982, pp 178–79) Later, Justice Frankfurter noted that "When you *in a conference room of the Supreme Court, or en banc in a court of appea* or at faculty meetings the same kind of thing happens Men get sh of temper and humor is a great solvent Fuller had that He presided w great courtesy He presided with authority, quiet authority " (19 pp 215–16)

Chief Justice White, as discussed earlier was promoted by President T from associate to chief justice in 1910, a time at which the Court was divid and difficult to lead Yet White, perhaps well-schooled by his experience senate majority leader, possessed the interpersonal skills to lead the Co effectively He was blessed with a genial temperament and adroit logroll skills (Watts, 1969) that permitted him to mend fences and reinforce the co sensus norms of the Court

Perhaps of all Stone's twentieth century predecessors, social leaders was most important to William Howard Taft Taft went to great extreme attain harmony on the Court As one biographer has noted "Taft valued c geniality and goodwill above most things, and consequently had few a monious relations with his professional peers His ideological convicti very often shaped his attitude toward a colleague, but he never let dif ences on social and intellectual issues override his desire for harmoni personal relations" (White, 1976, p 179). Another scholar has stated t "[h]appy working relations were not accidental Taft went to great pain establish *esprit de corps*" (Mason, 1969, p 2114)

To achieve "team spirit" on the Court, Taft took a number of tacks Fi

because "he hated dissenting opinions, (he) wrote very few himself and made every effort to dissuade others from writing them" (White, 1976, p. 180). He strongly believed that "important questions of law should not be broken anymore than we can help by dissents" (Murphy, 1964, p 47) In fact, he once told Justice Clarke, "I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have it settled either way" (Murphy, 1964, p 61) In short, Taft's views were diametrically opposed to Stone's Second, Taft was the "most active Supreme Court lobbyist of the 20th Century" (Baum, 1985, p 35) Among his most important lobbying activities, of course, was "frequently exerting pressure on behalf of people he wanted nominated" (Wasby, 1984, p 93, see also Danelski, 1964). He then socialized those new justices in the "no dissent unless absolutely necessary" tradition (Danelski, 1980) Finally, when required, Taft was willing to use his opinion assignment power to reward team players and punish dissidents Among those on the "punish" list—none other than Associate Justice Stone In one instance, Taft sent the following message to Stone "I voted to reverse While this sustains your conclusion to affirm, I still think reversal would be better But I shall in silence acquiesce Dissents seldom aid in the right development or statement of the law They often do harm For myself I say 'lead us not into temptation'" (quoted in Abraham, 1986, p 224)

Chief Justice Hughes, Stone's immediate predecessor, joins the ranks of Fuller, White, and Taft as a highly skilled social leader His colleagues indicated that the chief worked for sociability and harmony among the justices Owen Roberts, in fact, claimed that Hughes's efforts resulted in "a feeling of personal cordiality and comradeship that was unique in a Court so seriously divided in its review on great matters " Roberts also noted that even those justices deeply divided, such as Brandeis and Van Devanter, "were at one in their admiration and affectionate regard for their presiding officer" (1963, p 210) The scholarly literature supports the view of Hughes's colleagues the chief justice "was the most esteemed member of his Court" (Danelski, 1980, p 238) As Tressolini contends, Hughes "had the ability to allay jealousies and minimize personal frictions This was no mean accomplishment on a Court made up of strong, tough minded personalities " (1963, p. 87)

Little doubt exists about Hughes's leadership But what of his views on the value of the justices expressing their individual opinions on cases? On the surface, Hughes's writings lead us to believe that he was a major proponent of dissent A relevant section of his 1928 book, *The Supreme Court of the United States*, is often quoted: "A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a

later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the Court may have been betrayed" (1928, p 68)

Taken on its face, this passage seems to echo the views expressed by Chief Justice Stone. However, we have several reasons to suspect that upon being elevated to the chief justiceship in 1930, Hughes's perception of dissent had more in common with that of Taft than Stone Simply stated, Hughes and Taft, as Danelski points out, both shared the "no dissent unless absolutely necessary" tradition (Danelski, 1980, p 242, see also Schmidhauser, 1979, p 170).

This suspicion is verified by a number of points. First, Hughes was extremely time conscious, attempting to get the most out of conference in the least amount of time To accomplish this, Hughes provided concise summaries of each case and then presented his view in "a forceful, confident manner" (Goldman, 1982, p 337) After that, he "controlled discussion tightly, limiting the time devoted to each case" (Baum, 1985, p 114) Hughes's summaries and opinions "were so complete that in many cases nothing needed to be added by any of his associates" (Roberts, 1963, p 207, see also Murphy, 1964 and Frank, 1958)

Second, Hughes was determined to present the Court to the public as a dignified and united institution (Abraham, 1986, p 230) Hughes discouraged dissent in part because it would expose divisions within the Court to the public In an attempt to show the ever dissenting Associate Justice Stone why he would go along with an opinion with which he disagreed, Hughes wrote, 'I choke a little at swallowing your analysis, still I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to expose my views" (quoted in Abraham, 1986, p 224)

Finally, Hughes often kept opinions for himself by joining the majority even if it meant changing his view of the case He did this, at least in part, because he believed that he could prevent dissents and concurrences "by compromising and incorporating several different lines of reasoning in his opinion" (Murphy, 1964, p 64) Moreover, like Taft, Hughes tried to ingratiate himself to new justices, socializing them in the no-dissent tradition (see Murphy, 1964, Goldman, 1982, Bates, 1936)

We do not question Hughes's intentions at the time he wrote his book, a period during which "dissents were usually saved for serious business " (Frank, 1958, p 127) We are suggesting, however, that when Hughes assumed the role of chief justice he, in contrast to Stone, strove for harmony among the justices In fact, in summarizing the differences between the two, John Schmidhauser wrote, "In many respects Merlo Pusey's biography of Chief Justice Hughes and Alpheus Mason's biography of Chief Justice Stone provided polar viewpoints on the propriety of strong efforts on the part of the Chief Justice to 'mass the Court'" (1979, p 170)

The conclusion of the historical works is further supported by quantitative evidence Although many mechanisms exist for a chief to exert social leadership affecting consensus norms, one of the most important is his own dissent behavior. According to Stephen Wasby, "The Chief Justice's leadership is affected by the degree to which he dissents a dissenter may exercise *policy* leadership, but exercising leadership over colleagues in the short term is difficult if one is often in dissent" (Wasby, 1984, p 188) S Sidney Ulmer has provided an analysis of the dissent patterns of eleven chief justices (Ulmer, 1986) Data based on a portion of his study are illustrated in table 5 They are clearly consistent with the more qualitative evidence Chief Justice Stone's dissent rate was far greater than any of his predecessors and even exceeded the two who followed him Chief justices serving before Stone kept their dissent to a minimum (mean = 1 8 percent), Stone voted against the majority of his Court at a rate of 13 5 percent

Stone's behavior as chief justice was consistent with his earlier record as an associate Referring back to his associate justice years in table 4, we find that for nine of the sixteen and ten of the sixteen terms depicted, Stone cast more dissenting votes and wrote more dissenting opinions respectively, than would be expected During six terms, in fact, he wrote a higher proportion of dissenting opinions than any of the other eight justices with whom he served And as the histories of the Court tell us he might well have cast even more dissenting votes had Chief Justices Taft and Hughes not discouraged him from doing so Thus when Stone ascended to the head of the Court, dissent was fully acceptable to him as an outlet for individual expres-

TABLE 5

DISSENT BEHAVIOR OF ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES*

Chief Justice	N of Cases	N of Chief Justice Dissents	Dissent Proportion*
Marshall	1157	7	0058
Taney	1708	38	0222
Chase	1109	33	0297
Waite	2642	45	0170
Fuller	4866	113	0232
White	2541	39	0153
Taft	1706	16	0093
Hughes	2050	46	0224
Stone	704	95	1349
Vinson	723	90	1244
Warren	1772	215	1213

*Source Ulmer (1986) p 53

*Number of Chief Justice dissents divided by number of cases

sion. Furthermore, as he moved to the leadership position he experien no changes in role orientation that caused him to modify his views on Court's consensus norms.

The foregoing analyses led us to several conclusions First, Stone's lea ship appears to be a prime cause of the Court changing from an institu emphasizing consensus to one characterized by a high level of individual pression In a break from the tradition of his predecessors, Stone steadfa held that justices should be free to assert their individuality—that impo unanimity was no virtue in developing the law. Second, Stone's attitu were translated into action He did not draw back from challenging the jority He expressed his own views frequently, and by doing so gave a si to the other members of the Court that it was perfectly permissible to eng in concurring and dissenting opinions Furthermore, unlike his prede sors, there is no evidence that Stone engaged in any actions to enforce traditional consensus norms of the Court or to socialize new justices into no dissent convention. Third, Stone's views appear to have been reinfor by his lack of appreciation for the tightly run conferences of Hughes what he believed to be the superficial harmony of the Taft years Stone, sense, rebelled against the chiefs under which he had served As Mason best stated· "On the matter of 'massing the court,' Stone thought there w line beyond which a Chief Justice could not, with propriety, press for c promise He might seek unanimity by removing doubts and misundersta ing 'so far as that could be accomplished by exposition and discussion at c ference ' But unanimity purchased at the cost, 'either for himself or oth of strongly held convictions' was not worth the price A Chief Justice sh recognize the 'part played in the development of law by the dissenting o ion'" (Mason, 1956, p 575) In short, Stone boasted that "in his Court conflict represented intellectual, not personal differences" (Mason, 1 p 591)

Discussion and Conclusions

The evidence examined in the foregoing analysis leads to the conclu that much of the responsibility for changing the operational norms of Court from institutional unity to permitting free expression of indivi views can be attributed to the leadership of Harlan Fiske Stone His conc tion of the chief justiceship radically differed from his predecessors He jected the "no dissent unless absolutely necessary" rule and believed good law was the product of the clash of individually expressed positi Importantly, Stone refused to enforce consensus expectations, always maining a participant rather than a leader (Steamer, 1986, p 266). He le example in maintaining high rates of concurring and dissenting opinions

However, it is doubtful that Stone's leadership alone can account for abrupt alteration in Court behavior Other conditions, which coincided

Stone's elevation, substantially enhanced the impact of his leadership style and may have been necessary, if not sufficient, factors in producing the radical change in Court norms The Court's jurisdiction had been largely converted to one of discretion The associates were generally young and had relatively few years of Supreme Court experience They had not been deeply immersed in the traditional norms of the institution, nor for that matter, of any other appellate court Instead, they came from backgrounds in which individual articulation of views was expected and independence of thought rewarded With the most crucial legal battles of the New Deal already won, conditions were ripe for disagreement on emerging issues Unlike earlier leaders of the Court, Stone did not attempt to curb this tendency but granted the associate justices "permission" to disagree Delivered from the restrictions of the past, the associates took full advantage of the chief's tolerant attitudes toward individualism

Stone died in 1946, succumbing to a massive cerebral hemorrhage that struck immediately after he delivered his dissenting opinion in the naturalization case of *Girouard v United States* (328 U S 61) Although he had served only five years in the center chair, the shortest chief justiceship since Oliver Ellsworth stepped down in 1800, Stone's tenure in that position had a remarkable impact on the institution of the Supreme Court

Importantly, the Court did not revert to its traditional expectations following Stone's death The norm changes introduced under his leadership were maintained in spite of immediate attempts to reverse them Like many others, President Truman looked with disapproval on the results of the Stone years In selecting a new chief justice, the President desired a leader to bring unity back to the Court Truman's choice was the affable and kindly Fred Vinson (Frank, 1954) Clearly, Truman hoped that Vinson would be capable of curbing the rise of individuality among the justices As one scholar explained "Although Truman admired Vinson's record in government and agreed with his political philosophy, his personality was the most important factor in influencing the decision to appoint him to the High Court His sociability and friendliness, his calm, patient, and relaxed manner, his sense of humor, his respect for the views of others, his popularity with the representatives of many factions, and his ability to conciliate conflicting views and clashing personalities and to work out compromises were qualities that Truman admired Even more important, those personal qualities seemed to the President to fit the needs of the situation inside the Supreme Court Dissension and dissent were on the rise Vinson seemed capable of unifying the Court and thereby improving its public image" (Kirkendall, 1969, p 2641)

Truman's hopes did not materialize Vinson faced a Court unwilling to return to the old ways The eight associate justices already in place when the new chief justice opened the October 1946 term represented forty-six years

of experience, 74 percent of which had been served under Stone All of tl associates had spent a majority of their Court tenures under the Stone r gime. Rutledge, Jackson, and Burton had served only under Stone and ha no exposure to pre-Stone consensus norms. Frankfurter, Douglas, ai Black, once freed from the expectations of cohesion and consensus, co tinued to assert their new prerogatives after Vinson's nomination Signi cantly, each member of this trio had long years of service after Stone's dea Black and Douglas for more than a quarter century and Frankfurter fo decade and a half Vinson was unable to reimpose the norm that individ views should be suppressed in deference to the majority Instead, the V son Court became characterized as "nine scorpions in a bottle" (Steam 1986, p 19) Successive new justices joined and were socialized into a Co with behavioral expectations quite unlike those operative in the pre-St years Consequently, although Stone's term as chief justice was relativ short, his views on individual judicial expression constituted a legacy p tected by his surviving associates

Vinson's successors to the center chair did not attempt to turn back clock Earl Warren, Vinson's immediate replacement, may have posses many of the necessary leadership qualities to promote cohesion Yet War came to the Court directly from the political world having had no exposur the traditional norms of the judiciary. He could hardly be expected to v pre-1941 behavioral expectations, or impose them on associate justices were by then accustomed to readily engaging in dissenting and concur opinions Except for extraordinary situations, such as posed by the *Br* case, there is little evidence that Warren expended special effort to b about unanimity Instead, he was primarily interested in insuring that n nal disagreement was accepted by the justices without rancor (Katc 1967, p 312), thus further institutionalizing the practice By the time ren Burger rose to the Supreme Court in 1969, the atmosphere initiat the Stone era was more than a quarter century old and firmly rooted

Contemporary justices accept individual expression as an establi practice Some describe dissenting behavior in rather matter-of-fact t (see, for example, Rehnquist, 1987, pp 302–03) Others speak of a jus "responsibility" and "duty" to articulate views that differ from the ma (Brennan, 1985) This attitude is a far cry from earlier times when eve tice Holmes, noted for distinguishing his views from those of the maj acknowledged "it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express di (*Northern Securities v U S* , 193 U S 197, 400, 1904)

Hence, the long-term consequences of the regime change occurring Stone's leadership are institutional in nature Today we have a Suj Court characterized by division rather than consensus Was this a chan the better? Naturally this is a very difficult issue to address, but one which a great many scholars, lawyers, and judges have commented

who suggest that dissents and concurrences serve a negative institutional function offer the following reasons First, individual opinions may shake public confidence in the judiciary by bringing into question the certainty of the law (Bowen, 1905, Hughes, 1928, Schmidhauser, 1979) Second, dissents and concurrences avert the Court from functioning in the most ideal way—as an "organic unit" (Swisher, 1958, Schwartz, 1957) And third, as expressed in the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Ethics, when individual opinions are inconsistent with past jurisprudence or are based on issues of less than fundamental importance, they tend to pervert the judicial function and weaken the development of the law In an award-winning essay on dissents, R Dean Moorhead noted that, "If the decisions of a court are consistently accompanied by concurring or dissenting opinions which represent attempts to substitute the impulses of the present for the wisdom of the past the law suffers, and the only possible prediction is one of chaos" (1952 p 884)

However, the institutionalization of individual judicial expression has received a great deal of support from other quarters One school of thought, grounded in Jeffersonian views of the judiciary,[7] suggests that dissents and concurrences not only represent divisions of opinion within society (Douglas, 1948), but reflect democratic values as well According to one adherent Stanley Fuld, " disagreement among judges is as true to the character of democracy, and as vital as freedom of speech itself Indeed we may remind ourselves unanimity in the law is possible only in fascist and communist countries" (1962, p 926) Thus as Chief Justice Stone would most assuredly agree, individuals whether they be average citizens or justices of the Supreme Court, should be free to express their views

Scholars and justices have also argued that dissents and concurrences increase the quality of the judicial decision-making process and generally make for a more "responsible judiciary" (see Stone 1942) One scholar contends that the mere threat of a dissent in conference helps to improve judicial decisions "The thousands of potential but unwritten dissents and concurrences have no doubt raised the caliber of judicial opinions substantially just because they might have been written" (Stephens 1952 p 404)

What are the implications of this study for future research? On one level further examination of the evolution, nature, and use of individual judicial expression is indicated A substantial difference of opinion exists over the implications of the regime change ushered in by Stone's years in the center chair The purpose of the present research was merely to locate the sources of that change Studies examining its ramifications may ultimately address the question of whether history should regard Stone as a hero or a failure

[7]For example Jefferson disliked the decision-making process used by the Marshall Court claiming that the Court was cooking up opinions in conclave Jefferson wanted the Court to return to the seriatim tradition (See Moorhead 1952)

On another and perhaps more important level, the results of this study point to the promise offered by diachronic research designs in the investigation of the American legal system. Those who use traditional methods to explore areas of public law would never consider beginning their studies at the Warren or Burger Court eras They have always recognized the importance of understanding the historical development of doctrinal trends. Yet, for far too long, students of the judicial process have concentrated exclusively on relatively short, discrete and contemporary periods Certainly, longitudinal research can help us develop a richer appreciation for the Supreme Court as an institution.

References

Abraham, Henry J 1986 *The Judicial Process*, 5th ed New York Oxford University Press

Bates, Ernest S 1936 *The Story of the Supreme Court* Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill

Baum, Lawrence 1985 *The Supreme Court*, 2d ed Washington CQ Press

Blaustein, Albert P , and Roy M Mersky 1978 *The First One Hundred Justices Statistical Studies on the Supreme Court of the United States* Hamden, CT Archon Books

Brennan William J , Jr 1985 In Defense of Dissents Mathew O Tobriner Memorial Lecture University of California

Bowen, William A 1905 Dissenting Opinions *Green Bag* 17 690–98

Danelski David J 1964 *A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed* New York Random House

——— 1980 The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court In Joel B Grossman and Richard S Wells, eds *Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making* New York John Wiley

Douglas, William O 1948 The Dissent A Safeguard of Democracy *Journal of the American Judicature Society* 32 104–7

Frank John P 1954 Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship *University of Chicago Law Review* 21 212–46

——— 1958 *Marble Palace* New York Alfred A Knopf

Frankfurter, Felix 1963 Chief Justices I Have Known In Alan F Westin ed *An Autobiography of the Supreme Court* New York Macmillan

Fuld, Stanley H 1962 The Voices of Dissent *Columbia Law Review* 62 923-29

Goldman, Sheldon 1982 *Constitutional Law and Supreme Court Decision Making* New York Harper and Row

Grossman, Joel B and Richard S Wells 1980 *Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making* 2d ed New York John Wiley

Halpern, Stephen C and Kenneth N Vines 1977 Institutional Disunity the Judges Bill and the Role of the Supreme Court *Western Political Quarterly* 30 471-83

Hughes, Charles Evans 1928 *The Supreme Court of the United States* New York Columbia University Press

Katcher Leo 1967 *Earl Warren A Political Biography* New York McGraw-Hill

Kegley, Charles W Jr 1987 Decision Regimes and Foreign Policy Behavior In Charles F Herman Charles W Kegley, Jr , and James N Rosenau, eds , *New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy* London George Allen and Unwin

Kirkendall Richard 1969 Fred M Vinson In Leon Friedman and Fred L Israel, eds , *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969* Vol IV New York Chelsea House

Mason, Alpheus T 1956 *Harlan Fiske Stone Pillar of the Law* New York Viking Press

——— 1958 *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

——— 1968 The Chief Justice of the United States Primus Inter Pares *Journal of Public Law*, 17 20–60

——— 1969 William Howard Taft In Leon Friedman and Fred L Israel, eds , *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969*, Vol III New York Chelsea House

Moorhead, R Dean 1952 Concurring and Dissenting Opinions *American Bar Association Journal*, 38 821–24, 884

Murphy, Walter F 1964 *Elements of Judicial Strategy* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Nagel, Stuart 1961 Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions *American Political Science Review*, 55 843–50

Norpoth, Helmut 1986 Transfer Function Analysis In William D Berry and Michael Lewis-Beck, eds , *New Tools for Social Scientists* Beverly Hills CA Sage

Pritchett, C Herman 1948 *The Roosevelt Court* New York Macmillan

——— 1954 *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Rehnquist, William H 1987 *The Supreme Court How It Was, How It Is* New York William Morrow

Roberts, Owen J 1963 Charles Evans Hughes The Administrative Master In Alan F Westin, ed , *An Autobiography of the Supreme Court* New York Macmillan

Roper, Donald M 1965 Judicial Unanimity and the Marshall Court—A Road to Reappraisal *American Journal of Legal History*, 9 118–34

Schiffman, Irving 1969 Melville W Fuller In Leon Friedman and Fred L Israel eds *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969*, Vol II New York Chelsea House

Schmidhauser, John R 1979 *Judges and Justices The Federal Appellate Judiciary* Boston Little, Brown

Schubert, Glendon 1962 The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court *American Political Science Review*, 56 90–107

Schwartz, Bernard 1957 *The Supreme Court Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect* New York Ronald Press

Steamer, Robert J 1986 *Chief Justice Leadership and the Supreme Court* Columbia University of South Carolina Press

Stephens, Richard B 1952 The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort *University of Florida Law Review* 5 394–410

Stone, Harlan Fiske 1942 Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, 26 78

Swisher, Carl Brent 1958 *The Supreme Court in Modern Role* New York New York University Press

Tressolini, Rocco J 1963 *Justice and the Supreme Court* Philadelphia J B Lippincott

Ulmer S Sidney 1962 The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court *Journal of Public Law* 11 352–62

——— 1986 Exploring the Dissent Patterns of the Chief Justices John Marshall to Warren Burger In Sheldon Goldman and Charles M Lamb eds *Judicial Conflict and Consensus Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts* Lexington University Press of Kentucky

Wasby, Stephen L 1984 *The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System* 2d ed New York Holt Rinehart and Winston

Watts James F Jr 1969 Edward Douglas White In Leon Friedman and Fred L Israel eds , *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969* Vol III New York Chelsea House

White G Edward 1976 *The American Judicial Tradition* New York Oxford University Press

Hobbes's Counsel to Sovereigns

Gerald M. Mar[illegible]
Georgetown University

Hobbes's political philosophy is often seen as a project of civic education whose goal is to teach citizens how to obey. But this educational goal seems to expose fundamental tensions in Hobbes's work. How, for example, is a project of broad public education to be reconciled with a mechanistic ontology and a political absolutism? These tensions may be addressed by seeing Hobbes's *Leviathan* as, in part, counsel to the perceptive sovereign. The form of Hobbes's counsel reveals the limits of mechanistic science; its substance underscores the primacy of those activities which absolute sovereignty protects. The complexity of Hobbesian counsel illustrates the richness of Hobbes's liberalism, which both recognizes the need for a certain kind of public spirit and rejects possibilities for political neutrality regarding ways of life. This richer position revealed by Hobbes's counsel supplies perhaps the clearest basis for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of philosophical liberalism whose roots have been justly traced to Thomas Hobbes.

I

Even the most diverging interpretations of the basic character of Hobbes's political philosophy agree that it is in part a project of education. To be sure, commentators differ significantly about the precise *content* of its instruction. Watkins claims it teaches the practical implications of the science of man; Warrender sees it providing moral lessons on the obligation implicit in covenants; and Johnston suggests that it lays the groundwork for enlightenment by combatting irrationality. However, most discussions seem to concur about this education's scope and purpose. Its major audience is citizens or subjects; its principal purpose is tutelage in the duties of civic obedience (cf. Watkins 1973, pp. 75–81; Warrender 1957, p. 326; Johnston, 1986, p. 119).

Critics have suggested, however, that Hobbes's attempts at civic education also expose fundamental deficiencies within the form and substance of his political theory. According to Strauss, Peters, Habermas and others, the relation between Hobbes's scientific description of the motions and operations of the commonwealth and his practical teaching on civil obedience is highly problematic. There is a logical interval between *knowing* the causes of civil wars and dissensions and *practicing* the duties necessary to avoid them. Accordingly, Hobbes's political teaching is not applied science but practical wisdom. However, the practically wise *use* of Hobbes's scientific conclusions seems to fall outside the scope of *scientific* education per se (cf.

*I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this paper.

Habermas, 1973, p 74). Moreover, what Strauss and Johnston see as "popular enlightenment" effectively sanctions the surrender of all individual rights of judgment, except those related to personal survival, to the sovereign Thus, Habermas contends that the "liberal content" of Hobbes's political theory is eventually sacrificed to the "absolute form of its sanction" (Habermas, 1973, pp 67–69) While these examples hardly do justice to all of the major relevant interpretations, they do serve to illustrate the kinds of difficulties which seem to attend Hobbes's project of popular education

But perhaps the focus on *popular* education is too narrow Hobbes's express intention is that his work will contribute to mankind's learning "both how to govern and how to obey" (1955, p 241) The clear implication is that Hobbes's attempt at education extends to sovereigns as well as to citizens This suggestion is confirmed in Hobbes's subsequent hope "that at one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself and by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice" (1955, p 241) Thus Hobbes depends on the receptive and responsible sovereign for the "public teaching" of his doctrine, a general and popular enlightenment presupposes a specific and privileged enlightenment Moreover, this privileged enlightenment does not simply identify the content of public teachings, narrowly understood It also endeavors to shape public conduct, broadly understood, by offering instructions on "how to rule

But how can Hobbes reasonably hope to instruct sovereigns? The entire range of powers conferred upon the holders of sovereignty would seem to frustrate this design from the outset By investing the sovereign with an unchallengeable authority Hobbes seems to be moving in the direction charted by Strauss, of strengthening the absolute character of sovereign power in each succeeding iteration of his political theory (cf Strauss 1963 p 69) Yet even in *Leviathan* Hobbes draws a firm distinction between *command*, which presupposes the prior existence of compelling laws and *counsel*, which presupposes only mutual good will between adviser and beneficiary (cf 1955, pp 369–70) Thus, there is no suggestion of obligation or submission in the voluntary response to counsel (cf 1955, p 66) Even if Strauss accurately concludes that Hobbes's sovereign cannot be *obliged* in any meaningful way, he can nonetheless profitably receive and nobly follow counsel

Moreover, Hobbes's counsel is special, he makes it absolutely clear that he offers more than simply a series of well intentioned and prudent admonitions Hobbesian counsel teaches adherence to the *laws* of nature precepts "found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving same, or to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved" (1955, p 84) Because they antedate all conventions, natural laws compel all men *as men*, not le-

ly, but psychologically or intellectually (1955, pp. 104, 246). Thus, even if sovereign can be obliged because all effective obligations presuppose a ior sovereign power, he is not psychologically exempted from pursuing the ıal which the laws of nature set for all mankind. Hobbes's counsel thus aims *persuading* the absolutely powerful sovereign to reflect upon and to recgnize the intellectually compelling laws of nature In the absence of any ffective command over sovereigns, Hobbes's counsel emerges as the only easonable and, so to speak, binding means by which "the barbarous state of nen in power, toward their inferiors" (cf. 1955, p. 6) may be avoided

It is my contention that Hobbes's effort to instruct sovereigns can help to soften some of the formal and substantive "antinomies" which seem to beset his work when it is seen solely as a project of popular enlightenment. The decisive importance which Hobbes attaches to counsel suggests that he is acutely aware of the limits to any *science* of man within an effective political teaching And the substance of that counsel reveals that Hobbes is primarily committed to supporting those liberal activities and practices for which absolute politics alone is a sufficient guardian Moreover, the complexity of Hobbes's counsel reveals an impressive richness within his liberal political philosophy Unlike many of liberalism's more recent champions, Hobbes takes the need for a certain kind of public spirit very seriously He likewise rejects the possibility of political neutrality regarding individual ways of life This earliest and most complex statement of liberal principles, as yet uncorrected by Hobbes's heirs, supplies perhaps the clearest basis for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of philosophical liberalism The focus of Hobbes's political counsel emerges as a profound clue to the basis of this political philosophy as a whole. By building a political theory centered around the freely chosen activities of materially defined individuals Hobbes exerts, for good or ill, an influence on contemporary liberalism that is stronger and more permanent than is recognized by more recent liberal theorists

II

Hobbes's elaborate defense of offering counsel is mirrored by the complex counsel he imparts From one perspective, that which is emphasized by much of the critical literature, Hobbes's primary goal is to clarify the nature of sovereignty itself That nature is most clearly seen in light of the necessity which prompts the creation of sovereign power For Hobbes, the freedom and equality which characterize the natural state mean that vulnerability is the primordial human condition In the state of nature even "the weakest ha strength enough to kill the strongest either by secret machination or by con federacy with others" (1955, p. 80). The personal or psychological manifest. tion of that vulnerability is a fear of violent death which inclines men to sec safety through covenants (cf 1955, p 85) But covenants are only effective

the participants are confident of mutual sincerity. Such confidence is not reasonable in the state of nature whose covenants stand "without the sword" and are, thus, "but words" (1955, p 109). While fear compels men to make covenants, it equally forbids them to take covenants made in the state of nature seriously Thus, the need to secure the confidence necessary for reliable covenants compels men to create "a common power to keep them all in awe" (1955, p. 110) That common power must be absolute, for only absolute power effectively guarantees the confidence which differentiates civil society from the state of nature (1955, p 210). This leads to Hobbes's praise of absolute monarchy as the most effective form of government (1955, pp 122–25, 1969, p. 143, 1983, p. 112). While aristocracies and democracies exercise their sovereign powers with equally absolute right, the monarch, ruling absolutely, is the most complete or perfect sovereign

There are, however, enormous challenges to the praise and practice of absolute rule Hobbes evaluates these challenges not as the understandable reactions of naturally free individuals but as the dangerous products of certain odious and destructive opinions (cf 1969, pp 171–75) Most of these opinions (e g , that individual consciences may privately interpret the laws, that property rights precede and therefore limit sovereign power, that sovereign power can be divided) argue for the restriction of sovereign authority However, in the case of sovereigns, to limit is to destroy Therefore, Hobbes's most basic teachings on sovereignty are intended to protect the exercise of sovereign power by unmasking the intellectual and moral deficiencies of challenges to its supremacy These teachings are designed in part to correct or sober the opinions of citizens, who in conditions of relative peace are too apt to forget that it is the sovereign alone who stands between them and the ravages of nature (cf 1975, p 13) However, this instruction should even more inform the practices of sovereigns, who are urged both to resist pressures to limit the scope of their authority and to engage, through their representatives, in the active instruction of subjects as to the real grounds and extent of their obedience (cf 1955, pp 219–20)

Hobbes's basic arguments toward these ends are familiar enough Given the threats which sovereign power is designed to counter, anything less than absolute authority is demonstrably ineffective "Partial" sovereignty is both absurd and unstable Where sovereignty is divided or where it can be challenged by the dictates of private conscience, there lurks a masked or latent state of nature (cf 1955, p 213) Likewise, since individual rights to property depend on sovereign power for their existence, it is fundamentally mistaken to claim, as Locke will do, that these rights antedate and therefore constrain the sovereign's authority (cf 1955, pp. 162–63)

However, by itself, this instructional project may have the unintended consequence of making the sovereign's absolute rule truly oppressive, thus justifying Strauss's assessment that Hobbes's political teaching ends with the

elimination of restraints on sovereign conduct. Yet consistently throughout Hobbes's work, in *Leviathan* as fully as in the *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, conduct that is thus "absolutist" is shown to be self-destructive. Part of the reason why is that such actions blatantly ignore the ways of the world. Although the contents of their teachings differ dramatically, Hobbes implicitly agrees with Rousseau that a knowledge of laws as they might be made must be tempered by an understanding of men as they are. Thus, the Author's Introduction to *Leviathan* charges the reader not simply to learn the science of causes necessary for constructing an artificial political animal, but also to become a searcher of hearts, reading in himself "not this or that particular man, but mankind," a skill that is "harder to learn than any language or science" (1955, p. 6). A sensitive reading of mankind reveals that while the sovereign cannot be "rightly" resisted as long as he continues to protect the lives of his subjects, the exercise of what many would (naively) call tyrannical powers can be expected to generate violence in nearly all predictable empirical circumstances. The clarification of right does not change psychological reality. In spite of the fact that the sovereign can, strictly speaking, commit no injustice, "it is a thing manifest of itself, that they who seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the commonwealth are prone to be seditious" (1983, p. 152).

However, the negatively absolutist tendencies of legitimately absolute rule are not rejected simply because they clash with social reality. They also stand condemned by the laws of nature to which "a sovereign is as much subject as the meanest of his people" (1955, p. 225). From the perspective of the laws of nature there is an essential difference between *just* laws and *good* laws. Strictly speaking, no law properly so called (a command issued by the sovereign power—cf. 1955, pp. 172–73) can be unjust. Yet not all (just) laws are necessarily good, for "a good law is that which is necessary for the good of the people" (1955, p. 227). Thus, while a precise understanding of justice condemns those assaults on "unjust laws" (like those attacks on "tyrannical" rulers) as destructive and nonsensical, sovereigns *can* be counseled as to how their laws might be made *better*, i.e., more compatible with natural laws. "For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature . . . are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, *then they are actually laws*, and not before, as being then the commands of the commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws" (1955, p. 174, emphasis mine).

Therefore, just as the science of causes cannot replace the searching of hearts, so the science of right does not eliminate the practical need for moderate policies. In both the *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, Hobbes goes so far as to identify the *duties* of those who hold the sovereign power. Included among those duties are, first and foremost, recognizing that the safety of the

people is the supreme law (1969, pp. 178–79, 1983, p 157), regulating the religious and sexual behavior of the citizens in ways consistent with the common good (1969, pp. 178–80, but cf 1983, p 158), taxing citizens on the basis of expenditures, not wealth (1969, p 181, 1983, p. 162), supervising the conduct of lower magistrates to guard against injustice (1969, p 182, 1983, p 167), instructing the young as to the true grounds of civic obedience (1969, pp. 183–84, 1983, pp 160–61), maintaining standing armies for the common defense (1983, pp 159–60) while avoiding unnecessary wars (1969, p 184), encouraging the flourishing of the arts and sciences (1983, pp 164–65), exercising mercy in criminal cases whenever possible (1983, p 166), keeping down ambitious men and those factions likely to fragment the commonwealth (1983, pp 162–64), and allowing the subjects as much freedom as possible consistent with effective security (1983, pp 165–66)

In *Leviathan* Hobbes does not speak as explicitly of the sovereign's *duties*, but he fully sets forth and bases his counsel upon an outline of "the office of the sovereign representative " This discussion firmly opposes what many would call the "arbitrary" use of sovereign power Thus, Hobbes counsels the sovereign to avoid imposing laws which are not materially necessary for enhanced security It is perfectly true as a matter of right that "[t]he liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted (1955 p 139) But it is also perfectly true as a matter of policy that 'contentments of life which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself" should be allowed by the prudent sovereign as essential to the safety which he provides (cf 1955 p 219)

The influence of the laws of nature must also extend to the ways in which the civil laws, however good in themselves are administered The eleventh law of nature, equity, counsels ' that justice be administered to all degrees of people, that is, that as well the rich and mighty as poor and obscure persons may be righted of the injuries done them so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence, dishonor, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to one of them' (1955, p 225) The seventh law of nature, 'that in revenges men respect only the future good," places Hobbes firmly on the side of a deterrence rather than a retributive theory of punishment Hence, the purpose of punishment is that "the will of men may be better disposed to obedience' (1955, p 202) At the same time, the sixth law of nature, 'facility to pardon' counsels 'that upon condition of a future time, a man ought to pardon the offenses past of them that repenting, desire it" (1955, p 99) This leads Hobbes to devote an entire chapter (27) to "crimes, excuses and extenuations,' outlining the circumstances and intentions which call for greater or lesser punishment of the same physical act. One crucial effect of this teaching is to rationalize or temper the imposition of punishment so that the natural law enjoining pardon

may be observed in all appropriate circumstances, for "there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth, and lenity, where there is much place for it is required by the law of nature" (1955, p 228).

However, for obvious psychological reasons the sovereign cannot rely simply on laws and punishments for the keeping of the peace Instead, "the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment" (1955, p. 220) Thus, one of the *duties* of the sovereign mentioned explicitly in *Leviathan* is "the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty" (1955, p 221) While Hobbes's earlier political works are focused on "the rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretense of right to rebellious actions" (1969, p 183), *Leviathan* both identifies those pernicious doctrines which must be countered and outlines those positive teachings which will actively dispose the citizens to obey Citizens should be firmly persuaded that the sovereign authority ought to be respected and cherished as an indivisible font of power and source of security, that popular men have no just claims to allegiance in opposition to the sovereign power, and that all citizens should actively and sincerely avoid doing injury to any of their fellows (cf 1955, pp 221–24)

However, although these teachings are "so consonant to reason, that any unprejudicated man needs no more to learn , than to hear," Hobbes does not intend them to be presented as demonstrable scientific conclusions A counsel which foolishly assumes that all can be profitably instructed in the sciences of man is in its own way as damaging as that which arrogantly expects reverence for the sovereign's formal rights to eliminate the influences of rebellious hope or anger Thus, teachings on civil obedience can be taught as salutary opinions or even as articles of faith, resembling in some respects a worldly version of the ten commandments Indeed, because these teachings may be independently confirmed by common reason, there is no barrier against presenting them in a prophetically religious context or language as long as that language is properly employed From this perspective Hobbes praises the original schools of the Jews which simply taught the Law of Moses that the people "might learn and hear it" (1955, p 439) And his objections to the preachings of the Presbyterian divines during the Long Parliament do not condemn religious teaching as such but rather the purposes to which those ministers put their religious authority Since the people only have "one day in seven the leisure to hear instruction" there must be "ministers appointed to teach them their duty" (1969a, p 159). Hobbes thus recommends that special days be set aside to teach and to hallow civil obligation (cf 1955, pp 222–23) Accordingly, the enlightenment effected by Hobbes's civic education is perhaps less "the diffusion of scientific knowledge" (in Strauss's phrase) or even the laying of foundations for the exercise of rational

elf-interest (as Johnston suggests) than the stimulation of pervasive and inluential reverence for civil peace and its champions

But in spite of the heavily doctrinal aspects of this civic education, it is not educible to a narrowly construed repetition and acceptance of essential disrete articles This education must also inevitably influence the habits and haracters of all those who inhabit a flourishing commonwealth The healthy ommonwealth must contain a significant proportion of just *men*, those vhose *actions* are regularly and predictably in accordance with reason (cf 955, pp. 97, 394) Since the dictates of reason cannot be followed conidently in the absence of civil law, the just civil man obeys the civil law preisely because it *is* the civil law, the rationally-produced guarantor of the ffectiveness of rationality (cf 1983, p 64) Commonwealths whose laws surive solely on the basis of punishments are thus highly unstable because they re filled with essentially unjust men For "he is properly said to be *unjust* vho doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext to the Law, and inrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind" (1983, p 64, cf 1969 , 83) Therefore, effectively governed commonwealths must rest on more han outward conformity to the laws They must aspire to extirpate iniquity rom the minds of the citizens so that they will regard "not only the unjust acts, but also the designs and intentions to do them" as utterly reprehenible (cf 1955, p 224)

This extirpation cannot be accomplished, however, by demanding that hunan beings behave in psychologically unrealistic ways Like Machiavelli and ipinoza, Hobbes rejects any political philosophy which substitutes an image of how we ought to live for awareness of how we *do* live Thus, a political trategy which pursues not fearful compliance but rational acceptance must liscover a real unextirpatable human passion beyond fear To this end, Hobbes relies on those "other" passions beyond the fear of violent death vhich help to incline men to peace the "desire of such things as are necesary to commodious living, and [the] hope by industry to attain them' 1955, p 84) The virtues which flow from these passions are, of course, the irtues of the bourgeois Thus, in the language of *De Cive*, 'by *safety* must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever but n order to its happiness For this end did men fully assemble themselves and *institute* a government, that they might, as much as their humane condiion would afford, live delightfully" (1983, p 158, emphasis in text) Effecive government and delightful living thus appear to be mutually reinforcing, vhile an effective government assures the enjoyable security of its subjects, he experience of domestic or private pleasure reduces the threat of sedition Accordingly, Hobbes makes it clear that one of the offices of the sovereign is o encourage attitudes and behaviors leading to economic prosperity Effecive policies in this direction include the fostering of the arts and sciences 1983, p 164), the protection of trade and commerce (1969, pp 180–81), the

may be observed in all appropriate circumstances, for "there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, where there is much place for it is required by the law of nature" (1955, p. 228)

However, for obvious psychological reasons the sovereign cannot rely simply on laws and punishments for the keeping of the peace Instead, "the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment" (1955, p 220). Thus, one of the *duties* of the sovereign mentioned explicitly in *Leviathan* is "the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty" (1955, p 221) While Hobbes's earlier political works are focused on "the rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretense of right to rebellious actions" (1969, p 183), *Leviathan* both identifies those pernicious doctrines which must be countered and outlines those positive teachings which will actively dispose the citizens to obey. Citizens should be firmly persuaded that the sovereign authority ought to be respected and cherished as an indivisible font of power and source of security, that popular men have no just claims to allegiance in opposition to the sovereign power, and that all citizens should actively and sincerely avoid doing injury to any of their fellows (cf 1955, pp 221–24)

However, although these teachings are "so consonant to reason, that any unprejudicated man needs no more to learn , than to hear," Hobbes does not intend them to be presented as demonstrable scientific conclusions A counsel which foolishly assumes that all can be profitably instructed in the sciences of man is in its own way as damaging as that which arrogantly expects reverence for the sovereign's formal rights to eliminate the influences of rebellious hope or anger Thus, teachings on civil obedience can be taught as salutary opinions or even as articles of faith, resembling in some respects a worldly version of the ten commandments Indeed, because these teachings may be independently confirmed by common reason, there is no barrier against presenting them in a prophetically religious context or language as long as that language is properly employed From this perspective Hobbes praises the original schools of the Jews which simply taught the Law of Moses that the people "might learn and hear it" (1955, p 439) And his objections to the preachings of the Presbyterian divines during the Long Parliament do not condemn religious teaching as such but rather the purposes to which those ministers put their religious authority Since the people only have "one day in seven the leisure to hear instruction' there must be ' ministers appointed to teach them their duty" (1969a, p 159) Hobbes thus recommends that special days be set aside to teach and to hallow civil obligation (cf 1955, pp 222–23) Accordingly, the enlightenment effected by Hobbes's civic education is perhaps less "the diffusion of scientific knowledge" (in Strauss's phrase) or even the laying of foundations for the exercise of rational

self-interest (as Johnston suggests) than the stimulation of pervasive and influential reverence for civil peace and its champions

But in spite of the heavily doctrinal aspects of this civic education, it is not reducible to a narrowly construed repetition and acceptance of essential discrete articles This education must also inevitably influence the habits and characters of all those who inhabit a flourishing commonwealth The healthy commonwealth must contain a significant proportion of just *men*, those whose *actions* are regularly and predictably in accordance with reason (cf 1955, pp 97, 394) Since the dictates of reason cannot be followed confidently in the absence of civil law, the just civil man obeys the civil law precisely because it *is* the civil law, the rationally-produced guarantor of the effectiveness of rationality (cf 1983, p 64) Commonwealths whose laws survive solely on the basis of punishments are thus highly unstable because they are filled with essentially unjust men For "he is properly said to be *unjust* who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext to the Law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind" (1983, p 64, cf 1969, p 83) Therefore, effectively governed commonwealths must rest on more than outward conformity to the laws They must aspire to extirpate iniquity from the minds of the citizens so that they will regard "not only the unjust facts, but also the designs and intentions to do them" as utterly reprehensible (cf 1955, p 224)

This extirpation cannot be accomplished, however by demanding that human beings behave in psychologically unrealistic ways Like Machiavelli and Spinoza, Hobbes rejects any political philosophy which substitutes an image of how we ought to live for awareness of how we *do* live Thus a political strategy which pursues not fearful compliance but rational acceptance must discover a real unextirpatable human passion beyond fear To this end, Hobbes relies on those "other" passions beyond the fear of violent death which help to incline men to peace the "desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and [the] hope by industry to attain them" (1955, p 84) The virtues which flow from these passions are, of course, the virtues of the bourgeois Thus, in the language of *De Cive*, "by *safety* must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever but in order to its happiness For this end did men freely assemble themselves and *institute* a government, that they might, as much as their humane condition would afford, live delightfully" (1983, p 158, emphasis in text) Effective government and delightful living thus appear to be mutually reinforcing while an effective government assures the enjoyable security of its subjects, the experience of domestic or private pleasure reduces the threat of sedition Accordingly, Hobbes makes it clear that one of the offices of the sovereign is to encourage attitudes and behaviors leading to economic prosperity. Effective policies in this direction include the fostering of the arts and sciences (1983, p 164), the protection of trade and commerce (1969, pp 180–81), the

discouragement of idleness (1955, p 227), and the support of thrift and economic moderation at the expense of luxurious consumption (1969, pp 181–82, 1983, p. 162, 1955, p 226).

Because the goal of these measures is to influence deep-seated beliefs and not simply to elicit outer conformity, the sovereign must buttress policies favoring economic prosperity with more general examples and teachings conferring honor on bourgeois virtue Hobbes thus fixes the right to establish the "laws of honor and a public rate of worth" decisively in the hands of the sovereign (1955, p 118) Hobbes's counsel on the exercise of this right in this context is appropriately indirect The sovereign encourages bourgeois virtue largely by demeaning those qualities traditionally associated with aristocrats or warriors, qualities which contribute much more to strife than to harmony As Strauss has clearly shown, Hobbes's moral teaching is the dishonoring of vainglory (cf Strauss, 1963, ch VII) It is a particular vice of the vainglorious that they attribute their supposed preeminence to their personal qualities rather than to the "will of those that have the sovereign authority" (1955, pp 193–94) It is of supreme importance, therefore, that the Leviathan show itself as "king of the proud" (1955, p 209) The sovereign must stifle vainglory in part by punishing hubristic actions which stem from that passion (1955, pp 193–95), and in part by eliminating the very stimulants of that passion itself For example the sovereign must control the teaching of the ancient histories whose romantic praises of democracy and tyrannicide have ended "with the effusion of so much blood" (1955, p 141)

The passion of vainglory cannot be countered effectively, however, without the success of a much more pervasive educational project Hobbes effectively counsels the sovereign to lead the commonwealth's citizens ever further toward the condition of peaceful equality which is the goal of the laws of nature His recommendations concerning educational and economic policies, the administration of justice, and the leadership of manners and morals are all designed to contribute to the flourishing of a greater social equality, which should not, of course, be confused with social leveling Thus, all citizens must receive the same basic education as to the nature and grounds of their political duties (1955, pp 219–20) Economic structures should discourage flamboyant consumption among the wealthy, support the efficient and stable accumulation of the middle class and protect those who are blamelessly poor from falling into destitution (cf 1955, pp 226–27) The laws should be administered equitably among the powerful and the common alike, though the presumption of wealth and influence on the part of the elite calls for greater severity in the punishment of crimes, while the ignorance and fear of lower classes calls for greater lenity (cf 1955, pp 225–26, 191–202) Honors given to those who have served the commonwealth well should be moderate in scope and offered only to those who have acted out of a mod-

est public spirit, rather than out of a dangerous public ambition (1955, p 229)

The sovereign's control over the behavior of his subjects cannot, then, simply be understood as the imposition of contraints on freedom, stipulating which things are and are not included among those "which the sovereign hath practermitted" Additionally, Hobbes envisages the sovereign's use of power as a mechanism for encouraging a peaceableness and restraint rooted sincerely in the dispositions The sovereign is thus a shaper as well as a searcher of hearts (cf 1955, pp 224, 379) Through this concern for a kind of moral education, Hobbes thus calls the sovereign to the same formal project as that undertaken by the statesmen of Plato and Aristotle. Like Plato, Hobbes rejects claims that politics should simply gratify the passions of the many without a prior evaluation and modification of those passions In this respect, Hobbes's political counsel is as distant as Socrates' from the *rhētorikē* endorsed by Gorgias and Callicles To be sure, this formal similarity about the benefits of politically communicated moral instruction cannot mask important differences over the substance of that morality Hobbes's counsel is not to moderate the many's pursuit of economic gain by sublimating material and egocentric desires to more elevated or common purposes Rather, the many must be convinced that the best means toward permanent material security consists in avoiding the doing of injury While Plato recommends constraining freedom for the sake of virtue, Hobbes argues that a suitable practice of attainable virtue can be grounded in the anxious concern for material liberty Nonetheless, these vast differences over the content of moral education do not alter the conclusion that both Plato *and* Hobbes would regard calls for political neutrality regarding ways of life as dangerous illusions in a world where "every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught"

III

However successful Hobbes may be in justifying his counsel and however valuable his counsel may be, he nonetheless faces significant psychological barriers to securing any sovereign's agreement and response While the commonwealth may be an artificial animal, the sovereign does not, even in his preeminence, surrender his existence as a natural person As such, he is subject to the same desires and impulses as "the meanest of his people" No more than for other men does the sovereign's happiness consist "in the repose of a mind satisfied" In reading all men as he reads himself, the sovereign will discover as "a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and relentless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death" (1955 p. 64) But while all are fearful and vulnerable in the state of nature, the sovereign alone of men in the civil state is imbued with the power and strength of all of the individual authors of the commonwealth, making him, in effect, a

"mortal god" (1955, p 112) The question which Socrates asks Glaucon abou the guardians in book two of the *Republic* seems equally valid when applie to sovereigns. "With such natures how will they not be savage to one anothe and the rest of the citizens?" (*Republic* 375b6–9)

Of course Hobbes's sovereigns differ significantly from Socrates' and Glau con's guardians in that they owe their superiority to covenants rather than t nature It would be vainglorious for sovereigns to presume that their ar tificial preeminence reflects an exemption from the condition of natura equality But the sovereign's natural inclusion among the mass of equal me also implies that the Socratic means of restraining the guardians is unavail able to Hobbes Socrates counters the potential rapacity of the elite by show ing them 'a life better than ruling," the life of philosophy (cf *Republi* 520e5–521a1) Philosophy is defined first and foremost by its goal of con templating the most important, i e , the most intelligible, things As such its practice is by nature reserved for the gifted few But in Hobbes's eyes even the arguably unequal distribution of philosophic skills (cf. 1955, p 80 as well as the commentary of Kidder, 1983, pp 138–39) is placed in the ser vice of those desires experienced by all mankind Being essentially instru mental philosophy cannot, therefore, replace the universal desire for powe (cf 1955, p 435, 1839, p 7)

Since the sovereign owes his superior condition to the civil covenant Hobbes could, of course, point to the terms of that covenant as restraints o sovereign conduct But although the commonwealth is constructed exclu sively to protect its individual members, the absolute authority required fo effective sovereignty cannot by definition be scrutinized by the individua partners (cf 1955, p 114, 1969, p 119, 1983, pp 104–5, 115–16). Even a abusive sovereign could claim that an "authoritarian" but effective regim was infinitely preferable to "that dissolute condition of masterless men" (cf 1955, p 120) Moreover, matters of formal right are no more descriptive o sovereign than of popular psychology Possessed of those same desires an shortcomings which characterize all other natural individuals, the sovereign artificial preeminence insulates him far more than the rest from the frustra tion of those desires and the consciousness of those shortcomings

Part of Hobbes's motivational project, then, is to remind the sovereign o his natural personhood To do this without challenging sovereign authority Hobbes proceeds to show the ruler that his own fate is inextricably tied t that of the commonwealth (cf 1955, pp 122–23) However, the connectio between sovereign and civic well-being is more obvious in certain kinds o governments than in others While the prosperity of the *monarch* is ver closely tied to that of those he governs, the fortunes of individual members o sovereign councils or assemblies can apparently flourish directly at the ex pense of the common good "For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor se cure whose subjects are either poor or contemptible, or too weak, through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies whereas in a de

mocracy or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action or a civil war" (1955, p. 123, 1983, pp. 138–39).

The general solution to this problem does not lie in urging sovereigns to act against their natural interests in pursuit of the public welfare (cf. 1955, p. 123). Instead, Hobbes proceeds by clarifying the *true* interests of rulers—individual monarchs as well as individual members of sovereign councils or assemblies. Once they understand that their true natural interest compels them, as it does all men, to peace, they will be more likely to reject tyrannical passions. The single monarch is peculiarly advantaged for this rejection since the bulk of those passions which secrete "contention, enmity and war" are rooted in competition (1955, p. 64). The monarch's artificial but absolute supremacy elevates him far above those competing for "riches, honour, command or other power." Thus, Hobbes's teaching concerning the rights of the sovereign emphasizes that he is the source of, rather than a contestant for, all civil honors. Paradoxically, those beneficial results which would follow from the sovereign's recognition of natural equality may be best approximated by a full awareness of his artificial supremacy. In the one circumstance competition is fatally unrealistic, in the other it is patently demeaning and unnecessary.

This solution is clearly unavailable, however, for sovereign assemblies and councils. Therein, competition is an inevitable and dangerous reality. The conflicts among individual councilors and assemblymen lead not only to the direct clash of private interests, but also to the subtle vulnerability of the ruling body to the irrational influences of flattery and rhetoric (cf. 1955, p. 123, 1969, pp. 141–42). It is thus much more likely that an aristocratic or democratic commonwealth will be toppled by dissensions within or mistakes made by the sovereign power than by any rebellion against its oppressive rule. Hobbes's task, then, is to show individual members of these sovereign bodies that, in spite of all appearances, their true interests lie not in successful competitions with their fellows but in the effective pursuit of the general welfare. The tactics which Hobbes uses to achieve this purpose are in some respects the reverse of those employed to address monarchs. While the monarch must be made acutely conscious that his individual well-being is almost indistinguishable from the commonwealth's, the members of more broadly-based sovereign bodies must be reminded that their fractional individual exercises of authority only account for a small portion of their natural security. Individually considered, the members of a democratic sovereign representative are psychologically more similar to subjects than to rulers. There is no great difference in conduct and motivation between a people unschooled in their duties and a sovereign democracy ignorant of the requirements of ruling well (1955, pp. 124–25). Thus, the same lessons which remind subjects of their duties may also cue sovereign democrats as to their

responsibilities. Such lessons recall the realities of the state of nature which lie just beyond the democrats' passionate rivalries. Civil war is not an opportunity, but a catastrophe (compare 1955, p. 123 with p. 120). Any action thus contributing to the abuse or weakening of the sovereign power can be condemned as ushering in the greatest catastrophe. Conversely, actions tending to strengthen or solidify the sovereign power provide the greatest benefits to the private affairs of democratic rulers and subjects alike In this light, one might speculate that the best "Hobbesian" action of a sovereign democracy might be, circumstances permitting, the imitation of the final act of the Long Parliament, returning power to "King Charles II, where long it may remain" (1969a, p 204)

Yet reminding the sovereigns of their existence as natural persons may also seriously undermine the possibility of courageous actions Natural persons, even in civil surroundings, should be guided preeminently by a healthy fear But only in the best of all possible worlds, certainly not in Hobbes's world, is courage unnecessary for the rulers of men Sovereigns cannot maintain a commonwealth secure "from perishing by internal diseases" (1955, p 209) without a prudent but authentic bravery Most basically, the holders of sovereign power must be courageous enough to keep the sovereignty unified and individual, to resist claims that the sovereign is limited by the prior rights of the subjects, and to demand the resolute sacrifices that are necessary for stable and long-term economic security and national defense (cf 1955, pp 216–17, pp 454–55, 1983, pp 159–60) Moreover, since the sovereign relates to other sovereigns in the state of nature, that is, the state of war, he must be able and willing to conduct the more or less occasional military actions needed to secure the common defense (cf 1955, pp 83, 313) Thus, as Strauss notes, even Hobbes's most "bourgeois" work emphasizes that "[f]ortitude is a royal virtue" (1969a, p 45, cf Strauss, 1963, p 120) While it is unlikely that many political leaders would equal Hobbes in intellectual virtue, all must be his superiors in the moral virtue of courage

Hobbes cannot preserve the sovereign courage necessary for rule without the consequent rehabilitation of a certain kind of glory While Strauss is clearly correct in his conclusion that one of Hobbes's chief intentions is to unmask the folly of vainglory, he cannot simply replace that childishly reckless aristocratic virtue with the sober maturity of bourgeois virtue For effective rule in the world as it is, it is not sufficient that the sovereign imitate the middle class virtue of frugality (cf Strauss, 1963, p 120) Since the sovereign is potentially always at war, he must at least partially follow Machiavelli's advice and study war, practicing the virtues of the lion and the fox (cf Machiavelli, 1950, pp 53–55, 63–66) To support the kind of courage needed to resist domestic challenges and to meet foreign threats, Hobbes must have recourse to a salutary or praiseworthy impulse toward glory As Joel Kidder reasonably notes, sovereignty itself can be understood as "the ultimate prize

for glory seekers" (Kidder, 1983, p 140) Accordingly, Hobbes carefully distinguishes vainglory from the "[d]esire of praise [which] disposeth to laudable actions such as please them whose judgments they value. . Desire for fame after death does the same And though after death there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joys that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell *yet is not such fame vain*, because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity" (1955, pp 64–65, emphasis mine) The desire for fame that is not vain is apparently the only desire which maturely or rationally points beyond the finality of death while remaining rooted to the passions and the deeds of this world Between the selfless public spirit which is psychologically impossible and the hubristic ambition which is politically catastrophic, Hobbes thus relies on this present delight for deathless glory to provide motivation for facing the severe personal risks which attend the exercise of public power For "a well grounded *confidence* begetteth attempt whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain" (1955 p 36, emphasis in text)

However, a convincing endorsement of the rewards of healthy glory cannot simply rely on an objective presentation of its psychological contours since it would immediately confront Hobbes's more solidly scientific conclusion that violent death is the supreme evil Accordingly Hobbes's rescue of glory must be in part rhetorical thus paralleling the rhetorical appeal to citizens so lucidly discussed by Johnston The passion for healthy glory must itself be relied upon within a successful attempt to show its integrity Yet to nurture the health of that passion, the 'ultimate prize must be lifted far above the vain and venal rivalries affecting so many contestants for power Hobbes thus implicitly calls the sovereign to the superior imitation of the superior founders, Moses and Jesus As the effective deliverer of the secular Decalogue, the sovereign emerges as a new and greater Moses capable of handing down and animating eternal laws of nature which as such are vastly more universal and beneficial than the laws of Sinai which were addressed only to the embattled Hebrews (cf 1955 pp 221 386) As the guarantor of a psychologically compelling golden rule, the sovereign is capable of making the peaceful kingdom of Jesus a worldly reality "as much as their humane condition would afford "[1] Thus, while reminding the sovereign of his mor-

[1]On the general relation between Moses Jesus and sovereigns see Hobbes 1955 pp 306–12, 316–22 326–28, 385–86 Note especially Hobbes's claim that whoever in a Christian Commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses is the sole messenger of God and interpreter of his commandments, (1955, p 310), as well as his assessment of Jesus simple reiteration of the laws of nature and the laws of our several sovereigns (1955 p 385) On the translation of the scriptural into the natural golden rule see 1955 pp 327–28 For a useful discussion of Hobbes's comparison of the foundations of Moses and Christ see Schwartz (1985)

tality encourages restraint, promising him a kind of divinity is essen call forth his courage. Properly counseled, the just and courageous sov can justly and prudently be promised reverence as a *mortal god* pp. 112, 222).

IV

Is Hobbes's attention to the importance of sovereign counsel relev the problems which seem to beset his call for a popular enlightenment i it can perhaps also help to address some of the more basic controversi rounding Hobbes's political philosophy Most obviously, Hobbes's suc counsel would help to moderate the rightful exercise of power by the lute ruler, meeting, in a way, Watkins' concern that Hobbes may not sufficiently on "the possible unintended consequences of *his remedy* f social disasters" (Watkins, 1973, p 171) Tutelage on how to obey m accompanied by counsel on how to rule if the commonwealth is to esca twin evils of sedition and barbarism To this end, Hobbes might well c his counsel to monarchs as preferable to Locke's reliance on the majori power of the political society (cf Locke, 1980, pp 52–53) While clearly intends to limit the powers of a government instituted for the p tion of "civil interests," the practical discovery and effective enforcem those limits rest absolutely in the hands of the majority of the politi ciety formed by mutual covenant This majority directs or at least ov the government's articulation of economic and civil rights within socie its application of public laws to specific individuals and groups Thu translation of the *natural* into the *civil* right of property is properly the tion of civil government and thus ultimately dependent upon the ac cence of a given majority (cf Locke, 1980, p 22) And an abused m has no recourse against an oppressive government unless its cause is pioned by a sympathetic majority (cf Locke, 1980, pp 115–16) Locke's insistence that the sovereign respect natural law is *no more ment* than Hobbes's similar demand (compare Locke, 1980, pp 70–7 Hobbes, 1955, p 225) And he relies, *no less* than Hobbes, on the hu and prudence of those ultimately holding power as the *sole* means of ing that respect Thus, in a sense, Locke's majoritarian safeguards agai absolute monarch only serve to place the practical exercise of power lutely in the hands of the majority While the historical justificati Locke's unambiguous praise of majorities is unassailable, its theoretica its are diminished not only by our more recent experiences with majori rule, but also perhaps by Hobbes's alternative effort to correct the ex of "absolutism" within the defense of sovereign power itself Thus, in J Cropsey's view, Hobbes's posthumously published *Dialogue Between losopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* closes with t servation that a prudent and effective king, while avoiding the e

checks and balances damaging to sovereignty, must strive to secure the advice and consent of the populace, through Parliament, in support of his legislation (1971, pp. 47–48) While formal limitations on sovereign power are frightening and dangerous, the voluntary and prudent recognition of the need for public support is both consistent with and supportive of the sovereign's political effectiveness Hobbes might justly inquire how Locke's empowered majority could be analogously moderated

Hobbes's use of counsel may also help him respond to the allegations of recent commentators concerning the formal and substantive antimonies within his work The reliance on counsel suggests that Hobbes is acutely aware of the limitations of an objective *science* of man as a moral and political *teaching* Discourse oriented to "the good of him, to whom he giveth it" clearly requires a mode of presentation different from scientific demonstration if it is to be effectively coherent and persuasive Indeed, the practical nature of counsel thus understood exerts a consequent influence on its supporting psychological evidence or investigations Counsel cannot proceed simply from the scientific discovery that the reality of human passions is a certain kind of material motion It must rely much more on an insightful reading of hearts which alternately glances at one's own deepest longings and the universal hopes and fears of mankind Thus, whether the *genesis* of Hobbes's political philosophy is the deductive power of the modern science of motion, the lessons learned from observing manners and morals or, perhaps most likely, the interaction of both of these influences, the nature of counsel demands that Hobbes's discoveries be expressed in a language that is focused upon and relevant to human decisions

But in spite of the importance attached to counsel as a pedagogical or strategic tool, neither its form nor its content contradicts Hobbes's more scientific understanding of *homo sapiens* An objective science of the passions and motives of free human beings does not as such foreclose the possibility of a practical counsel informed by its discoveries Indeed, given Hobbes's scientific account of the natural and civil conditions, counsel is perhaps the only effective way to influence the behavior of one who can be neither legally commanded nor naturally intimidated Moreover, the good which the sovereign is counseled to pursue is that sought by *all* human beings, the continued satisfaction of desire in a way consistent with the longest possible period of self-preservation As distinct from all other single individuals, however the sovereign's heeding of prudent counsel makes a dramatic contribution to possibilities for the well-being of society as a whole Thus, Hobbesian counsel is *neither* a deductive consequence nor a pragmatic alteration of his scientific conclusions about sovereign power Rather, counsel is the educative mechanism by which theoretical conclusions may inform the general utility of practice

The complex relation between Hobbes's counsel to sovereigns and his pro-

posed education of subjects may also soften the tensions arising from the allel endorsements of absolute rule and general enlightenment Thoug bases his advice on the intellectually *binding* character of the laws of nat the compulsion exerted by those laws does not foreclose opportunitie both sovereigns and citizens to make important choices and decisions sense, the laws of nature provide grounds or guides for such decision establishing the most basic human priorities as well as the most critical man constraints Within those constraints, human beings are shown how they are to pursue those priorities From one perspective, even *sover* autonomy is clearly restricted by the character of Hobbes's counsel Bu very attempt to impart *counsel* rather than to prescribe a Benthamite n science is indicative of the respect which he accords the freedom of sc eigns Additionally, a certain kind of free choice seems integral even to most ordinary subjects in the commonwealth, those who are bound by civil as well as the natural law To be sure, the creation of and the ser respect for sovereign power limits the subjects' freedom to choose in a r ber of significant respects And it is perfectly clear that the best public cation should reinforce those limitations in the strongest possible te However, that same education also enlightens subjects as to the kinds o cisions and activities that are most important for human beings T choices are, even in the presence of absolute political rule, surprisingly ! Subjects are taught to devote nearly exclusive attention, through their choices among legitimate means, to the personal pursuit of material provements Free choices exercised in this broad direction are, in re those most consistent with the equal freedom of natural persons, yet those most contributive to the peace and stability of the commonwe Thus, Hobbes's defense of these choices does not in any way constitut unconscious softening of or discomfort with his absolutist political teacl Rather, these choices and "rights" are so important that they demand permanent security which can only be established with absolute soverei It is, accordingly, essential that Hobbes's counsel underscore the wisdo allowing such choices as much freedom as is consistent with the overall pose of the commonwealth (cf 1983, pp 165-66)

Accordingly, given the nature and purpose of counsel, the enlighten which Hobbes provides will be reflected in moral conduct more than i tellectual acuity Rational behavior is not exclusively that which is d mined through independent ratiocination More broadly, it is that whi most consistent with true human interests Hobbes's desire to expand scope of human rationality thus seems more substantive than procedura such, the rational choices of free natural or civil men are not inconsi with either the binding character of the laws of nature or the salutary i ence of certain right opinions Individuals *taught* their duties by respon universities or clergymen will nonetheless act freely and rationally in

most important respects Leaving the substance of these teachings aside for the moment, this formal conception of enlightenment may serve as a useful corrective to positions such as Habermas' which contend that enlightened decisions are inevitably subverted by the pretended existence of binding substantive standards or by the oppressive imposition of concrete values within a particular culture or tradition (Habermas, 1973, p 22) Indeed, if these features of Habermas' critique are accepted completely, the damage to Western political philosophy would not be limited to that imposed on Thomas Hobbes

But while Hobbes's attention to sovereign counsel may soften *some* of the tensions in his political philosophy, it introduces others which may be more persistent Given Hobbes's role in the genesis of liberal thought, such tensions may also reveal fundamental difficulties in the structure of philosophical liberalism Contemporary liberalism faces serious challenges which claim that its principles are inadequate for dealing with the richness and complexity, as well as the potential dangers, of political life These challenges have been most often raised by proponents of community-centered (Arendt Sandel) and virtue-centered (MacIntyre Salkever) political theories Liberals such as Barry and Galston who have recognized that these perspectives have important things to say have often held that their concerns can be addressed within the liberal framework itself However other commentators both friendly and hostile, have suggested that this is impossible without moving beyond the bounds of liberal theory (cf Rawls, 1985 p 246 MacIntyre, 1981, ch 17) As befits the founder of English-speaking liberalism Hobbes provides a rich perspective which appears to embrace at least some of the major concerns of both the friends of community and the friends of virtue At the same time Hobbes's treatment of these concerns suggests the limitations of efforts to accommodate them within a liberal perspective

First, Hobbes's necessary rehabilitation of a certain kind of glory clearly highlights liberalism's need to deal with the value of political activity within human associations *Liberal* politics is necessary solely because of the need to preserve and protect private goods But for liberal *politics* to be effective its practitioners must take certain public roles or public values very seriously How is this public orientation psychologically explicable if private goods or activities are of consummate human importance? Liberal theorists succeeding Hobbes have generally responded that politics *may* be attractive because of the private economic (Downs) or psychological (Rawls) rewards which it provides It is one source of personal gratification among many possible sources Political theorists who endorse community or participation as the highest human possibility obviously have a number of strong objections to this approach But even *within* the liberal framework, this solution seems seriously deficient in that it cannot adequately support the kind of politics most required for the continued welfare of the liberal society The absolute

necessity of providing for the common defense means that the exercise of political responsibilities cannot simply be treated as a job or a pasttime whose performance is subject to changing market opportunities or fluctuating individual tastes. At the same time, the severe personal risks attending the practice of political guardianship cannot rest exclusively on rational economic motivations. Liberalism cannot guarantee that politics will not be abandoned precisely at the moment when public courage is essential for the preservation of the liberal commonwealth. By recognizing the psychological necessity for a healthy desire for glory and thus a certain kind of public commitment, Hobbes seems more politically circumspect than many of those who have expanded upon or corrected his liberal doctrines.

However, given the overwhelming centrality of private welfare within his psychology, this circumspection is inevitably limited. Unlike Rousseau and Burke, Hobbes suggests that both private selfishness and public concern can be supported within a political teaching which remains decisively liberal. Yet, Hobbes's model commonwealth is composed of those very few individuals who value politics and the vast majority who do not. The contours of this society closely resemble those of Machiavelli's principalities (cf. Machiavelli, 1950, p. 85). In Machiavelli's eyes, these very features make principalities more vulnerable in war than the austere republics which purchase their security by cultivating a warlike and spirited patriotism among their citizens. To this end, the republic's inhabitants are stimulated much more by the needs for honor and recognition than by the "settled and sedate" desires for comfort and profit (cf. Machiavelli, 1950, pp. 486–88). This need for recognition is, in Hobbes's view, fatal to the civil peace and is justly execrated as dangerously immature. Yet in its absence, the preservation of Hobbes's commonwealth rests much more on the unlikely prospects for perpetual peace than upon the patriotic resolve of dedicated citizens. In this light, one wonders whether liberalism's commitment to protecting liberty and equality can be successful without a paradoxical recognition of the superior importance of activities which are both constrained and ennobled by their devotion to the common good (cf. 1955, pp. 460–61).[2] And one in turn wonders whether this recognition does not undercut, as it does for Rousseau and Burke, the *liberal* character of a politics so constituted.

Likewise, by positing that one of the missions of the enlightened sover-

[2] MacIntyre (1984, pp. 11–14) is generally pessimistic about the prospects for reconciling the demands of patriotic citizenship with freedoms of liberal individuality. Rawls would almost surely see the willingness to undergo severe personal risks for the sake of even the well-ordered society as superogatory and thus, by definition, beyond the scope of that conduct which can be demanded by a liberal moral philosophy (1971, pp. 438–39). Walzer is perhaps most successful in accommodating a commitment to individual rights with a defense of patriotism. But he does so only by seriously clouding the theoretical bases of his just war theory and is nonetheless forced to confess that the necessary defense of the community requires a kind of tyranny over individuals (Walzer, 1977, pp. 53–54, 29–32, cf. Pangle, 1978, pp. 1393–95).

eign is a particular enlightenment of subjects, Hobbes admits that the shaping of personal values and goals is indispensable within any political community. Liberalism's subsequent commitment to neutrality about its citizens' choices of life plans is, from Hobbes's perspective, simply naive. By recognizing the entwining of politics and ethics Hobbes perhaps emerges as more clear-sighted and comprehensive than many of his liberal descendants who firmly oppose political efforts to shape individual value choices even as they proceed systematically to show why and how this should be done.[3]

However, once one admits that the question of the best life is both unavoidable and intelligible within a political context, one becomes increasingly disturbed by Hobbes's answer. Hobbes's counsel does not revive the classical practical wisdom whose dominant concern is the virtue of the polity's citizens. Rather, it teaches the practical need to support the life of peaceful accumulation. But this praise of peaceful accumulation rests on the deep psychological propositions that human beings have a natural right to do anything that is physically possible, that the only legitimate limitations on that right are those which are voluntarily imposed, and that the only plausible reason for voluntarily choosing such limitations is to secure the pursuit of as many of the objects of one's desires as possible. The consequences of Hobbes's endorsement of private economism are perhaps even more troubling. There are no values or purposes which can psychologically justify the risk of one's economic or physical existence. There are, naturally speaking, no limitations on what one may do to preserve that existence in whatever condition for however short a time. Liberalism thus avoids the embarrassment of denying that individual life plans can be rationally evaluated only to confront the serious problems attending its own glorification of the life of freedom.[4]

[3]The view that liberalism must be neutral regarding ways of life has been rejected as a caricature or a distortion by such thoughtful liberals as Barry (1973, p. 126) and Galston (1986, pp. 809–10). But the most powerful representatives of historical (Mill) and contemporary (Rawls 1985, p. 246; Dworkin 1986, p. 1) liberal theory contend that such a neutrality cannot be surrendered without overturning the very foundations of political liberalism. I am not at all convinced that they are incorrect.

[4]This assessment depends, of course, on the conclusion that the differences among various conceptions of liberal freedom are less important than their similarities or at least that more recent, non-mechanistic conceptions of liberal freedom share important core principles with Hobbesian liberty. Thus, Nozick's rejection of Hobbes's authoritarian politics may be less important than his tacit agreement with many of Hobbes's most important psychological propositions. The non-political behavior of the inhabitants of Nozick's minimal state would perhaps not differ very much from the common freedoms allowed by the prudent king of the proud. Even Mill, who sees Hobbesian politics as historically passe, apparently concurs with Hobbes's assessment of the integrity of individual desire. The only criterion for determining desirability is the empirical fact of desire (cf. Mill 1979, p. 34). For an impressive, though not entirely convincing claim that the differences among liberal conceptions of freedom are seminal see the argument of Charles Taylor (1985, pp. 211–29).

Taken together, the strengths and weaknesses of Hobbes's reliance on ereign counsel create an imposing reality both for those who are unres edly hostile to Hobbes's teachings and for those who reluctantly and q fiedly follow in his footsteps. Tersely stated, this reality is that all fru commentaries on Hobbes must seriously encounter the liberal substanc well as the absolute form of his position Once Hobbes's critics apprec the decisive role of counsel in his work, it becomes harder for them to miss his approach as simply an antiquated and naive effort to apply an jective" scientific method to the fluid course of human events Neither his psychology be condemned for tracing a laughably primitive outline complicated human reality Still less is Hobbes's politics simply the ideo cal apology for an archaic or repugnant absolutism Hobbes's counsel to ereigns enjoins a political wisdom which is practical rather than mechani an education which is formative rather than propagandistic or liberating, policies which are surprisingly respectful of what many contemporary li als would regard as the most basic of human rights Critics who fail to re nize these features of Hobbes's work potentially ignore both that whic most valuable therein and that which is most worthy and demandin powerful criticism At the same time, those who strive to develop the glish liberal tradition while distancing themselves from Hobbes's le must show that they are not simply departing from the most offensive, perhaps also the most superficial aspects of his teaching, while fully acc ing the most profound and unsettling discoveries of his deepest searchin hearts

References

Barry Brian 1973 *The Liberal Theory of Justice* Oxford Clarendon Press

Dworkin Ronald 1983 Neutrality Equality and Liberalism In D MacLean and C ' eds *Liberalism Reconsidered* Totowa NJ Rowman and Allanheld

Galston William 1986 Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State *PS* 19 807 2

Habermas Jurgen 1973 *Theory and Practice* John Viertel trans Boston Beacon Pres

Hobbes Thomas 1983 *De Cive* Howard Warrender, ed , New York Oxford University I

——— Trans 1975 *Hobbes's Thucydides* Richard Schlatter ed New Brunswick Ru University Press

——— 1971 *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws o gland* Joseph Cropsey ed Chicago University of Chicago Press

——— 1969 *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic* Ferdinand Tonnies ed 2d ed bridge Cambridge University Press

——— 1969a *Behemoth or The Long Parliament* Ferdinand Tonnies ed 2d ed New Barnes and Noble

——— 1955 *Leviathan* Michael Oakeshott ed Oxford Basil Blackwell

——— 1839 *English Works* Vol 1 William Molesworth ed London John Bohn

Johnston, David 1986 *The Rhetoric of Leviathan* Princeton Princeton University Pres

Kidder Joel 1983 Acknowledgement of Equals Hobbes Ninth Law of Nature *Philoso Quarterly* 33 133 46

Locke, John 1980 *Second Treatise of Government* C B Macpherson, ed , Indianapolis Hackett

Machiavelli, Niccolo 1950 *The Prince and the Discourses* Luigi Ricci and Christian E. Detmold, trans , New York The Modern Library

MacIntyre, Alasdair 1984 Is Patriotism a Virtue? The Lindley Lecture Lawrence KS University of Kansas

——— 1981 *After Virtue* Notre Dame Notre Dame University Press

Mill, J S 1979 *Utilitarianism* George Sher, ed , Indianapolis Hackett

Nozick, Robert 1974 *Anarchy, State and Utopia* New York Basic Books

Peters, Richard 1956 *Hobbes* Harmondsworth, Middlesex UK Penguin Books

Pangle, Thomas 1978 Review of *Just and Unjust Wars* *American Political Science Review* 72 1393–95

Plato 1968 *The Republic* Allan Bloom, trans , New York Basic Books

——— 1987 *Gorgias* Donald J Zeyl trans , Indianapolis Hackett

Rawls, John 1985 Justice as Fairness Political not Metaphysical *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 223–51

——— 1971 *A Theory of Justice* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Schwartz, Joel 1985 Hobbes and the Two Kingdoms of God *Polity* 18 7–24

Strauss Leo 1963 *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* Elsa M Sinclair trans Chicago University of Chicago Press

——— 1953 *Natural Right and History* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Taylor Charles 1985 *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Walzer Michael 1977 *Just and Unjust Wars* New York Basic Books

Warrender Howard 1950 *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* Oxford The Clarendon Press

Watkins, J W N 1965 *Hobbes's System of Ideas* London Hutchinson University Library

Congressmen, Perquisites, and Elections

John C. McAdams
John R. Johannes
Marquette University

This paper examines the so-called "perquisites/constituency service" hypothesis that purports to explain incumbents' electoral margins in congressional elections. First, it reviews the individual-level and aggregate-level studies, pointing out serious problems in measurements and methodology and concluding that existing literature does not and cannot support the thesis. Second, using 1984 CPS/NES data, the paper models the voting decisions in 1984, finding that respondents' decisions were affected by shared partisanship with the incumbent, ideological compatibility, challenger spending, assessments of President Reagan, and (a dubiously measured) recollection of the incumbent's having done something for the district. Individual casework experience did not affect the voting decision. Third, with data gathered from over 200 House offices, the percentage of the vote won by incumbents in the 1982 election is modeled as a function of 1982 casework loads, staff allocation, mailings, and several baseline variables. The findings are that casework loads, trips home, and mailings did not affect the vote, but that district partisanship and ideology, redistricting, national electoral tides, and occasionally district education levels did.

We conclude that, based on existing evidence, the perquisites and casework hypotheses have not been demonstrated and that to explore the theses further, panel data are needed.

Introduction

Ever since Erikson (1971) pointed to increased electoral margins for House incumbents, scholars have sought to document and explain the phenomenon. The bountiful literature reveals that House incumbents are rather widely recognized, they receive favorable coverage from the press during election campaigns, they are liked and favorably evaluated at election time, and their reelection campaigns are well funded. House (but not Senate) challengers, because they rarely enjoy such advantages, generally mount weak contests against entrenched incumbents (Abramowitz, 1980; Hinckley, 1980; more generally, see Hinckley, 1981; Jacobson, 1987b; and Beth, 1981–1982, 1984). The question, of course, is *Why* are incumbents recognized, liked, and supported? Given voters' supposed ignorance of their senators' and representatives' voting records, the search for an answer turned mainly to nonpolicy causes.

In a pioneering essay, Mayhew (1974) offered what has come to be the

*The authors are grateful to the Marquette University Committee on Research and to the Everett Dirksen Center for the funding that made this project possible. They also wish to thank their research assistants, especially Maribeth Kazmierczak, Kathy Schalow, and Xin Gong, for their help.

drock explanation Incumbents protect themselves by credit claiming, sition taking, and advertising Morris Fiorina (1977) elaborated on the ayhew thesis by arguing that constituency service (casework and pork rreling) was the key element of credit claiming, suggesting a conspiratorial ot between congressmen who create programs, bureaucracies that admin-er them with the usual amount of error, red tape, and sometimes ar-gance, and constituents who reward congressmen for their "bureaucratic sticking services"

Subsequent studies have failed to confirm the hypothesis that incumbents n generate larger vote totals by means of constituency attentiveness After inting out weaknesses in much of the "constituency service/perquisites of ice" literature, this article tests that hypothesis at both the individual and aggregate levels with new data

:VIDENCE CONCERNING THE PERQUISITES HYPOTHESIS SURVEY DATA

oblems with the Dependent Variable

Evidence from individual-level tests of the service/perquisites hypothesis pears to be evenly split For example, using NES/CPS data, Yiannakis 981), Fiorina (1981), Jacobson (1981), and Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 984) appear to have uncovered support for it On the other hand, Johannes l McAdams (1981, McAdams and Johannes 1983, 1984) found little if any kage between "perks" and votes, Mann and Wolfinger (1980) reported no dence that casework pulled 1978 voters from their partisan predilections, l Mann (1978, p 72) showed that voters in one district who had received lp from their representative seemed no more likely to support him than ose who did not

A major reason for the mixed results in these and other studies cited below ay be the use of different dependent variables to measure the "electoral pact" of perquisites use One is the individual voter's decision to vote for : incumbent, a second is defection of challenger partisans from expected rty-line voting—an apparently exaggerated phenomenon (Eubank, 1985) umbent popularity or evaluations, usually measured by the feeling ther-mometer in the CPS/NES surveys, constitute a third measure The explicit implicit assumption is that "warmth" translates into votes This is hardly reasonable, but if modeling votes produces results that differ from model-, "approval" or "warmth," it is votes that have by far the highest face valid- (Alford and Hibbing, 1983)

asurement and Model Problems Independent Variables

In addition to the usual errors-in-the-variables problems of recall survey a and the pro-incumbent bias of the NES/CPS surveys (Eubank and Gow, 33, Gow and Eubank, 1984), many individual-level models of the effect of

constituency service are suspect because they rely on inappropriate independent variables. For example, models using the feeling thermometer as an independent variable produce high r-squares, but they are theoretically trivial—much like predicting birth rates from pregnancy statistics One needs to back up and ask what caused the warm feelings

Other models include intercorrelated endogenous independent variables that merely proxy, or are determined by, generalized affect toward the incumbent Votes, for example, sometimes are modeled as a function of the expectation of helpfulness (the congressman's reputation for service), and indeed this expectation does correlate with the voting decision Then the expectation of helpfulness is modeled (recursively) as a function of casework experience (Fiorina, 1981, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1984) Unfortunately, such a model *assumes* that casework precedes and produces the expectation of helpfulness but that the expectation of helpfulness has no effect on the probability of a casework request Using satisfaction with casework (or a friend's satisfaction) brings the same trouble as analyzing the expectation of helpfulness *A priori*, all these attitudes seem very likely to be mere rationalizations of preexisting sentiments—proxies for a feeling thermometer

This can be demonstrated In the first three rows of table 1 we use two-stage probit (Nelson and Olson, 1978, Heckman, 1978) to model these suspect variables The key independent variable is the CPS feeling thermometer for the incumbent representative Our expectation is that respondents who feel "warmer" toward the incumbent will rate casework as being more satisfactory, will perceive that a friend's casework experience has been satisfactory and will view the incumbent as more helpful

Since it is quite possible that favorable casework experiences or other contacts could lead to warmer feelings toward incumbents, it is necessary to use a nonrecursive technique, employing several exogenous variables (the respondent's party identification, an issues scale and an ideological discrepancy scale) to produce *FT an instrumental feeling thermometer All of these variables (which like all others used herein are described in the Appendix) have been found to affect voting Here we assume that they affect attitudes toward the incumbent but do not affect casework-related assessments *except* as such an effect is mediated through the feeling thermometer That is, they are excluded exogenous variables' within the two-stage frame

'Regressing the incumbent feeling thermometer on the exogenous variables (standard errors in parentheses)

FT = 60 57 + 10 83 Party ID + 340 Seniority 3 28 Education
(1 46) (657) (1 56)
4 18 Issues − 10 19 Ideology 4 94 No Ideology + 370 Media
(3 22) (2 24 (1 66) (111)
+ 417 Participation
(587)
R^2 = 096

work. We are thus estimating the effect of the feeling thermometer on our casework variables *independent* of any affect the latter might have on the feeling thermometer.

In addition to *FT we have included respondents' education and incumbent seniority in the equations. We expect that more senior incumbents will be more favorably perceived, and that respondents with more education will be *less* favorable toward incumbents due to their increased sophistication and higher expectations. Where appropriate, we have included two additional exogenous variables: an index of newspaper, magazine, and TV exposure ("media"), and the standard CPS participation index (see the Appendix). We expect that people generally high in participation and media exposure will judge incumbents to be more helpful, since incumbents generally *are* helpful and the politically experienced and informed are more likely to know it.

As expected, increased feeling thermometer scores strongly produce more favorable casework-related evaluations. (Note that the casework assessments are coded as supplied by the ICPSR: higher numbers imply *unfavorable* assessments.) Estimated standard errors in two-stage probit are probably biased, but there are no close calls in regard to statistical significance here. Thus, studies showing casework-related assessments to be significant predictors of the vote are essentially useless. Such assessments may or may not be caused by actual casework experiences, but they are most certainly a product of preexisting attitudes toward the congressman. The well known process of selective perception (bolstered, perhaps, by selective exposure and selective retention) is at work. The fourth row in table 1 shows that recollection of a congressman's pork barrel service to the district is suspect on similar grounds.

Faced with the problem of affectively loaded endogenous variables, and with the possibility of simultaneous causal relations among these variables, we have advocated the "reduced form" approach (McAdams and Johannes 1981; see Hanushek and Jackson 1977, pp. 224–27). *If* expecting help (or, for that matter, if a high feeling thermometer score) results from previous service, recall, recognition, various forms of contact, assistance, and so on, and *if* expecting help leads to votes from constituents, then regressing the vote on contact or service must show significant effects.

Unfortunately, even CPS contact items are suspect. They appear to be asking about a "hard" factual reality. However, survey questions often produce artifactual responses (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986). Indeed, a growing literature on "quasi facts" suggests that even straightforward matters such as a respondent's employment status (Bailar and Rothwell

The CPS/NES item asking respondents about what their incumbents have done for their districts is terribly imprecise because (except for 1978 and 1980) it includes all sorts of vague and general answers. One really ought to cull through the detailed responses; unfortunately, the 1982 and 1984 CPS/NES surveys did not provide them, so one has to use the variable as it stands.

TABLE 1

MODELS OF CONTACTS AND SERVICE
DATA 1984 NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
TWO-STAGE PROBIT ESTIMATES

Dependent Variable	Instrumental Feeling Therm	Seniority	Educ	Media	Party
Casework	−044**	120	145		
Satisfaction	(012)	(112)	(254)		
Secondhand	−041**	165	129		
Satisfaction	(013)	(116)	286		
Helpfulness	−031**	064	131	019**	0
Expectation	(005)	(035)	(062)	(006)	(0
Pork Recall	017**	073*	219*	036**	1
	(005)	041	(066)	007	(0
Met	027**	031	417**		2
Incumbent	(006)	045	(104		0
Attended	021**	122**	440**		3
Meeting	006	045	(111)		(0
Talked With	026**	098	548**		1
Staff	(006)	(062)	(154)		(0
Read About	001	009	525**	070**	
Newspaper	005	037	063	006	
Received	018**	098**	611**		
Mail	004	036	090		
Heard on	007	046	055	017**	
Radio	005	(039	087	006	
Saw on TV	009*	006	076	030**	
	(005	(036	090	006	
Service	011*	156**	491**		
	006	(051	118		(
Secondhand	020**	109**	837**		
Service	005	(044	(104)		
Open-Ended	022**	160**	099		
Service	005	043	092		
Mentions					

Note Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 05 **p < 01

1984), ethnicity (Smith, 1984), and quality of housing (Newman, 1984 problematic in survey research In the present case the process of s exposure (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947, Conover, 1980, pp 102–104, Oskamp, 1977, pp 157–59) may lead voters to seek contact with or h tive to the media appearances of incumbents thought to be "willing t or to "have something to say " A newsletter from a disliked member trast, might be tossed out as "junk mail " The process of *selective* r

[Lan]e and Murphy, 1943) may cause individuals to retain memories of con[tact] with incumbents whom (for reasons partisan, ideological, or merely [idio]syncratic) they favor

[T]he remaining equations in table 1 present evidence on these points. [He]re the CPS contact items, as well as dummy variables for constituency [ser]vice and second-hand constituency service, are the dependent variables [Th]e key independent variable is the CPS feeling thermometer, treated as an [en]dogenous instrumental variable Where appropriate, we again include the [m]edia and participation variables, expecting that people generally high in [p]articipation will be more likely to have met the incumbent and that those [h]igh in *general* media exposure are more likely to have been exposed to the [in]cumbent The results show a very strong tendency for respondents to re[p]ort contacts and service from those incumbents toward whom they feel [w]armest, although we don't know whether these effects represent selective [e]xposure or selective retention or both The estimates vary from one type of [c]ontacting to another, and it is unclear whether this is the result of sampling [e]rror, or whether these selection processes operate differently in different [c]ontexts What is clear is that CPS respondents are not passive recipients of [a]nd unbiased rememberers of House members' attentions Recall of such at[te]ntions is substantially the result of preexisting favorable attitudes Thus, [C]PS contact items are to a degree, proxies for a feeling thermometer and [sh]ow inflated estimates of the effects of contacting, pork, and service

[O]ther Individual-Level Approaches

Another approach is to model the incumbent's vote (or popularity) as a [fun]ction of references to district service mentioned by respondents in the [op]en-ended questions asking what they like or don't like about the candi[da]tes (Parker, 1981, Arsenau, 1984, Jacobson, 1987b, p 126)—or simply to [infe]r that because constituents say that district service is more important [tha]n how their congressmen vote such service is the key to elections (Parker [and] Davidson, 1979, *Public Opinion* 1978) Unfortunately, as the last entry [in t]able 1 shows, open-ended references to service are also substantially the [res]ult of preexisting affect People who like the incumbent make favorable [ref]erences to service while dislike produces unfavorable comments In an [int]erview situation, faced with pressure to demonstrate they are not igno[ran]t, respondents may find references to service a safe, "nonpartisan" way to [ex]plain their favorable attitudes This, in other words may be another ex[am]ple of "doorstep opinion" (Erikson, Luttbeg and Tedin, 1980, ch 2)

[Th]e doorstep opinion problem can explain why particular kinds of socially acceptable re[spon]ses are given at a particular point in time, but it should not produce *changes* between one [electio]n and the next Thus it is important to note that Campbell (1983) found that incumbents [runnin]g for their first reelection in 1980 received more favorable comments concerning their [experie]nce and ability than their district service Indeed, comments about their personal quali-

One solution to all these problems is to use an experimental design wherein respondents are randomly assigned to either an experimental group (which is exposed to some form of contacting) or control group (which is not). Using such a strategy, Cover and Brumberg (1982) showed that mailing copies of *Infant Care* to new parents by an incumbent produced substantially increased feeling thermometer ratings. Although their methodology was sound, there is a question as to whether the findings (which also showed that the uptick in popularity was short-lived) generalize to more typical kinds of congressional mail.

EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PERQUISITES HYPOTHESIS AGGREGATE DATA

Direct Evidence and Measurement Problems

At the aggregate level of analysis, where the distorting individual-level psychological processes and the inherent weaknesses of survey questions are avoided, scholars have agreed that the appropriate dependent variable is the percentage of votes won by incumbents.[4] The *independent* variables, however, are more problematic. Either because measures of service actually rendered to constituents are unavailable to most scholars, or because they seek to test broader concepts of incumbent "presence," "home style," or "perquisite use," attempts to study the Mayhew-Fiorina hypothesis have employed a variety of independent variables: trips home and time in the district, mailings, staff allocations and/or salaries, staff activities, bills introduced, and newspaper columns and radio or television shows. At least one has employed federal spending activity to measure the pork barrel thesis. Unfortunately, there are serious problems with using some of these measures, especially when reliance must be placed on staff titles in the *Congressional Staff Directory*. Many congressional offices, in assigning the titles which appear in the *Directory*, do not make such clean-cut distinctions between casework and other functions; in many offices aides bearing a variety of titles do both constituency and other work (Johannes, 1984, ch. 4).[5]

---

ties declined between 1978 and 1980. If constituency service—or at least voters' awareness of it—were as important as alleged, one would expect that incumbents increasing their electoral margins would be increasingly praised for their personal, especially service, qualities. Such apparently was not the case.

[4]Recently, Bond (1985) also examined the reelection rates of freshmen congressmen from marginal districts, concluding that district attentiveness had no effect.

[5]Indeed, the correlations between the volume of individual cases and federal projects in congressional offices during the first six months of 1982 and the number of staffers in the district were −.04 and .05, respectively. The correlations between cases, on the one hand, and the number of aides who, according to interviews, (1) regularly do casework and those who (2) specialize in casework, on the other hand, were only .31 and .33.

Nonetheless, such measures frequently are all that is available. Three studies that used them provide some more or less direct support for the constituency service thesis. Cranor and Westphal (1979) found a modest correlation between district "office capabilities" in 1975–1976, and improvement in election results in 1976 over 1974 for a limited sample of nonurban incumbents who were marginal in 1974. Powell (1982) established a relationship between district staff salaries and the time members spent in their districts, and the changes in electoral margins between their first election and that of 1978. (Using this measure of increased electoral support is suspect, given the widely varying circumstances under which freshmen enter the House.) Parker (1986, Parker and Parker, 1985) also found that, for marginal incumbents who were atypical of their districts, increased time at home improved vote margins between 1964 and 1980.

A recent study of the effect of the "personal vote" on the electoral swing in the 1979 British general election (Cain, 1983, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1984) found that MPs who were very active in constituency service activities tended to gain more (or lose fewer) votes than those who were less active.[b] Surprisingly, Cain *et al.* do not present any model of vote swing in U.S. House elections, even though they have the data to produce such a model and even though their analysis shows a larger "personal advantage" in the United States than in Britain. And although these scholars have estimates of caseloads in both the United States and United Kingdom (1984, p. 115, table 4), they do not use them to model votes. In fact, their study tested not a hypothesis concerning actual constituency service (amount of casework), but rather one concerning potential for it (legislators' techniques and activity levels).

The majority of aggregate studies, however, have found little payoff from the use of the perquisites of office. Cranor and Westphal (1978) found no correlation between *actual* district office credit-claiming activities—as opposed to capabilities—and improvement in incumbents' election margins. Bond (1981, 1985), who has studied the problem over three Congresses, found little evidence of the impact of various "advertising" schemes, district attention, and perquisite use on electoral margins and district competition, and Born (1982) could not find any relationship between a variety of staff allocation indicators, on the one hand, and electoral margins, on the other. Using member and staff estimates of actual casework volume (Johannes and McAdams, 1981), we found no impact of service on votes, and Feldman and

[b]Their use of change scores as the dependent variable is problematic. The more orthodox procedure would be to model votes in the 1979 general election as a function of votes in the previous election and other variables of interest. Putting a change score on the left-hand side of a regression equation implicitly constrains the stability of the variable to equal 1 (Markus, 1979, pp. 47–48). If the actual stability of the variable differs substantially from 1, other estimates may be biased (McAdams, 1986).

Jondrow (1984) turned up no evidence that federal employment or cons tion spending in districts affected the vote Parker (1986, p 191, n. 5), n over, found no payoff from increases in members' time spent in their dis for most members.[7] Neither did Ragsdale and Cook (1987), who also di ered no electoral impact for district staff, national media attention, an number of bills sponsored

Indirect Evidence from Aggregate Data

In support of the Mayhew-Fiorina hypothesis are studies showing th replacement of "old-time" congressmen by a "new breed" during the l led to increased electoral safety (Born, 1979, Parker, 1986, Payne, 1980) This new type of congressman, of course, relied heavily on self measures to court constituents On the other hand, Garand and Gross (Gross and Garand, 1984), employing a longitudinal approach to electio sults for winning incumbents, noted that the increase in victory margins preceded the expansion of the welfare state (which is the ostensible ca enlarged casework and pork barrel activities) A roughly comparable ment concerning pork barreling was made by Douglas Arnold (1981), showed that the sort of federal project money that members can most steer to their constituencies (and take credit for) was declining when th cumbency effect was becoming so noticeable

Although part and parcel of the constituency service argument is th cumbents can ward off strong electoral threats by assiduous courting of stituents (Fiorina, 1981, Jacobson, 1983, p 37), several recent analys the emergence of strong and well-financed challengers have not been al link incumbents' use of casework, pork barreling or perquisites of office any deterrent effect (Bond, Covington, Fleisher, 1985, Ragsdale and C 1987, Feldman and Jondrow, 1984, McAdams and Johannes 1987, Sch 1984) Finally, if holding seats on the "right" sorts of committees (those offer members opportunities for credit claiming advertising, and po taking) pays off at the polls, studies by Fowler, Douglas, and Clark (1980 Ragsdale and Cook (1987) must prove disappointing Few committee are electorally rewarding, and failure to obtain key committee assignn apparently does little damage

The mystery of the vanishing marginals has not yet been solved by victing perquisites use, constituency service generally, or casework in ticular If anything, the available evidence would call for an acquittal, least a mistrial Clearly, further research is needed In the remainder paper, we return to the courtroom with new evidence, using the CPS/ survey data from the 1984 election to replicate the models used previ

[7] Parker and Parker's (1985) estimates actually show negative effects for Republicans 1966–1970 cohort and essentially zero effects for Democrats

for 1978, 1980, and 1982 (Johannes and McAdams, 1981, McAdams and Johannes, 1983, 1984), and then new aggregate data to model the 1982 election as a function of casework volume in the first six months of that year.

Individual-Level Analysis 1984

Table 2 contains three models of incumbent voting in the 1984 House general elections Having already shown that the CPS contact items, the pork variable, and the service measures are contaminated by endogenous affect, we might well be questioned about using them in an analysis However, the estimates one gets, in spite of the problems, are not completely useless Although they are clearly biased, the direction of the bias is known it tends to inflate estimates of the effect of contact and service Substantial *positive* estimates are useless in such circumstances It cannot be determined to what

Table 2

Voting for Incumbents in the 1984 House Elections
Data. 1984 National Election Study
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ideology	−719 (217)**	−727 (215)**	720 (213)**
No Ideology	−351 (164)*	−366 (163)**	−377 (161)**
Issues	−1 167 (322)**	−1 146 (321)**	−1 131 (319)**
Party ID	782 (143)**	800 (143)**	786 (142)**
Inc Dem[a]			
Challenger	−157 (025)**	−161 (025)**	−160 (025)**
Seniority[a]			
Pork	463 (136)**	501 (135)**	512 (126)**
Met	162 (175)		
Meeting	286 (181)		
Staff	−142 (225)	−014 (215)	
Mail	077 (119)	070 (118)	
News	098 (119)	126 (114)	
Radio	096 (124)		
TV	−063 (110)		
Service	−071 (179)	052 (171)	064 (164)
2nd Hand Service	−140 (145)	061 (140)	
Finances	031 (034)	030 (033)	030 (033)
Economy	030 (037)	026 (037)	026 (037)
Reagan	−258 (051)**	−257 (051)**	−262 (051)**
Intercept	2 17	2 18	2 31

[a]Probit failed to converge with all listed variables in the equation In order to get it to converge, we omitted these two variables which had produced trivially small coefficients (not approaching significance) both in preliminary probit runs (which nearly converged) and in OLS runs.

degree they reflect real effects and to what degree methodological artifacts. However, small positive estimates (or zero or negative estimates) are quite useful they essentially rule out any significant payoff from perquisite use.

Two variables test for two logically distinct types of policy voting. One ("Ideology") is a measure of the respondent's ideological discrepancy from the incumbent's voting record (as summarized by ADA scores). It is included on the theory that voters have some general information about the ideology of the incumbent and use this information as a voting cue (Wright, 1978, Sanger, 1981, Johannes and McAdams, 1981, Erikson and Wright, 1980, 1985, Wright and Berkman, 1986, Whitby and Bledsoe, 1986) The other ("Issues") tests the proposition that voters generally understand that Democrats are likely to favor liberal policies, and Republicans conservative ones, and that they vote on the basis of the incumbent's party and their own issue positions These variables (and another "No Ideology," a dummy used to include respondents who cannot identify themselves ideologically) are described in the Appendix

Testing for retrospective voting are (1) the CPS item asking about respondents' family finances, (2) their judgments about the nation's economy, and (3) a scale based on respondents' approval or disapproval of President Reagan's performance in three areas We expect respondents whose finances have improved, who perceive the economy as improving, and who approve of Reagan's performance to be more likely to vote for Republican incumbents and against Democratic ones

Party identification is included, as is the log of challenger spending the log of the number of years the incumbent had served in the House, and a dummy variable ("Pork") for respondents who could cite something that the incumbent had "done for the district " The perquisites theory is tested by the inclusion of the CPS "contact" items as well as a dummy variable ("Service") for respondents who reported that someone in their household had gotten help or information from the incumbent's office, and another dummy for persons who reported knowing anyone else who had

Model 1 rather promiscuously puts all these variables into the equation giving all the contact variables "a shot" at showing a significant effect None does Model 2, omitting six variables that have not produced a significant coefficient in our analyses of the 1978, 1980, and 1982 elections, decreases the standard errors ever so slightly but fails to change any of the coefficients substantially Model 3 omits all the contact items in an effort to give "Service" every possible chance to show a significant effect It does not

Comparing these estimates with those we obtained from earlier National Election Studies (Johannes and McAdams, 1981, McAdams and Johannes 1983, 1984), one is impressed with the volatility of the effects of key variables The influence of party identification in 1984, for example, is roughly halved compared to 1982 Respondents' ideological congruity with their congressmen, which showed substantial effects in 1978 and 1980 but none

1982, now yields an effect about double that of 1978 or 1980 Presidential performance evaluations, which had a very large effect in 1982 and a small (but significant) effect in 1980, now show estimates midway between those of 1980 and those of 1982

Where the "perquisites" variables are concerned, the overall pattern is one of general insignificance tempered by occasional "significant" coefficients which show no consistency Since, when estimating a large number of coefficients, one expects a few to be "significant" merely by chance, one probably should not draw positive conclusions about the influence of a variable unless it shows a "significant" coefficient with some regularity Positive results for the "pork barrel" variable may occur due to our inability to cull out the meaningless general replies often given to that question, or to the fact that it picks up generalized affect as we have already discussed The single contact item meeting the consistency test is the one for newspaper or magazine coverage It produced significant coefficients in 1978 and 1980 and two more which have the right sign and are larger than their standard errors in 1982 and 1984 This form of contact also may be independent of affect toward the incumbent (see table 1 above) At issue, of course, is whether the print media focus on representatives' policy activities or their constituency service and the degree to which incumbents control that press coverage

Aggregate Analysis 1982

Table 3 presents ordinary least squares estimates of ten models of incumbents' vote percentages in the 1982 House general election Models 1 through 3 replicate an earlier analysis of the 1978 election (Johannes and McAdams, 1981), with the addition of an index of "redistricting threat," constructed by comparing the 1976 Ford and 1980 Reagan vote percentages in the district as constituted *before* redistricting with the vote percentages of the newly constituted district Democrats who increased their number of Ford and Reagan voters have a positive score on this threat index, and those who faced fewer such voters have a negative score

Each model uses a different "baseline" against which to assess incumbent support Model 1 uses the incumbent's percentage in the previous (1980) election and thus examines the effect of casework (the actual weekly number of cases received in congressional offices in the first half of 1982)[6] over a two-year span Model 2 averages the percentage House vote won by the incumbent's party in the elections of 1974 1976, and 1978 Model 3 uses the newly constituted district's 1976 Ford and 1980 Reagan percentages as an index of the exogenous partisanship and ideology of the district

In 1982, aggregate casework loads again seemed to have no effect on ag-

[6]Members of the House in 1982 got a mean of ninety-one individual constituent cases (and federal projects) per week The median figures were sixty-one cases and five for projects

TABLE 3

AGGREGATE MODELS OF THE EFFECTS OF PERQUISITE USE DEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN 1982

Model	1980 Elec	74–78 Elec	Pres Elec	Cases	Redist	Discrep	Dem	Educ	Sen	Staff	Trips	Mail	R^2	N
1	− 564**			015	− 716*	139**	8 29**	−1 51	−1 02				461	215
	(064)			(009)	(258)	(052)	(1 61)	(1 19)	(968)					
2		450**		− 004	− 725**	− 190**	4 15*	−2 02	−2 26*				403	215
		(064)		(009)	(273)	(054)	(1 87)	(1 25)	(1 07)					
3			539**	− 002		− 208**	10 4**	− 2 72*	751				355	215
			(095)	(010)		(056)	(1 75)	(1 23)	(1 03)					
4	565**			− 017	− 747*	− 144**	5 69**	−1 31	− 864	− 256	070	231	465	215
	(067)			(009)	(269)	(055)	(1 74)	(1 25)	(1 05)	(354)	(075)	(500)		
5		448**		− 006	− 734**	− 190**	4 54*	− 1 81	−2 24	− 305	081	− 106	408	215
		(066)		(010)	(285)	(056)	(2 01)	(1 31)	(1 16)	(372)	(079)	(523)		
6			535**	− 002		202**	10 6**	−2 74*	448	− 243	003	− 338	358	215
			(099)	(010)		(059)	(1 89)	(1 30)	(1 14)	(387)	(083)	(539)		
7	607**				− 706**	− 094**	9 84**	− 435	−1 80*	− 122	008		477	374
	(047)				(199)	(041)	(1 22)	(864)	(779)	(257)	(054)			
8		448**			− 661**	− 135**	4 67**	−1 46	−2 46**	− 188	001		381	374
		(049)			(218)	(045)	(1 50)	(931)	(894)	(280)	(059)			
9			585**			− 152**	11 6**	−2 53**	357	− 164	− 029		342	374
			(077)			(045)	(1 37)	(933)	(845)	(287)	(061)			
10			539**	− 932		− 203**	−10 7**	−2 53*	575	− 218	− 092	− 701	359	215[a]
			(099)	(1 61)		(058)	(1 88)	(1 28)	(1 12)	(385)	(1 47)	(1 55)		

[a]Casework Trips and Mass Mailings trichotomized in model 10

Note Standard Errors in parentheses *$p <$ 05 **$p <$ 01

gregate vote margins. All of the estimates have the wrong sign, and all are trivially small. Further, the standard errors are quite small, indicating that a *substantively* significant effect of casework on votes would also be statistically significant. Incumbents' ideological discrepancies from their districts did affect vote margins. The estimate in model 2 implies that an incumbent who was "too liberal" or "too conservative" for a district could moderate his or her voting behavior by a mere ten points on the ADA scale and pick up an extra 1.9 percent of the vote. The "DEM" variable picks up the national electoral trend that favored Democrats that year.

Models 4 through 6 add perquisite variables of considerable interest: the number of staffers in district offices in 1981, the number of trips taken to the district by the incumbent in 1981, and the number of mass or "postal patron" mailings to the district in the last six months of 1981 and the first six months of 1982. The findings for staff and mass mailings are decisively negative. The coefficients for the trips variable, while not significant, are correctly signed, and the one in model 5 is larger than its standard error. The coefficients for the education variable suggest that incumbents fare less well in well-educated districts. Seniority, however, seems not to matter, but being the victim of redistricting does.

Will a larger sample reduce the standard errors sufficiently to produce positive findings for trips? Models 7 through 9 drop from the analysis variables obtained from staff interviews, generating a model of the vote margins of virtually all incumbents running for reelection. The larger sample does yield smaller standard errors, but the point estimates of the effect of trips also decrease, and none now approach statistical significance.

It has been frequently suggested that perquisite use matters only in extreme cases. The psychological literature on assimilation and contrast effects provides a theoretical basis for this hypothesis, with members who are near the mean being "assimilated" and perceived as being "average," while those further from the mean are "contrasted" and seen as exceptionally conscientious in attending to the district or as notoriously "out of touch" (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Thus, in model 10, we have trichotomized casework volume, trips home, and mass mailings so that cases in roughly the bottom 15 percent of the distribution have a value of −1, those in the middle of the distribution a value of 0, and those in the top 15 percent a value of +1. Doing this yields no stronger evidence at all of an electoral effect.

The Simultaneity Critique

One objection to the sorts of models presented in table 3 is that the estimates of the effect of casework (or any other perquisites variable) may be negatively biased because of a simultaneous causal relationship between perquisite use and electoral margins. Suppose that perquisite use pays off at the polls. There would thus be a positive relationship between "perks" and

votes Suppose further that comfortable electoral margins lead incumbents to be less attentive to the constituency, while electoral difficulties lead to stepped up perquisite use Then a positive effect of perquisites on votes will be counterbalanced by a negative effect of votes on perquisites, leaving little zero-order association between perquisites and votes even if there are strong causal relationships (Fiorina, 1981)

This simultaneity thesis must be based on four behavioral assumptions (1) that congressmen allocate resources in accordance with their perceptions of the electoral threat facing them, (2) that such perceptions are substantially accurate, (3) that short-term, rather than intermediate- or long-term electoral expectations govern resource allocation, and (where casework is the form of attentiveness being analyzed), (4) that allocation decisions can substantially affect actual casework loads (McAdams and Johannes, 1981)

Propositions (1), (2), and (4) are substantially correct (McAdams and Johannes, 1985, Johannes and McAdams, 1987), but none of the relationships is terribly powerful in its ability to explain variance If objective electoral threat explains 20 percent of the variance in perceived threat, and perceived threat explains 20 percent of the variance in resource allocation, and resource allocation explains 20 percent of the variance in casework loads then objective electoral threat is an extremely weak determinant of casework loads Thus, a model specification which assumes that it is *not* a determinant of casework loads is likely to be very close to the truth

The weakest assumption, however, is clearly the third Our models in table 3 are misspecified due to simultaneity only *if electoral expections which are effectively proxied by the 1982 vote margin are a substantial determinant of resource allocation* All incumbents have *general expectations* based on their own previous vote margins, district voting in other elections the presence or absence of certain interest groups or ideological constituencies, and so on These expectations doubtless do influence perquisite use However, our "baseline" measures should capture these expectations very well Further, the perquisites variables in table 3 already reflect such influence The incumbent has had ample time to adjust his or her "home style" to accommodate longer-term expectations The question is whether expectations *specific to an individual campaign* (1982 in this example) determine perquisite use If they do, our perquisites measures are "contaminated" by such expectations and cannot be treated as exogenous

Where some incumbent behaviors are concerned, the 1982 vote margin is clearly an appropriate proxy for expectations If we were modeling fund raising or position taking in (say) August of 1982, it would be reasonable to believe that the incumbent knew the identity of the likely challenger, knew approximately how much money had been raised by the challenger, and even knew approximately what the vote margin would be Our models, however, contain trips to the district in 1981, district staff in 1981, mass mailing in the last half of 1981 and the first half of 1982, and casework for the first ha

2. Might the 1982 election result be a plausible proxy for the expecta- 'hat govern these allocations?

iough there surely were isolated cases of a member's knowing well in ce, in early 1981, that a particular individual was going to run in 1982, xtremely unlikely that most incumbents could form any *campaign-ic* expectations until at least early or mid-1982 In that year, only y-three of the fifty states had held their primaries before July, and nine · June, in 1984, comparable figures were twenty-three and eleven e campaign finance is concerned, the vast majority of challenger money nt after June or July (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984, p 96), but some eed money" is raised earlier

e that *after* strategic elites have decided to mount a serious challenge t an incumbent, some time must elapse before the incumbent per- the full extent of the challenge Further, *after* the full extent of the nge is perceived, further time must pass before a home style can be ed to the approaching threat Home styles are rather rigid (Fenno, Parker, Larson, and Parker, 1984, McAdams and Johannes, 1985, ale and Cook, 1987) Congressmen's calendars are usually set several in advance, likewise, producing a newsletter usually involves several lead time Further, in the face of a strong short-term threat, campaign-ic activities may rival more general forms of constituency attentive- an incumbent with a choice between increasing the number of office held in the district or raising campaign funds probably would choose tter

is, on the face of it, it seems quite unlikely that incumbent resource tion in the spring of 1982 should be modeled as a function of votes in ll election However, data do exist to allow testing the "simultaneity" Equations 1 through 4 present the results of two simultaneous equa- iodels which allow resource allocation in early 1982 to be determined 32 votes The resource allocation variables are trips to the district dur- ie first six months of 1982 (we have doubled the count of trips to ce an annualized variable), and the number of staffers in district offices in the 1982 *Congressional Staff Directory* (which provides data for the 'arly months of the year)

se two resource allocation variables (used in turn) and the 1982 incum- 'ote percentage are our endogenous variables We want to estimate the of 1982 vote margins (assumed to proxy campaign-specific expecta- on perquisite use independent of any effect perquisite use may have e margins Likewise, we want to estimate the effect of perquisite use te margins independent of any effect campaign-specific expectations ave on perquisite use

rder to identify the model, we use two exogenous variables The first quisite use (trips and home staff) in 1979–1980, which is assumed not uence the 1982 vote, except for any effect mediated through 1982 per-

quisite use. Second, our index of district partisanship and ideology (based on 1976 and 1980 presidential votes) identifies the equations for "perks." It is assumed not to influence perquisite use *directly* in 1982. Although it is quite likely that exogenous partisanship and ideology do affect levels of perquisite use, the model allows such influence to be mediated through the lagged staff and trips variables. Only if exogenous partisanship and ideology produce *changes* in perquisite use is there a model specification problem. And even then, any misspecification will bias the results in the direction of supporting the simultaneity argument.[9]

Our sample consists of incumbents who entered Congress in 1979 or earlier, and who were running for reelection in 1982. We used two stage least squares and did not estimate intercepts.[10]

$$\text{(1)}\quad \text{Votes82} = \underset{(.075)}{.026}\ \text{Trips82} + \underset{(.092)}{.227}\ \text{Pres. Vote} + \underset{(.057)}{.547}\ \text{Votes80} \qquad R^2 = .330$$

$$\text{(2)}\quad \text{Trips82} = \underset{(.407)}{.579}\ \text{Votes82} - \underset{(.251)}{.438}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.055)}{.703}\ \text{Trips79} \qquad R^2 = .222$$

$$\text{(3)}\quad \text{Votes82} = \underset{(.356)}{.256}\ \text{Staff82} + \underset{(.089)}{.236}\ \text{Pres. Vote} + \underset{(.056)}{.541}\ \text{Votes80} \qquad R^2 = .330$$

$$\text{(4)}\quad \text{Staff82} = \underset{(.041)}{.046}\ \text{Votes82} - \underset{(.025)}{.036}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.032)}{.813}\ \text{Staff80} \qquad R^2 = .690$$

[9]The exogenous presidential vote variable is positively correlated with the other electoral variables, and if it has an effect on perquisite use, that effect is expected to be negative: a favorable partisan and ideological balance in the district produces complacency in the use of perquisites. Therefore, the omission of the presidential vote variable will (*if* it produces any bias at all) bias the coefficients on the electoral variables in a *negative* direction. See Hanushek & Jackson (1977, pp. 79–86). But a negative effect of electoral success on perquisite use is what the Fiorina simultaneity hypothesis predicts.

[10]The intercepts are *not* constrained to be zero. The reader may be interested in the reduced form equations that result from regressing each endogenous variable on all the exogenous variables:

$$\text{Votes82} = \underset{(4.09)}{29.71} + \underset{(.056)}{.543}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.053)}{.018}\ \text{Trips79} + \underset{(.091)}{.230}\ \text{Pres. Vote}$$

$$\text{Trips82} = \underset{(3.49)}{16.20} - \underset{(.048)}{.123}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.045)}{.713}\ \text{Trips79} + \underset{(.078)}{.133}\ \text{Pres. Vote}$$

$$\text{Votes82} = \underset{(4.40)}{29.34} + \underset{(.055)}{.538}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.293)}{.210}\ \text{Staff80} + \underset{(.089)}{.238}\ \text{Pres. Vote}$$

$$\text{Staff82} = \underset{(.448)}{2.03} - \underset{(.005)}{.011}\ \text{Votes80} + \underset{(.029)}{.822}\ \text{Staff80} + \underset{(.009)}{.010}\ \text{Pres. Vote}$$

Instrumental variables produced by these equations were not used in the estimation. Rather both simultaneous equation systems were directly estimated using LISREL.

These estimates show incumbents allocating time and staff resources in response to electoral pressures, but it is the 1980 election which they seem to key on. Both the estimates for the effect of that election on perquisites have the expected negative sign, and the one for trips is statistically significant (The coefficient for staff narrowly misses at t = 1 44) They imply that for each 10 percent drop in 1980 vote margin, an incumbent would increase the number of trips to the district by over four per year, and the number of staffers in the district by about .36 The estimates for the effect of 1982 election margins, in contrast, have the wrong sign in both cases There is, in other words, no evidence that incumbents' campaign-specific expectations influenced constituency attentiveness as early as the spring of 1982, and thus no reason to believe that a model that allows for simultaneity is necessary The soundness of the recursive models in table 3 is attested to by equations 1 and 3, which show essentially no effect of perquisite use on votes

Conclusion

Like most others we find no support for the perquisites thesis By now such findings should not be surprising The fact is that solid evidence simply has not been produced on its behalf What has emerged consistently—and what ought to be stressed more—is that national electoral tides, district partisan strength, challenger quality and incumbents ideological and partisan compatibility are the keys to reelection Yet textbooks continue to point to incumbents' perquisite use especially casework as the key to electoral security The ability of incumbents to use the media to promote themselves, often seen as a key to electoral safety is belied by the null individual-level findings for media content

Perhaps scholars have failed to find evidence that incumbents can buy or even rent voters' loyalties by means of shrewd constituency service because their research efforts have been faulty It is tempting to argue that while "crude" versions of the perquisites thesis have been tested and found wanting, a more "sophisticated treatment of the subject would lead to positive results This may be true But as scientists we must remember that the more one has to elaborate a theory to avoid having it falsified by observations, the more skeptical one ought to become about it Versions of the theory that imply a payoff only among some voters or only for certain groups of incumbents not only lack parsimony but quickly reach the point where they are unable to explain the aggregate vote shifts the theory purports to explain

The same goes for the possibility that only certain forms of contacting have a payoff For example, one might be impressed with Cover and Brumberg's methodologically sound finding of a payoff from baby books (1982) and with the undoubtedly inflated but still large and consistent coefficients we have obtained for pork Perhaps baby books and successful pork barreling some-

how seem "unusual" or "out of the ordinary"—the former implying personal attention from the incumbent, and the latter special skill or real influence in Washington. On the other hand, mailings, casework, and trips to the district may seem like ordinary activities that "every congressman does," with constituents not knowing (and perhaps not caring) whether they are done in larger or smaller quantity by a given incumbent. If this line of speculation is correct, the Cover and Brumberg study tells us something about voter psychology but very little about the "vanishing marginals," since mailings, casework, and trips to the district are the bread and butter tactics of the post-1960s generation.

Indeed, any theory centered on perquisites generally or casework specifically must be rather elaborate ("convoluted" might be a better term) to account for four facts. (1) While average incumbent margins in the House have been increasing, electoral safety has *not* (Mann, 1978, Erikson, 1976, Payne, 1980, Collie, 1981, Jacobson, 1987a, 1987b, pp. 27–34). (2) Senators also have been assiduously courting constituents, but with no perceptible general payoff (Alford and Hibbing, 1983, Parker, 1986). Conversely, state legislators are as safe as U.S. representatives, yet their constituency service operations generally are less thorough and extensive, nor are they credited with the same capabilities of image building via the media that are found in the literature on congressional elections. (3) The widening of margins in the House began long before the recent mania for trips home, mailings, and constituency service (Garand and Gross, 1984, Gross and Garand, 1984). (4) While more senior incumbents have heavier aggregate casework loads (Johannes and McAdams, 1987, see table 1 above for individual level corroboration), these heavier loads do not seem to pay off in an increased expectation of helpfulness (table 1 above, McAdams and Johannes, 1981, p. 599). Moreover, in spite of larger casework loads, the evidence that more senior incumbents have any electoral advantage beyond those seeking reelection for the first time is very weak (see table 3, Born, 1979, but see Alford and Hibbing, 1981).

Does all this mean, then, that members of Congress could close up shop on constituency service and fire all their caseworkers without suffering electoral harm? Technically speaking, we don't know, since our data do not bear on that point. The lowest casework loads in our aggregate analysis represent not congressmen who refuse to help constituents (a class now nonexistent, so far as we can determine), but rather incumbents who do not "hustle" cases and happen to have constituents not predisposed to ask for help (Johannes and McAdams, 1987). Likewise, virtually everyone in the CPS surveys who asked for help got it.

Perhaps if we had a sample of members who refused all requests for help or a sample of constituents who had been denied help, we would find strong effects. Incumbents who fail to meet clear constituent expectations of *any* sort (policy, representation, service) would probably suffer, but few do fail

However, the data presented here are precisely the sort needed to test the hypothesis that more service and greater use of "perks" bring more votes. No one suggests that before the middle 1960s incumbents arrogantly refused to help constituents—indeed, in the very earliest days of the republic, they were busily serving them (Swift, 1983, Johannes, 1984, p. 149). Rather, what the 1960s saw was a sharp increase in attempts to stimulate casework, accompanied by new government programs which triggered citizen demands for help in dealing with a burgeoning bureaucracy.

Incumbents probably are prisoners of expectations they themselves have created. Alan Ehrenhalt (1984) has referred to incumbents' constituency service situations as the "Cracker Jack" syndrome. "The more people get, the more they seem to want. Even those most aggressive in helping constituents sometimes have to struggle to avoid being taken for granted. . . . [W]hatever the member chooses to do, there is a high level of expectation about his ability to solve local problems" (p. 947). Given that incumbents cannot violate clear expectations, the relevant questions are: Have they in fact benefited from this inflation of expectations? And does performance above the norm bring electoral benefits? Our answers are "no." Most recipients of a congressman's help either do not vote or already were favorably predisposed before asking for assistance. Being reasonably attentive to one's district is probably like avoiding a sex scandal, something that a member (at least until recently) had to do to remain in office, but hardly a source of electoral advantage. Voters rightly assume that any candidate, if elected, would do a reasonable job on this score (Jacobson, 1983, p. 115).

But if casework, constituency attentiveness, and perquisite use generally cannot be convicted in the "case of the increasing margins," what can? Prudent political scientists, well aware of the weak evidence supporting the perquisites theory, might point to the lack of any plausible alternative. Let us suggest some possibilities. Perhaps attention should focus on the behavior of individual voters. Certain hypotheses, such as increased name recall, have been ruled out (Ferejohn, 1977), but other possibilities, both gross and subtle, come to mind. Might today's voters somehow be more inclined to cherish *their* "man [or woman] in Washington"—as opposed to someone else's—than they were previously? Citizens' general views of the political system have become more negative. Perhaps incumbents have benefited from this negativity by running against the institution (Fenno, 1978, pp. 97, 163–69).

Perhaps voters have been increasingly evaluating the intelligence, diligence, and leadership qualities of candidates, as recent research on policy voting (cited above) suggests they are doing. If incumbents now *are* more intelligent, diligent, and capable of leadership, one would predict increased electoral success. However, if this is the case, why aren't challengers also more intelligent, diligent, and so on?

Without a doubt, the partisan and ideological compatibilities of constitu-

encies and incumbents are important. Perhaps incumbents, on average, no are more compatible with the districts they represent. One way of achievin such compatibility, gerrymandering, seems to have been ruled out (Ferejohr 1977, p 168, Bullock, 1975, Born, 1985). But there are other possibilitie including broad social and demographic changes, and changing patterns c candidate recruitment Yet another possibility is that drop-off voters are di proportionately inclined to vote against incumbents, their decisions not t vote (because the challengers offer no attraction) thus have the effect of pr tecting sitting members. Challenger quality thus may be the key However if this argument implies that incumbents neutralize potentially disagreeabl constituents by means of constituency service, our aggregate analysis shoul pick up the effect—unless it occurs solely in presidential election yea (Pothier, 1987)

Finally, the behavior of strategic political elites may have changed. Fc example, increasingly rational targeting strategies may have resulted in saf incumbents getting a "free ride," while those who are actually vulnerable ar attacked (McAdams and Johannes, 1987) Perhaps the former are inflatin the average margin, while the latter are as likely as ever to succumb A these hypotheses are very difficult to test, but this difficulty does not justif dismissing them

Clearly, this should be an open question among political scientists. A solu tion to the mystery is needed, and both fresh thinking and fresh data ar needed Where individual-level data are concerned, the clearest need is fo a panel study to allow the sorting out of mutual effects of affectively loadec simultaneously determined endogenous variables

APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES

Individual Level

Casework Satisfaction Based on 1984 NES question G13C Respondent who contacted incumbent were (1) "very satisfied," (2) "somewhat satisfied (4) "not very satisfied" or (5) "not at all satisfied" with the response

Challenger Natural log of challenger spending in the 1984 election i thousands of dollars

Economy Based on NES question G2 For constituents of Democrats coded 5 if respondent thought the nation's economy had "gotten worse," 1 i it had "gotten better," and 3 if it had "stayed the same " For constituents o Republicans, the coding was reversed A positive sign on the coefficient indi cates that (when a Republican is president) voters will punish Republican and reward Democrats for a sagging economy

Education. Coded 0 if less than a high school education, 5 if respondent completed high school and/or had some college, and 1 if respondent reported a college degree or higher education

Finances Based on NES question E1 For constituents of Democrats, coded 5 if respondent thought his or her family was "worse off" financially 1 if "better off," and 3 if it was "the same " For constituents of Republicans, the coding was reversed A positive sign on the coefficient, indicates that (when a Republican is president) voters will punish Republicans and reward Democrats for deteriorating personal finances

Helpfulness. Based on NES question G15 "If you had (another/a) problem that Representative [incumbent's name] could do something about do you think (he/she) would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful to you?"

Ideology Ideological discrepancy between the incumbent's actual House voting record (measured by the 1983 ADA score) and the respondent's own ideology (measured by the CPS "political views" scale) If the incumbent and the respondent were both liberal or both conservative, Ideology equaled 0 If the incumbent and the respondent fell at opposite ends of the spectrum, Ideology equaled 1 When one was a liberal or a conservative and the other was a moderate, Ideology equaled 5 Where respondents could not place themselves on the "political views" scale Ideology equaled 0 and another variable ("No Ideology") was set equal to 1 This procedure retains a large number of respondents who "don't know their ideology See Johannes and McAdams (1981 p 527)

Issues A scale based on five National Election Study items measuring respondents' positions on a government job guarantee, government help for minorities, women's roles, funding for social services, and abortion The index was scaled so that consistently liberal responses yielded a score of 0 and consistently conservative ones, a score of 1 For Republican incumbents, the index was reversed by subtracting it from 1 Thus high scores (near 1) indicate policy estrangement from the party of the incumbent

Media Based on NES questions C2B* C3, and C4 Index is the number of times respondent claimed to have watched national news on TV during the past week, plus the number of days respondent claimed to have read a daily newspaper. Then five was added to the index if respondent claimed to have read a national newsmagazine

Met, Meeting, Staff Mail, News, Radio, TV Contact with Incumbents All dummy variables, obtained from 1984 NES Study Where "Service" equaled

1, staff was set equal to 0, a procedure that assumes that staff contact was incident to casework, so that any positive effects should be credited to Service

No Ideology See "*Ideology*"

Open-ended Service Based on NES questions G1–G4a Codes 321, 322, 329, 330, 331, and 332 were counted as "service" mentions Coded (1) more negative than positive mentions, (2) no mentions or negative and positive mentions balance, and (3) more positive than negative mentions

Participation Additive index of acts of participation, standard NES series, 1984 questions D3 to D7

Pork Based on NES question G16 Does the respondent remember "anything special" that the incumbent has "done for [the] district" while in Congress

Reagan Respondents were asked (in three separate questions) whether they approved or disapproved of "the way Ronald Reagan is handling the economy," "the way Ronald Reagan is handling the balancing of the national budget," and "the way Ronald Reagan is handling our relations with foreign countries" Responses were coded (1) approve strongly, (2) approve not strongly, (3) don't know, (4) disapprove not strongly, and (5) disapprove strongly The mean of these three items was the Reagan index for Republican incumbents and 6 minus the mean was the index for Democratic incumbents

Secondhand Service Respondent claimed to know "anyone else who has contacted [incumbent] or anyone in [incumbent's] office and has gotten a reply" NES question G14

Service Dummy variable Had respondent or anyone in household contacted representative to "seek information" or "seek help with a problem"

Secondhand Satisfaction Based on 1984 NES question G14B Persons who claimed to know someone not in their own household who had contacted the incumbent (see "Secondhand Service" above) were asked whether the person was (1) "satisfied" (2) "somewhat satisfied" (4) "somewhat dissatisfied", or (5) "not satisfied" with the response

Party ID Coded 1 if respondent shares party identification with incumbent, 0 if he/she was of the opposite party and .5 if independent

Seniority The natural log of the number of years the incumbent has served as of 1984

ggregate Data

Cases Average weekly number of new cases from individuals received by i incumbent during first six months of 1982 The data were collected in per- onal and telephone interviews (and some by survey questionnaire) during ine of 1982 in a fashion designed to replicate 1977 data (Johannes 1984) or details, as well as tabulations demonstrating the representativeness of ie sample, see Johannes and McAdams (1987)

Dem Dummy variable set equal to 1 if incumbent was a Democrat used i pick up national electoral tide

Discrep A bivariate regression line was estimated describing the relation- nip between House incumbents' 1981 ADA scores and the percentage of 972 McGovern vote in their districts Discrep was the absolute difference etween the ADA score predicted by the regression line and the incum- ent's actual 1981 ADA score See Johannes and McAdams (1981 p 517)

Education Mean years schooling of the aged 25 and over population of ie district, as of the 1980 census

Mail Number of postal patron mailings sent by incumbents in twelve ionths preceding June 1982 from interviews with member staffs

1980 Election Incumbent's vote percentage 1980

1974–1978 Election Mean of incumbent's (or incumbent's party) percent- ge of the vote 1974 - 1978

Pres Elec The percentage district vote for Ford in 1976 was added to the istrict vote for Reagan in 1980 Then the mean Ford + Reagan percentage n all 435 congressional districts was subtracted out leaving an index on hich positive scores indicated Republican partisanship and conservative leology, and negative scores the opposite For Democratic incumbents the ign of the index was reversed Thus high scores on this variable indicate a istrict congenial to the incumbent in partisanship and policy preferences

Redist Based on a comparison of the 1980 Reagan vote and the 1976 Ford ote in the newly constituted district (as reconstructed by *Congressional Quarterly*) and the vote as constituted before redistricting The old district ote in each election was subtracted from the new district vote and the sum f these two differences was divided by 2 This was the redistricting variable r Democratic incumbents, with every unit representing a one percentage oint increase in Reagan and Ford voters For Republicans, the index was versed

Seniority The natural log of the number of years served in the House as of 1982

Staff. Number of staff located in district offices in 1981 (from *Congressional Staff Directory*)

Trips Number of incumbent's trips home in 1981 reported by *Report of the Clerk of the House* Members who took lump sum travel allowances were excluded.

References

Abramowitz, Alan 1980 A Comparison of Voting for U S Senator and Representative in 1978 *American Political Science Review*, 74 633–40

Alford John R and John R Hibbing 1981 Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House *Journal of Politics*, 43 1042–61

——— 1983 Incumbency Advantage in Senate Elections Presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago

Arnold R Douglas 1981 The Local Roots of Domestic Policy In Thomas E Mann and Norman J Ornstein eds , *The New Congress* Washington DC American Enterprise Institute

Arsenau Robert B 1984 The Electoral Value of Incumbency in House Elections Presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington, DC

Bailar Barbara A and Naomi D Rothwell 1984 Measuring Employment and Unemployment In Charles F Turner and Elizabeth Martin eds *Surveying Subjective Phenomena* New York Russell Sage

Beth Richard S 1981–1982 Incumbency Advantage and Incumbency Resources Recent Articles *Congress and the Presidency*, 9 119 36

——— 1984 Recent Research on Incumbency Advantage in House Elections Part II *Congress and the Presidency* 11 211–24

Bishop George F Alfred J Tuchfarber and Robert W Oldendick 1986 Opinions on Fictitious Issues The Pressure To Answer Survey Questions *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 240-50

Bond Jon 1981 A Paradox of Representation Diversity Competition Perks and the Decline of Policy Making in the U S House Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association New York

——— 1985 Perks and Competition The Effects of District Attention Over Time Presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago

——— Covington Gary and Richard Fleisher 1985 Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections *Journal of Politics* 47 510-29

Born Richard 1979 Generational Replacement and the Growth of Incumbent Reelection Margins in the U S House *American Political Science Review* 73 811-17

——— 1982 Perquisite Employment in the U S House of Representatives 1960 1976 The Influence of Generational Change *American Politics Quarterly* 10 347-62

——— 1985 Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the Congressional Redistricting Process *American Political Science Review* 79 305 19

Bullock Charles S III 1975 Redistricting and Congressional Stability 1962 1972 *Journal of Politics* 37 569-75

Cain, Bruce E John A Ferejohn and Morris P Fiorina 1984 The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U S Representatives and British Members of Parliament *American Political Science Review* 78 110 25

Cain, Bruce E. 1983. Blessed be the Tie that Unbinds: Constituency Work and the Vote Swing in Great Britain. *Political Studies*, 30: 103–11.

Campbell, James E. 1983. The Return of the Incumbents: The Nature of Incumbency Advantage. *Western Political Quarterly*, 36: 434–44.

Collie, Melissa. 1981. Incumbency, Electoral Safety, and Turnover in the House of Representatives, 1952–1976. *American Political Science Review* 75: 119–31.

Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1980. The Perception of Political Figures: An Application of Attribution Theory. In John C. Pierce and John L. Sullivan, eds., *The Electorate Reconsidered*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Cover, Albert D. and Bruce S. Brumberg. 1982. Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion. *American Political Science Review* 76: 347–59.

Cranor, John D. and Joseph W. Westphal. 1978. Congressional District Offices, Federal Programs, and Electoral Benefits: Some Observations on the Passing of the Marginal Representatives, 1974–1976. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Ehrenhalt, Alan. 1984. Pothole Politics: The Cracker Jack Syndrome. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 42: 947.

Erikson, Robert S. 1971. The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections. *Polity* 3: 395–405.

——— 1976. Is There Such a Thing as a Safe Seat? *Polity* 8: 623–32.

——— and Gerald C. Wright. 1980. Policy Representation of Constituency Interests. *Political Behavior* 2: 91–106.

——— 1985. Candidates and Issues in Congressional Elections. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Erikson, Robert S., Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L. Tedin. 1980. *American Public Opinion*, 2d ed. New York: Wiley.

Eubank, Robert B. 1985. Incumbent Effects on Individual Level Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections: A Decade of Exaggeration. *Journal of Politics* 47: 958–71.

——— and David John Gow. 1983. The Pro-Incumbent Bias in the 1978 and 1980 National Election Studies. *American Journal of Political Science* 27: 122–39.

Feldman, Paul and James Jondrow. 1984. Congressional Elections and Local Federal Spending. *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 147–63.

Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Ferejohn, John A. 1977. On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 71: 166–76.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. *Congress: The Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

——— 1981. Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 543–67.

Fowler, Linda L., Scott R. Douglas, and Wesley D. Clark, Jr. 1980. The Electoral Effects of House Committee Assignments. *Journal of Politics* 42: 307–19.

Garand, James C. and Donald A. Gross. 1984. Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends. *American Political Science Review* 78: 17–30.

Goldenberg, Edie N. and Michael W. Traugott. 1984. *Campaigning for Congress*. Washington: CQ Press.

Gow, David John and Robert B. Eubank. 1984. The Pro-Incumbent Bias in the 1982 National Election Study. *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 224–230.

Gross, Donald A. and James C. Garand. 1984. The Vanishing Marginals, 1824–1980. *Journal of Politics*, 46: 224–37.

Hanushek, Eric A and John E Jackson 1977 *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* New York Academic Press

Heckman, James 1978 Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System *Econometrica* 46 931–59

Hinckley, Barbara 1980 House Reelections and Senate Defeats The Role of the Challenger *British Journal of Political Science*, 10 441–60

——— 1981 *Congressional Elections* Washington DC Congressional Quarterly Press

Hyman H H and P B Sheatsley 1947 Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11 412 23

Jacobson, Gary C 1981 Incumbents Advantages in the 1978 U S Congressional Elections *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6 183–200

——— 1983 *The Politics of Congressional Elections* Boston Little Brown

——— 1987a The Marginals Never Vanished Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U S House of Representatives 1952–1982 *American Journal of Political Science* 31 126–41

——— 1987b *The Politics of Congressional Elections* 2d ed Boston Little Brown

Johannes John R 1984 *To Serve the People Congress and Constituency Service* Lincoln University of Nebraska Press

——— and John C McAdams 1981 The Congressional Incumbency Effect Is It Casework Policy Compatibility or Something Else? *American Journal of Political Science* 25 512 42

——— 1987 Entrepreneurs or Agents Congressmen and the Distribution of Casework in the House 1977–78 *Western Political Quarterly* forthcoming

Levine J M and G Murphy 1943 The Learning and Forgetting of Controversial Material *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 38 507 17

Mann Thomas E 1978 *Unsafe at Any Margin Interpreting Congressional Elections* Washington DC American Enterprise Institute

——— and Raymond E Wolfinger 1980 Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review* 74 617 32

Markus Gregory B 1979 *Analyzing Panel Data* Beverly Hills Sage

Mayhew David R 1974 *Congress The Electoral Connection* New Haven Yale University Press

McAdams John C 1986 Alternatives for Dealing with Errors in the Variables An Example Using Panel Data *American Journal of Political Science* 30 256 78

McAdams John C and John R Johannes 1981 Does Casework Matter A Reply to Professor Fiorina *American Journal of Political Science* 25 581 604

——— 1983 The 1980 House Elections Reexamining Some Theories in a Republican Year *Journal of Politics* 45 143 62

——— 1984 The Voter in the 1982 House Election *American Journal of Political Science* 28 778–81

——— 1985 Constituency Attentiveness in the House 1977 1982 *Journal of Politics* 47 1108–39

——— 1987 Determinants of Spending by House Challengers 1974 1984 *American Journal of Political Science* 31 457 83

Nelson Forrest and Lawrence Olson 1978 Specification and Estimation of a Simultaneous Equation Model with Limited Dependent Variables *International Economic Review* 19 695–709

Newman Sandra J 1984 Housing Research Conceptual and Measurement Issues In Charles Turner and Elizabeth Martin eds *Surveying Subjective Phenomena* New York Russell Sage

Oskamp, Stuart 1977 *Attitudes and Opinions* Englewood Cliffs Prentice Hall

Parker Glenn R 1986 *Homeward Bound Explaining Changes in Congressional Behavior* Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press

——— 1981 Incumbent Popularity and Electoral Success In Sandy Maisel and Joseph Cooper eds., *Congressional Elections* Beverly Hills Sage Publications

——— and Roger H Davidson 1979 Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More Than Their Congress? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4 53–61

——— and Suzanne L Parker 1985 Correlates and Effects of Attention to the District by U S House Members *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 10 223 42

——— Stephanie Greco Larson and Suzanne L Parker 1984 The Impact of Institutional Change on the Home Style Behavior of Members of Congress Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington

Payne James L 1977 The Changing Character of American Congressmen Some Implications for Reform Presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago

——— 1980 The Personal Electoral Advantage of House Incumbents 1936 1976 *American Politics Quarterly* 8 465–82

Pothier John T 1987 Drop Off the Vanishing Voters in On Year Elections and the Incumbency Advantage *American Politics Quarterly* 15 123 46

Powell Linda W 1982 Constituency Service and Electoral Margin in the Congress Presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Denver

Public Opinion 1 (November/December 1978) 22

Ragsdale Lyn and Timothy Cook 1987 Representatives Actions and Challengers Reactions Limits to Candidate Connections in the House *American Journal of Political Science* 31 45 81

Sanger Donald R 1981 Voter Knowledge of Congressional Issue Positions A Reassessment *Social Science Quarterly* 62 624 65

Schantz Harvey L 1984 Incumbency in Congressional Primaries Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington DC.

Sherif M and C I Hovland 1961 *Social Judgment Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change* New Haven Yale University Press

Smith Tom W 1984 The Subjectivity of Ethnicity In Charles F Turner and Elizabeth Martin eds *Survey Subjective Phenomena* New York Russell Sage

Swift Elaine K 1983 Behavioral Patterns in the Early Congresses Mayhew and Fiorina Transposed Presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago

Whitby Kenny J and Timothy Bledsoe 1986 The Impact on Policy Voting on the Electoral Fortunes of Senate Incumbents *Western Political Quarterly* 39 690–700

Wright Gerald C 1978 Candidates Policy Positions and Voting in U S Congressional Elections *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3 445 64

——— and Michael B Berkman 1986 Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections *American Political Science Review* 80 567 88

Yiannakis Diana Evans 1981 The Grateful Electorate Casework and Congressional Elections *American Journal of Political Science* 25 568 80

Solving a Puzzle: Aggregate Analysis and Economic Voting Revisited

Benjamin Radclif
University of Illinois-Urbana

This paper proposes an alternative explanation for the lack of congruence between aggregate and individual level studies of economic voting through a reexamination and extension of the aggregate time series. While aggregate level studies find a strong relationship between the state of the economy and the congressional vote, individual level studies performed in the latter half of the postwar era find little or no relationship between personal economic conditions and vote choice. It is argued that this lack of congruence exists because the impact of short-term economic fluctuations on voting in congressional elections has decreased dramatically over time. Using aggregate data, the relationship between economic changes and voting patterns is found to be time dependent: economic conditions are no longer major determinants of House elections. An examination of Senate elections indicates that this trend is limited to the House, in that economic fluctuations continue to influence senatorial contests. This House-Senate difference, it is proposed, stems from the different electoral dynamics of the two chambers.

I. Introduction

Though the conventional wisdom of journalists and politicians holds that short-term economic conditions have profound effects upon voting behavior, political scientists and other academicians have heatedly disputed this issue in recent years. While the literature on this subject presents several puzzles, perhaps the most interesting (and most intensely debated) is why aggregate level studies report strong, consistent, and significant effects of economic swings on the vote, while individual level research finds little or no relationship between personal economic fortunes and voting decisions. Several solutions have been offered, but none has proven to be completely acceptable. This paper offers an alternative explanation, arguing (through a reexamination and extension of the aggregate data) that the retrospective economic voting phenomenon as manifested in House elections is time dependent, having decreased dramatically in the postwar era.

* The author would like to express his indebtedness to James Kuklinski for his advice and encouragement throughout the development of this project. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers and the many people who commented on earlier drafts, including Michael Frank, Morris Fiorina, Paul Gabel, Michael Krassa, Robert Boynton, Ellen Riggle, and Steven Sei; their insightful comments are reflected throughout. Special thanks to Amy Radcliff for her support and assistance. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 10–12.

II Economic Voting: the Evidence

The seminal work in the field of economic voting is Kramer (1971). Utilizing longitudinal data from 1896 to 1964 (excluding 1912 and the war years 1942–44), he finds that the party percentage of the vote in House elections is dependent upon short-term economic fluctuations. With the entire nation as the unit of analysis, and considering changes in real per capita personal income as a measure of economic change, he shows that economic changes are "important influences on congressional elections, with economic upturn helping congressional candidates of the incumbent party, and economic decline benefiting the opposition" (1971, 140–41).

Kramer adopts a rational choice perspective, conceiving of congressional elections as existing within an environment that approximates a Downsian space (Downs, 1957). His assumptions are:

1. Voting is retrospective, that is, voters use the immediate past performance of the incumbent party to predict the future.
2. Voting is party-oriented. Viewing government as run by "teams," citizens vote for opposing teams (parties), not individual candidates.
3. Voting is based upon the following decision rule: if the performance of the incumbent team is satisfactory, vote for that party; if not, vote for the opposition.
4. Congressional members of the incumbent president's party are the incumbent team.
5. The basis for the definition of "satisfactory" is rooted in personal economic conditions.

Although Stigler (1973) launched a series of methodological and substantive attacks on Kramer's conclusions, the juggernaut of evidence from the aggregate level studies marched on with the publication of articles by Bloom and Price (1975) and Tufte (1975, 1978) (Hibbing and Alford 1981). Of special note is the Bloom and Price piece, which advances an asymmetrical thesis, whereby voters respond to negative changes but not to positive ones. In operational terms, this means that the effect of income fluctuations on the vote will be significant when elections are preceded by declining real income (a sour economy) and insignificant otherwise. Not only is the asymmetric hypothesis theoretically compelling, it is empirically supported by subsequent work (Arcelus 1978).

Though the aggregate level studies left little doubt that the economy influences voting decisions, identification of the individual level processes that might lead to the aggregate results remained problematic. Using survey research data, a number of researchers looked for the precise micro-level mechanisms through which economic changes influence the voting decision. The results were mystifying: an entire series of studies found the relationship between voting and personal economic well being to be modest to non-

existent (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981, Fiorina, 1978, Wides, 1976, Klorman, 1978)

The accumulated evidence, then, paints a confusing picture, with macroeconomic conditions seeming to have a strong impact upon election outcomes in the aggregate, but personal economic conditions having little to no effect on individual voter choice. A number of solutions to this puzzle have been offered (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981, Jacobson and Kernell, 1981, Kramer, 1983), none, however, has proven to be completely satisfactory (see Weatherford, 1983, Kramer, 1983, Feldman, 1984, Uslaner and Conway, 1985).[1]

I offer an alternative explanation for the lack of congruence between the aggregate and individual level studies, arguing that the relationship between changes in economic conditions and vote choice is time dependent. Economic fluctuations were a salient element in congressional elections until changes in election dynamics (such as incumbency advantage and the isolation of House elections from national issues) effectively muted the relationship. Voters may have been responding to economic changes during and im-

[1] Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) argue that perceived national conditions rather than personal economic fortunes actually affect voting decisions. Jacobson and Kernell (1981) assert that the strategic choices of candidates make the difference in the aggregate time series. These choices are themselves heavily influenced by economic conditions because politicians believe the current state of the economy will help or hinder their chances. Finally, Kramer (1983) maintains that the entire pool of individual level research is meaningless because the independent variable (whether one's personal economic situation has improved, gotten worse, or stayed the same) is overwhelmed by noise, making it an extremely unreliable measure. Kramer claims that personal economic evaluations are dominated by idiosyncratic changes peculiar to individuals rather than government induced changes in the economy. It is government induced change in personal income that voters utilize in their voting calculus, and which the aggregate studies tap by cancelling out the random variation in individual circumstances.

While I do not take issue with any of these positions per se, there are reasons to question the degree to which they explain the phenomenon in and of themselves. In the sociotropic studies economic evaluations of the type used by Kinder and Kiewiet are subject to projection and rationalization; the result is to confuse candidate appeal with economic judgment (see Page and Brody, 1972, Weatherford, 1983). Further, a sociotropic thesis cannot explain why some studies have shown a pronounced relationship between personal economic conditions and voting (for example, Butler and Stokes, 1969, Lewis-Beck, 1983, Feldman, 1984, Weatherford, 1983). The Jacobson-Kernell thesis, like the sociotropic concept, seems plausible, but the empirical evidence is far from conclusive (Uslaner and Conway, 1985). Kramer (1983) develops an elegant argument based upon the assumption that people are concerned only with government induced changes in personal economic conditions. While such a notion is reasonable on its face, it presents serious difficulties. For example, it requires that voters separate the morass of economic conditions into categories of government induced and non-government induced changes (which seems highly improbable). It further undermines the very model Kramer originally proposes by changing reliance upon personal economic conditions in the decision calculus to some kind of vague, undefined government evaluation process. In addition, the aggregate level indicators Kramer exalts as being noise free will also be contaminated by non-governmental activity (for example, the increase in oil prices during the 1970s and 1980s).

mediately after the Depression, but over time that effect has dramatically decreased.

The literature presents several unrelated bits of evidence in support of such a thesis. The first is Fiorina's (1978) observation that personal economic fortunes may have affected voting until 1960, but not thereafter. Another clue comes from Owens and Olson (1980). Using aggregate district level data for three mid-1970s elections, they find "no relationship between changes in the vote for individual congressional candidates and changes in real income and inflation in 1972, 1974, and 1976 congressional elections." If economic voting was occurring during this time period one would expect to find it in the analysis of the aggregate data (especially considering the turbulent conditions of those years). Similarly, in analyzing both district-level aggregate and individual survey data for the 1974 congressional election, Pierson (1975) finds no relationship between economic variables (consumer prices and real income) and voting. Finally, Atesoglu and Congleton (1982) attempt to forecast the 1966 to 1980 (post-sample) elections using Kramer's original set of equations. They compare these equations to a simple inertia model which views vote at time t as a function of vote at t − 1. The results indicate that "none of Kramer's equations outperforms the naive inertia equation through the entire post-sample period." Kramer's model, then, is a poorer predictor of recent election results than a simplistic univariate time model.

These studies hint at the possibility that the established aggregate relationship between economic fluctuations and congressional voting does not apply in the present era.

III. The National Aggregate Model Revisited

The place to begin the inquiry is with the national level model itself, which may be explicated as follows:

$$VOTE = a + b_1(DELTA*I) + b_2 EXPECT + e$$

where

VOTE = The Republican percentage of the vote across the United States as a whole

DELTA = The percentage change in real per capita personal income in the year preceding each election

Real per capita personal income (RINC) is calculated by:

RINC = (PINC*100)/CPI

where

PINC = per capita personal income in current dollars

CPI = consumer price index (1967 = 100)

I = An incumbency variable equal to 1 for Republican administrations and −1 for Democratic ones. The dummy variable is necessary addition because I measure the dependent variable as the Republican share of the vote, rather than the logically equivalent solution of using the share of the incumbent president's party, see Kramer (1971), Bloom and Price (1975)

EXPECT = The expected Republican percentage of the vote, based upon a moving average calculated by taking the mean of VOTE at times t − 1 and t − 2

a, e = The intercept and error terms, respectively

Substantively, the model states that the party share of the vote is a linear function of expected vote (EXPECT) and short-term changes in the economy (DELTA*I, hereafter referred to as the more mnemonic ECON)

Table 1 presents the original findings of Bloom and Price. It contains estimates for the entire sample, for elections preceded by declining income, and

TABLE 1

BLOOM AND PRICE ORIGINAL FINDINGS
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1896–1970, EXCLUDING 1912

	Elections Preceded by Rising Income	Elections Preceded by Declining Income	All Elections
ECON	-.12	.75**	.21*
	(.09)	(3.5)	(2.1)
EXPECT	.86**	1.2**	.61**
	(5.2)	(3.6)	(4.6)
constant	5.0	12.0	19.0**
	(.7)	(.5)	(2.7)
R square	.62	.60	.45
N	24	13	37

** = sig. at .01 level

* = sig. at .05 level

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (t ratio)

Source: Bloom, H. and H. D. Price. Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions. *American Political Science Review* 59:4: 1244, Table 1

The annual change in RINC in the year preceding an election at time t. DELTA is calculated by

$$DELTA = (RINC(t) - RINC(t-1))(100)/RINC(t-1)$$

where

RINC(t) is real per capita personal income at time t

RINC(t − 1) = real per capita personal income at time t − 1

TABLE 2

ELECTIONS PRECEDED BY DECLINING INCOME
1896–1970

Year	Change in real per capita personal income
1896	−3.8%
1902	−1.1%
1904	−3.2%
1908	−10.0%
1910	1.0%
1914	−9.4%
1920	−4.3%
1930	9.0%
1932	−15.5%
1938	−6.8%
1946	−4.1%
1954	1.6%
1958	−1.5%

for elections preceded by rising income. The data illustrate, much in accord with Bloom and Price, that the state of the economy is important when things are bad, but not when things are good. When income declines in the year preceding an election, the economic coefficient is large, statistically significant, and of the proper sign. But when income rises in the year preceding an election the coefficient is smaller, of the wrong sign, and insignificant at the .05 level. The value for the entire sample is significant and of the proper sign (and moderate in magnitude), presumably because of the influence of the years of declining income.

An examination of the thirteen cases that make up the declining income sample provides further insight (see table 2). All of these elections occur before 1958 and ten of the thirteen occur before 1940. By subsetting the time series into rising/declining categories, Bloom and Price not only examine elections preceded by economic downturns, they also look at years that occur early in the time series. Thus, what they identify may be less an asymmetric response to economic changes than a structural change that emerges over time. In looking at years preceded by declining income, Bloom and Price find significant results because these points occur early in the time series—or so I shall now try to show.

IV. EXTENSION TO THE STATES: THE AGGREGATE MODEL DISAGGREGATED

Due to the small number of cases involved, as well as the excessive aggregation that results when the entire United States is the unit of analysis

the national sample allows no real way to test between these rival ex[
tions. Moving to states as the unit of analysis provides a solution to
problems.

The data utilized in the remainder of this paper are state level agg[
indicators parallel to those used in the national data: the Republican pe[
age of the vote in House elections in each of the individual states, ar[
change in real per capita personal income during the year precedi[
election, in the given state. The time series runs from 1930 to 1980 (re[
personal income data do not exist prior to 1929). The years 1942 and 19[
excluded because of distortion caused by wartime regulation, rationin[
price controls (see Kramer, 1971). The South, as defined by the eleven
of the old Confederacy, is also excluded.[1]

Using states as the unit of analysis (so that each case is an election in [
at time t) provides several advantages over relying upon the nation [
unit of analysis (where each case is an election at time t), without altern[
basic structure, logic, or measurement units of the original specific[
First, and most important, the number of cases is drastically increased
42 to 903. Second, the South can be easily excluded from the sample. T[
the national data hide a tremendous amount of variation that can be t[
with the state sample.

The use of the state data does, however, introduce potential proble[
the estimation procedure in that it involves a pooled design—a time se[
cross sections (a pool created across both spatial and temporal dimens[
Such a design may induce special statistical problems since OLS regr[
ignores the pooled structure of the data. This in turn raises the possibi[
violating error and variance assumptions (Maddala, 1971, 1977; see
Chetty, 1968). Accordingly, all equations were estimated with OLS, a du[
variable solution which included a variable for each state (excepting th[
erence category), and finally a GLS error component model. Becau[

[1]The South is excluded because of the noncompetitiveness of the region (at the Hous[
throughout most of the time frame in question. The result of such a one party system [
tificially dampen any effect the economy has on election results, since voters have o[
choice—that of the dominant party (see Jacobson and Kernell, 1981).

A similar effect will obtain for uncontested elections: economic voting is not possibl[
for abstention. To account for this fact, I sought to isolate uncontested elections by re[
them from the analysis. This is a rather simple matter when using district level data; [
comes problematical when using state level data: for what, precisely, does it mean for a [
be uncontested, given that there are (normally) multiple congressional districts withi[
state? I operationalized uncontested to mean a situation in which the Republican share [
vote was less than some (arbitrary) threshold (e.g., 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent, or [
cent). The matter ultimately becomes academic, however, because the number of cases i[
is very small and, further, the analysis is not sensitive to the exclusion of uncontested el[
at any of these threshold values.

parameter estimates remained essentially unchanged across the different estimation procedures, only the OLS figures are reported.[4]

V. Analysis

If fluctuations in the state of the economy have a decreasing effect on the vote as time passes, one would expect to find economic impact to be more potent in the first part of the time series than in the second. This prediction is tested by dividing the series at 1959. Although in a strict sense the year is arbitrarily chosen—since I am not suggesting a dramatic, event-specific change of the kind postulated by an interrupted time series—there are reasons to believe this time point is meaningful. Fiorina (1978) presents evidence that a radical shift in voter response to the economy occurred around this time, with what he calls "circumstantial" evidence indicating the politicization of economic grievances is less pronounced after 1960; similar evidence is offered by Kiewiet (1983). Further empirical evidence presented below indicates that 1959 is an inflection point.[5]

[4] I rely upon the modeling strategy suggested by Stimson's (1985) lucid discussion of the problem.

Pooled data involves two particular issues. The first is that the cases within the spatial units (states) might not be temporally independent. The second is that heteroscedasticity may manifest itself in the form of greater variability across time for some spatial units (especially if large size differences are present, as variability may be assumed to be a fixed proportion of size). While there is evidence to suggest that regression estimates may be reasonably robust when such violations are present but not extreme, a form of model misspecification common to pooled design—the assumption of homogeneity in the level of dependent variable (here meaning the level of Republican party strength across the states)—may serve to inflate both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity to unacceptable levels. The result is the possibility that the parameter estimates may be biased and inconsistent.

A useful approach is to begin with OLS regression, proceeding to examine other models to test the stability of the results. For as Stimson (1985) points out, OLS may well be appropriate for a particular research question, but without entertaining other models there is no satisfactory way to know that it is appropriate. Given that the source of potential bias in OLS is large between-unit (i.e., state) differences, the most obvious solution is to remove them by introducing a set of dummy variables (one for each state except the reference category) which estimates a "fixed effect" for each unit. Another approach is to move to a GLS error component model in an attempt to improve the efficiency of the estimators, because the dummy variable solution may attenuate total variance by assigning much of it to the fixed effects. In the dummy variable model, the ECON coefficients did not meaningfully differ from the OLS equivalents, although the EXPECT coefficients (relative to their standard errors) were slightly deflated and goodness of fit was marginally increased. In the GLS solution all parameter estimates remained virtually unchanged, as did goodness of fit. OLS therefore appears to be appropriate in this case, and following Occam's Razor, I report the OLS results rather than those for the more complex models.

[5] The reported results, moreover, are not sensitive to the selection of 1959 as the cut-off point; similar results obtain when using other time points in roughly the same period (1957, 1961, 1963).

TABLE 3

RESULTS WHEN DIVIDING SAMPLE AT 1959

	1930–1940, 1946–1958	1959–1980
ECON	35**	– 032
	(9 7)	(71)
EXPECT	71**	82**
	(23.5)	(20 1)
constant	14 6**	9 2**
	(9 4)	(4 7)
R-square	57	49
N	477	426

* = sig at 05 level
** = sig at 01 level
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (*t*-ratio)

TABLE 4

SEQUENTIAL ADDITION OF ELECTIONS

Inclusion up to year	Coefficient of ECON	N
1946	45(10 2)	256
1948	42(10 0)	292
1950	42(9 9)	329
1952	42(10 7)	366
1954	40(10 6)	403
1956	39(10 6)	440
1958	35(9 7)	477
1960	26(7 9)	514
1962	24(7 4)	552
1964	23(7 3)	591
1966	23(7 5)	630
1968	24(7 6)	669
1970	21(6 9)	708
1972	21(7 1)	747
1974	20(6 7)	786
1976	19(6 5)	825
1978	19(6 3)	864
1980	19(6 7)	903

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (*t* ratio)
All coefficients significant at 01 level

The results are reported in table 3 As predicted, the coefficient for the state of the economy is large and significant in the pre-1959 era, while in the post-1959 era it is small, of the wrong sign, and statistically insignificant at the .05 level The substantive interpretation is clear fluctuations in the economy had a significant effect upon election results prior to 1960, but not thereafter

Another test may be performed by examining the change in the magnitude of the economic coefficient over time According to my hypothesis, if one were to begin with a base year (1946 the first postwar election) and sequentially add elections, the magnitude of the economic coefficient should decrease in a reasonably constant and linear fashion As table 4 illustrates, this is precisely what happens The value of the coefficient begins at about .42 and decreases to .37 by 1958 and to .20 by 1980 Substantively this implies that as time increases, the impact of changes in the economy on the vote steadily decreases Note the sharp drop-off at 1958 much in line with the decision to use that year as a cut-off point

VI Critical Tests

Two testable implications are manifest from the asymmetric hypothesis First, in the early portion of the sample (pre-1959) the significant relationship is due to elections preceded by declining income If one were to look only at elections preceded by rising income in the pre-1959 era the economic coefficient should be insignificant Second in the later portion of the sample (post-1959) the insignificant relationship is due to the predominance of elections preceded by rising income If one were to examine elections in this period preceded by declining income a significant relationship should be apparent

Although the national level data contain too few time points to make empirical tests (there is a general paucity of data points in post-1958 era with negative changes in personal income in the year preceding the election) the state level data—with multiple data points for each time point—provides a sufficient number of cases

The results of these tests are reported in table 5 which shows both asymmetric thesis predictions to be incorrect The pre-1959 rising income sample generates significant results while the post-1959 declining income sample yields insignificant results (as well as a much smaller coefficient) Contrary to the asymmetric thesis, this implies that elections preceded by rising income early in the series are influenced by changes in the economy and that elections preceded by declining income late in the series are not so affected Elections early in the sample are influenced by economic fluctuations regardless of the direction of those fluctuations Elections later in the sample are not influenced by economic changes regardless of the direction of those

TABLE 5

CRITICAL TESTS

	pre 1959 rising income	post-1959 declining income
ECON	.17**	.02
	(3.2)	(.28)
EXPECT	.71**	.76**
	(17.6)	(10.6)
Constant	14.3**	11.4**
	(6.9)	(3.2)
R-square	.57	.48
N	257	135

** = significant at .01 level
* = significant at .05 level
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (t ratio)

changes. On the other hand, asymmetry does not disappear entirel pare the ECON coefficients for pre-1959 rising income (see table 5) w for total pre-1959 (see table 3), the latter is larger by several standard although both are statistically significant. The implication is that for t part of the time series, a sour economy may have had a greater imp an improving one, although both were important. The point is so academic, however, in that in the post-1959 era neither recession n perity significantly affects congressional voting.

VII. DISCUSSION

I have presented evidence that fluctuations in the economy have increasingly unimportant determinants of congressional election ou Given the data presented here, the solution to the puzzle of why the gate and individual level studies find incompatible results seems cl gregate studies produce significant results because they are longitu nature. A sufficient part of the time series—the early part—is affe economic conditions, which make the entire series appear to be so a Individual level studies done in the latter half of the postwar per little or no effect because the phenomenon has subsided. Individu studies on the Depression era (see Weatherford, 1983 for a revie found better results because economic changes were still salient du period in question. The same can be said for studies done on elec 1956, 1958, and 1960 (Fiorina, 1978; Weatherford, 1978). Similarly gregate district-level work by Owens and Olson (1980) and Pierson finds no relationship for elections in 1972, 1974, and 1976. All of

search makes sense when viewed from a time perspective. Research on pre-1960 elections shows a relationship between economic changes and the vote regardless of whether they are done at the aggregate or the individual level. Research on later elections shows no relationship regardless of whether they are done at the aggregate or the individual level.

Why the trend? Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the nature of congressional elections has changed over time. House races have become local events which are increasingly isolated from presidential politics and national issues (see, for example, Ragsdale, 1980; Owens and Olson, 1980). The Downsian rationalism on which the economic voting model is based is further eroded by the rise of candidate-centric campaigns that allow (and encourage) voters to evaluate candidates as individuals rather than party members (Mayhew, 1974). House candidates seek to project images devoid of partisan or policy content (Fenno, 1975) and tend to successfully focus the campaign on personal qualities such as trust, dependability, integrity, hard work, and similar non-policy factors (Parker and Davidson, 1979; Abramowitz, 1980). There is also evidence to suggest that voters do in fact evaluate House candidates primarily in terms of personal traits (see Hinckley, 1981 for a review). The result of this situation is to reduce the impact of national factors such as the state of the economy on congressional voting because they are not relevant to a voter's decision calculus in elections which are fought largely on the basis of personal attributes instead of policy concerns or partisanship. In sum, congressional elections are not referendums on the performance of the economy in that House members are not held accountable for (or evaluated in terms of) economic conditions (Owens and Olson, 1980). Furthermore, this phenomenon is relatively new; voting in House elections was in the past more strongly linked to national factors such as the state of the economy (Fiorina, 1984). This would explain the findings presented here: the strong covariation between the economic variables and the vote series is due to the use of longitudinal data which include a preponderance of time points from an era in which national issues were more closely tied to House elections (see Fiorina, 1984, for a similar discussion).

This explanation may be partially substantiated by examining trends in economic voting in a comparable electoral setting—the Senate—in which the linkage between issues and voting is hypothesized to have remained strong over the same time period. The Senate has always been the more visible chamber, with more media attention and interest focused upon it and with its members being held more responsible for policy performance than their House counterparts (Erikson, 1971; Fenno, 1978). Additional work by Hinckley (1980) and Abramowitz (1980) confirms that for the Senate, all issues, economic and otherwise, are both more salient in voter decision making and more hotly debated by candidates. Finally, Kuklinski and West (1981) indicate that economic voting is more likely to occur in Senate

TABLE 6

SENATE ELECTIONS 1930–40, 1946–1982

	All Cases	DELTA < 0	DELTA > 0	Pre-1959	Post-1959
ECON	.46**	.34**	.22**	.28**	.23*
	(4.6)	(5.1)	(3.1)	(3.7)	(2.2)
EXPECT	.56**	.52**	.43**	.42**	.46**
	(16.7)	(12.5)	(12.4)	(14.9)	(8.9)
Constant	25.5**	21.7**	27.5**	28.0**	25.2**
	(12.6)	(6.0)	(11.3)	(7.6)	(10.5)
R-square	.16	.20	.14	.17	.15
N	629	245	384	321	308

* = significant at .05 level

** = significant at .01 level

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (t-ratio)

than House elections (see also, Wright and Berkman, 1986). The isolation from national issues that seems to characterize House elections has thus not obtained in Senate contests, and, accordingly, one should expect the relationship between economic fluctuations and voting in senatorial races to have remained stable over time.

Table 6 contains the results of regressing the Republican share of the vote for contested Senate elections (1930–1982, excluding 1942–1944) in state s at time t on expected vote, and change in real per capita personal income, with all variables defined as before, substituting senatorial for House returns, for (a) all elections, (b) elections prior to 1959, (c) elections subsequent to 1959, (d) elections preceded by economic downturns, and (e) elections preceded by economic upturns. The economic coefficient is significant and in the predicted direction for all cases; changes in real income impact upon Senate elections for the entire sample, in both the pre- and post-1959 subsamples, and for elections preceded by rising or falling income. There does, however, appear to be a trace of an asymmetric response in that the magnitude of the ECON coefficient is larger by several standard errors for elections preceded by falling income than for those preceded by rising income, although both are statistically significant.

These findings lend support to the contention that the relative isolation of House elections from national policy issues has been responsible for the observed decline in economic voting in that chamber because Senate elections—which have not been subject to that isolation—show no such decline.

While the explanation offered here is, I believe, both compelling and supported by the analysis of Senate voting, the data do not, strictly speaking, address the issue of causality. The conjecture offered as to cause and effect is exactly that—conjecture. Other explanations may be equally plausible. For

r, the isolation argument is not completely tidy, as it fails to account for importance of the 1960 election as a turning point in voter response to nomics This fact, while observed by others (Fiorina, 1978, Kiewiet, 3), remains unexplained

VIII Conclusions and Implications

I suggest that economic conditions systematically affected House elections til such time as the electoral dynamics of that chamber began to isolate ndidates from policy issues The well-known lack of correspondence be-een the aggregate and individual level studies on economic voting is il-sory The aggregate evidence reported here indicates that economic voting curred prior to 1960 but not thereafter The individual level research sup-rts such a contention as well Studies which examine the pre-1960 era find significant relationship between personal economic fortunes and vote oice, whereas those which consider elections in the post-1960 period find such relationship

Although the data do not specifically address the issue, the arguments ered in this paper also cast doubt upon the notion of sociotropic or "sym-lic" politics Given the aggregate evidence presented here, there is no ed to resort to concern for national societal issues in explaining economic ting The mountain of evidence in support of the symbolic politics argu-ent—that personal self interest is not a basis for political decision making—ay not be as monolithic as previously thought

Similarly, the well-known negativity bias in political behavior may be en to reexamination at least with regard to economics and congressional ections While the asymmetric response to economic conditions does not tirely disappear, it does seem to be less pronounced than sometimes ought (see, for example Kernell 1978 Lau, 1985)

Appendix on Data Sources

Election data For 1930 to 1970 House and Senate data by state were ob-ined from P T David, *Party Strength in the U S* (University of Virginia ress Charlottesville 1977) For 1972 to 1982 data obtained can be found various issues of *Statistical Abstracts of the United States* (1970-1974 440, p 443 in 1975 edition, 1976-1978 p 502 p 505 in 1979 edition 980-1982 p 244, p 245 in 1986 edition)

Economic data Personal income is available in *State Personal Income 929-1982* (U S Dept of Commerce Washington 1984), table 2, p 8-11 he Consumer Price Index (1967 = 100) is taken from *Handbook of Labor tatistics* (U S Dept of Labor Washington 1985) table 106 p 350

References

Abramowitz A 1980 A Comparison of Voting for U S Senator and Representative in 1978 *American Political Science Review*, 74(4) 533–40

Arcelus, F 1978 Effects of Aggregate Economic Variables on the Distribution of House Seats Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago

Arcelus, F and A H Meltzer 1975 The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review* 69(4) 1232 39

Atesoglu, H and R Congleton 1982 Economic Conditions and National Elections Post-sample Forecasts on the Kramer Equations *American Political Science Review* 76(4) 873–75

Bloom H S and H D Price 1975 Voter Response to Short-Run Conditions *American Political Science Review* 69(4) 1240–54

Butler D and D Stokes 1969 *Political Change in Britain* London Macmillan

Burnham W 1970 *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* New York Norton

Campbell A P Converse W Miller and D Stokes 1960 *The American Voter* New York Wiley

Chetty V 1968 Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data *Econometrica* 36 279 89

Downs A 1957 *An Economic Theory of Democracy* New York Harper and Row

Erikson R 1971 The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections *Polity* 3 395 405

Fair R 1978 The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for the President *Review of Economics and Statistics* 60 159 75

Feldman S 1984 Economic Self Interest and the Vote Paper presented at the Shambaugh Conference on Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes University of Iowa

Fenno R 1975 If As Ralph Nader Says Congress is The Broken Branch How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much? In N J Ornstein ed *Congress in Change* New York Praeger

——— 1978 *Home Style House Members in Their Districts* Boston Little Brown

Fiorina M 1978 Economic Retrospective Voting in American Elections A Microanalysis *American Journal of Political Science* 22(2) 426 43

——— 1984 The Presidency and the Contemporary Electoral System In M Nelson ed *The Presidency and the Political System* Washington CQ Press

Garand J and D Gross 1984 Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates A Specification of Historical Trends *American Political Science Review* 78(1) 17 30

Hibbing, J R and J R Alford 1981 The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions Who is Held Responsible? *American Journal of Political Science* 24 423 40

Hinckley B 1980 The American Voter in Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review* 74(4) 641 50

——— 1981 *Congressional Elections* Washington CQ Press

Jacobson G and S Kernell 1981 *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Jacobson G 1983 *The Politics of Congressional Elections* Boston Little Brown

Kernell S 1978 Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party *American Political Science Review* 71(1) 44 65

Kiewiet, D 1983 *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Kinder D and D Kiewiet 1981 Sociotropic Politics the American Case *British Journal of Political Science* 11(April) 129 61

Klorman R 1978 Trend in Personal Finances and the Vote *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42(1) 31 48

Kramer, G. 1971. Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964. *American Political Science Review*, 65(1):131–43.

——— 1983. The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate Versus Individual Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting. *American Political Science Review* 77(1):92–111.

Kuklinski, J. and D. West. 1981. Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in United States House and Senate Elections. *American Political Science Review* 75(June):436–47.

Lau, R. 1985. Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in Political Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1):119–40.

Lewis-Beck, M. 1983. Economics and the French Voter: A Micro-analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47:347–60.

Maddala, G. 1971. The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data. *Econometrica* 39(March):341–58.

——— 1977. *Econometrics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mayhew, D. 1974. Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals. *Polity* (6):295–317.

Monroe, K. 1984. *Presidential Popularity and the Economy*. New York: Praeger.

Owens, J. and E. Olson. 1980. Economic Fluctuations and Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 24:469–93.

Page, B. and R. Brody. 1972. Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: the Vietnam War Issue. *American Political Science Review* 73:1071–89.

Parker, G. and R. Davidson. 1979. Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More than Their Congress? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4:53–61.

Pierson, J. 1975. Presidential Popularity and Midterm Voting at Different Electoral Levels. *American Journal of Political Science* 19(4):683–94.

Ragsdale, L. 1980. The Fiction of Congressional Elections as Presidential Events. *American Politics Quarterly* 8:375–98.

Stigler, G. 1973. General Economic Conditions and National Elections. *American Economic Review* 63(2):160–67.

Stimson, J. 1985. Regression in Space and Time. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(4):914–47.

Sundquist, J. 1973. *Dynamics of the Party System*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Tufte, E. 1975. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 69(3):812–26.

——— 1978. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Uslaner, E. and M. Conway. 1985. The Responsive Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974. *American Political Science Review* 79(3):788–803.

Weatherford, M. 1978. Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in the Political Response to Recession. *American Journal of Political Science* 22(4):917–38.

——— 1983. Economic Voting and the "Symbolic Politics" Argument: A Reinterpretation and Synthesis. *American Political Science Review* 77(1):158–75.

Wides, J. 1976. Self-perceived Economic Change and Political Orientations: A Preliminary Exploration. *American Politics Quarterly* 4:395–411.

Wright, G. and M. Berkman. 1986. Candidates and Policy in U.S. Senate Elections. *American Political Science Review* 80(2):567–88.

Research Notes

Divisive Primaries and Party Activists: Kentucky, 1979 and 1983

Penny M. Miller
Temple University

Malcolm E. Jewell
University of Kentucky

Lee Sigelman
University of Arizona

How do campaign workers react when their candidate loses a primary election? Do they retire from the political fray, at least for the rest of the political season, or do they enlist in the winning candidate's general election campaign? And what factors determine these responses? Based on a mail survey of high level workers in the Kentucky gubernatorial primary campaigns of 1979 and 1983, we conclude that Kentucky activists were more likely to support the winner of the primary than would be expected on the basis of prior research, and that the best predictors of such reactions are the activist's degree of involvement in past campaigns, identification with the party, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, political ideology and material motivation for involvement in the primary.

It has often been asserted that direct primaries undermine political parties by producing, exacerbating, or at the very least publicizing rifts among their supporters. V. O. Key believed that "the adoption of the direct primary opened the road for disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized the party organization. [T]he primary system . . . facilitated the construction of factions and cliques attached to ambitions of individual leaders" (1964, p. 342). Those who voluntarily commit their time, energy, money, and other resources to a candidate who loses the party primary may be reluctant to transfer their loyalties to the winner (Hacker 1965). Even if the issue positions of the winning and losing candidates are virtually identical, the experience of losing can sour an activist on further involvement, as can the fact that the winning candidate was the agent of this defeat.

Over the years, considerable research has accumulated concerning the effects of divisive primaries on general election outcomes (see Born 1981; Kenney and Rice 1984; Piereson and Smith, 1975; Stone 1984, 1986), but relatively little is known about how *activists* respond to defeat in primaries. Are they more likely to pitch in and work for the primary winner in the general election campaign or to withdraw, at least temporarily, from the political fray? Just as importantly, what factors shape these responses?

A rare glimpse at these issues was provided by Johnson and Gibson's (1974) study of volunteers in the 1970 primary and general election campaigns in an Iowa congressional district Among those whose candidate did not survive the primary, 73 percent anticipated becoming less active in the general election campaign, nearly half indicated an unwillingness to vote for the primary winner, and 21 percent actually intended to work for the other party in some capacity But this short-term dropoff in partisan activity seemed unlikely to inflict lasting harm on the party, since most of the activists—losers as well as winners—voiced an intention to participate in future campaigns and to seek higher positions within the party (Johnson and Gibson, 1974, pp 76–77)

Since the Johnson-Gibson study was limited to a single district during a single year, it seems appropriate to re-examine the response of primary activists to the defeat of their candidate This note uses data from a survey of volunteer workers in the 1979 and 1983 Democratic gubernatorial primary campaigns in Kentucky to clarify the impact of divisive primaries on party activists

THE SETTING OF THE STUDY

From the 1930s through the 1960s Kentucky Democratic politics was bifactional During the 1970s, however, the old factional lines began to break down, and by 1979 they could scarcely be perceived In 1979 the gubernatorial candidates were George Atkins, John Y Brown, Jr , Carroll Hubbard Terry McBrayer, Harvey Sloane, and Thelma Stovall Atkins, the state auditor, was a sharp critic of the Carroll administration while McBrayer a former state representative, was the Carroll administrations designated candidate Sloane, the mayor of Louisville and Hubbard a U S representative from western Kentucky, drew their support from the party's liberal and conservative wings, respectively The political base of Stovall a veteran state office-holder and the incumbent lieutenant governor, was the trade union movement in Louisville Brown, a multimillionaire political neophyte, entered the campaign late, formed a last-minute alliance with Atkins (who withdrew), poured a great deal of money into a media campaign, and unexpectedly won the nomination In 1983, the candidates were Martha Layne Collins, the lieutenant governor, who ran a very well-financed campaign that emphasized media coverage and a strong grassroots organization, Harvey Sloane, the second-place finisher in 1979, who entered the 1983 primary season as the frontrunner and appeared to have the support of many organization Democrats who had not enlisted in his 1979 campaign, and Grady Stumbo, a Brown administration cabinet member perceived as the labor candidate from coal-poor eastern Kentucky, who won the active support of

Brown in the last days of the campaign In a hotly contested race, Collins won with just 35 percent of the vote

These are the bare facts of the 1979 and 1983 campaigns, but since we use these two campaigns as cases in point of *divisive* primaries, we need to consider whether they were truly divisive A closely contested primary is not necessarily divisive Rather, divisiveness obtains only when the campaign is characterized by bitterness and ill feelings among the participants—by animosity so palpable as to potentially alienate individuals and groups essential to the party's success in the general election (Westlye, 1985, p 5)

Prior to Brown's entry, the 1979 primary was a free-for-all, with the party split along several lines Then Brown, in an eleventh hour media-based campaign, launched a hard-hitting attack against old-style politics in general and the Carroll administration in particular, focusing on corruption as the prime issue in the campaign Although McBrayer was not named in the ongoing grand jury investigation of the Carroll administration, Brown and others (especially Atkins) capitalized on McBrayer's links with Carroll to tar him with the same brush, and the campaign in its latter stages became uncommonly personalistic and acrimonious Brown's maverick operating style and public disdain for the party organization also antagonized many party regulars The Sloane camp, for its part, was embittered by what it perceived as Atkins' sellout to Brown, especially since a Sloane-Atkins linkage had earlier been considered In the end, all the defeated candidates did back Brown's candidacy in the general election but the primary battle left scars that are still observable

The sheer nastiness of the 1979 primary was not repeated in 1983, but even then ill feelings continued to prevail among the various camps Sloane was portrayed as a "wimp" a characterization that naturally rankled him and his backers, while Stumbo who enjoyed support from the labor movement, was pictured as a wild-eyed radical Doubts were also raised about Collins fitness for the job, with overt references to her background as a beauty queen and home economics teacher and to her close ties to the "courthouse crowd," and with veiled suggestions that Kentucky was not ready for a female chief executive Stumbo's labor supporters worked energetically to defeat Sloane Sloane, the acknowledged front-runner early on was extremely upset with his defeat in this very close primary He demanded a recount conceded to Collins only two weeks after the primary and withheld even his grudging endorsement for several more weeks

By any standard, then, the 1979 primary would have to be considered highly divisive The 1983 primary was a less vitriolic and divisive affair But since the close three-way race generated sharp antagonisms among the three camps, we believe that it, too, can fairly be included in the category of divisive primaries

FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESPONSE TO LOSS

How did those who campaigned for losing candidates in the 1979 and 1983 primaries react? It seems highly likely that responses to a primary loss are shaped by the activist's political experience and commitments. Those who have been involved in politics on a more or less continuous basis and who strongly identify with the party should be less prone to walk away from a general election campaign after their preferred candidate loses in the primary, while those whose involvement has been more intermittent or who are less firmly bonded to the party should have less hesitation about sitting out the general election campaign. Johnson and Gibson noted in this regard that "bolters" were more likely than "nonbolters" to be political amateurs, 80 percent of the bolters had less than five years of political experience, and nearly 50 percent had no campaign experience. Similarly, only 25 percent of the bolters, but 50 percent of the nonbolters were strong party identifiers (1974, pp. 73–76).

It also seems possible that activists' reactions to a primary loss are shaped by the motivations that led them to become involved in the primary campaign in the first place. In particular, those motivated by a "material" incentive, e.g., financial rewards or career enhancement are primarily interested in the "spoils" of victory, in contrast to those whose motivation is more social ("solidary") or ideological ("purposive") (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Where the materialistic orientation prevails, the activist should be eager to become involved in the general election campaign, for to withdraw after a loss in the primary would be to cut oneself off from the spoils. On the other hand, some of those who enlist in a campaign are motivated above all else by their friendship with or admiration for a candidate, and this type of motivation seems less likely to transfer over to a second candidate.

It is also plausible that activists who invested most heavily in a primary campaign and who derived the greatest satisfaction from their participation in the primary would be most willing to become involved in another candidate's bid for election. We might also anticipate that supporters of certain losing candidates would be more likely to become involved in the general election campaign than supporters of other losing candidates would. Some candidates seem to attract more "professional," long-term activists than others, and these professionals tend to work year in and year out in both primary and general election battles. In the Kentucky context, we would expect, for example, that McBrayer's relatively "professional" supporters would have been more likely to line up behind Brown than would Sloane's relatively "amateur" supporters. Furthermore, conflicts between certain candidates sometimes become heated during primaries, leading supporters of some candidates to become embittered against the candidate who ultimately wins the primary. For this reason, one might expect Collins to have

been less successful in attracting workers from her defeated opponents in 1983 than Brown was in 1979

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this study come from a mail survey of high-ranking volunteer workers in the campaigns of the nine Democratic contenders in the 1979 and 1983 primaries Each candidate or a high-ranking staffer in his or her campaign provided a list of county, district, and state chairmen and treasurers These lists were supplemented where necessary with information from other sources, or, if they were too long, names were randomly drawn from them The state party headquarters also provided a list of heads of county party organizations and party women's clubs These selection criteria gave small counties greater weight than their population would merit but this overrepresentation was counterbalanced to some extent by the disproportionate representation of large population centers in higher campaign roles

In all, 2,000 people were contacted shortly after the November 1983 general election, and a follow-up postcard was sent to nonresponders approximately one month later Responses were received from 734 (37 percent) of those contacted a return rate deemed acceptable in view of the length (16 pages) of the questionnaire Analysis here focuses on the subset of respondents who worked for a losing candidate and who answered every question upon which the analysis is based (N = 284 for 1979 and 262 for 1983) There are obvious difficulties in using recall data of any kind (see Weir 1975) but political activists might be expected to remember their participation in a campaign much more accurately than the average citizen recalls his or her relatively casual political involvement On the other hand the time dimension of this study presents a potential complication Respondents were asked to describe their involvement in the 1983 primary and where applicable in the 1979 primary as well If their memories had faded over four years they may have based their 1979 responses on their 1983 experiences While we have no way of determining the extent to which such bias may have crept into the responses analyzed here the vividness of the primary campaigns in the activists memories enhances our confidence that the bias was minimal

The dependent variable in the analysis is a yes/no response to the question "In 1979 [1983], did you work for the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in the general election?" The independent variables based on the propositions outlined above fall into five categories personal political characteristics, motivations for involvement in the primary campaign level of involvement in the primary campaign positive affect toward the primary campaign, and primary candidate preference

Four *personal political characteristics* were included in the analysis a

1–5 Likert scale summarizing a respondent's degree of involvement in Kentucky campaigns during the last five years; the number of years the respondent had been actively involved in Kentucky politics, a 1–5 liberalism-conservatism scale, and the respondent's party identification (measured on the traditional 1–7 scale). *Motivations for involvement in the primary* were measured in a series of thirteen, 1–4 Likert-type items drawn from prior empirical work on the Clark-Wilson typology of motivations (Costantini and King, 1984, Hedges, 1984) One item ("support of a particular candidate I believe in") was set aside since so many of the respondents highlighted it Factor analyses of the remaining twelve items uncovered three dimensions in both 1979 and 1983 The first dimension, on which the highest-loading items included "certain group-political ties," "social contacts," "excitement of the campaign," and "work with friends and relatives," clearly tapped solidary motivations, the high loadings of "help my own political career," "make business contacts," and "obtain local/state job" suggest that the second factor tapped material motivations, and the remaining four items ("work for issues, "influence policies of the government," "civic responsibility," and "interest group goals") loaded on a third dimension, which related to purposive motivations for involvement Based on these results, each set of items was combined additively to form a summary score for each respondent on each dimension in a given year The "personal friendship with a candidate" item was used by itself as an indicator of a candidate-centered motivation for participation in the primary

Two separate indicators of *level of involvement in the primary campaign* were employed for each year the number of hours per week and the amount of money the respondent contributed to the campaign *Positive affect toward the primary campaign* was probed in a series of seven 1–5 Likert-type items ("experienced good relationships with the co-workers", "felt primary deserved my support even if I were unable to participate" "campaign involvement made me more interested in sticking with politics", felt I belonged to a cohesive group", "cared about what the campaign organization said or did", "participation increased due to personality of candidate", and "importance of the primary campaign's purpose") Since factor analyses uncovered a single underlying dimension for each year, the seven items were combined into a single additive index of positive feelings about the primary campaign Finally, dummy (0, 1) variables were coded to designate each activist's *candidate preference* in the campaign(s) in which he or she worked [1]

[1]The central tendency and dispersion of every variable in the analysis are shown below

	1979		1983	
	mean	s d	mean	s d
Frequency of campaign activity	3 3	7	3 2	5
Years of campaign activity	19 4	10 0	15 9	10 2

FINDINGS

Of the 284 activists who had worked for one of the losers in the 1979 Democratic gubernatorial primary, 214 (75.4 percent) subsequently joined the campaign of the Democratic nominee, John Y. Brown, Jr. This percentage declined somewhat in 1983, when (probably as a reflection of animosities that developed during the extremely competitive primary) only 67.6 percent of the Sloane and Stumbo supporters decided to work in the Collins campaign. While it is impossible to draw exact comparisons between these figures and Johnson and Gibson's (1974) Iowa data, it does seem clear that losing the primary did less to demobilize the Kentucky activists than their Iowa counterparts. In Iowa nearly half of the backers of candidates whose bids for nomination were unsuccessful refused even to vote in the general election for the winner of the primary. By contrast, in Kentucky two-thirds or more of those whose candidate lost in the primary went on to campaign for the winner of the primary. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear whether the Iowa or the Kentucky pattern is the more typical, but our data do indicate that the very pronounced tendency that Johnson and Gibson (1974) observed in Iowa for supporters of losing primary candidates to withhold their support from the primary winner is far less prevalent in at least one other setting.

Did the thirty percent or so of the Kentucky activists who did not join in the general election campaign after their favorite lost in the primary differ in any systematic way from the approximately seventy percent who did campaign for the winner of the primary? Table 1 summarizes a pair of discriminant analyses bearing on this question; the two analyses are identical, except that the variables in each were matched to the election at hand.

Party identification	1.5	.8	1.4	.9
Political ideology	2.9	1.0	2.9	1.0
Solidary incentives	10.8	3.1	10.0	5.0
Material incentives	4.8	2.0	5.0	2.1
Purposive incentives	11.8	2.6	12.2	2.5
Candidate-centered incentives	3.1	1.0	2.7	1.1
Hours worked in the primary	13.4	15.5	17.7	15.4
Money contributed to the primary	159.5	92.2	166.0	94.2
Satisfaction with the primary	28.6	4.5	29.1	4.3
% preferring each 1979 candidate				
Atkins	10.9		—	
Hubbard	5.6		—	
McBrayer	52.8		—	
Stovall	13.7		—	
Sloane	16.9		—	
% preferring each 1983 candidate				
Stumbo	—		35.1	
Sloane			64.9	

Table 1

Discriminant Analysis Summary, 1979 and 1983 Kentucky Democratic Primary Activists' Response to Primary Defeat

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	
	1979	1983
Personal Political Characteristics		
Frequency of campaign activity	581***	443*
Years of campaign activity	236	100
Party identification	504***	464**
Political ideology	− 206	450**
Motivations for Primary Involvement		
Solidary incentives	239	029
Material incentives	− 034	101*
Purposive incentives	− 057	253
Candidate-centered incentives	029	− 169
Level of Involvement in the Primary		
Hours worked	089	038
Money contributed	163	254
Satisfaction with the Primary Campaign	028	271
Candidate Preference		
Atkins 1979	401*	
Hubbard 1979	204	
McBrayer 1979	403*	
Stovall 1979	234	
Sloane 1979 reference category		
Stumbo 1983		115
Sloane 1983 (reference category)		
Group Centroids		
Nonworkers for the Democratic nominee	599	641
Workers for the Democratic nominee	294	308
Eigenvalue	266	199
Canonical Correlation	458	407
Percent Correctly Classified	75 2	76 3
Goodman and Kruskal's tau	415	456

*p < 05
**p < 01
***p < 001

As the summary statistics at the bottom of table 1 indicate the perfo[r]mance of these models was fairly impressive The best gauges of predictiv[e] power are Goodman and Kruskal's *tau* coefficients of 405 and 434 for 19[79] and 1983, respectively, this means that the errors in classification based [on] the discriminating variables were more than 40 percent below what wou[ld] have been expected had classification been attempted based solely on th[e] marginal distribution of the grouping variable

The standardized discriminant function coefficients identify the independent variables that do the most to distinguish those who remained active in the general election campaign from those who did not. In both 1979 and 1983, two personal political characteristics stood out above all the other predictors in the model. Those who had been involved in political campaigns relatively rarely or only intermittently over the previous five years were significantly more likely to drop out after a primary loss than those who had been involved in Kentucky politics on a more sustained basis. Similarly, the party identification scale (which largely distinguished between strong and less strong Democrats, with some independents and a handful of Republican identifiers) also separated the stayers from the dropouts among supporters of losing primary candidates: those who were more closely identified with the Democratic Party were more likely to work for the party's nominee after their preferred candidate had lost in the primary.

The effect of political ideology was significant in 1983 but fell short of significance in 1979. In 1979, Brown ran as a reformer, attacking corruption in state government and old style patronage politics. He did not adopt any identifiable issue positions, except for his refrain that he would "run state government like a business." In Kentucky, reform is part of the liberal agenda, but Brown did not campaign as either a liberal or a conservative. While there may thus have been some tendency for more liberal supporters of his defeated primary opponents to shift over to his general election campaign, that tendency was not very widespread. On the other hand, in 1983 Collins was clearly the most conservative of the three primary candidates, both in her orientation toward reform and the issue positions with which she and her opponents were identified. Thus the more liberal among the supporters of Sloane and Stumbo were significantly more likely to sit out the 1983 general election campaign than were their more conservative counterparts.

Among the motivations for involvement in the primary campaign, only the material motivation significantly affected the losing primary activists' likelihood of remaining active in the general election campaign, and that only in 1983. Those who participated in a primary campaign for what they hoped to get out of it in a material (largely career-advancement) sense were less hesitant to transfer their loyalties to the primary winner's campaign than those who were less moved by material considerations. Why did material considerations motivate the activists in 1983 but not in 1979? We would speculate that Brown's oft-expressed scorn for old-style patronage politics led to a perception that few tangible rewards, especially jobs, would result from working for him in the general election. By contrast, Collins, an old-line politico and ally of courthouse "professional" activists, was probably seen as more likely to reward her supporters with jobs, personal service contracts, and other forms of patronage. In contrast to these material considerations, the remaining motivational dimensions—most surprisingly, the candidate-centered

motivation—displayed no significant impact on the tendency of these activists to enlist in the winning candidate's general election campaign.

In 1979, Atkins and McBrayer backers were significantly more likely than Sloane supporters to sign on with the Brown general election campaign. These differences come as no great surprise, considering Atkins' withdrawal from the primary and subsequent endorsement of Brown, McBrayer's heavy reliance on long-term, "professional" politicos who would be predisposed to back the party's choice no matter who it may have been, and the predominantly "amateur" character of Sloane's primary workers. By contrast, in 1983 there was no significant difference between Sloane and Stumbo supporters in the decision to work for Collins' election, in both cases the percentage who worked for Collins in the fall campaign fell below the percentage of losing primary activists who had rallied behind Brown in 1979.

Conclusion

We have seen that the decision of activists who backed a losing candidate in the primary to work for the party's standard-bearer in the general election is reasonably predictable. The more active a primary worker has been in recent elections and the stronger his or her sense of identification with the party, the greater the likelihood that he or she will work to elect the winner of the primary. It is also true that backers of some primary candidates are more likely to sit out the general election than are supporters of other primary candidates.

While it is natural to highlight the factors that do affect the decision to become involved in the general election campaign, we should also pause to consider those that do not. We expected that activists who joined a primary campaign because of friendship with or attraction to a particular candidate would be less likely to transfer their loyalty to another candidate. But the findings summarized in table 1 contained only faint hints of any such effect. Nor, in contrast to our expectations, did positive feelings about involvement in the primary have a significant carryover impact on decisions to participate in the general election campaign. These two *non*effects constitute the major surprises of the present analysis, but for the present it is very difficult to account for them, only a strategy of replication in other settings will reveal whether these noneffects reflect peculiarities of Kentucky politics or a more general phenomenon. Speaking of peculiarities, we should also take note of the unusual Kentucky election calendar, which assures that a significant general election is held each year. In that context, committed party activists may develop a greater tolerance for short-term setbacks and a stronger norm of cooperation with their erstwhile intraparty opponents than would otherwise characterize intraparty conflict.

On a more positive note, two points stand out about the willingness of

reluctance of Kentucky Democratic party activists to back a party nominee against whom they have campaigned in the primary election. First, the *sheer frequency* with which Kentucky Democratic activists transfer their loyalties from a candidate who lost in the primary to the party's gubernatorial nominee appears to be considerably higher than was the case in the Iowa congressional district analyzed by Johnson and Gibson (1974). Second, the factors that best predict this tendency relate to the activists' *involvement in the party*. Together, these two points convey a strong sense that Democratic activists in Kentucky view primaries as intramural contests for which they must choose up sides. When one's side loses the intramural contest, there is relatively little hesitancy—especially on the part of those who identify most strongly with and participate most extensively in the party—to enlist in the extramural battle against the Republicans. We consider it highly probable that this willingness to campaign for the election of a candidate one originally opposed reflects the fluidity of factional politics and the nonideological nature of politics in Kentucky. This interpretation suggests a proposition that can serve as a guidepost for future comparative state analyses: that the willingness of losing primary activists to campaign for the primary winner is greater in party systems characterized by the absence of deep factional or ideological divisions than in systems where such schisms predominate.

REFERENCES

Born, Richard. 1981. The Influence of House Primary Election Divisiveness on General Election Margins, 1962–1976. *Journal of Politics* 43:640–61.

Clark, Peter B., and James Q. Wilson. 1961. Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6:129–66.

Costantini, Edmond, and Joel King. 1984. The Motives of Political Party Activists: A Factor-analytic Exploration. *Political Behavior* 6:79–91.

Hacker, Andrew. 1965. Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances? *American Political Science Review* 59:105–10.

Hedges, Roman B. 1984. Reasons for Political Involvement: A Study of Contributors to the 1972 Presidential Campaign. *Western Political Quarterly* 15:489–506.

Johnson, Donald Bruce, and James R. Gibson. 1974. The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa. *American Political Science Review* 68:67–77.

Kenney, Patrick J., and Thomas W. Rice. 1984. The Effect of Primary Divisiveness in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections. *Journal of Politics* 46:904–15.

Key, V. O., Jr. 1964. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. 5th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Pierson, James E., and T. B. Smith. 1975. Primary Divisiveness and General Election Success: A Reexamination. *Journal of Politics* 37:555–62.

Sigelman, Lee. 1984. Doing Discriminant Analysis: Some Problems and Solutions. *Political Methodology* X:67–80.

Stone, Walter J. 1984. Prenomination Candidate Choice and General Election Behavior: Iowa Presidential Activists in 1980. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:361–78.

———. 1986. The Carryover Effect in Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review* 80:271–79.

Weir, Blair T 1975 The Distortion of Voter Recall *American Journal of Political Science* 19 53–62

Westlye, Mark C 1985 The Effects of Primary Divisiveness on Incumbent Senators, 1968–84 Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans LA

Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting

Roberta Q. Herzberg
Indiana University

Rick K. Wilson
Rice University

This research explores the extent of sophisticated voting in a simplified agenda setting. We begin from the commonly held presumption that decision makers (whether legislators or school board members) employ sophisticated strategies when voting. This viewpoint has been rigorously modeled under a variety of formal theories. However, given that there is little corroborative empirical evidence that decision makers use sophisticated voting strategies, we turn to a series of laboratory experiments designed to test the extent to which sophisticated voting is relied upon. Our findings are at odds with a general claim that sophisticated behavior is ubiquitous.

Theoretical studies of decision making with fixed agendas suggest that extensive sophisticated voting should occur. Sophisticated voters, faced with a series of binary choices, make intermediate non-utility maximizing decisions to produce a preferred final outcome. While these theoretical results are both logical and compelling, empirical voting studies provide little support for sophisticated voting. Hundreds of roll-call voting studies of the U.S. Congress, for example, reinforce a conclusion that voting is characterized by consistent and sincere voting patterns. Important exceptions do exist (see Riker 1965, or Bjurulf and Niemi 1978), but relative to the numerous sincere voting patterns the handful of sophisticated outcomes are hardly in keeping with theoretical expectations.

This research note suggests several constraints on sophisticated behavior and presents an important laboratory test of such voting. Specifically, we evaluate voting strategies in a setting which controls information conditions, the risks associated with errors by other players, and the complexity of the decision process. Based on these experiments we challenge the theoretical contention that sophisticated voting is commonplace. Our findings suggest

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Economic Sciences Association Meeting, February 28-March 1, 1986, and the West Coast Conference on Small Group Research, March 6, 1986. This paper has benefited from comments by Elinor Ostrom, Charles Plott, Arlington Williams, and several anonymous reviewers. Our thanks also go to Patsy Garcia.

that theorists consider some of the limitations on sophisticated behavior when modeling decision processes.

Theoretical Background

Sophisticated voting involves a choice among voting strategies whereby an individual foregoes short-term gains for long-term advantage. Robin Farquharson (1969) suggests the first comprehensive model of sophisticated voting. In his discussion, Farquharson reduces simple majority rule procedures to games in normal form. This leaves a decision maker facing the problem of selecting an optimal strategy given the possible strategies played by other decision makers. Farquharson's primary contribution lies with conceptualizing vulnerable strategies in which an individual, anticipating the strategies of others, can unilaterally change his own strategy and be left better off than otherwise would have been expected. Farquharson characterizes those circumstances under which an individual abandons a sincere strategy, (i.e., the consistent choice of a most preferred alternative in the short run) in order to improve his expected outcome.

Theorists have considerably embellished Farquharson's original discussion (see Kramer, 1972, McKelvey and Niemi, 1978, Miller, 1980, Niemi and Frank 1982, Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, Banks, 1984, Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle, 1985, McKelvey, 1986, and Ordeshook and Schwartz, 1987). For instance, McKelvey and Niemi (1978) provide an intuitively more appealing alternative to Farquharson that closely corresponds to most binary choice agenda mechanisms. They represent choice settings as games in extensive form, and develop a useful algorithm for working backward through the decision tree, pinpointing decision nodes at which an individual has a sophisticated strategy. Shelpsle and Weingast (1984) recast Farquharson's discussion in terms of overlapping sets of undominated alternatives. Their characterization is conducive to uncovering geometric solutions for sophisticated strategies. Finally, work by Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle (1985) steps back to consider the complex environments in which voting strategies (including sophisticated strategies) are selected.

All of this work has clarified and steadily progressed beyond Farquharson's original observations. The question we ask is whether the theoretical attention paid to sophisticated strategies is justified. The theoretical work clearly shows that collective choices based on an assumption of sincere voting will be quite different from those obtained when actors are assumed to vote with foresight. It is not clear, however, whether individuals consistently rely on sophisticated strategies and consequently it is unclear whether an assumption of sophisticated voting helps predict events in the empirical world.

Previous Empirical Work

Despite the strong theoretical results regarding sophisticated voting, few empirical studies substantiate those findings. Sophisticated voting requires extensive information regarding individual preferences and agenda procedures. Political scientists seldom have information about the full array of decision makers' preferences and it is even more difficult to infer such information from observable actions in natural decision settings. Consequently, most empirical work on sophisticated voting consists of either case studies of extraordinary situations or laboratory experiments replicating the basic structure of the decision rules assumed in theory.

The case studies of sophisticated voting focus on isolated situations where the incentives for such behavior are transparent. Riker's (1965) study of the 1956 U.S. House Education and Labor committee bill authorizing construction grants to local schools provides an excellent example of sophisticated behavior within the House of Representatives. Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle (1985) subsequently reanalyze this setting, noting as well the sophisticated strategies selected by coalitions of representatives. In a different vein, Enelow and Koehler (1980) focus on two case studies from the U.S. Congress to illustrate two variants of sophisticated amending strategies. Examples of sophisticated voting, however, are not limited to legislators. Rosenthal (1974) finds evidence of sophisticated voting by union members in French labor union elections, while Felsenthal and Brichta (1985) provide some evidence of strategic voting by electors in the 1980 Israeli parliamentary elections. While these case studies point out that sophisticated strategies are used, they do not indicate how extensive sophisticated behavior is under typical voting conditions. These studies are based either on isolated cases or on imputing sophisticated strategies to aggregated groups.

Experimental work provides a way to test the extent of sophisticated behavior under the restrictive assumptions the theory requires. The experimenter constructs well-defined agendas and induces participant preferences in order to investigate a variety of decision theoretic topics. Plott and Levine (1978) focus explicitly on individual choice strategies in binary voting games. While they do not directly address the issue of sophistication, their experiments do capture differences in sincere behavior and an assortment of other strategic choices. They find that individuals consistently use non-myopic voting strategies. However, these experiments do not allow a direct assessment of whether those strategies are sophisticated. Wilson and Pearson (1987) also observe a good deal of non-myopic individual level voting in experiments using committee-like settings. However, they observe little sophisticated voting, even when participants have strong incentives for such strategies. In light of their findings, Wilson and Pearson suggest that a num-

ber of exogenous variables may be important for predicting sophisticated behavior.

Although these experiments provide controlled settings with which to test the concept of sophistication, they fail to address several possibilities. First, sophisticated strategies may be difficult for individuals to calculate.[1] The experiments by Wilson and Pearson (1987) often involved lengthy agendas in which sophisticated choices occurred early in the agenda. This meant that to act with foresight, individuals had to calculate a complex set of intersecting win sets in a two-dimensional space—a difficult task at best. Even in finite alternative games, where solving decision trees and locating sophisticated nodes of such trees is easier, this task can become quite complicated. Hence, it may be that sophisticated behavior occurs only in settings in which the calculations involved in uncovering a sophisticated strategy are limited. If true, this implies that formal theory should employ relaxed assumptions of perfect foresight.

A second consideration, unexplored in existing empirical research on sophisticated voting, pertains to decision makers' assessments of other participants' behavior. In order to produce a sophisticated outcome, all participants must play their appropriate sophisticated or sincere strategies. At worst, even if all other players choose only their sincere strategies, a sophisticated decision maker will obtain the sincere outcome. However, if other decision makers fail to comprehend the nature of the decision setting, then a sophisticated voter can be left even worse off. In the absence of any assurance that other participants are playing the same game, choosing a sophisticated strategy may be risky. This is especially so for representatives casting sophisticated votes. As Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle (1985) point out, sophisticated choices (which are contrary to self-interest in the short run) may be difficult for representatives to explain to constituents. A representative's plight is compounded if a sophisticated strategy fails (due to non-maximizing choices by others) and the collective choice is worse than the sincere choice. If a decision maker can only imperfectly assess the likely strategic choices of others (who may not even be playing the same game), then sophisticated choices may be risky for a representative who must stand by and justify each vote.

Finally, the decision setting itself can constrain sophisticated strategies. As noted above, the length of an agenda can complicate the calculations that an individual must make. Agenda length often is defined by specific institutional rules which govern the number of allowable amendments and limit the length of time open for discussion. Similarly, as a decision setting increase

[1] Psychologists have long noted the boundaries on individuals' cognitive processing ability. A classic experiment by Miller (1956) discusses several interesting limitations on short term memory. Also see Kintsch (1970) for subsequent work on memory constraints. Simon (19 also relies on these limited calculating abilities to elaborate the concept of bounded rationa

in complexity, presenting an individual with more choices, the number of calculations he faces increases as well. On the other hand, the decision setting may simplify an individual's calculations by providing additional information about how others make their choices. The institutional components of a decision setting provide more or less information to decision makers which in turn can support or inhibit the selection of sophisticated strategies. The decision settings examined by Wilson and Pearson (1987), for example, were complex institutions with considerable uncertainty. If the decision setting affects the extent of sophisticated voting, then such settings must be incorporated into formal models of collective choice. In part, this process has already begun by those interested in models of "structurally-induced equilibrium" (see for example Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985).

Experimental Test

The experiments reported in this study were designed to test the extent of sophisticated voting in binary choice settings. The laboratory experimental setting used here allows us to control for several of the factors that may affect sophisticated behavior in empirical settings. First, we explicitly induce individual preferences and thereby overcome one of the principal shortfalls of empirical work investigating sophisticated voting behavior. Second, these experiments aim at controlling the problem that decision makers must respond to the unpredictable, non-maximizing strategies of others. Each participant voted on a fixed agenda along with four computer-controlled robot participants who always played sincere strategies. Finally, our primary treatment variable allows us to directly test the overall frequency of sophisticated voting and to evaluate whether institutional complexity has any effect on sophisticated choices.


Every experiment had two components. The first instructed participants and allowed them to practice until they were familiar with the mechanics of the experiment. The second component involved participants voting across a fixed agenda, choosing an outcome that determined their payoff for the experiment. These activities were not very time consuming with participants typically spending only twenty five minutes in the experiment. Participants first worked through a short set of instructions on the computer indicating the basics of the experiment.[7] In these instructions, a sample agenda was shown to participants and the simple majority binary choice rule used in the experiments was explained. Also explained was the way in which payoffs for the experiment were attached to arbitrary alternatives. Finally, these instructions emphasized that the other players in the experiment were robot participants who *always* voted for the alternative they most preferred. That is, robot players' strategies were fixed as sincere strategies.

[7] These instructions are available from the second author upon request.

Having the computer give the instructions has two important advantages for experimental design. First, participants can work through those instructions at their own speed. This allows them to spend extra time on those items which are troubling. Second, participants receive the same instructions. This eliminates the danger of experimenter-induced threats to validity in which, by emphasizing certain words and concepts, the experimenter telegraphs prior expectations about outcomes. While participants were encouraged in the instructions to ask questions of the experimenter if they did not understand some part of the experiment, very few took such an opportunity. Once these instructions were completed, participants faced a practice round. This involved voting on an agenda with four alternatives. This agenda, represented by the decision tree on figure 1, had both a sincere and a sophisticated outcome, D and B respectively. In practice, as in the real experiment the robot players (members 2–5) always voted sincerely. When participants completed this practice round, they were informed as to their earnings if the decision had not been for practice. Players could then choose to begin the

FIGURE 1

DECISION TREE AND MEMBER PREFERENCES FOR PRACTICE ROUND



Member Preferences


Human Player	C > B > A > D
Robot 1	C > A > B > D
Robot 2	A > D > B > C
Robot 3	B > D > A > C
Robot 4	D > C > B > A

D = Sincere Outcome

B = Sophisticated Outcome

FIGURE 2

VOTING SCREEN USED BY PARTICIPANTS




experiment or to practice again. If they chose to continue practicing, they then faced the same agenda as represented in figure 1. However, the alpha-numeric representations of these alternatives were randomly reset so that the agenda appeared different. Participants could practice as many times as they wished (and were urged in the instructions to do so until they were familiar with the way in which the experiment worked). Across all treatments individuals averaged 4.4 practice rounds, with one individual going through 15 such rounds.

In the experiment, participants were presented with the screen represented in figure 2. At the top of the screen participants were given all other members' ordinal preference rankings for all alternatives. Next they were given their own preferences for and dollar valuations associated with each

Figure 3

Decision Tree Representing Agendas Used in all Experiments



alternative. Below this information was a box indicating the current agenda. The first and second alternatives to that agenda were paired with one another. The highlighted boxes indicated the status quo and amendment alternatives. Once a vote was taken, the losing alternative was removed from the agenda and the highlighted boxes were updated to reflect which alternatives were being voted on. Participants were forced to wait forty-five seconds between votes (though most waited a longer period of time). This was to ensure that individuals considered each pair of alternatives and did not rush through the agenda. Following a vote, participants were informed as to what they had voted for and the valuation of that alternative. Participants were then given an opportunity to change their vote or continue. Once they had confirmed their vote they were informed of the collective choice. When the voting was concluded, the final outcome was displayed, as well as the participant's earnings. Participants were then paid in cash and sent on their way.

Treatments

All experiments reported in this paper used procedures identical to those outlined above. However, three agendas of different length were used in these experiments in order to disentangle effects due to complexity. The first treatment, the *short* agenda, had four alternatives and three votes. The second treatment, the *medium* agenda, had six alternatives with five votes. The final treatment, the *long* agenda, contained eight alternatives requiring individuals to vote seven times. Both the first and second treatments used agendas that were subsets of the agenda used in the third treatment. Relevant portions of the decision tree used in these treatments are given in figure 3 (members' preferences are given in figure 2). As can be seen, the agenda for the second treatment contains the final six elements of the third treatment. The first treatment, in turn, contains the final four elements of both the second and third treatments. These agendas were chosen to provide continuity across the treatments and also to illustrate the important differences over classes of outcomes when the agenda expands in length.

These experiments involved 101 participants responding to advertisements at Rice University and Indiana University. Roughly one-third of the 101 participants were assigned to each treatment. A relatively large number of participants was run in each treatment since we anticipated low levels of sophisticated behavior under one or more of the treatments. Under the first treatment, as can be noted from figure 3, the sincere choice for the participant was alternative C. Participants also had a sophisticated choice. At the agenda step pairing alternatives (C, G), a sophisticated player would vote for

Roughly one third of the experiments were run at Rice University and the remaining were conducted at Indiana University. In all of the results reported here, there are no subject pool differences.

G over C. This results in the sophisticated outcome, H. In a like manner, both the second and third treatments had sincere and sophisticated strategies for the human participant In all treatments, the sincere choice was the same, alternative C. Under both the second and third treatments, alternative F is the sophisticated choice This meant that the human participant had to vote contrary to his preferences at the vote between the pair (B,C)

While these experiments seem complicated, they are far less complex than decisions in a natural setting. With these simplified decision-making experiments, we aim at testing two distinct points First we wish to test overall rates of sophisticated voting These experiments allow us to determine whether decision makers rely on sophisticated strategies in a setting which is almost transparent Our second aim is with testing whether complexity affects an individual's strategic choice Our expectation is that as the agenda becomes longer, strategic calculations become more difficult, and consequently individuals are less likely to use sophisticated voting strategies

Results

Our experimental results show participants choose fully sophisticated strategies 29 7 percent of the time Contrary to expectations, individuals use sophisticated voting strategies relatively infrequently This finding is surprising since the decision setting is quite simple Even though voters have full information about the ordinal preferences of others and vote over a fixed agenda, less than one-third of these decision makers choose sophisticated strategies Given that this setting provides a conducive environment with every incentive for sophisticated voting, we believe our findings represent an upper limit for such behavior in other settings

If these results are broken down by treatment (see table 1), we find little support for our conjecture about the role of complexity We speculated that as the length of the agenda (complexity) increases, participants are less likely to select sophisticated strategies Under our first treatment, with the shortest agenda, less than one-third of the participants selected a sophisticated voting strategy Meanwhile, those making decisions under a long agenda acted with foresight just more than twenty percent of the time These results are in line with our expectations However, the second treatment, with a six element agenda, finds participants choosing a sophisticated strategy at substantially higher rates (approaching forty percent) This finding is contrary to what we expected Instead of a monotonically decreasing proportion of participants selecting sophisticated outcomes as the agenda process becomes more complex, we find a curvilinear relationship Within the bounds of our discussion there is no theoretical justification for these anomalous results

Are these unexpected results a function of other contaminating, uncontrolled elements of the experiment? We doubt it and we can subject several alternative explanations to test First, are these results a function of the ex

TABLE 1

TYPE OF OUTCOME BY EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT

		Outcome			
		Sophisticated Outcome	Sincere Outcome	Other Outcome	Row Totals
Treatment	Short Agenda	29.4% (10)	67.6% (23)	3.0% (1)	100% (34)
	Medium Agenda	37.1% (13)	48.6% (17)	14.3% (5)	100% (35)
	Long Agenda	21.9% (7)	53.1% (17)	25.0% (8)	100% (32)

(Frequencies in parentheses)
Source: Data collected by authors

tent to which participants practiced.[2] Sophisticated behavior may be something acquired through experience. In these experiments participants were urged to practice as much as they wished in order to become familiar with the experiment. This practicing amounted to learning about the choice mechanism and the variety of strategies available to individuals. The same structure of preferences and agenda was presented to participants at each practice round. The question, then, is whether practice provided short-term learning about the choice setting and whether this translated into a propensity to choose a sophisticated strategy. We conducted a one-way ANOVA (unbalanced design) of the number of times a participant went through the practice session and compared this across choice of voting strategies. From this analysis we found no relationship between practicing and type of outcome ($F_{2,98}$ = .02, p = .98). This tells us that individuals choosing a sophisticated strategy (and obtaining a sophisticated outcome) did not practice any more than did those choosing other strategies.

In conjunction with the idea that participants may learn sophisticated behavior, we examined participants' strategic choices during their practice rounds. If participants used the practice session to learn the strategic components of the experiment, then they ought to apply that learned behavior to the voting choices made during the actual experiment. There is no support for this conjecture. While seventy-five participants chose the sophisticated strategy at some point in practice, only thirty-two percent also chose it in the real experiment. Taking a cross-tabulation of a member's sophisticated or non-sophisticated choice over the practice session and in the real experiment yields a weak relationship (tau-b = .069).[3]

The apparent lack of learning evident in these experiments could be a

[3]The same basic weak relationship is borne out under each individual treatment as well.

function of mistrust on the part of participants. Even though the experiment was represented as non-manipulative, and participants faced a series of practice sessions designed to allay those fears, when voting for real payoffs, participants may be very suspicious. Consequently, they may be inclined to choose a myopic strategy in order to defend against surprises that they (incorrectly) anticipate coming from the experimenter. To test whether this was a concern, five participants in the long agenda treatment repeated the experiment. It was not announced to these participants that they would vote twice to earn money. Instead, once they completed their voting, they were paid. They were then informed they would vote once again over *exactly the same agenda*. If participants were initially suspicious of the real voting session, once they participated these suspicions should have been reduced. Consequently, the second time through the same agenda, they were free to choose any other strategy. In each instance, however, participants were consistent in their choice of strategies. Three participants initially selected the sincere choice and continued to do so the second time through the experiment. Another participant chose an "other" strategy and again did so when voting the second time on the same agenda. Finally, the fifth participant chose a sophisticated strategy both times when voting on the agenda. These results lend credence to the point that strategic choices are consistent.

An interesting footnote to our results concerns those outcomes which were a function of neither sincere or sophisticated voting strategies. On table 1 these results are labeled as "other." Three of these outcomes were the result of non-maximizing strategies chosen by participants. In post-experiment debriefings, these individuals' rationalizations varied. One indicated that she always sought to vote with the majority, even though her vote was pivotal at crucial junctures of the agenda. Another participant chose to always vote contrary to his self-interest, suspicious that the experiment entailed some form of manipulation since the voting strategies looked so straightforward. A third simply seemed confused regarding the entire game. These reactions were not specific to any treatment since one instance occurred in each treatment.

The remaining voting strategy in this "other" category (accounting for almost eleven percent of the total experimental results) yields a common outcome—alternative H. While this outcome is the sophisticated choice under the short agenda, it is *not* under either the medium or long agenda treatments. This outcome could be considered a "limited sophisticated" choice under these latter treatments if participants use only limited foresight when calculating the agenda. For example, suppose a participant only anticipates the first half of the agenda under the second treatment. This means partitioning the agenda (A, B, C, F, G, H) into two subsets. If the first partition contains the alternatives (A, B, C), the sophisticated (and sincere) choice is alternative C. If this alternative is then added to the second partition so that the agenda is now (C, F, G, H), the sincere and sophisticated choices differ. The former is

alternative C while the latter is alternative H. Because an individual fails to look very far down the agenda (noting that alternative C will defeat F—the sophisticated choice for the medium and long treatments), outcome H represents a second best choice. Of course, this is only one way in which an individual might partition the agenda. When the participant has foresight, any partition that includes the subset (B,C,F) will result in the sophisticated choice F. Only where participants have limited foresight over the final elements of the agenda will outcome H arise. Our results show that this outcome is selected on occasion and that it is more likely to be chosen when the agenda is longer and hence more difficult to calculate. This provides a small piece of evidence that complexity may matter for some types of voting strategies.

Conclusion

These findings directly address the three points raised earlier in the paper. First of all our experiments indicate that sophisticated strategies are infrequently selected by our participants. In part, this may be due to the fact that such strategies are difficult to calculate. We expected that the more complicated (longer) the agenda, the less often participants would choose sophisticated strategies. This was not what we found. Instead, participants, whether faced with short or long agendas, have difficulty calculating sophisticated strategies. This finding holds up irrespective of the amount of practice participants had with this voting mechanism and whether they uncovered the sophisticated outcome during the practice sessions.

The second point concerns whether participants understood that they were choosing among the same array of strategies. This experiment was designed to elicit as much sophisticated behavior as possible. To do so we minimized uncertainty about the behavioral strategies of others by having participants play against robot players with fixed, sincere, strategies. Even so, the bulk of the voting choices failed to be sophisticated.

The final point of concern was whether different decision settings constrained the choice of voting strategies. We sought to test this conjecture by varying the length (hence the complexity) of the agenda. We expected that the more limited the number of elements to an agenda, the more likely actors will make sophisticated choices. This point is only weakly supported in our experiments and then only when comparing the shortest and longest agendas. What we find in these experiments is that as the size of the agenda increases, the proportion of participants choosing limited sophisticated strategies increases. Keep in mind that limited sophisticated choices are second best in that they yield less than an individual could obtain by using foresight across the entire agenda. Limited sophisticated choices in these experiments are choices across a very small part of the agenda and they tend to occur more frequently as the length of the agenda increases.

These experimental results should not be construed as a test of ration-

ality." Our intention is not to determine whether people act rationally and then to defend or condemn rational choice theory on the basis of our results. Our concern is with testing the extent to which individuals choose among several different voting strategies. These experiments, then, focus on testing theoretical claims about sophisticated voting. This point is quite important, since it relates to the degree of generalization derived from these experiments. The findings are obtained from a deliberately controlled setting that aims at being closer to theory than to a variety of natural settings. The intention was to build a test quite favorable to the model—where full information about ordinal preferences existed, members' strategies were clear, and participants were experienced. Even though the procedures in these experiments look complicated, they are quite simple and substantially easier to comprehend than procedures in most natural settings. Given this rather favorable experimental setting and the rather low levels of observed sophisticated behavior, we are skeptical about the extent of such behavior. Since we find little sophisticated voting in a laboratory setting in which all of the assumptions of such behavior are clearly met, we generalize that it is less likely such behavior will predominate in natural settings where the assumptions may be only weakly met.

Our principal finding, then, is that sophisticated behavior is relatively uncommon. This should not be an earth-shaking finding, since in natural settings (legislatures, city councils, school boards) there is not a substantial body of literature documenting the prevalence of such behavior. Nonetheless, this finding appears to go against the usual impulse of political scientists to view political activity as ripe with manipulation. Policies are often viewed as the product of clever actors scheming to achieve desired ends, and obtaining those ends using sophisticated ploys. Our findings do not support such observations as being the norm. Instead, we conclude that decision making is most often characterized by sincere behavior.

We do not claim that political actors never choose sophisticated strategies—only that these choices are infrequent. Our findings suggest that sophisticated behavior may be constrained by the decision setting. Where the agenda is complex, decision makers may find it difficult to calculate different strategies. We observe some inclination by participants to rely on limited sophisticated strategies as the size of the agenda grows in length. This point also corresponds with several case studies of sophisticated voting. The examples given by Riker (1965), and Enelow and Koehler (1980) examine instances in which legislators faced very limited agendas—typically only the status quo, the bill and an amendment to the bill. Consequently, constraints on the size of an agenda may enhance the ability of actors to calculate the effect of various strategies and to choose a sophisticated strategy.

Our findings also suggest that the decision setting be well understood and apparent to all actors. The simplicity of our experiments, the relative trans-

parency of the different strategies, and the use of robots with known strategies yields a higher level of sophisticated behavior than in other experiments (see Wilson and Pearson, 1987, Eckles and Holt, 1986, Plott and Levine, 1978). This point, too, is congruent with case studies in natural settings The sophisticated votes by Republicans on the Powell amendment in 1956 (Riker, 1965) or the sophisticated votes by liberal senators on Panama Canal Treaty amendments (Enelow and Koehler, 1980) were well recognized by all factions. All actors were clear as to the nature of the game being played and ensured that those voting sophisticatedly stayed with that strategy As noted earlier it appears to be the case that the obviousness of a sophisticated strategy is due to the size of the agenda

While sophisticated voting must be contended with, it is not omnipresent, dominating the strategic choices of all actors It is a strategy that is relatively infrequently played—especially in complex decision-making settings What is interesting is that the decision-setting places constraints on the extent to which sophisticated strategies are employed This means that when modeling or studying individual behavior in collective choice settings, the extent to which the decision setting enhances or hinders sophisticated choices must also be taken into account

REFERENCES

Banks Jeffrey S 1984 Sophisticated Outcomes and Agenda Control Pasadena CA California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper Number 524

Bjurulf Bo and Richard Niemi 1978 Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments *Scandinavian Political Studies* 1 5 22

Denzau Arthur William Riker and Kenneth Shepsle 1985 Farquharson and Fenno Sophisticated Voting and Home Style *American Political Science Review* 79 1117 -34

Eckles Katherine and Charles Holt 1986 Strategic Voting in Agenda Control Committees Presented at 1986 Public Choice Society Meetings Baltimore MD

Enelow James and David Koehler 1980 The Amendment in Legislative Strategy Sophisticated Voting in the U S Congress *Journal of Politics* 42 396 413

Farquharson Robin 1969 *Theory of Voting* New Haven Yale University Press

Felsenthal Dan S and Abraham Brichta 1985 Sincere and Strategic Voters An Israeli Study *Political Behavior* 7 311 24

Kintsch Walter 1970 *Learning Memory and Conceptual Processes* New York John Wiley

Kramer Gerald 1972 Sophisticated Voting Over Multidimensional Choice Spaces *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 2 165 80

McKelvey Richard D 1986 Covering Dominance and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice *American Journal of Political* Science 30 283 314

McKelvey Richard and Richard Niemi 1978 A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures *Journal of Economic Theory* 18 1–22

Miller George 1956 The Magic Number Seven Plus or Minus Two Some Limits on our Capacity for Processing Information *Psychological Review* 63 81 97

Miller, Nicholas R 1980 A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting Further Graph Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting *American Journal of Political Science* 24 68 96

Niemi, Richard G and Arthur Q Frank 1982 Sophisticated Voting Under the Plurality Proce

dure In Peter C Ordeshook and Kenneth A Shepsle, eds , *Political Equilibrium* Boston Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, pp 151–72

Ordeshook, Peter C and Thomas Schwartz 1987 Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes *American Political Science Review* 81 179–99

Plott Charles R and Michael Levine 1978 A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions *American Economic Review* 68 146-60

Riker, William 1965 Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting In John Claunch, ed , *Mathematical Applications of Political Science* Vol 1 Dallas Arnold Foundation Southern Methodist University pp 41-69

Rosenthal Howard 1974 Game-Theoretic Models of Bloc Voting Under Proportional Representation Really Sophisticated Voting in French Labor Elections *Public Choice* 18 1 23

Shepsle, Kenneth A and Barry Weingast 1984 Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting with Implications for Agenda Institutions *American Journal of Political Science* 28 49-75

Simon Herbert A 1979 *Models of Thought* New Haven Yale University Press

Wilson Rick K and Anne Pearson 1987 Evidence of Sophisticated Voting in a Committee Setting Theory and Experiments *Quality and Quantity* 2 255 73

The Item Veto and Expenditure Restraint

David C. Nice
University of Georgia

The presidential item veto has been proposed as a solution to the national government's persistent budget deficits. Part of the case for the item veto typically includes reference to its record at the state level. However, systematic analysis of the relationship between state item veto powers and expenditures reveals no evidence that the item veto restrains spending.

The chronic national budget deficits, which have ballooned substantially in recent years, have led some observers to call for structural reforms in order to bring the deficits under control. According to one perspective, the current budgetary process—coupled with pressures from interest groups and agency officials advocating specific programs and with elected officials hoping to preserve their careers—will not correct the situation by itself (for a discussion of this perspective, see Break 1980, pp. 256–60). The only way to control the deficits, in this view, is to change the rules of the budgetary game. One of the most widely discussed changes is the presidential item veto on appropriations bills. The following analysis will review the arguments supporting and opposing the item veto and assess its effectiveness in restraining government spending.

Support for giving the president an item veto on appropriations bills comes from a number of quarters. President Reagan has repeatedly called for its enactment, as have a number of other presidents, including Truman, Eisenhower, and Ford (Abney and Lauth 1985, p. 372; Cronin and Weill 1985, pp. 127–29; Ross and Schwengel 1982, pp. 70–72). Opinion polls have found public support for the presidential item veto since 1945 (*Gallup Report* 1985, pp. 22–23; Ross and Schwengel 1982, p. 73). Proponents of the item veto have marshalled a number of arguments on its behalf.

The Case for the Item Veto

Supporters for the presidential item veto contend that members of Congress, most of whom want to be reelected (Mayhew 1974), are prone to support programs which are popular in individual districts but which may not be in the national interest. The dynamics of the legislative process then encourage excessive spending. While the president could veto the wasteful bills, members of Congress often attach them as riders to bills the president

wants. As a result, the president is virtually forced to accept the wasteful spending (see Abney and Lauth, 1985, p. 372, Cronin and Weill, 1985, pp. 130–31, Ross and Schwengel, 1982, pp. 75–77, Edwards and Wayne, 1985, p. 342). The item veto, according to its supporters, would eliminate this problem by permitting the president to veto undesirable items and permit other portions of the bill to become law Congress would lose its ability to slip unnecessary spending past the president by attaching it to vital legislation.

Advocates of the presidential item veto also point to the fact that most state governors possess some form of item veto power (Abney and Lauth, 1985, p 372, Ross and Schwengel, 1982, pp 74–75). Certainly the item veto, which most governors have, is a more potent control over legislation than is the president's veto (Adrian, 1976, p 241, Lorch, 1983, p 147) The item veto is not, then, an unproven device

The Case Against the Item Veto

Not all observers agree that the item veto would be an effective solution to the national government's deficit problems First, the availability of an item veto means little without the willingness to use it Certainly the use of available veto powers has varied considerably from president to president and from governor to governor (Rohde and Simon, 1985, Copeland, 1983, Wiggins, 1980) Item vetoes are used infrequently in most states (Abney and Lauth, 1985, p 373), and even President Reagan, while decrying excessive national spending, did not veto a single regular appropriations bill in his first four years in office (Cronin and Weill, 1985, p 141) Executives are not immune to the spending pressures which also affect legislators and program clienteles (Adrian, 1976, p 241)

Even if chief executives were immune to direct spending pressures, which they are not, the need to build legislative support often causes executives to support or at least tolerate spending which legislators desire in order to build support for executive programs (Adrian, 1976, p 240, DiClerico, 1983 p 93, Koenig, 1981, pp 132–33) Jimmy Carter received a powerful lesson in that process when he attempted to eliminate funding for a number of public works projects. The need for legislative votes and goodwill may render the item veto unusuable even if it were adopted

The effectiveness of a presidential item veto on appropriations bills would be further limited by the fact that most of the national budget —roughly 75 percent in recent years—is relatively uncontrollable within the appropriations process Entitlement programs and a number of other devices create financial obligations which an item veto on appropriations would be unable to control (*Budgeting for America*, 1982, pp 45–51, Cronin and Weill 1985, pp 130–31, Zycher, 1984) The item veto's effectiveness can also be limited if the legislature combines items which the executive favors with

items the executive opposes (Cronin and Weill, 1985, pp. 140–41, Koenig, 1981, p. 395), a practice which is regularly used in states where the governor has an item veto (Abney and Lauth, 1985, p. 373, Berman, 1984, p. 126).

Critics of the item veto have complained that it would place too much power in the hands of the president. Moreover, given the difficulty of overriding vetoes, the item veto would weaken congressional control over spending, a power which has traditionally been a key source of congressional influence (see Abney and Lauth, 1985, p. 373, Cronin and Weill, 1985, pp. 134–39, for a dissenting view, see Ross and Schwengel, 1982, pp. 75–77). Given the problems associated with presidential accountability in the 1960s and early 1970s, those concerns cannot be dismissed easily.

One other criticism of the item veto stems from its record at the state level. While proponents of the item veto point to its successful record in the states (Ross and Schwengel, 1982, pp. 74–75), a number of analyses raise serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the item veto as a means for limiting spending. Studies have found little relationship between state expenditure levels and governors' veto powers, including the presence or absence of an item veto (Dye, 1969, Zycher, 1984). In addition, a survey of state legislative budget officers concluded that item vetoes are rarely used in most states, that legislative maneuvers blunt the effectiveness of the item veto, and that the item veto does little to encourage legislative fiscal restraint (Abney and Lauth, 1985).

The preceding assessments, however, may not present a complete picture. Zycher's (1984) analysis failed to control for other influences on state expenditures. Dye's (1969) research did not consider possible interactional effects which could shape the impact of the item veto. Abney and Lauth (1985), by emphasizing the frequency of item veto usage, may have overlooked the influence which occurs when the legislature anticipates a veto and, consequently, alters appropriations bills to avert an item veto.

The state experience with the item veto may provide insights into its prospects for success at the national level. In addition, research on executives at one level may, if placed in a broader context, contribute to the development of general theories of executive behavior at all levels (see Cohen and Nice, 1985, Herzik, 1985).

All Item Vetoes Are Not Alike: Provisions And Contexts

While much of the item veto debate has been conducted at a relatively general level, item veto provisions vary considerably from state to state. In some states the item veto is limited to the power to kill individual expenditure items, statutory provisions in appropriations bills are not subject to the item veto in those states (see Abney and Lauth, 1985, p. 373, *Book of the States*, 1978, pp. 44–45). As a result, a legislature may write statutory language in an appropriations bill which essentially requires expenditures and

consequently render the item veto on expenditure amounts useless. Other states, by contrast, grant the governor item veto powers over statutory language as well as expenditure amounts. Moreover, a limited number of states permit the governor to reduce expenditure amounts in addition to permitting the item veto. A governor with the power to reduce items as well as veto them altogether has much more flexibility than does a governor with only the item veto, particularly when the legislature is unduly generous to an essential or very popular program.[1]

In addition to variations in the item veto powers from state to state, the context in which vetoes might be cast varies. Probably the most important contextual factor in shaping item veto use is divided partisan control of the governorship and legislature, a condition which affects many aspects of executive-legislative relations (Harris, 1964, p. 280; Ogul, 1976, p. 18; Scher, 1963). Unified partisan control may lead the legislature to produce appropriations bills which are more acceptable to the governor and may lead the governor to be somewhat more tolerant of legislative decisions. Divided partisan control may increase legislative-executive conflict and, therefore, encourage greater use of item veto powers. That dynamic seems to be particularly strong when a Republican governor faces a Democratic legislature (Abney and Lauth, 1985). Variations in item veto powers may, therefore, have greater impact on expenditures in a context of divided partisan control, especially with a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor.

Data and Methods

In developing a model to assess the impact of the item veto, a number of analytical issues must be addressed. An initial issue concerns the relative merits of cross-sectional versus time series analyses, a point of some controversy in the literature (see Gray, 1976). In this particular case, a cross-sectional design has significant advantages. First, the age of many state item veto provisions poses significant data collection problems for time series analysis. Second, a cross-sectional design is better able to capture the variations in item veto provisions discussed previously; across-state variations in item veto powers are greater than within-state variations over time. Finally, to the degree that state budgeting is incremental, with changes emerging only gradually (Sharkansky, 1968), a cross-sectional design may be better at detecting the cumulative effects of item veto provisions.

A second issue centers on the question of whether analysis should focus on

[1] State item veto provisions also vary in terms of the vote margins needed for overriding the veto. However, in view of the extreme rarity of overrides (Abney and Lauth, 1985, p. 373; Wiggins, 1980) and the problem of comparing override requirements (some states define the needed proportion in terms of the number of elected members while other states define in terms of the number of members present), override requirements will not be examined in the subsequent analysis.

state expenditures or on combined state-local spending. On one hand, the governor's item veto applies to state expenditures, its impact should be most clearly revealed there. However, this relatively direct approach carries a number of potential risks. Variations in the state-local division of responsibilities from state to state may distort the relationship between item veto powers and state spending. To the degree that those variations are rooted in tradition and bureaucratic inertia, they may inject unpredictable biases into the analysis. A further complication arises from the ability of state governments to mandate local programs, including programs requiring local expenditures (*State and Local Roles in the Federal System*, 1982, pp. 162–65). Given the tendency for officials who truly want to spend money to devise numerous methods for circumventing limits (see Break 1980 pp 259–60, Lowery, 1983, Schick, 1980, pp 42, 79) a legislature intent on spending might outflank an item veto by mandating local support for a program instead. Any reduction in state spending from the item veto would be offset by an increase in local spending.[2] An analysis of state spending alone would miss that effect.

Because there is no clear basis for choosing either state-only spending or state-local spending, both approaches will be used in this analysis. If consistent findings emerge from both, we can have considerably more confidence that they represent actual relationships rather than measurement artifacts.

A final issue involves the measurement of item veto provisions. As noted earlier, state item veto provisions vary, particularly in terms of whether they apply to substantive provisions of appropriations bills (as well as expenditure amounts) and whether they include the power to reduce as well as delete items. In addition, the literature indicates that the impact of the item veto may depend on the presence of divided partisan control, especially with a Republican governor. Consequently, a number of different specifications of item veto provisions, both alone and in conjunction with divided control, will be examined.[3]

Analysis

Examination of the zero-order relationships between item veto powers and expenditures provides no support for the contention that the item veto serves to reduce or restrain overall spending (see table 1). Whether analysis focuses on the presence or absence of an item veto power over appropriations amounts, a scale of item veto powers (one point each for an item veto on appropriations amounts, an item veto on other provisions of appropria-

While Congress has relatively little ability to mandate state or local spending, it has many methods for shielding programs from the appropriations process (see *Budgeting for America* 1982, pp. 48–51).

Data on state item veto provisions are from the *Book of the States* 1978–79 (1978, pp. 44–45

tions bills, and the power to reduce appropriations), or the item veto scale interacting with divided partisan control or divided control with a Republican governor, the same findings result: There are no substantial, negative relationships between item veto powers and state spending.[4]

The item veto has been portrayed as an instrument of partisan conflict (Abney and Lauth, 1985) Welfare, which ranks as one of the prime sources of partisan conflict (see Clausen, 1973, pp 168, 176–79, Nice, 1985), may be particularly affected Broader item veto powers, particularly in the context of a Republican governor and Democratic legislature, may be a significant brake on welfare expenditures Once again, however, bivariate relationships between veto powers and expenditures reveal no substantial support for the argument that the item veto reduces expenditures (see table 1)

A possible complication arising from the analysis presented in table 1 is federal aid Given the natural reluctance of governors to return federal aid to Washington rather than spend it, states which are particularly successful in attracting federal aid may have higher spending, regardless of the governor's item veto powers A partial recalculation of table 1 with federal aid removed from state spending provides a preliminary check on this possibility Again however, the zero-order relationships between item veto provisions and expenditures (own-source only) provide little evidence that the item veto serves to restrain expenditures All of the relatively sizeable coefficients are in the wrong direction, and the majority of the relationships are very weak regardless of direction (data not shown)

A clear assessment of the impact of any policy or reform must include accounting for other factors which also influence the condition which the policy or reform is designed to affect (Dye, 1984, pp 351–54, Nachmias, 1979 chapters 2–3) Determining whether the item veto helps to restrain expenditures requires controlling for other influences on expenditures The literature indicates three groups of influences which merit particular attention

First, socioeconomic development shapes state expenditures (Dye, 1966 Where economic resources are more abundant, officials are more likely to support new initiatives and can fund programs more generously without raising tax rates (Walker, 1969) Officials in a relatively poor state may have a more difficult time raising the funds needed to support programs without boosting tax rates to the point that the state's economy is impaired

The educational achievements of a state's population are also part of the socioeconomic environment A more educated population may be more assertive in pressing demands on state officials, certainly higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of political participation (Conway 1985, pp 20–22) Moreover, higher education levels and more liberal be

[4]Increasing the time lag between measurement of item veto powers and expenditures produces findings which are virtually identical to those in table 1 A variety of other specifications of the item veto powers produces findings virtually identical to those in table 1

TABLE 1

STATE SPENDING AND THE ITEM VETO ZERO-ORDER RELATIONSHIPS*

	Item Veto on Appropriations Amounts	Item Veto Scale	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control Score	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control Republican Governor
State Expenditures Per Capita, 1980	05	12	05	− 03
State Expenditure Effort 1980	06	12	00	− 10
State Local Expenditures Per Capita 1980–81	14	12	12	− 01
State Local Expenditure Effort 1980–81	10	14	05	07
State Welfare Expenditures Per Capita 1980	− 02	15	04	19
State Welfare Effort 1980	09	06	− 06	08
State-Local Welfare Expenditures Per Capita 1980–81	− 03	10	01	11
State Local Welfare Effort 1980–81	− 09	05	− 03	09

*Data sources are listed in the appendix. Coefficients are Pearson's r.

liefs on noneconomic issues tend to go together (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, 1980, pp. 158–61).

One other component of the socioeconomic environment is metropolitanization. As more people concentrate closer together, they are increasingly affected by one another's actions. Interdependence rises, and more interactions take place among people who never expect to see one another again. As a result, demands and needs for government action rise. Residents of rural and small-town environments are somewhat insulated from those big-city problems and may, therefore, be less supportive of government activism (see Adrian, 1976, pp. 42–43, Adrian and Press, 1977, pp. 26–27, Banfield and Wilson, 1963, pp. 48–49).

A second major group of influences on state policy decisions includes various ideological forces. Many observers have noted that residents of some states seem to be relatively liberal while people in other states seem to be relatively conservative. More systematic research indicates that the ideological leanings of the public do indeed vary from state to state (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985). Moreover, variations in public views are often reflected in state policy decisions (Erikson, 1976, Nice, 1983).

Two indicators of electoral liberalism merit consideration as controls. First, an estimate based on pooled survey data gives a relatively direct measure of ideological self-identification (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985), although the samples are relatively small for some states. Second, the percentage of the vote cast for McGovern in the 1972 presidential election, when party loyalties were relatively weak and ideological forces, relatively strong, provides a less direct but more behavioral indicator of electoral liberalism. The McGovern vote is associated with policy liberalism at the state level (Klingman and Lammers, 1984, Nice, 1983).

State party ideologies are also important influences on many state policy decisions (Jennings, 1979, Nice, 1985). McGregor's (1978) analysis of voting by state party delegations revealed a pattern of consistent ideological alignments which persist beyond the comings and goings of individual candidates. His scales are the most inclusive and comparable measures of state party ideologies available.

A third major influence on state expenditures is federal aid (Gramlich, 1977, Break, 1980). As noted earlier, state officials are typically reluctant to return federal aid to Washington. To the degree that federal aid is regarded as free money, even a governor with very broad item veto powers may be unwilling to use them to restrain spending if the result is an underutilization of available aid.

Because of the larger number of potential control variables, stepwise regression analysis using the control variables was used to generate baseline

The unweighted ideology score is used. Score for Nevada is adjusted (see Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985, pp. 478–80).

models to predict state expenditures. Once the baseline models were developed, the various item veto variables were introduced, one at a time, into the baseline models in order to assess the relationship between item veto powers and expenditures when other relevant influences on expenditures are held constant.

The results of the multivariate analyses fail to support the contention that the item veto restrains state spending (see table 2). Most of the relationships between item veto powers and expenditures are in the wrong direction, and all are trivially small. Increasing the time lag between item veto powers and spending, examining other specifications of the item veto powers, or using all control variables simultaneously does not change the overall findings presented in table 2. In addition, confining the analysis to own-source state spending fails to produce any evidence that the item veto restrains state spending (data not shown).

Overall, the analyses of relationships between a variety of indicators of item veto powers, on one hand, and various indicators of state and state-local spending, on the other, do not support the contention that the item veto limits government spending. The findings are quite consistent at the zero-order level and with various controls, across a variety of specifications of item-veto powers, and whether total or own-source expenditures are considered. The many models assessed failed to produce a single negative relationship which had less than a five percent chance of having been produced by coincidence.

Discussion and Conclusions

Efforts to bring the national budget deficits under control bear a strong resemblance to efforts to improve coordination of national programs, as described by Seidman (1975, p. 190): "If only we can find the right formula, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent." Certainly President Reagan and members of Congress have approached the deficits with a keen awareness of the political risks associated with the actions which would actually reduce the deficits. The president has not been particularly vigorous in using existing budgetary and veto powers to trim the deficits (Cronin and Weill, 1985). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill created a mechanism to cut the deficits automatically; if members did not reach the deficit limits, an across-the-board cut would be imposed. Members would, therefore, be able to tell people angered by the cuts that the mechanism did it.[6]

[6] The automatic mechanism represents a version of the "I'd love to help you but" strategy (Wildavsky, 1974, pp. 80–81). The members of Congress could inform constituents angered by cuts that he or she did as much as possible to protect programs but was thwarted by the automatic mechanism. Constitutional issues have upset the plan somewhat.

TABLE 2

STATE SPENDING AND THE ITEM VETO REGRESSION RESULTS

	Item Veto on Appropriations Amounts[a]	Item Veto Scale	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control Score	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control, Republican Governor
State Expenditures Per Capita 1980[b]	02	- 07	- 11	- 12
State Expenditure Effort 1980[c]	08	07	02	03
State Local Expenditures Per Capita 1980-81[d]	11	03	03	05
State-Local Expenditure Effort 1980-81[e]	13	06	03	05
State Welfare Expenditures Per Capita 1980[f]	09	12	07	09
State Welfare Effort 1980[g]	04	10	05	06

In the context of a problem which seems to be solvable only through a[c]tions which are politically dangerous at best, the presidential item veto ha[s] emerged as a solution to the deficits Proponents of the item veto conte[nd] that it will greatly reduce the use of riders and help to eliminate unnecessa[ry] spending without jeopardizing funding for essential programs

Critics of the item veto contend that executives are subject to the sam[e] pressures and inclinations to spend as are legislators Frequent item veto us[e] would risk congressional retaliation, and the bulk of national governmen[t] spending is relatively uncontrollable through the appropriations process [in] any case Moreover research on the effectiveness of the item veto at th[e] state level has raised questions regarding its effectiveness in restrainin[g] spending

The results of this analysis underscore those questions Examination of

TABLE 2—*Continued*

	Item Veto on Appropriations Amounts[a]	Item Veto Scale	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control Score	Item Veto Scale Multiplied by Divided Control Republican Governor
State-Local Welfare Expenditures Per Capita, 1980–81[h]	09	08	04	05
State-Local Welfare Effort, 1980–81[g]	04	06	04	05

[a]Coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. Only one item veto measure was used at a time. None of the coefficients is significant at the .05 level.

[b]Median family income, 1975, and federal aid per capita, 1980, are controlled.

[c]Federal aid per $1,000 personal income, 1980, controlled.

[d]Percentage of population graduated from high school, 1976, and federal aid to state and local governments per capita, 1980, are controlled.

[e]Electoral conservatism (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985) and federal aid to state and local governments per capita, 1980, are controlled.

[f]Percentage of the two party vote for McGovern, 1972, percentage metropolitan, 1978, and federal welfare aid per capita, 1980, are controlled.

[g]Federal welfare aid per capita, 1980, is controlled.

[h]Percentage for McGovern, 1972, percentage metropolitan, 1978, median income, 1975, and federal welfare aid per capita, 1980, are controlled.

[i]Percentage for McGovern, 1972, and federal welfare aid per capita, 1980, are controlled.

variety of measures of item veto provisions, both in general and in the context of divided partisan control, failed to produce a single instance of a significant negative relationship between item veto powers and government spending. Most of the relationships were quite small, and the few significant relationships were in the wrong direction. The results provide no support for the contention that item vetoes serve to restrain spending.

APPENDIX

Data Sources

Book of the States 1978–79 (1978, pp. 44–45): item veto powers, 1978–79

CQ Almanac (1972, p. 1014): percentage for McGovern, 1972

Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985, pp. 478–90): electoral conservatism

Statistical Abstract

(1978, p. 146): percentage high school graduates, 1976

(1980, p 455) median income 1975
(1980, p 20) percentage metropolitan, 1978
(various volumes) distribution of partisan control of the governor and legislature, 1971–1980

McGregor (1978, pp 1020–23) party ideology

State Government Finances in 1980 (1981)

(p 22) federal-state aid effort 1980
(p 22) state expenditure effort, 1980
(p 22) state welfare effort 1980
(pp 12–18) federal-state aid per capita 1980
(pp 12–18) state welfare expenditures per capita 1980
(pp 12–18) federal-state welfare aid per capita 1980
(pp 12–18) state expenditures per capita 1980

Government Finances in 1980–81 (1982)

(p 92) state-local expenditures per capita 1980–81
(p 92) state-local welfare expenditures per capita 1980–81
(p 95) state-local expenditure effort 1980–81
(p 95) state-local welfare effort 1980–81
(p 91) federal-state/local aid per capita 1980–81

References

Abney, Glenn, and Thomas Lauth. 1985. The Line Item Veto in the States: An Instrument fo Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship? *Public Administration Review* 45: 372–77.

Adrian, Charles. 1976. *State and Local Governments*. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Adrian, Charles, and Charles Press. 1977. *Governing Urban America*. 5th ed. New Yor McGraw-Hill.

Banfield, Edward, and James Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. New York: Vintage.

Berman, David. 1984. *State and Local Politics*. 4th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Book of the States, 1978–79. 1978. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments.

Break, George. 1980. *Financing Government in a Federal System*. Washington, DC: Brookin Institution.

Budgeting for America. 1982. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.

Clausen, Aage. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide*. New York: St Martins.

Cohen, Jeffrey, and David Nice. 1985. A Decision Theoretic Model of Gubernatorial Vetoes. Paper presented at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association, New O leans, LA.

Conway, Margaret. 1985. *Political Participation in the United States*. Washington, DC: Co gressional Quarterly.

Copeland, Gary. 1983. When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Leg lation. *Journal of Politics* 45: 696–710.

CQ Almanac. 1972. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.

Cronin, Thomas, and Jeffrey Weill. 1985. An Item Veto for the President? *Congress and th Presidency* 12: 127–52.

DiClerico, Robert. 1983. *The American President*. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice H

Dye, Thomas. 1966. *Politics, Economics and the Public*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

———. 1969. Executive Power and Public Policy in the States. *Western Political Quart* 27: 926–39.

———. 1984. *Understanding Public Policy*. 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Edwards, George, and Stephen Wayne. 1985. *Presidential Leadership*. New York: St Mart

Erikson, Robert 1976 The Relationship Between Public Opinion and State Policy A New Look Based on Some Forgotten Data *American Journal of Political Science* 20 25 36

Erikson, Robert, Norman Luttbeg, and Kent Tedin 1980 *American Public Opinion* 2d ed New York Wiley

Gallup Report 1985 October

Governmental Finances in 1980–81 1982 Washington DC Bureau of the Census

Gramlich, Edward 1977 Intergovernmental Grants A Review of the Empirical Literature In Wallace Oates ed *The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism* Lexington MA D C Heath Pp 219 40

Gray, Virginia 1976 Models of Comparative State Politics A Comparison of Cross Sectional and Time Series Analyses *American Journal of Political Science* 20 235–56

Harris Joseph 1964 *Congressional Control of Administration* Washington DC Brookings Institution

Herzik Eric 1985 The President Governors and Mayors A Framework for Comparative Analysis *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 15 353 71

Jennings Edward 1979 Competition Constituencies and Welfare Policies in American States *American Political Science Review* 73 414 29

Klingman David and William Lammers 1984 The General Policy Liberalism Factor in American State Politics *American Journal of Political Science* 28 598–610

Koenig Louis 1981 *The Chief Executive* 4th ed New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

Lorch Robert 1983 *State and Local Politics* Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-Hall

Lowery David 1983 Limitations on Taxing and Spending Powers An Assessment of Their Effectiveness *Social Science Quarterly* 64 247 63

Mayhew David 1974 *Congress The Electoral Connection* New Haven Yale

McGregor Eugene 1978 Uncertainty and National Nominating Coalitions *Journal of Politics* 40 1011 43

Nachmias David 1979 *Public Policy Evaluation* New York St Martins

Nice David 1983 Representation in the States Policymaking and Ideology *Social Science Quarterly* 64 404 11

——— 1985 State Party Ideology and Policy Making *Policy Studies Journal* 15 780–96

Ogul Morris 1976 *Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy* Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh

Rohde David and Dennis Simon 1985 Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response A Study of Institutional Conflict *American Journal of Political Science* 29 397 427

Ross Russell and Fred Schwengel 1982 An Item Veto for the President *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 66 79

Scher Seymour 1963 Conditions for Legislative Control *Journal of Politics* 25 526 51

Schick Allen 1980 *Congress and Money* Washington DC Urban Institute

Seidman Harold 1975 *Politics Position and Power* 2d ed New York Oxford University

Sharkansky Ira 1968 *Spending in the American States* Chicago Rand McNally

State and Local Roles in the Federal System 1982 Washington DC Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

State Government Finances in 1980 1981 Washington DC Bureau of the Census

Statistical Abstract various volumes Washington DC Bureau of the Census

Walker Jack 1969 The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States *American Political Science Review* 63 880 99

Wiggins Charles 1980 Executive Vetoes and Legislative Overrides in the American States *Journal of Politics* 42 1110 17

Wildavsky Aaron 1974 *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* 2d ed Boston Little Brown

Wright Gerald Robert Erikson and John McIver 1985 Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data *Journal of Politics* 47 469 89

Zycher Benjamin 1984 An Item Veto Wont Work *Wall Street Journal* October 24 p 32

Review Essay

The Ethics of American Statecraft

Greg Russell
Louisiana State University

Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power. By Daniel G. Lang. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Pp. ix, 175. $20.00.)

Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. By Michael Joseph Smith. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986. Pp. xi, 256. $30.00.)

Bureaucracy and Statesmanship: Henry Kissinger and the Making of American Foreign Policy. By Robert J. Strong. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Pp. xiv, 109. $8.25.)

American Approaches to World Affairs. By Inis L. Claude. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Pp. xi, 67. $5.75.)

The American Approach to Foreign Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective. By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985. Pp. xi, 86. $6.75.)

Testifying before the joint House-Senate committees investigating the Iran-contra scandal, Lt. Colonel Oliver North's desire to "balance the difference between lives and lies" culminated in a conscious decision to give "misleading, evasive and wrong" explanations to Congress. The unchallenged facts were that top aides of the president orchestrated the secret arms-for-hostages transactions, circumvented the will of Congress, and conspired to cover up their acts. In light of the United States' professed neutrality in the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, former National Security Advisor John Poindexter revealed that, in order to win Iranian assistance in getting U.S. hostages out of Lebanon, President Reagan himself approved a tentative offer of American help in deposing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and military aid if Iran went to war with the Soviet Union.[1]

Officials working in and with the National Security Council, in the language of North, "lied at every turn" and justified the tactics of deceit and evasion of constitutional restraints by the end of projecting American power and combatting communism in Central America. The clandestine diversion of profits from the Iran arms sale to fund the Nicaraguan contras raises important questions concerning foreign policy ethics in a democratic society.

An assessment of the operative standards and norms in foreign policy must address two preliminary themes: first, the respected tradition of moral idealism in American thought; and, second, the significance of Christian-liberal-humanitarian ideals for estimates of American national interest in a rapidly

changing postwar world With regard to the guiding principles of American diplomacy, attention should focus on the conditions under which this nation can realistically hope to reconcile its self-interest with transcendent moral principles.

The bicentennial of the United States Constitution directed national attention to more than the historical enactment and growth of democratic institutions at the center of American self-government Believing themselves to be the beneficiaries of the *novus ordo seclorum* imprinted on America and the world, the founding fathers were practical philosophers who stipulated that individuals possess certain inalienable rights of self-expression so that they may fulfill their potentialities as rational human beings These early American statesmen, as Edward S Corwin (1979) has noted, succeeded in translating principles of transcendental justice into terms of personal and private rights (pp 4–5) Accordingly, Walter Lippmann (1955) acknowledged that the founders were adherents of a public philosophy, "of the doctrine of natural law, which held there was law above the state and the whole community of mortals" (p 76) As Hans J Morgenthau (1982) suggested, the very uniqueness of the American purpose—the establishment of freedom conceived of as equality of opportunity and minimization of political control—brings into being another norm that "endows the action required by the fundamental purpose with a special responsibility, to maintain equality in freedom as an example for other nations to emulate" (p 34) In the words of Jefferson (A Lipscomb, 1905) "A just and solid republican government maintained here, will be a standing monument for the aim and imitation of the people of other countries and I join with you in the hope that they will see from our example that a free government is of all others the most energetic, and that the inquiry which has been excited by our revolution and its consequences will ameliorate the condition of man over a great portion of the globe" (X, p 217)

Public officials, in seeking to relate the basic purposes of American society to world affairs have consistently defined diplomatic objectives in terms that transcend survival or the struggle for power and security Standing for moral purposes beyond the state (e g , freedom and order, liberty and justice, economic growth and equality), Americans have typically regarded the struggle for power as a social aberration—the consequence of ignorance faulty institutional arrangements, or the suppression of the public voice From Washington's warning against "inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others" to Wilson's Fourteen Points, this nation's identity was deeply involved with the assertion of universal human rights and political liberties For well over a century of relative isolation from world politics, Americans resorted to that mixture of self- righteousness and genuine moral fervor in the faith that their lofty moral example would shed enlightenment abroad

Even after World War II, and the emergence of a climate of opinion conducive to a more objective calculation of the configuration and scope of American power, the moral force of supranational principles was most compelling when the pursuit of ideals coincided with tangible national advantages. For example, the Marshall Plan and more recent foreign policy initiatives to promote the international observance of human rights, to reduce poverty and hunger throughout much of the Third World, and to control or reduce strategic armaments served both moral and practical security needs. In one key respect, the geopolitical confrontation between the leading superpowers is a pervasive and spiritual "struggle for the minds of men." The conflict between freedom and totalitarianism is not transient or incidental, it is a moral conflict, of fundamental historical proportions, which gives the modern age a special meaning.

American moral judgment in foreign affairs emphasizes the need to view the concept of the national interest as a problem in political ethics. Specifically, the statesman confronts the perennial dilemma of reconciling necessity with moral principle. The necessity is that of safeguarding the interests of a group for which one serves as trustee. The principle is that of undifferentiated loyalty to values transcending the national community. Can the American national interest in foreign policy be interpreted as an objective, value-free category exempt from normative restraints either of a universal or relative character? Furthermore, does the ethical horizon of postwar political realism provide a responsible basis from which to derive transnational norms in a world menaced by the nightmare of nuclear catastrophe and ecological disaster? In an era shaped by both growing interdependence and new forms of conflict, the ultimate challenge for men and nations is how the good of the state may fit into a more general and universal scheme of values.

A number of recent scholarly works offer a provocative inquiry into the interrelation of law, morality, and power in two centuries of United States diplomacy. The books reviewed here are representative of two distinguished publication forums: the Political Traditions in Foreign Affairs Series, affiliated with Louisiana State University Press, and the Hewlett Foundation Series on the Credibility of Institutions, Policies, and Leadership organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. As senior editor for both series, Professor Kenneth Thompson has been guided by two principal goals. One objective has been to encourage a marriage between political theory and policy by probing interconnections between a nation's values and diplomatic initiatives for landmark periods in America's foreign relations. Like the University of Chicago Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy in the 1950s and 1960s, the Miller Center has also succeeded in bringing together both younger scholars and established thinkers with a continuing interest in restoring the primacy of philosophical and historical thinking for the study of politics and international relations. Without a viable

intellectual and philosophic framework, foreign policy debates become litt more than glorified discussion of current events

Written from a perspective affirming the centrality of political ethics in t study of diplomatic history, Daniel Lang's *Foreign Policy in the Early R public* documents the influence of seventeenth and eighteenth century E ropean political ideas on the thought of the American founders The auth substantiates the thesis that early American thinking about international r lations was premised on the assumption of "an identity of morality and p icy," whereby "the law of nations and the balance of power were understo to be mutually reinforcing" (p 12) For example, in reflecting on the leg norm concerning the equality of sovereign states, James Madison (Farran 1937) opined 'Among individuals of superior eminence in societ rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions Among independe nations preeminent over their neighbors, the same remark was verified The Houses of Austria and France were hostile as long as they remained t greatest powers of Europe England and France have succeeded to the pr eminence and to the enmity To this principle we owe our libert (I, p 448) The *equality of states, therefore*, was *inseparable from the pra* tical conviction that American national interest could best be promoted by system in which the large states would counter each other rather than act concert ' Fidelity to treaty obligations and justice in international relatio according to Alexander Hamilton (1969) meant that a policy regulated by own interest, as far as justice and good faith permit is and ought to be nations prevailing policy (XV pp 85–86)

The most interesting feature of Lang's analysis is the well-researched pr cess by which he draws a connection between the just war tradition a America's foreign situation in the 1780s and 1790s To this end the first h of the book includes chapters that assess the significance of the evolvi natural law perspective for European diplomacy following the wars of re gion and the Thirty Years War Jurists such as Gentili Vitoria Wolff, a Grotius rejected religious grounds as a just cause for war As empha shifted from limiting entry into war (*jus ad bellum*) to limiting a state's co duct in war (*jus in bellum*) writers of the law of nations looked less to the ogy and more toward a conception of just war based upon the secular tributes of natural rights theory

At a time when legal theorists drew upon Hobbesian social contract a state-of-nature arguments to identify the conditions of sovereignty, politi theorists like Hume and Montesquieu and polemicists like Charles Dav nant looked to the balance of power as a bulwark against universal emp and world tyranny Lang cites three major reasons why the balance conce converged with the requirements of modern just war approaches Fir statesmen would refrain from hegemonic aspirations because of the anti pated opposition of other states Second, the incentive to concentrate

marginal advantages and limited objectives made sovereigns cognizant of the need to weigh the costs and benefits of relying on the use of force to achieve political ends. In other words, "the evil produced by the war must not be greater than the good done or the evil averted by it" (p. 8). Finally, and as Hume (1964b) proposed, the operations of the balance of power would increase the probability that oppressive states with universalist pretensions would over time modify their goals and reform their inner nature (III, pp. 353–55). He noted further that it is a frequent attribute of "civilized monarchies" as of republics that "they are a government of laws, not of men" (1964a, III, p. 161).

That the American founders had both a moral and prudential regard for the question of just war can be adduced by their clear reliance upon the writings of Swiss diplomatist Emmerich de Vattel. Writing in *The Law of Nations* (1844), Vattel was able to engender a "new synthesis" by combining a natural rights interpretation of the universal categories in the just war tradition with praise for a balance of power system grounded in accepted nonecclesiastical principles of legitimacy. In admitting "no other natural society between nations than that which nature has established between mankind in general," Vattel opened the way for an interpretation that would differentiate between obligations applicable for the statesman and those norms relevant for individual conduct (see Lang, 1985, p. 17).

In effect, the state is elevated to the level of an autonomous moral entity to which rights and duties can be assigned. If Grotius wrote the international law of absolutism by affirming the patrimonial theory of the nature of government, Vattel's somewhat exaggerated emphasis on the independence and equality of states placed upon "the plane of the law of nations . . . the great principles of legal individualism" (Lapradelle, 1916, p. lv). As Vattel (1844) remarked, "It is an evident consequence of the liberty . . . of nations that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the . . . right to interfere in the government of another" (p. lxii). In terms of the framework of European state relations, Lang points out that Vattel often invoked the principles of "right" and "justice" to shore up imperfections in the balance of power system with respect to the integrity of states and to the making of treaties.

Subsequent chapters reveal how, in the decades after the revolutionary war, leading Americans drew upon a venerable heritage of moral and political reasoning to judge the conflicting interests and obligations shaping the European equilibrium of rival states. In events ranging from the Jay Treaty to the quasi war with France, Lang notes that both Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans consistently evaluated the nation's power and willingness to resort to force in light of specific issues *and* according to established legal norms: the rights of neutrals, the rights of free passage, treaty obligations, and the treatment of alien property during war. Agreement on

the need to defend the national interest, however, did not prevent significant differences between partisans of either political orientation regarding the proper extent of American participation in the European state system.

More importantly, the differences between these two groups is symptomatic of a larger debate in social ethics concerning the distinction between public and private standards of morality and how this affects the political existence of men and nations. Writing in the "Pacificus" and "Americanus" essays, Hamilton (1969) contended that "it may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another, is in the interest or advantage of the Nation, which performs them" (XV, pp. 85–86). Along Vattelian lines, Hamilton believed that the rule of morality is not the same between nations as between solitary individuals. By contrast, Jefferson (1905) held both kinds of actions to be a uniform standard insofar as the moral duties which exist between individuals in a state of nature "accompany them into a state of society and the duties of all the individuals composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other, so that between society and society the same moral duties exist as did between the individuals composing them while in an unassociated state, their maker not having released them from those duties on their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts between nation and nation are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts" (VII, pp. 285–86). What is striking about the pronouncements of the founding fathers is the similarity between their political and intellectual interests and the restraints and limitations on American power some two centuries later. The balance of power, the nature of moral choice in foreign policy, and the democratic control of foreign policy conduct are cases in point.

Michael Smith's *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* considers the diplomatic strategies and enduring moral doctrines that epitomize the modern philosophy of power politics in world affairs. Unlike other recent studies that circumscribe realist thought by constructing such Procrustean categories as "technical realism" and "structural realism," Smith's research is integrative and acknowledges the nuances at the heart of the realist worldview. Throughout the book, he examines the contribution of several representative European and American thinkers along three axes: as general theories of international relations, as guides to making foreign policy, and as possible solutions to the ethical dilemmas of interstate behavior.

Following introductory chapters on the intellectual antecedents of realism (Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes) as well as the expression of interwar idealism in the 1920s and 1930s (Sir Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Toynbee, and Nicholas Murray Butler), Smith evaluates the ideas of six central figures who represent the range and depth of modern realist thought: Max Weber, E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry

Kissinger Yet his analysis hardly qualifies as an apologetic exegesis of realist literature. More importantly, his preoccupation is with why many of these writers "sometimes prove to be inconsistent both internally and taken together" While acquiescing in Robert Keohane's (1984) judgment that critiques of the realist approach only reconfirm "the centrality of realist thinking in the international political thought of the West" (p 503), Smith probes the "elusiveness" of many realist arguments and why these scholars reach "surprisingly dissimilar conclusions on a wide range of issues" (p 13)

Suggesting that Weber's political writing 'established the terms of realist discourse that endure to the present day' (p 15), Smith provides a new and interesting angle from which to relate the norms of realism to the Weberian conflict between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility At issue is whether the prophets and practitioners of realism have relegated the moral judgment of human conduct to mere ideological rationalizing or have covered our acts with a tissue of expedient excuses in order to maximize political strength The authors mode of analysis points to the additional need for clarifying the connection between continental realism based on *raison d'état* and the distinctive values and purposes typifying the American approach to power politics The legacy of *raison d'état* for American realism merits a reappraisal, since critics of the latter often deplore what is perceived to be an admixture of Machiavellian or Hobbesian sentiments limiting or sacrificing, the force of moral conviction in a tragic social drama from which man has no escape As a prominent theorist of international relations has written "From Machiavelli to Meinecke and Morgenthau the elements of the approach and the reasoning remain consistent (Waltz 1979 p 117)

In the lost history of European statecraft the diplomatic legacy of 'reason of state often defied precise or consistent interpretation Among continental theorists, *raison d'etat* was characterized variously as a mixture of moral and power considerations ' the state's first law of motion, and 'the victory of the demonic over the divine or rational in man (Meinecke 1957 pp 1–3) In relations among sovereigns the concept was viewed as exempting the state from any rule of external conduct or normative restraint other than its own self-interest *Salus publica suprema lex* The ethical dualism of *raison d'état* was strikingly formulated by the Italian statesman Cavour If we had done for ourselves what we have done for Italy what scoundrels we would have been" (see Thompson 1980 p 78) In perhaps its most extreme form *raison d'etat* suggests not only that the state is exempt from morality it implies that if the state does rely on morality morality will fail to protect it (Vasquez, 1986, p 2)

Smith's concluding remarks on the normative roots of realism offer a basis from which to judge how American thinkers have interpreted the statesmans moral dilemma in seeking to uphold universal norms of conduct in a world of changing and unstable values At a minimum American realists consistently

objected to the dual moral standard embodied in classical *raison d'état*. The juxtaposition between public and private ethical criteria is fundamentally mistaken inasmuch as it is always the individual who acts either in his own interests or in reference to the goals of others, the action of a society or nation has no empirical existence. The potential immorality of all human action, as Niebuhr (1940, p. 123) explained, becomes more evident in political behavior where it is impossible for an action to conform fully to the rules of politics (i.e., to achieve political success) and to the rules of ethics (i.e., to be good in itself). However, each of the figures included in Smith's work have explicitly affirmed that political actors come under moral judgment and are witness to the values of their society. As the author notes, "realists have insisted on the inescapable responsibility of power" and have "urged statesmen and citizens to apply an ethic of responsibility to the moral judgment of state behavior" (p. 234). The continuing challenge for realist thought, as Morgenthau (1945) noted, is how and under what circumstances the struggle for power can be rendered "intelligible as a dialectical movement toward the realization of justice" (p. 5).

Another issue concerns the "moral dignity of the national interest" and the role of universal principles in foreign policy. Certainly the writings of American realists often appear to stretch the gap between the moral ideal and the facts of political life to its breaking point. For example, Morgenthau (1949) wrote that "the invocation of moral principles for support of national policies is . of necessity a pretense" (p. 211). Similarly, Kennan (1985–86) argued that the state's interest in preserving its sovereignty and security constitutes the "unavoidable necessities of a national existence and are not subject to classification as good or bad" (p. 206). Yet, as Smith points out, the national interest is not an objective datum or amoral law of interstate existence. Their stern denunciation of legalistic and moralistic approaches often prevented some realists from "acknowledging that their judgment of morality and their definition of the national interest rested on their own hierarchy of values" (p. 235).

Although American realists have argued that "moral principles must be derived from political practice and not imposed on it," a case can be made that their approach to the national interest relied upon transcendent norms as a directive force in the life of nations. In his discussion of the diplomatic function, Morgenthau (1973) treated diplomacy as a kind of norm, directed by certain moves toward particular goals. The methods of foreign policy are relative and conditional, "not to advance by destroying the obstacles in one's way but to retreat before them, to circumvent them to soften and dissolve them by means of negotiation and pressure" (p. 544). These operational diplomatic norms are anything but self-evident in Morgenthau's discussion of the national interest as a moral-free guide to foreign policy (see, for example, Good, 1960, pp. 606–10).

Kennan (1956), along similar lines, would have us "ease" the transitions and "temper the asperities" of international life, he wishes to "isolate and moderate" international conflicts, and he places before us "that tremendous task of learning, and helping others to learn, how man can live in fruitful harmony" (p. 33). As these representative examples illustrate, American realists have not escaped the "invocation of moral principle" so much as they have neglected to make explicit a view of diplomacy that incorporates a notion of purpose that by its nature must transcend pure self-interest.

Si vis pacem, para bellum, "If you wish peace, prepare for war," was the insignia emblazoned on the ministry of war in Metternich's imperial Austria (Stoessinger, 1979, p. 223). As a scholar and statesman who both wrote and made history, Henry Kissinger sought to translate that old Roman adage into the setting of the nuclear age. Kissinger's doctoral dissertation, published as *A World Restored* (1957), was far from an idiosyncratic investigation into the role of aristocratic or conservative diplomatic practices that restored the peace of Europe at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. From the ability of these nineteenth century statesmen to erect a durable structure of peace, he consistently relied on a threefold doctrine to minimize Cold War tensions and enhance prospects for détente throughout the postwar years. These principles, geopolitical in scope, looked to such strategic objectives as (1) a secure peace, not imposed by a victor, but based on a negotiated settlement and with all sides in balance, (2) a process in which the victor decontaminates the defeated of his revolutionary ardor and by subtle incentives co-opts the "have not" into "have" nations, and (3) a viable "balancer" that reacts not on the basis of who is right or wrong but according to who is weak or strong in order to sustain the equilibrium.

Robert Strong's *Bureaucracy and Statesmanship: Henry Kissinger and the Making of American Foreign Policy* integrates a sophisticated appreciation for Kissinger the philosopher-historian with a concern for bureaucratic decision making in foreign policy. In general, the author concentrates on "the relationship between the White House and the permanent organizations responsible for American foreign policy during the Kissinger era, and the issues raised for modern statesmen by the existence of large bureaucracies" (p. xii). After reviewing models of bureaucratic politics popular in American foreign policy, Strong examines Kissinger's stewardship of foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford years in his capacity as a successful bureaucratic politician, "who was able to maximize his personal power at the expense of the Secretary of State and permanent bureaucracies," and as a statesman "manipulating the bureaucracy for a larger purpose." The key question, according to Strong, is whether "American foreign policy can be conducted without the inefficiencies inherent in complex organizations or the abuses that may occur when power is concentrated in a single leader" (p. xiv).

Discussing the elements of leadership, Strong notes that Kissinger's states-

man "must understand the sources of national character and values, and be able to transcend those sources when situations threaten vital national interests" (p. 52) Kissinger linked statesmanship to "the fatedness of historical events" and the interplay of freedom and necessity in human existence He showed a commitment to a philosophy that made the individual the responsible agent: "Reason discloses objective necessity . the linkages which enable man to master his environment" (see Graubard, 1973, p 7) At the same time, however, Kissinger believed that "action derives from . inward necessity, from the personal in the conception of the environment, from the unique in the apprehension of the phenomena" (Graubard, 1973, p 8). Ethics, therefore, must always reside in an inward personal state, in a personal recognition of limits Success and failure are relative categories, meaningful only in retrospect and never finally decided Concluding *A World Restored* he wrote "Man's existence is as transcendental a fact as the violence of history Man's actions testify to his aspirations which stem from an attitude of the soul, not an evaluation of conditions In this spirituality resides humanity's essence, the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of his life, the self-transcendence which gives peace" (Graubard, 1973, p 8)

While the relationship of ethics to statesmanship is only an implicit theme in Strong's book, a few preliminary conclusions can be registered Kissinger retained a tragic vision of the world that rejected the facile belief in progress and the exuberant rationality of man Unlike the dichotomous morality of John Foster Dulles, who carved up the world into "good" and "evil" states and judged those in the middle as "immoral," Kissinger's ethical world view was infinitely more complex Never making peace or justice the objective of his policy Kissinger realized that the statesman could not escape time that his duty was to reflect on accident and contingency Moral reasoning in foreign policy more often entailed choosing among alternative expressions of right or the course of action that entailed the least evil Comparing the pragmatic Castlereagh with the mystical Czar Alexander I, Kissinger understood that the encounter between the statesman and the prophet is always tragic The statesman is compelled to reduce the prophet's vision to precise and workable measures, the prophet will judge the temporal structure by transcendental standards (Graubard, 1973, p 38) Kissinger's *Weltanschauung* benefited from the vision of an old Harvard colleague who once wrote "We have no choice between power and the common good To act successfully according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage That this conclusion is nothing more than a *modus vivendi*, uneasy and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the soothing logic of specious concord" (Morgenthau 1946, p 202)

The remaining texts to be considered here inquire into the pragmatic values and political axioms increasingly relevant for the ability of the United States to promote the national interest and meet its global responsibilities. Inis Claude's *American Approaches To World Affairs* includes a number of well-crafted essays encompassing such themes as continuity and change in the American approach, what to do about other people's wars, and the rejection of collective security. A prudent and responsible American approach to foreign policy must be located somewhere between the "recognition that isolationism is no longer possible" and periodic "disillusionment with the life of a Great Power."

Against claims in the literature of international relations that American foreign policy is characterized by "oscillation from quietism to activism," Claude contends that the United States has adhered consistently to the rules of what he terms an "auxiliary" power. Doctrines of aloofness and commitment to involvement "have served to mislead" and to obscure the "actual pragmatism of American foreign policy" (p. 16). The capacity of the United States to act pragmatically, in the author's estimation, includes "acting when and as . . . necessary to uphold interests and values that concern it, acknowledging no obligation to be systematic" while "treasuring the right to be unpredictable even when it hopes that . . . deterrent threats and reassuring guarantees will seem credible" (p. 16). In short, Claude relegates the spirit of pragmatism to a self-centered standard by which a participant retains the freedom to decide on action or inaction in accordance with its own judgment of the interests and values at stake.

The justification for a pragmatic or situational morality in world politics may be evinced from the author's argument that the concept of collective security has been universally rejected. One factor contributing to the demise of this principle is "the decline of moral self-confidence in the West." Specifically, "the moral propriety of military defense cannot be dissociated from the issue of the moral worthiness of that which is to be defended" (p. 61). Especially since the debacle of Vietnam, Americans have been lacking in assurance that the moral quality of the established order is sufficiently open to the achievement of justice or order-keeping ventures that resist violent approaches to change. The imprecise distinction between aggression and resistance to aggression lies in the minds and wills of the antagonists. Moreover, as Claude suggests, "moral self-confidence today is almost exclusively the property of those . . . dedicated to changing the world by force if necessary" (p. 62). For a world lacking in international civic virtue, no statesman "has either a moral responsibility that permits him or a political interest that requires him, to subordinate national advantage to international stability" (p. 64).

Referring to the revival of *realpolitik* under the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team, George Ball (1976) described a foreign policy actuated by prag-

matic principles as nothing more than "cynicism mislabeled as realism" and "the adroit manipulation of force and counterforce" (p. 309). Sloganizing such as "peace with honor" or "no more Vietnams" underscored the proclivity of the United States to engage in "improvised crusades" and "crusading improvisations." Cecil V. Crabb's *The American Approach to Foreign Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective* is the first major original study of that philosophy as it relates to foreign policy. Two general, and provocative, assumptions enter into the author's task of relating the philosophy of William James and John Dewey to pragmatic currents in American life since the revolutionary period.

The opening pages of Crabb's work build on the argument that representative pragmatic thinkers provided a scientific and philosophical rationale for habits of mind and behavior which had long been familiar to Americans and which remain characteristic of American society today. Prominent features of the American pragmatic approach to problem solving include emphasis upon the infinite variety and random nature of reality, upon creative human intelligence as a means of directing environmental change in a manner beneficial to human welfare, and upon the ideas of historical progress and the scientific search for truth as a cooperative social endeavor. Conversely, attempts to explain reality by reference to an a priori ideological code, or intellectual speculation divorced from concrete human problems, "have not been principles of behavior traditionally valued by Americans" (p. xiii).

A second important assumption is that pragmatic desiderata have significantly influenced the diplomatic activities of every administration in Washington since World War II. Aside from illustrating how specific foreign policy actions over a forty-year period have variously conformed to the basic tenets of pragmatic thought, Crabb stresses the moral content of pragmatic decision making. Taking exception with Ball's contention, he argues that "there is no intrinsic reason . . . why behavior based on pragmatic precepts *must* result in egocentric and cynical conduct politically" (p. 58). Even though pragmatism has been an eclectic and philosophically omnivorous movement, James and Dewey repeatedly emphasized that the goal of scientific thought was to "improve the human condition, to encourage the fullest expression of the human personality, to strengthen and expand democracy" (p. 61). Crabb sees no reason why these underlying norms (even if not subject to consensual interpretation), and their advancement in foreign policy, should be inconsistent with the notion that the human perception of reality is inherently imperfect and subject to change in light of new evidence.

In addition to the unresolved issue of whether the "pragmatic perspective" constitutes either theory or methodology, the author's presentation raises several challenging questions for any attempt to reconcile the ethics of national purpose with a pragmatic interpretation of American national interest. For example, what moral gains can be expected when the author

acknowledges that the pragmatic tradition "provides little useful guidance to . policy-makers in sorting out rival foreign policy goals, and in arranging them along some scale of priority, according to their contribution to the nation's wellbeing" (p 66)? While Crabb acknowledges that a further defect of pragmatic thought can be its intrinsically pro-Western bias, the question remains as to how the norms of "good judgment" and "common sense" will serve Americans in relating to political movements and governments that reject principles like moderation, gradualism and compromise for solving human problems Finally, the question may be posed whether a pragmatic perspective posits a universal good for mankind or a formula, essentially in keeping with the moral horizons of realism, for seeking the lesser evil while promoting the primacy of national self-interest?

In the final analysis, each author under consideration draws upon various intellectual and historical traditions in evaluating the moral purposes and philosophical bases of American foreign policy Since the beginning of the republic, whether due to benign self-interest or self-righteous moralism, Americans have displayed deep sentiments about their country's role and moral significance in world politics Even realists, always alert to the dangers of a crusading messianism in national conduct, would (if presented the choice) prefer a world populated by civic cultures with a commitment to human and civic rights under law At few points however do these writers attempt to build upon a framework of reasoning that would enable officials to fashion principles and norms of foreign policy in a world in which dangers and challenges, adversaries and friends are endlessly in flux

More specifically it might be useful to explore further several questions regarding the moral margins within which either relative or universal principles might affect America's relationship to the outside world Admittedly, any great nation must pursue its interests for the sake of a transcendent purpose that gives meaning to the day-by-day operations of foreign policy With reference to justifying assumptions underlying America's commitment to human rights do these obligations flow from (1) the American heritage (2) international law or (3) universal human aspirations? Are there any operative moral principles which do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the view of expediency? Seldom do these authors specify whether those values that assure the legitimacy of the nation and impart a modicum of dignity to the national interest, can ever be defined in such a way to accommodate the devotion to principles of justice and established mutualities in a community of sovereign nations

There are at least two ways in which transcendent norms influence the pursuit of narrow political self-interest First, moral absolutes may serve as the relevant, objective, and constant goal of political life Especially in the works of American realists this theme is not always present or unequivocally stated For example, Morgenthau was archetypical of his colleagues in rely-

ing on universal moral principles to expose and moderate the temptation to hypocritical pretense in foreign policy. At this level, realist political ethics becomes deontological (i.e., a judgmental restraint rather than a controlling end-in-view) The prudent statesman able to distinguish between "the misery of politics" and the realm of universal ethical norm is less apt to commit the sin of the fascist mind—the equation of "political and military success with moral superiority " The scholars examined in this review are unable to provide any detailed objections or alternative viewpoints to the familiar realist contention that political norms, while they may be derived from universal norms, are ultimately distorted (and, thus, relativized along immanental lines) by individual selfishness and the tragic presence of evil in all political action No less for the realist than the pragmatist, attention must probe the creative presence of human will in all political action and provide some hierarchy of values according to which nations can use their power for the purpose of making it an instrument of justice and a servant of interests broader than their own

REFERENCES

Ball George 1976 *Diplomacy for a Crowded World An American Foreign Policy* Boston Little Brown and Co

Corwin Edward S 1979 *The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Farrand Max, ed 1937 *The Records of the Federal Convention* Vol 1 New Haven Yale University Press

Good Robert 1960 The National Interest and Political Realism Niebuhrs Debate with Morgenthau and Kennan *Journal of Politics* 22 597 619

Graubard Stephen 1973 *Kissinger Portrait of a Mind* New York W W Norton

Grotius Hugo 1925 De Jure Belli ac Pacis First published in 1625 F W Kelsey trans Oxford Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Hamilton Alexander 1969 Pacificus No 4 In Harold C Syrett and Jacob Cooke eds *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* Vol 15 New York Columbia University Press

Hume David 1964a Of Civil Liberty In T H Green and T H Grose eds *Philosophical Works* Vol 3 Darmstadt Scientia Verlag Aalen

——— 1964b Of the Balance of Power In T H Green and T H Grose eds *Philosophical Works* Vol 3 Darmstadt Scientia Verlag Aalen

Jefferson Thomas 1905 Letter to John Dickinson In A Lipscomb ed, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* Vol 10 Washington DC Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association

——— 1905 Opinion on French Treaties In Paul Ford ed *The Works of Thomas Jefferson* Vol 7 New York G P Putnams Sons

Kennan George 1956 Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy *Harper s Magazine* August 113 27 - 33

——— 1985 86 Morality and Foreign Policy *Foreign Affairs* 64 205 18

Keohane Robert 1984 Theory of World Politics Structural Realism and Beyond In Ada Finifter, ed *Political Science The State of the Discipline* Washington DC American Political Science Association

Kissinger Henry 1957 *A World Restored Metternich Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812 - 1822* Boston Houghton Mifflin

Lapradelle, Albert de 1916 Introduction In Emmerich de Vattel *The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law* Vol 1 Washington, DC Carnegie Institution
Lippmann, Walter 1955 *Essays in the Public Philosophy* New York New American Library
Meinecke, Friedrich 1957 *Machiavellianism The Doctrine of Raison D'Etat and its Place in Modern History* D Scott, trans London Routledge and Kegan Paul
Morgenthau, Hans 1945 The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil *Ethics*, 56 1-18
_____ 1946 *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* Chicago University of Chicago Press
_____ 1949 National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy *American Scholar*, 18 207-12
_____ 1973 *Politics Among Nations* 5th ed Chicago University of Chicago Press
_____ 1982 *The Purpose of American Politics* Washington, DC University Press of America
Niebuhr, Reinhold 1940 *Christianity and Power Politics* New York Charles Scribner's Sons
Stoessinger, John 1979 *Crusaders and Pragmatists* New York W W Norton
Thompson, Kenneth 1980 *Morality and Foreign Policy* Baton Rouge LA Louisiana State University Press
Vasquez, John, ed 1986 *Classics of International Relations* Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-Hall
Vattel, Emmerich de 1844 *The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns* First published in 1758 Joseph Chitty trans Philadelphia T and J W Johnson
Waltz Kenneth 1979 *Theory of International Politics* Menlo Park CA Addison-Wesley

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Cecil L Eubanks, Editor

Terrorism, U.S Strategy, and Reagan Policies By Marc A Celmer (New York and Westport, CT Greenwood Press, 1987 Pp x, 132)

This is a study of the U S antiterrorist strategy (defined as *defensive* measures against terrorism) and counterterrorist strategy (*offensive* measures) during the past fifteen years with particular attention to the Reagan years Much discussion concerns National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 (in effect known also as the "Shultz Doctrine"), under which the Reagan Administration decided "to use force and greater covert actions and counter intelligence operations and military and CIA hit teams designed to strike at international terrorists and their bases" (p 3) Thus, NSDD 138, in the words of one Defense Department official, "redirected the focus of the American response to international terrorism . from a passive and reactive defense to recognition that pro-active steps are needed" (p 24)

After a rather brief preface introduction, and discussion of contemporary international terrorism, Celmer moves into his main substantive concerns by observing that "before 1972 the United States had no formal structure designed to deal with international terrorism " The Munich Olympics massacre of September 1972, however, "radically altered the U S attitude and response" (p 17)

A brief overview of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan years follows Here Celmer points out that "there was no single agency, and there still is none, with jurisdictional authority to handle all terrorist incidents and policy-formulation functions " Rather, "the lead agency concept operates on the principle that if an incident falls within one agency's jurisdiction, that agency coordinates the U S response toward the incident" (p 20)

The following chapter examines the agencies comprising the antiterrorist bureaucracy "The most important is the Department of State" (p 29) Others include the Departments of Justice (and F B I), Transportation, Energy, Commerce, and Treasury Celmer concludes here that "the U S response to terrorism must be formulated with the goal of minimizing both the influence of domestic politics and the adverse aspects of bureaucratic politics" (p. 55)

For the most part, this book takes a non-ideological, but rather dry, descriptive, even encyclopedic approach that often reads like one endless job description after another, through which is sprinkled a constant stream of

dates concerning when such and such a government unit dealing with terrorism was created Celmer is well versed in the nuances of his task, but even the attentive reader can absorb with benefit just so much of this The extra-small print in which the book is produced does not help

On the other hand, this sort of listing does serve a useful purpose, especially when it is so copiously footnoted with government as well as scholarly documents A frequently repeated citation to an article which appeared in *Playboy* even adds a little spice, but why the *Washington Post* serves as a source so much more than the *New York Times* remains uncertain

Perhaps Celmer saves his best for the last chapter where he moves beyond mere description to an analytical critique of the Reagan administration's policy "Despite all its harsh rhetoric, the Reagan administration's approach has had no positive impact on the deterrence, prevention and suppression of international terrorism, nor has it created a greater degree of safety for Americans travelling and living abroad" (p 113) This reviewer found particularly valuable Celmer's refusal to pin the terrorist blame largely on the Soviet Union, as the Reagan administration and a number of right-wing policy-serving scholars" have tried to do in recent years "There is evidence of Soviet Union support of some terrorist organizations However support should not be equated with command" (p 114) Elsewhere, Celmer adds "To combat terrorism effectively the U S response must not be colored by an administration's political or ideological considerations The American response should be objective and bipartisan" (p 91)

Biting, but true, is Celmer's declaration There is no substantive difference between U S actions against Libya and the South African raids of May 1986 on three African states in which African National Congress members were based " "The administrations condemnation of South Africa is hypocritical," (p 116) a policy characterization Celmer also uses to describe the Iran arms-for-hostages affair Indeed, we ironically have come full circle by the end of this study when Celmer declaims "The Reagan administration's aggressive stance on terrorism must also be weighed in the light of the administration's own terrorist behavior, that is, the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and CIA manuals on assassination" (p 116) Celmer might have gone on to add, as in effect he did in his introduction (p 2), that "one man's freedom fighter is another mans terrorist "

Scattered throughout Celmer's seven preceding chapters are a number of other serious criticisms of the U S anti- and counterterrorist policy (1) lack of organizational and personnel continuity, which "only demonstrates and reinforces the image of confusion and inadequacy" (p 37), (2) overemphasis on the entire issue of terrorism that gives terrorists the very "recognition and "high visibility' they seek (p 41), (3) operational failures involved in the Mayaguez affair, the Iranian hostages rescue attempt, and even Grenada and (4) inability to rescue American hostages held in Lebanon which "dem

onstrates a lack of capabilities on the part of the intelligence community that is shocking and frustrating" (p 88)

Is there, then, any hope? In detailing the U S government's attempts to come to grips with terrorism, Celmer does offer some There is, at least, a lot of activity "Currently, the United States has 30 agencies, departments, and offices involved in executing its antiterrorist program" (p 28) More specifically, "the record of the FBI in dealing with terrorism is one of the few positive aspects of the U S antiterrorist efforts " "Perhaps the greatest success . has been the almost total elimination of hijackings of aircraft using U S facilities and airspace" (p 44)

Cautioning against too much negativism concerning these matters, Celmer points out that "the perception of international terrorists as powerful political actors can be deceiving Terrorist groups are small Their potential power is limited" (p 8) He admits, however, that against them "the best that can be achieved is damage control" (p 116) Perceptively he adds "As long as individuals, groups and even nations view certain political, economic and social institutions as illegitimate, unacceptable and immoral, terrorist behavior will continue as a form of political expression" (p 117)

This book contains a "selected biography and a modest index It will be useful to scholars interested in U S national security and terrorism studies

Michael M Gunter, *Tennessee Technological University*

Affirmative Action Theory, Analysis, and Prospects Edited by Michael W Combs and John Gruhl (Jefferson NC McFarland & Company, Inc , 1986 Pp vi, 185 $19 95 cloth)

Combs and Gruhl have drawn upon papers presented at a symposium in Lincoln, Nebraska in 1983 In doing so, they have produced a slender anthology that focuses on various aspects of the controversy surrounding affirmative action policy The essays included in this anthology are almost uniformly well-crafted, but they vary somewhat in their timely relevance to theorists and practitioners in the field

The editors introduce the books with an analysis of the *Bakke*, *Fullilove*, and *Stotts* cases and conclude that the group rights basis of affirmative action renders it ideologically vulnerable in classically liberal America They follow this virtually unarguable conclusion with a precise summary of each essay s premises and conclusions that defies its space limitations

Part I begins the essays provocatively enough with a philosophical treatment of "American Values and Affirmative Action " Richard Young makes a populist case for closer consideration of "substantive racism" (actual inequality) rather than the "procedural racism" (unequal opportunity) contemporary

affirmative action dwells upon Jeffrey Prager attempts to blunt merito criticisms of affirmative action by questioning whether a more comple subtle notion of merit might be necessary. W R Newell overshadows these essays, coming across as the conference discussant whose remarl more interesting than the papers. Newell gently criticizes Young and Pr narrower arguments amid a far-flung discussion of Locke, Rousseau Rawls Newell concludes that Rawls and, especially, Rousseau provid basis for a classically liberal defense of affirmative action The reader wa vain for Young and Prager's rejoinders One misses also a philosophical ment that links affirmative action to the overall reform of personnel p dures and to the implementation of the principle of nondiscrimination By treating affirmative action as a species of "reverse discrimination," from orderly personnel practice and distinct from the identification ar mediation of discrimination, the philosophical defenders of affirmative a needlessly concede a great deal to its detractors

Parts II and III rectify this situation somewhat by dealing, respect with "Some Consequences of Equal Employment Legislation" and Public Sector and Affirmative Action." Rice and Whitby employ time analysis to measure the impact of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on abs black-white differences in unemployment rates between 1948 and 1983 measure admittedly emphasizes the situation of the most vulnerable worker The authors report that racial inequality, thus measured, did n exorably decrease before the 1964 Act, as conservative economists ass Rice and Whitby further conclude that the racial gap narrowed dramat between 1965 and 1977 This progress ceased after 1977 Moving beyon limitations of their model, they suggest qualitative change in the econo the likely culprit behind a black decline that is coterminous largely wit sympathetic Carter administration In a companion essay, Bridges and mez attempt to measure the impact of Equal Employment Opportunity lation in reducing, between 1972 and 1981, the educational overqualific of minority workers Unfortunately, noncomparable survey data mar thorough and well-written analysis

Sigelman and Cayer begin Part III with a comprehensive descripti racial and gender employment inequality at various government l Peter Eisinger follows with an ambitious attempt to explain black mun employment in terms of changing urban economic dynamics The pr with such a dynamic methodology is obvious results become veste news between their discovery and the printer's final deadline Reading Houston's "rampant growth" (p 113) distracts the reader Grace Salt fares better in her attempt to identify the correlates of female represent in full-time municipal employment Saltzstein concludes that institu barriers, such as statewide merit systems, the rule of three, and vete preference are significant depressors of female representation, but that significance is widely exaggerated An indicator of the much more el

otion of organizational concern for fairness, the location of the affirmative fficer in the chief executive's office, turned out to be the most important redictor of female representation.

Part IV, "The Future of Affirmative Action," features the book's most in- eresting essay in Plant and Thompson's case study of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) amid the Reagan Administration's early eal for deregulation Applying the work of Moe, Romzek, Hendricks, et al , ie authors identify the factors conducive to deregulation as well as those romoting an agency's resistance to its own curtailment Their basic conclu- on is that the EEOC, an independent commission and representative bu- eaucracy with a complaint-driven regulatory technology and prosecutorial coproducers" (the agency's beneficiaries), should be highly resistant to hos- le deregulation attempts

Affirmative Action closes disappointingly with Michael Preston's tentative Affirmative Action Policy Can It Survive the Reaganites?" A close reading xplains Preston's diffidence There is a reference to "what Reagan has ac- omplished in the past two years" (p 173) that reminds the reader that these ssays derive from conference papers delivered in 1983 References to slip pinions issued in 1984 (p 176) indicate a later revision As political science navoidably overlaps journalism at the edges of each, a three-year lag be- veen prediction and publication can prove critical Perhaps Combs and ruhl should have concluded the anthology with the same trenchant analysis nd crisp prose that introduced it

In sum, this is a diverse sampling of well-crafted, but not always timely, ssays The normative essays that make up Part I, and the efforts of Rice and Vhitby, Saltzstein, and Plant and Thompson, in particular, escape the dated- ess that can afflict public policy research Each addresses persistent con- erns with an analytical rigor that transcends today's news

Bert C Buzan, *California State University, Fullerton*

olitics and Ambiguity By William E Connolly (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1987 Pp xiii, 168 $25)

n *Politics and Ambiguity*, William Connolly has given us a graceful, unset- ing, and intriguing book He poses the following question to both himself nd those modes of thought he engages in debate Can one endorse critical andards that provide the foundation for a common way of life and public irtue while at the same time appreciating the ambiguity of that life, recog- izing that it will tend to exclude, normalize, and silence that which resists iclusion into it? Connolly argues that we can In the course of answering is question, he examines several additional concerns First, he argues that ontemporary political debate and public policy endorsing programs for eco- omic renewal and imperatives of growth extend to the normalization of dis-

ciplinary society to more and more areas of our lives. Second, he argues that conventional contemporary democratic theory in both individualist and communitarian forms, despite its criticisms of disciplinary techniques, unwittingly contributes to their extension. Third, Connolly examines the inherent shortcomings of liberalism, critical theory, pragmatism, Foucauldian genealogy, and expressivist interpretive theory in dealing with the threat of the disciplinary society, the dilemmas of legitimacy, and the ambiguity of modern authority and politics.

There are several criticisms that one might make of Connolly's book. As a series of essays, many previously published elsewhere, that Connolly weaves together, there are repetitions of themes. For example, the threat posed by the civilization of productivity is summarized in several of the chapters. In addition, the chapters focusing on Habermas and Rorty respectively, though they are important for Connolly's argument, do not seem to fit as cleanly into the terrain as the other chapters.

But I think there is a more substantive point to make. One can point to a discordance (some might call it inconsistency) within the text. Clearly, from the very first chapter, Connolly takes the Foucauldian challenge to contemporary thought and politics very seriously. But it is unclear whether the result is an interpretive theory with a Foucauldian moment, or whether his endorsement of dissonant holism (which he claims Foucauldian genealogy makes possible) signals a break with interpretive theory and a more complete Nietzschean posture, or whether Connolly is moving beyond both expressivist interpretive theory and genealogy. To complicate this, still others might interpret Connolly's confrontation with Foucault, specifically his argument that Foucault plays a central role in a politics of ambiguity that democracy can cultivate, as a taming of Foucault.

To demonstrate this discordance, in chapter four, titled "Progress, Growth and Pessimism in America," Connolly argues that though Foucault's theory of disciplinary society is essential for understanding the mechanisms of power operating in our current political economy, it encourages a counter-strategy of dispersed tactics of resistance and localized disruption. This type of politics eventually strengthens the mechanisms of disciplinary politics (p. 51). In addition, Foucault's unwillingness to identify affirmative ideals is itself, argues Connolly, a version of Hegel's beautiful soul (p. 50). But by the last chapter, "Where the Word Breaks Off," more Foucauldian in both tone and substance, Connolly's argument has shifted noticeably. There he argues that "genealogy expresses a social ontology of dissonant holism . . . that prepares the self to support a politics in which achievements are affirmed but the ambiguity within them is acknowledged textually and institutionally" (p. 159).

The importance of this lies in the connections Connolly interprets among the importance of ambiguity, democratic politics, and dissonant holism. One of the central themes of Connolly's book is that "modern politics, at its best is the institutionalization of ambiguity . . . " since it "both unsettles dimen

ons of the common life that have assumed a fixed character" and can "achieve temporary settlement in areas where common decision is needed " 141) This ambiguity of modern democratic politics can best be appreated through an ontological stance of dissonant holism, i e , "a social onlogy of discord within concord" that opens discourse to "the voices subued by the pursuit of harmony and identity" (p 160) It is a stance that onnolly claims enables him to endorse democracy, the common good, and e self as a subject and citizen while recognizing and insisting upon the amguity that such achievements embody (p vii) In short, if Connolly is corect in his interpretation of the connections among ambiguity, democracy, nd dissonant holism, Foucault, at least in Connolly's hands, is more imporant for democratic theory than is currently perceived by most political theosts Indeed, whether one agrees with Connolly's interpretation or not, I an think of no other book in political theory that so forcefully and subtly rgues for the possibilities of Foucauldian genealogy for democratic politics his is not to say that Connolly argues that genealogy is a new foundation of emocratic politics Rather, the argument here is more subtle than that onnolly is arguing that the common ground between democratic theory nd genealogy is to be found in their distinctive capacity to cultivate ambiguy The dissonant holism that characterizes genealogy encourages a recognion of ambiguity in political life that finds its most complete expression in odern democratic politics when democracy is at its best And the ambiguies lodged within and constitutive of democratic theory and practice can est be articulated when democratic theory is informed by a philosophy of issonant holism made available by genealogy

I take this discordance within Connolly's own thought to be a strength of e book Connolly engages a diverse set of thinkers in his examination of the onnections among politics, democracy legitimation, the self, and ambiguy In doing so he engages in a form of edification that is both risky and romising Such edification encourages the ambiguities and discordance in s own thought to emerge This celebration of ambiguity makes it possible r him to identify and address what many of us seek to hide, deny, or exain away in our own thought In this respect it is a courageous book with a oral sensibility for the possibilities, complexity, and promise of, as well as e dangers facing, democracy that few of us are able to articulate

Michael T Gibbons, *University of South Florida*

Women, Elections, and Representation By R Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark (New York and London Longman Inc , 1987 Pp 181)

his book makes a significant contribution to the growing body of literature n the role of women in one of the most basic functions of democratic soety—representation The authors, who have an impressive track record of

research on women and electoral politics, have brought together a large number of empirical studies, as well as what little traditional political theory exists on women and politics, in an effort to explain where "women are at" currently in the representative bodies of government at all levels in the United States.

The book is an exploration into the gross underrepresentation of women—defined as women representing women—in political institutions today. This phenomenon is presented as both a "problem" and a "puzzle" in a society claiming to be democratic However, when the authors review the major works of Western political philosophy and women's political roles from pre-Revolutionary days well into the nineteenth century, a big part of the "puzzle" is solved Women were virtually excluded from political life But what remains a question is why they are still significantly underrepresented in the late twentieth century after they have had the right to vote for over sixty years

To address this "problem," three sets of variables are examined as possible explanatory factors for why few women get elected to political office (1) differences in the vote for male and female candidates, (2) differences in how political elites, e g , party leaders treat male and female aspirants for office (3) electoral arrangements, such as recruitment, financial support, and the nature of districts, that may affect males and females differently Local, state and national levels are treated separately because of differences in elections at each level and variations in the evidence available on which to base conclusions

Data illustrating the success of women in local government offices are spotty at best, but do reveal overall that differences in demographic and political characteristics of cities have little to do with women's chances of getting elected The authors found that women and men are generally equal in the organizational support received from community and party leaders, although the sources of support vary Women tend to get their backing from civic and community service groups, and men receive theirs more from the business sector While differences do not emerge on the basis of the variables examined, the authors emphasize that women are far from approximating an equal proportion of political offices to their population, though their achievements at the local level are much higher than at the state and national levels For example, by 1983, about twenty percent of council members from cities of 50,000 to one million were women, double the proportion in cities over 25,000 in 1975-1976

At the state level, the authors rely heavily on their own studies of selected state legislatures from the midwest and southwest to test their hypotheses They found no evidence of voter or party elite hostility toward women candidates, or that women candidates suffered from underfinancing as compared to men In examining the cultural characteristics of states in the Elazar

mode, no differences emerged on this dimension that could explain the low numbers of women candidates

The data on women in political life at the national level is the most systematic Relying on Gallup polls and the General Social Survey 1972–1984, the authors noted that enough of the American electorate demonstrate hostility toward women candidates to make a difference in election outcomes However, data from the 1982 CPS Survey found that voters were as favorably disposed toward women as men In addition, gender was not a factor in determining a candidate's support from party elites, nor in a candidate's ability to raise funds when type of race was controlled

Even though numerous political variables fail to explain the dearth of women in political life, the authors demonstrate that election laws can be a contributing factor to increasing the numbers of women in political life For example, in state legislatures where some candidates are selected in multimember districts, women have a better chance of getting elected than in the single-member districts Women also seem to do better where the selection process occurs within a limited body, as a mayor being selected by a city council rather than by the general electorate

The authors find the biggest part of the answer to their "puzzle" in the larger social system Aspirants to elective political office, particularly at the state and national levels, are often drawn from income and occupational groups that have been closed to women until recently Until women become economically secure and established in those professions providing an entree to political life, their numbers in office will remain few

Perhaps the most important question addressed in the book is whether increasing the numbers of women in political office makes any difference Obviously the authors think it does, or else they would not have engaged in such a tedious and laborious investigation However, they have little to say about this directly, though they cite several studies demonstrating women politicians' greater sensitivity to women's issues and the tendency for female legislators to vote in a more liberal direction than their male counterparts. Whether these differences will remain as more women enter political office is a topic the authors argue should be a research priority, and rightfully so

This book should rank as one of the best sources on the current status of women in the elective political process The "problem" and the "puzzle" of the paucity of women in political life are examined from a variety of angles The authors' careful documentation and synthesis of the current research on women in political life at all levels of government make this book a valuable resource for students of political socialization, electoral behavior, and the legislative process

Ruth Bamberger, *Drury College*

Exploring Federalism By Daniel J Elazar. (Tuscaloosa, AL. The Universi of Alabama Press, 1987 Pp xvi, 335.)

In the past quarter century, Daniel Elazar has emerged as the leading co temporary scholar of American federalism His excellent latest book, *Explo ing Federalism*, should further enhance his position and status among scho ars of comparative federalism He diligently explores the roots of federalism traces its historical development through three stages, and then describ how it has and can be employed to promote workable and effective govern mental systems in nations with people of diverse tradition

Describing federalism as a major principle of political import, Elazar b lieves the federalist revolution is among the most widespread (and perha one of the most unnoticed) of the various revolutions currently changing th face of the globe By his assessment, "nearly 40 percent of the world's pop lation now lives within polities that are formally federal, another third live polities that apply federal arrangements in some way" (p 6) Elazar's answ to the question "Why Federalism?" is that it "directs the attention of politic science away from a principal concern with the nature of regime to a pri cipal concern with the character of political relationships—between politic units, between governors and governed, between members of the body pol tic" (pp 31–32)

Definitions of federalism are offered throughout the book On a singl page, federalism is "concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of politic power in the name of liberty and its concentration on behalf of unity or ene getic government", "has to do with the need of people and polities to unit for common purposes yet remain separate to preserve their respective integ rities", and "is rather like wanting to have one's cake and eat it too" (p 33) I a fuller definition, federalism "involves the linking of individuals, group and polities in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for th energetic pursuit of common ends while maintaining the respective inte rities of all parties" (p 5) The definition most relevant to the book's content that federalism "can be considered a genus of political organization of whic there are several species" (pp 6–7) The variety of federal arrangements co sidered are federations, political systems with federal arrangements, union consociations, confederations, asymmetrical federal arrangements, league and local and nongovernmental federalism

Elazar identifies three basic phenomena of modern political life whi support the expansion of federalism first, the emergence of the mode nation-state encompassing large territories and population, and the pro lems of internal distribution of power, second, a breakdown of the pr modern community with its organic lines of authority based on fixed soc relationships occurred, and third, a breakdown of the old aristocratic pri ciples in favor of a new commitment to equality resulted in a "concomita

demand for the creation of a more democratic social and political order" (p 110)

Elazar believes the federal principle offers one possible resource for resolving the problems "whose sources lie in conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims arising out of historical experience" (p 11) He is convincing as he describes the current status of federalism and federal arrangements around the world He identifies three basic characteristics and operational principles common to all truly federal systems as (1) a written constitution, (2) noncentralization, and (3) an areal division of power (pp 157–68) Vital but supplementary features include means for maintaining the union, maintaining noncentralization, and maintaining the federal principle (pp 168–86)

Chapter 6 is a description and analysis of the centralizing and decentralizing trends in contemporary federal systems Elazar believes that the tendency, at least for now, seems to be in the direction of decentralization He concludes, however, that a mixture of centralizing and decentralizing trends is likely to continue as long as federalism exists' (p 222) While one might hope for a more definitive finding, his is appropriate since contradictory tendencies are noted and almost seem inevitable in nations with either federal systems or federal arrangements

The concluding chapter begins with the question "Whither the modern nation-state?" (p 223) After assessing why federations have failed, Elazar concludes that federal systems have succeeded when they managed ethnic or intercommunal conflict, substituted government by an elite for a government of a single, strong man, had adequate available human and material resources, and where common economic and security interests existed (pp 244–47) He is optimistic that the postmodern era will continue the trend from the 'reified state—exclusive sovereignty—centralism syndrome toward one of partnership, negotiation, and sharing" (p 265)

In addition to the clarity of his writing, Elazar provides much information in eleven figures and six tables One figure of particular interest shows the varying approaches to federalism in the writings of selected political theorists (p 81) Some theorists advance federalism as means to attain ends external to it (these include most American theorists, e g , John C Calhoun and Woodrow Wilson), while others see the realization of the federal idea as end in itself (e g , Althusius, Proudhon, and Montesquieu) There are 311 endnotes to the seven chapters filling 38 pages, offering a goldmine of sources for those seeking additional or supporting information, as does the 22-page bibliography In addition, the extensive index provides easy and ready assistance to the reader in finding specific information which might not be clear from the table of contents

In conclusion, the book is a welcome and much needed addition to the growing literature on comparative federalism and represents a truly extraor-

dinary task of amassing and analyzing material on that subject. It is deserving of a wide audience in both the United States and abroad

George S. Blair, *Claremont Graduate School*

The Multiple Self By Jon Elster, editor (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1986 Pp. 269)

As usual, Jon Elster focuses on an important aspect of human social behavior, in this case, the foundation of rationality, a central concept for scholars in fields as diverse as philosophy, economics, psychology, sociology, and political science And as usual, Elster does so with imagination, insight, and creativity, by identifying the conceptual difficulties for rational and social choice theory posed by the possible existence of a multiple self While the quality is uneven, the selections are all by eminent scholars who raise provocative questions concerning rationality and the existence of a multiple self How can we reconcile our concept of rational agents with self-deception and akrasia? Can we speak of a public and a private self, each with divergent interests? If choices and preferences shift over time, how can we make binding rational decisions? And to the extent that issues are framed to fit personal norms or one's concept of self, how can we speak of man rationally processing and evaluating information? Such issues are complex and difficult to reconcile with traditional theories of rational action and rational choice Discussing them from varied perspectives and with great insight is the volume's chief strength, and one which makes this collection important reading for all rational choice theorists and political scientists interested in voting and democratic theory

The volume's chief weakness lies in its failure to establish a clear linkage between the concept of a multiple self and the study of rationality and social change, a linkage I presume is of interest to Elster since this work is published as part of the series on rationality and social change that Elster edits with Gudmund Hernes Since I believe the concept of self is emerging as central to our understanding of rationality, let me concentrate on a discussion of the relation between self and rationality, in order to draw together the loosely assembled threads Elster provides in this excellent collection (Throughout this review, I will use the efficient pursuit of self-interest as a loose meaning for rationality, one which would be generally acceptable to all contributors to this volume, although each would no doubt suggest refinements)

The selection which best succeeds in establishing an explicit linkage between self and rationality is Amélie Oksenberg Rorty's excellent analysis of self-deception and akrasia, roughly translated as weakness of will All too

often theorists ignore self-deception and akrasia, or explain them away through the tautological sleight-of-hand involved in the revealed preference argument, e g., Mary is not weak-willed when she eats the ice cream while on a diet, she merely values something else more than she values her stated goal of losing weight. Rorty rejects such a device, arguing (1) that self-deception and akrasia exist and are an "embarrassment for the theory of rational agency" (p. 115), insofar as each phenomenon causes people to fail efficiently to pursue their own self-interests, and (2) that an examination of them can produce useful revisions in our theories of rational agency

What are the differences between akrasia and self-deception? One theory holds that self-deception concerns beliefs and akratic actions Another theory argues that self-deception is always motivated while akrasia is not Rorty discusses but ultimately rejects both theories, arguing that the two phenomena are subtly interlocked via the concept of self

Why do akrasia and self-deception persist, and do they serve any useful purpose? Rorty believes they persist because of their relation to ambiguities in notions of preference and satisfaction To exemplify this, Rorty identifies three "attractive" strategies of akrasia

1 *Attraction by dominating the agent's attention* The akratic alternative can have more salience for the agent than the preferred choice As much experimental work in cognitive psychology has demonstrated if the actor's attention is focused on one choice alternative, it can fill the experiential field and drown out the preferred choice Or it can dominate by default when the agent's preferred judgments simply fail to attract his attention This can happen in many ways The akratic alternative can be immediately present It can offer more promise of excitement or absorbing pleasure It can appear in vivid detail, highly specified and determined, or can be physiologically or psychologically salient, often representing the satisfaction of a frustrated need (p 123)

2 *Attractions of the familiar, the habitual, the easy course* Alternatives composed of strongly habitual actions, particularly when the more preferred alternative seems distant from habitual routines, are often more attractive Following the familiar does not require extra motivation

3 *Social streaming* Akrates easily follow charismatic leaders, or are moved by appeals to sympathy or antipathy to take positions conflicting with their own preferred alternatives Rorty notes an irony here these same strategies of social streaming (defined as the capacity to comprehend or acquire the beliefs and desires of others) also give us the ability to act as social agents, capable of quick cooperative action (p 124)

What does a consideration of akrasia and self-deception tell us about a multiple self? And how can that help us refine our understanding of rationality? Rorty argues that we can regard the self as a loose configuration of hab-

its of thought, perception, motivation, and action, all acquired at different stages But her very discussion of akrasia and self-deception underlines the unity of one single agent

> It is only when an agent takes the unification of his traits, his thoughts and his actions, as a central project that he is capable of self-deception and akrasia A person who just is a loose confederation of habits is an agent only in the loosest sense For someone to be capable of agency in the strong sense, to hold himself responsible for avoiding self-deception and akrasia, requires that he—or at any rate some relatively central set of his habits—reflexively underwrite his integrative processes (p 131)

I have focused a great deal of attention on Rorty's analysis of akrasia and self-deception mainly because Rorty succeeds in carefully relating these phenomena to the concept of rationality If irrational phenomena, such as akrasia and self-deception, are related to psychological processes necessary for rationality, then, ironically, their eradication might also jeopardize the useful rational processes (p 129)

While none of the other selections in the volume establishes as detailed a linkage between the self and rationality, valuable insights on this linkage are provided by several authors Ian Steedman and Ulrich Krause focus the problem for economists in choice theoretic terms Individuals often feel the force of conflicting considerations relative to particular actions, yet economic theories of rational decision making usually represent the individual by a single, complete, transitive preference ordering (p 197) Even when man has conflicts among his preferences, he still must make choices based on incomplete rankings of preferences To understand how this process works Steedman and Krause direct our attention to the complexity of the individual's inner environment, the domain of conflict, and the integration process by which preferences are formed These are all important leads to follow

One of the richest areas for such exploration, and one for which political scientists are ideally suited, is voting behavior The selection by George Quattrone and Amos Tversky focuses directly on voting, analyzing it in relation to self-deception In particular, the authors argue that people treat voting as a diagnostic action, defined as one where both action and outcome are believed to follow from a common antecedent, this causes people to reason that by their selection of a particular action they will increase the probability of the desired *outcome* Calvinists and Catholics provide instructive contrast here Both groups believe that one's earthly conduct is correlated with postmortal fate But Catholics subscribe to a casual theory, whereby earthly actions *determine* one's position in the afterlife In contrast, Calvinists hold both earthly and eternal fate the consequence of predestination, virtuous action on earth is an indicator of the position already assigned one in the eternal lottery, not a determinant of one's fate This research typifies the classic Kahnemann and Tversky experiments on decision making and will be

of interest to both rational choice and democratic theorists, as well as to those many political scientists interested in voting

Donald Davidson's selection on deception and division of the self constructs an excellent statement of the difficulties in making external observations about the rationality of others' actions Davidson concludes that since people can and do keep opposing beliefs apart, we must accept (1) that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind, and (2) that drawing such boundaries is irrational since, in the case of self-deception, it separates belief from relevant evidence

Other articles include a somewhat obtuse selection by David Pears, disappointing articles by Thomas Schelling and Elster himself, an article by George Ainslie on picoeconomics, noteworthy primarily for the unrealistic aspect of its assumptions, and a piece by Serge-Christophe Kolm on the Buddhist theory of no-self

So overall, what does the volume contribute to our understanding of rationality? First, it presents a sophisticated litany of problems concerning the self and rationality and discusses many of these problems with more insight than is usually the case But the work makes an even more important contribution Simply by devoting an entire volume to discussion of the multiple self, Elster focuses attention on the extent to which our concept of self is central to understanding rationality If the volume fails, for the most part, to make explicit *how* the self relates to rationality, at least valuable suggestions are provided by several of the authors in ways I have tried to highlight throughout my review I would argue that the concept of self is critical for all political scientists and rational choice theorists concerned with collective or altruistic behavior Innumerable hours have been spent trying to reconcile such behavior with the assumption of individual self-interest that lies at the heart of both rational choice theory and economics The key to such a reconciliation lies with the concept of self When an actor conceives of himself as an individual apart from a group, he will pursue his self-interest But when he conceives of himself as a group member collective or altruistic behavior can occur The context of action (the domain of conflict as Steedman and Krause describe it) and the individual's inner environment—principally that part of his multiple self which is brought to the fore—will determine action The essential contribution of this volume therefore, would be the extent to which it encourages philosophers and political scientists, as well as economists and other rational choice theorists to revise existing theories of rationality to allow for these factors

Kristen Renwick Monroe, *University of California Irvine*

Key Pittman. The Tragedy of a Senate Insider. By Betty Glad. (New York. Columbia University Press, 1986. Pp 388. $45.)

Since the name Key Pittman is not exactly on everyone's lips these days, immediately the question arises as to why anyone would bother to write a detailed biography about a onetime senator who has been dead for more than forty-five years. Anticipating the question, Professor Glad defends her choice on the following grounds (1) Pittman's life provides an opportunity to develop a leadership theory based on the interplay between role, personality and political situation (2) This is an area that particularly lends itself to comparative work because of the availability of data on other chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (3) The materials available on Pittman "are uniquely suited to an in-depth study" (p xii) (4) Pittman's personality and place in history deserve to be reevaluated

Let it be said at the outset that points 1 and 3 seem to me to be persuasive while I remain unconvinced by the arguments set forth in 2 and 4 This is to say Pittman's history and Glad's access to a trove of revealing materials do provide her with a rare opportunity to innovate within the biographical form At the same time, there is no reason to suppose either that there will now be a slew of books on other chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or that this book will trigger a repositioning of Pittman in the lexicon of important figures in American history

Glad is most successful in this enterprise when she is least pretentious She has a quintessentially American tale to tell and her extensive research and simple narrative style enable her to tell it well In fact, I can see the book as a movie made in the forties with Gary Cooper in the starring role of lanky young man, who heads west and against all odds makes it to nearly the top of the greasy pole

Pittman's story has all the ingredients of what was once considered the perfect Hollywood script After the death of both his parents when he was still a boy, he was sent to live with a grandmother who herself died little over a year later A third haven with still other relatives soon gave way to prep school, after which young Key never looked back He set out to strike gold ending up in wild and woolly Alaska with only a Canadian dime in his pocket Along the way he met a beautiful but remote woman with the romantic name of Mimosa Gates, who was to become his wife Together they ended up in Nevada, where Pittman's law practice (he had earned the right to practice law by studying at night) grew almost as rapidly as the boomtown in which he had settled

Before he turned forty-one, Pittman was elected to the U S Senate He had found his niche and would remain there for the rest of his life A natural politician, skilled both at addressing the needs of his constituents and at getting along with his peers in the Congress, Pittman became a presence in

Washington. He achieved a preeminent position in the Senate, became an advisor of sorts to President Roosevelt (although he was never as close to the Oval Office as he would have liked), and as his life drew to a close could take claim for having been more prescient than most with regard to the Nazi threat in Europe

But if the trajectory of Pittman's life was generally up, there were nevertheless problems that haunted the man throughout his adulthood Above all there was the heavy drinking which almost from the start had a deleterious impact on his relationship with his wife, and which eventually injured the senator's public performance as well Moreover, his letters attest to inner conflicts which appear to go beyond those that plague the average man (I say "appear to" because perhaps Pittman seems so troubled only because his devils are unusually well documented) Thus it is the underbelly of Pittman's life that no doubt particularly intrigues Professor Glad, and that motivates her to draw on psychological theory to do some explaining

However, Glad fails finally to demonstrate that role is as important as she claims Moreover, her use of personality theory is less than fully persuasive With regard to the issue of role, Glad tries to convince us that it was the lack of a clearly defined political role for Pittman in the 1930s that triggered his final decline In fact, however she herself allows as to how increasing age alone can aggravate the effects of untreated alcoholism With regard to the use in this book of personality theory, I see two problems First, there is the matter of style By not threading psychological insights throughout the text by in fact inserting references to depth psychology only very rarely into the narrative, psychology seems to be grafted on to history rather than an integral part of it Thus for example, Heinz Kohut's work on narcissism is said to be important to understanding Pittman but other than an elucidation thereof in chapter 9, it is hardly referred to Second, there is the matter of substance A few of the conclusions Glad draws are arguable at best For example, she writes that the genesis of Pittman's problems is hard to trace She goes on to speculate, on the basis of admittedly scanty evidence, that there was a problem in the mothering he received (p 118) Why she fails during this key discussion to underscore the simple fact that he was deserted (via her death) by his mother when he was only nine is not clear

At its best, then, Glad's book is a straightforward yarn about a western adventurer and professional politico In fact, the subtitle does the story a disservice For what Glad herself has provided is testimony to the vibrancy—in spite of personal problems—of a life lived in the crosscurrents of American history and politics

Barbara Kellerman, *Fairleigh Dickinson University*

Ideology and U S Foreign Policy By Michael H Hunt (New Haven Yale University Press, 1987 Pp xiv, 237)

There are certain core ideas that constitute the ideological framework within which the foreign policy of the United States has been formulated and implemented historically These first emerged and took shape at the time of the American Revolution, producing an elite consensus linked to prevailing cultural values and to the nations sense of identity in the sphere of foreign affairs To understand the attitudes and responses to international events throughout the independence period down to the present, in the view of Michael H Hunt, therefore requires an exploration of the place of ideology in U S foreign policy The task, as he properly notes, is a challenging one, and has not been extensively explored in the literature At the same time, it constitutes an undertaking too important to remain neglected and unattended

The intellectual setting is provided in a short but succinct introduction entitled 'Coming to Terms with Ideology " Noting the extensive critiques of U S policy that arose in reaction to Vietnam and continued during the Reagan years Hunt examines representative works as a means of defining his own perspective concerning the character and place of ideology While several are cited, he places particular emphasis on major statements by George Kennan and William Appleman Williams These are cited as the two dominant interpretive approaches of the past thirty-five years The first is termed an exponent of the pejorative' approach to foreign policy ideology based on criticism of the presumably errant moralism and legalism inherent in American foreign policy In contrast the latter centers attention on the influence of economic interests, with ideology central to the evolution of American policy abroad This was epitomized by the open door policy, first effective in China and later applied globally

The authors examination of these two writers is intrinsically valuable Even more importantly, however, it permits him to move toward his own perspective of ideology as shaped by cultural forces Drawing particularly on the writings of Clifford Geertz, and to a lesser degree from such exponents of political culture as Almond and Verba, Hunt argues that it becomes possible to incorporate both social class and economic power into a definitional concept of ideology Moreover, changes over time may more readily be accommodated As a consequence, it becomes useful to review the attitudes of foreign policy elites from the eighteenth century to the present Drawing extensively on public rhetoric as well as private writings, Hunt guides the reader across the years from the independence movement to the present The result is an intellectual *tour de force* that insists upon an elite consensus over fundamental issues of international affairs

This swift if exciting expedition highlights three core ideas, which, for Hunt, have exerted a powerful influence in the sphere of foreign affairs The

first defines the future in terms of an unalloyed quest for national greatness, underlined by a dedication to the advocacy of liberty The second element shapes attitudes toward foreigners in terms of a racial hierarchy The third is composed of ideas about revolution, about the pace and character of political and social change abroad Each of thee receives an individual chapter, tellingly labeled "visions of national greatness," "the hierarchy of race," and "the perils of revolution " In reaching the book's concluding discussion, Hunt is therefore arguing that the three central themes are inherent to the understanding of contemporary controversies Thus, "American policy-makers measured the worth of other peoples and nations against a racial hierarchy They displayed hostility toward revolutions that diverged from the American norm, especially those on the left Finally, they were convinced that national greatness depended on making the world safe for liberty" (p 171)

In examining the experience of recent times, the preceding analysis leads to the contention that the national ideology of foreign policy has produced unfortunate consequences Vietnam is the obvious case employed as illustrative of the argument, although the discussion is carried forward to include much of the Reagan experience Ideological forces have insisted on several powerful if unhealthy proclivities a tendency to see the world in simplistic geopolitical terms, a paternalism linked to racial stereotypes the refusal to accept the legitimacy of spheres of influence and an elitist proclivity to invoke public opinion when convenient but otherwise to treat it with cavalier disregard Notwithstanding the differences between say, the outlooks of the Carter and Reagan administrations the fundamental ideological impulses of American foreign policy have endured despite periodic efforts to dislodge or override them

The final pages suggest a refashioning of the nationalist roots of foreign policy Requiring meaningful cross-cultural education and a resuscitation of republicanism, the United States would thereby link notions of international greatness to domestic conditions as well It would also concede the existence of a double standard that differentiates between internal and external concerns, accepting limitations while retaining an enduring belief in liberty as a universal good A full and fair assessment of the authors line of argument cannot be summarized here His work deserves a thoughtful reading From his earlier work on U S -China relations, Hunt has moved to an inquiry of the broadest and most basic elements of American foreign policy His use of original materials political cartoons and commentaries from a two-century span is superb, his scholarship impeccable This is a penetrating and provocative study for students and policymakers alike a pleasure both to read and to contemplate

John D Martz *Pennsylvania State University*

Democracy, Italian Style. By Joseph LaPalombara. (New Haven versity Press, 1987. Pp 190. $25.)

As a senior member of the international community of "Italianists LaPalombara has endeavored to explain Italy to the English-speak through government service, lectures, and a number of well-recen arly volumes Among textbooks on comparative government, hi *Within Nations*, first published in 1974, is considered something of During a leave of absence in the early 1980s from his position LaPalombara has even served as the first secretary at the American I in Rome, making him an insider's insider in Italian politics

I last heard Joseph LaPalombara lecture sixteen years ago, and I ber him as intellectually challenging, sometimes abrasively uncompr in his views and unforgettably brilliant *Democracy, Italian Styl* lished in 1987 by Yale University Press, demonstrates that he has c little in a decade and a half

Democracy, Italian Style is neither a systematic textbook nor a pri the student wishing to approach Italian politics from the beginning R is a compilation of ten loosely-connected essays on Italian public life, v for a reader who is already moderately familiar with European politi history and now wishes to be teased, entertained occasionally annoye unfailingly stimulated

Those of us who have come to know and love the postwar Italian Re will have reason to be grateful to LaPalombara for the one central perc that serves as the underlying theme of this entire book LaPalomba rectly perceives that English and American scholars have—since the c days of Fascism—regarded Italy condescendingly as a fragile and fle democracy hopelessly unstable forever trembling upon the brink of s collapse

LaPalombara argues that Italy is in fact, a fundamentally healthy s with the world's fifth largest economy and a viable political system, d unfair attacks from Italy's own intellectuals and journalists For them Anglo-Saxon critics of Italian society have been chauvinistic and in tent The author suggests, for example, that Americans who talk abo sins of the Mafia might do well to focus instead on the enormity of org crime in their own country The Italian approach to government is tedly idiosyncratic and complex, but LaPalombara stresses the ext which it is both deeply democratic and reflective of the Peninsula's h and culture As he notes "The real miracle of Italian democracy i whereas Italy represents a plural, divided society with a high potent exaggerated conflict, those same individuals and institutions that mi expected to promote or to exacerbate conflict have worked to dampen i This astonishing achievement is largely the work of a much maligned cal class" (p 285)

After reviewing the basic ingredients of Italian political history the author attacks some time-honored notions about the character of the Italian people suggesting that elderly assumptions about the pervasiveness of "amoral familism" and "campanilismo" need to be re-examined in the light of what he calls the "New Pluralism" of Italian society. LaPalombara then reviews—at a relatively sophisticated level—the present political system in Italy discussing the role of the Roman Catholic Church the impact of patronage systems and the evolution of the present party structure.

Chapter seven, "Political Terror," may strike some readers as superficial since the author bounces gleefully among right-wing left-wing and Palestinian guerrilla movements as if they were all part of the same political process. Sounding very much like the embassy official he once was LaPalombara concludes in substance that terrorism was legitimized in Italy because of the irresponsibility of leftist academics and journalists who created a kind of revolutionary culture. While this was certainly part of the problem it was hardly the root cause of revolutionary instincts among the Italian young since civil wars have not traditionally been launched on the advice of teaching faculty and the most effective terrorist leaders—such as Mario Moretti of whom LaPalombara writes so eloquently—never saw the inside of a university. There were deeper more subtle causes for the "Years of Lead" and the subject demands more profundity than we find here.

Throughout the book LaPalombara makes no secret of his profound mistrust of the *Partito comunista italiano* or PCI and there are more than occasional traces here of that lingering suspicion—so common among American intelligence officers—that the Italian communists were merely shamming when they abandoned Leninist revolutionary policies. In fact the PCI's rejection of armed revolt was already implicit in Togliatti's policy during World War II, and had been explicit for many years before it became a central feature in Enrico Berlinguer's leadership of the PCI in the 1960s and 1970s. The American government, however could never quite bring itself to make the act of faith involved in accepting the PCI's renunciation of revolution. Neither can LaPalombara. In his recent book on the CIA Robert Woodward alleged that former CIA Director William Casey mounted a clandestine operation costing some $2 million to combat the PCI in the 1987 national elections in Italy one wonders if Professor LaPalombara would have approved.

Neither does LaPalombara attempt to disguise a certain grudging respect for Bettino Craxi, Prime Minister of Italy for a record four years between 1983 and 1987, leader of the dynamic *Partito socialista italiano* or PSI and currently the dominant force in Italian political life. LaPalombara's enthusiasm for Craxi seems now somewhat muted however compared to the sentiments expressed in his watershed article "Socialist Alternatives: The Italian Variant," in *Foreign Affairs*, (60 4, Spring 1982 pp 924-42). One suspects that this qualified admiration is extended to Craxi the anti-communist rather than Craxi the socialist, and despite the fact that Craxi has tried to reor-

ganize the PSI along monarchical lines, with himself as the absolute monarch . . ." (p 123)

Witty and engaging, *Democracy, Italian Style* is calculated to amuse and entertain as well as to instruct The content is rich, fluid, intense, and absorbing, whether or not one shares all of Dr LaPalombara's political views No reader who has visited Italy or studied the country's history will want to miss this fascinating volume

Richard Oliver Collin, *University of South Carolina*

Appointment of Judges The Johnson Presidency By Neil D McFeeley (Austin, TX University of Texas Press, 1987 Pp xiv 199 $22 50)

As the recent confirmation hearings on Robert Bork so emphatically and embarrassingly underscored presidential appointment of judges is a highly political act This book starts with that observation as a basic premise and then as one volume in a series on the administrative history of the Lyndon Johnson presidency goes on to examine the administrative framework through which selection for nomination occurred and general success in confirmation was secured Though critically juxtaposing several recent presidencies in this regard, the author focuses to good effect upon The Johnson Presidency (one supposes that the author expects those reading the book's title to infer from the publisher's identity that the presidency in question is not Andrew Johnson's)

From his career-enhancing early endorsement of Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing' scheme to his ill-fated nomination of old crony Abe Fortas as chief justice, Lyndon Johnson's politics continually encompassed some degree of concern for federal judicial appointments When the opportunity came for him to make the nominations appointments, he was able to apply his judicial politics within an administrative context As the author notes the selection structure was well organized with Johnson's personal involvement prominent

Innovative use of a civil service perspective (the Macy operation) helped ensure identification of meritorious candidates but as with most presidential activities--and certainly with consummate politician Johnson's- political considerations were never far from the judicial nomination decision-making process Since examination of that process constitutes the major thrust of the book, it is no surprise that the author identifies and details what he terms "the criteria of choice " The Johnson process recognized both the long-term effects of judicial selection upon national policy and governance and the short-term exigencies of political quid pro quo and senatorial confirmation In addition to merit then, several other Johnson-prescribed factors were considered, including experience, gender age race, ethnicity/religion party politics, personal loyalty, and, finally, domestic policy concerns

The personal loyalty criterion stemmed from the circumstances of Johnson's elevation to the presidency as much as from his own insatiable ego needs. Late in his presidency, that loyalty was posited in the context of unswerving support for Johnson's policy in Vietnam. The refreshing thing about this book, however, is its emphasis upon Johnson's domestic policy concerns rather than the Asian venture that was ultimately his undoing. It was in regard to the former criterion especially, then, that Johnson sought to shape the federal judiciary as a whole and at each level, for he recognized the power of the judiciary (especially an activist judiciary committed to social engineering) to give a lingering vitality to the Great Society long after his own death.

President Reagan, of course, long ago achieved that same recognition, but, as is typical for him, more aspects of the selection process are delegated to subordinates. Johnson used subordinates, but took care in maintaining overall process management and thereby in controlling the results. He intervened actively for political, and sometimes personal, reasons. So it happened that Johnson nominated his long time friend and adviser, Associate Justice Abe Fortas, for the chief justiceship. To the chagrin of both, the Senate did not confirm, and Johnson's boldest stroke in his attempt to shape the judiciary and thereby to perpetuate his political agenda failed doubly. Not only did Johnson not get to name a chief justice to succeed Earl Warren, but his own successor and political arch enemy Richard Nixon did. Given that singularly important fact, one may not be impressed with the author's assertion that Johnson was highly successful in his designs on the federal judiciary.

All things considered, this is a scholarly work of value and probably should be read by the winner of next November's presidential election—and by the winner's opposition. It is, moreover, a fitting volume in the series of which it is a part and should be considered by those interested in politics or in the interface of politics and administration (broadly conceived) and especially by those who invested long hours in the Bork confirmation hearings.

Dennis D. Murphy, *Armstrong State College*

Black Political Mobilization: Leadership, Power and Mass Behavior. By Minion K. C. Morrison. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. 308. $19.95.

Minion K. C. Morrison's *Black Political Mobilization: Leadership, Power and Mass Behavior* is the latest volume in the State University of New York series in Afro-American Studies. The book is organized into eight chapters. Appropriate notes, bibliography, and index pages follow the text. Morrison illustrates important data in an elaborate list of figures and tables.

Morrison's study fills the lacuna that has existed in the scholarship on recent trends and currents in southern politics and black political life in the

southern region He introduces and provides fresh and instructive analysis of black political life in three Mississippi towns Morrison's analysis of Bolton, Mayersville, and Tchula presents a view of the post-new South that permits an assessment of the actual performance of black political authorities, while it provides a new appreciation for the political culture in which black political authorities must operate In large measure, these are studies in mayoral leadership in the three towns

The primary variables—mobilization, leadership, power, and mass behavior—are clearly conceptualized as they meet the test of making explicit and specific the political milieu in the American South and the state of Mississippi Morrison leaves nothing to chance, as he attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding of the variety of conditions and factors which shape political mobilization, leadership development, power acquisition, and mass behavior in three Mississippi towns

Chapter 1 is an excellent treatment of the significant literature on the process of mobilization in southern politics Morrison's analysis of the literature easily meshes with the attention he gives to the three towns, as he assesses how they evolved within the "revolution" that took place in the legal status and participation of black people in the American South Chapter 2 is a concise, but critical overview of racial history and ideology in the southern region in general and Mississippi in particular

Taken as a whole, the specific studies on Bolton, Mayersville and Tchula are studies in contrasts and transitions Morrison's descriptions tell us much about black life, history, geography, and the sociology of race in Mississippi While the geographies of these three towns are different, their politics tell us much about the problems of leadership and the contradictions of effecting change in communities quite resistant to the sweep of history

The differences in leadership are rather fascinating Morrison's study identifies three distinct leadership types a neo-populist democrat in Bolton, an inventive, charismatic heroine in Mayersville, and an agrarian townsman in Tchula

Morrison's survey of the electorates of the three towns is well crafted and informative We learn about their political behavior, temperament, and attitudes on a wide range of local, national, and international issues The analysis of counties brings the entire study to a full critique It indicates that Morrison understands that the politics of the American South must be examined in relationship to the broad structural factors that shape primary social relations

Morrison has asked and answered many of the crucial questions about black politics in the American South His study of Bolton, Mayersville, and Tchula is significant work He opens new ground His analysis is critical and refreshing The data are exhaustive and the findings are instructive This study is well written and carefully documented *Black Political Mobilization*

is an important contribution to the literature on southern and black politics, and it should become required reading on these subjects

Rickey Hill, *South Carolina State College*

Amal and the Shi'a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon By Augustus R Norton (Austin, TX University of Texas Press 1987 Pp 238 $25 cloth, $10 95 paper)

Any book that makes more intelligible the complex interplay of political forces in modern-day Lebanon must be viewed as a welcome addition to the political science literature on the Middle East *Amal and the Shi'a* fulfills that criterion admirably

The book is an authoritative objective, and extremely well-informed analysis of a difficult, important but too often neglected subject This is the emergence of political consciousness among the largest segment of contemporary Lebanon's population This emerging consciousness has taken several specific forms, and in the author's view the organization known as the Amal may well be its most influential manifestation Norton had an excellent opportunity to observe the movement first-hand to interview key participants in it, and to collect data about it while serving as a member of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in southern Lebanon

Even among well-informed students of Middle Eastern affairs in the United States, it is safe to say only a small minority has an informed understanding of Lebanese political forces or of the relationships among them The reader will no doubt find some of Norton's conclusions surprising if plausible For example, the author contends persuasively that (in common with most Maronites), the Shi'ites are *committed to the preservation of Lebanon's survival as an independent nation*, neither of these communities desires to be 'swallowed up' in the sea of Sunni Islam that (except for the border with Israel) surrounds Lebanon

The author's knowledge and understanding of the subject are impressive and his research (no doubt sometimes under very difficult conditions) is resourceful and scholarly He skillfully sets the analysis of Amal into a broad context of relevant social, economic and other tendencies that have affected and in some cases profoundly altered traditional attitudes and behavior patterns of Lebanon's Shi'ite community

Amal was founded by the Imam Musa who disappeared mysteriously in 1978 while on a visit to Libya (Foul play by Libya's Qaddafi has always been suspected, although never proved) Norton's account is especially informative in explaining Amal's relations and attitudes toward such disparate political actors as the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel, Syria, and Iran Surprisingly perhaps Norton asserts that

most Lebanese Shi'ites do *not* desire a Khomeini-style political regime in their country His verdict is that Amal stands as a major *deterrent* to growing Iranian influence among the largest segment of the Lebanese population.

In order to derive maximum benefit from Norton's commendable study, the reader ought to possess at least an adequate background on political developments in the modern Middle East, especially Lebanon With such preparation, the reader will unquestionably find *Amal and the Shi'a* a readable and enlightening source of facts and ideas about an important dimension of Middle Eastern political life

Cecil V Crabb, Jr , *Louisiana State University*

The General Will Before Rousseau The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic By Patrick Riley (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1986 Pp 274 $27 50)

This book is a major contribution to understanding the roots of Rousseau's thought Patrick Riley, with crisp and lively writing and superb scholarship, argues that "the French theological and scientific tradition that has viewed *généralité* as the chief characteristic of God's will (in a general will to save all men) as well as the chief characteristic of a nature ruled by simple, constant, uniform general laws regularly producing all *effets particuliers*, was inherited and transformed by Rousseau" (p 257)

Riley claims that Antoine Arnauld "invented, or at least first made visible, the notion of the general will" (p 9) in the seventeenth century when Arnauld entered on the side of Jansenius during the controversy concerning how the assertion, "God wills that all men are saved," should be interpreted Jansenius, in a rather severe Augustinian way, argued that God manifested a general will to save all, even if only the "elect" actually reach the Kingdom of Heaven Arnauld first used the term "general will" "ironically enough, as part of a Jansenist effort to minimize (without annihilating) the notion that all are saved" (p 9) Riley tells us that were it not for the intensity of debate over this issue, the general will "might never have become one of the great disputes of the seventeenth century" (p 9)

Riley focuses on Malebranche, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, although in developing the nature of the transition from the divine to the secular version of the general will, we are treated as well to the contributions made by other, less well-known thinkers like Bossuet Fenelon, Diderot, and Bayle Riley shows how for the seventeenth century thinker, Malebranche, God's will is not arbitrary but it manifests "immutable laws of justice" (p 59) Malebranche, with Leibniz, argues that laws are not the products of the powerful with sovereign domain, as was the case for Hobbes, but they reflect the justice of God's will Here, particular laws can only be understood in terms of

the general will of God's justice which produces them (p. 61). Malebranche took the idea of God as the source of immutable laws further when he argued that God was a "general cause" in the world. This notion becomes "after secularization, Montesquieu's notion of (many) *causes générales* (geography, climate, education, *moeurs*) that generate the particular character of individuals" (p. 101) and, one should also say, the rational character of the law.

On either view, men are only "occasional causes of their actions while God acts as the sole veritable *cause générale*" (p. 254). Rousseau, by contrast, retains the idea of generality in politics while at the same time securing autonomy. Thus, Rousseau rejects a physical determinism as the source of the general will (p. 221). Whereas men are affected by particular circumstances, they are not determined by them, and if they were, then they would not possess a free will or a will that is the "autonomous producer of moral effects" (p. 245). Rousseau's general will is a commitment to a common moral objective. To attain this goal the individual must have freedom from dependence on destructive passions so that persons can make the moral will their own.

Rousseau's general will is a moral will that does not conflict with man's need for autonomy. But how is this state of affairs possible? In other terms, how is the general or moral will made compatible with the particular, where the particular refers to a free and autonomous will? Individuals can attain autonomy only where there is equality or a setting where for Rousseau "no citizen [is] opulent enough to be able to buy another and none so poor as to be constrained to sell himself" (p. 218). But whereas equality is an essential condition for securing autonomy, by itself equality does not guarantee autonomy. Thus, Riley argues that for Rousseau political education is needed to transform individuals with particular selfish wills into citizens with civic commitments. Here, repeating Emile's words, each person is a citizen who says, "I have decided to be what you made me" (p. 247). In adapting a civic perspective, citizens accept a common and general moral commitment, but their doing so does not produce "non-individualism" (p. 249). Generality may rule out particularism or self-interest and ego-centered politics, but the individual, as an autonomous being, remains for Rousseau.

Riley's view of the transition of the general will from the divine to the secular in the French tradition is well done, and his efforts demonstrate quite convincingly the impact of this tradition on Rousseau. But in undertaking this project, one wonders if the central problem of the general will, the problem of harmonizing the particular with the general, does not remain unresolved. In the earliest version of this problem, God protects all but allows only a few into heaven. How can the particular, the concept of a few allowed into heaven, be squared with God's general commitment to protect all? In the modern version, can the secularized general will, even though proper forms of political education (whatever that might be in today's liberal society

which is filled with dissensus on so many issues), create a common will, without denying the freedom and independence of the individual will? To do so, it is necessary to demonstrate that society possesses a clear notion of the moral will to be taught to its citizens, and further, that citizens upon learning of this moral will, freely and readily accept it But whereas we can teach the theory of the general will, its practice awaits its actual formulation with respect to contemporary politics.

That Rousseau's reading of the general will and Riley's accurate portrayal of that reading suggest this problem should not be construed as a criticism of this fine book, but it is a fact of life of the history of the general will, as Riley describes it In transforming the general will from the divine to the secular, the conflict between the general and particular remains, even if in a different form from the earliest version

Steven M DeLue, *Miami University, Ohio*

Congress and the Nuclear Freeze An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Political Movement By Douglas C Waller Foreword by Senator Edward M Kennedy (Amherst MA University of Massachusetts Press, 1987 Pp xix 346)

This is a vivid descriptive account of the nuclear freeze movement and the legislative battle in two sessions of Congress for the adoption of the nuclear freeze resolution in the House of Representatives, which resulted in its passage by a 278 to 149 majority on May 4, 1983

The passage of the resolution climaxed a citizen campaign beginning in 1980, calling for the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate a treaty by which the two nations would agree to end the nuclear arms race by halting the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear devices This agreement, in the view of its advocates would "freeze" the nuclear arms race Reducing the prospect of a nuclear war would be an essential first step in the eventual reduction of the nuclear arsenals of both nations

Douglas C Waller, then an administrative assistant to Representative Edward J Markey of Massachusetts, was advantageously situated to be both a participant and observer of the fray accompanying the adoption of the resolution He is admittedly biased in favor of control However, only the most fervid partisan of policies designed to guarantee American nuclear superiority as the means for the elimination of the Soviet threat and nuclear peril will find that Waller's partisanship mars his judgment of the dynamics and events of the legislative struggle

Waller provides a wealth of minute detail in a swiftly-paced narrative of events depicting the ploys, tactics, and strategies, as well as brief informa

tive personality profiles of the congressional contestants Material that might have been deadly comes alive in his account The book has significance apart from the intrinsic importance of the legislation involved Waller's account of the ambience of committee and floor action provides a rare insight into the tortuous debates over the meaning of words, the aroused tempers, the feints, and the posturing that accompanies legislative struggles He gives a blow-by-blow description almost reminiscent of an expert announcer at ringside of a prize fight

In an early chapter, Waller identifies an ambiguity in American public opinion about the nuclear dilemma Americans appreciate the horrible consequences that would flow from the use of nuclear weapons Consequently, public opinion supports limitations on the nuclear arms race Simultaneously, they are concerned about national security and the Russian threat This is the context in which the battle for public opinion and the freeze resolution took place

Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1980 on a party platform and a campaign that asserted the United States was vulnerable to Soviet attack, and promised a massive military buildup while disparaging any efforts for nuclear arms control Waller argues that the freeze campaign and resolution, now virtually moribund, was not in vain It heightened the American consciousness of the possibility of nuclear annihilation This aroused an awareness that the threat of the Russians and the possibility of nuclear destruction were separable matters, compelling the Reagan administration to place arms control on its agenda with a greater degree of seriousness and responsibility than originally intended The inference seems to be that opinion supporting the freeze compelled the administration to look upon arms control as involving something more than merely an arena for the struggle for restoration of U S nuclear superiority It would follow then that the summit conference in Iceland and the pending INF agreement can in some degree be traced to the force of the freeze campaign in the nation and the Congress This of course in the nature of the case, will always be a speculation The most lasting achievement of the freeze movement, in Waller's estimation is that Congress the House in particular for the first time ceased merely to "rubber stamp" national security policy determined by the executive branch Advocacy of arms control could become a political asset for members in both houses

One can question how real this achievement might be It is manifest that Americans suffer a deep anxiety about the possibility of nuclear war despite the efforts of many "experts" in nuclear weapons and strategies to establish the dominance of the idea that deterrence works Nuclear weapons have not been used in armed conflict since Nagasaki The assumption that more nuclear weapons will prevent nuclear war with the corollary that a limitation of these devices of destruction will bring about a nuclear catastrophe does not appeal to the common sense of any person who has even a rudimentary

picture of the role of war in modern history when the question of ultimate relative power becomes the issue between nation-states. The possibility always exists that in a crisis, when national survival upon terms acceptable to either of the protagonists is perceived to be at stake, then the ultimate weapons may be used

In this connection, a weakness can be found in Waller's analysis of the outcome of the campaign He asserts that Reagan's so-called "Star Wars" scheme did more damage to his opposition to the freeze than it did to that cause for arms control This interpretation is suspect Reagan in his Strategic Defense Initiative in March 1983 proposed something that has great appeal to Americans, a "technological fix" Technology would solve the problem of the ever-present danger of nuclear holocaust Inescapably, the nuclear dilemma presents both a survival as well as an ethical problem Reagan proposed a "shield" which would encapsulate the nation, protecting our people from the peril of nuclear warheads and bombs This can be regarded as a political masterstroke, for in the SDI he offered an alternative to arms control as a solution for nuclearism as well as virtually guaranteeing the continuation of the technological and nuclear arms race for the indefinite future

The technological-nuclear competition between the United States and the U S S R is moving well into the second generation of its existence At this point American policies implementing it are institutionalized, not as strongly as the social security and national park systems but it is nonetheless a part of the fabric of the political, economic, and social life of our nation Accordingly, the Congress will support the institution, trimming it occasionally at the margins in response to demands for budget balancing and entreaties for nuclear arms control If the same process of institutionalization has occurred in the Soviet Union, and it may well have, the outlook for nuclear arms control that will obviate the use of nuclear weapons in the next major war appears bleak

Herbert G. Wilcox, *West Virginia University*

Presidential Address

Regional Realignment from an Officeholding Perspective

Charles S. Bullock III
University of Georgia

Most of the scholarship on realignment has relied on information about party identification and much of it has concentrated on national patterns. An analysis of partisan victories in five types of offices for each of six regions reveals variation in the fortunes of the parties over the last thirty years. For all offices, Republican strength has grown appreciably in the Mountain West and the South. Generally, GOP gains came first in statewide contests and then spread to lower offices. In most of the rest of the country, Democrats have become more successful at winning legislative offices despite a notable lack of success in winning the presidency. The shifts have been of such magnitude that the identity of the party holding a majority of the offices has changed in most of the regions outside the South. In the South, impressive gains have been registered by the GOP, but its strength was so minimal thirty years ago that it remains the minority party at the legislative level.

Like five-year-olds at Christmastime, political scientists have been awaiting the coming of a partisan realignment. Extrapolating from the onset of the five previous party systems, a sixth system should have begun sometime around 1964. Lyndon Johnson's impressive sweep of all but six states to the accompaniment of thirty-six additional Democratic House members suggested, in some quarters, that the realignment was on schedule. In the presidential elections since the Johnson landslide, various savants have seen traces of a new partisan configuration. Typically these visions have been interpreted as the onset of a new realignment, the full manifestation of which, it is predicted, will become visible over the next two to four years. But rather than confirming the initial sighting, the more typical conclusion after the elapse of a quadrennium has been that the initial sighting was a mirage.

Determination of whether there has been a realignment, like Monday morning quarterbacking, is post hoc. Only through hindsight can one distinguish between a major shift in partisan fortunes of sufficient persistence that the results of a particular election signal the advent of a pattern that prevails and not a one-election aberration. Gains by a party in a single election clearly would not constitute a realignment.

An earlier version of this paper was presented as the presidential address at the 1986 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hyatt Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia. This version has benefited from suggestions on an earlier draft made by Earl Black and Harold Stanley and discussions over the years with Earl Black, Merle Black, David Brady and Harold Stanley.

Searchers for the foot tracks of realignment have utilized various data sources Key's seminal articles (1955, 1959) used presidential election returns for New England towns. The Key-type study that focuses on election returns for selected political units has been largely supplanted by explorations of voters' partisan loyalties Most of the search for a contemporary realignment has followed the twists and turns of the tapes of Michigan's Survey Research Center or the polls conducted by commercial organizations such as Gallup or CBS News-*New York Times* For survey researchers, a realignment will occur when Republicans supplant the Democrats as the majority party If an essential of realignment is that the Republican party becomes first in the allegiance of American voters, then the "year of jubilee," like the pennant hopes of the Atlanta Braves, remains somewhere in the offing (cf Farah and Norpoth, 1986)

This paper breaks with the current trend of survey analysis and with Key's focus on presidential elections I examine the incidence of partisan representation across five categories of public offices My interest is in election outcomes—which party wins particular offices While I have some concern about which party is in the majority, I also consider degree and rate of change A realignment—or something similar to it—occurs when a party experiences substantial growth, even if it remains the minority In the South, for example, the Republican party could enjoy a forty percentage point gain in the share of offices held between 1950 and 1980, yet be the minority In other regions, a gain of forty percentage points would make the GOP the dominant party

Since most recent work on realignment has concentrated on attitudinal measures, a justification for the decision to focus on election outcomes is in order Interest in partisan identification is premised on the assumption that party loyalty translates into voting behavior A generation ago there was strong evidence that party ties guided votes In the late 1950s, as much as 84% of the electorate reported voting for their party's nominee in House elections (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980) Subsequently, partisan defections have risen in both Senate and House elections, particularly among supporters of the challenger's party (Bullock and Scicchitano, 1985) Weakening party ties are also manifest in split-ticket voting in which more than 40% of the congressional districts may vote for the presidential nominee of one party and the congressional nominee of the opposing party (Ornstein et al , 1984) As Ladd has observed, "party identification is a more casual matter than it ever before has been" (1985, p. 6)

Since many voters either profess no party affiliation or regularly defect, party identification may not provide the perspective necessary to recognize a realignment Stone (1986) found less relationship between party affiliation and voting except in the Mountain West By concentrating on which party wins elections, we may note changes in party fortunes even if voter identifi-

cation remains a muddle Changes in partisan fortunes may be more visible in data on office control than in attitudinal data. Changed voting behavior may be a harbinger of changes in party identification Voters who ultimately change parties may not acknowledge that their loyalties have changed until after they have supported a number of their new-found party's candidates.

Realignments have been accompanied by more dramatic changes in the partisan distribution of congressional seats than in the distribution of popular votes While the ratio of seats to votes is rarely unity in electoral systems that use single member districts, the distortion has been particularly pronounced during periods of realignment (Brady, 1985).

Scholars scrutinizing survey results have generally taken a national perspective Apparently the assumption is that a realignment will be visible across the country While a major shift in allegiances to the Republican party which would be visible in national surveys could produce a realignment, a realignment does not *require* a change so broad and unidirectional Clubb and associates (1980) and Brady and his colleagues (1985) argue that the national shift to the Democratic party that ushered in the New Deal coalition was atypical of realignment movements In earlier realignments, the new majority was achieved by smaller changes in partisan fortunes and these smaller changes were confined to certain regions (Brady, 1985) Ladd (1985) also cautions against expecting that future realignments should resemble the one that created the New Deal coalition

This paper will rely on electoral outcomes rather than survey data Lest too much be made of the success that a party has enjoyed for a single office, five positions will be analyzed These offices are the presidency, both houses of Congress, and both chambers of the state legislature We will look for shifts in electoral success across time (secular realignment) rather than searching for a cataclysmic change in a single election (critical realignment) We also will look at electoral outcomes at the regional level rather than restricting attention to national patterns If, for example, the South has become as Republican as the rest of the nation, would that not constitute a regional realignment, even if responses to party loyalty questions continue to show a Democratic majority?

THEORY

This paper has several dimensions since it is a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of multiple offices It would be surprising if partisan control were constant across all offices in a region at a given time, although a similar trend may prevail across offices When partisan fortunes are changing, an emerging party may reap success earlier at one level than at others. Specifically, the emerging party may have earlier success at the top of the ticket

Success at the top of the ticket can give the emerging party a legitimacy in a region An attractive candidate heading the ticket may help recruit poten-

tial winners for lesser offices In time, the emerging party will capture a growing number of the less visible offices.

Several factors may operate to produce initial breakthroughs for higher offices First, larger constituencies have a greater potential for an heterogeneous population (Bond, 1983) The presence of multiple social and economic groups provides potential constituencies as two parties build competing coalitions As Bullock and Brady (1983) have shown, states with heterogeneous populations are more likely to simultaneously have one Democratic and one Republican senator

District size may facilitate the development of party competition in what had been a one-party area in a second way In larger districts, the probability that attractive, qualified candidates will come forward in the minority party is greater The GOP, for example, has had greater success in finding viable candidates for southern senatorial or gubernatorial contests than for state legislative seats or local posts

If district size is related to the likelihood of two-party competition, then in those regions in which there has been a change in party control, the change will be most pronounced in statewide competition In the context of this paper, that leads to the prediction that change should be greatest in winning Senate seats and presidential electors The least change in party fortunes should come in state legislative seats, with U S House seats being in an intermediate position

Incumbency is another major factor, and it can delay the changes in office control associated with realignment Incumbency, always advantageous, has taken on increased significance as the partisan allegiance of voters has weakened (Bullock and Scicchitano, 1985) The benefits of incumbency may be heightened in less populous constituencies The smaller the population, the more likely that the incumbent will have contact with voters, contact promotes familiarity, and voters are more likely to support candidates about whom they know something (Jacobson, 1983, chap 5) State legislators, who typically have small constituencies, may turn back challenges by conducting person-to-person campaigns Members of the U S House will have more difficulty establishing or maintaining face-to-face contact but can meet a larger share of their constituents than can the senators from their state and will find it easier to utilize the frank than will senators [1] Moreover, two-year terms prompt more attention to constituency relations and more frequent visits to the district than do a senator's six-year term

The implications for this paper's multi-office approach are that change in party control will be related to incumbents' reelection rates *Ceterus paribus*

[1] Franked mail from senators must carry the name and address of the recipient, representatives can send franked mail to constituents by simply sorting it into stacks equal to the number of postal patrons served by each post office or rural route

the presidency should be the office for which change will be evident first since a president is generally limited to a single reelection. In contrast, recently more than 90% of the U.S House incumbents who run have been returned (Ornstein, et al., 1985) Sitting state legislators have also been reelected at extraordinarily high rates (Rosenthal, 1981) Reelection rates for U.S senators have generally been lower, sometimes falling to less than 67% (Ornstein, et al., 1984, p 51) Differences in incumbent reelection rates lead to the hypothesis that when a party is in decline, weakness will first be manifest in presidential elections, next in senatorial elections, and only later in U S House and state legislative contests The departure of a popular incumbent increases the likelihood that the emerging party will win the position An incumbent can delay the consequences of a realignment for years after the control of other positions has changed hands

Legislative districting schemes and the way in which districting is implemented may also retard the development of an emerging party When a party has the support of the majority of the electorate statewide, it can win Senate seats, the governorship, or carry the electoral vote for its presidential candidate Even if a majority of the electorate votes straight tickets, a party that wins statewide offices might emerge with fewer than half of the congressional or state legislative seats Through cracking or packing (Parker, 1984), an emerging party could see its strength divided or over-concentrated so that it loses numerous close contests This situation is most likely to occur when a party that has traditionally dominated the state continues to hold a majority in the state legislature, a vantage point from which to shape districting decisions This advantage in the districting process can help account for a lag in the time when an emerging majority first wins statewide contests and subsequent victories in legislative contests

Data

The chief concern of this paper is the winning of public office, and evidence of realignment will be sought in five types of elections For each position, the time series begins with an election prior to initial breakthroughs by the GOP in the South. This timing is justified since the South is most often scrutinized when the possibility of realignment is explored and therefore more is known about partisan changes in the South than other regions (for a recent major study of the South see Black and Black, 1987) If there has been a realignment, the evidence should be strongest in the South

Data on presidential elections begin with 1944, the last year in which the South voted solidly for the Democratic presidential nominee House data begin with 1950 since Eisenhower's coattails in 1952 brought the first southern Republicans in modern times to Congress outside of two east Tennessee districts that had been electing Republicans since the Civil War U S Senate

and state legislative data begin with 1956 which pre-dates John Tower's election as the first modern Republican senator from the South.[2]

The time series begin early enough that they should prove adequat inspecting data from other regions. For each office, the initial point is to major Republican losses in 1958 and 1964. Also, the time periods beg a point sufficiently removed from the onset of the fifth party system tl new generation had entered the electorate. This new generation migl prepared to foresake the party commitments of its parents (Beck, 1 Abramson, 1976).

In examining the data, I will be looking for changes within the regions also making cross-regional comparisons. Thus, in assessing the incre success of the Republican party in the South and Mountain West, I am ii ested not simply in how many more House seats the GOP holds now th did ten or twenty years ago. I also want to know whether Republican stre in the South lags behind that of other regions or has the South joined mainstream of American partisan competition. In other regions, such as Northeast, have Democratic gains produced a level of partisan compet comparable to that in the nation as a whole?

For this study, the nation was divided into six regions.[3] In keeping Key (1949) and other students of southern politics, the South is define the eleven states that seceded. For some offices the West can be treated thirteen-state region while for other offices it is more appropriate to divide the region into five Pacific states and eight Mountain states. The o regions are the North Central (twelve states), Northeast (nine), and Bo (five).

FINDINGS

President

The South was last united in 1944 when Thomas Dewey received no so ern electoral votes. Four years later, four Deep South states foresook Democratic party for the siren song of the States Rights' ticket heade South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond. The Eisenhower candi produced the first support for a Republican presidential nominee since 1928 backlash against Catholic Al Smith. Eisenhower carried four Rim So

[2] Congressional data are for the congress elected in a particular year and are taken from *gressional Quarterly*. State legislative data come from appropriate volumes of the *Book* *States* for 1957 to 1985. State figures for 1987 come from *Congressional Quarterly*.

[3] The regions include these states—Northeast: CN, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI an North Central: IL, IN, IO, KN, MI, MN, MO, NB, ND, OH, SD, and WI; Mountain: AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, and WY; Pacific West: AS, CA, HA, OR, and WA; South: AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, and VA; and Border: DL, KY, MD, OK, and W

TABLE 1

REPUBLICAN SHARES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS BY REGION, 1944–1984 (ALL NUMBERS ARE %)

Year	Northeast	North Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	Border
1944	6	53	28	0	0	0
1948	86	35	0	15	0	28
1952	100	100	100	100	45	53
1956	100	92	100	100	52	100
1960	9	54	78	94	26	45
1964	0	0	15	0	37	0
1968	19	79	100	79	45	54
1972	89	100	100	100	100	100
1976	30	60	100	94	9	22
1980	97	93	100	94	91	56
1984	100	93	100	100	100	100

states which contained 45% of the region's electoral votes, certainly a respectable showing for the party which had carried a total of only six southern states over the previous seventy-two years Although it was a major breakthrough, Eisenhower's share of the South's electoral votes was 50 percentage points below that of the rest of the nation where he carried all states except for Kentucky and West Virginia

Since 1952, Republicans have carried one or more southern states in every presidential election, and as table 1 reports, Republicans have won a majority of the South's electors four times and in 1968 Richard Nixon received a plurality of the region's electoral votes Over the last nine presidential elections, southern presidential voting has been more Republican than Democratic In three of the last four elections, southern support for the GOP nominee has been almost identical to that in the rest of the nation Even in the three-way 1968 race, Nixon's 45% share of the South's electoral votes was only 15 points below his performance in the non-South Over the last twenty-five years, only in 1976 was the South more Democratic than the rest of the country As the Blacks observe, "Although the Democratic party is still capable of winning presidential contests in the South, it is unlikely to do so unless an array of powerful short-term factors, such as a charismatic Democratic candidate or egregious Republican misadventures concerning the economy or foreign policy, cumulate to the Democrat's advantage" (1987, p 264)

The thirteen Western states have also become more Republican in presidential politics, and this change came earlier than in the South In the 1940s the West was solidly Democratic, with only Colorado and Wyoming support-

ing Dewey in 1944. The West exceeded even the South in its commitme[illegible] Truman in 1948.

This all changed with Eisenhower.[4] Since 1952, the West has been the tion's most Republican region, except for 1964 when that distinction we[illegible] the South. Excluding the Johnson landslide, only four western states [illegible] voted even once for a post-Truman Democratic nominee. (Hawaii has [illegible] in the Democratic column in every election except 1972 and 1984, Ne[illegible] and New Mexico supported Kennedy, and Washington voted for Humpl[illegible] in 1968.) Seven of the ten western states that supported Truman have co[illegible] tently voted Republican since 1952, except when confronted with the G[illegible] water candidacy. Indeed, if one excludes 1964, the West was as solidly [illegible] publican from 1952–1984 as the South was Democratic from 1912–194[illegible]

Of the other regions, the Border states have remained particularly loy[illegible] the Democrats throughout the forty years, and the Northeast has been n[illegible] Democratic than the nation as a whole since 1960. The North Central st[illegible] have been Republican in nine of the last eleven presidential elections. exceptions were the wholesale rejection of Goldwater in 1964 and the t[illegible] to-one split for Truman. Three of the last four elections have produced C[illegible] sweeps in all regions except the Border states in 1980. Regional differe[illegible] are fewer than in the past.

Senate

The realignment to the GOP in presidential voting in the South and V[illegible] has carried over to Senate elections. The West, which has become the nerstone for Republican presidential candidates, has had the most hea[illegible] Republican Senate delegations since 1976, having consistently had a C[illegible] majority (see table 2). During the Reagan era, Democrats have held [illegible] Senate seats only in Hawaii—the western state most receptive to De[illegible] cratic presidential efforts—and in Montana. In the 100th Congress, Rep[illegible] cans hold both seats in Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. At end of the Eisenhower era, Democrats had at least one senator in each s[illegible] and controlled 77% of the region's seats. Since 1959, only twice (in 1970 1986) has the number of western Republican senators declined.

As in the West, the share of GOP Senate seats in the South grew by 40 [illegible] centage points between 1960 and 1980. From 1961, when John Tower (Te[illegible] became the South's first popularly elected Republican senator, through 1[illegible] only three Republican seats were lost. Despite these setbacks, the trend upward, peaking in the Ninety-eighth Congress when Republicans held of the southern seats. From 1980 until 1986, the South was in the nati[illegible] mainstream in terms of Republican Senate representation. During thos[illegible]

[4] Stone's (1986, p. 52) analysis of survey data shows that in terms of professed party allegia[illegible] the Mountain West remained second only to the South in Democratic support through 19[illegible]

TABLE 2

REPUBLICAN STRENGTH IN THE U S. SENATE BY REGION, 1956–1986 (FIGURES ARE % OF SEATS)

Year	Northeast	North Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	Border
1956	78	75	44	33	0	60
1958	61	54	25	20	0	50
1960	61	50	25	20	5	60
1962	50	38	44	20	5	50
1964	44	38	38	30	9	40
1966	44	46	38	40	14	40
1968	56	46	44	50	18	60
1970	61	46	44	40	23	70
1972	56	38	44	40	32	60
1974	44	33	44	40	27	50
1976	44	33	56	40	23	40
1978	44	42	63	40	27	30
1980	50	58	69	60	45	30
1982	50	58	69	70	50	30
1984	50	50	69	70	45	40
1986	50	46	63	60	27	30

years, Republicans held between 45% and 58% of the Senate seats in the South, the Northeast, and the North Central regions

The GOP suffered a major setback in 1986 in the South narrowly losing seats they had won in 1980 in Alabama, Florida, Georgia and North Carolina The proportion of Republicans among southern senators dropped into the 22% to 33% range that existed during the 1970s Not all was gloom and doom, however, as Republicans won a larger share of the vote in its 1986 losses than at any time in the past, except for its close victories in 1980 A change of 43,000 votes in 1986 could have produced three GOP victories, giving Republicans 41% of the southern senators in the 100th Congress Only by a narrow margin did the South drop out of the national mainstream in terms of its Senate composition

Since the Eighty-sixth Congress, the Republican percentage in the North Central states has varied from 33% (Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses) to 58% (Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth Congresses) North Central states were at least as Republican as the West until the Ninety-third Congress, but they have been ten or more points less Republican than the West during the last decade, except for the Ninety-seventh Congress The Northeast was generally the most Republican region before 1976 but was only slightly more likely than the South to have Republican senators from 1980–1986 During the 1980s, Republicans have held ten to twenty percentage points fewer seats in the Northeast than the West Border states, which

TABLE 3

GOP U.S. SENATE STRENGTH REGRESSED ON TIME, 1958–1986*

	Intercept	Slope	Std. Error of Slope	R^2
Northeast	56.44	-0.63	0.53	.10
North Central	45.85	-0.18	0.73	.00
Mountain	24.05	3.10	0.40	.83
Pacific	16.76	3.21	0.67	.67
South	-0.62	2.97	0.51	.73
Border	37.79	1.64	0.97	.19
West (Mountain & Pacific)	21.17	3.11	0.37	.85

*Estimates have been adjusted to correct for first-order autocorrelation.

had been the most Republican region in the Ninety-first to Ninety-fourth Congresses, were the most Democratic from 1980 to 1986.

By regressing share of the seats held by Republicans on time, we can de termine whether there has been a pattern of change or whether fluctuations in party strength have been largely random. The trend lines for the South and West are up with slopes of 2.97 and 3.11, respectively (for survey results in the Mountains, see Stone, 1986, p. 54). In the South, Republicans have averaged about one additional Senate seat every four years. The sizable loss in 1986 results in the largest residual. If the GOP does not rebound from 1986, there will be a smaller slope so that ultimately the figures for the early 1980s may be the most pronounced outliers. (The upward slopes cannot, of course, continue forever.)

U.S. House

There has been a realignment favoring Republican House candidates in the South and Mountain West. In both regions the GOP's share of the House seats has risen by thirty points. An opposing trend characterizes most of the rest of the country. In the Northeast, Pacific, and North Central states Democrats have been transformed from minority to majority party.

The pattern for Republican growth in southern House delegations has fo lowed that of the U.S. Senate. Eisenhower coattails opened the way for t initial GOP House gains in the Rim South, including Raper Jonas fro Charlotte, North Carolina. Jonas's victory was the first in an urban setting the area in which the South's New Republicanism has flourished.

Each Rim South state except Arkansas elected a Republican House me ber during the Eisenhower years, but it took the congressional struggle o the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Republicans to win in the Deep South bama, which was holding its first elections after a prolonged redistric

struggle,[5] sent a Republican majority delegation to the Eighty-ninth Congress. Goldwater's candidacy also produced the first House Republicans from Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina

With Nixon's 1972 landslide, the South ceased to be uniquely inhospitable to Republicans That year also marked the first time since Reconstruction that all eleven southern states had at least one Republican representative As shown in table 4, the high water mark came with Reagan's sweep in 1984 which left Republicans holding 37% of the southern House seats

During the sixteen elections since the Eisenhower-based gains of 1952, the share of the southern seats held by Republicans has rarely declined (three times) The Watergate backlash of 1974 produced a seven percentage point drop in southern Republicans While Republicans suffered in all regions, the South's seven point decline was substantially less than the drop in the North and West The GOP experienced a setback in 1982 when two fac-

TABLE 4

REPUBLICAN STRENGTH IN THE U S HOUSE BY REGION, 1950–1986 (FIGURES ARE % OF SEATS)

Year	Northeast	North Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	Border
1950	58	72	38	64	2	27
1952	63	73	56	71	6	32
1954	59	66	56	68	7	21
1956	62	64	44	59	7	32
1958	49	47	31	49	7	11
1960	51	61	31	49	7	14
1962	50	62	41	38	10	22
1964	35	47	24	35	15	19
1966	40	64	53	42	22	37
1968	40	62	65	42	25	37
1970	42	56	53	40	25	30
1972	44	58	58	40	31	31
1974	33	43	42	30	24	23
1976	30	44	47	28	25	27
1978	34	46	53	33	29	27
1980	43	52	63	44	36	31
1982	39	45	67	38	29	19
1984	43	45	71	39	37	23
1986	42	45	63	41	34	27

[5] Alabama lost one seat following the 1960 census The state legislature failed to redistrict the state forcing the nine incumbents to run at-large in the 1962 Democratic primary The oldest member, Frank Boykin, ran ninth and with the electorate having decided which incumbent to eliminate, the legislature produced eight districts in time for the 1964 elections

TABLE 5

GOP U.S. HOUSE STRENGTH REGRESSED ON TIME, 1950–1986*

	Intercept	Slope	Std. Error of Slope	R^2
Northeast	57.55	-1.20	0.42	.34
North Central	69.45	-1.40	0.27	.63
Mountain	36.61	1.36	0.64	.22
Pacific	60.82	-1.48	0.57	.29
South	0.06	1.97	0.20	.86
Border	24.54	0.09	0.37	.00

*Estimates have been adjusted to correct for first order autocorrelation.

ors coincided. Mid-term losses were concentrated in Virginia where Reagan's coattails had carried all but one of the state's ten seats in 1980 and in North Carolina, which may have the most competitive House seats in the nation. Another impediment was Democratic control of redistricting. Republicans won none of the three new seats in Texas nor the new Tennessee seat and only two of the four new seats in Florida. Finally, the 1982 setback, like that in 1986, may simply be evidence that the South is experiencing the same surge and decline in GOP fortunes as the rest of the nation during the 1980s.

The slope for Southern GOP seats when percent Republican is regressed on time is 1.97, indicating that with each election Republicans have won two more seats. The data points fall close to the regression line with R^2 = .86 (see table 5). Stanley forsees a time when "the voting loyalty of southern white Democrats to House candidates will soon be on a par with that toward Democratic presidential candidates" (1988). Should that happen, GOP representation in southern congressional delegations would be substantially greater than at present.

In the West, Republican House gains have been more concentrated than their presidential and senatorial successes with House advances limited to the Mountain States (cf. Stone, 1986, p. 54 for a complementary treatment of survey data). Prior to the Ninetieth Congress, the Republicans' share in the Mountain states was less than in the Northeast, North Central, or Pacific states. Beginning with the Ninety-fifth Congress, the Mountain states have been the most Republican region of the country, and since 1980 more than 60% of the Mountain legislators have been Republicans. From the Ninety-fifth to the Ninety-ninth Congresses, the gap between the percentage GOP in the Mountain states and the second most Republican area grew with each election. Since 1950 the slope for Republican seats has been 1.36. The average GOP gain in the Mountain states has been only two-thirds of that in the South but with an intercept of 36.6, the regression line for the Mountains is

much higher than for the South (intercept = 0 08) although there has been some convergence Time is a poorer predictor of GOP strength in the Mountains (R^2 = 22) than in the South.

The Pacific states, which were Republican prior to 1958, have moved in the opposite direction from the Mountains Democrats have comprised a majority of the California delegation since 1958 and have been a majority in the Washington delegation since 1964. By the mid-1970s, the growing Democratic strength in the Pacific delegations produced partisan splits similar to those in the South (Indeed, GOP strength in the South has been more comparable to the Republican's share of the seats in the Pacific states than in any other region during the 1980s) In the Ninety-ninth Congress, the Pacific states were only two points more Republican than the South Since 1950, Republicans have lost, on average, 1 5% of the seats per election although there is a fair amount of variation

Republican strength in the Northeast curved downward (slope = −1 2) in a manner similar to that of the Pacific states, although the intercept was lower in the Northeast than in the Pacific states Except for the Eighty-sixth Congress, Republicans were the majority until losing 30% of their strength in the Johnson landslide During the last twelve elections, Republicans have failed to win as many as 45% of the seats in the Northeast, prior to 1958, Republicans averaged 60 5% of the seats

Republicans held more than 70% of the North Central seats during the early 1950s and a majority of the region's seats for all but two congresses until 1974 The GOP has never recovered from the losses brought on by the Watergate scandal when the GOP percentage dropped from 58% to 43% While the North Central was the second most heavily Republican region in the 100th Congress, the GOP held only 45% of the seats Losses in the North Central states, where the GOP was at its strongest until 1976 (slope = − 1 4), have been similar to those in the Pacific and Northeast

Over the last thirty-five years, Republicans have generally held 20% to 37% of the Border state seats, and there is not a relationship with time For the last decade, the Border states have been the most loyal Democrats In descending order of loyalty to the Democratic party based on seats in the U S House, the other regions fall into the following order for the 1980s South, Pacific, Northeast, North Central, and Mountains A comparable ranking for the 1950s would be South, Border, Mountains, Northeast, Pacific, and North Central The most pronounced changes in the rankings involve the Mountains and the Pacific.

State Senate

Republican growth has been greatest in the Mountain West with gains also occurring in the South The Northeast and North Central have experienced an erosion in GOP strength

Few gains were registered in the South until 1967 when the combination of weakened partisan allegiance and the recruitment of more and better candidates in the wake of the Goldwater candidacy allowed Republicans to more than double their numbers In 1967, as reported in table 6, 11% of the South's state senators were Republican

Gains in the last two decades have been modest and less consistent than in Congress The rate of increase in southern Republican state senators has been only half that for Republicans in the U S House, and there has been greater variability (see table 7) The burden of Watergate pushed Republican representation below 10%, and after a series of fits and starts, Republicans held 18% of the senate seats in 1987 Unlike the three types of offices discussed earlier, the South continues to have the most Democratic state senates

The Republican share of state senators in the Mountain West has increased, but there has been more fluctuation than in the South During the first five periods, the average proportion was 40% Republican while during the last four biennia, the average was 58% The Mountain West has had the most Republican senators during the Reagan presidency The Pacific states have been less Republican than the Mountain states For many years the disparity was approximately ten percentage points, but since 1979 it has been fifteen to twenty points After rising from a low of 32% in 1959 to a high point of 46% in 1969, the percentage Republican has fluctuated within that range

TABLE 6

REPUBLICAN STRENGTH IN STATE SENATES BY REGION, 1957–1987 (FIGURES ARE % OF SEATS)

Year	Northeast	North Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	Border
1957	67	67	42	42	3	23
1959	53	56	36	32	2	18
1961	54	58	39	34	3	18
1963	55	65	42	33	3	23
1965	44	49	41	33	5	24
1967	47	61	55	45	11	26
1969	51	69	55	46	13	31
1971	49	61	51	43	12	32
1973	48	54	51	41	14	27
1975	36	47	44	34	10	22
1977	41	44	44	34	9	21
1979	39	48	49	35	11	22
1981	42	52	58	41	14	23
1983	45	50	56	38	13	22
1985	45	50	58	39	16	22
1987	41	48	60	42	18	26

TABLE 7

GOP U S STATE SENATE STRENGTH REGRESSED ON TIME, 1959–1986*

	Intercept	Slope	Std Error of Slope	R^2
Northeast	54 12	−0 90	0 31	42
North Central	62 35	−0 92	0 45	26
Mountain	36 22	1 44	0 44	47
Pacific	33 77	0 46	0 42	09
South	1 04	1 02	0 24	60
Border	20 42	0 38	0 33	06

*Estimates have been adjusted to correct for first-order autocorrelation

At no time during the last three decades have Pacific Republicans controlled more than two chambers at the same time, and often all five state senates have had Democratic majorities

In the Northeast and North Central states, which used to be the most Republican areas, the GOP ranks have declined at a rate of about one point per election The change has been particularly marked in the Northeast where Republicans have had a majority only once in the last twenty years From 1957 until Watergate, Republicans held a majority of the North Central seats—except when the Goldwater albatross pulled them down to 49% Since Watergate, the North Central GOP has averaged slightly less than half the seats with the highest point (52%) coming on Reagan's 1980 coattails

State House

As with other offices, Republicans have scored substantial gains in the South and Mountains There has been a weaker pro-Democratic shift in the Northeast Republican growth in southern state houses has come more slowly than in either chamber of Congress but at a faster pace than in state senates (see tables 8 and 9) Only Watergate has reduced the Republican ranks and, as with other collegial bodies, recovery did not come until the 1980s Reagan's strong showing in 1984 was associated with a four point rise in GOP strength pushing their share of seats above 20% for the first time As with state senates, no region is more Democratic than the South, although after the 1986 elections both the South and the Border states were 24% Republican

Changes in Republican seat control and rates of change in state houses in other regions are similar to GOP strength in senates GOP presence is greatest in the Mountain West where at least 55% of the members have been Republican during the last decade. This is substantially higher than two dec-

TABLE 8

REPUBLICAN STRENGTH IN STATE HOUSES BY REGION, 1957–1987 (FIGURES ARE % OF SEATS)

Year	Northeast	North Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	Border
1957	68	63	42	45	4	27
1959	57	46	32	35	2	13
1961	57	58	43	42	4	16
1963	55	58	48	41	5	22
1965	51	39	40	38	7	20
1967	48	60	57	51	12	30
1969	50	60	58	50	13	32
1971	48	51	53	45	13	26
1973	50	51	54	41	17	27
1975	40	41	43	33	12	19
1977	40	42	49	33	12	17
1979	44	48	57	39	14	23
1981	47	51	62	43	18	24
1983	44	45	58	39	18	20
1985	51	50	65	40	22	26
1987	47	46	57	39	24	24

TABLE 9

GOP U.S. STATE SENATE STRENGTH REGRESSED ON TIME, 1959–1987*

	Intercept	Slope	Std. Error of Slope	R^2
Northeast	55.75	−0.76	0.35	.28
North Central	54.46	−0.53	0.40	.12
Mountain	38.33	1.49	0.38	.54
Pacific	41.16	0.09	0.44	.00
South	0.37	1.39	0.20	.80
Border	18.37	0.43	0.41	.07

*Estimates have been adjusted to correct for first-order autocorrelation.

ades earlier. And while Republicans dominated the region from 1967 until Watergate, the strength of the last decade has eclipsed that earlier period.

The Northeast and North Central states were the most Republican prior to the Johnson presidency. These regions still rank second and third in GOP representatives but are gradually becoming more Democratic and were at least ten points below the Mountain states during the Reagan era. Republican strength in Pacific houses has fluctuated between 32% and 51% and has hovered around 40% since 1979. There has been no clear trend in GOP

strength in the Border States However, based on the experience of congressional offices, it is likely that the Border states may soon have the most Democratic state houses.

Conclusions

At the sub-presidential level, a complex mixture of changes has occurred If viewed from a national perspective, a clear trend could not be discerned because of the contradictory patterns for different regions A national perspective obscures the reality that two of the three regions in which Democrats were strongest thirty to forty years ago have become much more hospitable to Republicans while the two regions which were Republican strongholds now elect Democrats about half the time The magnitude of the pro-Democratic shift in the North is further obscured if attention is focused exclusively on presidential elections

The analysis of partisan officeholding generally reveals similar trends across offices within individual regions There is, however, no common pattern for all six regions Over the last quarter century, the Mountain West experienced a secular realignment to the GOP which has gained seats at a rate of 1 3 percentage points per election The South is also marked by persistent GOP growth In both regions, at all levels, officeholders have become substantially more Republican [6] The Northeast and, to a lesser degree, the North Central have become more Democratic below the presidential level although the rates of change have been more gradual and the variation greater Regional differences in longitudinal trends bespeak a realignment sharing at least one feature with the changes of 1860 and 1896 However unlike the realignments of the latter half of the 19th century the changes of the last generation have been more gradual and less persistent

The most consistent evidence of realignment is found in the Mountain West, which had been more Democratic than the Northeast or North Central states after the New Deal realignment but is now a bastion of Republicanism Even Watergate had no visible effect on presidential and Senate outcomes in the Mountains and in 1978 GOP ground lost in state houses in 1974 was recovered From 1974 to 1984, the GOP averaged a twenty-three percentage point increase in its share of seats across the four legislative offices The partisan transformation of public offices in the Mountain West generally conforms with changes in party identification and voting for presidential and congressional candidates that Stone (1986) observed in survey data

The GOP has swept the last five presidential elections and, over the last decade, has been slightly more successful in winning Mountain U S Senate than House seats During the 1980s, Republicans have been stronger in con-

[6] Survey data from 1984 show younger voters in the South and West to be especially likely to be Republican (Farah and Norpoth, 1986, p 13)

gressional than state legislative contests, so that there has been general support for the proposition that the party benefiting from a realignment will first chalk up victories at the top of the ticket where constituencies are larger with commensurate gains coming later for lesser offices The one exception in the expected ordering is that Republicans have done better in state houses than state senates

The rate at which the GOP has gained offices in the South closely parallels the Mountain experience The Republican starting points in the two regions—as reflected by the intercepts reported in tables 3, 5, 7, and 9—were so disparate that while the Mountains have GOP margins of greater than 60 40, Democrats continue to dominate southern offices In light of the persistence in Democratic strength, is it appropriate to assert that there has been a secular realignment in the region?

The clearest evidence of realignment in the South comes from presidential elections where the South has joined other regions in rejecting northern liberals nominated by the Democratic party The gap between Republican congressional strength in the South and elsewhere has narrowed even though the GOP has yet to win a majority of Dixie's national legislators If Republican congressional strength had been on par with that of even the second most Democratic region in the 1950s, the gains to date would have produced GOP majorities The next round of redistricting coupled with a strong Republican presidential nominee could possibly reduce Democrats to a minority of southern House seats

There is a striking difference between GOP performance at the federal and state offices While economic success may not have trickled down in the South—or elsewhere—an affinity for the GOP began at the top and has percolated downward Republican presidential success in the 1950s begat steady gains in House delegations and growth in Senate delegations during the 1960s and 1980s Eisenhower attracted the middle and upper classes in the Rim South These groups have continued to support Republican candidates and have been joined by Deep South whites Some of these converts of the 1960s objected to the stands taken by the national Democratic party on civil rights [7] Republicans have also enjoyed rarely interrupted growth in state houses

From 1980 until 1986, except for Republicans doing less well in the lower than the upper chamber of state legislatures, GOP strength in the South declines as the level of the office and the scope of the issues surrounding it lessen Presidential elections which feature national and international issues have favored Republican candidates (Brownstein, 1986, p 2230) Senatorial

[7] Lamis (1985) sees opposition to the national Democratic party's advocacy of civil rights as the primary motivator of southern white defections to the GOP Wolfinger and Hagen (1985) find little evidence to support so sweeping a conclusion in their study of survey research data Other factors in the declining support for the Democratic party among southern voters include in-migration of northern Republicans and generational replacement (Stanley, 1988)

elections in which national issues often play major roles and which generally have candidates well known to the electorate (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980, Hinckley, 1980), are being won approximately half the time by Republicans in recent years Southern House elections typically have a Republican challenger unknown to more than half the electorate opposing a Democratic incumbent (cf Mann and Wolfinger, 1980) Despite the obstacle of incumbency, House contests which include a melange of national and local issues are gradually, but increasingly, being won by Republicans The GOP has done least well in state legislative contests where local issues and local ties dominate The advantages that the GOP has enjoyed among southern voters in terms of perceived greater competence to hold down inflation, resolve international crises, and a reputation for limiting federal interference in local matters are less salient in state contests (Brownstein, 1986)

Republican growth in the South has been delayed by two factors First, southern Democrats more readily abandoned racist appeals and courted black support than did southern Republicans This allowed members of the party that had erected the barricades intended to exclude black participation to reap the benefits of reinfranchised blacks drawn to the pro-civil rights stands of the national party In the Deep South where more than a quarter of the population is black, Democrats who can win cohesive support from a large black turnout can hold on to office with little more than a third of the white vote Blacks provided the margins of victory in four of five 1986 southern Senate contests (Petrocik, 1987, p 372) and in Alabama in 1984 ("*The 1984 Election Results*," 1985, p 41) The white vote now typically goes Republican for president, senator, and governor With full slates and in the absence of Democratic incumbents, the GOP tidal wave might have already spread all the way down to southern state legislatures

Wolfinger and Hagen (1985) see the black vote as not simply insufficient to save the South for Democrats but as a potential liability The black percentage of the electorate is unlikely to grow, and when black votes help nominate liberal Democrats, this will drive additional white conservatives into the GOP (also see Sundquist, 1983, p 375)

The second factor that resuscitated southern Democratic fortunes was the one-two punch of Watergate and the Carter candidacy In the wake of the 1976 elections, Republican ranks in the four sets of legislative chambers fell to the levels of six to ten years earlier Not until Reagan did Republicans surpass their accomplishments of 1972 Thus, while Democratic overtures to blacks have retarded Republican growth, the Watergate-Carter combination set the GOP back by perhaps as much as a decade

Only in the South and Mountain West has the GOP registered gains across all offices Elsewhere the GOP has gained ground in presidential elections—hardly surprising since Republicans have now won four of the last five presidential contests and six of the last nine The only other example of significant long-term Republican gains has come in Senate seats from the Pacific coast

Otherwise, Republicans have done no better than to hold their own and for most positions, Democrats have shown new strength Republicans have lost seats in all four legislative chambers in the Northeast and North Central. The GOP has also suffered reverses in the U.S. Senate in Border states and in the U.S House in the Pacific states

Northeastern Republicans never recovered from the Democratic surges of 1958 and 1964 The region's House representation has become predominantly Democratic From 1951 to 1957, Republicans held 60% of the seats From 1959 to 1963, the average was 50%, but in 1964 the GOP fell to 35% of the seats. Over the next ten elections, Republicans have never won as many as 45% of the seats Losses of House seats and other positions have converted the Northeast from one of the two most heavily Republican regions in the nation to a region in which Republicans fare about as well as in the nation as a whole The Republican share of the seats shows less variation across offices in the Northeast than other regions, which suggests that the viability of both parties may be more widespread in these states than elsewhere

Democrats have also registered sizable and continuing gains at the subpresidential level in the North Central region Democrats have held most of the House seats since Watergate, except for the Ninety-seventh Congress At the state-level, Democrats have been the majority in the senates in four of the last seven biennia and have dominated upper chambers in five of the last seven biennia The Pacific and Border regions have changed little during the decades covered in this study

The trickle down expansion of Republican gains which has generally characterized the South and Mountains fits the pattern of Democratic gains in the Northeast and North Central less well During the 1980s, Democratic strength at the subpresidential level has often been greatest in U S House delegations and least in the U S Senate. Democratic strength in state legislative chambers has usually fallen between the sets of congressional delegations Below the Senate level, however, the Democrats became the majority party in the wake of Kennedy's 1960 triumph The three strong performances of Democratic presidential candidates during the 1960s seemingly made the Democrats the majority in non-statewide offices in the Northeast Presidential politics also colored the partisan composition of North Central lower offices but in a different way. The Johnson landslide was a one-election break in GOP dominance With Watergate, Democrats had six years of majority status in subsenatorial offices The evenness of partisan competition that has extended into the late 1980s shows that the Democratic gains induced from on high have withstood the Reagan revolution.

These changes have significantly reduced regional distinctiveness. The South now votes much like the rest of the nation in presidential elections—even in the three recent elections in which the Republican nominee won overwhelmingly in the electoral college.[8] Only when a native southerner ran

ir president (Wallace in 1968 and Carter in 1976) has the South deviated om the rest of the nation, and the rejection of Carter by his home region in 984 suggests that a southern candidacy may be necessary but is not sufficient for Democrats to carry the South [9] Disparities between Republican iccesses in southern congressional contests and those in other regions have ecome less pronounced and at times have disappeared For example, in the inety-fifth House, Republicans held 25% of the seats in the South, 28% in ie Pacific, and 30% in the Northeast

Further evidence of the nationalization of officeholding comes from inspecon of the standard deviations across regions for individual years For exnple, in the 1950s, the standard deviation for U S House seats ranged from 9 for the Eighty-sixth Congress to 26 for the Eighty-second to Eightyurth congresses During the last seven congresses the standard deviaon has ranged from 09 (Ninety-fourth Congress) to 16 (Ninety-eighth ongress)

While the clarity and persuasiveness vary from office to office, there is an dication that the present realignment is occurring along regional lines If OP gains in the South continue at anything like their past rates, a Republiin heartland could extend from Virginia west to Nevada and north to the anadian border Should this come to pass and should the North Central and ortheast continue to be evenly divided between the parties, the GOP would ecome the officeholding majority regardless of how people respond to pollers when queried about partisan loyalties

REFERENCES

bramson Paul R 1976 Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America 1952-1974 *American Political Science Review* 70 469-78

eck, Paul Allen 1974 A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignments In Richard G Niemi et al , eds , *The Politics of Future Citizens*, San Francisco Jossey-Bass

—— 1977 Political Dealignment in the Postwar South *American Political Science Review* 71 477-96

ack, Earl, and Merle Black 1987 *Politics and Society in the South* Cambridge Harvard University Press

ond, Jon R 1983 The Influence of Constituency Diversity on Electoral Competition in Voting for Congress, 1974-1978 *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 8 201-17

ady, David W 1985 A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics Evidence from the House of Representatives *American Political Science Review* 79 28-49

ady, David W , Charles S Bullock III and Louis Maisel 1985 Realigning Elections A Com-

[8] Petrocik (1987) reports that white southerners party identification differs little from the rest the electorate

[9] Despite sweeping ten of eleven southern states electoral votes in 1976 Carter's share of the pular vote in the South was similar to that in the rest of the nation (Sundquist 1983 p 372) to Carter's rejection by most white southerners, Merle Black asserts that ' Ronald Reagan is ore of a Southern President than Jimmy Carter ever was or Lyndon Johnson was' (quoted in ner, 1986)

parative Application Paper presented at the International Political Science Association meeting, Paris, France, July 15–20

ownstein, Ronald 1986 Still No Breakthrough *National Journal*, 18 2228–32

illock Charles S III, and Michael J Scicchitano 1985 Partisan Defections and Senate Incumbent Election In Glenn R Parker, ed, *Studies in Congress*, Washington, DC CQ Press

urnham, Walter Dean 1964 The Alabama Senatorial Election of 1962 The Return of Inter-Party Competition *Journal of Politics* 26 798–829

Campbell, Bruce A 1977 Patterns of Change in the Partisan Loyalties of Native Southerners, 1952–1972 *Journal of Politics*, 39 730–63

Clubb, Jerome M, William H Flanigan, and Nancy H Zingale 1980 *Partisan Realignment Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* Beverly Hills, CA Sage

Farah, Barbara G, and Helmut Norpoth 1986 Trends in Partisan Realignment, 1976–1986 Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC

Hinckley, Barbara 1980 House Reelections and Senate Defeats The Role of the Challenger *British Journal of Political Science*, 10 441–60

Jacobson Gary C 1983 *The Politics of Congressional Elections* Boston Little Brown

Key, V O, Jr 1949 *Southern Politics* New York Knopf

——— 1955 A Theory of Critical Elections *Journal of Politics* 17 3–18

——— 1959 Secular Realignment and the Party System *Journal of Politics* 21 198–212

Ladd, Everett Carll 1985 As the Realignment Turns A Drama in Many Acts *Public Opinion* 7 (December/January) 2–7

Lamis, Alexander P 1985 *The Two-Party South* New York Oxford

Mann, Thomas E, and Raymond E Wolfinger 1980 Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review*, 74 617–32

1984 Election Results 1985 *Public Opinion*, 7 (December/January) 23–42

Ornstein, Norman J, Thomas E Mann Michael J Malbin, Allen Schick and John F Bibby 1984 *Vital Statistics on Congress 1984–1985* Washington, DC American Enterprise Institute

Parker, Frank R 1984 Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment In Chandler Davidson, ed, *Minority Vote Dilution* Washington DC Howard University

Petrocik John R 1987 Realignment New Party Coalitions and the Nationalization of the South *Journal of Politics* 49 347–75

Pomper, Gerald 1985 The Presidential Nomination In Pomper Gerald, ed *The Elections of 1984* Chatham NJ Chatham House

Rosenthal, Alan 1981 *Legislative Life* New York Harper and Row

Stanley, Harold 1988 Southern Partisan Changes Dealignment, Realignment or Both *Journal of Politics*, 50 64–88

Stone, Walter J 1986 Regional Variation in Partisan Change Realignment in the Mountain West In Randy T Simmons, ed *The Politics of Realignment* Boulder CO Westview Press

Sundquist, James L 1983 *Dynamics of the Party System*, rev ed Washington, DC Brookings Institution

Toner, Robin 1986 Splintering of Once-Solid South Poses New Problems for Democratic Party *New York Times* (October 16), p 16

Wolfinger, Raymond and Michael G Hagen 1985 Republican Prospects Southern Comfort *Public Opinion*, 8 (October/November) 8–13

Articles

pa
m
Bro
Bul
I
(
Bu
]
Ca

Cl

F

I

J
1

The Problem of Institutional Constraint

Robert Grafstein
University of Georgia

Political institutions are both human products and constraints on those participating within them. Focusing on rational choice theory and Marxist political theory this paper shows that the problem of reconciling these two characteristics pervades modern political research. The upshot is a fundamental ambiguity in political science's specification of what institutions are. The paper proposes a reconciliation of the two characteristics based on a conception of political institutions as particular aggregates of human individuals. The paper explores the political implications of this conception for the possibility of a society changing or eliminating institutional constraints.

In order to understand existing regularities of political life and possibilities for departing from them, political science must understand institutions. They determine to a large extent both the character of political order and the direction of political change. This is now appreciated by behavioralists, has long been appreciated by Marxists, and is increasingly appreciated by strongly individualist rational choice theorists. The reasons for this growing appreciation are varied, but two broad considerations seem to dominate. Institutions, first of all, are recognized as significant human creations. They reflect the distinctive purposes, beliefs, interactions, values and norms of the people who compose them. By the same token, institutions cannot be dismissed as inert artifacts. They structure our interactions, stabilize particular solutions to societal problems, and even help define what the feasible courses of action are.

Does this growing respect for the concept of institutions indicate agreement on its meaning? Or does this respect trade on fundamental ambiguities in the notion? Consider one version of the creation theme: "[political] institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest" (Huntington, 1968, p. 10). If so, the political mobilization of new groups having new perspectives and values threatens institutions and may cause them to decay. Those emphasizing the constraint theme, however, can discover a different lesson since institutions have the power to mold and thereby integrate the behavior of the newly mobilized, mobilization actually strengthens political order (Przeworski, 1975).

Perhaps beneath the growing consensus on the significance of political institutions lies a Janus-faced concept, presenting its constraint side to some and its human creation side to others. There may be a deep incoherence in

I wish to acknowledge the particularly helpful comments of the referees.

The Problem of Institutional Constraint

Robert Grafstein
University of Georgia

Political institutions are both human products and constraints on those participating within them. Focusing on rational choice theory and Marxist political theory, this paper shows that the problem of reconciling these two characteristics pervades modern political research. The upshot is a fundamental ambiguity in political science's specification of what institutions are. The paper proposes a reconciliation of the two characteristics based on a conception of political institutions as particular aggregates of human individuals. The paper explores the political implications of this conception for the possibility of a society changing or eliminating institutional constraints.

In order to understand existing regularities of political life and possibilities for departing from them, political science must understand institutions. They determine to a large extent both the character of political order and the direction of political change. This is now appreciated by behavioralists, has long been appreciated by Marxists, and is increasingly appreciated by strongly individualist rational choice theorists. The reasons for this growing appreciation are varied, but two broad considerations seem to dominate. Institutions, first of all, are recognized as significant human creations. They reflect the distinctive purposes, beliefs, interactions, values, and norms of the people who compose them. By the same token, institutions cannot be dismissed as inert artifacts. They structure our interactions, stabilize particular solutions to societal problems, and even help define what the feasible courses of action are.

Does this growing respect for the concept of institutions indicate agreement on its meaning? Or does this respect trade on fundamental ambiguities in the notion? Consider one version of the creation theme: "[political] institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest" (Huntington, 1968, p. 10). If so, the political mobilization of new groups having new perspectives and values threatens institutions and may cause them to decay. Those emphasizing the constraint theme, however, can discover a different lesson: since institutions have the power to mold and thereby integrate the behavior of the newly mobilized, mobilization actually strengthens political order (Przeworski, 1975).

Perhaps beneath the growing consensus on the significance of political institutions lies a Janus-faced concept, presenting its constraint side to some and its human creation side to others. There may be a deep incoherence in

I wish to acknowledge the particularly helpful comments of the referees.

the way we conceive the double life of institutions as both human products and social forces in their own right. The common wisdom among political scientists, of course, is that no such incoherence threatens. The notion of our own products having power over us is now as familiar as the alarm clock at our bedside and the world of work it wakes us up to experience. The real puzzles concerning institutions, it is felt, are the questions of detail, history, mechanism, significance, and structural alternatives standardly raised in the context of political scientific research. To investigate, for example, how the post-Watergate generation in Congress affected institutional norms does not preclude consideration of how, in turn, existing institutional norms modified or obstructed the actions of that generation.

Prevailing wisdom notwithstanding, I will argue there is a genuine problem reconciling the creation and constraint features of political institutions, a problem both difficult and subtle. The next two sections will in effect challenge the general optimism of the discipline. They will show that a problem in understanding these features continues to plague those empirical theories that have tackled the issue in a serious and detailed way. This is not an issue, in other words, generated exclusively by and for philosophers. The third section will propose one way the existence of both features can be reconciled within a coherent conception of institutions.

The link between the first two sections and the third is not simply that of problem to solution. The first pair of sections will also generate two useful guidelines for assessing whether the solution posed in the third section is adequate. First, a proper conception of institutions cannot ignore their constraining role or define it away. Second, the constraining power of institutions should not be conceptualized by enshrining them as mysterious entities hovering above us all. This is always a threat when the effectiveness of institutional constraints is treated as an inexplicable, brute fact.

Marxist theory, we will see, tends to avoid the first danger, but not the second. For rational choice theory, the situation is reversed. To their credit, rational choice theorists avert the second danger by attempting to show how institutions become self-imposed constraints by continuing decision of the participants. In the next section, however, we will document serious weaknesses with their approach and the strong methodological individualism it reflects. Yet, this does not entitle us to ignore the problem their approach addresses: the need to explain rather than just assert the constraining power of political institutions. As the third section will suggest, any plausible explanation along these lines must recognize individuals as a crucial medium in which the emergence and persistence of institutional constraint take place. The trick is to show this to be a plausible medium of constraint without defining away the constraint itself.

Finally, the fourth section will draw out the implications of this solution

ıot only for our understanding of political institutions but for a practical as-
,essment of the capacity of politics to alter the constraints institutions impose

The Institution in Rational Choice Theory

The purpose of this section and the next is to show that the problem of ıccommodating both the creation and constraint features of political institu-ions pervades empirical political theory I have selected two representative 'ases rational choice and Marxist theory Each has explicitly attempted to ınderstand the political institution as a constraint on and vehicle for express-ng social decisions. In the process, each approach has been forced to analyze he relation between political institutions and political actors whose orienta-ıon is defined independently of those institutions Not only is the issue of nstitutional constraint thus posed in a particularly clear way It is approached rom two distinct directions The starting point of Marxist analysis is the idea hat institutions constrain The starting point of rational choice theory, we vill now see, is the idea that "[v]iewing institutions as explicit or implicit ›roducts of individual choice seems only logical" (Ordeshook, 1986, p 243)

On the assumption that human beings antedate institutions, the rational 'hoice theorist considers it useful to imagine institutions emerging from a vorld devoid of them The advantage of this state of nature interpretation is ›rimarily analytic To explain the creation of institutions *de novo* apparently ›recludes the circularity of explaining institutions in terms of institutions This austere framework, the rational choice theorist hopes, will help unlock he more complicated arrangement in which individuals find themselves vithin pre-existing institutions

Given this, the simplest way to account for the emergence of institutions is o assume they are chosen directly by the residents of the state of nature Buchanan and Tullock (1962) assume, in particular, that institutions are cho-,en by unanimous consent Any decision rule requiring less than unanimity, hey seem to suggest, cannot adequately explain the emergence of political nstitutions since it presumes the initial existence of a political relation of lomination between those who agree and those who do not

Buchanan and Tullock's approach, however, is fatally flawed, even in the 'yes of many rational choice theorists First, in assuming that individuals ıave *ex ante* preferences concerning political decision rules, this approach mputes substantial political content to the individual's psychology before here is supposed to be politics Second, unanimous consent is no less a po-ıtical decision rule than those Buchanan and Tullock reject and, therefore, hey do not avoid the additional circularity of invoking a political mechanism o explain political arrangements (see Plott, 1972) Third, the "counting of votes' is the final ceremony of a long process" (Gramsci, 1971, p 193) force, ,ocialization, and culture limit the alternatives actors perceive and choose If

so, Buchanan and Tullock may miss the most important determinants of institutional outcomes. Finally, the role accorded both unanimous consent and the comprehensive free choice of institutions is an historical inaccuracy reflecting the values and assumptions of liberalism more than the demands of analytic tractability

In the last ten years, rational choice theorists have begun to correct many of these problems (see, e.g., Taylor, 1976, Axelrod, 1981) Since Schotter (1981) deals explicitly with the genesis of institutions, his work offers a good representative example. In brief, he demonstrates that so long as each resident of the state of nature conditions her behavior on her developing expectations concerning the behavior of others, a stable system of behavioral regularities—an institution—can emerge Tacit behavioral norms evolve performing essentially the same function political authorities, constitutions, or Leviathans perform in more standard social contract theory the norms indicate the punishments or adverse behavioral reactions one can expect from failing to conform to the institution As a result, each individual's expectations about the behavior of others converges with their actual behavior, so the emerging regularity of behavior, which all recognize as such, becomes stable

Though Schotter's theory of institutions "is still in its infancy" (1981, p xi), it avoids many of the problems plaguing Buchanan and Tullock's work Participants are not initially equipped with political plans or intentions Similarly, Schotter does not invoke the political decision rule of unanimous consent—or any political decision rule for the matter—in order to explain political arrangements True, individuals ultimately decide to conform to the institution, that is what makes it a stable regularity of behavior Yet individuals conform not because they unanimously agree on the best possible decision rule, but because each finds conformity best given his information about the preferences of others, existing patterns of behavior, and the punishments awaiting nonconformity As individuals adapt to new information and develop mutual trust, institutions emerge. They do not emerge from one synoptic act of creation

Yet there is a problem with Schotter's analysis In the process of explaining how human beings create institutions, he makes it impossible to recognize let alone explain, the constraints these institutions as institutions impose on their creators and subsequent participants It would be one thing if Schotter demonstrated on theoretical grounds that such constraints are illusory Yet as we will now see, he simply defines institutional constraint out of existence Given the ratio of analytic apparatus to empirical content in Schotter's work, however, there is little reason to deny our empirical intuitions about the existence of that constraint

To begin, we need to examine more closely the nature of the institution emerging in Schotter's analysis The institution, under his scheme, is defined in part as a stable regularity of behavior to which everyone knowingly con-

forms (1981, p 11). While these regularities and accurate expectations about them are not in place from the beginning, their institutionalization requires they become known and acted upon by all participants The resulting regularities may become codified in laws or other explicitly stated rules The crucial step in the existence of an institution, however, is the formation of correct expectations concerning these regularities, which otherwise would not be stable

I claim Schotter's analysis defines away institutional constraint The culprit is the information requirement built into his definition of institutions This requirement insures that all relevant behavioral regularities must, by definition, be the intended expression of correct participant expectations The latter are the real source of the regularities, which merely verify rather than constrain individual expectations and choices If institutions must be the intended expression of participant expectations and choices, the "institution," by definition, can only act in the intended way, as a reflection of those intentions Accordingly, it disappears the moment those intentions and complete, accurate expectations about behavioral regularities disappear [1]

To be clear, my complaint is not that Schotter treats preferences and beliefs as the proximate cause of institutional regularities The complaint is better put this way institutions do not constrain in Schotter's scheme but merely confirm the accuracy of the real constraints, beliefs and preferences To follow Schotter is to think that finding one's hand on the correct lever in a voting booth constrains the voting decision itself By ultimately matching expectations and regularities and thus making his invisible-hand explanation visible, Schotter in sum avoids directly addressing the nature of institutional constraint The specific force of institutional constraint can be ignored since the corresponding expectations and preferences take up all the explanatory slack In this sense, Schotter (1981) has not advanced beyond Buchanan and Tullock (1962)

A specific comparison with the study of language may clarify the point Schiffer (1972) is of the Schotter-like view that the semantic regularities of language are merely conventions coordinating the prior purposes of the language-users, who first use a private language He acknowledges that these language-users learn to match their linguistic performance with their linguistic purposes by getting feedback from the public language they observe Yet the surface rules of language, however descriptively accurate or well learned, simply do not constrain, that is, generate the regularities of performance

But there is another way to understand linguistic constraint Suppose the semantic structure of public language somehow constrained language production, say by determining the inventory of meanings or intentions avail-

[1] Note, for example that two institutions could in principle be behaviorally equivalent but nonetheless count as different (see Schotter, 1981 pp 62-63)

able to anyone trying to formulate an individual purpose (cf. Burge, 1986, Field, 1978, pp 52–54) Though the resulting linguistic regularities might not differ, the nature of language and its constraints would. The constraint would originate from the outside rather than from the inside

To take a more political example, consider Duverger's Law correlating certain electoral conditions with a two-party system. In a thought experiment, Connolly (1981, pp 16–17) imagines that the standard beliefs and expectations about elections deteriorate to the point that elections involve random voting by blindfolded voters As Connolly notes, Duverger's Law would remain valid despite this complete transformation of underlying voter psychologies While not Connolly's purpose, his experiment may indicate the robustness of electoral institutional constraints under wide variations in participant psychologies

The idea that a constraint can act directly on individuals without being filtered through an accurate set of expectations is hardly unknown in rational choice theory As Becker (1976, pp. 153–68) observes, the central propositions of demand theory are fulfilled independently of individual rationality or even stable preferences Budget constraints, however, are largely understandable as physical constraints on time and resources Metaphor aside, one may still wonder what an independent *institutional* constraint is In the next section, we will explore this question, which Schotter (1981) simply defines away

For now, let us briefly consider one recent current in rational choice theory that seems to develop the notion of institutional constraint directly Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that the structure of political institutions constrains political choice and induces behavioral equilibria that otherwise would not exist These institutional constraints are demonstrably effective they suggest, because the same set of individual preferences leads to different outcomes in different institutional settings Is this, finally, the rational choice solution to the problem of conceptualizing institutional constraint We will see that it is not.

The claim that different institutional arrangements can lead to different outcomes is relatively uncontroversial As many defenders of the rational choice view quickly concede, the simple preference aggregation model of institutions is neither very accurate nor particularly promising as an explanation of stable outcomes (see, e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1984, pp. 182–83 What they are unwilling to concede is that this notion of institutional constraint represents a genuine addition to the existing rational choice apparatus Their reasoning is as follows. The appeal to structure-induced equilibria is an unsatisfactory or at least incomplete substitute for a full explanation of institutional phenomena For the appeal to structure invokes institutional forces that are themselves in desperate need of explanation. Yet when th

explanation is unpacked, what emerges is virtually the old theory of institutional choice Structures induce equilibria because individuals select structures within which preferred equilibria appear "We are saying that since institutions and rules are the products of human choice, we should assume that like other choices, they are designed to attain some preferred set of outcomes And, when such outcomes cannot be attained under them and when some set of persons possesses the appropriate means, those institutions will either be modified or bypassed" (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1984, p 201)

Note the tacit assumption that appropriate means do not include the existence of appropriate institutions Note as well the tacit assumption that the products of human choice are intended objects refashioned as intentions or information are revised This is Buchanan and Tullock without the state-of-nature setting

Although this view fundamentally challenges the idea of institutional constraint, Shepsle and Weingast (1984) do not defend it at that level To the contrary, they agree (p 219) that institutions do not constrain in any independent sense Rather, the constraint appears because anyone attempting to structure a new institutional arrangement must recognize the serious transaction costs standing in the way of any transition Bargaining is difficult and agreements are opportunistically broken Just as McKelvey and Ordeshook claim, institutions are rooted in participant preferences for feasible outcomes Shepsle and Weingast simply weaken this claim, and weaken the theoretical significance of their own, by noting that actions depend not only on preferences but on expectations concerning the actions and preferences of others To put the point another way, we now find that all institutional constraint implies, according to Shepsle and Weingast (1984), is that each individual not only has preferences but also uncertain expectations and beliefs about other individuals This analysis does not define institutional constraint, but is simply a more complete description of individual psychologies

In effect, Shepsle and Weingast are playing Schotter to McKelvey and Ordeshook's Buchanan and Tullock. The essential difference is that in Schotter's case institutional stability emerges from the certainty of our expectations, in Shepsle and Weingast's case, it emerges from our uncertainty (see also Shepsle, 1986) In both cases, institutions do not have any distinct constraining role, but merely stand for the fact that participants see no clear advantage in changing their situation, which, therefore, reflects their choices Goldberg (1985) has effectively argued that transaction costs are, in this sense, not fundamentally different than the other costs individual actors face An appeal to them, therefore, does not in and of itself make an ostensibly institutional analysis any more an analysis of institutional constraint One could of course argue, as Goldberg notes, that transaction costs are distinc-

tive by being, somehow, institution-specific But given that our problem precisely the nature of this institutional influence, this is hardly an infc mative suggestion

The issue, then, is whether rational choice theory, as it stands, accoun for the active constraints imposed by political institutions or whether, in co trast, it deactivates institutions by definition I think there is a difference b tween these two outcomes, as do McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984), who a parently thought their statement quoted above expressed disagreement wi Shepsle and Weingast rather than shared principles

For all this, it is still hard to imagine, the rational choice theorist mig argue, how institutions would be maintained and remain effective were th not the product of implicit choice or tacit acceptance. "conventions and i stitutions do not simply come out of the blue, arbitrarily imposing ther selves on individual agents" (Lucas, 1981, p 4) Lucas's point is that tru rational agents efficiently use all information about any social patterns th confront, so institutional processes never occur behind their backs. If a pr cess is institutionalized, in short, it can be anticipated, and if it can be antic pated, it will be It is not just that institutions do not exist arbitrarily Th cannot exist arbitrarily

In the next section, we turn to Marxist political theory for an attempt articulate a notion of institutions in which constraint is not defined awa Though Marxism, as we will see, does not completely answer the challen posed by rational choice theory, it does offer a valuable statement of what a institutional constraint is and what rational choice theory misses It gives certain important tools for solving the riddle of created and constrainin institutions

The Institution in Marxist Political Theory

Marxists embrace the concept of institutions because it captures the soci constraints on individuals prior to communism Marxists typically questic the other side of the coin, the idea that institutions reflect the people wl compose them Only under communism is there "production of the form intercourse itself . rendering impossible that anything should exist ind pendently of individuals" (Marx and Engels, 1947, p 70) Marxist theory, this sense, is a mirror image of rational choice theory

In a famous summary of his own view, Marx writes "In the social produ tion of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, whi are independent of their will, namely relations of production . The tot ity of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of s ciety, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstru ture. . At a certain stage of development, the material productive forc of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production

From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters" (1970, pp. 20–21)

Encapsulated here are an internal and external version of the problem of institutional constraint In the internal case, production by the members of society occurs within and is ultimately fettered by the relations of production, say those between worker and manager In the external case, the society itself is articulated into economic and political institutional levels whose relation of mutual constraint has been a constant object of Marxist theorizing For reasons of space, we will focus on the internal version of constraint, though an analysis of the external version would reveal parallel problems

In *The German Ideology* (1947) and elsewhere, Marx left to his followers a strong admonition to study the real, biological creatures who *produce* their social and political world, including their relations of production Marxists, however, also argue that production relations and other kinds of social structure constrain producers independently of their will and thus fetter the development of their productive forces "This crystallization of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now" (Marx and Engels, 1947, p 23) How is one to make sense of this dialectic of individuals and relations? Marx insisted on the human production of institutions in order to avoid the mysticism in which they had been enshrouded by Hegelian metaphysics Should not this same concern have prompted Marx to insist on the human reproduction of institutions rather than their independent, objective constraining power? This, in effect, is what rational choice theorists have asked

Marx (1947) believed the division of labor plays a central role in explaining how what we produce crystallizes into a power above us Recently, O'Connor (1984) and Burawoy (1985) among others have shown how skill-hierarchies and various organizational patterns in firms diffuse conflict and block fundamental change Without questioning the accuracy of these examples, one may still wonder what precisely they tell us about the nature of institutional constraint After all, in another arena, Shepsle and Weingast (1981) have detailed how different organizations of legislative committees differentially influence outcomes and the stability of decisions Yet Shepsle and Weingast also argue, we have seen, that these institutional structures are themselves reproduced by the participants What they are telling us, in a sense is that analysis in terms of institutional constraint offers no guarantee that we are, in the end, analyzing behaviorally transcendent phenomena

Marxism's appeal to institutional constraint thus still needs clarification Unfortunately, there is now considerable evidence (Cohen, 1978, Elster 1985) that Marx's own writing on this topic is characterized by ambiguity and vagueness. Cohen offers perhaps the most detailed and careful attempt to clarify the Marxist conception of the issue His initial analysis of institutional

constraint (1978, p 94) emerges immediately from his definition of wh means just to describe people in social terms "a description is social if only if it entails an ascription to persons . of rights or powers *vis-a* other men "[2] Under this definition, of course, the claim that social relat constrain—fetter independently of our will—becomes trivial and uncor versial. No man is an island; no one is an unmoved mover

Yet for our purposes, the problem with this analysis is far from trivial. cial relations under this interpretation do not seem to have any distinct stitutional efficacy but rather summarize or reflect the myriad individu: individual interactions constituting any society Following Cohen's de tion, we can say A has power over B if, roughly, A has the ability to get do what A wants Add some language about beliefs, preferences, and feas alternatives, and the game theoretic machinery of rational choice falls place (see, e g , Elster, 1985, pp 406–7) So Cohen's initial formulation c not represent substantial progress in clarifying a distinctly Marxist con tion of institutional constraint. Nor, by the way, is it sufficient to respond A's power is not personal but, in the Marxist account, flows from A's insi tional position This response is correct but leaves us back on square on

We must confront more directly and explicitly the nature of institut and their distinct constraints For that, we turn to Cohen's discussion o cial structure According to his description of the Marxist view, the econ structure, in particular, determines each person's "objective place in the work of ownership relations" (1978, p 73) With an eye on constraint, Co carefully excludes consciousness, culture, politics, and even actual beha from the definition of objective structural place "these exclusions are quired to protect the substantive character of the Marxian thesis that c position strongly conditions consciousness, culture, and politics " X, in o words, can constrain Y only if X is distinct from Y Stripped of all this f and blood, a social structure, "like a number, is an abstract entity" (hen, 1978, p. 236) He is not being deprecatory He simply means s structures are perfectly real though nonphysical (by "physical" I mean c posed of atoms or some favorite list of microphysical entities, see Hell and Thompson, 1975)

Cohen, in sum, turns his back on the notion of social structure as onl abstracted description of complex human interactions, a notion reminis of Parsons's (1954, p. 341) levels of analysis approach (see also Easton, 19 Structures, under this new interpretation, are given a clear ontological sta And in terms of understanding institutional constraint, this is progress th can constrain whereas descriptions cannot But there is an important, lin ing problem No one, to my knowledge, has solved the notoriously pe

[2]Cohen (1978, p 220) defines a power simply as an ability Rights are considered effecti social contexts only insofar as they are coupled with the appropriate powers

tent puzzle about how these particular *kinds* of things—abstract entities—constrain or otherwise (causally) interact with the more mundane objects of the world One does not have to explore the voluminous literature on this issue (e.g , Field, 1980) to recognize that Cohen's appeal to such entities raises as many questions as it answers about how an institution, conceived in this way, actually constrains flesh and blood individuals The issue, in other words, is not whether institutions in this sense are second-rate entities but how they interact with nonabstract entities which *inter alia* are physical [2]

The whole issue comes to a head when Cohen considers the arrival of communism, an epoch in which structural constraint will be eliminated or at least greatly reduced "[A]ctivity under communism is not unstructured, but it is also not pre-structured One might say *the form is now just the boundary created by matter itself* The structure displayed by communism is no more than the outline of the activities of its members, not something into which they must fit themselves' (1978, p 131)

Presumably, any patterned collection of matter, human or not, has a form and is therefore structured in some sense This includes communism which, under Cohen's interpretation, will therefore consist of abstract structural forms existing alongside the communists In order to avoid this awkward and pessimistic result concerning the possibility of eliminating structural constraint, Cohen distinguishes pre-structured activities from those that are merely structured (cf Przeworski, 1980, p 150) [3] Everything, therefore, hinges on the notion of pre-structuring, which is his formulation of the idea of active structural constraint

All Cohen (1978, p 133) tells us about pre-structuring, however, is that in its absence, individuals 'face one another and themselves 'as such,' without the mediation of institutions For institutions represent 'fixation of social activity, consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power

[2] Cohen (1978, p 235) recognizes the problem but responds by suggesting that while the divorce rate is a number it explains other things such as the fear of marriage Without rehashing the entire Durkheimian question of social facts I think we can recognize the tug of methodological individualism here by observing that the more precise formulation is not that a certain *number* literally causes anything or influences anyone Rather the fact that (a fudge expression) the divorce rate is such and such causes certain reactions Note that the common appeal to another abstract entity, a system is equally question-begging Finally, many philosophers of science invoke properties an appeal I also find inadequate Are there truly emergent properties? Which properties are genuine with actual causal or constraining powers? The old questions re-emerge

[3] Discussing this crucial distinction between social form and material content Cohen (1978, pp 91–92) offers the analogy of a statue with respect to which one can abstract a form and a content But these are, as he says, abstractions In reality, the statue is spatially distributed matter and there is no raw, formless stuff" constrained by the statue's form This suggests two things One, his description of communism — the form is now just the boundary created by matter itself"—is in fact generally true of the form-content relation Two he has not shown how form constrains

above us '" So Cohen's analysis comes full circle To explain institutional constraint, he posited structures Yet if structures explain, they explain too much insofar as they cease to be limited to class societies To recognize the freedom of communism, therefore, Cohen is forced to confront the sense in which structures, conceived as abstract entities, do not necessarily constrain. But if structures per se do not constrain, then the mere positing of them fails to solve the problem of constraint Cohen's final suggestion is that in the constraining case, individual relations are mediated by institutions This leaves us where we started, that is, without a serious understanding of how institutional constraints constrain, though with a better sense of why it would be worth finding out whether they do

A Solution Proposed

The problem of reconciling the creation and constraint features of institutions pervades distinct and prominent bodies of political research On a more positive note, we have also seen that attempts to grapple with this problem generate certain (tacit) guidelines as to what a proper solution to this problem would look like

First, rational choice and Marxist theory insist that institutions are human products, continuous with human activity and not merely parallel to it (as Marx, 1968, p 670 observes. "What is society whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action ") Even though Marxists are unwilling to view institutions as chosen, their agreement with rational choice theory extends to the understanding of institutional persistence The Marxist vision of a deinstitutionalized society would be incomprehensible if institutions, once created, truly ceased to persist as human products Their constraint on individuals must be part of the character of their human production, not in contradiction to it

For a specific guideline to emerge from this core of agreement, there must be a sense in which institutions can be human products even if they are not designed or implicitly chosen This core of agreement, I suggest, is the weaker belief that what institutions are cannot be independent of what the members of society in aggregate have done and are doing More precisely, the guideline says the totality of noninstitutional facts about the aggregate of individuals in society determines or "fixes" the facts about their institutions (for a technical rendering of determination, see Hellman and Thompson, 1975) Simply put, there cannot be a change in institutions without some change in the associated group of people. This does not mean that institutional descriptions can be reduced to noninstitutional ones [5] Still less does it

[5]It is not always easy in practice to distinguish institutional from noninstitutional facts, particularly when many theorists are inclined to incorporate participant conceptions of an institution into its definition Yet, this practical problem may be evidence for determination since it testifies to the intimate connection between descriptions of people and descriptions of institutions

imply that institutions are the intended objects of individual or collective decision making, or even that institutional facts can, in any serious sense, be explained individualistically (methodological individualism). This guideline simply denies institutions a degree of independence or detachment from the activities or thinking of people that neither Marxists nor rational choice theorists would countenance.

The second guideline emerging from our analysis addresses the proper conception of institutional constraint. This issue is fundamentally ontological: it concerns what sort of entity any institution must be if it is to constrain those subject to it. Rational choice theory dodges this issue by focusing on constraints internalized by participants. Cohen's (1978) explicitly ontological solution also turns into a Pyrrhic victory. In his case, the nature of the institution is clarified but its constraining power is obscured (see James, 1984).

The second guideline, then, says there must be an ontological clarification of institutions, but it should not render the notion of constraint problematic. If interpreting institutions as abstract entities creates this problem, then they must be conceived as nonabstract. Since this may evoke misleading images of hammers and caroming billiard balls, the second guideline is better expressed this way: a proper conception of institutions must enable one to conceive of (though not necessarily specify) an underlying physical process "realizing" the constraints they impose.[6] Under this guideline, for example, institutions cannot be expected to "act at a distance" (just as with individuals, whose actions in my view are simultaneously physical events, see Davidson, 1980).

The insistence on possible realization does not mean that institutions themselves are properly characterized in terms of the physical mediation between constraints and the constrained. My proposal, again, is not disguised reductionism. Claims about institutional constraint should continue to be couched in social scientific terms and tested in social scientific ways. Rather, the second guideline helps clarify the referential import of statements about institutions and helps ward off spurious correlations in purported explanations. An example is the use of functional explanations in Marxist theory to explain what I have called the external version of institutional constraint. These explanations have been justly met with skepticism because the possibility or clarity of the underlying constraining mechanism is questionable.[7] The same

[6]While the concept of causation is controversial, the underlying idea of physical realizability is, I believe, much less so in areas where the issue has come up (see, e.g., Block, 1980). The insistence on realizability reflects what one might call a "causal norm," which still plays a noticeable role in science, e.g., in relativity theory (for documentation, see Skyrms, 1980, p. 110).

[7]See, e.g., Elster (1980) and Cohen (1980). For our purposes, the issue is nicely formulated by Cohen (1982, pp. 33–34) who objects to individualist Marxism because it focuses on behavior rather than the "forces and relations constraining and directing it." Note also Giddens's (1982) attempt at a synthesis and Elster's (1983) reply. Parijs (1984) is also interesting.

realizability requirement also surfaces in more clearly suspect cases, su explanations appealing to mental telepathy or the occult.

With these two guidelines in hand—the determination and realizal requirements—we can turn to the conception of institutions. The co tion I propose is, in effect, an extension of Cohen's (1978, p. 91) impo observation that while Spartacus is a slave by virtue of certain social rela that obtain the concrete human organism named Spartacus is the slave some separate social object or structural position (as with Althusser and ibar, 1970). Various descriptions, physical and social, are simultaneously of him, but as Cohen notes, they are true of that selfsame human being extension, social relations can be understood in terms of relational desc tions, such as "is the master of" and "enslaves," applying to these conc human beings. Just as "slave" is true of single flesh and blood individuals Spartacus, so too in this interpretation is "enslaves" true of multiple f and blood individuals like Batiates and Spartacus.

This extension of Cohen's analysis allows us to steer between two extr treatments of social structure exemplified, respectively, by rational ch theory and much of Marxism. The proposed interpretation, on the one h does not require that the institutional structure mirror the beliefs, cho or characteristics of the individual. A person has a social structural ider by virtue of a social relation. On the other hand, we do not guarantee reality of social relations through an ontological transformation rende them stubbornly independent of the comings and goings of the mund world. The proposed interpretation does not question the reality of so relations by denying that the associated social descriptions are true. But latter are *descriptions* true of collections of individuals.

We now reach the key result. By compounding this process of relati description, we can cover all the social relations of slavery, that is to say, aggregate of human life corresponding to the relevant institution. T aggregate, of course, does not encompass the entire lives of Batiates, S tacus, and the others. The aggregate consists of spatiotemporal segment time-slices—of human beings.[5] The pertinent segments would be th extending over the times in which people do whatever is relevant to the p ticular institution, be it obeying, commanding, or signing a contract. compounding this process still further, we can cover all the institution any society.

I propose, in short, that institutions be defined as corresponding to a c tain aggregate of time-slices of human beings. Less ambiguously, an i tution literally *is* the aggregate or sum of human time-slices referre

[5]There is a simple explanation for this odd formulation. In general, we do not want the ins tional aggregate to include the entire lives of participants from birth to death. So we analyti distinguish the spatiotemporal boundaries appropriate to their institutional participation.

above [9] The "correspondence" is one of identity. Philosophically speaking, this is a version of ontological individualism there are, under varying descriptions, only human individuals *and* aggregates of them (see Goodman, 1972, pp 155–71).

Before showing how this proposed interpretation of institutions addresses our two guidelines, we need, I suspect, to indicate why this is a satisfactory interpretation of institutions One objection is likely to be raised by those influenced by the influential levels of analysis approach If an institution consists of an aggregate of flesh and blood individuals, then an institution consists of breathing, digesting, foot scratching, and other activities irrelevant to the institution (see Easton, 1979, pp 35–45) But this objection rests on a mistaken assumption It presupposes that if an institutional description is about human organisms, then that description must itself detail or be concerned with all their physical features There is no reason to think this is so On the other hand, in choosing not to describe those features, one does not eliminate them, which in the form of fatigue, injury, or lust may turn out to be relevant

Shylock was right having a social identity is fully consistent with having 'hands, organs, senses, affections, passions ' So our institutional interpretation need not and does not jump to a supposedly different level of reality at which these features really are not there Nor, by the same token, does the absence of physical details from the description necessarily render it artificial or anything less than absolutely true Fido can be truly described as a dog without mentioning how many fleas he has

If one possible objection to this approach concerns its inclusion of irrelevant details, another concerns its exclusion of relevant ones Where are norms, values, concepts, beliefs, rules, organizational hierarchies, and other ingredients of institutional life? The answer within this approach is that these ingredients, like the social relation of slavery, should continue to be recognized, but recognized in our descriptions of the participants [10] The reasoning behind this recommendation is exactly parallel to that used in the case of social relations The descriptive approach allows us to say what we need to say about the institutional aggregate without embracing an ontology violating the realizability guideline And what we need to say, let me emphasize, is a great deal about institutional rules, organization, and practices These remain the proper focus of political scientific research My goal is to provide

[9] Cf the suggestive remark of Quine (1981, p 13) and the wider discussion by Noonan (1980) concerning the justification for this sort of identification It is interesting that Althusser (1971 , 166) calls ideology and state apparatuses modalities of matter It is beyond the scope of this analysis to compare my anti-Platonist treatment of institutions with, say, an Aristotelian treatment of universals

[10] Grafstein (1983) works out one possible analysis of rules based on this assumption

this research with ontological ballast, not to subordinate it to a supposedly superior or more objective physicalist framework.

For this reason, I do not attempt to specify a priori the sociopolitical contours of institutions that will emerge as the result of specific theoretical and empirical research Connolly (1981, pp. 7–18), for example, argues that an electoral institution is not simply a mass of mechanical behavior but is defined, in part, by the concepts and beliefs voters bring with their participation The conception of institutions I am proposing can accommodate Connolly's argument insofar as institutions, in my view, encompass full-blooded participants with their beliefs and conceptualizations By the same token, my conception does not confirm his argument. It leaves open the exact specification of the psychological states, if any, defining an institution

Similarly, institutions are often considered to be particularly stable social arrangements This restriction can also be built into the definition by specifying that institutions are aggregates that are stable (under some particular description) Though it is not incumbent upon a definition of institutions to explain that stability, any stabilizing psychological orientations can be incorporated in the definition as needs be

In short, my agnosticism with respect to definitions should not be confused with indifference The proposition that institutions are aggregates of human beings no more obliterates the distinction between institutions and other human aggregates than the proposition that animals are aggregates of cells obliterates the distinction between animals and plants Any existing differences will survive our failure to mention them [11] But these differences should be mentioned and developed within specific political research into particular institutional arrangements

It is obvious that this interpretation of institutions is an ideal one for meeting the determination guideline Since institutions, in this view, do not occupy an ontological realm different than those who participate in them, there seem to be few theoretical obstacles to exploring determination in the usual ways This, of course, does not guarantee success for the ongoing project of showing that institutional facts are determined by noninstitutional facts about the participants To satisfy the first guideline properly, this approach should only make success possible

The main task, then, is to show that the proposed interpretation also allows

[11] One distinction often raised in discussions of institutions deserves special mention, namely the distinction between institutional roles, which may or may not be occupied, and their potential human occupants (for the encouragement this gives to more abstract conceptions of institutions, see Grafstein, 1982) I believe we can define the operative importance of an objective place in terms of the existing institutional aggregate potential occupants would become part of This would also be my way of addressing the complaint that institutions correspond to a set of counterfactuals about what individuals cannot do, such as freely leave when enslaved The masters hypothetical and counterfactual responses are embodied in each flesh-and-blood master, as expectations about these are embodied in each slave's brain

ions to constrain in a physically realizable way To make this argu-
s broadly applicable as possible, let us assume, as a worst case, that
lological individualists have succeeded in showing how and that hu-
ings in the state of nature contractually or organically created a set of
l institutions The issue, under these circumstances, is how their hu-
eation goes on to constrain its creators and others

er the proposed interpretation, these institutions, however created,
supernatural entities but exist *pari passu* with institutional partici-
Yet in order to understand their constraining role, it is also important
eciate that these institutions are distinct entities, ontologically on a
h each of the individuals who helps compose them This is a subtle
crucial point With respect to each participating individual, an in-
n is a distinct but not a discrete entity [12]

e who hypothesize institutional constraints can now be understood as
ig the following The supra-individual segments invoked in their
s are not merely artificially delimited physical entities They are also
lly meaningful entities with causal powers [13] An institution, in this
can be understood as a connected group of such entities, be they
committees, or political roles Their interactions and thus their
in participating individuals constitute the constraints of the institu-
ome Marxists, for example, argue that while any given individual may
degree of choice as to his or her particular class position, the class
itself may be a structural given that is not a consequence of subcon-
or implicit choice, collective or otherwise, but constrains that choice
ly, some political economists might regard a specific social choice
nism as an institutional status quo relative to which individual deci-
akers assess the benefits and costs of institutional change and within
rules they institute change

ch institutional effects can be shown then it turns out that individuals
state of nature had the wit to generate institutions having power over
Processes at the macro level—cycles of partisan control of legisla-
or example—may be sustained at the individual level by a combina-

e two aspects of institutions may suggest why the ontological status of holistic entities
ed ambiguous even to proponents of holism (e g , Gellner 1968 p 256)
sessing this claim, remember that an individualistic explanation of the emergence of an
n need not entail psychological reductionism the view that the political character of
ution must forever reflect individual psychological characteristics It is worth noting in
ection that Mandelbaum's (1955) widely cited argument for holism seems to offer the
nage of psychological reductionism As I understand his argument he is claiming that
s the full social content or significance of a behavioral disposition depends on the dis
of others, the methodological individualist is unable to explain it without assuming the
of other social dispositions Mandelbaum (1955 p 308) concludes that an individualis
nation would be circular, overlooking the possibility that a socially significant result can
individualistic genesis

tion of ideological misconceptions, restricted information, narrowed perspectives, alternative conceptions of the process, the socialization of tastes, habits, reflexes, and individual rational adaptations. In this case, theories of institutional constraint may make systematic sense of macro-level results that methodological individualists ignore through *ceteris paribus* clauses, treat as accidental, or valiantly attribute to the implicit or subconscious choices of individuals These theories would redeem the intuition that there are institutional constraints

It is, of course, the burden of those hypothesizing such constraints to demonstrate the systematic effects of institutional aggregates, as it is the burden of those seeking individualistic explanations for the existence of these aggregates to demonstrate that explanations in the opposite direction work [14] Once both approaches lose their presumption of exclusivity, moreover, interesting blends of analysis are possible Bourdieu's (1976) analysis of the marriage strategies of an isolated community of French peasants is a case in point In contrast to sociological structuralists, Bourdieu notes the degree to which peasant marriage choices do not simply "execute" a fixed set of institutional rules or customs Peasants will knowingly break rules and redefine customs in order to transmit the family's patrimony and maintain or advance its social position, power, and privileges In contrast to individualists, Bourdieu argues the "constraints surrounding every matrimonial choice are so numerous and appear in such complex combinations that the individuals involved cannot possibly deal with all of them consciously" (1976, p 141) [15] The choices made under these constraints of social hierarchy and ownership nonetheless reproduce these constraints, which thus face each succeeding generation Bourdieu, in short, shows how choice and constraint need not preclude one another

Political Implications

The interpretation of institutions we have just explored has several attractive features First, while recognizing that institutions transcend particular individuals or even generations of individuals, it does not convert institutions into supernatural entities Second, the institution's role as creation and constraint is no longer fundamentally mysterious but relies on the standard physical means of causal mediation Third, whether institutions are created or constrain is seen to be an empirical question rather than one settled by

[14] It is worth emphasizing that both demonstrations are more complex and treacherous than individualists and their opponents often recognize According to Brodbeck (1968, p 283), e g the issue of holistic entities is equivalent to the question of whether holistic properties are definable in terms of individualistic ones, but that is not true (see Hellman and Thompson 1975 pp 556–57)

[15] Bourdieu (1976, p 141) adds that the constraints can be mastered "on a different level This, I would argue, may be an unnecessary concession to individualism

efinition Fourth, clarifying the ontological status of institutions also helps arify when alternative theories of institutions are about (different aspects) the same thing, this clarification does not transcend theoretical disagreeents so much as give them a point Fifth, one can recognize, if one wants, a screpancy between social and individual meaning The former need not be ternalized, consciously or unconsciously, by any participants

This conception, then, introduces certain philosophical improvements to the study of institutions and alerts empirical researchers to the danger of iwittingly foreclosing particular explanatory possibilities This conception, oreover, implies there may be inherent limits to the political potential of dividuals to control the institutions constraining them or, at an extreme, to iminate such constraints entirely An example drawn from the Marxist the-y of revolution will help show why our reconciliation of creation and con-'aint has this implication

Why do workers put up with capitalism? Tired of excuses, some Marxists ggest capitalism is actually a better economic deal for workers than so-ilism, particularly when workers factor in disturbances during the revolu-mary and post-revolutionary periods "Is it not an absurdity that they ould consent to capitalist relations, that they would not use their political ghts for 'social emancipation' if there did not exist a real possibility for real-ng their material interests [under capitalism] in some forseeable future?" rzeworski, 1985, p 147) In this view, therefore, retaining capitalist con-'aints is a matter of decision "while social relations constitute a structure of oices within which actors choose, their choice may be to alter social rela-ns" (1985, p 96)

The parallel with Shepsle and Weingast (1984) is striking Both positions e nurtured by a methodological individualism with respect to institutional nstraint nicely summarized by Watkins (1968, p 271) "no social tendency ists which could not be altered *if* the individuals concerned both wanted to er it and possessed appropriate information " It is important to note, how-er, that this belief in the political control of constraints is nurtured by the atkins version of individualism but is not a consequence of it Even in atkins's formulation, the power to alter constraints is conditional and ra-nal choice theorists can point to other reasons, such as problems with the ovision of collective goods, for dampening one's optimism So in this view pitalist constraints can be altered if workers can produce the collective od of organization and also possess appropriate information, that is do not bor under "false consciousness" (see Przeworski, 1985, p 136) Institu-nal constraints become binding, on the other hand, when these conditions e not present.

The conception of institutions I have proposed does not take a stand on the yopia or disorganization of workers, however important to the power of in-tutions they may be. The proposed conception, rather, highlights another

consideration. Both sides in the debate over false consciousness and c tive goods assume there is basically one set of institutions which may o not become transparent to the workers and other participants Our own ception suggests a somewhat different state of affairs Institutions are tiotemporal aggregates ontologically distinct from the specific institut conceptions of workers, capitalists, or political scientists They can be ceptually segmented and studied in one way without necessarily prejud alternative ways A population can be carved up into both quartile quintiles, with no pretense that only one way is correct or is capable of erating true statements So too can the institutional territory be vari partitioned by participants and observers [16]

An observer's theory of institutional constraint, in short, can be tr well confirmed, given its background conceptual scheme involving structure and classes, without precluding other theories based on othe tems of categorization An institutional theory held by rational worker example, may be true, well confirmed, or an efficient predictor of the ture material benefits, whereas the observer's theory might explain in tionally why workers are constrained to perceive in terms of material b fits rather than other terms [17] Individualistically oriented participant other words, can anticipate and, on that basis, master political outc within their perspective without necessarily endangering the observer ferent conception of the situation The only real question in each c whether the segments the institutional conception marks out exhibit th lationships the associated theory posits [18]

It may turn out that political outcomes do reflect rational choice w one institutional conception whereas within another, equally possible ception there are institutional forces participants have failed to recog The counter, moreover, that "truly free" individuals will define their institutions and thereby determine which institutional conception is c just begs the question One's judgment that individuals are truly free appropriate sense is relative to the institutional configuration one j them to be confronting

[16] This does not mean that everything is relative and any kind of theorizing goes F thing, disputants are constrained by the language they do share which must be proportio large enough for them to recognize their disagreements Second, they are constrained contours of the spatiotemporal aggregate they are segmenting One cannot segment what there Finally, given a chosen frame of reference one can use it to make false as well statements So a theory could be condemned on its own terms

[17] The fact that workers' ideology can be explained does not, in my view, mean it is a s rate theory

[18] While I have assumed that the spatiotemporal aggregate is constant across different p theories, one theory may include, say, educational systems in the ambit of politics while a may not Whether education is called political strikes me as secondary to the issue of wl litical relationships are hypothesized regardless of terminology

What is problematic about the vision of society using politics to deinstitutionalize its life, at least in the constraining sense of institution, is thus the implicit assumption that there is only one institutional arrangement to discover and master. In abolishing one set of institutional necessities, society may be reflecting another set. The view of institutions as creations encourages our optimistic belief that what we have created and understood—what we define—we can master. "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve" (Marx, 1970, p. 21). Yet the possibility that created institutions coexist with unseen or ignored constraining ones suggests the converse may also be true: mankind only solves such tasks as it sets itself. This does not imply that any particular institutional configuration is, in principle, beyond the control of individuals. It does raise the question whether all institutional configurations could simultaneously be under their control. There may be institutional necessities accompanying each expansion of political possibilities.

Since the world does not consist solely of armchair theoreticians and freely associated participants, this should not imply the peaceful coexistence of constraining and created institutions. Around the world there are struggles to impose pluralist or class based, racial or ethnic, individualist or nonindividualist institutional conceptions. And as we have seen, the possibility these political differences will arise is in the nature of the case. This leaves political actors and scientists alike with a practical dilemma. What from one perspective on institutions may be a welcome use of politics to deinstitutionalize society may, from another perspective, be viewed as an unwelcome attempt to tighten its institutional constraints.

REFERENCES

Althusser, Louis. 1971. *Lenin and Philosophy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Althusser, Louis, and Etienne Balibar. 1970. *Reading Capital*. New York: Random House.

Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists. *American Political Science Review* 75: 306–18.

Becker, Gary. 1976. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Block, Ned, ed. 1980. *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1976. Marriage Strategies as Strategies of Social Reproduction. In Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., *Family and Society*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Brodbeck, May. 1968. Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction. In May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.

Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Burawoy, Michael. 1985. *The Politics of Reproduction*. London: Verso.

Burge, Tyler. 1986. Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. *Journal of Philosophy* 83: 697–720.

Cohen, G. A. 1978. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
——— 1980. Functional Explanation: Reply to Elster. *Political Studies*, 28: 129–35.
——— 1982. Functional Explanation, Consequence Explanation, and Marxism. *Inquiry* 25: 27–56.
Connolly, William E. 1981. *Appearance and Reality in Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, Donald. 1980. *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Easton, David. 1979. *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Elster, Jon. 1980. Cohen on Marx's Theory of History. *Political Studies* 28: 121–28.
——— 1983. Reply to Comments. *Theory and Society*, 12: 111–20.
——— 1985. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Field, Hartry H. 1978. Mental Representation. *Erkenntnis* 13: 9–61.
——— 1980. *Science without Numbers*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1968. Holism versus Individualism. In May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.
Giddens, Anthony. 1982. Commentary on the Debate. *Theory and Society*, 11: 327–39.
Goldberg, Victor P. 1985. Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the New Institutionalism. In George R. Feiwel, ed. *Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Goodman, Nelson. 1972. *Problems and Projects*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Grafstein, Robert. 1982. Structure and Structuralism. *Social Science Quarterly*, 63: 617–33.
——— 1983. Taking Dworkin to Hart: A Positivist Conception of Institutional Rules. *Political Theory* 11: 244–65.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
Hellman, Geoffrey Paul, and Frank Wilson Thompson. 1975. Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction. *Journal of Philosophy*, 72: 551–64.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
James, Susan. 1984. *The Content of Social Explanation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1981. *Studies in Business-Cycle Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mandelbaum, Maurice. 1955. Societal Facts. *British Journal of Sociology* 6: 305–17.
Marx, Karl. 1970. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1947. *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.
——— 1968. *Selected Works*. New York: International Publishers.
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1984. An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior. *Journal of Politics* 46: 182–205.
Noonan, Harold W. 1980. *Objects and Identity*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
O'Connor, James. 1984. *Accumulation Crisis*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. *Game Theory and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parijs, Philippe Van. 1984. Marxism's Central Puzzle. In Terence Ball and James Farr, eds. *After Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1954. *Essays in Sociological Theory*. New York: Free Press.
Plott, Charles R. 1972. Individual Choice of a Political-Economic Process. In Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill.
Przeworski, Adam. 1975. Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay? *American Political Science Review*, 69: 49–67.

——— 1980 Material Interests, Class Compromise and the Transition to Socialism *Politics & Society*, 10 125–53

——— 1985 *Capitalism and Social Democracy* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Quine, W V 1981 *Theories and Things* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Schiffer, Stephen R 1972 *Meaning* London Oxford University Press

Schotter, Andrew 1981 *The Economic Theory of Social Institutions* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Shepsle, Kenneth A 1986 Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions In Herbert F Weisberg, ed , *Political Science The Science of Politics* New York Agathon Press

Shepsle, Kenneth A , and Barry R Weingast 1981 Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice *Public Choice*, 37 503–19

——— 1984 Why do Rules of Procedure Matter? *Journal of Politics* 46 206–21

Skyrms, Bryan 1980 *Causal Necessity* New Haven Yale University Press

Taylor Michael 1976 *Anarchy and Cooperation* London John Wiley

Watkins, J W N 1968 Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies In May Brodbeck, ed *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* New York Macmillan

Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model

Joseph M. Grieco
Duke University

Realist political theory finds that states are positional in character. Thus, states prefer that relative achievements of jointly produced gains not advantage partners, and their concerns about relative gains may constrain their willingness to cooperate. Conventional presentations of the game of Prisoner's Dilemma do not depict Realism's specification of the relative gains element of the structure of state preferences or Realism's analysis of the capacity of state concerns about relative gains to impede cooperation. However, by distinguishing between game payoffs and state utility, an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model can depict both the relative-gains element of state preferences and the relative-gains problem for cooperation. This Amended Prisoner's Dilemma facilitates analysis of an important systemic constraint on international cooperation identified by Realist political theory, contributes to our understanding of international institutions, and draws our attention to a number of potentially interesting research problems concerning international collaboration.

Introduction

This essay seeks to contribute to the Realist theory of the problem of international cooperation. It presents a model, derived from the well-known game of Prisoner's Dilemma, of the Realist specification of rational state preferences in the face of anarchy and common (albeit mixed) interests.[1] An Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model, the essay suggests, clarifies the Realist analysis of the link between anarchy and state preferences relating to coopera-

For their helpful comments on this essay, the author thanks Robert Axelrod, Robert Bates, Stephan Haggard, Louise Hodgden, Robert Jervis, William Keech, Robert Keohane, Peter Lange, Timothy McKeown, John Mearsheimer, John Ruggie, George Tsebelis, and Kenneth Waltz. The author is grateful to the German-Marshall Fund of the United States and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University for their support during the preparation of earlier drafts. All statements, of course, remain the responsibility of the author.

[1] State rationality means that states possess consistently ordered goals and that they select strategies with the purpose of achieving these goals in the largest possible measure. International cooperation involves the voluntary adjustment by states of their policies in such a way as to help each other reach a mutually desired goal (Keohane 1984, p. 51). Mixed-interest situations are those in which the structure of payoffs leads players to have an interest both in cooperative and conflictual behavior. International anarchy means that no agency exists in the international polity to which states can appeal for protection or the enforcement of promises.

tion. In addition, it facilitates development of Realist thinking as to the manner in which anarchy inhibits the willingness of states to work together and the manner in which states, through international institutions, may overcome their inhibitions and achieve cooperation.

It is sometimes suggested that a powerful model of the Realist theory of cooperation in mixed-interest situations already exists, i.e., Prisoner's Dilemma itself.[2] Employing perfectly symmetrical payoff-structures and assuming that states are egoistic agents, conventional forms of the game do highlight *one* Realist-specified state preference (for maximum individual gains), and *one* resulting Realist-specified constraint on cooperation (cheating).[3] Yet, Realism asserts that states are positional, not egoistic, in character. As a result, it finds that states have *two* preferences in mixed-interest situations—maximum individual gains and minimal gaps in gains favoring partners, and finds that states thereby experience *two* constraints on their willingness to cooperate—cheating and the fear that gaps in jointly produced gains favor partners. The problem, then, with conventional forms of Prisoner's Dilemma is that they capture only half of Realism's analysis of state preferences in mixed-interest situations and only half of its analysis of anarchy's inhibitory effects on the willingness of states to cooperate in such situations.

To resolve this problem, the essay offers a game-theoretic model which does highlight Realism's identification of state concerns about relative-gains and which does depict its analysis of the inhibitory effects of such state concerns on international cooperation. Because it captures the relative-gains problem for international cooperation, the Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model provides a more complete representation of Realist theory and permits a more penetrating analysis of a major constraint on cooperation. In addition, the amended game may shed new light on the politics and purposes of

[2] Prisoner's Dilemma has been applied to arms races and arms control (Harsanyi, 1969, p. 376; Snyder, 1971, pp. 67–68; Russett, 1983, pp. 99–104; Brams, David and Straffin, 1979; Brams, 1985a, pp. 139–56; Brams, 1985b, pp. 86–115; Downs, Rocke and Siverson, 1985, pp. 127–32); nuclear nonproliferation (Cioffi-Revilla, 1978); crisis management (Schelling, 1963, p. 213; Zagare, 1981, pp. 152–56; 1983, pp. 77–82; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, pp. 164–80; Brams, 1985b, pp. 64–67, 74–78), military alliances (Snyder, 1984); monetary cooperation (Cooper, 1975, p. 82), tax policy coordination (Laver, 1977), trade wars (Conybeare, 1985), and trade liberalization (Stein, 1983, p. 124; Conybeare, 1984; Axelrod, 1984, p. 7; Keohane, 1984, pp. 88–89, 103–5; Lipson, 1984, pp. 8–10).

[3] Symmetry in Prisoner's Dilemma means that each player has mutual cooperation (CC*) and mutual defection (DD*) as its second and third most-preferred outcomes, and mirror image preferences for the CD* and DC* outcomes. States may overcome the problem of cheating if they can change strategy within a given play (Wagner, 1983), are forward-looking or non-myopic (Brams, 1985a, pp. 128–34, 146–50; Brams, 1985b, pp. 66–74), or believe the game will be iterated and thus engage in mutual conditional cooperation (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, pp. 97–102; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965, pp. 87–102, 200–201; Axelrod, 1984). For a critique of these solutions, see Zagare (1984, pp. 54–62).

international institutions Finally, the Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model may generate a number of potentially significant research problems concerning the achievement and maintenance of international collaboration.

THE REALIST STRUCTURE OF STATE INTERESTS AND CONVENTIONAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA

The main proposition of the essay—that rational states are concerned about relative gains arising from cooperation—is firmly grounded in Realist political theory [4] A core Realist insight is that states are positional in character (Grieco, 1988) That is, Realists observe a deep-rooted tendency in states to assess their level of achievement in any domain of activity—whether it be military power, industrial prowess, or educational excellence—by comparison of their own individual performance to the performance of other states

This positional orientation of states, according to Realism, results from their co-location in an anarchical political context States, while possessing many different objectives, all must have survival as independent agents as their primary interest [5] This basic interest in survival compels states to be acutely sensitive to threats to their relative capacity to protect their security and to maintain their independence [6] As a result, while some states may seek to ensure their security through maximization of their relative power, Realism finds that a fundamental goal of states is *to prevent advances in the relative power of others* States, according to Realist theory, might even forego opportunities to increase their absolute capabilities if doing so contributes to a more stable distribution of power This is because "the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system "[7] Thus, a state will be concerned if another achieves relatively greater gains from their joint action because "When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided They are compelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?' If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other" (Waltz, 1979, p 105)

[4] Non-Realist analyses also identify and explore state concerns about relative position See, for example, the work by Galtung (1964), Rummel (1972), and Wallace (1972) on the relationship between national status and international conflict, and by Organski and Kugler (1980) on relative power transitions Also, games of coordination depict distributional aspects of cooperation See Schelling (1963, pp 89–118), Stein (1983, pp 125–26, 130), Conybeare (1984), and Snidal (1985, pp 931–36)

[5] See Aron (1973, pp 6–7), Carr (1964, p 108), Waltz (1979, pp 91 126–27, 1986, p 334), and Gilpin (1986, pp 304–5)

[6] See Aron (1973, p 14), and Gilpin (1975, p 34, 1981, pp 81, 87–88)

[7] Waltz (1979, p 126), also see Waltz (1986, p 334), Gilpin (1975, p 35, 1981, p 175) and Carr (1964, p 111)

In addition, a state will be concerned about relative achievements of jointly produced gains because an asymmetry advantaging a partner in one arrangement might result in a shift in bargaining capabilities to the partner's favor, thus permitting it to renegotiate to its further benefit the terms of that arrangement as well as the terms of other common ventures From this argument about the possible harmful effects of imbalanced achievements of gains from cooperation emerges the Realist specification of the relative-gains problem for cooperation· a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to achieve, disproportionate gains as a result of their common endeavor

However, conventional forms of Prisoner's Dilemma do not model the relative gains element of state preferences or the relative-gains problem for cooperation For example, the form of Prisoner's Dilemma depicted in table 1(a) typically is done in such a way that not only do the players have a symmetric rank-ordering of outcomes, but the magnitude of cardinal-value payoffs for each player is exactly equal in the mutual cooperation and mutual noncooperation outcomes Every analyst listed under table 1(a) follows this convention The assumption underpinning this practice—which is never expressed explicitly—must be that, in either mutual cooperation or mutual noncooperation, players achieve similar payoffs or believe this to be so Neither assumption may be valid and states may in fact believe that payoffs from mutual cooperation or mutual noncooperation or both may be highly unequal An alternative explanation for the employment of perfectly symmetric cardinal payoffs is that doing so is an analytical convenience for emphasizing the symmetry of the rank-orderings of outcomes by the players Although perfectly appropriate if the objective is to depict cheating problems in mixed-interest situations, this analytical convention blinds the analyst to the possibility that states may be concerned and may be acting on the basis of the concern, that partners might achieve disproportionate gains as a result of their collaboration

Similar problems characterize the specification of Prisoner's Dilemma in terms of ranges of interval data, as represented in table 1(b) Player-states in this version of the game are assumed to make their decisions on the basis of the ranking of payoff-ranges (specifically, T > R > P > S), and on the basis of the assumption that values within the ranges cause mutual cooperation to be superior to alternating between cheating and being cheated (i e , R > [T + S]/2) This depiction of the game assumes that each state does not examine and may not even know, the magnitude of payoffs in the other's interval-ranges Yet, from a Realist viewpoint, one state might become highly dissatisfied if its partner's "R" payoff or payoff-range substantially exceeded its own The manner in which states might evaluate payoff gaps is discussed in the next section The point to be emphasized at the moment, however, is

TABLE 1

CONVENTIONAL FORMS OF PRISONER'S DILEMMA

(a) Cardinal Values

Player A \ Player B	C*	D*
C	3,3	0,5
D	5,0	1,1

Source Axelrod (1984 p 8)

Examples

Schelling (1963 p 213)
Harsanyi (1969 p 375)
Snyder (1971, p 67)
Rosecrance (1973 p 103)
Brams (1975, p 31)
Wagner (1983, p 332)
Axelrod (1984 p 8)
Lipson (1964, p 8)

(b) Ranges of Interval-level Values

Player A \ Player B	C*	D*
C	R R*	S, T*
D	T, S*	P, P*

Conditions

T>R>P>S
R>(T + S)/2

Examples

Brams (1975 p 32)
Snyder and Diesing (1977 p 43)
Axelrod (1984 pp 8–10)
Keohane (1984, p 69)
Lipson (1984 p 3)

(c) Ordinal Ranking of Preferred Outcomes

Player A \ Player B	C*	D*
C	3,3	1,4
D	4,1	2,2

Key

1 = least preferred outcome
4 = most preferred outcome

Examples

Cioffi-Revilla (1978, p 194)
Jervis (1978 p 171)
Zagare (1981, p 153)
Zagare (1983 p 78)
Russett (1983 p 101)
Stein (1983 p 122)
Snyder (1984 p 463)
Brams (1985a p 143)
Brams (1985b, pp 75, 90)
Snidal (1985 p 927)

that specification of Prisoner's Dilemma as a particular set of payoff-ranges does not facilitate and indeed may hinder analysis of the relative gains element of state preferences concerning cooperation as it is articulated in Realist political theory.

Finally, of all the forms of Prisoner's Dilemma, the most general—the attribution to players of a particular rank-ordering of preferred outcomes, as depicted in table 1(c)—may impose the greatest obstacles to analysis of the relative gains problem for international cooperation. It is possible to assert that the rank-orderings of outcomes in table 1(c) reflect an assessment by each state of the magnitude of its own absolute payoff *and* a comparison of the size of its own payoff to that of its partner in the same outcome. However, in the analyses listed in table 1(c), cross-player, intra-cell comparisons of raw payoffs are *never* made an explicit element of the process by which states establish their rank-ordering of preferred outcomes. Indeed, these analyses appear to assume that each state rank-orders outcomes exclusively on the basis of the differences in its own payoffs across the four possible outcomes.[8]

Moreover, even if it were accepted that rank-orderings of outcomes in conventional versions of Prisoner's Dilemma *implicitly* reflect state assessments both of absolute and relative payoffs, then it would still be necessary to conclude that such a practice seriously impedes analysis of the problem of international cooperation. Suggesting that rank-orderings of outcomes by states include an implicit assessment both of absolute and relative gains does not tell us how states evaluate the latter. It also fails to tell us what weight states assign to absolute as opposed to relative gains. Finally, such a suggestion fails to inform us as to whether, how or why weightings assigned by states to absolute as opposed to relative gains may be greater in some mixed-interest international situations than in others.

Overall, then, the assertion that assessments of absolute and relative gains are both implicit in Prisoner's Dilemma when the game is expressed as a particular rank-ordering of outcomes provides us with little insight into the manner in which states integrate these two elements of their structure of preferences into a single composite score (which then generates the unique rank-ordering of outcomes), and thus it tells us very little about the reasons for a particular rank-ordering of outcomes in any particular international situation. The assumption, in other words, that rank-orderings of outcomes already implicitly include assessments by states both of absolute and relative gains obstructs efforts to posit or explore important problems concerning states and international cooperation. The challenge, then, is to probe behind table 1(c)'s simple listing of rank-orderings and to establish a model which

[8] See Brams (1985b, pp. 74–78), Cioffi-Revilla (1978, pp. 193–94), Jervis (1978, p. 171), Lipson (1984, pp. 2–6), Russett (1983, pp. 101–3), Snidal (1985, pp. 926–27), Snyder (1984, pp. 462–63), Stein (1983, pp. 117–18), and Zagare (1981, pp. 152–56; 1983, pp. 78–81).

depicts *explicitly* both the absolute and relative-gains elements of a state's structure of preferences in mixed-interest international situations.

Conventional forms of Prisoner's Dilemma do not model the relative-gains element of the structure of state preferences. This is because most contemporary discussions of Prisoner's Dilemma do not use the Realist definition of state utility. As noted above, from a Realist viewpoint, states are "positional" in character and assess all international relationships, including those based on common interests, in terms of their impact on defensive power capabilities. Because it attributes defensive positionality to states, Realist theory suggests that state utility functions have some level of negative interdependence. In contrast, analyses based on conventional Prisoner's Dilemma assume that states are "atomistic" in character and, as "rational egoists," act only on the basis of calculations of individual absolute gains.[9] It is this assumption of state atomism—that the rational response of states to anarchy is to be self-regarding egoists—which prevents conventional Prisoner's Dilemma from depicting Realism's understanding of the relative-gains element of state preferences or its inhibitory effects on the willingness of states to cooperate.

State Positionality, the Relative-Gains Problem, and an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model

Prisoner's Dilemma would depict systemic constraints on international cooperation more fully, and might shed light on the process of international collaboration more powerfully, if it could be recast to model explicitly state positionality and the resulting structure of state preferences, i.e., a desire for larger over smaller absolute gains and for smaller over larger gaps in gains favoring partners.

To model this structure of state preferences, Prisoner's Dilemma must be reconstituted in such a way that states are assumed to know their own payoffs *and* those of their partners *and* to be able to compare the magnitude of their own payoffs to those of their partners. If payoff values in the game were thought to represent utility scores, then inter-player comparisons of them would not be fruitful.[10] However, a fundamental distinction is often made in game theory between payoffs (quantities of a good) and the utility (level of satisfaction) derived from them.[11] Payoffs may be viewed not as utility scores but rather "as a quantity of some basic good, such as money, or amounts of several private goods reduced to a single quantity of some *numeraire*, such

[9] See Axelrod (1984, pp. 6, 9, 14, 110–13), Keohane (1984, pp. 27, 66, 78) and Lipson (1984, pp. 2, 5).

[10] See Luce and Raiffa (1957, pp. 33–34, 130–32, 168–69), and Rapoport (1960, pp. 125–27).

[11] See, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957, pp. 20–23), Rapoport (1960, pp. 121–23), and Taylor (1976, p. 70).

as money" (Taylor, 1976, p 30) [12] If states can identify their own payoffs and those of their partners, and if they can each "normalize" them in terms of a metric, then each may specify the payoff matrix in terms of ratio-scale values (so much money, so many exports, weapons, etc) Thus, while a state may not be able to compare levels of utility that it and its partner derive from their respective payoffs in a particular outcome, it may well be able to compare the magnitude of the payoffs they each achieve [13]

Both states, however, need not employ the same metric or unit of account For example, in trade negotiations, the United States may use dollars to assess relative increases in exports that may be generated by different liberalization packages, while the European Economic Community (EEC) might make these same sorts of calculations of relative export gains in terms of European Currency Units (ECUs) Similarly, in arms negotiations the United States may define the payoffs for itself and the Soviet Union in terms of numbers of warheads, while the Soviet Union might specify the matrix in terms of equivalent megatonnage. So long as a player can express its own payoffs and those of the other in terms of a single "normalized" metric, then it can estimate the magnitude of payoffs both might achieve in different outcomes of the game

If states can express payoffs as some type of ratio-level value, then we may model—through specification of their respective utility functions—the possibility that their utility is affected not only by individual payoffs but also by those achieved by partners [14] For example, let us assume that a moderately altruistic referent state, A, derives utility U, in exactly the same amount as any payoff V it receives and whatever payoff W is attained by another state, B In these circumstances, we would specify A's utility function as $U = V + W$ Alternatively, let it be assumed that A's utility is reduced by any payoff achieved by B, then $U = V - W$ Finally, it may be found that A is highly altruistic and derives proportionately greater utility from B's achievement of payoffs than from achievement of its own In this case, $U = V + k(W)$ where $k > 1$

As noted earlier, Realist theory finds that international anarchy causes states to prefer greater rather than smaller absolute gains and smaller rather than larger gaps in gains favoring partners It may also be expected that some states would strive for, and all states would accept (but not necessarily seek) gaps in gains in their favor The following utility function captures both of these preferences for referent state A

[12] Also see Axelrod (1984 p 8) In one simulation students faced with asymmetric CC* and DD* payoffs (expressed as cents) were found to be much more likely to fail to cooperate than if CC* and DD* did not produce payoff-gaps (Sheposh and Gallo 1973)

[13] The players would each assign the same origin and unit of measurement to the payoffs (Taylor, 1976, p 69)

[14] See Rapoport (1960, p 121) and Taylor (1976 pp 70–74) Taylor (1976 pp 70–81) offers a taxonomy of games involving player sensitivity to the payoffs of others

$$U = V - k(W - V) \qquad \text{where } k > 0 \tag{1}$$

In statement (1), k represents state A's coefficient of sensitivity to gaps in payoffs. It represents the level of A's susceptibility to reductions in utility if gaps in gains favor partners In statement (1), payoffs achieved by others do not in themselves affect A's utility Instead, only gaps in payoffs (i e , $W - V$) do so Gaps in favor of B ($W - V > 0$), according to statement (1), reduce U, gaps in favor of A ($W - V < 0$) increase it Thus, statement (1) describes the Realist argument that states lose utility as a result of gaps in gains which advantage partners, and it depicts the Realist argument that because of state sensitivities to payoff gaps favoring partners, state utility functions are, in part, negatively interdependent It also models the enjoyment of greater utility on the part of some states through the attainment of gaps in gains in their favor.

It is now possible to restate Prisoner's Dilemma in such a way that it models *explicitly* both elements of the Realist-postulated structure of state preferences in mixed-interest situations and the relative gains problem for international cooperation For this, we first note that (1) may be restated as

$$U = (1 + k)V - kW \qquad \text{where } k > 0 \tag{2}$$

Employing this general function, and substituting V and W for their corresponding labels in a 2 × 2 matrix, it is possible to recast the game-matrix for Prisoner's Dilemma in the form depicted in table 2, where R, S, T, P, and R*, S*, T*, and P* are the classic Rapoport payoff-ranges for referent state A and for any other, B, respectively, and k and k^* are their respective sensitivity coefficients to gaps in gains [15]

Moreover, the characteristic ranking of outcomes by players in Prisoner's Dilemma, using state A as an example, may be restated as

$$[(1 + k)T - kS^*] > [(1 + k)R - kR^*] > [(1 + k)P - kP^*] > [(1 + k)S - kT^*] \tag{3}$$

[15] In his discussion of games of anti-difference," Taylor (1976, pp 73–74) specifies a utility matrix such that states seek their highest possible payoffs and the smallest possible gap in payoffs favoring partners However, because, as with the analysts listed under table 1(a) he assumes that Prisoner's Dilemma is symmetric and that both players achieve the same payoff in the mutual-cooperation and mutual-defection outcomes, he assumes that actors will be concerned about gaps in payoffs *only in the two possible unilateral-defection outcomes*, i e , CD* and DC* Also, Taylor does not offer a theoretically grounded argument as to how differences in context might induce differing types and levels of sensitivity to gains in different kinds of players, and thus would lead them to believe they were in one type of game as opposed to another In contrast, the present discussion draws upon Realist theory to suggest that in the self-help circumstances created by international anarchy, and because payoffs within CC* and DD* may be unequal, rational states will be driven to play games of anti-difference in CC* and DD*, as well as in CD* and DC*

TABLE 2

AN AMENDED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

		Player B: C^*	Player B: D^*
Player A	C	$(1+k)R - kR^*, (1+k^*)R^* - k^*R$	$(1+k)S - kT^*, (1+k^*)T^* - k^*S$
	D	$(1+k)T - kS^*, (1+k^*)S^* - k^*T$	$(1+k)P - kP^*, (1+k^*)P^* - k^*P$

Assumptions

$T>R>P>S$

$R>(T+S)/2$

Statement (3) defines the characteristic inequality for an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma game model, making explicit and incorporating the concern of state A about relative achievements of gains in its interdependent calculus of choice between cooperation and defection Likewise, if the distribution of payoffs, or the value of k, or some combination of the two leads state A to conclude that there is no collective action problem because it is better off in mutual noncooperation than in mutual cooperation, then the game for state A is Deadlock, in which

$$[(1+k)T - kS^*] > [(1+k)P - kP^*] > [(1+k)R - kR^*] > [(1+k)S - kT^*] \qquad (4)$$

Statement (4) defines an Amended Deadlock game As required by the definitions of Prisoner's Dilemma and Deadlock, the essential difference between statements (3) and (4) lies in the reversal of the middle terms in the two statements of inequality

Whether state A finds that the game is Amended Prisoner's Dilemma (3) where cooperation is difficult but possible, or Amended Deadlock (4) where cooperation is impossible depends on state A's sensitivity to gaps in gains (k), and on the difference in R and P payoffs achieved by itself and state B This may be clarified if Amended Prisoner's Dilemma and Amended Deadlock are reformulated as, respectively

$$[(1+k)T - kS^*] > (R + k\Delta R) > (P + k\Delta P) > [(1+k)S - kT^*], \qquad (5)$$

and

$$[(1+k)T - kS^*] > (P + k\Delta P) > (R + k\Delta R) > [(1+k)S - kT^*], \qquad (6)$$

where $\Delta R = R - R^*$ and $\Delta P = P - P^*$, thus denoting the gap in payoffs from mutual cooperation and mutual noncooperation

The direct effect of the relative-gains factor on international cooperation can now be seen by solving for k in the two terms which distinguish these

inequalities For instance, solving statement (6) for k, we observe that stat A will define the situation as Amended Deadlock if

$$k > (R - P)/(\Delta P - \Delta R) \quad (7$$

Given a particular level of state sensitivity to gaps in gains, and its estimatio of the maximum gap favoring state B which might arise from mutual non cooperation, the likelihood that statement (7) will be true for state A es calates as ΔR declines—that is, as estimated gaps in gains from mutual co operation turn progressively against state A and in favor of state B. If ΔI declines sufficiently to validate statement (7), state A will define itself to b in Amended Deadlock and unambiguously will choose defection Thus, gap in mutual-cooperation gains favoring some partners over others may result i the breakdown of a cooperative arrangement.

Thus far, state sensitivity to gaps in payoffs—(k)—has been treated as constant Yet, state sensitivity may be conceptualized and investigated as variable—in which case it may be noted as (K)—whose changes in magni tude may powerfully influence the definition by a state of an internationa situation as Amended Prisoner's Dilemma or as Amended Deadlock. In gen eral, a state's sensitivity coefficient reflects its assessment of the impact tha gaps favoring partners would have on its relative capabilities and, by conse quence, its security and independence in the international system [16] Th state perception of the potential power-effects of gaps in gains will be a func tion of, and will vary in response to, at least six factors

First, a state's sensitivity coefficient is likely to vary in response to its esti mate of the level of convertibility of payoff-gaps into influence within a par ticular joint arrangement A state may believe that payoff-gaps arising fron one cooperative arrangement can be readily converted into bargaining re sources and thus permit advantaged partners additional political leverag within that common endeavor, while it may perceive that the payoff-gaps i another joint effort are not readily converted by advantaged partners int bargaining resources or leverage If this is so, then we may expect that th state will experience a higher sensitivity coefficient in the first cooperativ endeavor than in the second

A second factor influencing a state's sensitivity coefficient will be its esti mate of the cross-venture fungibility of bargaining power derived from gap in jointly produced gains A state will be concerned that increases in bargain ing power attained by a partner through enjoyment of disproportionate gain in one joint venture will be applied against it not only in that arrangemen but in others as well Thus, as with intra-game convertibility of payoffs-gaps a state's sensitivity coefficient in a proposed arrangement will vary directl

[16]This assumes that states believe that payoffs contribute to their "influence base" (Lasswel and Kaplan, 1950, pp 83–86), power base" (Dahl 1957, p 203, Baldwin, 1971, p 585), o 'capabilities ' (Waltz, 1979, pp 191–92)

with its estimate of the ease with which bargaining advantages arising from gaps in that cooperative relationship could serve as a basis for greater influence in other relationships.[17]

A third factor which affects a state's sensitivity coefficient is its time horizon. Over a sufficiently long period of time, states may learn how to transform gaps in gains into leverage both within and across cooperative arrangements. In other words, the *long-term* convertibility and fungibility of payoff-gaps may be quite high.[18] A state, then, which has a longer-term time horizon is more likely to appreciate the long-term harmful implications (from the viewpoint of relative capabilities and influence) of potential payoff-gaps generated within a proposed arrangement. Thus, a state characterized by an extended time horizon is likely to experience higher sensitivity coefficients in its cooperative relationships than a state characterized by a constricted time horizon.

Another factor affecting sensitivity coefficients concerns the previous experience of a state. A state which has engaged in cooperative arrangements in the past and which has experienced gaps in gains advantaging partners is likely to be worried about its relative capabilities. This, in turn, may cause it to be acutely sensitive to possible gaps in gains advantaging partners resulting from future common endeavors. Thus, a positive relationship may exist between a state's sensitivity coefficient with regard to cooperative endeavors proposed for the future and its assessment of the harmful impact made on its relative capabilities by gaps in gains arising from cooperative arrangements established in the past.

Fifth, differences in issue areas are likely to influence state sensitivity coefficients. Given its core interest in survival, a state's sensitivity coefficient with respect to a given partner will be markedly higher in military than in economic matters (Jervis, 1983, pp. 174–75; Lipson, 1984). However, a state's sensitivity coefficient in economic issue areas is not likely ever to be zero, given the long-term fungibility between economic and military capabilities.

Finally, a given state is likely to possess different sensitivity coefficients for different partners. It is very probable, for example, that a state's sensitivity to gaps in gains will be higher in relationships with traditional adversaries than with long-time allies. Similarly, a state's sensitivity coefficient is likely to be higher with respect to partners which have a reputation for exploit-

[17] The concepts of convertibility and fungibility are derived from Baldwin (1971, pp. 593–99; 1979, pp. 166–69). It should be noted that Baldwin argues that power, in contrast to money, is highly infungible and must be carefully defined in terms of its scope and domain.

[18] Thus, gaps in gains arising from economic relationships might, in time, induce shifts in relative military capabilities. The long-term positive relationship between economic and military capabilities has been observed by mercantilist writers (Viner, 1948, p. 10), Adam Smith (Hirschman, 1969, p. 5; Earle, 1971, p. 122), and contemporary analysts of national power (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 118–20; Knorr, 1973).

TABLE 3

PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH RANGES OF RATIO-LEVEL PAYOFFS

(1)
Without Iteration

		Player B: C*	Player B: D*
Player A	C	7-10 7-10	0-1 11-12
	D	11-12 0-1	5-6, 5-6

(2)
With Iteration ($w = 95$)

		Player B: C*	Player B: D*
Player A	C	140-200, 140-200	0-20, 220-240
	D	220-240, 0-20	100-120, 100-120

ng payoff-gaps or, more generally, for seeking domination within cooperative arrangements, than in regard to partners whose reputation suggests a lesser willingness to press advantages and a higher satisfaction with the status quo

To observe the impact of changes in a state's sensitivity coefficient on its willingness to cooperate, let us assume that states A and B find themselves in a mixed-interest situation with the ranges of payoffs for each depicted in table 3 Table 3(a) represents a single play of the game, while table 3(b) reports the present value of the complete stream of table 3(a)'s payoffs with iteration and with a (very high) .95 discount parameter Both A and B might achieve their minimum, maximum, or some intermediate payoff within a given cell, and the level achieved by one player within the range in any given cell does not affect the particular payoff attained by the other within its range in the same cell As noted earlier, the anarchical context within which the states are operating is likely to induce a very high level of caution in each Hence, in estimating future payoffs, each might assume that it will receive the lowest payoff within a given cell's payoff-range while the other will attain the highest In table 3(b), state A thus assumes that it will achieve 140 points from mutual cooperation while state B will achieve 200 points and A assumes that its payoff from mutual noncooperation will be 100 points while B's will be 120 points Nevertheless, without taking B's payoffs into account (i e , in terms solely of its own cross-cell comparisons of payoffs), A's structure of payoffs is clearly Prisoner's Dilemma and, with iteration and a "tit-for-tat" strategy, A might well be expected to choose to cooperate

TABLE 4

STATE A'S DEFINITION OF THE GAME
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN ITS SENSITIVITY COEFFICIENT

Case	A's Sensitivity Coefficient (k)	Does Amended PD Obtain $R + k\Delta R > P + k\Delta P$[1]	A's Definition of the Game
(a)	2.0	False	Amended Deadlock
(b)	1.0	True	No Game[2]
(c)	0.9	True	Amended Prisoner's Dilemma

Assumptions for iterated payoffs

$R = 140$
$R^* = 200$
$P = 100$
$P^* = 120$

[1] From statement (5) in the text

[2] Limiting case between Amended Prisoner's Dilemma and Amended Deadlock where

$$k = \frac{R - P}{\Delta P - \Delta R}$$

However, depending upon its sensitivity coefficient, state A may be more or less likely to choose to cooperate As table 4 indicates, the particular distribution of payoffs assumed to characterize the game causes a K of one to be the threshold value for A's sensitivity to gaps in gains If K is less than one, then A defines the game to be Amended Prisoner's Dilemma—A might engage in mutual conditional cooperation However, if K is equal to one, the expected utility derived from mutual cooperation is equal to mutual noncooperation, and the game is neither Amended Prisoner's Dilemma nor Amended Deadlock—it would be difficult to predict A's behavior in this case Finally, if K is greater than one, then A defines the game to be Amended Deadlock—it would defect and thus would induce mutual noncooperation

In the above discussion it is assumed that mutual cooperation generated larger gaps in gains than did mutual noncooperation. If the reverse were true, then states would be more likely to define the situation as Amended Prisoner's Dilemma than Amended Deadlock, for the net expected utility from mutual cooperation would be more likely to be greater than that from mutual noncooperation The Realist argument, it must be emphasized, is not that cooperation is difficult because CC* gaps are *typically* greater than DD* gaps What Realism argues instead is that, *in those cases* in which the former are greater than the latter, breakdowns in cooperation may occur not because of cheating problems but because sensitivity to gaps in gains led states to conclude they were in Amended Deadlock

It may also be observed that, in table 3, no gap exists between A and B's *average* payoff if they both cooperate or defect If A and B assumed that future outcomes in terms of national achievements of gains were randomly distributed, and thus assumed that each would be likely to achieve the average payoff within any of the payoff-ranges, then it might be expected that they could both ignore possible inequalities in gains and simply concentrate on the absolute improvement in individual average gains as each crossed over from DD* to CC* However, this probability-based decision rule would require each state to accept the possibility that it might suffer a much greater disparity in payoffs (and thus possibly of relative capabilities) if it cooperated rather than defected, and this is precisely the type of risk-taking which might be least expected to characterize defensively positional states operating in a context of international anarchy [19]

International Institutions and State Management of the Relative-Gains Problem

In addition to its capacity to depict the Realist analysis of the relative-gains problem for international cooperation, the Amended Prisoner's Dilemma

[19] The impact of probability estimates on state utility maximization and state decision making is explored by Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Brams (1985b, pp 90–94)

model facilitates analysis of the ways in which states utilize international institutions to manage relative-gains concerns arising from collaboration [20] The most direct way to ameliorate relative-gains concerns is to reduce possible gaps in gains that may result from cooperation so that, given national sensitivities to such gaps, partners are no worse off from a relative-gains viewpoint as a result of cooperation as compared to noncooperation By way of illustration, table 5 reports state A's definitions of the game if the per-iteration gap arising from mutual cooperation (beginning with the gaps from both mutual cooperation and noncooperation in table 3) is progressively narrowed As can be observed in the table, state A continues to perceive itself to be in Amended Deadlock if the per-iteration gap is lowered from 3 0 to 2 4 points. However, if the gap is reduced to 2 0 points, which is still greater than the mutual noncooperation gap, the game for A is Amended Prisoner's Dilemma and prospects for cooperation improve From A's viewpoint, the threshold CC* payoffs per iteration would be 7 4 for itself and 9 6 for any partner, B All CC* payoffs within the 7 4–9 6 band lead state A to define the situation as Amended Prisoner's Dilemma, and, if the cheating problem is resolved, may attract A to mutual cooperation, all payoffs outside the band lead it to define the game as Amended Deadlock and will prevent its acceptance of cooperation

One may also observe from table 5 that the reduction of unacceptable gaps in joint gains occurs at the expense of the total gains each partner can hope to achieve through cooperation, what is reflected in the table is an agreement that states A and B will each achieve more than 148 and less than 192 points Each partner is willing, in this case, to sacrifice eight potential points in absolute gains in order to reduce from 60 points to an amount less than 44 points the maximum possible gap it might experience in the cooperative arrangement Hence, the relationship becomes more predictable and equal but also less efficient

The Amended Prisoner's Dilemma highlights the positive impact which can be made on the willingness of states to cooperate by agreements to constrain possible payoff-gaps This insight may shed new light on the behavior of states as they establish and operate international institutions For example, one might imagine an inter-state agreement to establish an international monetary and trade order based wholly on open markets Economic theory suggests that such an international system would offer the greatest opportunities for generating the maximum economic gains for the states *as a group* However, from the viewpoint of *individual states*, such a system might also create the greatest uncertainty and anxiety for each as to relative achievements of gains (and losses during periods of recession) Complete

[20] International institutions following Young (1986 p 108) may be viewed as international practices composed of recognized roles coupled with sets of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles

Table 5

State A's Definition of the Game
Effect of Changes in CC* Gaps

Case	CC* Payoffs: Single Play R	Single Play R*	Iterated Play R	Iterated Play R*	Does Amended PD Obtain $R + k\Delta R > P + k\Delta P$[1]	A's Definition of the Game
(a)	7 0	10 0	140	200	False	Amended Deadlock
(b)	7 3	9 7	146	194	False	Amended Deadlock
(c)	7 4	9 6	148	192	False (terms are equal)	No Game[2]
(d)	7 5	9 5	150	190	True	Amended Prisoner's Dilemma

Assumptions

$k = 2$

$P = 5$

$P^* = 6$

Discount Parameter for future payoffs = 95

[1] From statement (5) in the text

[2] Limiting case between Amended Prisoner's Dilemma and Amended Deadlock where

$$R = \frac{k(R^* - P^*)}{(1 + k)} + P \text{ and where}$$

$$R^* = \frac{(1 + k)(R - P)}{k} + P^*$$

free trade and free flows of international finance might be viewed, then, as Case (a) in table 5

The actual international economic order constructed after World War II—and which might be viewed as Case (d) in table 5—promotes trade and monetary liberalization, but accepts limited forms of state intervention having as its purpose the mitigation of externally induced economic disruptions of the domestic economy [21] This intermediate position between free and managed commerce—the result of an ideological consensus in the major trading countries which Ruggie (1983) calls "embedded liberalism"—allows states to achieve absolute gains from freer world markets but also to limit the economic stress a national participant would be expected to sustain as a result of temporary or longer-term changes in its relative capacity to compete internationally Temporary, internationally sanctioned and monitored deviations established by the safeguard provisions in Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), for example, are meant to enhance the confidence of states that, if necessary, they may readily take steps to limit possible gaps in gains which might evolve through trade liberalization (Dam, 1970, pp 99–107) Similarly, revisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1970s, and negotiations among the major market economies at yearly summits, have sought (with only limited success) to promote greater symmetry between deficit and surplus countries in bringing about national adjustment in the face of a persistent balance of payments disequilibrium (Ruggie, 1983, p 225, Putnam and Bayne, 1984, Bergsten, 1987)

Moreover, disputes and strains within international institutions may revolve around their capacity to bring about a balanced sharing among partners of the gains and costs arising from joint action With respect to the contemporary trade order, for example, the United States has argued in recent years that West Germany and Japan have not accepted sufficient responsibility for the absorption of internationally produced goods, and that the EEC and Japan have not provided reciprocity in terms of equivalent access for American products into the European and Japanese markets (Thurow and Tyson 1987) In a similar manner, Italy, Britain Ireland and France found during the early 1970s that their participation in a joint monetary float with West Germany and several smaller European states—the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of 1972-1976—yielded all partners absolute gains in terms of monetary stability but imposed greater burdens on them than on Germany, and the four dissatisfied states exited from the EMU in the face of this perceived maldistribution of net benefits from monetary coordination (Tsoukalis, 1977, Kruse, 1980) Finally, it has been suggested that while all member-states benefit from their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty

[21] See Cooper (1968) Ruggie (1983) Finlayson and Zacher (1983 pp 290–93) and Lipson (1983, pp 242–43)

Organization (NATO), it is the United States which carries a disproportio ate share of the costs of the alliance and that, as a result, its European alli are getting the lion's share of the gains from their political-military collabor tion (Layne, 1987).

International institutions, then, embody general bargains among states to relative achievements of gains from cooperation, and the success and st bility of cooperative endeavors may be significantly affected by the efficacy these bargains In addition, more specific bargaining encounters within a institutional framework often constitute an effort to ameliorate relative-gai problems among partners For example, during the Tokyo Round of 1973 1979, the United States, Japan, and the EEC all believed they would ga from a further reduction in industrial tariffs. The United States preferred single, deep (50%), across-the-board cut in tariffs in all industrial sector However, the EEC, facing an American tariff structure which containe some moderately high tariff peaks, believed that an across-the-board cu while reducing all tariffs, would still leave the peaks in the U S tariff stru ture For the Europeans, then, an across-the-board cut had the potential create relatively greater new export opportunities for the United States tha for the EEC The European Community thus proposed that tariff reductio be greater in industries with higher initial tariff rates, a proposal resisted the United States Both sides eventually accepted a Swiss compromise pr posal which mandated deep tariff cuts across many industries but which al included *somewhat* deeper cuts for industries with higher initial rates Thu while neither the U S nor the EEC could formulate a precise estimate as the impact of the formula on relative export gains, each knew that it had na rowed the range of possible gaps, and in this way the Swiss formula faci tated successful completion of a major round of trade negotiations (Whalle 1985, pp 145–49, Winham, 1986, pp 17–18, 160–63, 200–205)

Finally, many inter-state bargains may be interpreted as the establishme of sidepayment agreements to mitigate concerns about relative gains e pressed by states which find themselves disadvantaged by the operation an international arrangement [22] In table 5, state A worries that, through c operation, it will achieve as few as 140 points while state B may achieve many as 200 points As noted above, A's relative-gains concerns can be vi ated if both partners agree to constrain CC* payoff ranges at the outset of th relationship. However, another solution would be for A and B to retain th original CC* range but for each to promise that if a gap in gains were to d velop, the advantaged state would transfer points to the disadvantaged par ner to a degree sufficient to ameliorate the latter's concerns about relati gains This strategy would allow each state to seek greater potential indivi

[22] On the concept of sidepayments, see Luce and Raiffa (1957, pp 168–69), and Riker (196 pp 34, 108–23)

ual gains, and it would allow the states to proceed with cooperation even if they were unable to formulate the terms of their collaborative arrangement *ex ante* in a way that protected each against unfavorable gaps in gains.

This fine-tuning of collaborative arrangements through *ex post* sidepayments may be an important part of the politics of international institutions. For example, developing countries increasingly voiced concerns during the 1960s that the international trading system, while providing them some opportunities for increased exports, tended to operate to the relative advantage of the advanced democracies. Rather than restructure the basic features of the international trading order, the advanced countries came to offer within the framework of the GATT a special, limited program of nonreciprocal trading preferences—the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—which enhanced export opportunities of a number of developing-country GATT members (Meltzer, 1976, Bhattacharya, 1976). Similarly, instead of responding to American complaints about burden-sharing in NATO during the mid-to-late 1960s with a major reevaluation of the American role in Europe or a major overhaul of responsibilities within the alliance, West Germany mollified American concerns in part through a number of financial transfers (worth more than $7 billion between 1968 and 1975) which substantially offset U.S. balance of payments losses associated with the stationing of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic (Treverton, 1978). Finally, the European Monetary System (EMS), founded in 1978 as the successor to the failed EMU, specifically sought to establish greater obligations for Germany to adjust in the face of its large regional balance of payments surplus. This new division of obligations, together with the provision of special financial resources to Italy and Ireland, brought the latter two countries plus France (but not Britain) back into a joint float with Germany and her deutsche-mark partners (Coffey, 1984, Zis, 1984).

The discussion above concentrates on the capacity of international institutions to facilitate the reduction of potential or emerging gaps in gains arising from cooperation which, given a state's particular level of sensitivity to gaps in gains, might otherwise reduce that state's attraction to joint action. In other words, it concentrates on the term, $(W - V)$, in statement (1)'s specification of state A's utility function, $U = V - k(W - V)$. It is also possible that the norm-generating and norm-maintenance functions of international institutions promote cooperation by reducing state sensitivities to gaps in gains, i.e., by reducing k in statement (1).[21] For example, reciprocity is "a central norm of the GATT regime," and in the GATT context reciprocity means that "a country that benefits from another country's lowering of trade barriers

[21]A very useful analysis of the meaning of norms (as prescriptions for choice and obligations toward others) is provided by Kratochwil (1984). For discussions of norms in international regimes and institutions, see Krasner (1983, p. 3), Ruggie (1983), Keohane (1984, pp. 111–20) and Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, pp. 766–71).

should reciprocate, preferably to an equivalent extent" (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983, p 286) If reciprocity were perceived to be a highly operative norm in the GATT, then members could be more confident that concessions made in a particular GATT-governed interaction would be matched immediately or at least would create an obligation for the partner to extend roughly equivalent benefits in the near future [24] Similarly, the perception that the norm of reciprocity has in fact become progressively less operational in international economic relations has probably increased the sensitivity of states to relative gains in any particular interaction in the contemporary trade and monetary issue areas (Bhagwati and Irwin, 1987).

Overall, then, the politics of international institutions may often involve and reflect state efforts to manage relative-gains concerns In addition, the vitality of these institutions may turn, in some measure, on the success of efforts undertaken by and within them to resolve relative-gains problems International institutions may promote resolution of relative-gains problems insofar as they help states set outer limits on the gaps in gains which might arise from cooperation, or as they facilitate the transfer of sidepayments by advantaged to disadvantaged states Moreover, as can be observed in the cases of developing countries and GSP, international institutions may also provide regularized opportunities for dissatisfied states to employ their "voice" option and to bring attention to their concerns about relative achievements of gains arising from joint action (Hirschman, 1970) Finally, international institutions may promote norms of international behavior which allow states to moderate in some fashion their sensitivity to relative achievements of gains Thus, just as international institutions may serve as insurance against the danger of cheating, so too they may serve as insurance against the development of otherwise politically unacceptable gaps in jointly produced gains

Conclusion

Conventional presentations of Prisoner's Dilemma depict neither the Realist specification of the relative-gains element of the structure of state preferences in mixed-interest situations, nor the Realist identification of the constraining effects of this element on international cooperation In contrast, the amended version of the game presented above isolates and underscores the relative-gains element of state preferences and its capacity to inhibit the willingness of states to cooperate Hence, it is hoped that the discussion presented above clarifies arguments presented by the leading theory of international relations and, more importantly, captures and makes more accessible to analysis a significant systemic-level constraint on international cooperation.

[24] For a discussion of the reciprocity norm in international relations, see Keohane (1986)

In addition, a focus on state positionality and the relative-gains problem generates several research questions concerning international cooperation One set of questions involves the specification of state payoff structures For example, how do states estimate future gains from cooperation and how do they go about comparing them with current or prospective partners? Also, are gaps in gains arising from mutual cooperation typically greater or smaller than gaps associated with mutual noncooperation? Another set of questions concerns the bargaining agendas of states undertaking joint action For example, do states try to communicate to partners an inflated image of their own sensitivity coefficient in order to extract sidepayments or to bring about an institutional arrangement which operates more fully to their advantage? Do states present in bargaining encounters a metric which depicts their gains from cooperation in the least favorable light, again in order to yield the fewest concessions and to attain the best possible treatment? Finally, in the process of negotiations, do states seek to establish a single metric for the estimation of gains in order to facilitate bargaining and the exchange of concessions?

Because they originate at the very core of an anarchic international system, the relative-gains element of state preferences and the relative-gains problem for cooperation are both likely to be enduring, characteristic features of world politics [25] Hence, game-theoretic models can contribute markedly to our understanding of international politics if they facilitate exploration of these two effects of inter-state anarchy Then, as we attain greater understanding of the relative-gains problem for cooperation, we may turn our efforts to further development of those national strategies and international institutional arrangements which are most effective in its amelioration In this way it may be hoped that modern game theory, directed by the Realist tradition, will make a new contribution to efforts to promote the emergence and maintenance of international cooperation

References

Aron Raymond 1973 *Peace and War A Theory of International Relations* Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox abridged by Remy Inglis Hall Garden City NJ Anchor Press

Axelrod, Robert 1984 *The Evolution of Cooperation* New York Basic Books

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O Keohane 1985 Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions *World Politics* 38 226 54

Baldwin David A 1971 Money and Power *Journal of Politics* 33 578–614

——— 1979 Power Analysis and World Politics New Trends Versus Old Tendencies *World Politics* 31 161-94

[25] Relative-gains issues also arise in domestic politics For example Lange (1984) has demonstrated that members of unions which are participating in incomes policies will be more likely to accept wage restraint in the present to the extent that they can be certain that such restraint will contribute to greater medium-term economic growth and that they will enjoy a fair portion of that increment in growth

Bergsten, C Fred 1987 Economic Imbalances and World Politics *Foreign Affairs*, 65 770–94

Bhagwati, Jagdish N , and Douglas A Irwin 1987 The Return of the Reciprocitarians *World Economy*, 10 109–30

Bhattacharya, Anindya K 1976 The Influence of the International Secretariat UNCTAD and Generalized System of Preferences *International Organization*, 30 75–90

Brams, Steven J 1975 *Game Theory and Politics* New York Free Press

——— 1985a *Rational Politics Decisions, Games and Strategy* Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly Press

——— 1985b *Superpower Games Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict* New Haven Yale University Press

Brams, Steven J , Morton D David, and Philip D Straffin, Jr 1979 The Geometry of the Arms Race *International Studies Quarterly*, 23 567–88

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 1981 *The War Trap* New Haven Yale University Press

Carr, Edward Hallett 1964 *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939 An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* New York Harper Torchbooks

Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio A 1978 A CUSP Catastrophe Model of Nuclear Proliferation *International Interactions*, 4 191–224

Coffey, Peter 1984 *The European Monetary System Past Present and Future* Dordrecht and Boston Martinus Nijhoff

Conybeare, John A C 1984 Public Goods, Prisoners Dilemmas, and the International Political Economy *International Studies Quarterly* 28 5–23

——— 1985 Trade Wars A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse Franco-Italian and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts *World Politics* 38 147–72

Cooper, Richard C 1968 *The Economics of Interdependence* New York McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations

——— 1975 Prolegomena to a Choice of an International Monetary System In C Fred Bergsten and Lawrence Krause, eds , *World Politics and International Economics* Special issue of *International Organization* 29 63–98

Dahl, Robert 1957 The Concept of Power *Behavioral Science* 2 201 15

Dam, Kenneth W 1970 *The GATT Law and International Organization* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Downs, George David M Rocke, and Randolph M Siverson 1985 Arms Races and Cooperation *World Politics*, 38 118–46

Earle Edward Meade 1971 Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton Friedrich List The Economic Foundations of Military Power In Edward Meade Earle ed *Makers of Modern Strategy Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* Princeton Princeton University Press

Finlayson, Jock A , and Mark W Zacher 1983 The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers In Stephen D Krasner, ed *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Galtung, Johan 1964 A Structural Theory of Aggression *Journal of Peace Research* 2 95–119

Gilpin, Robert 1975 *U S Power and the Multinational Corporation The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* New York Basic Books

——— 1981 *War and Change in World Politics* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

——— 1986 The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism In Robert O Keohane, ed , *Neorealism and Its Critics* New York Columbia University Press

Grieco, Joseph M Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism *International Organization* 42 forthcoming

Harsanyi, John C 1969 Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflict In James S Rosenau, ed , *International Politics and Foreign Policy A Reader in Research and Theory*, rev ed New York Free Press

Hirschman, Albert O 1969 *National Power and the Structure of Trade* Berkeley University of California Press

——— 1970 *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Jervis, Robert 1978 Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma *World Politics*, 30 167–214
——— 1983 Security Regimes In Stephen D Krasner, ed , *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1983
Keohane, Robert O 1984 *After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* Princeton Princeton University Press
——— 1986 Reciprocity in International Relations *International Organization*, 40 1–27
Knorr, Klaus 1973 *Power and Wealth The Political Economy of International Power* New York Basic Books
Krasner, Stephen D 1983 Structural Causes and Regime Consequences Regimes as Intervening Variables In Stephen D Krasner, ed , *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press
Kratochwil, Friedrich 1984 The Force of Prescriptions *International Organization*, 38 685–708
Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie 1986 International Organization A State of the Art on an Art of the State *International Organization*, 40 753–76
Kruse, D C 1980 *Monetary Integration in Western Europe EMU EMS, and Beyond* London Butterworths
Lange Peter 1984 Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation The Rational Bases of Consent In John H Goldthorpe, ed *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* Oxford Clarendon Press
Lasswell, Harold, and Abraham Kaplan 1950 *Power and Society* New Haven Yale University Press
Laver, Michael 1977 Intergovernmental Policy on Multinational Corporations A Simple Model of Tax Bargaining *European Journal of Political Research* 5 363–80
Layne, Christopher 1987 Atlanticism Without NATO *Foreign Policy* 67 22–45
Lipson Charles 1983 The Transformation of Trade The Sources and Effects of Regime Change In Stephen D Krasner ed *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press
——— 1984 International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs *World Politics* 37 1–23
Luce R Duncan and Howard Raiffa 1957 *Games and Decisions Introduction and Critical Survey* New York John Wiley
Meltzer, Ronald I 1976 The Politics of Policy Reversal The U S Response to Developing Countries and Linkages Between International Organizations and National Policy Planning *International Organization* 30 649–68
Morgenthau, Hans J 1973 *Politics Among Nations The Struggle for Power and Peace* 5th ed New York Alfred A Knopf
Organski A F K and Jacek Kugler 1980 *The War Ledger* Chicago University of Chicago Press
Putnam Robert D and Nicholas Bayne 1984 *Hanging Together The Seven-Power Summits* Cambridge Harvard University Press
Rapoport Anatol 1960 *Fights Games and Debates* Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press
Rapoport Anatol and Albert M Chammah 1965 *Prisoner's Dilemma* Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press
Riker William H 1962 *The Theory of Political Coalitions* New Haven Yale University Press
Rosecrance, Richard 1973 *International Relations Peace or War?* New York McGraw-Hill
Ruggie, John Gerard 1983 International Regimes Transactions and Change Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order In Stephen D Krasner ed *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press
Rummel R J 1972 U S Foreign Relations Conflict Cooperation and Attribute Distances In Bruce M Russett ed *Peace War and Numbers* Beverly Hills Sage Publications
Russett, Bruce 1983 *The Prisoners of Insecurity Nuclear Deterrence The Arms Race and Arms Control* New York W H Freeman and Company
Schelling Thomas C 1963 *The Strategy of Conflict* New York Oxford University Press

Sheposh, J P, and P S Gallo 1973 Asymmetry of Payoff Structure and Cooperative Behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 321–33

Snidal, Duncan 1985 Coordination Versus Prisoner's Dilemma Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes *American Political Science Review*, 79 923–42

Snyder, Glenn H 1971 Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics *International Studies Quarterly*, 15 66–103

——— 1984 The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics *World Politics*, 36 461–95

Snyder, Glenn H, and Paul Diesing 1977 *Conflict Among Nations Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* Princeton Princeton University Press

Stein, Arthur A 1983 Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World In Stephen D Krasner ed, *International Regimes* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Taylor, Michael 1976 *Anarchy and Cooperation* London John Wiley

Thurow, Lester C, and Laura D'Andea Tyson 1987 The Economic Black Hole *Foreign Policy*, 67 3–21

Tsoukalis, Loukas 1977 *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration* London George Allen and Unwin

Treverton Gregory F 1978 *The Dollar Drain' and American Forces in Germany Managing the Political Economics of the Atlantic Alliance* Athens, OH Ohio State University Press

Viner, Jacob 1948 Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries *World Politics*, 1 1–29

Wagner, R Harrison 1983 The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation *American Political Science Review* 77 330–46

Wallace, Michael D 1972 Status Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820–1964 In Bruce M Russett, ed, *Peace, War, and Numbers* Beverly Hills Sage Publications

Waltz, Kenneth N 1979 *Theory of International Politics* Reading, MA Addison-Wesley

——— 1986 Reflections on *Theory of International Politics* A Response to My Critics In Robert O Keohane, ed *Neorealism and Its Critics* New York Columbia University Press

Whalley John 1985 *Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas* Cambridge MIT Press

Winham, Gilbert R 1986 *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation* Princeton Princeton University Press

Young, Oran R 1986 International Regimes Toward a New Theory of Institutions *World Politics*, 39 104–22

Zagare, Frank C 1981 Nonmyopic Equilibria in the Middle East Crisis of 1967 *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 5 139–62

——— 1983 A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of the Cease-Fire Alert Decision of 1973 *Journal of Peace Research*, 20 73–86

——— 1984 *Game Theory Concepts and Applications* Sage Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No 41 Beverly Hills Sage Publications

Zis, George 1984 The European Monetary System, 1979–84 An Assessment *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 23 45–72

Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax Legislation

Thomas W. Gilligan
University of Southern California

Keith Krehbiel
Stanford University

Based on a legislative history of energy tax legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives in the Ninety-third Congress, this article extends a spatial model of legislative politics to accommodate complex special rules. The model and extension yield two predictions regarding the effect of the assignment of rules on expected congressional outcomes. The predictions are tested by examining stock market returns to oil and gas stocks. Both predictions are supported even when alternative and competing explanations are taken into account. A concluding discussion qualifies the theoretical and empirical results by addressing two broader issues: the sources of committee power and the relationship between congressional and economic activity.

I. Introduction

Spatial models of legislative politics are increasingly common in political science but remain limited in two key respects. First, existing models capture only a small portion of the procedural complexity that characterizes congressional politics. Second, the modeling literature suffers from a paucity of empirical tests. To address these limitations, this study examines a particularly complex sequence of legislative activity, proposes a formal model that captures the essence of conflict in the case, and tests two predictions that emerge from the model.

The focal case is oil and gas tax legislation during the Ninety-third Congress. Presented in section II, the legislative history reflects several issues of interest to the empirical congressional scholars. Intense conflict emerges at several stages in the legislative process. A powerful committee chairman is pitted against disillusioned committee backbenchers. A standing committee

The authors acknowledge the comments of Stan Bach, Jon Bendor, Ami Glazer, Dick Johnston, Mark Kamlet, Ken Koford, Doug Rivers, Jack Wright, *JOP* referees, and seminar participants at Caltech, Stanford University, and Washington University.

confronts a rejuvenated party caucus And the standing committee must anticipate the prospect of an embarrassing showdown on the floor of the House To complicate matters further, a labyrinth of legislative procedure underlies the overt substantive disagreement on the salient issues of the oil depletion allowance and foreign tax credits Most of these procedures are ostensibly routine and well accepted, such as regularities in the assignment by the Rules Committee of special rules to legislation However, other key procedures are new, unused, and subject to uncertainty, such as a provision in Democratic Party rules whereby the Democratic Caucus may formally contest the Rules Committee's assignment of a closed rule

Although the legislative history of oil and gas taxation is necessarily narrowly focused, the case is a useful vehicle for addressing a broader concern What are the limitations and possibilities of formal models of legislative politics in the face of the procedural complexity in Congress? Section III first presents a standard spatial model that, juxtaposed with the case, illustrates the limited ability of existing legislative theory to represent procedural complexity An extension of the model is then proposed to illustrate new possibilities for employing spatial models to study relatively complicated congressional politics The extension focuses on *complex rules* (Bach, 1981) which are characterized formally as a dimension-by-dimension specification of whether and which amendments may be offered to a committee's bill This extension not only provides a more complete and accurate characterization of House procedures but also highlights a class of committee strategies not previously incorporated in the formal literature Standing committees whose bills are assigned complex rules can benefit by strategically choosing among many possible combinations of issues within their jurisdictions in which to initiate changes in law Under complex rules, committee strategy consists of two actions. choosing which issue or "bundle" of issues to address, and choosing what actual proposals to make on those issues Or, in the vernacular of spatial models, committee strategy in a multidimensional jurisdiction consists of both the *dimensionality* of bills and the *placement* of bills

The extended model is interpreted with reference to the energy tax case By design, the key decisions in the case are adequately represented in the model This interpretive exercise is not regarded as sufficient empirical support for the model, however Section IV, therefore, tests two predictions in a more rigorous and less subjective fashion The empirical technique—an event study—is common in economics but rare in political science (see Roberts, 1987) It exploits the fact that the economic consequences of congressional action or inaction are often transparent In the case of energy taxation, passage of *any* of the legislation under serious consideration in 1974 would have reduced the after-tax profits of U S oil and gas firms A time series of stock returns for oil and gas firms (relative to other, unaffected firms) permits a more convincing test of the predictions derived from the

model. Alternative econometric specifications permit testing for—and rejecting—hypotheses about possibly confounding events.

In addition to the primary concerns with modeling an increasing portion of procedural complexity and with testing such models, the study also has implications for the nature, sources, and limits of committee power in Congress and for future applications of event study techniques. These issues are discussed in section V.

II. Energy Tax Legislation in the Ninety-third Congress

Taxation of oil and gas firms is a complicated issue subject to numerous disputes among economists and politicians.[1] Congressional consideration of energy tax legislation in the Ninety-third Congress was no less complex. The Arab Oil Embargo shook the national economy. The legislative procedures under which the energy issues were addressed were in a state of flux due to the pervasive spirit of reform in the congresses of the early 1970s. The jurisdiction of the relevant committee, Ways and Means, was one of the most far-reaching in the House. And the leadership of the committee's chairman, Wilbur Mills, was challenged on numerous occasions. A chronology of the relevant events during the early '70s illustrates that procedural subtleties are instrumental in determining legislative outcomes even though they are beyond the grasp of existing theories of legislative decision making.

Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Firms

Oil and gas firms were subject to many special provisions of the federal tax code in 1974 when the second session of the Ninety-third Congress convened.[2] Like all firms, oil and gas producers were allowed to depreciate the costs of capital investments and expenditures. But unlike most other firms, oil and gas producers could employ one of two methods of depreciation. First, they could use the standard method of depreciating a portion of the cost of the assets in each year until the original cost equaled accumulated depreciation. This method of depreciation was referred to as cost depletion. Alternatively, an oil and gas firm could use percentage depletion to recover its exploration and development costs. Percentage depletion was based on the gross income generated from a property subject only to the constraint that the total deduction not exceed some fixed percentage of the net income of the property. For instance, suppose the percentage depletion, also called the oil depletion allowance (ODA), was 22% so long as the total deduction

[1] See "An Analysis of the Federal Tax Treatment of Oil and Gas and Some Policy Alternatives," Ninety-third Congress, 2d Session. See especially section III, "The Effect of Taxation on Domestic Oil and Gas Production: A Theoretical Background," pp. 11–16.

[2] This discussion is based on *Background Readings on Energy Policy*, hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, March 1, 1975, pp. 353–413.

did not exceed 50% of the net income from the property If the gross income generated by a well was $100,000, the maximum deduction for that well was $22,000 If, however, the net income (gross income minus other deductions) from the well was $40,000, then only $20,000 of the deduction was allowed The total depreciation taken on any given property under the percentage depletion was unrelated to the costs of acquiring the property Percentage depletion, along with expensing of intangible drilling expenses and dry holes, generated two special and salient features to the federal tax treatment of oil and gas production. First, by accelerating depreciation, the tax treatment allowed a firm to defer taxes. Second, by increasing total allowable deductions on a given property, it reduced a firm's total tax liability

Oil and gas firms were also affected by some generic features of the federal tax code Firms earning income from foreign sources subject to foreign taxation qualified for equivalent levels of tax credits against their U S tax liabilities The creditability of foreign income taxes proved particularly beneficial for U S , multinational oil and gas producers In 1973, most of these companies had accumulated foreign tax credits (FTC) in excess of their U S tax liabilities

The Economic and Political Environment of the Ninety-third Congress

In many respects, the time was ripe for changes inimical to the interests of gas and oil producing firms Recent changes in the structure of international petroleum markets was a major contributing factor [1] In 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) restricted production and deliveries OPEC's actions increased prices for all petroleum products and substitutes to Western and Third World countries and led to large increases in profits of the oil industry These so-called windfall profits spawned the ire of many voters and congressmen An attempt to tax windfall profits had failed the previous year because of a successful filibuster in the Senate Indeed, the House's reluctance to pass any energy legislation that did not contain a windfall profits tax led to Congress's failure to pass any energy bill in the first session.

Existing criticisms of the oil and gas industry continued in the second session of the Ninety-third Congress Three distinctive provisions, the ODA, the FTC, and the expensing of intangible drilling expenses, again provided a focal point for criticisms of the tax treatment of large multinational energy companies Indeed, it was estimated that the ODA and the immediate deductability of intangible drilling expenses alone provided the industry with approximately $3 3 billion in federal subsidies in 1974 Recent studies also called into question the notion that these tax breaks were necessary to stimu-

[1] Unless noted otherwise, information in this subsection is extracted from Morrison (1975) and Balz (1974)

late the development of domestic energy supplies In short, it was all but inevitable that Congress would conduct a thorough and critical examination of oil industry tax policies

Jurisdiction over tax legislation in the House belongs exclusively to the Ways and Means Committee Prior to 1974, compositional and behavioral changes in the Committee were generally unfavorable to the interests of oil and gas producers The minority leadership of the committee had become less cooperative with Chairman Wilbur Mills, a pro-oil representative The Democrats on the committee had moved in an anti-oil direction in part due to turnover following the 1972 elections but more likely due to changes in members' preferences brought on by the oil embargo and corresponding increasing profits of oil companies

In addition to changes within the Committee, its relationship with the House Democratic leadership changed as a result of reforms initiated by the Democratic Caucus in February 1973 One reform made it possible for a Democratic majority to challenge the right of the Rules Committee to issue a closed rule for legislation reported by a committee The jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee had come under scrutiny, also The net effect of these changes was that the authority of the chairman and the autonomy of the committee were challenged in a fundamental way

Consideration of the Energy Tax Act of 1974

The Oil and Gas Energy Tax Act of 1974 began its legislative journey in the spring in an environment hostile to oil and gas industries and to the Democratic leadership of the House Ways and Means Committee The committee met in early February to begin mark up of the bill Attempts by the chairman to construct a bill representing the Committee members' preferences proved difficult Conservative members preferred the status quo They saw little advantage to eliminating or reducing the ODA or FTC or to imposing a windfall profits tax on oil producing companies, particularly given the national objective of increasing domestic energy production Liberal members demanded immediate elimination of the ODA, imposition of a windfall profits tax, and the abolition of FTC By the end of April, a compromise emerged which contained a gradual (three-year) phase-out of the ODA, a limit (52 8) to the percentage of FTC a company could apply against its U S tax liabilities, and a weakened windfall profits tax supported by the Nixon Administration On April 30, with only four dissenting votes the committee passed a motion to report H R 14462 Its next step was to request a rule Although Mills "had told some committee members he would support efforts before the Rules Committee to permit some selective amendments" (*Wall Street Journal*, May 3, 1974, p 2), on May 1 he nevertheless announced in the *Congressional Record* that he had been "authorized and

directed by the committee to request a closed rule from the Rules Co tee" (p H3463)

But also on May 1, Representative Green, a liberal member of the mittee, sent a letter to his Democratic colleagues requesting that the c review Mills's request His aim was to collect the fifty signatures requ call a meeting of the caucus. At the meeting a vote would be tak whether to instruct the Rules Committee to write a modified rule perm a separate vote on an amendment to repeal the ODA retroactively, ning January 1, 1974 Within two days, more than half of the Demo members of the House signed the petition On May 6, another liberal ber of the committee, Representative Vanik, used the same proced force consideration of an amendment calling for the immediate eliminat the FTC. These efforts culminated in a meeting of the Democratic C on May 15 Both requests were overwhelmingly endorsed, and the Committee was formally instructed to write a modified rule that woul mit debate and votes on these two anti-oil amendments to H R 14462

The Ways and Means Committee and its leadership were not pow against the caucus, however Chairman Mills first responded by refus appear before the Rules Committee Then, on June 6, he threatened to cise the committee's prerogative under House rules to bring the priv bill directly to the floor without a rule Were this to occur, H R 14462 be considered under an open rule with all amendments meeting sta germaneness requirements in order Key actors' interpretations of the bility and implications of the threat differed Green called it a "cute that could "throw the bill into chaos", Rules Committee member R Bolling said it represented a "rule-or-ruin attitude", but Mills argued t could "protect the bill from amendments" even without a closed rule *Street Journal*, June 7, 1974, p 5)

Credible or not, the threat was short-lived because of the simple fa to take the bill directly to the floor required ratification by the Way Means Committee, which had a forty-two year history of receiving rules on its major tax legislation [4] To forego this special treatment wou verely damage the persuasiveness of its long-standing and seemingl suasive argument that "it is impossible to write a tax bill on the floor " open-rule threat subsided after the committee met in closed session on 10 Mills emerged from the meeting with a formal statement that he "

[4]The only possible exception to the closed-rule rule [*sic*] occurred in 1973 on a noncon sial extension of the interest equalization tax on foreign stocks and debt obligations (H R In spite of its open rule, the bill passed unamended, 358-23 See *Congressional Quart manac* 1973 p 219

[5]See Robinson (1963), p 45 The words are those of former Rules Committee Cha Howard W Smith

feeling they [members of Ways and Means] would like to consider the possibility again of getting a closed rule" (*Washington Post*, June 11, 1974, p A3)

Uncertainty prevailed, however, on the question of whether the Rules Committee would comply with the instructions of the Democratic Caucus to write a modified rule Relative to the outlook in the spring, a modified rule was more likely, but it was neither a foregone conclusion nor an easy decision for the Rules Committee Wishing to avoid a destructive fight between party liberals and Rules Committee conservatives, Speaker Carl Albert announced on June 11 that House action on the legislation would be postponed until July [6] But deflecting attention to the Senate through June and July still did not clarify expectations regarding the rule in the House In a June 27 story on the Senate's activity, the *New York Times* reported that "it remained unclear whether House liberals would be able to bring to a vote an alternative proposal that would end the depletion allowance immediately" (p 28) Similarly, a July 6 *New York Times* story on a "major lobbying effort" by Gulf Oil to defeat the legislation suggests that oil firms continued to regard H R 14462 as live (p 31)

In July, the Ways and Means Committee met again to consider energy and other pending tax legislation These meetings culminated in the inclusion of H R 14462 as a separate title in a larger, general tax reform bill, which was reported on August 2 This strategy was inimical to the interests of liberals for two reasons First, although the question regarding the rule for the ODA title was still unresolved, there was little doubt that Ways and Means could receive a rule that would at least protect the other titles of the bill from amendments Second, because "a number of major provisions of the bill expand[ed] tax advantages that mainly help the wealthy," some liberals were reluctant to support the entire package in spite of its repeal of the ODA (*New York Times*, July 31, 1974, p 1) In fact, Green so opposed the bundling strategy that he threatened to "begin a new fight against the entire tax-revision bill if it finally emerges from the Committee containing the new phase-out plan" (*New York Times*, August 3 1974 p 7) [7] The final outcome still remained unknown, of course But the actions of late July and early August virtually guaranteed that oil and gas tax legislation would not be considered alone as was expected in May after the committee first reported H R 14462

As the remainder of 1974 progressed, it became increasingly apparent that no tax legislation would survive the Ninety-third Congress Wilbur Mills, for

[6]Aside from hoping to "avoid the thorny issue of the caucus the House leadership wanted the Senate to act first on reform legislation that could be accepted by the House in conference (Morrison, 1975, p 408)

[7]Although the Ways and Means Committee agreed to the bundling strategy the bill itself had yet to be formally drafted (*ibid*)

Table I

Chronology of Energy Tax Legislation, 1973–1975

November–December 1973	President Nixon outlines effects of energy shortage, proposes legislation. Senate acts promptly. House acts slowly due to dispute concerning imposition of a windfall profits tax. Senate and House cannot agree on legislation. No energy legislation passes during the first session of Ninety-third Congress.
January–April 1974	Ninety-third Congress reconvenes. Hearings on taxation of oil industry. Mark up of Energy Tax [illegible] begins. Many anti-oil provisions are discussed. Administration proposes a modest windfall profits tax. Chairman Mills supports gradual phaseout of the ODA. Limitations of FTC are also proposed. The Oil and Gas Energy Tax Act is reported [illegible] committee which formally requests a closed rule.
May–June 1974	Green and Vanik petition House Democratic caucus to reverse the closed rule request on H.R. 14462. Caucus votes to instruct the Rules Committee to write a modified closed rule permitting amendments to repeal the ODA and FTC for oil and gas firms. Mills delays in refusing to appear before the Rules Committee. Mills threatens open rule. Ways and Means Committee reconvenes and decides to request a closed rule again. House leadership postpones consideration of H.R. 14462.
July–August 1974	Ways and Means Committee meets and votes to combine H.R. 14462 with general tax bill with minor modifications. Green and Vanik, together with industry supporters, oppose action.
September–December 1974	No action taken until post-election session. In late November the committee reports the bundled bill, again opposed by liberals on the committee. Chairman Mills appears with stripper on Boston stage. New Ways and Means Committee Chairman Ullman requests rule for H.R. 17488, the bundled tax bill. Rules Committee refuses to assign a rule. Tax reform in the Ninety-third Congress dies.
February–March 1975	Ninety-fourth Congress resumes action on energy and general tax issues. Ways and Means attempts to postpone consideration of energy tax issues. Once again Green calls for caucus vote which causes the Rules Committee to propose a modified rule on energy taxation issues. The modified rule is passed, the Green is adopted, and entire tax package is passed.

sons transcending the scope of the current analysis, resigned the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee on December 4 (*Washington* t, December 5, 1974, p. 1). The new president was not favorably dised towards general tax legislation And the Senate, which had helped ose the old president, had little time remaining to grapple with the utiae of tax policy. When the Ninety-third Congress adjourned, the treatment of the oil and gas had not changed Table 1 presents a brief onology of energy tax legislation in the Ninety-third and Ninety-fourth gresses

III A SPATIAL MODEL OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX RULES

The preceding historical account provides a rich illustration of procedural mplexity and conflict in the contemporary Congress It also raises and anvers several specific questions that are of intrinsic interest to legislative holars How does a previously venerable committee chairman respond to issatisfied committee backbenchers? How does an esteemed standing comnittee with a long history of procedural advantage respond to a dissatisfied party caucus that possesses recently arrogated procedural advantages? How lo party leaders mediate committee-caucus conflict? And how can a committee with an expansive jurisdiction strategically bundle legislation to thwart a najority of its parent chamber (or, at minimum party)?

As with most legislative histories, however, the saga of energy tax legislaion is not readily amenable to generalization Existing formal theories of legslative politics facilitate identification of some general propositions about procedural conflict However, current models go only part way toward prelicting relatively complex legislative activity Thus, this section presents an extension of the basic spatial model to capture sufficient procedural and strategic complexity to yield two refutable predictions

The starting point is a standard spatial model in which for simplicity of exposition, there are only three actors a "committee" an "amender" and he "floor"[8] Each actor has a quasi-concave utility function defined over a Euclidean policy space Thus, preferences on any given dimension of the policy space are single-peaked For this study the relevant portion of the pace is the committee's n-dimensional jurisdiction, $X \subset R^n$ Existing policy n the jurisdiction is referred to as the status quo and denoted x^s

The committee is the initial decision maker It reports a bill, x^c, that hanges the status quo in some but not necessarily all dimension(s) of its jusdiction[9] The special rule governing permissible amendments to the bill is

[8] For purposes of brevity and to maximize congruence between the model and the case this ection focuses exclusively on examples rather than general results A general proposition is tated, proved, and interpreted in the appendix

[9] For example, H R 14462 changed oil and gas provisions of the tax code but left all others ntact

then assigned exogenously.[10] Finally, the floor actor dictates the selection of the bill in accordance with amendments permitted and constraints imposed by the rule.[11]

Two classes of rules are considered *simple* (including open, closed, and modified) and *complex*. Under a *simple open rule*, the floor actor may pass any amendment that changes policy only on dimensions in which the bill changes the status quo. This constraint reflects the House's Rule XVI, clause 7, which requires that amendments be germane to the pending proposal Under a *simple modified rule*, the amender is uniquely conferred the right to offer an amendment that changes a designated provision (dimension) in the bill Modified rules are increasingly common in the contemporary House (Krehbiel, 1986) Under a *simple closed rule*, no amendments are permitted The floor actor simply chooses between the committee's bill and the status quo Finally, a *complex rule* specifies dimension-by-dimension (title-by-title, section-by-section) which simple rules apply to the single dimensions (titles, sections) of the committee's multidimensional bill Complex rules, too, are increasingly common in the House (Bach, 1981)

Figure 1 illustrates elementary results on the effects of simple rules when the committee reports a unidimensional bill Given this configuration of ideal points, a committee that anticipates a closed rule reports the bill, x^b, equal to its ideal point, x^c This bill is assured of passage since the floor actor prefers x^b to x^s [12] Under an open rule the result is consistent with the median voter theorem (Black, 1958) Any number of amendments may be proposed, but the floor actor's ideal point, x^f, is uniquely invulnerable to further amendments Finally, under a modified rule the outcome lies in the interval $(\bar{x}^b, x^f]$, where $\bar{x}^b$ is the indifference point of the floor median voter with respect to the bill, x^b Thus, the optimal amendment depends upon the location of the committee's bill Suppose the committee anticipates a closed rule and, as above, reports $x^b = x^c$ If a modified rule is assigned, the amender proposes


[10]Rather than model the choice of the Rules Committee, we assume that, based on historical experience, the standing committee anticipates the granting of the rule In section V, the findings are qualified accordingly

[11]This is especially stylized with respect to the floor actor Alternatively, the predictions can be derived by assuming that there are *m* floor actors, one of whom is pivotal (i e , the median voter) on all dimensions, and by assuming that actors have separable preferences and vote sophisticatedly, one issue at a time, over a finite, exogenous agenda (see Kramer, 1972, for example) However, because this alternative set of assumptions is unnecessarily complicated, the intuition of the model is more easily exposed by interpreting the floor actor as a constrained dictator in the last stage of decision making The constraints, as explored below, are imposed by the committee's bill, by the rule under which the bill is considered, and (depending upon the rule) by the amendment offered by the amender

[12]The unidimensional examples generalize to cases without a unitary 'floor actor,' since with *m* actors (*m* odd) the statements about the floor actor (*qua* median voter) are also true of all actors to one side of median, thus comprising a majority An analogous argument generalizes the committee stage of decision making to multiple actors

FIGURE 1

DIFFERENT OUTCOMES UNDER DIFFERENT RULES



$^{b'} = \tilde{x}^b + \epsilon$, which the floor actor barely prefers to x^b. Of the three motions n the agenda (x^c, x^b, and $x^{b'}$), $x^{b'}$ is the outcome. Note, however, that if the ommittee anticipates the modified rule and behaves sophisticatedly, the odified rule is of no value to the amender. In the limit, the committee eports $x^b = x^f$ so the amender cannot find a winning amendment.[13]

Though simple, this unidimensional model nevertheless facilitates an nderstanding of the events through mid-May 1974. Given its long history of losed rules on tax legislation, the Ways and Means Committee has reason to elieve that energy tax legislation would receive traditional treatment by the ules Committee.[14] Consistent with these procedural expectations, the pro- il membership of the committee drafted a bill that reduced tax benefits of il and gas firms modestly (approximately to x^c on figure 1) but not as much s the floor median voter would have liked (x^f). Had the closed rule been ssigned by the Rules Committee and passed on the floor, the committee's ill surely would have passed, since more than a majority preferred it to the

[13]Alternatively, the committee could refuse to report a bill. If this strategy were viable, then e condition for sophisticated obstruction is that the committee prefers x^s to x^f. In light of in- itutions such as the discharge petition, however, obstruction may not be viable. We proceed ith the assumption that committees regard the threat of discharge as credible. That is, com- ittees have proposal power but not gatekeeping power.

[14]Although committee members surely knew of the recent change in the Democratic Caucus iles, the key provision had yet to be invoked.

status quo (x^s) However, the possibility of rule-making intervention by th Democratic Caucus—and the eventual use of the new procedures by cauc liberals—significantly altered procedural expectations and increased th likelihood of an anti-oil outcome (x^b)

The utility of the model for clarifying the case breaks down, however, the procedural battle became more intricate One limitation of the simp model is its restricted applicability to unidimensional jurisdictions Althoug some bills may be regarded as unidimensional, jurisdictions of congression committees are more aptly characterized as multidimensional But existir literature on agenda setters or committees as first-stage actors in mult dimensional settings are also incapable of addressing adequately the pro cedural richness of the oil and gas case First, multidimensional mode currently focus only on *simple* open and closed rules (e g , Shepsle an Weingast, 1987, Mackay and Weaver, 1983, respectively) Second, the models contain an implicit and strong assumption that the proposal of th committee (or "agenda setter" in Mackay and Weaver) spans its entire juri diction ("commodity space") These limitations preclude consideration committee strategies in which the choice of provisions to be included in le islation can be as strategically valuable as the content of those provisions

Figure 2 illustrates this strategic selection of the *dimensionality* of bil along with the conventional focus on location or placement of bills Notic that in these two dimensions of the committee's n-dimensional jurisdictic (with dimensions x_3 through x_n not shown) the three actors' ideal poin projected onto x_1 are the same as figure 1 Figure 2 therefore shows a larg portion of the Ways and Means Committee's jurisdiction than does figure


Suppose that the committee anticipates a *complex rule* in which no amen ments are permitted on the dimensions x_2 through x_n but any amendme may be proposed on dimension x_1 Thus, the complex rule is open on x_1 bu closed otherwise [15] In the unidimensional case in figure 1, the committe was destined to suffer from either an open or modified rule on x_1 (via amen ments or anticipating amendments and thus reporting x^f) But under a com plex rule, the committee can preclude an unfavorable outcome by reportin the bill $x^b = (x'_1, x^*_2)$ This bill has the property that under the complex ru there exists no permissible amendment that the floor actor prefers to th status quo [16] Thus, even though the complex rule allows amendments, th committee's strategic choice of dimensionality of its bill, in addition to i placement of the bill, preempts passage of hostile amendments As in prev ous literature, the committee is strategically bundling its legislation, a

[15]The argument also holds for a complex rule that is modified on x_1 This was the like scenario in the energy tax case as of July Figure 2 nevertheless depicts the less restrictive ru and somewhat stronger result

[16]Recall that even though there are three actors in the model the floor actor is a dictator the final stage (subject to the constraints imposed by the rule)

FIGURE 2

AN OBSTRUCTIVE BUNDLE UNDER A COMPLEX RULE



hough in this case the bundle is deliberately obstructive (cf Mackay and Weaver, 1983)[17] However, the extension of this model to complex rules captures a key component of committee strategy which while evident in the oil and gas case, is absent from previous formal models Under complex rules committee strategy implicitly consists of two choices placement and dimensionality of bills Optimal bill placement is conditioned by the simple rules in unidimensional models or in multidimensional models that assume that bills

[17] Although it *appears* that the committee could successfully propose its ideal point (x^c) under he complex rule, this would redefine the set of feasible amendments such that the amender ould successfully propose an amendment well to the left of x^c but just inside the floor actor's ndifference contour This would leave the committee worse off than under the status quo and hus is the motivation for the committee's obstructive as opposed to a winning bundle

span all dimensions of a jurisdiction Analogously, optimal bundling of bills including placement and dimensionality—is conditioned by complex rules in multidimensional models in which the committee is free to choose or to ignore issues in its jurisdiction

IV AN EVENT STUDY

The historical summary in section II provides a modicum of support for the models of simple and complex rules Figure 1 adequately depicts events through mid-May as described earlier Figure 2 characterizes much of the remaining history The x_1 dimension can be interpreted as the degree of taxation of oil and gas firms (as in figure 1), and the x_2 dimension can be regarded as a composite of various non-oil and non-gas provisions [18] The unanticipated but eventually credible threat of a modified rule brought about attempts by pro-oil members to delay consideration of the legislation because, as the unidimensional model with simple rules suggests, they expected a modified rule to lead to an undesirable outcome Ultimately they carefully expanded the dimensionality of the legislation by bundling the oil and gas tax bill with general tax legislation Represented by x^b in figure 2 this strategy and the expectation of a complex rule permitted successful obstruction

While consistent with the model *prima facie*, such "empirical support must be regarded as impressionistic and tentative The purpose of this section is to test the model with more rigor and clarity than historical analysis alone permits The premise of the following event study is that changes in expectations regarding the assignment of special rules to legislation with unambiguous economic consequences will alter the willingness of traders to pay for stocks of oil and gas firms Therefore, the test employs capital market data The spatial model of section III is used to identify key events in the legislative history and to generate predictions of corresponding capital market changes An econometric model assesses the direction and magnitude of the predicted changes and thereby provides a more objective opportunity to test predictions of the spatial model

Predictions

Joint consideration of the model and the chronology of tax legislation in 1974 suggests that two events were critical the vote of the Democratic Caucus on May 15 and the announced bundling of legislation by Ways and

[18]The actual provisions in H R 17488 included revision of taxation of real estate and political parties, increasing the low-income allowance, increasing the standard deduction, adjusting withholding tables, and allowing individuals to use large capital losses to reduce federal tax due for previous years See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1974, pp 189–93

Means on August 2 The effects of the possible outcomes on the economic well-being of oil and gas firms is clear. In terms of the model illustrated in figures 1 and 2, the firms had the following preference ordering: x_1^*, x_1^c, x_1^f, $x_1^{b'}$ (In contrast, they are assumed to be indifferent about policy on other dimensions.) If the model of rules is correct, then given the unidimensional bill x_1^c, a change in expectations from a closed rule to a modified rule should increase expectations of the outcome x_1^b, which clearly would have reduced after-tax profits of oil and gas firms relative to the bill The caucus vote undoubtedly increased the perceived probability of a modified rule, thus

PREDICTION 1 *A portfolio of stocks of oil and gas firms should exhibit significantly negative abnormal returns (defined below) on or around May 15*

Uncertainty about the rule persisted throughout May and June, but in late July through August 2, there was an increasing expectation that the Ways and Means Committee would exploit the anticipated complex rule by bundling the energy tax bill with general tax legislation The consequences for changing expectations regarding outcomes must be assessed relative to the events of the early summer At that time, the best outcome oil and gas firms could hope for was x^f (This would have been possible, for example, if the committee had reconvened and rewritten its bill as x^f to preempt a successful anti-oil amendment under a modified rule) The worst possible outcome, which seemed especially likely after the caucus vote, was x^b In contrast under a complex rule and a bill with expanded dimensionality, oil and gas firms' preferred outcome, x^*, was possible The incorporation of H R 14462 with general tax legislation was tantamount to an obstructive bundle such as x^b in figure 2, thus

PREDICTION 2 *The same portfolio should exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns on or around August 2*

Two sets of tests are conducted First, after introducing the most elementary form of event study, several models are estimated that focus only on the two primary events identified by the model of rules Second, the robustness of the first set of empirical results is assessed by testing for possibly confounding events The section concludes with a general assessment of the usefulness of the technique

Test 1 Primary Events

Two assumptions about the capital market and the formation of stock prices are required for the test The first is that the *efficient markets/rational expectations* hypothesis holds This hypothesis states that stock prices reflect all available relevant information An implication of the hypothesis is that it is impossible to make profits by trading stocks on the basis of available infor-

mation. That is, if R_{it} is the return on the stock or portfolio of stocks period t, ϕ_{t-1} is the information available in period $t-1$, $E(\cdot)$ is the exp tion operator, and $\epsilon_{it} \equiv R_{it} - E(R_{it}|\phi_{t-1})$, then $E(\epsilon_{it}) = 0$. Essentially, hypothesis implies that the effects of new information are reflected fully quickly in stock prices The empirical evidence supporting this hypothe substantial (Schwert, 1981)

The second assumption is that there is a common factor in the return assets or a portfolio of assets This common factor is the return to a v. weighted portfolio containing all tradeable assets Given this assump the return to any given security or portfolio of securities is

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \epsilon_{it},$$

where R_{it} and ϵ_{it} are defined above, R_{mt} is the return to a value-weig portfolio of all marketable securities, and α_i and β_i are parameters Equ. (1), referred to as the *market model*, yields estimates of the return to a s or portfolio of stocks which control for market-wide variations in the re to all traded assets The market model can be generated under altern theoretical assumptions and has substantial empirical support (Fama, 1

Conditional on the information set, ϕ_{t-1}, and the contemporaneous re to the market portfolio, equation (1) implies that the equilibrium expe return to asset i is simply $E(R_{it}|\phi_{t-1}, R_{mt}) = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt}$ Thus, the equ. provides a basis for measuring "unexpected" or "abnormal" returns to as *Abnormal returns* are the parts of R_{it} unaccounted for by $\alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt}$ G the rational expectations/efficient markets hypothesis, abnormal return sult from new information that is uniquely relevant to future profits of f in the specific portfolio In the present case, changes in economic ag expectations about rules for energy tax legislation should result in signif abnormal returns Thus, the following equation is estimated using we data [19]

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \gamma_1 D_{1t} + \gamma_2 D_{2t} + \epsilon_{it},$$

where

R_{it} = the weekly return to the equally-weighted portfolio of stocks and gas producers listed in table 2,

R_{mt} = the weekly return to the value-weighted market portfolio stocks traded on the New York and American Stock Exchang

$D_{1t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{in weeks of increasing expectations of a modified rule,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$

[19]Often securities are not traded regularly on a daily basis Nonsynchronous trading can biases in estimates of parameters derived from daily data (Dimson, 1979) Additionally, are frequently day-of-the-week effects in securities returns that may also cause biases Th of weekly returns (the geometric accumulation of daily returns over a seven calendar-da riod) minimizes these biases

TABLE 2

FIRMS IN THE OIL AND GAS PORTFOLIO*

Firms	
Ameranda Hess	Apco Oil
Ashland Oil	Atlantic Richfield (-)
Canadian Hydrocarbons	City Services
Clark Oil and Refining	Commonwealth Oil and Refining
Conoco Oil (-)	Crown Central Petroleum
E D G, Inc	Earth Resources
Exxon Corp (-)	Getty Oil
Gulf Oil (-)	Holly Corp
Husky Oil	Kerr McGee
Marathon Oil	Mobil (-)
Murphy Oil	O K C, Corp
Pacific Petroleum	Phillips Petroleum
Quaker State Oil	Reserve Oil and Gas
Shell Oil (-)	Standard Oil of California (-)
Standard Oil of Indiana (-)	Standard Oil of Ohio
Sun Oil	Tesoro Petroleum
Texaco Oil (-)	Total Petroleum
Union Oil of California	

*This list represents all firms in the 2911 and 2912 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for which daily stock return data appeared on the Center for Research and Security Prices (University of Chicago) for the dates relevant for estimation (-) denotes firms omitted for the analysis discussed in footnote 23

$$D_{2t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{in weeks of increasing expectations of a complex rule,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

ϵ_{it} = the error term

'he null hypothesis is H_1^0 $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = 0$ The theoretically motivated alter-ive is H_1^A $\gamma_1 < 0, \gamma_2 > 0$ If the coefficients are of the predicted sign, then ection of H_1^0 supports the model of rules [30]

The econometric model readily accommodates alternative definitions of nts so that it is possible to detect changes in procedural expectations that y have occurred in weeks other than those containing the primary events evant information can reach the market in a variety of ways, and it is often icult to identify perfectly the date on which new, unanticipated informa-n became available Information regarding the relevance of the event may e become public shortly after the event itself occurred For example, in-pretations of the May 15 caucus vote were published during the weekend

Additionally, rejection of the null hypothesis implicitly supports the maintained hypothesis economic actors obtain essential information about political decision making and incorpo it into their decisions Because this is a secondary concern further discussion is deferred to ion V

and week after vote.[21] A second possibility is that events are forecast on the basis of information that became available before the event. For example, the *Wall Street Journal* reported on May 3 that Green had received the support of 111 colleagues, and the *New York Times* reported on May 9 that he had obtained 125 signatures on the petition to call the caucus meeting. Similarly, information about the Ways and Means Committee's bundling strategy may have been leaked by members or staff prior to August 2, since the Ways and Means Committee meetings were well publicized during the period. *The Washington Post*, for example, published four stories on tax legislation during the last eleven days of July.

Uncertainty about the exact timing of the release of information suggests a need for several codings. The variables D_{1t} and D_{2t} are therefore coded differently for seven event intervals which are denoted (i,j), where i and j are the number of weeks prior and subsequent to the primary date that are coded one.

Table 3 contains OLS estimates for equation (2) using data for the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1975. The estimates of the market model parameters α and β attest to the stability of the specifications. The coefficients always have the predicted signs and do not change significantly with alternative definitions of D_{1t} and D_{2t}. The R^2s are also stable.

With the exception of the (0,0) and (−3,0) codings, the null hypothesis is always rejected with a high degree of confidence as indicated by the p-values for the F-test. This is strong evidence that significant abnormal returns occurred near the primary events.


The individual estimates for γ_i are more specifically supportive of the predictions. Negative abnormal returns are observed when it was increasingly likely that energy tax legislation would be considered under a modified rule. Positive abnormal returns are observed when it was increasingly likely that energy tax legislation would be incorporated into general tax legislation and considered under a complex rule. The estimate of γ_2 (for the bundling event) is significant at better than the .05 level in five of the seven specifications. Without exception, these coefficients are larger for $(i, 0)$ than for $(i, 1)$ codings. This suggests that the effects of the committee's strategy were known and capitalized quickly.

The estimate of γ_1 (for the caucus event) is statistically significant four of seven times. The exceptions are understandable in light of the legislative history. The (−3,0) and (−2,0) intervals extend back to the trading weeks of April 22–26 and April 29–May 3 when, on the basis of the content of the committee's bill and expected rule, the prospects for oil and gas firms were still relatively bright. In contrast, the (−1,0) coding yields a significant co-

[21] See the *Washington Post*, May 16, 20, and 24, 1974, and the *New York Times*, May 16, 17 and 18, 1974.

FIGURE 3

ACCUMULATED ABNORMAL RETURNS, 1974



fficient Finally, for both events the (0,0) interval is too narrow to capture atistically significant abnormal returns However, the coefficients are of the redicted signs

The estimates of γ_1 and γ_2 have straightforward interpretations that accen-uate the magnitude of the capital effects potentially attributable to the pro-dural events The average weekly return to R_{it} over the three-year period 00185 which, under continuous compounding, implies an annualized rate f return of 10 09% According to the estimates from the (− 1 1) interval, the turn to R_{it} exhibits a one-time reduction of 8 8% around May 15 and a one-me increase of 5 5% around August 1 Thus, in weeks of increasing expecta-ons of a modified rule for a bill occupying only a single dimension of the irisdiction, the annualized return to the portfolio of oil and gas stocks is 7 22% lower. Similarly, in weeks of increasing expectations of a bundled

bill, the annualized return is 54 51% higher Figure 3 is a graph of the accumulated weekly abnormal returns for oil and gas firms throughout 1974 The effects identified in the empirical analysis are evident.

Test 2 Confounding Events

Objections to findings of event studies can almost always be raised in terms of coding of events or potentially confounding events The results in table 3 confirm that definition of the event intervals makes a difference But the differences are understandable in light of the specifics of the case, and the results are generally robust to alternative codings Little has been said about other possible causes of the abnormal returns near the primary event dates, however The Ninety-third Congress and the federal government generally were occupied with a number of energy issues in 1974 Thus, with the aim of performing a more discriminating test, the possibility that other unanticipated actions caused changes in abnormal returns is entertained

The obvious first step in investigating alternative explanations is to find them Typically this is easy However, in the present case, readings of the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, and *Washington Post* indexes revealed

TABLE 3

OLS ESTIMATES OF MARKET MODEL WITH PRIMARY EVENT DUMMY VARIABLES

Event Interval	Parameter Estimates *						
	α	β	γ_1	γ_2	$F(2,153)$	p	R^2
(0 0)	0 0027	1 0400	−0 0203	0 0077	0 37	465	766
	(1 92)	(22 04)	(−1 15)	(0 44)			
(−1,0)	0 0025	1 0490	−0 0234	0 0318	5 44	005	780
	(1 83)	(22 98)	(−1 94)	(2 63)			
(−2,0)	0 0024	1 0486	−0 0097	0 0233	3 22	043	773
	(1 68)	(22 77)	(−0 96)	(2 32)			
(−3,0)	0 0025	1 0440	−0 0092	0 0154	2 15	121	770
	(1 73)	(22 45)	(−1 05)	(1 75)			
(−1 1)	0 0028	1 0384	−0 0294	0 0185	6 38	002	782
	(2 05)	(23 02)	(−3 00)	(1 88)			
(−2,1)	0 0027	1 0415	−0 0176	0 0154	3 74	026	775
	(1 90)	(22 75)	(−2 03)	(1 78)			
(−3,1)	0 0028	1 0372	−0 0158	0 0106	3 05	050	773
	(1 95)	(22 51)	(−2 02)	(1 35)			

*Numbers in parentheses below the estimates are t-statistics

[22] For t = 1, . . . , 52 weeks in 1974, the accumulated weekly abnormal returns are defined as $\Sigma_{s \le t}(R_{is} - \hat{R}_{is})$ where $\hat{R}_{it}$ is the predicted value of R_{it} based on the market model

TABLE 4

CHRONOLOGY OF PRICE ROLLBACK LEGISLATION, 1974
DATES, EXPECTED EFFECTS, AND EVENTS*

February 6 (−)	After returning to conference on January 29, House and Senate members reported on February 6 a modified version of S 2589 which had died at the end of the first session In both sessions President Nixon threatened to veto the bill But on February 19 the Senate passed the conference report by one vote more than the two-thirds majority needed for override
February 28 (+)	A day after the House passed the conference report by fifteen votes less than a two-thirds majority, Nixon vetoed the bill on February 28 On March 6 the veto was sustained in the Senate
April 25 (−)	The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee decided by voice vote to report H R 13834 which contained a rollback provision similar to that in S 2589
May 21 (+)	The House rejected H R 13834 by a vote of 191–207 The bill was considered under suspension of the rules and thus required a two-thirds majority vote for passage

Sources 1974 *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* March 9 pp 632–33 May 4 pp 1121–22 May 25 pp 1343 1399

few candidates One possibly confounding event was the appointment of John C Sawhill as administrator of the Federal Energy Office in late April But the appointment coincided with another event in a sequence of decisions pertaining to legislation to rollback prices on certain domestic oil Coverage of rollback legislation by major newspapers was erratic, but *Congressional Quarterly* followed the legislative history more closely The legislation was considered in the first session of the Ninety-third Congress but fell victim to the same filibuster that killed windfall profits tax legislation Of the four potentially key events in the second session the latter two occurred near the May 15 vote of the Democratic Caucus A chronology is presented in table 4

Econometric refutation of the significance of rollback legislation is straightforward and ultimately illustrates some important subtleties of using event analysis to test political theory If indeed rollback legislation is a viable confounding influence on the results presented above, then the predictions stated in table 4 should receive as strong or stronger support than that received for the predictions from the model of rules Thus, the following econometric model is also estimated

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \delta_1 X_{1t} + \delta_2 X_{2t} + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (3)$$

where R_{it}, α_{it}, β_{it}, R_{mt} and ϵ_{it} are defined as in equation (2), and the new variables, X_{1t} and X_{2t}, are dummy variables pertaining to the two sets of explanations for the observed abnormal returns In particular,

TABLE 5

OLS ESTIMATES OF MARKET MODEL WITH GROUPED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVENTS

Event Interval	Parameter estimates*				
	α	β	δ_1	δ_2	R^2
(0,0)	0 0026	1 0477	0 0140	−0 0061	767
	(1 88)	(22 30)	(1 14)	(−0 69)	
(−1,0)	0 0026	1 0480	0 0265	−0 0046	780
	(1 93)	(23 13)	(3 08)	(−0 75)	
(−2,0)	0 0026	1 0478	0 0151	−0 0041	773
	(1 90)	(22 75)	(2 09)	(−0 81)	
(−3,0)	0 0026	1 0408	0 0126	−0 0011	770
	(1 89)	(22 46)	(2 03)	(−0 25)	
(−1 1)	0 0026	1 0415	0 0231	−0 0025	782
	(1 94)	(23 08)	(3 27)	(−0 49)	
(−2,1)	0 0026	1 0440	0 0156	−0 0038	776
	(1 91)	(22.84)	(2 54)	(−0 88)	
(−3,1)	0 0026	1 0383	0 0133	−0 0004	773
	(1 90)	(22 52)	(2 41)	(−0 09)	

*Numbers in parentheses below the estimates are t-statistics δ_1 and δ_2 are hypothesized to be positive

$$X_{1t} = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{in weeks including/surrounding May 15,} \\ 1 & \text{in weeks including/surrounding August 2,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise, and} \end{cases}$$

$$X_{2t} = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{in weeks of increasing expectations of rollback legislation,} \\ 1 & \text{in weeks of decreasing expectations of rollback legislation,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

These codings permit one-tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis H_2^o $\delta_i = 0$ against the alternative H_2^A $\delta_i > 0$, $i = 1,2$, and thus permit discriminating between the two sets of explanations

The results are presented in table 5 for seven different event intervals With the sole exception of the (0,0) interval, the rule-based predictions permit confident rejection of the null hypothesis for δ_1 In stark contrast, the rollback explanation receives no support The estimate of δ_2 is usually of the wrong sign and never significant

To clarify the details underlying the overall rejection of the rollback explanation, a separate model was estimated that contained six separate dummy variables corresponding to the six events (four rollback events plus the rule events). Coefficients for the Senate's vote on the conference report, the subsequent veto of S 2589 and the introduction of H.R 13834 (rollback events 1, 2, and 3) were never significantly different from zero, even though event 3

coincided with the Sawhill appointment which, if anything, should have enhanced the predicted negative abnormal returns. And although the final failure of H.R. 13834 (event 4) achieved significance in five codings, the sign of the coefficient was *negative*. Since the rollback legislation was strongly and consistently opposed by oil firms, this is persuasive evidence against the competing hypothesis that the observed abnormal returns had more to do with rollback legislation than with rules.[23]

Aside from rejecting the competing claim regarding rollback legislation, this extended test illustrates four more general points about the use of event studies for testing political theory. First, while it is often easy to examine the public record and find some temporally proximal events from which *ad hoc* alternative explanations can be derived, it is important to note that such claims can be refuted in a less *ad hoc* fashion. In this case, the test simply consists of examining all relevant rollback events, not just those that roughly coincided with the vote of the caucus.[24]

Second, when economic actors have good information about political preferences, procedures, and strategies, abnormal returns will *not* in general be observed. Under these informational conditions, expectations are more or less constant. In the case of rollback legislation, information about preferences and procedures was good. The legislation had passed both houses the previous session, thus its emergence from conference at the beginning of the second session probably was not surprising. Similarly, it was known that "the threat of veto was hanging over the measure" as early as December 1973 (*Congressional Quarterly*, March 9, 1974, p. 632). After the Senate sustained the veto, information about congressmen's preferences was even

[23] Two additional and similarly uneventful analyses of potentially confounding effects were also conducted. First, regressions were run with alternative dates of February 19 and March 6 for the first two rollback events (see table 4). The results were almost no different from those reported. Second, the possibility of a confounding regulatory decision on May 17 was explored by repeating the primary event analysis using only firms that would not have been affected by the decision (see *New York Times*, May 17, p. 1). Specifically, a rule was proposed by the Federal Energy Office (FEO) that would disallow increases in the costs incurred by a domestic refiner in purchasing crude oil from foreign affiliates as measured by customary accounting methods. The FEO, which sought to make transfer prices between the affiliate and its parent reflect true market prices, proposed that comparable sales or net cost methods be used in these transactions. The FEO's proposal (*Federal Register*, Vol. 39, No. 98, pp. 17771–6) was thought by some to lead to price rollbacks by nine oil companies (*Wall Street Journal*, June 17, 1974, p. 16). Entertaining the FEO alternative explanation for the negative abnormal returns in May, one would expect no effect when re-estimating equation 92) for firms not to be affected by the regulatory proposal. The estimates were not significantly different from those for the larger portfolio, however. This suggests that even if some of the observed abnormal returns may have been due to the proposed accounting rule change, an independent effect can be attributed to the congressional rules disputes.

[24] In retrospect, it probably would have been sufficient to examine only the proximal events since one was always insignificant and the other never yielded a significant coefficient with the right sign.

better So, although the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee reported yet another rollback bill in April, few if any informed economic actors expected it to make its way to final passage For example, after the bill failed well short of the two-thirds required under suspension, reporters asked Harley Staggers, the floor manager of the bill, whether he thought it could have passed Staggers responded, "It would have been a wild hope" (*New York Times*, May 22, 1974, p 8)

Third, joint analysis of primary and putatively confounding events sheds light on the conditions under which event studies can be informative Clearly, it is not sufficient simply to code dates of committee reports, floor votes of final passage, confirmation of appointees, regulatory decisions, etc. When information on the progress of these decisions is plentiful, as is typical, the so-called events are anticipated and capitalized prior to their occurrence. Estimates of models based on these simple coding rules are therefore likely to be misleading In contrast, more promising applications of the event study technique require careful selection of cases in which convincing arguments can be made that expectations changed during the event period Often, as in the present case, a theoretical model facilitates the otherwise nettlesome identification of unanticipated events

Finally, it should be apparent that event studies cannot circumvent the generic limitations of empirical tests of theories No matter how convincing the case for correct identification of dates on which new information reached the market and regardless of the strength of the econometric results, no claim can be made to have proved a theory Certainly no such claim is made here Rather, a model identifying the effects of alternative special rules was proposed, two predictions were subject to, and survived, a test that provided an explicit and relatively objective opportunity for falsification, and the model was compared to an alternative explanation that was falsified

V Discussion

The primary purpose of this study was to illustrate legislative complexity, to extend an existing model to accommodate complexity pertaining to special rules, and to conduct a test of the predictions of the model and extension Two additional themes were implicit above but become explicit below

The first theme is committee power as determined by interaction between standing committees and their parent chamber In practice, this relationship is mediated by several of the House's institutions (such as standing rules and the Rules Committee) and by party organizations (such as leadership and caucuses) But in theory, the strategic interactions typically are reduced to two sets of actors—a committee majority and a parent chamber majority "Committee power" typically is said to occur when the outcome of the collective-choice process tends to be closer to the committee's ideal point than to the ideal points of noncommittee members The "puzzle of commit-

tee power" raised by Shepsle and Weingast (1987), for example, is simply. Why does this happen? A related contribution of this study is to an understanding of some of the specific mechanisms of committee power. As in other formal models, the mechanisms identified here derive from procedures that restrict the parent chamber.

The most transparent restriction on the parent chamber is that of the simple closed rule. Political scientists have long suspected that closed rules account for some of the power of committees whose legislation systematically receives such rules (Manley, 1970, Fenno, 1973). But explicit theoretical explanations for the effects of restrictive rules have been offered only relatively recently (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978, Denzau and Mackay, 1983) and have never been tested using congressional data. The first part of the energy tax case provides a concrete instance of a committee's strong preference for a closed rule and its anguish over its unanticipated loss. The empirical test suggests more convincingly that the committee's concern was well-founded and consistent with the model of simple rules.

The more subtle and realistic restriction on the parent chamber came in the form of the (anticipated) complex rule in the second part of the case. Complex rules, as characterized here, restrict amendments by the parent chamber on at least some issue dimension(s) in the committee's jurisdiction.[25] Formally, such restrictions implicitly confer to the committee the opportunity to exert more influence than it could under alternative, less-restrictive procedures. The energy tax case illustrates that, given a multidimensional jurisdiction, the loss of a simple closed rule need not eliminate a committee's power. Pro-oil members of the Ways and Means Committee were able to use a bundling strategy as an effective response to the threatened loss of their historical procedural advantage of the closed rule. Furthermore, traders in oil and gas stocks seemed to recognize that the strategy would yield a status quo outcome as predicted by the model of complex rules.

Does this empirical support for these theoretical predictions constitute a solution to Shepsle and Weingast's "puzzle of committee power?" Our answer is "probably not" and requires some elaboration. First, although we are confident that much of what is observed and labeled as committee power indeed stems from procedural restrictions on parent chamber activity,[26] this

[25]This characterization is mostly consistent with Bach's (1981) comprehensive study of complex special rules, although he writes not only of "restrictive" but also of "expansive" provisions of complex rules. An example of an expansive provision would be a waiver on a point of order that an amendment is nongermane. Our model of complex rules presently does not provide for expansive provisions. This could be accommodated, however, by representing an expansive rule as one that permits the parent chamber to expand the dimensionality of the bill, e.g., by attaching a provision pertaining to an issue that the committee's bill did not address.

[26]This claim is consistent not only with the model in section III but also with a diverse set of legislative models. For example, Denzau and Mackay (1983) identify equilibria in a unidimensional choice space that tend to be closer to the committee median than to the floor median

generalization ignores a deeper, outstanding issue. Why would a parent chamber majority tolerate restrictive procedures that permit "committee power" *at the parent chamber's expense*?[27] If formal models are correct in identifying procedural restrictions as foundations of committee power, then answering this question is a prerequisite to solving any puzzle of committee power.

Our tentative (and perhaps heretical) answer to the question is that the parent chamber does *not* tolerate such procedures. Two specifics of the energy tax case are illustrative. First, sufficient procedural disillusionment was already present in 1974 for liberals to deploy their newly-acquired procedural weapon without hesitation. Second, the continuation of the oil depletion allowance battle into the Ninety-fourth Congress—as well as the intervening battles culminating in the passage of the extensive reforms in December 1974 (Davidson and Oleszek, 1977)—affirmed that the victory of the Ways and Means Committee in the Ninety-third Congress, though significant, was not permanent.[28] More generally, although parent chamber majorities often tolerate restrictive procedures, their tolerance seems to vanish

---

because the committee possesses gatekeeping power and/or receives a simple closed rule. The closed rule is an explicit restriction on amendments. Gatekeeping is an implicit restriction since if the power is exercised, the parent chamber has nothing to amend. Shepsle and Weingast (1987) propose a model in which neither gatekeeping nor a closed rule is assumed during *first* consideration of the committee's bill. However, the committee is guaranteed appointment to a conference committee and is assured that its conference report, if any, is considered under a simple closed rule. Thus, the committee has both of Denzau and Mackay's types of procedural protection, albeit at a later stage: gatekeeping in conference (because the committee is assumed to possess an "ex post veto") and a closed rule on the conference report (if the committee chooses not to veto the bill). No general results are proved, but examples show that committees may be powerful in such settings in the sense of not being made worse off vis-a-vis the status quo. Finally, Baron and Ferejohn (1987) challenge Shepsle and Weingast's claim that proposal power is not a sufficient condition for committee power by presenting a divide-the-dollar game in which the committee, in equilibrium, receives larger divisions than noncommittee members. Moreover, this happens even under a rule that permits first-degree (but not second-degree) amendments by a randomly recognized member of the parent chamber. Thus, Baron and Ferejohn's model imposes weaker restrictions on the parent chamber than models that rely on gatekeeping, closed rules, and veto powers. However, their "power to propose" is nevertheless a restriction, since noncommittee members are barred from being the first to propose a division of the dollar. Thus, in each of these models, restrictions on parent chamber actions help to account for equilibria (or outcomes via example) that favor the committee.

[27] If instances of "committee power" do not entail gains to the committee at the expense of a parent chamber majority, we would argue that the concept is ill defined.

[28] See table 1, February–March 1975. Several confounding factors may account for rapid passage of anti-oil energy tax legislation in the Ninety-fourth Congress, however. These include the net gain of forty-nine seats by Democrats in the post-Watergate election, the aforementioned sweeping reforms of the late Ninety-third Congress, the specific reforms affecting the Ways and Means Committee (Rudder, 1977), and changing economic conditions as the oil embargo subsided.

when the procedures cease to serve their interests. A convincing solution to the puzzle of committee power therefore requires a model in which the parent chamber chooses its rules.[30] In the absence of such a model, one runs the risk of making exaggerated inferences regarding committee power (e.g., Ways and Means, circa 1974) when, in fact, endogenous procedural changes keep committee behavior in conformance with parent chamber preferences (Ways and Means, circa 1975).

The second, implicit theme concerns the relationships between political and economic decision makers or, in this case, between Congress and markets. In the empirical test, this connection was represented by the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations. Since the findings could not have emerged without some alternative but unspecified connection between political and economic decisions, the maintained hypothesis received implicit support. Elaboration upon its meaning in the context of congressional politics is therefore helpful.

Obviously, the rational expectations hypothesis does not require that all traders on the New York and American Stock Exchanges are well versed in congressional procedure. All that is necessary is that traders somehow receive good information about congressional institutions (such as rules), strategies (such as a committee's choice of the dimensionality and placement of bills), and their implications for outcomes. Little is known about the sources of this information or its path to the marketplace. But this study suggests that along the path from initial sources to final traders, some economic actors are politically well-informed. Thus, even though the nature of the connection between political and economic decisions is unclear, its existence brightens the prospects for future applications of event studies to test political theory. We only caution that such applications should be attentive to the caveats discussed in section IV.

APPENDIX

Although the empirical analysis supports the thesis that complex rules and bundling strategies can help account for committee influence, the model from which the predictions were derived was deliberately confined to the case studied. This appendix contains a statement, proof, and interpretation of general conditions for the existence of an obstructive bundle in an n-dimensional jurisdiction, $X \subset R^n$.

Several definitions are required. Define $X' \subset X$ as the set of *feasible committee proposals*. (The substantive rationale for this definition is discussed

[30] In a model with incomplete information and endogenous choice of rules, the "procedural equilibrium" is for the parent chamber to choose closed rules under surprisingly weak conditions. See Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) for an exposition of this model and some support from nineteenth century House precedents.

ow) Partition the committee's proposal as $x^b = (x_j^b, x_k^b)$ where j are the ed and k the open (or modified) rule dimensions as determined by the nplex rule The rule and the proposal determine the set of *feasible floor endments*, $A(x^b)$, which includes all points on the k-dimensional hyperine orthogonal to the closed rule dimensions in which x^b changes the status io. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate $A(x^b)$ for the three-dimensional policy ace where $j = 1$, $k = 2,3$ and $j = 1,2$, $k = 3$, respectively

Let $U_i(x)$ be a quasi-concave utility function for actor i (committee or floor) efined over the jurisdiction X, and $P_i(x)$ be the strict upper contour set with espect to the point x, i e , $P_i(x) = \{x' | U_i(x') > U_i(x)\}$ Finally, an *obstructive bundle* is a committee proposal that, given the complex rule, preserves he status quo

PROPOSITION *An obstructive bundle exists if and only if there exists an $x^b \in X'$ such that $A(x^b) \cap P_f(x^s)$ is empty*

PROOF *For necessity assume that, contrary to the proposition, $A(x^b) \cap P_f(x^s)$ is non-empty for all $x^b \in X'$ Then for any x^b there exists a feasible amendment $x^{b'}$ for which $U_f(x^{b'}) > U_f(x^s)$ and which therefore defeats the status quo Thus x^b is not obstructive, a contradiction For sufficiency, note that if for some $x^b \in X'$, $A(x^b) \cap P_f(x^s)$ is empty, then for all amendments $x^{b'} \in A(x^b)$, $U_f(x^{b'}) < U_f(x^s)$ Thus, no amendment passes, so x^b is obstructive*

The proposition may be regarded as theoretically trivial, but its significance is better interpreted in light of the practical manifestations of its condition In particular, the most important constraint on committee strategy is the size and location of X' relative to $P_f(x^s)$ It may be tempting to argue that X' is very large the Ways and Means Committee could, if it really wanted to, propose to tax away *all* oil and gas profits But there are practical limitations on the size of X' relative to the committee's unconstrained jurisdiction X Two such constraints are a committee's expectations about decision making in future sessions and the possibility of miscalculating preferences or procedure (including time constraints) in the current session Both of these seem to have been considered in 1974 A story in the *New York Times* just prior to the Ways and Means report of the general tax bill (an ultimately obstructive bundle) stated that in spite of the likelihood that the bill would not pass in the current session, ". what the Ways and Means Committee does with the tax bill is significant for two reasons The first is that the decisions the committee makes now will acquire a certain standing that will make them hard to overturn later . The second is that there is always the possibility that Congress may somehow find time to debate and pass the tax bill, despite the time-consuming nature of the proceedings against President Nixon" (July 31, 1974, p 24)

In sum, the apparent weakness of the theoretical condition for the existence of an obstructive bundle should not be interpreted as suggesting that

FIGURE A1

SET OF FEASIBLE AMENDMENTS WITH ONE CLOSED RULE DIMENSION (x_1)





FIGURE A2

SET OF FEASIBLE AMENDMENTS WITH TWO CLOSED RULE DIMENSIONS (x_1, x_2)



committee with some closed rule protection can always easily preserve the status quo with a proposal that is outrageous on the protected dimension(s). Because such behavior probably endangers the assignment and passage of the restrictive rule—i e , because rules are endogenous—actual exercises of obstructive bundling strategies are likely to be more restrained and subtle

REFERENCES

Bach, Stanley 1981 The Structure of Choice in the House of Representatives The Impact of Complex Special Rules *Harvard Journal on Legislation*, 18 553–602

Balz, Daniel J 1974 Tax Report Ways and Means Seeks to Maintain Power and Prestige *National Journal* June 22 pp 913–20

Baron, David P and John A Ferejohn 1987 The Power to Propose Manuscript, Stanford University Stanford, CA

Black, Duncan 1958 *The Theory of Committees and Elections* London Cambridge University Press

Davidson, Roger, and Walter J Oleszek 1977 *Congress Against Itself* Indianapolis Indiana University Press

Denzau, Arthur T , and Robert J Mackay 1983 Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior *American Journal of Political Science* 27 740–61

Dimson, Elroy 1979 Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading *Journal of Financial Economics*, 7 197–223

Fama, Eugene F 1976 *Foundations of Finance* New York Basic Books

Fenno, Richard F 1973 *Congressmen in Committees* Boston Little, Brown

Gilligan, Thomas W and Keith Krehbiel 1987 Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 3(2) 145–93

Kramer, Gerald H 1972 Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 2 165–80

Krehbiel, Keith 1986 Restrictive Rules in Theory and Practice Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society Baltimore MD

Mackay, Robert J , and Carolyn L Weaver 1983 Commodity Bundling and Agenda Control in the Public Sector *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 611–35

Manley John F 1970 *The Politics of Finance The House Committee on Ways and Means* Boston Little, Brown

Morrison, Edward F 1975 Energy Tax Legislation The Failure of the 93rd Congress *Harvard Journal on Legislation*, 12 369–414

Roberts, Brian 1987 Voters, Investors and the Value of Political Information Manuscript University of Texas, Austin, TX

Robinson, James 1963 *The House Rules Committee* Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill

Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal 1978 Political Resource Allocation Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo *Public Choice*, 33 27–43

Rudder, Catherine 1977 Committee Reform and the Revenue Process In Lawrence C Dodd and Bruce I Oppenheimer, eds , *Congress Reconsidered* Washington Congressional Quarterly Press

Schwert, William G 1981 Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation *Journal of Law and Economics* 27 121–58

Shepsle, Kenneth A , and Barry R Weingast 1987 The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power *American Political Science Review*, 81 85–104

Value Trade-off

Saguiv A. Hadari
Stanford University

The dilemma of 'value trade-off' (VTO) stems from the combined difficulties of "normative pluralism" (i.e., the ever-present possibility of conflicts among values within one moral system) and incommensurability (i.e., the lack of a common unit to measure relative gains and losses in the implementation of different values). The problem thus defined is common to a broad range of practices and disciplines, and the identification of its formal structure could serve as a heuristic device to encourage a sharing of insights and to stimulate better theoretical and empirical research. These possibilities are presented, and an initial typology of possible extrication moves is delineated and illustrated through the examination of four major works in recent normative theory.

Maximizing individual preferences as well as collective goals often proves more complicated a project than our intuition would have it. As a rule, scarcity of resources (whether natural or artificial) entails choice among goals, making optimization imperative and thereby giving economics its raison d'être. Also, excess of information (in comparison to processing costs and capabilities) necessitates a toning-down of expectations, encouraging the pragmatic "satisficing" of preferences which characterizes "bounded rationality."

More particularly, the maximization of narrow self-interest at times assumes counterintuitive aspects. Once one's interest is bound up with a public good, acting self-interestedly might well prevent the attainment of that good. Such of course is the lesson so elegantly delivered by the Prisoner's Dilemma matrix.

As for normative decision making, specifically the maximization of a set of values or ideas constituting a living ethos or a theoretical moral system, it too is plagued with some particular problems. First, no known ethos has managed to be entirely coherent. The list of virtues which taken together defines the moral ideal in various traditions has always harbored multiple possibilities for conflict. In these cases optimization, a degree of compromise entailing the failure to fully implement all the relevant values involved, becomes imperative, regardless of scarcity. Can a society simultaneously promote full equality and full liberty? Can conflicts between civic and filial duty, modesty and honesty, or patriotism and justice be eliminated forever? Forcing us to admit the existence and confront the difficulties of this state of "normative pluralism" has been a lifelong effort for Sir Isaiah Berlin (see also, more recently, Nagel, 1979, chap. 9).

Second, no common unit of measurement is available to ground a calcula-

tion of the maximization of different values. While comparisons betwee grees of equality or liberty in different societies are possible, in spite o sential contests over respective definitions (Connolly, 1982), no proce translation has been found enabling us to compute optimal mixture equality and liberty What gain in liberty adequately compensates for lo in equality, or vice versa? Answers perforce remain discursive and ine with no prospects of algorithms for irrefutable conclusions Bernard Willi in refining Berlin's discussion, has made this aspect of the issue more exp (1981, chap 5, see also Barry and Rae, 1975)

The specific problem I wish to address is constituted by the intersectio pluralist conflict and incommensurability Taking this logical next step sults in a structure which clarifies a crucial difficulty in normative deci making, the practical expression of a thorny—if neglected—theoretical lemma To be sure, the specific normative problems I have mentioned well known and have been the subject of intense study Indeed, I will duce more evidence still of the widespread recognition of value trad cases by different authors and disciplines My contribution here consist the explicit formulation of the isomorphic structure of these separa treated dilemmas, and in the argument for its theoretical and practical im tance Specifying that structure will permit a fruitful synthesis of prese disparate bodies of thought, and consequently inspire a healthy measur cross-disciplinary fertilization which could influence and guide decis making practices

Value Trade-off Defined

A A decision-making unit must choose a course of action whose implem tation involves two values, V_a and V_b, both held as positive values,

B The alternatives available would each necessarily entail sacrificing least to some degree, either V_a to V_b or the opposite to use technical guage, past some point the values to be upheld are divergent (Sc macher, 1977, pp 120–28),

C No common unit of measurement applies to both V_a and V_b, the val are incommensurable

The need for such a formal definition, in order to call attention to this pr lem in its general form, is underscored by two observations

First (as both Berlin and Williams note), philosophical reflection has st bornly resisted confrontation with the problem of value trade-off (herea VTO) The power of the monistic myth, the unshakeable belief in the u mate harmony of all virtues, remains evident in our intuitive reasoning prion the assumption is that normative theory and practice—at least wit a single moral tradition—must be coherent and internally consistent. M over, a favorite second line of defense whenever value conflicts become apparent (a common occurrence in the literature at least since Greek tra

es) has been to posit the existence of a common yardstick of measurement, that following appropriate procedures, the true and good solution always nerges—once more confirming that all we deem good hangs together From is perspective, the tortuous Platonic redefinitions of "true" courage and "ue" piety which identify them and all virtue with "philosophic knowledge" id a distant yet related expression in modern utilitarian arguments reconcil-g various goods through "precise" calculation of collective "welfare "

In addition, occasional confrontations with VTO dilemmas—usually aimed circumventing particular problems—take the form of disconnected exami-tions of various specific cases Consider the following examples

You have promised your child an all-too-rare common afternoon of enter-nment, yet your dear friend from Australia has just flown in, unexpec-lly, for a short stay Do you break your promise to your child or shirk your endly duty?[1]

A communal or governmental body needs to decide on the possible loca-n of a nuclear waste disposal Does it neglect acute short-run energy eds, or betray its obligation to future generations?[2]

A politician faces a terrible choice abide by her ethical standards, and re-t undue physical violence as a policy means, or attempt to extract the loca-n of threatening bombs from a political prisoner Does she order the tor-re of the prisoner, or fail to ensure the safety of the population?[3]

Lawmakers contemplate tax reforms Milton Friedman and John Rawls ch drafted their proposal Do the legislators overlook gross socioeconomic equalities, or do they neglect the demands of efficiency?[4]

Finally, to end where my awareness of the problem began in envisioning better democratic society, theorists must balance the oft-conflicting claims liberty and equality Does one trust Marx or Tocqueville?

Throughout these examples, different decision-making units come into ay from the individual to the collective, from the politician through the pert to the theorist Simultaneously, the divergent values vary, retaining ly, artificially, their fixed number reaching further to a realistic V_n seems ore than could be tackled immediately Furthermore trade-offs are neces-y in those different cases for different kinds of reasons from the practical tates of specific circumstances to the inflexibilities of theoretical logic In first two examples, a fortuitous coincidence and possibly temporary lack technical knowledge force a trade-off Yet, as Michael Walzer, in analyzing next example, already demonstrated against Merleau-Ponty VTOs are t always the result of uncertainty (1974, p 74) Thus in the last example e values involved are *by definition* divergent, if implemented in thor-

[1]This example is borrowed from R M Hare (1980 pp 171-93)

[2]This example is taken from Susan Fallows (1979)

[3]This example is adapted from Michael Walzer (1974)

[4]This case is drawn from Arthur Okun (1975)

oughly uncompromising fashion. To secure complete "negative" freedom (from constraints) with sufficient "positive" freedom to prevent manipulation of individually held values, would prevent the achievement of a full equality of conditions. To be sure, definitions of liberty and equality not rooted in liberal political theory might eliminate the conflict between these values as well. (On this whole issue, see Nielsen, 1984.) In between the extremes illustrated by these examples, a case straddles both categories. Are efficiency and equality unavoidably divergent by definition? Within a capitalist framework, the answer appears positive. Yet a collective economy such as the kibbutz can presumably socialize its members to give to their utmost and find satisfaction in a rigorously equal compensation. Evidently, disputations on definitions aside, this dilemma presents a thoroughly empirical side: at issue is the psychology of incentives, a topic with a long pedigree in economic theory (e.g., Margolin, 1974, Gintis, 1976, Edwards, 1979). Thus, at times, the second step of my formal definition—"divergence"—could call for an empirical examination. This theoretical analysis, however, is restricted to VTOs where no practical escape routes are available.

Finally, the footnotes, if not the cases themselves, indicate the great range of disciplines involved: philosophy, public policy, ethics, economics, and political theory. Indeed, the list easily could be enlarged. Yet, without recognition of the common structure described above, the essential identity of these various dilemmas goes unnoticed. Consequently, superfluous repetition of past efforts combines with a lack of cooperation with and amongst disciplines to slow down significant progress.

Unfortunately, this failure to recognize the dilemma in its general form (point 2 above), by ensuring the pervasiveness of VTO will not be detected, merely reinforces the tendency to deny its reality (point 1 above). A vicious circle is thus created, making obvious the need for the concept of VTO and the accompanying structure as introduced above. The concept, as any deliberate name-giving, is meant to call attention to a neglected problem. The structure is consciously designed to include issues elsewhere addressed in total separation, under the rubrics of "conflict of obligations," "controversy," "dirty hands," "compromise," "trade-off," "value-conflict," and "dilemma"—a probably incomplete yet sufficiently suggestive list.[5]

This last observation concerning the illustration of the reach of the concept of VTO most pointedly raises the crucial question to be addressed in the remainder of this paper. Can one provide a convincing justification for this de-

[5]Aside from the sources mentioned earlier, "Compromise" comes from R. Pennock and J. Chapman (1979), "Value-Conflict" from B. Barry and D. Rae (1975), as well as M. McPherson (1983), and "Dilemmas" is R. Dahl's term (1982). There is also a "Value Conflict" school in sociology and social work characterized by a deep pessimism concerning social change always impeded by the clash of values and by different parts of the social system (see Spector and Kitsuse 1977, pp. 50–53).

ıbstraction from characteristics until now considered essential? In-
; character of the decision-making unit, the specific values involved,
ı the type of concrete circumstances under which a VTO occurred
h deemed sufficient to determine the discourse applicable to each
r dilemma, hence to keep their various resolutions separate Can
ıfication of the fundamental structure they all share make an impor-
ribution?[6]

"Value Trade-off" Justified

:an the successful introduction of a new concept of this kind reason-
ect to achieve? Reflecting on previous examples, three distinct
nterrelated types of achievements appear particularly noteworthy
-wise unrelated theoretical discussions and practical problems are
d, once it is perceived that they share the same structure defined by
ept Consequently, insights can be shared, common strategies can
ed, and generally a healthy process of interdisciplinary fertilization
ed (2) A key aspect of practice which simultaneously raises a chal-
heoretical issue is suddenly illuminated (such as the suboptimaliza-
lf-interested rationality in the case of the PDG) (3) As a result, a
program centered on the structure uncovered can be defined, in-
oth a return to traditional sources in the hope of recovering their
nding and approaches to the problem, and an attempt to discover
s of tackling it I contend that the concept of VTO holds great prom-
three areas

t presented in the first section of this paper in order to illustrate the
the concept provides ample evidence of the VTO's synthetic poten-
various categories and numerous disciplines thereby included could
tribute an already abundant crop of insights Williams took a modest
in this direction, noting that the clash between divergent values
lar structurally to the oft-discussed "conflict of obligations" (1981
Surely the realization that the dilemma of liberal democracy—rec-
liberty and equality—and the problems of "dirty hands" also share
structure should stimulate some exchange between those ponder-
issues, and further the analysis of all three For example the tradi-
ilosophical extrication move, determining "prima facie" obligations
een to be a particular, a posteriori version of the (a priori) lexical
solution to the political dilemma advocated by Rawls (1971) on
ore will be said in the third section Much could be learned from a
the problems these two approaches share as well as the complica-

1979, p 135) could be read as implying that such an abstract synthetic approach does
nherent complexity of normative issues Yet he could not be judged correct a priori
l resorts to a similarly broad conceptualization in a further chapter of the very same
hap 14, and particularly p 135)

tions generated or avoided by the respective temporal perspectives they each adopt

The dilemma of VTO embodies and highlights a particular problem of normative decision making, the intuitively appealing maximization of all values upheld by a community or included within a coherent moral framework might itself be an incoherent, self-contradictory endeavor. Compromise is at times both necessary and superior, moral absolutism is self-defeating The insight at the core of the concept of VTO, that a confrontation between good and good is often unavoidable, remains until now less familiar, though certainly no less crucial than the one recovered by the PDG (e g., the clash between egoism and public good, which in classical terms would be perceived as the struggle between good and evil) Not only does it offend our most cherished beliefs, but it also robs us of those heavens so dear to dreamers and theorists—perfect utopias The psychological frustration thus accompanying the study of VTO probably accounts for much of its neglect by theorists, past and present, whose eagerness for absolute order and closure in their proposals and blueprints has at times seemed an unavoidable professional deformation Of course, this perpetual tendency only compounds the need for highlighting the dilemma of VTO Yet, in all fairness, another aspect of this particular issue might be partly responsible for the lack of attention from which it has suffered.

Admittedly, while the formal description of VTO identifies the structure of a fundamental dilemma for "normative" rationality, its specifications are vaguer, its range broader than those, for example, of the PDG The problem of course is inherent to the nature of VTO incommensurability makes the comparative computation as well as the ordinal ranking of payoffs impossible, and generally reflection on values perforce must remain discursive and interpretive How can one compare or permanently rank filial duty and patriotism (see Plato's *Eutyphro*), or national security and the rule of law (e g., the recent Shabak affair in Israel)? Moreover, while the PDG matrix offers a *demonstration*, the VTO structure simply *describes* and *defines* a problem specifically, the second and third steps of the definition explicitly introduce the two difficulties in maximizing normative goals (whereas the PDG builds upon the concept of the rational actor to deduce a difficulty in maximizing self-interest)

These added complexities, though, should not be used as excuses for neglect The definition of VTO here offered, as has been amply illustrated, allows for an easy identification of the structure across disciplines and practices—in subjects as diverse as Rousseau's political thought (a sustained reflection on the unbridgeable conflict between the self-sufficient autonomy of "man" and the fulfillment in the collective of "citizens"), or the Israeli-Palestinian dispute (by now, if not historically, a clash between two rights)—and there can be no doubt that the concept pinpoints a core issue for all social and political theory. To strengthen these claims, I will proceed with a

demonstration of the concept's fruitful application, and offer an initial exploration of a representative variety of extrication strategies.

"Value Trade-off" Explored

Approaches to the problem of VTO can be located on a continuum, ranging from a denial of the problem to an admission of impotence in facing it. These extremes are not artificial: names and headings can be nailed to those poles. Bentham's utilitarianism professes to offer a computable solution to all normative decision-making problems, while Weber's decisionism proclaims the absolute finality and irreducibility of normative antinomies. Interestingly, these two approaches share a common conception of rationality, closely akin to scientific and bureaucratic rationality. For both, rational choice consists solely of discursively intelligible means-ends deductions, a narrow conception aptly characterized as the "rationalistic conception of rationality" (Williams, 1985, p. 18). However, their respective elaborations upon this common core lead these approaches to radically opposed conclusions.

Utilitarianism sets itself as a powerful, one-principled system of social and political decision making. The notion of value trade-off has no place in that system, for it claims to overcome all alleged problems of incommensurability. Utils, units denoting the satisfaction of personal preferences, offer a common measure for all normative choices. Thus all one need do is identify the alternative maximizing everyone's welfare calculated in utils. Through the reductionism of utils (exit incommensurability), all values boil down to welfare (exit divergences). The epistemological appeal of such an economic arithmetical formula is obvious (Taylor, 1982). Unfortunately, its shortcomings are just as glaring.


To recapitulate, the criticisms of utilitarianism would require an amount of space disproportionate to the value of the task. For the purpose of this essay, specifically to preserve the critical third part of the definition of VTO, a three-pronged attack on its alleged refutation of incommensurability will suffice. First, can one really quantify any component of normative decisions? Trying to put a value on a life, to cite but one well-debated case, not only seems morally questionable in itself, but also has been judged impossible in practice (Broome, 1978). Then, assuming utils apply uniformly, can one truly satisfy the enormous demands the system makes on empirical information? Attempting to gather everybody's preferences about all possible states of affairs that any decision needs to include is a practical impossibility for a modern state. Moreover, here as well the effort by a central agency to concentrate such detailed information, however well-intentioned, seems distasteful and possibly threatening. Furthermore, it remains a conceptually foggy endeavor. People's preferences are not independent of the government's own performance, hence a vicious circularity lies at the core of the system. All theories legitimized by satisfying individual preferences confront this fundamental problem of endogeneity. Neither are preferences perfectly stable

over time—while changes might be abrupt and unpredictable—hence, all computations have but a temporary value. Finally, granting both the existence and utility of utils, as well as the availability of all the information required for their computation, the system still displays a remarkably limited reach. Could one really accept the irrelevance of questions of equity? Yet social decision making on the basis of maximum average utility simply erases the problem of distribution from the equation. On such crucial VTO questions, utilitarianism is both unrealistic, in missing a key normative element, and useless, if not worse The tendency of narrow computation techniques is to encourage an overemphasis on aspects lending themselves to crude quantification, and to allow a neglect of all others, thus generating a systematic bias (cf Tribe, 1971, 1972, on the dictatorial "dwarfing of soft variables" by quantitative methods) Williams's seemingly harsh conclusion that utilitarianism, albeit technically sophisticated, is "absurdly primitive" thus becomes intelligible (Williams and Smart, 1973, p 142)

Similarly, the resigned admission of defeat characterizing decisionism ("romantic defeatism," Nagel, 1979, p 137), being informed by a quest for the same kind of rational deductions in questions of values, becomes clear in view of utilitarianism's complete failure In Weber's tragic vision, decisions about and amongst ends take the character of existential choices between "warring gods," acts of faith forever removed from any rational justification There is an insoluble and deadly conflict between the values among which man must choose, or rather pick (see Morgenbesser and Ullman-Margalit, 1977, for an analysis of this neglected category of selection) The shortcomings of this extreme position are as obvious as those of its utilitarian counterpart Clearly, as a method of decision making, its contribution remains rather thin decisionism can only serve to reemphasize the inevitability of value conflict and the necessity of choice Moreover, as a description of normative decision making, it fails to do justice to two main characteristics of the actual process

1 Even Jean-Paul Sartre ultimately recanted the absurd notion that we pick (much less create) values from scratch, as entirely autonomous egos Granted, there are "no intelligible values inscribed in the sky," revealed to us universally and for eternity, yet this correct premise does not entail that we create our normative world ex nihilo Recently, Alasdair MacIntyre eloquently criticized this concept of the "disembodied self" common to Weber and the existentialists (1984, p 32).
2 While rationalistic justifications of the kind expected by decisionism (and allegedly produced by utilitarianism) might not be available, normative decision makers certainly make it a point to justify their choice in what they consider a rational fashion Unless all such attempts are mere deceptions or self-deceptions, decisionism thus misses a crucial element in the decision process concerning VTOs (see Nagel, 1979, p 135)

TABLE 1



Once more, a theory's all-too-narrow focus places a dimension of reality beyond its reach.

Presumably, this double failure of decisionism partially explains the stubborn persistence of utilitarianism, despite all the criticisms. Thus, rationalistic reductionism and irrationalist defeatism continually reinforce one another. Yet, in truth, for both approaches the same narrow model of rationality creates a blind spot on the crucial issue of value trade-offs: while the first fails to perceive their existence, the latter cannot envision their nonarbitrary resolution. Either there is no problem, or there is no solution.

The continuum from utilitarianism to decisionism thus charts a movement from simultaneous denials of the force of normative divergence and incommensurability to simultaneous affirmations of both. Neither incommensurability without divergence nor divergence without incommensurability would create a dilemma: one could either "satisfice" all values desired at one, or compute satisfactory trade-offs. Accordingly, all extrication moves—which by definition recognize a problem, yet presume to offer a solution—must adopt one of two logical escape routes:

I. deny divergence, or at least its practical consequences, or
II. deny incommensurability, or at least its practical reach.

Denying both would force one back to the reductionism of utils, measuring the one ultimate value, welfare. Accepting both leads one to the defeatism of arbitrary decisions—at least within the strictures of our current conceptions of rationality.

Furthermore, gambits of either kind can appear in one or two guises:

A. an objectivist, universalist version, or,
B. a pragmatic, culture-bound one.

A fourfold typology thus results, enclosed within the continuum initially defined as schematically represented in Table 1 above.

Should the VTO be a real and crucial normative dilemma, as I am suggesting, at least three consequences might reasonably be expected: theoretical efforts should have stumbled upon the dilemma, developed their extrication moves within the typology just presented, and thereby necessarily failed to

confront the full, combined force of normative divergence and inco surability Limiting my remarks to four recent, critically acclaimed w normative theory, I will vindicate these three claims

IA

"The traditional moral theories are for the most part single-princi intuitionistic, so that the working out of a serial ordering is novelty for a first step" (Rawls, 1971, p 45, hereafter TJ for *A Theory of Just*

Thus writes John Rawls, thereby clarifying his intent to steer aw both poles on the continuum, and fashion a middle-of-the-road ap His theory of justice explicitly sets out to confront the issue of VTO assignment of weights (to competing principles) is an essential an minor part of a conception of justice" (TJ, p. 41) Rawls rejects the mo utilitarianism, admitting the existence of a plurality of normative pr (ibid) incommensurability is acknowledged Yet an absolute relianc tuitions alone to balance among these principles seems to him a very method Rather, one must go beyond intuitionism's denial of the po of useful and explicit solutions to "the priority problem" (TJ, p 40)

Two problems of normative divergence are addressed directly by theory the balancing of liberty and equality, and the adjudication b equality, on the one hand, and efficiency and welfare on the other H tions, embodied in the two principles of justice, introduce a new mec of decision making lexical ordering The concept denotes a strict hi amongst the normative principles to be implemented Thus, Ra sentially sides with Tocqueville against Marx, granting absolute pri liberty over equality (TJ, p 302) Then, equality itself takes priori efficiency—contra Friedman in my earlier example—as well as welf fined as "maximizing the sum of advantages" (the utilitarian notion criticized for erasing all questions of equity and distribution) (TJ, p

What makes this clear-cut solution possible? Rawls grants the exist a plurality of conflicting values, yet shies away from the messy task o ing trade-offs In his own words, "a serial ordering avoids, then, ha balance principles at all, those earlier in the ordering have an a weight, to to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exc (TJ, p 43) Should this rigid, mechanical solution be acceptable to would wonder why a thorny dilemma existed in the first place— what could have been the cause of the normative divergence eve found so hard to resolve? Rawls, of course, via the construct of the position, seeks to defend the rationality of his absolute priorities Yet have taken a strong act of will for him to underplay the problems he perceived with his solution, and sincerely formulate some of the assur he was forced consequently to introduce A few examples will just criticism

1. Undeniably, in an underdeveloped society, one could be willing, rationally, to exchange lesser liberty for greater material well-being. This is the typical trade-off adopted by many countries confronting "the dialectics of modernization and political development" (Bill and Leiden, 1984, pp. 9–16; see also Almond and Powell, 1978, pp. 411–15 on the trade-off between liberty and security). However, though the decision makers in the original position do not know in what type of society they will live, they are assumed to believe that the passing of time, universally, brings about an irreversible state of material well-being, where liberty becomes the most prized value (TJ, p. 542). On the basis of this shaky historical law, they then ratify the serial ordering favoring liberty.[7] Thus is the problem of normative divergence eschewed.
2. Then again, why should one believe the "overlapping consensus" (1985, p. 225) on the priority of liberty to be characteristic of a rich, materialistic society? Tocqueville certainly warned of the spiraling guiles of materialism, appreciating well that any economic system produces its own system of values. In a democratic, capitalistic America, materialism and a passive retreat to privatism would rank higher than liberty, indeed endanger it. Yet Rawls, here sharing one of utilitarianism's false assumptions, reasons as if "men's wants are not largely created by institutions and social forms" (TJ, pp. 542–43; notice that when it comes to education, Rawls's faith in socialization knows few bounds). Thus an efficient, successful economy could free its managers and workers to appreciate and concentrate upon the merits of liberty. On the basis of this faulty understanding of social psychology, the rigid lexical ordering holds.
3. Finally, against the overwhelming evidence of his own society, Rawls assumes that in a developed community moving toward greater equality "members take little interest in their relative position as such" (TJ, p. 544). In one utopian sweep, Marx, Weber, and Veblen are all forgotten. Why this unbridled idealism? A more realistic outlook, recognizing the yearning for status and prestige, would threaten the conclusion that raising productivity and efficiency will become, in due course, secondary goals. Here, then, a naive social psychology is needed to shore up an unlikely historical law.[8]

Although these examples sufficiently illustrate the inadequate ad hoc argumentation forced upon Rawls in defense of his allegedly rational escape from normative divergence, one more case deserves special mention. Per-

[7] The variety and complexity of historical development paths is beautifully illustrated in Eckstein's study of British political history, which emphasizes the simultaneous growth of effective centralization and constraints on power, the harmonious achievement of both authority and liberty (1962, pp. 82–83).

[8] In all fairness, one should note Rawls's progressive retreat from the objectivism of his "sub specie aeternitatis" rationalism (TJ, p. 587) to a more pragmatic, nontranscendental stance in recent writings (1985).

haps the most contrived of Rawls's ingenious intellectual constructs, his distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty, best expresses the arbitrariness of the lexical solution (TJ, pp. 204–5) To separate liberty from its enjoyment must be reckoned a desperate gambit, yet Rawls had no choice. Equality and liberty are not only divergent, at times, but also convergent values severe inequality, as both Marx and Tocqueville acknowledged, threatens liberty Thus one must work on both fronts to secure some progress However in Rawls's scheme, the implementation of each principle is not only autonomous, but also hierarchically ordered: first liberty, and when it be secured, equality To keep the two neat rubrics airtight, a bogus distinction was a small price to pay Hence, while the "worth of liberty" admittedly depends on a level of equality, "liberty," however thin and abstract, does not

Unsurprisingly, then, Rawls's lexical ordering of values makes good sense only in a somewhat artificial and greatly flattened social landscape In complex reality as we experience it, VTOs—problems of normative incommensurability and divergence—are unavoidable Only more flexible accommodations allow for the partial flourishing of all values involved After all, should one respect a strict hierarchical ordering, lower ranked values might never come into play Indeed, should one allocate top priority to a value of unlimited implementation, e g , efficiency (presumably), no other value should ever be considered

IB

Having to forego the vertical ordering of values, it would seem tempting to explore a horizontal ordering of the realms of life to which they apply Such a differentiation might ease the balancing between competing values, possibly allocating to each a sphere of absolute dominance Albeit recast in the vocabulary of VTO, this is Michael Walzer's proposal in *Spheres of Justice* (1983, SJ hereafter)

Walzer also clearly distances himself from the extremes of utilitarianism and decisionism The search for unity, although a hallowed tradition since Plato, must be recognized as a misguided philosophic reflex (SJ, p 4) Normative decision making in general, and choice amongst principles of justice in particular are not a science, as utilitarianism hoped, but rather an art (SJ, p xiv), since neither a single criterion nor a single decision point are available (SJ, p. 4) On the other hand, while Walzer grants the culture-bound particularism of his argument, he certainly rejects the notion that its basis is decisionistic and arbitrary. The only contingencies admitted remain the circumstances of a specific time and place. Within that framework, a clarifiable network of intersubjectively shared meanings holds I shall return to this somewhat optimistic conventionalism, when its considerable ambition will become obvious. Walzer believes or feigns believing that in the secret of our hearts we all share DSOC's aspirations.

As for the main problem of normative divergence at issue, once more it is the delicate balancing of liberty and equality. Approaching it from the latter angle, Walzer nevertheless seeks to escape the Procrustean bed of a literal, simple equality the complex equality he defends would secure "an egalitarianism that is consistent with liberty" (SJ, p xiv) Walzer's proposal, now stated from his own original vantage point, is to create a separate 'sphere of justice" for every good to be distributed The intersubjectively shared meaning of each social good, he contends, clearly suggests the normative principle governing its allocation, thus avoiding an irreducible clash among values, while recognizing their irreducible plurality Once more, incommensurability is acknowledged, and a necessary divergence in practice denied

Confronting this innovative solution, two related queries at once come to mind What is this "social meaning," and how does one uncover it? Surely careful answers await these expectable questions However, Walzer here disappoints us no definitions or explanations are forthcoming Should one closely watch his proceedings to comprehend the methodical core around which his proposal is built, more perplexity ensues With amazing consistency, Walzer displays a social good, produces its social meaning, and transmutes it into the appropriate normative principle From empty hat, to rabbit, to pigeon, nothing disrupts the act Should two pigeons appear, they are both allowed to fly without further ado Fortunately, only in the case of the allocation of office does Walzer postulate two applicable principles, neglecting to leave some further clue as to adjudication between them (SJ, pp 163–64) As to the real nature of the rabbit, little is known Walzer emphatically distinguishes the "internal logic" of a good from its "social meaning" the first is universal and immutable, while the second varies across cultures Given the premise of Walzer's argument, one should expect only the historically specific to determine what value applies, yet this is not the case with holidays and vacations (SJ, p 196), education (SJ, p 198), or the discussion of the political sphere (SJ, p 285) Indeed, his surprisingly strong conclusion that all politics is essentially democratic relies on an alleged "logic of politics" rather than any contingent "social meaning" (SJ, p 303) Walzer's 'art of differentiation," highly persuasive as it is, boils down to a thoroughly personal hermeneutics Neither the uniqueness of meaning, nor its broad intersubjective nature, much less the replicability of the whole alchemical/interpretive process, are secured

Leaving the method behind, what then is wrong with Walzer's solution? Once more an honest confrontation with VTO is avoided, hence the link with reality, inevitably, has been severed In truth, normative divergence appears within and between spheres, making light of Walzer's airtight compartments Surely spheres themselves are not single-principled A decision on immigration policy—allocating the good of citizenship—brings into play at least the values of humanitarianism and preservation of national self-identity both, as Walzer recognizes, while failing to suggest any mechanism of ad-

judication between them (see Galston, 1984, p 332) Just as clearly, spheres overlap and transgress boundaries After all, such was the initial motivation for Walzer's proposal Would love or recognition remain impermeable to riches, while the latter still flow from the vagaries of the free market with its resulting inequalities (see Rosenblum, 1984, pp 593–94)? Perhaps more pointedly, can and should love and recognition be kept entirely independent? One is forced to conclude that the indissoluble bonds between social goods and their social meanings, on which Walzer's solution relies, are nothing but a series of shotgun weddings

IIA

A similar conclusion informs Alasdair MacIntyre's study in moral theory, *After Virtue* (1984, hereafter AV). Dissatisfied with unreflective celebrations of a shallow pluralism, MacIntyre contends that our moral discourse is but an "unharmonious mélange of ill-assorted fragments" (AV, p 10) Bits and pieces of once whole normative worlds, from Aristotle through Aquinas to the Enlightenment, misconceived as a coherent totality, challenge our rational capacities, leaving us stranded in interminable moral debates (AV, p 7)

Unsurprisingly, then, we live in a Weberian world (AV, p 109) Platonic monism, and its related normative ideal, the unity of the virtues, make little sense when all rational efforts ultimately flounder on a dreaded "conceptual incommensurability" (AV, p 8) Confronted with this abyss, over which each side's careful defense of its arguments becomes a mere hurling of assertions and counterassertions, the pretense of impersonal rationality collapses (AV, p 9) Yet MacIntyre, however sarcastic, is not gleeful at the sight of this failure In fact, Weberian "emotivism" appears just as rationally rootless to him (AV, p 109) Rather than defining the essence of normative argument, it at best describes the sorrowful state of our moral discourse, a particular historical degeneration one could hope to transcend

Neither Plato nor Weber, in fact, are of much help in confronting VTO, such as the inevitable balancing of equality and liberty, one of MacIntyre's three initial examples of a current "interminable moral debate" (AV, p 7) Both bland denial and blind leap fail to recapture the complexities of VTO, a moral drama Sophocles depicted most systematically (AV, pp. 142–43) His vision, as presented by MacIntyre, incorporates elements from both extremes, synthesized into a more compelling story "There *is* an objective moral order, but our perceptions of it are such that we cannot bring rival moral truths into complete harmony with each other and yet the acknowledgement of the moral order and of moral truth makes the kind of choice which a Weber or a Berlin urges upon us out of the question" (AV, p 143)

The lack of punctuation combines with the grandeur of the conception to leave the reader breathless Yes, moral Truth exists, hence arbitrary normative decisions are unsatisfactory (exit Weber) Yet, our dim lights fail to

illuminate this Truth in its harmonious entirety, leaving our moral dilemmas intact. Not comprehending commensurability, we face tragic divergences. How does one find one's way, then, in this mysteriously ordered moral universe? MacIntyre discounts Sophocles' *deus ex machina* interventions as dramatic endings rather than moral dénouements (AV, p. 143). The real lesson to be learned lies in the molding of human life into a coherent narrative, incorporating individual and community in its account of the tragic choice (AV, p. 144).

What does this "narrative solution" offer? MacIntyre succeeds in broadening the focus from specific VTOs and their resolution to broad traditions of moral discourse. The query for algorithms designed to solve specific VTOs, to his mind, is misguided. The real problem lies with our culture's lack of a coherent moral tradition. Its key, then, would be the restoration of such an ethos, within which normative divergences and quests for right attitudes in confronting them would once more make sense. Deploying the vocabulary of literary criticism onto the moral world, he elaborates on the significance of "genre" in narratives of the self, on the phenomenon of "imbeddedness" (AV, pp. 212–13), and gives his new perspective a classic canonic form: man is "essentially a story-telling animal" (AV, p. 216). Most importantly, personal narratives gain coherence and significance from their belonging to a tradition—be it Aristotelian or liberal-individualist (AV, p. 222). Within a single, unitary tradition, normative divergences retain their tragic nature, but regain a sense of right and wrong concerning their outcome: both single-principled calculations and arbitrary decisions are out of the question.

What is wrong with this solution? In this case, more particularly, the very term "solution" appears an exaggeration. Indeed the quest for a specific algorithm applying to particular VTOs has been abandoned entirely, and replaced by a more ambitious and still more elusive attempt to deny the force of incommensurability and reconstruct a coherent ethos. MacIntyre disdains concrete decision-making procedures in favor of vague suggestions for a fruitful state of mind. The latter, clearly, constitutes the polar opposite of the modern temper: a belief in a meaningful if unknown objective moral order anchored in a sheltered, stable moral tradition. Embedded in this reconstructed ethos, narratives addressing the VTO dilemma can make sense to a community and calm its moral anguish. Little indication is given as to the practical implementation of such a radical transformation.[9] Ironically, MacIntyre, rightly dismissive of decisive divine interventions in Sophoclean plays, leaves us waiting for a new, different St. Benedict, capable of build-

[9] "We know virtually nothing about the factors determining the ebb and flow of moral beliefs, conventions, and commitments," writes Stuart Hampshire, "and we know very little about the conditions under which an intense and exclusive attachment to a particular way of life develops as opposed to a more selective and critical attitude to the moral conventions that prevail in the environment" (1983, p. 160).

ing local communities where a rejuvenated moral life could be sustained (AV, p 263)[10]

IIB

The contribution of Ronald Beiner's investigation, *Political Judgment* (1983, hereafter PJ), from my perspective, consists primarily of a more rigorous—some would say reckless—pursuit of the implications of the "narrative solution " Underplaying throughout the importance of historical wholes and moral traditions, Beiner stresses the purely rhetorical, persuasive aspect of the narrative approach His method remains thoroughly traditional, relying on an exegetical extraction from the works of three contemporary masters (Arendt, Gadamer and Habermas) of common Aristotelian and Kantian residuals, which in turn are studied for their insights into the objectivity and autonomy of individual judgment within a community

Beiner's starting point should by now be familiar "There must exist a way of breaking the twin stranglehold of methodical rules and arbitrary subjectivism" (PJ, p 2) His theoretical ambition, however, is perhaps greater than those of the authors previously examined, for Beiner wishes to identify a means of adjudication between "thick" theories of the good life (PJ, p 126) The ultimate result of this quest once more points to the persuasive character of narratives as the sole way out of moral dilemmas such as VTO[11]

What further steps differentiate Beiner's efforts on behalf of the "narrative solution" from MacIntyre's? Both the emphasis on the imbeddedness in a coherent moral tradition and the allusions to an "objective moral order," however elusive, are gone Rhetoric stands alone Beiner thus rids his solution of the difficulties of reconstructing a wholesome tradition and restoring a belief in moral objectivity All he needs to demonstrate remains the possibility

[10]To accept MacIntyre's analysis, knowing this gloomy conclusion to be its culmination, would demand a profound trust in his logic Unfortunately the case for MacIntyre's position relies more on richness of illusions than on rigor of argumentation He explains that the ideal of proof is rather a barren one in philosophy and truth more often emerges out of a consensus on applicable rational procedures (AV, pp 259–60) Indeed it would seem that the 'rationalistic concept of rationality common to both utilitarianism and decisionism effectively prevents the development of constructive approaches to the issue of VTO Yet MacIntyre's attempt to lift himself and the debate above this cursed continuum remains but a promise in a future book, to elaborate upon the systematic if unaccounted concept of rationality underlying *After Virtue* (AV, p 260)

[11]I might venture, at this point, to help the reader more than either MacIntyre or Beiner do the following example of a narrative elaborated as an extrication move from a thorny VTO, however, will only testify to my own conceptualization of what in their works remains, uncharitably disembodied suggestion

An important theme of *Democracy in America* (1969) is the coming to terms by its author with the rise of democracy As objectively as possible, Tocqueville compares the new order with the one his family and education prepared him to love and serve The relative flaws and merits of

within a shared culture, of creating convincing narratives and of choosing among them. The first requirement is easily secured. Normative conflicts, claims Beiner, cannot develop without a modicum of conceptual contact between the competing claims (PJ, p. 142).[12] To confront a tragic choice, one must have an "underlying substratum of agreement" yet no means of decision (PJ, p. 142). Incommensurability thus reaches not as deep as it would seem. On such grounds, the elaboration of conciliatory, persuasive narratives is possible. By the same token, Weber's absolute "polytheism," as well as utilitarianism's reductionary computations, fail to capture the true character of moral conflict (PJ, p. 142). What about the multiplicity of possible narratives, however? MacIntyre considered the confrontation of multiple normative traditions, yet could only hint at a possible selection through dialectical overcoming in an appendix to the second edition of *After Virtue* (AV, pp. 276–77). This Hegelian solution would give the advantage to a moral tradition better equipped to satisfy defined human needs, providing the competing traditions share an overlapping set of similarly conceived needs. The precariousness of this solution should be obvious. It remains contingent on the actual existence of such an overlap, and in need of further demanding caveats. Thus, the shared needs should be more important than the different ones, for both traditions, an agreement on the deceptively simple notion of "needs satisfaction" must be secured, and a will to engage in such possibly earth-shattering debate must be present. Beiner's approach to the problem, once more, is less contrived and more plausible: we all possess a "capacity for weighting the truth of a narrative" (PJ, p. 126). No new faculty is hereby postulated. Beiner is merely describing, a bit euphemistically, our ability to distinguish "rich and penetrating" stories from "colorless and superficial" ones (PJ, p. 126).

The main problem of this straightforward solution lies in this aforementioned euphemism: the equation of literary qualities to moral truths lacks any justification. Should poets, or, in a culture with different bestsellers, how-to authors, really be legislators? Beiner's own story, at this crucial

aristocracy and democracy are meticulously noted with the accustomed Tocquevillian emphasis on the normative costs and benefits (e.g., p. 703). Yet no computation can verify the primacy of heroism over peace-loving (or vice versa) and no single measure can be found to permit the addition and subtraction of all the values involved in finding out the sociopolitical order to be preferred. To make up his reader's mind, as well as his own one suspects, Tocqueville fashioned a quasi-religious narrative in which secular history assumed the character of Providential progress (p. 12), and the vote for democracy came to reflect an effort to empathize with the (suddenly clear) Divine view (p. 704). Justice, the key concept in this artful narrative, ultimately resided in the improved well-being of the many, a notion so familiar to us as to be "self-evident," yet not one to be rationally deduced from the normative cost-benefit table put together by Tocqueville.

[12] Beiner uses then retracts the term "commensurability" as it implies "more than simply a common ground, a common measure which would effectively dissipate the tragic dimension of normative judgment" (PJ, p. 142). The thrust of his solution comes out most clearly in this slip

juncture, is deficient and unconvincing. Another major issue is similarly sidestepped. The all-important decision concerning the appropriate community to be addressed and appealed to is barely discussed. According to Beiner, it lies beyond the limits of theoretical inquiry, being a concrete, particular decision (PJ, p. 144). Nevertheless, Beiner succeeds in retrieving a recognizable aspect of what it means to be persuaded, the one habitually overshadowed by the exclusive emphasis on rational argument. Interestingly, in retrospect, the construction of persuasive narratives—Arendt's "story-telling"—ultimately defines Beiner's endeavor as well as his colleagues' (see, e.g., Barry's perceptive comments on Walzer's SJ, 1984), though neither he nor they openly present their arguments as such. Presumably, mere self-delusion does not fully explain this reticence. Rather, theories put forward as stories would undoubtedly suffer from a grave loss of authority with both their professional and lay public.

Thus, as my logical examination concluded, VTO appears as a crucial dilemma for normative theory, and the four fundamental extrication moves—each independently developed by a different thinker—fail to resolve it through their denial of either divergence or incommensurability (or at least of their practical force). All four thinkers explicitly reject both extremes of the utilitarianism-decisionism continuum. They acknowledge the existence of a normative dilemma, yet refuse to consider either divergence (for Rawls and Walzer) or incommensurability (for MacIntyre and Beiner) an insurmountable problem. However the labels used by each to designate the extremes they reject vary: intuitionism, arbitrary decisions, emotivism, and subjectivism respectively oppose utilitarianism, monism (for both Walzer and MacIntyre), and methodical rules. This variation in labels has some significance. Against the background of other nuances emphasized by each theorist, it alerts us to the second dichotomy governing extrication moves from VTO: the quest for an objective, transcendental moral order (common to Rawls and MacIntyre, albeit in different ways), as opposed to the more modest search for pragmatic, culture-bound moral conventions (characteristic of Walzer and Beiner). Each work examined thus represents a clearly defined "fourth" of the prospective extrication moves from VTO.[13]

[13]Moreover, to those familiar with the works examined, the fruitfulness of VTO as an interpretive tool should be obvious. The focus on the conceptualization of an approach of the VTO dilemma provided a direct insight into the core of these various theoretical constructs. In fact the particular emphasis on this one fundamental issue not only eased the detection of critical junctures, but also enabled the prediction of significant failures, wherever a theory shied away from an honest, straightforward confrontation with VTOs. Potentially problematic areas in terms of subsequent translation into practice were thus easily identified. Moreover, the distinctiveness of each approach emerged more clearly under the light of the unifying concept of VTO. The degree of realism and sophistication in confronting VTO thus could be seen as a fundamental yardstick of achievement in normative theory.

CONCLUSION

A new concept, VTO, has been introduced, identifying and highlighting a crucial problem in normative decision making. In a second step, a justification for this procedure has been offered, specifying three broad areas of potential contribution to theory and practice. Finally, an initial examination of prospective extrication moves has been presented, delineating the logical field within which major recent normative theories have emerged. This conclusion will sketch a number of prospects for further application of the concept, as well as further research concerning the dilemma of VTO.

At the most abstract level, the main questions seem to center around the notion of divergent values. Is a fully consistent moral system possible? If so, could it serve as a contemporary ethos, fulfilling the diverse and multiple needs of a modern society? Alternatively, what minimal set of values would already harbor the possibility of normative conflict? That is, what creates the divergence between components of a conception of the good? Could a typology of values identify problematic areas and potential VTOs (e.g., Tribe, 1972, p. 96), or maybe suggest ground rules for their routine resolutions (e.g., Nagel, 1979, p. 131)? These complex questions, which entail many others, might well prove unanswerable. Yet even further reflection on these issues could be fruitful, in and of itself, in contributing to a better understanding of the nature of the VTO dilemma. At least one example of such work comes to mind. James Fishkin's (1983) study of the liberal "trilemma" constituted by the simultaneous allegiance to merit, equal opportunity, and the autonomy of the family both illuminates the complexity of a particular VTO in practice, and provides some important metaethical insights. His scale detailing possible stands in confronting such dilemmas bears some affinity to the one offered here (1983, p. 173). Moreover, the stand that Fishkin defends displays a willingness to admit the normative uncertainties surrounding such issues, and regards them as open questions to be solved specifically for each particular case. It indeed appears as the most reasonable and commendable alternative.[14]

Turning to our rich past, and pursuing the interpretive possibilities of VTO, a renewed study of classical texts could generate different and provocative readings. The VTO at the core of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought has already been alluded to. Did Hegel indeed find a way to resolve

[14]Joel Feinberg's work deserves mention in this context as well, in particular his study of the balancing of interests, which develops an interesting hierarchy between three kinds of personal interest: welfare, "security," and accumulative interests (1980, p. 35). Within each category, however, adjudication is problematic. In particular, all welfare interests (e.g., liberty, health) are equally needed; hence no trade-offs are acceptable, claims Feinberg (1980, p. 33). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for these references to Fishkin and Feinberg.

the tensions between "man" and "citizen," integrating the values of in ual autonomy and collective fulfillment, while avoiding the psychologic falls of the schizophrenic "bourgeois?" Were the *Republic's* last waves way of resolving the immanent conflict of loyalties between civic and fa duties? By illuminating anew such great texts, inquiries of this kind enrich our own self-understanding.

With regard to the empirical aspects of the social sciences, a variety tentially fruitful projects presents itself What underlying socioeco structures and processes influence the acceptance of particular trade-of the shifting degree of persuasiveness of various narratives?[15] What cu symbols reinforce these choices (Eckstein, 1962, p 84, Calabresi and bitt, 1978, pp 137–38)? Could some alleged VTOs dissolve as a result (empirical findings (e g , the aforementioned prospective impact of stu(the psychology of incentives on the equality versus efficiency dile1 What particular VTOs are confronted by particular social institutions McPherson, 1983, on American higher education)? Even preliminary matic answers to such questions would enhance our understanding of t miliar yet mysterious process by which societies resolve VTO dilemm

As for the practice of normative decision making itself, clearly the fo typology of extrication moves offers much room for further refine Could some cases accommodate a conscious rotation of alternative trad rather than rigid normative hierarchies or artificial separation of r(which would provide a more satisfactory extrication move by stressi ever-renewed allegiance to all values involved? (For a structurally s mechanism, see Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978, pp 45–49) Would bett lutions depend on a third dimension, presently absent from this typ along which other concepts of rationality could be elaborated? Bot range of possibilities for further refinements, as well as their potential tical benefits, should suffice as incentives for applied research of this k

Surely, this initial study cannot embark on any of these challenging (rations Should it have clarified the complexity and importance of th(dilemma, its aim will have been reached

REFERENCES

Almond, Gabriel A , and G. Bingham Powell, Jr 1978 *Comparative Politics System, I and Policy* Boston Little, Brown

Arendt, Hannah 1958 *The Human Condition* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Barry, Brian 1984 Intimation of Justice *Columbia Law Review*, 84 806–15

Barry Brian, and Douglas Rae 1975 Political Evaluation In F Greenstein and N eds , *Political Science Scope and Theory* Reading, MA Addison-Wesley

Beiner, Ronald 1983 *Political Judgment* Chicago University of Chicago Press

[15]See Hugh Heclo's path-breaking study on the new welfare state for a good example research (1981, in particular table 11 1 pp 386–87)

Bill, James A., and Carl Leiden 1984 *The Middle East* 2d ed Boston Little, Brown
Broome, John 1978 Trying to Value a Life *Journal of Public Economics*, 91–100
Calabresi, Guido, and Philip Bobbitt 1978 *Tragic Choices* New York Norton
Connolly, William 1982 *The Terms of Political Discourse* 2d ed Princeton Princeton University Press
Dahl, Robert A 1982 *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* New Haven Yale University Press
Eckstein, Harry 1982 The British Political System In S Beer and A Ulam, eds *Patterns of Government* 2d ed New York Random House
Edwards, Richard 1979 *Contested Terrain The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* New York Basic Books
Fallows Susan 1979 The Nuclear Waste Disposal Controversy In D Nelkin ed *Controversy* Beverly Hills Sage Publications
Feinberg, Joel 1980 *Rights Justice and the Bounds of Liberty* Princeton Princeton University Press
Fishkin, James 1983 *Justice Equal Opportunity and the Family* New Haven Yale University Press
Galston, William 1984 Review of M Walzer *Spheres of Justice Ethics* 94 329–33
Gintis, Herbert 1976 The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production *Review of Radical Political Economics* 8 36–54
Hampshire Stuart 1985 *Morality and Conflict* Cambridge Harvard University Press
Hare, R M 1980 Moral Conflicts *Tanner Lectures on Human Values* Salt Lake City University of Utah Press
Heclo Hugh 1981 Toward a New Welfare State? In P Flora and A Heidenheimer eds *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* New Brunswick Transaction Books
MacIntyre Alasdair 1984 *After Virtue* 2d ed Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press
McPherson Michael S 1983 Value Conflicts in American Higher Education A Survey *The Journal of Higher Education* 54 3, pp 243–78
Margolin Stephen 1974 What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production *Review of Radical Political Economics* 6 33–60
Morgenbesser, Sidney and Edna Ullmann-Margalit 1977 Picking and Choosing *Social Research* 44 753–85
Nagel, Thomas 1979 *Mortal Questions* New York Cambridge University Press
Nelkin Dorothy ed 1979 *Controversy Politics of Technical Decisions* Beverly Hills Sage Publications
Nielsen Kai 1985 *Equality and Liberty* Totowa NJ Rowman and Allanheld
Okun Arthur M 1975 *Equality and Efficiency The Big Tradeoff* Washington DC Brookings Institution
Pennock, J Roland and John W Chapman eds 1979 *Compromise in Ethics Law and Politics* New York New York University Press
Rawls John 1971 *A Theory of Justice* Cambridge Harvard University Press
——— 1985 Justice as Fairness Political Not Metaphysical *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 223–51
Rosenblum, Nancy 1984 Moral Membership in a Postliberal State *World Politics* 36 581–96
Sartre, Jean-Paul 1956 *Being and Nothingness* New York Philosophical Library
Schumacher, E F 1977 *A Guide for the Perplexed* New York Harper and Row
Spector, Malcolm and John I Kitsuse 1977 *Constructing Social Problems* Menlo Park CA Cummings Publishing Company
Taylor Charles 1982 The Diversity of Goods In A Sen and B Williams eds *Utilitarianism and Beyond* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Tocqueville, Alexis de 1969 *Democracy in America* New York Doubleday
Tribe Laurence 1971 Trial by Mathematics Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process *Harvard Law Review* 84 1329–93

——. 1972. Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology? *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2: 66–110.

Walzer, Michael. 1974. Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands. In M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——. 1983. *Spheres of Justice*. New York: Basic Books.

Williams, Bernard. 1981. Conflict of Values. In *Moral Luck*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——. 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana Press/Collins.

Williams, Bernard, and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. *Utilitarianism, For and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Social Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth

Alexander Hicks
Emory University

Recent papers by Lange and Garrett and by Jackman have debated whether the political and economic power of the Left has had a sustained impact on the economic growth of relatively affluent capitalist democracies since 1973. This paper indicates that, consistent with theory and research by Lange and Garrett, they have had such an impact. Economic growth between 1974 and 1980-1982 accelerated where both unions were organizationally strong and Left parties were strong participants in governments, and this finding is not an artifact of a 1970s oil boom in Social Democratic Norway. In addition, it is robust in the presence of several key control variables drawn from economic theory. These variables indicate that less affluent and slower growers tended to catch up, and that capital formation tended to accelerate growth while progressive governmental redistribution of income tended to dampen it.

Capitalism, Social Democratic Corporatism, and Economic Growth

In recent research in these pages, Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett (1985, 1986) conclude that the strength—that is, the centralization and scope—of labor unions is a source of long-term economic growth insofar as it is complemented by strong Left party participation in government (see Lange and Garrett, 1985, 1986; Garrett and Lange 1986). Consistent with their model, they also conclude that Left party participation in government is a cause of growth insofar as unions are strong.[1] If accurate, these conclusions have important implications for knowledge of economic growth, equality-efficiency trade-offs, and postwar "neocorporatist" institutions.

However, the accuracy of Lange and Garrett's conclusions has been challenged in these pages by Robert Jackman (1986b). Despite a response by Lange and Garrett (1986), Jackman (1986b) leaves the impression that evidence for the Lange-Garrett model is weak once the model has been ad-

I am grateful to Terry Boswell, William Dixon, Thomas Lancaster, Duane Swank, Michael Wallerstein, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this paper. However, I am clearly responsible for all of its flaws.

[1]While they do not stress it, their model also indicates that union weakness is conducive to economic growth *insofar as non-*Left parties govern, *or* that *non* Left government is a cause of growth to the extent that unions are weak (see Lange and Garrett 1985; Garrett and Lange 1986).

justed for a Norwegian "outlier" and for a dubious standardization b nomic growth Here, I extend political economic theory and reseai economic growth, building foremost on the highly suggestive Lange-C model and the rather unsettled Lange-Garrett-Jackman exchange. F review and take stock of that exchange Second, I clarify aspects Lange-Garrett model algebraically and theoretically, and marginally re in light of work on "catch up" effects Third, I estimate the margina vised model and obtain estimates that dispel the cloud cast over the I Garrett model by Jackman's (1986b) evidence. Fourth, I find that th ginally revised model is robust in the face of diverse, statistical coı even in the absence of the Norwegian case Finally, consideration of th trol variables yields an eclectic model of growth that supports cent sights from several theoretical perspectives, illuminates several issue suggests puzzles for future theory and research

This eclectic model affirms the relevance of central assertions o classical and "new classical" growth theory, for example that capit mation augments growth and that certain governmental "market ‹ tions" dampen it The model identifies two mutually exclusive p economic configurations conducive to economic growth, one that n termed free-market conservativism, another that may be termed democratic corporatism The last, as we shall see, emerges as an e variant of "neocorporatism"—elegant conceptually because strong ı and social democratic government effectively suffice to define it, e in explanatory terms because it appears to foster both superior agg growth and superior income equality

Jackman's Criticisms and Lange and Garrett's Response:

In his criticism of Lange and Garrett (1985), Jackman (1986b) argu the Lange-Garrett empirical findings are dependent "on the inclus Norway (with its North Sea oil) in the analysis" and do "not reflect g patterns in their data" (Jackman, 1986b, p 242) In a similar vein, he that "any association between leftist strength and economic growth period is spurious" (1986b, p. 243) This "spuriousness" is traced to to statistically control for earlier growth rates and the recent coinci in Norway of a strong Left and a North Sea oil boom (Jackman, 1 pp 243–53) Finally, failure of the Lange-Garrett model, which Jackn tempts to document with a series of regressions excluding Norway : including a statistical control for (instead of standardizations by) l growth rates, is imputed to a series of "rather implausible assumptions the nature of electoral competition in the advanced democracies" (1 p 243) These include (A) a "Westminster model" of party and govern

and (B) "consistent and distinctive" party programs (1986b, pp 154–55, also, Jackman, 1986a) [2]

Lange and Garrett (1986) respond to Jackman's (1986b) theoretical attack first by arguing that assumption of an "unimodal normal distribution" of voter preferences required for Downsian convergence is frequently unrealistic (Lange and Garrett, 1986, p. 211) They also respond with the empirical claims that "Left parties in Europe have often chosen to pursue more class based strategies than the distribution of voter preferences would deem rational" (p 211), that both single-party Left governments and Left-dominated coalitional governments *have* in fact been commonplace, and that partisan policy differences are well documented (Lange and Garrett, 1986, pp 211–12, and see, e g , Alt, 1985, pp 1021–27) I think that the Lange-Garrett response to Jackman's theoretical criticisms is sufficiently effective, and the overall theoretical exchange at issue sufficiently complex that further theoretical debate can be deferred for now [3]

Lange and Garrett's (1986) response to Jackman's skilled statistical-empirical criticisms seem less effective to me than their theoretical response First, Lange and Garrett (1986, p 258) do show, *as they had already done in their 1985 paper*, that a measure of "oil dependency does not overwhelm the effects of domestic political structure " In a similar vein, they also present some fair arguments for including Norway in analyses on the several grounds first, it is an "exemplary corporatist case" as well as an oil-rich country, second, its oil-growth situation is no more basis for special treatment than those of Britain (oil-rich and slow-growing) or Denmark and Japan (oil-poor and fast-growing), and, third, "providing the impact of oil on growth is

[2] The so-called Westminster model is one that identifies institutions that generate majority single-party governments, where competition occurs between two major parties on a left-right (i e labor versus conservative) dimension (Jackman 1986b p 254) and that is rendered unrealistic by 'the prevalence of coalition governments' marked by multiple parties Consistent and distinctive party programs Jackman continues are rendered implausible by Downsian convergence of party platforms in particular under Westminster conditions of two-party competition along a Left-Right axis (Jackman 1986b, pp 254–55)

[3] This is especially true in light of Jackman (1986a) which although not directly aimed at the Lange-Garrett model critiques the type of society-centered (and class-centric) work that it exemplifies My short response to that critique is that Lange and Garrett's response to the Downsian criticism is flawed because of the extensive neo-Downsian derivations of convergence without the assumption of unimodal normality (e g Riker and Ordeshook 1973 pp 334-75 Ordeshook 1986), but that Lane and Garrett might have discredited claims for policy convergence by simply claiming enough (ideological and/or voter) constraint on parties to prohibit a party from jumping over" its opponent's issue positions (Riker and Ordeshook 1973 p 350) and they might also have stressed that, applied to the explanation of real world phenomena Downsian convergence need be regarded as no more than *one* of many pressures on party policies As for Lange and Garrett's (1986, p 211 -12) empirical claims these seem to me quite persuasive

controlled for, we may be able to determine more accurately the im
domestic political conditions on growth since 1974 by including Nor
analysis" (p 260) Thus, the North Sea prop for Jackman's "Norw
outlier" criticism is loosened if not dislodged, and the force of results
gressions estimated without a Norwegian case is attenuated Nevert
the numerous multiple regression equations presented to ballast emp
the Lange-Garrett responses arguably causes them to founder As s
Norway is removed from analyses, statistical results, although *direct*
consistent with the Lange-Garrett theory, fall short of any conventio
nificance level (Lange and Garrett, 1986, pp 163–68) [4] For most re
consistent signs are likely to undercut Jackman's (1986b, p 242) as
that there is "no basis" for the Lange and Garrett claims, yet statistic
significant slope estimates are also likely to consolidate a measure of
doubt concerning such claims

Lange and Garrett defend their choice to adjust post-1973 grov
1960–1973 growth by dividing the former by the latter rather than, lik
man, by statistically controlling for pre-1974 growth in regression anal
post-1973 growth [5] However, all three authors' treatments of adjustm
lagged rates of GDP growth are fundamentally flawed by their neglec
other control variable the "level of technology" at the beginning of a
period (Choi, 1983, p 80) This is usually measured as the *level of per
product or income" at the beginning of the period*, and it is comm
beled with that much-used term "development" (Choi 1983, pp 79-

[4] Lange-Garrett's equations estimated without Norway contain only two slope estim
attain statistical significance at the 0 05 level for a one-tailed test (On the relevance c
cance tests in the absence of explicit probability sampling see e g Camilleri 1970 I
1970 Kruskal 1974)

[5] First they argue that they had not meant to deny an explanatory role to prior growt
nor to assert more than political effects at the margins (Garrett and Lange 1986 p 2
ond they argue that their model is confined to national responses to post-1973 st
(Lange and Garrett 1985, pp 792–94) Third they argue that controlling for pre-197
rates may obscure political structure effects operating on and through pre-1973 growt
and Garrett 1986, pp 210–11) However, their first response here is largely irreleva
charge at issue namely, that consideration of a regressor for pre-1973 growth reveals
litical effects as spurious Their second point is blunted by a lack of compelling theore
sons for regarding the model as one for stagflationary periods alone Lange and Garre
pp 792–94) proclaim an interest in stagflationary conditions and attribute a like in
some (e g Cameron, 1984, Schmidt, 1983 Whitely 1983) but by no means all of t
references (e g , Olson 1982 Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982) However, they pr
arguments for limiting their formulation to a post-1973 domain The third response
effective a lagged growth control may suppress some rather long-term effects of "politic
ture" and by aggravating multicollinearity in a very small sample attenuate the power
tical tests Nevertheless, the belated appeal to long-term structural effects (operating o
pre-1973 time period) lacks arguments for persuading readers that any such effects are
be notable, and decrying multicollinearity in the presence of a growth control does not
specification bias in the absence of one

Whereas concern for lagged growth rates in the Jackman and Lange-Garrett analyses of growth is rather idiosyncratic, concern for lagged "development" is now fundamental to economists' statistical analyses of growth (e g , Olson, 1982, chap 4, Pryor, 1985, pp 73–77) Theoretically, "developmental laggards" can imitate effective existing technologies while "leaders" must devise more effective new ones, given increments yield higher growth rates from lower bases, etc Empirically, a tendency for technological laggards to do some "catching up" and for the more advanced to do some "falling back" is soundly documented (Choi, 1983, Pryor, 1985, chap 3) Negative slope estimates for measures of "development" (typically per capita GDP) catch these tendencies If they prevail, growth during a period will be relatively high where "development" at the beginning of the period was relatively low, and relatively low where "development" was high In lieu of compelling arguments for the specificity of their arguments about growth effects of "labor/Left" for strength, the post-1973 period of stagflation, Lange and Garrett and Jackman might have attended more profitably to standardizations/controls for lagged *development* than for lagged rates of economic *growth* [6] Indeed, if spurious estimates are to be avoided there are many candidates for statistical control as worthy as lagged growth

ELEMENTARY REVISIONS AND REANALYSES

The Basic Model

Lange and Garrett's (1985) original model was of the form

$$G = i + aO + bP + cOP + e \quad (1)$$

$$G = i + aO + (b + cO)P + e \quad (2)$$

$$G = i + bP + (a + cP)O + e \quad (3)$$

Here, G connotes *long-term relative growth* (e g , for 1974–1980 versus 1960–1973), O connotes the organizational strength of labor conceived in terms of both the percent of a nation's labor force that is unionized and the centralization of a nation's labor union organization, typically via a union confederation P connotes the political power of labor, conceived in terms of Left (Social Democratic, Socialist, Communist, Labor) party power especially in governments OP (i e , "O times P") is the product of O and P a b and c are coefficients, e is an error and i is an intercept (e g , Lange and Garrett, 1985, p 801)

Importantly, the bracketed terms in equations (2) and (3) reflect what Lange and Garrett loosely term the two facets of labor power's impact on economic growth One, $b + cO$ denotes linear dependence of political-strength effects (of P) upon union strength (O) The second, $a + cP$, re-

[6] Of course lagged growth is not necessarily irrelevant to good estimation

flects dependence of union strength (or O) effects upon Left party strength (P) However, "facets" may be deceptive Equation (1) can be derived from either equation (2) *or* equation (3) (Just multiply the bracketed terms by P in equation [2] or O in equation [3]) It cannot, however, be derived from equations (2) and (3) simultaneously, and these equations should be viewed as two *alternative* theoretical interpretations of (or foundations for) equation (1) (Cohen and Cohen, 1975, pp 310–14) Here, ***equation (2) stresses labor organization, or union, effects that are conditional on labor's political strength*** and that vary with this in magnitude and even sign ***Equation (3) stresses effects of labor's political strength that are similarly conditional on union strength*** Equation (1) is best regarded as an ***estimation equation*** that is useful for obtaining parameter estimates for equations (2) and (3), but that is ***unable to adjudicate between these two algebraically equivalent equations or between any substantively distinct causal process they may suggest*** (Cohen and Cohen, 1975, p 312)

It may be instructive to rewrite the Lange-Garrett model in terms of two different models implied by equations (2) and (3), each containing the estimation equation (1) (see Cohen and Cohen, 1975, pp 310–14) The resulting "union" and "party" models (A and B, respectively) are presented in table 1 Note that estimation equations (A3) and (B3) are identical to each other and to equation (1) above, except for the addition of a matrix of control variables X and a vector of their coefficients F, introduced explicitly to allow complications in the determination of growth Note also that equations (A1) and (A2) are essentially an elaboration of equation (3) in the Lange-Garrett presentation, just as equations (B1) and (B2) are elaborations of equation (2) in that presentation Again, model "A"—the "union" model—is a model of G as a function (equation [A1]) of variable O (plus P and other unspecified variables in matrix X) in which the coefficient for O is a vector a^*, which is a function of P described by equation (A2) Model B—the "party" model—is a distinct but analogous model stressing variable effects b^* of P, which effects are, in turn, a function of O The former "union" model is the one stressed by Lange and Garrett, though the latter is referred to by them as well (see Lange and Garrett, 1985, pp 798–801)

TABLE 1

TWO "INTERACTION" MODELS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
A "UNION" MODEL (A) AND A "PARTY" MODEL (B)

(A)		(B)	
(A1) G	$= i + a^*O + bP + XF + e,$	(B1) G	$= i + b^*P + aO + XF + e,$
(A2) a^*	$= a + cP,$	(B2) b^*	$= b + cO,$
(A3) G	$= i + aO + bP + cOP + XF + e$	(B3) G	$= i + aO + bP + cOP + XF + e$

TABLE 2

LABOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH (O), POLITICAL STRENGTH (P) AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Political Strength	Organizational Strength O: High	Organizational Strength O: Low
P High	A High Growth	B Low Growth
P Low	C Low Growth	D High Growth

The Lange-Garrett Model's Theoretical Rationale and Related Variations

Lange and Garrett (1985, pp 798–801) exposit the rationales for their hypotheses in terms of the cells of a fourfold table much like table 2 In terms of table 2, situations which are characterized by the "presence of a labor movement that is both organizationally and politically strong (cell A) should contribute positively to economic growth' (1985, p 799) In Lange and Garrett s (1985, p 799) words Powerful central union confederations which are assumed to be able to deliver the restraint of their constituents have an interest in pursuing a collective gain strategy Such a strategy however, is only rational where the uncertainty that restraint will be translated into favorably distributed economic growth is low Leftist control of government will reduce the uncertainty because the state is likely to provide strong incentives for capital to reinvest in the national economy, and to enact policies guaranteeing that future increases in societal product are distributed favorably to workers "

Thus, in situations of organizational and political strength, union use of wage restraint is central for growth, although it is importantly complemented by industrial cooperation and growth-sensitive exercises of political influence (Lange and Garrett, 1985 p 795) By these means strong ("encompassing") unions "contribute to greater profits, a more favorable investment environment and higher rates of economic growth (1985 p 795) Crucially, realization of such goals is contingent upon Left control of government and, in turn, reduction of labor s uncertainty and provision of incentives for capital investment

Situations characterized *either* by labor s organizational strength and political weakness (cell B) *or* by its political strength and organizational weakness (cell C) are ones that make "higher rates of economic growth less likely (Lange and Garrett, 1985, p 800) In the former class of situations Lange and Garrett stress that labor, in the absence of governmental guarantees and compensations, would be "more likely to exploit their organizational strength in the market" through wage militancy, than to follow wage restraint (1985

p. 800).[7] As a result, societal gains from union restraint and cooperation would be foregone. In the latter class, which is characterized by union weakness and Left governmental strength, union wage militancy and poor implications for aggregate growth again are predicted (1985, pp. 800–801). Individual unions would separately pursue their special interests, free-riding where labor-wide policy options arose, while Left governments (for example) would be unable to moderate inflationary costs of high-employment policies via incomes policies.

Finally, if labor is organizationally and politically weak (as in cell D), "it is likely that something akin to the pure play of market forces will ensue" (Lange and Garrett, 1985, p. 801). Labor's organizational and political weakness would reduce "their ability to disrupt the capitalist growth process" (1985, p. 801), and, presumably, to disrupt conservative free-market policies supportive of relatively market-driven growth.[8]

In short, Lange and Garrett (1985, 1986) stress the causal agency of union wage and lobbying restraint, as do Garrett and Lange (1986) and Lange (1984). They treat Left governments primarily as guarantors and executors of conditions for union labor-market and public policies yielding collective economic gain. Enactment of wage restraint, which may involve low strike rates, enhanced worker morale, and employer-worker accords, as well as moderate wage demands, yields, in turn, a probable increases in profits, investment and productivity, and growth.[9] Growth-sensitive political demands

[7] Here "guarantees" involve governmental assurances that capital will (A) productively reinvest whatever income labor foregoes and (B) in time equitably redistribute any profits attributable to this investment; "compensations" involve redistributive sidepayments in compensation for foregone income and for risks that it might never be repaid.

[8] Elaborated in terms of "continuous" rather than dichotomous conceptions of labor's organizational and political strength, Lange and Garrett's theoretical rationales for their model imply that effects of either "Left/labor" variable will vary with levels of the other: they will be positive, augmenting growth rates for relatively high values of the contingency variable, weakly positive or negative for intermediate values of the contingency and negative, and dampening economic growth for low values of the contingency variable. More concretely, under a "union" interpretation like that of column (A) in table 1, union (party) strength would have effects a^* (b^*) that besides varying directly with P (O) would be relatively strongly positive for relatively high degrees of O (P), hover in the vicinity of 0 for roughly intermediate levels of P (O), and have relatively strongly negative effects on growth for relatively low values of P (O).

[9] Extant quantitative empirical evidence on consensual incomes policies, the principal form that wage restraints of the type discussed here take, is unclear with regard to anti-inflationary consequences (Marks, 1986, pp. 258–59, 276). However, Flanagan et al. (1983), despite giving incomes policies a mediocre overall grade for inflation fighting, give some imprecise praise to *consensual* incomes policies by waxing affirmative where "labor units sought escape from their prisoner's dilemma by erecting their own centralized bargaining units . . . where an implicit consensus seems to have been reached," and where it need not be said that "consensus was lacking" (Flanagan, et al., 1983, p. 661). Finally, Bruno and Sachs (1985, pp. 249–57) find evidence that corporatism (measured to encompass consensual incomes policies as well as union centralization, economy-wide bargaining, and the like) reduces a major cause of inflation that they term

might include moderation of demands for progressively redistributive income transfers (despite some use of these as side payments to grease wage restraint), investment-tax credits, high-employment fiscal and monetary policies conducive to high anticipated demand and a bullish investment climate, and anti-inflationary consensual incomes policies (compatible with high-employment policies)

Lange and Garrett stress the causal agency of unions as opposed to Left governments They do not, for example, stress the pro-growth functions of high-employment policies augmented by incomes and investment policies except insofar as these policies contribute to labor restraint Their theorizing leans heavily toward a "union" model, stressing effects of union organization that are reinforced by Left party strength in government (see also Lange 1984)

First Reanalyses of the Lange-Garrett Model

My initial revision of the model is summarized by the following equation

$$G7480 = i + aO + bP + cOP + dPCGDP734 + e \qquad (4)$$

Here G7480, the 1974 to 1980 percentage change in (constant dollar) GDP, replaces and Lange and Garrett's ratio of such growth to 1960 to 1973 growth

TABLE 3

REGRESSIONS OF GROWTH (1973–1980) ON LEFT STRENGTH AND PCGDP734 WITH (A) AND WITHOUT (B) NORWAY

	Constant	O	P	O*P	PCGDP734	R^2	F-Ratio	N
(A)	6 93	−1 46	−2 02	0 56	− 0003N	52	4 13	15
	(4 90)	(3 26)	(3 64)	(3 49)	(1 36)			
(B)	6 48	1 01	1 53	0 56	0004*	56	3 47	14
	(5 29)	(2 32)	(2 59)	(2 39)	(1 77			

* denotes that the result is statistically significant at (at least) the 0 10 test level (for one tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate) but that it is *not* significant at the more stringent conventional 0 05 test level or better

N denotes that the result is not even statistically significant at the marginal 0 10 level

R^2 denotes coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom

--

the "wage gap" (i e , "persistent excess of real wage levels above the marginal product of labor at full employment" [Bruno and Sachs 1985 p 178]) Moreover Bruno and Sachs's (1985) wage gap findings may be construed as support for price stabilizing effects of wage restraint per se and Cameron (1984) provides extensive evidence that centralized unions and Left governments - Marks's (1986) effective predictors of consensual incomes policies—are associated with price stability as well as with high-employment labor quiescence and other characteristic 'neocorporatist' policy ambitions

TABLE 4

CONDITIONAL SLOPES OF O (LABOR ORGANIZATION) FOR LEVELS OF P (LEFT GOVERNMENT) AND OF P FOR LEVELS OF O FOR 1974 TO 1980 GROWTH WITH T-STATISTICS AND WITH (A) AND WITHOUT (B) NORWAY (SEE TABLE 3 FOR FULL ESTIMATION EQUATIONS)

Conditional Slope Estimates for O and Their T-Statistics			Conditional Slope Estimates for P and Their T-Statistics		
(A) Incl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for O (t-statistics below)	Nation (value of P)	(B) Excl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for O (t-statistics below)	(A) Incl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for P (t-statistics below)	Nation (value of O)	(B) Excl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for P (t-statistics below)
1 62	Austria	0 99	1 02	Sweden	0 45
(3 32)	(100 0)	(1 96)	(2 64)	(3 52)	(1 08)
1 62	Norway	XXXX	0 85	Norway	XXXX
(3 32)	(100 0)	XXXXXX	(2 41	(3 33)	XXXXXX
1 30	U K	0 78	0 62	Austria	0 20
(3 11)	(96 0)	(1 68)	(1 97)	(3 06)	(0 59)
1 06	Denmark	0 63	0 39	Belgium	0 05
2 86	75 5	1 67	(1 38)	(2 80)	(0 17)

1 04	W Germany	0 62	0 37	Denmark	0 03
(2 54)	(74 8)	(1 67)	(1 31)	(2 77)	(0 11)
0 37	Sweden	0 18	0 36	Finland	0 03
(1 39)	(45 9)	(1 09)	(1 28)	(2 76)	(0 10)
0 26	Netherlands	0 11	− 38	Netherlands	− 46
(1 02)	(41 2)	(0 47)	(1 44)	(1 90)	(1 99)
0 24	Finland	0 09	− 41	Australia	− 47
(0 93)	(40 2)	(0 41)	(1 53)	(1 87)	(2 05)
0 02	Australia	− 05	− 46	U K	− 51
(0 06)	(30 5)	(0 24)	(1 70)	(1 81)	(2 18)
− 24	Belgium	− 19	− 47	W Germany	− 51
(0 81)	(21 0)	(0 80)	(1 72)	(1 80)	(2 19)
− 54	Italy	− 41	− 75	Italy	− 70
(1 90)	(6 5)	(1 67)	(2 47)	(1 47)	(2 66)
− 65	France	− 48	−1 17	Canada	− 97
(1 82)	(1 7)	(1 82)	(3 13)	(0 98)	(2 91)
− 65	Canada	48	−1 31	United States	−1 06
(1 82)	(0 0)	(1 82)	(3 26)	(0 82)	(2 93)
− 65	Japan	− 48	−1 43	France	−1 14
(1 82)	(0 0)	(1 82)	(3 36)	(0 68)	(2 94)
− 65	United States	− 48	−1 65	Japan	−1 28
(1 82)	(0 0)	(1 82)	(3 49)	(0 43)	(2 92)

O is the organizational strength of labor, conceived in terms of the unionized share of the labor force and the centralization of the national labor organizations, P is the political strength of the labor movement, conceived as the extent of Left party cabinet participation, and PCGDP734 is per capita Gross Domestic Product in dollars averaged across 1973 and 1974. Here, G7480 is a measure of lagged economic growth taken from Lange and Garrett (1985, table 1), as are the measures of O and P (Lange and Garrett, 1985, table 2), as an operationalization of their lagged growth or "growth inertia" variable. PCGDP734 is a measure of real per capita percentage growth in GDP included to operationalize lagged "development" (or laggard "catch up" effects). The measure is averaged across 1973 and 1974 to increase its stability. It is drawn from Summers, Kravis and Heston (1980) because they provide the most cross-nationally comparable GDP figures for the years in question. In addition to estimating equation (4) with and without Norway, I compute conditional slope estimates "a^*" for O (under model "A," table 1) and "b^*" for P (under model "B," table 1), and compute the t-statistics for these conditional slopes. The revised Lange-Garrett model of equation (4) is simply a variant of the original for which an idiosyncratic *standardization* of 1974–1980 growth on 1960 to 1973 growth is replaced by an *additive control* for 1973–1974 real per capita GDP (the barbarous PCGDP734).

My first reanalysis of the Lange-Garrett model is for the same fifteen nations analyzed in Lange and Garrett (1985, 1986), Garrett and Lange (1986), and Jackman (1986b). It proceeds with the estimation of equation 4, with and without Norway. Resulting estimates are presented in table 3 and interpreted in terms of the "union" and "party" variants of the model in table 4.

As may be quickly gleaned from table 3, all key Lange-Garrett parameter estimates are reasonably signed and are statistically significant at (at least) the .05 level. With or without Norway, slope estimates for the product terms OP are significantly positive, while slope estimates for the additive specifications of the separate components O and P are significantly negative. These estimates mean that for "union" ("party") models, conditional slopes for O (P) are probably less than zero when P (O) equals zero. (See equations [A1] and [A2], [B1] and [B2] in table 1.) They also mean that effects of P (O), net of those determining "a^*" ("b^*"), are negative (i.e., that parties [unions] tend to slow growth net of their interactions with unions [parties]).

Conditional coefficients for O and P vary (with P and O, respectively) more or less as Lange and Garrett (1985) predict. For example, the conditional slope estimates for O (on data including the Norwegian case) that are reported in column "A" on the right-hand side of table 4 are positive for nations that are high on P (highest for Austria and Norway) and decline with values of P, switching from positive to negative as we move into the range of nations with less than 30% Left cabinet participation (e.g., Belgium, France and the United States). However, with *Norway excluded*, they provide only

support for two of the conclusions most stressed by Lange and Gar-
85) *Without* Norway, union organizational strength (O) has more
wth than pro-growth effects That is, it has only one unambiguously
int, positive, *conditional* effect on growth (an "a^*" = 0 99 for Austria
4, column B) Furthermore, union strength has four marginally sig-
negative conditional effects on growth (see table 4, column B for
Canada, Japan, and the United States) Moreover, without Norway,
rty governmental strength (P) has *no* solidly positive conditional
on growth, while it has fully nine unambiguously significant, *nega-*
nditional effects on growth (see Australia down through Japan in table
nn D). Thus, although these analyses of 1974–1980 growth support
Lange-Garrett assertion that union growth effects are dependent on
ty strength (or *vice versa* that Left effects are dependent upon union
hey do so with something of an anti-union, anti-Left tilt not present
ange and Garrett (1985, 1986) and Garrett and Lange (1986) collabo-
[10] Some "union" effects and most "party" effects are anti-growth
s turn to reanalyses that are substantially more fully specified to see
ey have to correct or add

FURTHER REVISIONS AND REANALYSES

ns

Lange-Garrett model may benefit from a more extensive revision
at of equation 4 In particular potential causes of growth exogenous
model may be taken into account to reduce dangers of spurious
es
urse, many such causes—capital formation social security transfers
on—could be policy conduits for effects posited by the Lange-Garrett
Specification of such factors might control away the very means (or
nechanisms) whereby the Lange-Garrett model operates However

-case estimates seem likely to be unstable and a 1974–1980 specification of growth is
t arbitrary it is wise to seek to replicate the above results This has been done in tables
l an appendix for 1982 the year stressed in Garrett and Lange (1986 and in tables 1
he appendix for 1981 the intervening year between the two already chosen As these
eal the replications are very close to the originals in all regards They reaffirm the
idings and the notably "anti-Leftist" tilt in the pattern of their conditional coefficients
stimates for O P and OP are all intrinsic to the computation of conditional effects and
he slope estimate for O in table 5 can't be assumed equal to zero on the basis of its
low (− 07) value and low t statistic, O is retained in the row A equation of table 5
A equation, reestimated after deletion of O is presented in table 1 of the appendix
gs vary trivially from those of the original row A The appendix which also contains
r 1981 and 1982 estimations of regression models with more numerous control vari
footnote 19), is available from the author on request c/o Department of Political Sci
iory University Atlanta GA 30322

if we focus on possible "Lange-Garrett" effects upon growth that are confined to variations in Lange-Garrett variables during particular growth periods—for example, on effects of labor strength upon growth during 1974–1980—*and if we confine controls for other variables to their variations preceding the focal period* (e g., to pre-1974 variations in controls), *we can avoid this problem* We can control for potential sources of spuriousness in Lange-Garrett reestimates without vitiating them by controlling away their causal mechanisms For example, we may focus on effects of Lange-Garrett variables that are confined to 1974–1980 variations in "labor/Left" strength and growth, yet control for possible impacts of pre-1974 investment

There are two predominant types of explanatory factors and theoretical perspectives in the literature on economic growth to consider One may be termed the "factor quantity and quality" type and is associated with "neoclassical" long-term growth theory (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978) The second type may be termed the "efficient allocation" type and is associated with work by the "new classical economists" and others seeking to ground macroeconomic theorizing in individual rationality and market efficiency (Alt and Crystal, 1983) [11]

"Neoclassical" growth theory focuses primarily upon rates of change in quantities, income shares, and technical improvement of factors of production (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, pp 549–77) Measures of physical capital formation (or the change in capital as a share of national product or income) are the preeminent "neoclassical" control in other political economic investigations of growth using such controls (Bornschier, et al , 1978, Whitely 1983, Friedland and Sanders, 1985), and they are readily available for the Lange-Garrett cases Accordingly, I include a measure of *gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP* in the early 1970s as a "long-term' control in analyses

The "efficient allocation" approach has recently inspired a notable literature addressing deleterious effects of "market distortions" resulting from special interest collusions, pressure group politics, and resulting state policies (e g , Olson, 1982, Choi, 1984, Weede, 1984, 1986, Lane and Ersson 1986) One prevalent line of inquiry has stressed measures of uninterrupted years of democracy as indicators of the accumulation of special interest group pressures for "market-distorting" policy concessions (e g , Olson, 1982, Choi 1984, Weede, 1984, 1986, Lane and Ersson, 1986) Another has stressed presumably deleterious growth effects of specific aspects of the "power of the state to transfer income" as measured by aspects of government budgets Weede (1984, 1986), who has vigorously pursued this line of inquiry, provides evidence that *years of uninterrupted democracy and revenues and so*

[11] I will henceforth use 'new classical to refer to works and economists that address macroeconomic issues with a rigorous adherence to the rational choice focus on instrumentally rational individual, economic agents plus either competitive or perfectly clearing markets (see Alt and Crystal, 1983)

cial security spending as percentages of national product negatively affect growth. In my reanalyses, I accordingly include each of these variables as a control. Because much of the literature on possible market distortions due to government transfers gives special attention to the extent of *progressive* governmental redistribution of income (see, Page, 1983, pp. 213–23), special attention to this aspect of government spending and taxing seems appropriate here.[12] I will extend extant inquiries into governmentally generated market distortions potentially inimical to growth by utilizing a control for the extent of *progressive governmental redistribution of household income* resulting from government taxing and transfer spending (see Hicks and Swank, 1984b).

I shall also utilize Lange and Garrett's (1985, p. 808; 1986) control for "dependence on imported oil."

Methods for Second Reanalyses

Reanalyses with the new controls can help establish the accuracy/inaccuracy of the table 3 findings and the validity/invalidity of the Lange-Garrett model. If control variables have nontrivial effect estimates when entered into equations, yet do or do not cause the estimates for O, P, and OP or the statistical tests for these estimates to belie the Lange-Garrett model, our confidence in the model should be enhanced or diminished. (See, for example, Rao and Miller, 1971, on "bias," "efficiency," and omitted variables.) The reanalyses employ the following modification of equation (4):

$$G7480 = c + aO + bP + cOP + d\,PCGDP734 + \sum_{i=2}^{9} d_i X_i + e \qquad (5)$$

Here variables X2 through X9 are the "controls." X2 and X3 are those for dependence on imported oil (OIL) and 1960 to 1973 GDP growth (G6073). OIL is a measure of the ratio of "net oil imports" to "total energy requirements," measured as in Lange and Garrett (1985) and Garrett and Lange (1986, table 2), and G6073 is the measure of 1960 to 1973 percentage growth in (constant-dollar) GDP growth used by Lange and Garrett to operationalize lagged growth rates or "growth inertia effects" (Lange and Garrett, 1985; Garrett and Lange, 1986, table 1). X4 is a measure of gross capital formation (or, more specifically, an average of gross domestic investment rates as proportions of GDP) averaged across 1970 and 1973 (see Hicks and Swank, 1984a, p. 95; Bornshier and Heintz, 1979, table 1.4.2). X5 through X8 are measures of governmentally linked "market distortions." X5 is years of uninterrupted political democracy through 1973 (DEM), measured according to procedures and data sources described in Weede (1984) to tap that facet of "market distortions" that Weede associates with the accumulation of conces-

[12] The anti-progressive criticisms of redistributive transfers stress the economic dysfunctions of savings and work disincentives of progressive governmental income transfers (see Page, 1983, pp. 53–59, 97–100).

TABLE 5

REGRESSIONS OF GROWTH (1973–1980) ON LEFT STRENGTH AND PCGDP734 AND CONTROL VARIABLES WITH (A) AND WITHOUT (B) NORWAY

	Constant	O	P	O*P	PCGDP734	OIL	G6073	CAP	RED	$SOC	$REV	R^2	F-Ratio	N
(A)	0 75ˋ	−0 07ˋ	−1 65	0 31	− 0004ˋ	− 015	− 18*	23	−11 8	03*	04*	975	55 9	15
	(0 75)	(0 28)	(3 64)	(8 92)	(1 36)	(6 94)	(1 76)	(6 73)	(4 46)	(1 76)	(1 90)			
(B)	3 88	−0 60	−1 68	0 46	− 0003	− 005ˋ	− 35*	20	−6 05			875	12 4	14
	(3 69)	(2 25)	(4 91)	(3 59)	2 31)	(1 22)	(1 96)	(3 88)	(2 43)					

* denotes that the result is statistically significant at (at least) the 0 10 test level (for one-tailed or two-tailed tests as appropriate), but that it is *not* significant at the more stringent conventional 0 05 test level or better

ˋ denotes that the result is not even statistically significant at the marginal 0 10 level

R^2 denotes coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom

sions to special interests by democratic governments X6 and X7, respectively, are total governmental social security transfer spending as percentages of GDP in 1973 ($SOC) and total government revenues as a percentage of GDP in 1973 ($REV) measured with data from the International Labor Organization (1977) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1977–1984). They are intended as further measures of market-distorting public budgets (Weede, 1984). X9 is an extension to Austria, Belgium, and Denmark of the measures of governmental redistribution presented in Hicks and Swank (1984b, table 2, column V). That measure, which is the difference between pre-tax/pre-transfer and post-tax/post-transfer gini indices of household inequality ("pre" minus "post") circa 1970, indexes downward shifts in income inequality effected by government transfer spending and taxing. The measure was extended to these nations by estimating redistribution values as predicted values from an estimation equation, expressing the Hicks-Swank index as a function of Hewitt's (1977) index of redistribution.[13]

Because scarce degrees of freedom make the simultaneous addition of eight control variables into the already rather packed basic models of table 3 prohibitive, controls were considered more sequentially. They were entered by means of a forward stepwise procedure executed with an inclusion criterion of (absolute value of) t > 1.0 and with safeguards against characteristic "stepwise" shortcomings.[14] This procedure permits control variables to en-

[13]The Hewitt index is readily computable from easily available data and was recomputed for 1970. A simple bivariate regression estimated that the Hicks-Swank index equaled −.0007 + .0111(HEWITT). This regression, which had a coefficient of determination of 0.45, yielded estimates of governmental redistribution of .101 for Austria, .082 for Belgium, and .107 for Denmark (as compared to Hicks-Swank index values of, for example, .172 for Sweden, .094 for the United Kingdom, and .060 for the United States).

[14]First, forward stepwise procedures may sacrifice theoretical model building to atheoretical empiricism. However, in this case, a basic theoretical model already exists and the purpose of the stepwise procedure is to check on that model's robustness in the face of theoretically suspicious control variables. Second, forward stepwise processings of potential additions to a basic model like ours may result in rejections of variables that, nevertheless, if retained in an equation would have (however insignificant) driven variables in the basic model below significance (i.e., t < 1.0). However, variables that did not attain inclusion into the equations of table 4 were specially entered one at a time to see if they so degraded the estimates for retained variables, and none did. Third, unretained variables may have been rejected because of multicollinearity with retained ones. Here (in parentheses) are the squared multiple correlation coefficients for each rejected variable's regression on the set of retained variables. For the equation with Norway: DEM (.92); for that without Norway: DEM (.82), $REV (.86), $SOC (.43). From these results, it should be evident that (negative) hypothesized effects of "years of uninterrupted democracy" of the sort hypothesized by Olson (1982) may have been suppressed by multicollinearity, and that effects of governmental revenues as proportions of GDP may have been suppressed as well. However, it should be noted that signs of slope estimates for $REV are positive in these data (consistent with Cameron's [1978] interpretation of such indicators as ones of the scale of the "public economy"), not negative as hypothesized by Weede (1984) and others.

TABLE 6

CONDITIONAL SLOPES OF O (LABOR ORGANIZATION) FOR LEVELS OF P (LEFT GOVERNMENT) AND OF P FOR LEVELS OF O FOR 1974 TO 1981 GROWTH WITH T-STATISTICS AND WITH (A) AND WITHOUT (B) NORWAY
(COMPUTED FOR "CONTROL" MODELS)
(SEE TABLE 5 FOR FULL ESTIMATION EQUATIONS)

Conditional Slope Estimates for O and Their T-Statistics			Conditional Slope Estimates for P and Their T-Statistics		
(A) Incl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for O (t-statistics below)	Nation (value of P)	(B) Excl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for O (t-statistics below)	(A) Incl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for P (t-statistics below)	Nation (value of O)	(B) Excl Norway Conditional Slope Estimates for P (t-statistics below)
1 05	Austria	0 98	− 54	Sweden	− 06
(7 55)	(100 0)	(3 73)	(1 75)	(3 52)	(0 28)
1 05	Norway	XXXX	− 60	Norway	XXXX
(7 55)	(100 0)	XXXXXX	(2 05)	(3 33)	XXXXXX
0 93	U K	0 86	− 69	Austria	− 27
		[illegible]	(2 53)	(3 06)	(1 47)
					− 39

0 83	W. Germany	0 72	− 78	Denmark	− 40
(8 40)	(74 8)	(3 43)	(3 13)	(2 77)	(3.37)
0 59	Sweden	0 37	− 78	Finland	− 41
(5 84)	(45 9)	(2.29)	(3 15)	(2 76)	(2.40)
0 55	Netherlands	0 31	−1 05	Netherlands	− 80
(5 15)	(41 2)	(1 98)	(5 50)	(1 90)	(4.64)
0 54	Finland	0 30	−1 06	Australia	− 82
(5 01)	(40 2)	(1 90)	(5 59)	(1 87)	(4 68)
0 46	Australia	0 18	−1 08	U K	− 85
(3 72)	(30 5)	(1 15)	(5 78)	(1 81)	(4 76)
0 38	Belgium	0 06	−1 08	W. Germany	− 85
(2 68)	(21 0)	(0 38)	(5 82)	(1 80)	(4 77)
0 26	Italy	− 12	−1 18	Italy	−1 00
(1 50)	(6 5)	(0 68)	(6 88)	(1 47)	(5 02)
0 22	France	− 18	−1 34	Canada	−1 23
(1 19)	(1 7)	(0 96)	(8 25)	(0 98)	(5 04)
0 20	Canada	− 20	−1 39	United States	−1 35
(1 08)	(0 0)	(1 06)	(8 56)	(0 82)	(5.04)
0 20	Japan	− 20	−1 44	France	−1 36
(1 08)	(0 0)	(1 06)	(8 76)	(0 68)	(5.10)
0 20	United States	20	−1 51	Japan	−1 48
(1 08)	(0 0)	(1 06)	(8 97)	(0 43)	(5 12)

ter (and remain in) estimated variants of equation (5) if and only if their indi vidual exclusion would reduce equation mean square error and "correctec R-squares" (Johnston, 1984, pp 504–7) On the one hand, the procedure i somewhat tilted toward inclusion of controls because it permits some "capi talization on chance", but on the other hand it treats controls conservativel because of scarce degrees of freedom (from ten to as few as three).[15] Overall all findings will be conservative in the sense that it will be hard to reject an null hypotheses with our few cases

Findings

Support for the Lange-Garrett model strengthens when control variable are considered for 1974–1980 With or without Norway, parameter esti mates for all Lange-Garrett variables are reasonably signed and, with on minor exception, unambiguously significant (see table 5) [16] Moreover, condi tional estimates for slopes of labor organization (O) are more consistent wit Lange and Garrett (1985, 1986) than they were before the addition of con trols Now, with Norway included, ten are unambiguously significant an positive, while none are significantly below 0 (see table 6 column A) Wit Norway excluded, eight conditional slope estimates remain unambiguousl significant and positive (those for Austria, Norway, and on down column I through Finland) while none are significantly negative However, it is stil the case that all conditional slope estimates for Left-party governmenta strength (or P) are *negative* once Norway is excluded, although these esti mates are insignificant where unions are strong This "party" finding con trasts with the "union" finding that the strength of labor organization tend to augment growth in all nations but a few with very weak Left cabine participation

Overall, the longer models fit the data very well, explaining (after adjust ment for degrees of freedom) 97 5% of the variation in 1974–1980 GDI growth with Norway included, and 87 5% of the variance in 1974–198 growth with it excluded Because both this difference and a collapse of (posi tive) social spending ($SOC) and revenue share ($REV) effects once Norwa is excluded evoke the specter of an overly influential Norwegian case, let u focus on the detailed results from the equation estimated without Norwa (see table 5)

[15]Thus it is especially important to stress that failures to *reject* null hypotheses that particula slopes equal *zero* do not confirm such hypotheses

[16]The estimate for O in the equation estimated including Norway is very insignificant an effectively *zero* Under a "union" interpretation this simply identifies an approximately 0 0 in tercept for the equation linking O's conditional effects (*a** s) to levels of P zero Under "party" interpretation this somewhat more notably identifies a roughly 0 0 union (O) effec once interactive consequences of unions are accounted for

Results for this equation indicate that "dependency on foreign oil" (OIL) is marginally useful for differentiating growth rates, even after the deletion of Norway. They also indicate major "catch up" effects: pre-1974 *growth rates*, as well as 1973–1974 *development levels*, apparently dampened 1974–1980 growth, contrary to Jackman's (1986b) finding that pre-1974 growth tapped durable sources of post-1973 growth (see G6073 and PCGDP734 findings in table 5, row B). Predictably, capital formation, although lagged back to the years immediately preceding the 1974–1980 growth period under examination, has a notable impact upon growth. Results for the "market distortion" propositions are mixed. With Norway excluded, Weede's (1984, p. 354) indicators of "the power of the State to transfer income" have no significant effects in these data. Furthermore, years of uninterrupted democracy, which according to Weede (1984) indicate the accumulation of special interest groups and resulting market distortions, have no effect either.[17] However, consistent with the broad theoretical thrust of Weede and other "market efficiency" theorists, progressive governmental redistribution of income *does* appear to reduce growth.[18]

In short, *redistributive* transfers, at least, appear to slow down economic growth, presumably because they reduce work and/or saving incentives as well as to shift allocative processes from some relatively efficient (albeit certainly "imperfect") market alternative (Page 1983). Paradoxically, progressive governmental redistribution appears to be greatest in nations characterized by just those traits of union strength and Left government which, when jointly strong, raise growth rates. Somewhat puzzlingly, under our "union" model, strong unions backed by Left governments appear to be able to more than fully offset the cost of redistributive programs. Under our "party" model, they appear only to keep the cost of Left governments down.[19]

[17] As collinearity between years of uninterrupted democracy and postwar obsolescence of capital stock (due to lack of wartime destruction and of postwar replenishment of stock) should be high for our cases, and as replenished capital stock figures prominently in economic historians' accounts of postwar comparative growth rates for such cases as our fifteen (e.g., Gould 1972), rejection of "democracy" propositions of Weede, Olson, and others may be no great shock.

[18] Specifically, a one percentage point shift upward in the percentage rate of gross capital *investment* as a percentage of GDP appears to generate a 0.2 percentage point upward shift in growth roughly a half dozen years later (see the CAP findings in table 5, row B). Also, a one percentage redistributive shift in a nation's gini index of income inequality appears to give rise to a .06 percentage point shift in the average percentage growth rate of the subsequent decade or so (see $RED finding in table 5, row B). Thus, a seventeen percentage point reduction in inequality—that scored for Sweden—apparently shaves a bit more than a percentage point—the 1974–1980 difference between Japanese growth and Italian growth—off a nation's percentage GDP growth rate.

[19] Reestimation of the equations in table 5 with, first, a new 1974–1981 growth measure as dependent variable, and then a *1974–1982* growth measure as dependent variable reproduces the pattern of finding just reported for 1974–1980. These reestimations, which are reported in

More than one puzzle emerged with the findings. First, findings in the "short" equations of table 3 estimated without the Norwegian case indicated that anti-growth effects of unions in contexts of weak Left parties were more numerous and, overall, stronger than pro-growth effects of unions in contexts of strong Left parties. However, this pattern vanished once controls were examined.[20]

Second, results for "union" and "party" variants of the Lange-Garrett model have apparently divergent implications. Under the "union" models, strong Left party governmental strength appears to *augment* generally positive growth consequences of unions, whereas under "party" models, union strength appears merely to *cut* the growth costs of Left party participation in government.[21] As regards economic growth outcomes viewed in isolation, the "union" model indicates that strong union organization and Left party governmental participation are preferable to weak-union, weak-Left circumstances, while the "party" model indicates the opposite. The two models do converge on the preferability (from a strictly pro-growth point of view) of *either* consistently strong unions and Left cabinet participation *or* consistently weak unions and Lefts. These two extremes contrast with intermediate or mixed situations in which Left governments are unsupported by extensive centralized unions or strong unions are unsupported by Left governments. Still, only the "union" model neatly matches Lange and Garrett's (1985, 1986) theorizing about unions, parties, and growth (see the section on theoretical rationales). Perhaps, with new formulations of union-party inter-

the appendix (available on request from the author, as described in note 10) are simple replications of the 15- and 14-case equations of table 5. In these replications, variables which have slope estimates with (absolute) t-values < 1.0 are deleted. Results are remarkably stable across years and the inclusion/exclusion of Norway. 1974–1981 and 1974–1982 estimation equations are reported in table 4 of the appendix. (Complete absence of $REV and $SOC from the replications constitutes their main distinctive feature.) Conditional slopes for growth rates for 1974–1981 and 1974–1982 are reported in tables 5 and 6, respectively, of the appendix (see just above and note 10).

[20] This is true for 1981 and 1982 as well as for 1980 (see notes 10 and 19).

[21] However, one should be cautious not to overestimate the divergencies between the two sets of estimates. Under "union" ("party") interpretations, equations include negative effects of parties (unions) *net* of interactive effects (see tables 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6). For example, under a "union model" reading of equation (A) in table 4, there is still the negative effect of P net of P's involvement in the interaction with O to consider. In either model, negative effects of O or P are to some extent offset by positive interaction effects. And in either model, only *interactive* growth effects of unions and parties are collectively beneficent. (The interactive portions include *a**, *a* and *c* under the "union" models and *b**, *b*, and *c* under the party ones, and exclude "*b*" for the "union" ones, "*a*" for the "party" ones.) Apparently, unions' effects on growth independent of Left government tend to be (negative) ones of unbridled union militancy (resistance to technological innovation, etc.), while Left party effects independent of unions tend to be (negative) ones of destabilizing fiscal stimulation (public assistance, etc.) such as are sometimes proclaimed by conservative spokespersons.

ins in larger data sets permitting more accurate estimates and flexible arch strategies, divergent results can be reconciled [22]

iird, the combination of findings for the core Lange-Garrett model with agged negative effect of progressive governmental redistribution leaves e unanswered questions For example, what relative weights are appriate to pro-growth effects of labor movements, exercised net of reibutive policies, as opposed to unintentionally anti-growth effects of reibutive policies effected by labor movements? To answer this question, e new theory and research will be required than can be hinted at here

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

conomic growth between 1974 and 1980 was relatively high, insofar as n organizational strength and Left party participation in government simultaneously high In addition, findings for this conclusion are connt with two central thrusts of the Lange-Garrett model that the organinal strength—that is, the centralization and scope—of labor unions is a ce of long-term growth insofar as it is complemented by strong Left y participation in government, and that the organizational weakness of r unions is also a source of growth, insofar as it is complemented by ng *non*-Left participation in government Under this reading, findings indicate that Left party participation in government, net of its impacts mions' growth consequences, tends to diminish economic growth Con- y to Jackman (1986a), these conclusions are not artifacts of a Norwegian lier" Neither are they shaken by statistical controls for 'dependence foreign oil" or a host of other variables including lagged 'develop- t," lagged GDP growth, early 1970s gross capital formation as a share of P, and governmental redistribution of income circa 1970 This is so de- apparent contributions of all of the variables just listed to the genera- of domestic economic growth However the relevance of these vari- s to economic growth does indicate the importance of various theoretical pectives—for example, "neoclassical" and "new classical" ones from iomics—for explaining growth [23]

his might best be achieved with pooled time series of cross-sections (e g Friedland and ers 1985) For example with the larger sample size and fuller specification permitted by data, improved accuracy of estimates might resolve some present complications (e g yield eemingly divergent union and party results) However some key measures (e g of redistion, union centralization) appear unavailable for more time points

he potential importance of strong states for growth (e g Zysman 1983 Hicks 1988 a not directly addressed here, especially merits future attention The durability of social cratic corporatism as a progressively redistributive and economically efficient political also merits special attention in light of the increasing doubt concerning such models that ven been expressed recently by authors apparently sympathetic to the models (e g

The implications of these conclusions are large. First, the union and gov ernmental strength of labor emerge as notable causes of aggregate economi growth/stagnation, as well as of job security and progressive redistribution c income (on employment see, e.g., Cameron, 1978, 1984, and Weede, 1984 on welfare transfers see van Arnhem and Schotsman, 1982, Myles, 1984 Hicks and Swank, 1984a, 1984b, Hicks et al., 1986)

Second, this has major implications for free-market criticisms of progres sively redistributive policies which claim that these slow down aggregat economic growth. Under the "union" interpretation of the findings, jointl strong working-class unions and parties tend to expand the economic pie a well as to divide it up more equally. Long-term (i.e., greater than six years as well as short-term (less than six years) anti-growth consequences of re distributive public policies tend to be offset by labor market and macro economic public policies of the same working-class and party actors most re sponsible for redistributive policy outcomes. Under the "party" interpreta tion of findings, anti-growth consequences of redistributive policies ar aggravated by Left governments and, to a lesser extent, unions, yet short term costs of Left governments are reduced, or even turned to margina gains, if unions are extensive and centralized. Under either interpretation anti-Left and anti-union implications of equality-efficiency trade-off ar qualified. Indeed, under what I have termed a "union" model, these anti Left and anti-union implications are reversed dramatically. Organizationall and governmentally, strong labor movements may emerge as major societa benefactors, as purveyors of relatively rapid income growth, and also o somewhat more equal distribution of income.

Third, the conclusions have implications for competing conceptions o postwar "neocorporatism." Some key elements of such "neocorporatist" con ceptions are (A) the presence of "peak" organizations of labor and business (B) policy-formation networks involving negotiation among representative o these peaks and government, (C) party alliances/fusions with particula "peaks", (D) government underwriting of such "peaks" and "networks (E) "ideologies of cooperation", and (F) stresses on labor, or (G) busines motors and functions of corporatism. Of these elements, some major concep tions stress business and labor "peaks" in policy networks underwritten by government (elements [A], [B], and [D], as in Schmitter, 1974, 1981). Som

Gourevitch, 1986). However the present model has no apparent empirical problem with dat on such conspicuously strong states as Japan and France and its current empirical focus is o just the period for which a substantial decay of the social democratic corporatist option has re cently been pronounced. What is clear is that social democratic corporatism today operate without the clear accommodation of business interests (Gourevitch 1986, p. 33). This may en tail its eventual breakdown but it also suggests that it may have functioned yet more effectivel before the political economic troubles of the early 1970s and after

stress "peaks," peak-government "policy networks," and "ideologies of cooperation" ([A], [B], and [E], as in Katzenstein, 1985]) Others stress "peaks," parties and government, plus business primacy ([A], [C], [D], and [G], as in Panitch, 1981) Yet, others stress "peaks," parties, governments, and union/Left primacy ([A], [C], [D], and [F] as in Stephens, 1979, Lehmbruch, 1984, Crouch, 1985, Marks, 1986) Clearly, it is the last type of conception—a social democratic or Left corporatism one—that is most consistent with the present findings (see Hicks, 1988) Schmitter's view is too statist and not sufficiently class analytic for our conclusions, Katzenstein's overemphasizes "cooperation" at the expense of social democracy, Panitch's view transforms impressive union pursuit of aggregate growth, as well as redistributive goals, into union cooptation by capitalists Under a social democratic conception of corporatism, labor/Left resources and interests drive neocorporatism Indeed, neocorporatism is a kind of institutional compromise or equilibrium arising within polyarchies when the working class albeit reformist, is relatively strong (Przeworski, 1986)

Of course, the present findings provide a rather small pedestal for such grand conclusions Partly because of their limited empirical base, the conclusions themselves may be more complex and uncertain than objective reality may warrant Research going beyond the Lange-Garrett focus on post-1974 GDP growth in fifteen capitalist democracies to time-series and pooled data for all relevant nations and years going beyond the present 'control' structures to more complex ones including policy instruments as causal mechanisms, and going beyond conventional formulations of interactions that conflate substantively dissimilar conclusions is needed before the possibilities for a *political* economy of economic policy and performance suggested by Lange and Garrett can be evaluated definitely In other words, work on the research agenda suggested by Lange and Garrett's paper has just begun

REFERENCES

Alt James E 1985 Political Parties World Demand and Unemployment Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity *American Political Science Review* 79 1016 40

Alt James E and Alec Crystal 1983 *Political Economics* Berkeley CA University of California Press

Bornschier Volker Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson 1978 Cross National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality A Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis *American Journal of Sociology* 84 651 83

Bornschier Volker and Peter Heintz eds 1979 *Compendium for Data for World Systems Analysis* Zurich Sociologisches Institute der Universitat Zurich

Bruno, Michael and Jeffrey D Sachs 1985 *The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation* Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press

Cameron David 1978 The Expansion of the Public Economy A Comparative Analysis *American Political Science Review* 72 1243 61

[illegible] Social Democracy, Corporatism and Labor Quiescence: The Representation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Societies. In John H. Goldthorpe, ed. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.

[illegible] 1976. Theory of Probability and Induction in Social Science. In Denton Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, eds., The Significance Test Controversy. Chicago: Aldine.

Choi, Kwang. 1983. Theories of Comparative Economic Growth. Ames: IA: Iowa State University Press.

——. 1984. A Statistical Test of Olson's Model. In Dennis C. Mueller, ed. The Political Economy of Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cohen, Jacob, and Patricia Cohen. 1975. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Crouch, Colin. 1985. Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint. In Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagflation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Stanley Fischer. 1978. Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Flanagan, Robert J., David W. Soskice, and Lloyd Ulman. 1983. Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Friedland, Roger, and Jimy Sanders. 1985. The Public Economy and Economic Growth in Western Market Economies. American Sociological Review 50: 421–37.

Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. 1986. Performance in a Hostile World: Economic Growth in Capitalist Democracies, 1974–1982. World Politics 38: 517–45.

Gould, John D. 1972. Economic Growth in History: Survey and Analysis. London: Methuen.

Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hagood, Margaret Jarman. 1970. The Notion of a Hypothetical Universe. Chap. [illegible] in Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, eds. The Significance Test Controversy. Chicago: Aldine.

Hansen, Alvin H. 1951. Business Cycles and National Income. New York: Norton.

Hewitt, Christopher. 1977. The Effects of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies: A Cross-national Comparison. American Sociological Review 42: 450–64.

Hicks, Alexander. 1988. National Collective Action and Economic Performance: A Review Essay. International Studies Quarterly.

Hicks, Alexander, and Duane H. Swank. 1984a. On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion. Comparative Political Studies 17: 81–119.

——. 1984b. Governmental Redistribution in Rich Capitalist Democracies. Policy Studies Journal 13: 265–86.

Hicks, Alexander, Duane Swank, and Martin Ambuhl. 1986. Welfare Expansion Revisited: Policy Routines and their Mediation by Party, Class and Crisis, 1957–1982. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, August 1986, Washington, DC.

International Labor Organization. 1962–1973. The Cost of Social Security. Geneva: International Labor Organization.

——. 1961–1983. Yearbook of Labor Statistics. Geneva: International Labor Organization.

Jackman, Robert. 1986a. The Politics of Economic Growth in Industrial Democracies, 1974–1980: Leftist Strength or North Sea Oil. Journal of Politics 48: 242–56.

——. 1986b. Elections and Democratic Class Struggle. World Politics 26: 123–46.

Johnston, J. 1984. Econometric Methods. 3d ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kruskal, William. 1974. The Ubiquity of Statistics. American Statistician 28: 3–6.

and Svante Ersson 1986 Political Institutions, Public Policy and Economic
ndinavian Political Studies, 9 19–49
1984 Unions, Workers and Wage Regulation The Rational Bases of Consent In
oldthorpe, ed , Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism New York Ox-
ersity Press
er, and Geoffrey Garrett 1985 The Politics of Growth Journal of Politics, 47
7
986 The Politics of Growth Reconsidered Journal of Politics, 48 257–74
ch, Gerhard 1984 Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Nations In John H
horpe, ed , Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism New York Oxford Uni-
y Press
Gary 1986 Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North Amer-
Comparative Politics, 18 253–77
r, Dennis C , ed 1983 The Political Economy of Growth New Haven Yale Univer-
Press
, John 1984 Old Age in the Welfare State The Political Economy of Public Pensions
ton Little Brown
, Mancur 1982 The Rise and Decline of Nations Economic Growth Stagflation and Social
gidities New Haven Yale University Press
— 1986 An Appreciation of Tests and Criticisms Scandinavian Political Studies 9 65–85
shook, Peter C 1986 Games Theory and Political Theory New York Cambridge Univer-
y Press
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1985 Economic Outlook Historical
atistics 1960–1983 Paris Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
, Ben 1983 Who Gets What from Government? Berkeley CA University of Califor-
a Press
tch, Leo 1981 Trade Unions and the Capitalist State New Left Review 125 21–43
r, Frederick L 1985 A Guidebook to the Comparative Study of Economic Systems En-
lewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
worski Adam 1986 Capitalism and Social Democracy New York Cambridge Univer-
ity Press
eworski Adam and Michael Wallerstein 1982 Democracy at the Crossroads Democracy
2 52–68
, Pothuri and Roger L Miller 1971 Applied Econometrics Belmont CA Wadsworth
er, William H and Peter C Ordeshook 1973 An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-Hall
midt Manfred G 1983 The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis
A Comparative Study of OECD Nations European Journal of Political Research 11 1–25
mitter Phillippe C 1974 Still the Century of Corporatism? Review of Politics 36 85–131
— 1981 Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western
Europe and North America In Suzanne Berger ed Organizing Interests in Western Eu-
rope New York Cambridge University Press
ephens John D 1979 The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism London Macmillan
mmers Robert Irving Kravis and Alan Heston 1980 International Comparisons of Real
Product and Its Components 1950 1977 Review of Income and Wealth 39 19–66
n Arnhem, J, Corina M and Geurt J Schotsman 1982 Do Parties Affect the Distribution
of Income? The Case of Advanced Capitalist Democracies In Francis G Castles ed The
Impact of Parties Beverly Hills CA Sage
eede, Erich 1984 Democracy Creeping Socialism and Ideological Socialism in Rent
Seeking Societies Public Choice 44 349 66
— 1986 Sectoral Reallocation Distributional Coalitions and the Welfare State as Deter-

minants of Economic Growth Rates in Industrialized Democracies *European Journal of Political Research*, 14 501–14

Whitely, Paul F 1983 The Political Economy of Economic Growth *European Journal of Political Research*, 11 197–213

Zysman, John 1983 *Governments, Markets and Growth Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change* Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press

The Mismeasure of Political Man

John S. Dryzek
University of Oregon

Recent advances in the philosophy of science and political discourse analysis make possible a critical scrutiny of the most popular instrument in the scientific study of politics, the opinion survey. Despite its utility when put to other uses, this instrument can yield only flawed accounts of human political attributes and capabilities. Its findings should therefore be treated with caution in attempts to theorize about democratic politics. Moreover, widespread use of the instrument unwittingly reinforces an established political order of limited democracy and obstructs more participatory and discursive alternatives.

Measuring Political Man

Speculations as to human political characteristics and capabilities are probably as old as organized politics itself. The diversity of speculations suggests that political man may be a multifaceted creature. Bits of evidence selectively adduced can support the dismal view of man underlying Hobbes's bleak political prognosis, the far more cheerful interpretation which informs Rousseau's rustic utopia, and most points in between. While there is clearly more to political theorizing than examination of individual human attributes, a philosophical anthropology underpins every political theorist's conception of actual, possible, and desirable political orders. For example, if substantial numbers of people were not strongly disposed to knavery, there would be no point in "designing institutions for knaves," to use Hume's famous dictum.

Empirical scrutiny of political man was once fairly casual. Only in the last few decades has science been brought to bear. A number of tools rooted in fields as diverse as social psychology, physiology, psychoanalytics, and sociobiology have been utilized. By far the most popular approach has involved the application of survey research methods, especially in conjunction with the fields of public opinion and voting studies.

At risk of doing violence to a substantial and nuanced body of literature, the principal findings of these last two fields (as they relate to the content and distribution of politically relevant characteristics and capabilities) may be summarized as follows. Most people are uninterested in and uninformed about politics. When pressed, they express attitudes highly intolerant of unpopular minorities. There is little consistency across any political opinions they do express. Their minimal political behavior is often under the sway of

Measured criticism from James Farr, Robert Goodin, Susan Hunter, David Jacobs, and John Orbell improved the content of this essay.

social and psychological forces the individual does not fully understand (in the standard socio-psychological model of voting behavior, vote choice is determined by attitudes, which in turn are affected by social forces). While some recent American studies have found more in the way of constraint across issue attitudes and issue-oriented voting than in the past (see especially Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976) and substantial retrospective judgment by voters on the performance of governments (Fiorina, 1981), these findings call for but marginal readjustment to an unflattering portrait of political man (Kinder and Sears, 1983, pp. 664–68; Kinder, 1983, pp. 393–97; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1981).[1] For the most part, Blondel's (1981, p. 48) surmise still holds: "Politics is too distant, too complex, too mysterious, and therefore too frightening for the common man to be prepared to be involved."

Such micropolitical contentions have clear macropolitical import. Indeed just about every study reflecting upon mass political behavior pays homage to the inspirational force of democratic theory in imparting meaning to the empirical quest (see, for example, Berelson, 1952; Asher, 1983, p. 341). Moreover, "contemporary" democratic theory has drawn support from this empirical literature in arguing for limited and indirect popular influence in political life (see, for example, Dahl, 1956; Sartori, 1962; Eckstein, 1966). In this spirit, Almond and Verba's (1963) "civic culture" celebrates democracy but demands enough deference and parochialism to regulate the dangers of excessive participation. While some unanticipated political developments over the past two decades have seen this contemporary theory lose much of its vitality, the weight of survey findings supports no alternative theory. So popularizations of this view may still be found in introductory political science textbooks; for example, in Dye and Zeigler's (1987, pp. 14–17) best seller the "irony of democracy" is that elites rather than masses are the guardians of democratic values.

Opinion surveys have met with a variety of criticisms since their introduction to political science. Some dislike the method (e.g., Lane, 1962), some the macropolitical implications of the field's findings (e.g., Pateman, 1970, pp. 5–7). Yet the political opinion survey continues to flourish, an enduring legacy of the behavioral revolution. If political science has a dominant method, survey analysis is it (see Achen, 1983, pp. 69–70). In 1979–1980 35% of the articles in the three major American political science journals involved survey research (Presser, 1984, p. 96). Moreover, the conjunction of survey research and voting studies is frequently paraded as the most scientific branch of the study of politics, proof positive that political *science* has arrived (see Beck, 1986, p. 241 for a representative statement). The trap

[1] Apparent increases in the coherence of issue attitudes may in fact be attributable to change in the wording of survey questions (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1978).

›ings are evident. covering-law explanations,[2] systematic bodies of theory, umulative research programs, testable hypotheses, quantitative methods, a ommunity of like-minded practitioners, and "engineering" applications in onsultation to political leaders

My intent here, though, is not to praise political opinion surveying but to xpose some crucial limitations In so doing, I will begin by accepting the ontention of its partisans that the opinion survey is indeed a scientific intrument This instrument will be subjected to a scrutiny made possible by ecent advances in the philosophy of science and political discourse analysis will argue that, regardless of any utility when applied to other questions uch an instrument can produce only a fundamentally flawed account of politically relevant human dispositions Further I will claim that extensive use of opinion surveys functions in a particularly subtle and unexpected way to einforce a prevailing political order which treats mass politics in terms of ndividuals who are mostly passive, and only occasionally and minimally disposed to participate in political life Conversely I argue that this widespread ise obstructs incipient movements toward a "classical" style of politics involving more in the way of active dialogue among competent citizens Given he dominant status of survey methods in the discipline this essay therefore ortrays the mismeasure of political man [3]

Despite my critical stance, the arguments that follow are not sufficient in hemselves to justify the burial of opinion surveying in political science, still less rejection of the whole idea of naturalistic explanation in social science While individuals with such aims (e g , Taylor 1971) would find support in these pages, my own arguments are limited in two ways

First, I focus on a single instrument the opinion survey put to just one kind of use, the study of the content and distribution of political capabilities My critique of the instrument as put to this use might be accepted without subscription to grander arguments against the possibility of social *science* In fact, my account takes at face value the contention that politics can indeed be approached through scientific instruments such as the opinion survey, though the understanding of science that informs my analysis is post-empiricist [4]

Second, I will not detail any alternative method for the empirical scrutiny

[2]Explanations of this standing are subsumed under general laws Any such law states that given a certain set of conditions some phenomenon will always occur (see for example Hempel 1965)—though probabilistic relaxations of this last principle are generally allowed in the social sciences

[3]My title is adapted from Gould (1981) who exposes the bad science of attempts to demonstrate hereditarian and racialist theories of intelligence The sins of political mismeasurers are less blatant

[4]That is, I will draw upon contemporary accounts of science as advanced by philosophers such as Popper, Kuhn Lakatos, and Laudan who for all their differences share a rejection of the positivist precepts of an earlier era

of political man Rational rejection of any one research program- that encompassing the opinion survey—must await a demonstra some rival program possesses superior explanatory or problem-solvi (Lakatos, 1970, Laudan, 1977, pp 106–14, Dryzek, 1986, pp 303–· dates include quantitative approaches that take the subjectivity of i ees seriously, such as Q-methodology (Brown, 1980), intensive id interaction with subjects (Lane, 1962), Popperian situational analys can explore deviations from a baseline of individual rationality (Fa the intentional approach to public opinion outlined by Brunner (1 experimental work within a public choice paradigm (e.g , Orbell, S Shea, and Simmons, 1984). The analysis that follows should be tre piece of evidence for use in a comparative evaluation of compe grams Given that this analysis is highly critical of research progra nized around the opinion survey, it suggests the alternatives mer attention and development

Understanding Scientific Instruments

Scientific instruments provide access to phenomena for which ex is sought So an electron microscope yields access to the molecul and large telescopes enable exploration of galactic forces To be rea instrument must embody a theory—for example, interpretation of ings on a thermometer in terms of temperature is rooted in thermo theory As Popper (1972, p 107n) puts it, all scientific observation terpretations of the facts observed, they are interpretations in th theories." Theory-neutral scientific instruments cannot exist [5] In days of an instrument's use, this theory of instrumentation will typic the forefront of its users' consciousness With further use of the ins the theory can fade from awareness so the instrument can yield s direct access to observed phenomena In reading a thermometer, not need to be aware of how Boyle's law is applying—one simply re perature The instrument becomes like a window through which viewed, the observer can let the instrument slip from awareness (be no more conscious of the theoretical underpinnings of the in than of the principles of grammar and syntax when reading a book

The similarities between reading a book and reading a scientif ment are explored by Heelan (1983) Heelan notes, following (1975), that in reading a text, we are from the very beginning pro meaning for the text as a whole Otherwise, our reading would be ent. This projection is always rooted in the cultural milieu of th

[5]See Lakatos (1970, pp 97–98) for another statement of this point Kuhn (1962) g than Popper in arguing that observations are always made through the lens of th which inspires the theories that the observations are designed to test

hich is why such varied readings of classic texts like *Das Kapital* or the ible are possible Similarly, in making an isolated reading on an instrument, we are always projecting a meaning for the set of readings (on one or iore instruments) we will obtain This act of projection too is culturally conitioned Kuhn (1962) was among the first to note that scientific communities an be analyzed in cultural terms (see also Garfinkel, Lynch, and Livingston, 981) Thus, reading a scientific instrument involves the application of culirally acquired capacities (Heelan, 1983, p 185) A common set of readings an convey different meanings to adherents of, say, wave and corpuscular aditions in optics (in the unlikely event that one set of readings will interest oth traditions) The "text" generated by a set of readings of scientific instruients is, then, a cultural artifact

This discussion of the culture in scientific instrumentation is not meant to isparage particular scientific instruments or research traditions Heelan 1983, p 189) notes that transparent, culture-soaked technologies of instruientation generally characterize the advanced stages of research programs, vhen there is "broad agreement about general outlines of scientific undertanding " Therefore, analysis of this culture should not take the form of a earch for correctable bias and error, because the culture is properly intrinic to the instrument Worries about the theoretical grounding of instruients are found only in the early phases of a program Instruments drop rom consciousness as practitioners become more adept in their use

Heelan's account contains no means for the evaluation of instruments, only way of understanding their function in the practice of science I will argue elow that we can, at least in social science, use the cultural dimension of cientific instrumentation to develop evaluative questions But first let us onsider the opinion survey instrument in Heelan's terms

Theory and Culture in the Survey Instrument

The limiting case of a bad scientific instrument would be one thoroughly opaque to its users Practitioners could make no sense of stimuli produced by the instrument, think for example, of an untrained person confronted with the output of a mass spectrometer Of course generally only trained people confront mass spectrometers So how could a community employing an opaque instrument possibly exist?

Confessions of such opacity come from the quarter of survey research itelf Achen argues both that the opinion survey is the major quantitative political science method, and that its users do not know what its readings convey "Bluntly put, political scientists do not know what survey responses are measuring" (Achen, 1983, p 80) More technically, researchers are unable to choose between competing simulations of measurement error in the absence a "mathematical theory of the survey response" (Achen 1983, p 80) Survey researchers also have no good theory to explain the impact of different

phrasing and ordering of questions—while being only too aware that wording and ordering can make a huge difference to responses, having devoted substantial attention to such matters over the years. But if the theory is missing, how can a meaningful instrument exist?

The answer may be that Achen overstates his case, so only the refinement, not the creation of what he calls "theories of data" (i.e., instrumentation) is needed. Perhaps the survey instrument is currently light on theory but heavy on culture. This disparity reinforces the need to attend to the culture of the instrument, which, let me stress again, is not the same as saying that the instrument suffers from bias and error amenable to discovery and correction by practitioners. Such attention would still be justified if the theory were better.

Political Discourse in Scientific Instruments

The aspects of a (scientific) culture embodied in an instrument are not easily assessed empirically, for, like any culture, they are unspoken and taken for granted by users of the instrument, who are typically unaware even of the need for consensus upon them. So how may one speak of the hitherto unspoken?

The appropriate procedure here begins by treating these unspoken aspects as the underpinnings of a "discourse." In these terms, a discourse embodies a shared set of capabilities which enable the assemblage of words, phrases, and sentences into meaningful "texts" intelligible to readers or listeners (see, for example, van Dijk, 1985). With Heelan's account of the essential identity of texts and sets of readings on scientific instruments in mind, these capabilities can also be said to refer to the assemblage of instrument readings into intelligible wholes (Heelan himself does not make this extension). Similar unself-conscious, taken-for-granted processes operate in both ordinary language and scientific instrumentation.

Political scientists have rarely attempted to bring such processes to explicit awareness. One exception is Edelman's (1977) analysis of the political positions embedded in seemingly clinical and technical discourse among those who administer to the poor on behalf of the welfare state. Unlike Edelman, the present focus is not on the discourse of a particular scientific or professional community, but upon the discourse implicit in a scientific instrument like the opinion survey.

However, in common with Edelman, my focus will be upon the specifically political aspects of discourse. Sociolinguists have not generated any universally applicable set of questions with which to scrutinize a discourse. The questions one asks depend upon the purpose of the inquiry. Given that my purpose has to do with the study of politics, I will stress the political and hence engage in what Seidel (1985) and Alker and Sylvan (1986) call political

analysis. The political aspect of a discourse includes the following ents.

ology—that is, a set of entities whose existence is recognized or icted Examples might include utility-maximizers, social classes, Hegelian *Geist*

ment of degrees of agency to these entities Some may be granted t status (for example, prime movers in political events, or the pro- in the Marxist theory of revolution), others categorized as objects ample, slaves in the antebellum South, or Japanese in American War II propaganda)

; those with agency, a recognition of some motives (such as self- t, self-doubt, anxiety, moral rectitude) and a denial of others For le, Edelman (1977, pp 20–21) points to the professional inter- on of rebellion among the poor in terms of psychological deviance than reasonable assessment of conditions and options

otions of what is natural and unnatural in political relationships for-granted hierarchies based on gender, birth, race, professional ise, or age are possibilities here

proceeding, let me stress that the remainder of this essay does not ie diverse cultural dispositions ideological aspirations, and politi- gs of opinion researchers themselves Rather, my concern is with irse implicit in their instrument, what follows is rooted in the phi- ather than the sociology of science What, then, can we make of irse of survey instrumentation in terms of the four elements just ed?

HE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

tology of this discourse contains first and foremost, individuals d as structured bundles of psychological attributes Political be- nterpreted as the product of psychological forces, social factors can behavior, but such factors are mediated by individual psychology ls are seen as capable of possessing beliefs, opinions, and attitudes ties which have a real existence outside and independent of politi- sion or action Clearly, the survey encounter itself does not involve ission or action (beyond minimal and highly constrained invitations hrough responses to open-ended questions) practitioners see any ence as contamination [6] So it must be assumed that an individual's

1968) notes that the very experience of being interviewed can change respondents l behaviors For example they may become more interested in politics or more vote Clausen discusses this phenomenon in terms of a threat to the validity of panel

beliefs, opinions, and attitudes about politics are invariant across the degree of action or inaction involved in a situation (though of course survey researchers are interested in how attitudes change with time and political history—for example, between two waves of a panel survey).

Beyond a particular kind of individual, the ontology of the instrument's discourse recognizes but one kind of political world. This world is characterized by competitive struggle between well-defined entities such as issue positions, parties, candidates, and interests. The political behavior of ordinary individuals therefore consists of choosing sides (with varying degrees of commitment) in such struggle.

Agency is distributed unequally by the discourse of the survey instrument among the individuals recognized. Full "subject" status is granted only to the investigators designing and interpreting surveys, who are masters of their situation. At the opposite extreme, interviewers are "objects." They must behave like automata as they administer the instrument, otherwise the dreaded interviewer bias will affect responses. The respondents themselves fall somewhere between these two extremes. They are subjects to the degree they autonomously form their opinions and act upon them. But full subjects would be of no interest to opinion research that strives for covering-law explanations of political behavior. Covering-law ambition is intrinsic to any social science instrument that isolates variables from the totality of the relevant characteristics of an individual and proceeds to seek associations between these variables across individuals. The influences uncovered by such explanations (such as peer attitudes, party identification, social class, party propaganda, etc.) must remain mysterious to the respondent. If these influences were not mysterious, one could dispense with the elaborate survey instrument and simply ask people why they act or behave as they do. Thus, ordinary people are treated as though they respond to stimuli according to the way they are programmed, such that they are incapable of freely crafting responses to stimuli. In this sense, they may be termed reactive rather than active. Their behavior reflects the causal influences upon them, they are objects.

However, as noted earlier, the survey instrument allows respondents an element of subjective status. The behavior of subjects requires some motivation. The motives recognized by the discourse of the survey instrument are all instrumental in character, in that they involve behavior designed to achieve some end. The end can involve perceptions of sectional, public, or material self-interest, a simple desire to see one party, candidate, or issue position prevail, or the political system survive. The content of the end and the (ir)rationality of the action can be investigated using the instrument, but ontologically speaking, there are such things as ends and instrumental actions which are intrinsic to the discourse.

The point to be stressed here is that political behavior is conterminous

r kinds of social or economic behavior The very first voting studies ied out by Lazarsfeld and his associates after he was frustrated by ty to survey consumer behavior Whether he turned to voting for ectual reason that consumer behavior is too complex to study see Natchez, 1985, pp 47–53), or for baser pecuniary motives 962, p 57), he clearly thought the same techniques appropriate to s This original sin of the field was not absolved by the demise of l, Columbia, social determinism, and the victory of Michigan and chology in the 1950s As Michigan's Miller put it, " we did not theory which argued that political behavior was any different from economic behavior" (Miller, 1960, quoted in Natchez, 1985, p 163) ument today still does not allow the possibility that individuals may s when it comes to politics Achen (1983, p 70) notes that political ogists have made few original contributions to survey methodology, g to "shop for hand-me-down techniques invented by statisticians, gists, and economists '

, the instrument's discourse embodies a "natural" political relation- e survey encounter itself which is thoroughly structured and domi- the survey designer The respondent must not fully understand the of the encounter, for such understanding would affect its results into the realm of the experimenter effect dreaded by experimental gists

f these elements of the discourse of the survey instrument should ite innocuous and unremarkable ' I will argue that in combination ermine the claim of the instrument to tell us much about politically human characteristics What then renders political dispositions able to this particular instrument?

The Uniqueness of the Political

sue this issue a more basic question must be asked What is poli- popular answer is that politics involves power and the (instru- ursuit of interest (see, for example Dahl 1984, pp 8–35) The lities between this notion of politics and the discourse embedded vey instrument should be obvious (at least to the degree that the ty of respondents is recognized) These commonalities arise not ms of the kind of political world recognized in the instrument's on- it also with respect to questions of agency and motivation So is not ment ideally suited to the study of political behavior? Indeed, if we deeper we can trace both the popular definition of politics in terms and interest, and some aspects of the survey instrument's discourse

l be noted that all apply irrespective of the degree of sophistication in survey de- cample, in the use of open ended questions to get at complex attitudes

to a classical liberal conception of man in society. Opinion researchers may be unaware of this connection. Thus, Natchez (1985) argues that voting studies have been sundered from the liberal constitutionalist view of democracy that would give them political bite. But any such gaps could be easily bridged at the conscious level, for they do not exist at the unconscious, taken-for-granted level of discourse

There is, however, an alternative account which defines politics in terms of public debate among people deciding how they shall act and interact individually and collectively The lineage of this classical conception of politics is Aristotelian, though it has contemporary exponents in Arendt (1958), Gadamer (1975), Habermas (1984), pragmatist philosophers, and participatory democrats such as Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984) The classical model is not just a theoretical construct It relates to some practical political possibilities in the contemporary world, to which I shall return later

My main interest here, though, is not in advocating any particular program of political reform. Rather, I will use this classical model primarily as a critical device, along lines suggested by Ball (1983), to highlight the partiality of the survey instrument's discourse. Critical perspective might also be provided by Marxism, as indicated by Lindblom (1982),[8] psychoanalytics, cybernetics, or microeconomics [9] The classical model is used here because it is tied to some political alternatives at one end of a continuum of democratic possibilities Its distance on this spectrum from the conception of politics implicit in the survey instrument makes it well placed to highlight all the key implications of that discourse, of which a re-examination is now in order.

A Classically Political Critique of the Instrument

To begin, an ontology which treats a person as a bundle of structured attributes and conceives of mass politics in terms of an agglomeration of such individuals, finds little resonance in the classical model which sees the production of political opinion as an eminently fluid, collective, and public affair Hence, political processes can proceed and conclude in ways that do not simply reflect and aggregate individual dispositions, be these dispositions fixed and predetermined, or flexible and malleable The survey instrument's recognition of causal social influences upon individuals hardly does justice to such possibilities It allows that man is a social being (admitting influences rooted in, for example, role playing or social networks), but not a political being in the classical sense Social man is constrained within or driven by

[8] Marxists might stress the ahistorical aspect of opinion surveying of political dispositions and capabilities, and the taking of false consciousness at face value

[9] Some political science practitioners of public choice, itself inspired by microeconomics make use of sample surveys In contrast, mainstream microeconomics does not study individuals directly, focusing instead on preferences and other attributes revealed in behavior

y into a web of relationships, (classically) political man is free to nd recreate relationships These creative possibilities cannot be ex- in the political world recognized by the instrument's ontology where ials can only choose sides in struggles

ding to the discursive classical conception of politics, one should not iny evidence of political perceptions and beliefs outside the context cal action (the second aspect of the instrument's individualistic on- ioted earlier) Such disembodied and constrained beliefs are sought ion researchers in the form of ideology, or, in recent more sophisti- ork, scripts and schemas (see Kinder, 1983, pp 414–15) By classical iey are a veritable hindrance to the ideal of free, action-oriented po- bate, so we should rejoice if we do not find them and criticize them e do

ersely, one should not regard any apparently issueless thinking dis- y the survey instrument as a defect of the individual, but as a defect ystem of discourse in which this individual is engaged It is only their expression in political action that (classically) political attitudes iavior can be discerned To be called political, cogitation should be to—and revealed in—action itself or action-oriented debate [10] The encounter fails here because it is artificial, disembodied, divorced tion, and hence nonpolitical At best (and this is not insignificant), it pick up on the echoes of past situations in which people were more l politically, which might show up (for example) in reasons given for party loyalties

road point here is that the kind of interaction between the analyst object of his or her inquiry should be capable of generating the kind nation the analyst seeks For example, van Dijk (1984, p 5) argues structured discursive interviews do capture what he wants to explore cially prejudiced talk precisely because the interview itself is a con- n with a stranger

loes find intimations of such concerns in the writings of opinion re- rs For example, Gant and Davis (1984) argue that apparently igno- ponses to survey questions indicate only mental economy in informa- cessing, once individuals have processed information about issues or tes into choices, that information is rationally discarded In similar ey's (1966) attempted resurrection of the issue-oriented voter argues us on issues only in the context of the judgments people make about ies they could vote for, and that there is no sense in looking for any about issues outside this act of choice In all other respects, Key sub- to the discourse of more orthodox opinion researchers His departure

ord 'action has a special meaning to one prominent adherent of the classical model 958, pp 175–81) defines political action in terms of creative and self-revealing public id so would see action itself and action oriented debate as synonymous

here is minimal For the kind of context he (like Gant and Davis) emphasizes—selection from a predetermined menu of candidates or parties—is only marginally political in the classical sense But even this mild heresy was rejected out of hand, rather than argued against, by the mainstream, which simply could not fathom what Key was up to (see Campbell, 1966) However limited his departure, Key verged on challenging an element of the survey instrument's discourse, such curt dismissal is exactly what discourse analysis would predict (see above) [11]

Further intimation of the importance of an acting context may be found in an opinion researcher's concession that "identically worded questions actually have different meanings over time as the social and political contexts change" (Asher, 1983, p 348, see also Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976, pp 10–12) If one allows that a crucial dimension of political context is the degree to which it is action-related, this recognition is potentially devastating Thus, *the fact that survey respondents frequently express highly intolerant attitudes toward unpopular minorities is of little concern from the perspective of classical politics because people rarely act upon those attitudes* (see Natchez, 1985, p 112)

More generally, actions are not easily predicted from survey responses (Niemi, 1986, p 237) Survey researchers can investigate this point further by incorporating different scenarios in the instrument in an attempt to represent the genuine dilemmas of real life Thus, Schuman (1972) demonstrates that the number of people who can be classified as opposed to racial discrimination depends on the scenario incorporated in the question Yet, the genuine dilemmas of life take place in the context of interaction with and about real people, nobody suffers from the expression of intolerance in a disembodied survey interview The incorporation of action scenarios in the instrument can at best capture only expressed dispositions toward action, rather than action itself

It might be countered at this juncture that the opinion survey is designed only to measure attitudes, and at most the expressed intentions which constitute what may be termed the action component of attitudes (Sudman and Bradburn, 1983, pp 123–25), rather than to predict actions from attitudes But survey researchers in political science themselves see this lack of predictive power as a serious lacuna in their efforts to develop a science of public opinion directly relevant to *political* science, rather than just psychology (Niemi, 1986, pp 237–38) As long as this gap remains, one should hesitate

[11] By no means do I wish to suggest Key was attuned to a classical conception of politics In fact, he took the liberal constitutionalist American political system for granted and sought only to persuade political elites to attend to issues rather than images in their communications with the masses (see Seidelman and Harpham, 1985, p 172), such that public opinion could better constrain leadership

ipplying the results of opinion surveying to macrolevel theories of de- y and politics.[12]

ing now to the question of agency, here too the discourse of the sur- trument proves (classically) nonpolitical Recall that this discourse ishes between autonomous "subject" researchers and largely reac- ject" respondents Nothing further from the classical conception of l relationships as discursive and pedagogical can be imagined (short of n of command) Reactive individuals under the sway of causal influ- iave no place in classical politics The scathing reactions to Lane's leparture from the survey instrument and its discourse are instructive ane employs in-depth interviews to investigate individuals' political s—and finds more coherent structure than do the survey researchers (1983, p 399) dismisses Lane on the grounds that such encounters deology, rather than merely report on it The survey researcher fears cing such interactive and productive cogitation into the survey in- it's encounter, for to the extent it occurs, respondents become unrep- tive of the larger population, and the interview experience will differ espondents (Weisberg, 1986, p 299) Yet, if Kinder's criticism is on Lane should be congratulated for inadvertently adhering to the clas- nons by seeking cogitation in the context of a more truly political ter (In passing, it should be noted that Lane's encounters are not elated, and that the "ideology" he seeks to uncover would be incon- with classical principles—see earlier)

consider again the question of recognized motives embedded in the instrument The idea that motivation is instrumental is thoroughly nt with politics conceived in terms of power and the pursuit of in- But from a classical perspective such behavior constitutes an inva- the communicative and discursive rationality of politics in which in- ls publicly and jointly reason toward collective ends and actions (cf 1984, p 151) by the technical rationality appropriate to different as- f life (such as economic production and exchange, or engineering and ogy)

ly, consider once more the "natural" political relationship found in rument—specifically, its domination by the survey designer Such tion is absolutely essential, for if the respondent understood that the gator was trying to discern causal influences upon individuals of which

ifying this gap is easy bridging it is another matter In fact there are two gaps one attitudes and behaviors, another between these microlevel behaviors and their mac- l consequences This micro macro discontinuity is embarrassingly ubiquitous in the ences, though it is bridged by general equilibrium theory in economics and contrac litical theory, and addressed at length by social choice theorists (Coleman 1986 27)

they were unaware, a negative reaction might intrude. If informed of the alleged causal laws governing their behavior, they might even change that behavior, thereby subverting the law. Widespread dissemination of causal knowledge about individual behavior can conceivably undermine the empirical regularities in behavior which alleged laws capture (Gewirth, 1954). Of course, opinion researchers themselves have an interest in maximizing dissemination of their work. But this just highlights once again the difference between the aspirations of members of a community and the inherent characteristics of the instrument they wield. The discourse of the survey instrument has a subtle stake in perpetuating the reactive side of human behavior and suppressing the active aspect. For the generalizations it seeks are meaningful only if behavior is repetitive and regularized across individuals and across time. Such behavior is, of course, inconsistent with the classical idea of politics.

This last criticism applies with special force to the extent the instrument treats individuals as plastic and reactive objects. However, as noted above, the instrument's discourse also admits instrumentally motivated subjects. Laws about aggregates of this second kind of individual can be "agentistic generalizations," which are immune to the kind of subversion just discussed. The best-known agentistic generalizations are found in microeconomics, where the validity of laws of supply and demand depends on the instrumental rationality of large numbers of individuals. The aggregate result does not change to the extent each individual is aware of his or her miniscule contribution to the operation of the law in a particular market. But even such agentistic microeconomic laws apply only as long as the people they are about adhere to particular standards of behavior—such as rational maximization—which in principle they can choose to violate (Wilson, 1984, pp. 231–32). So even if it renounces social psychology and adopts microeconomics, thereafter to seek only agentistic generalizations, the survey instrument still has a stake in perpetuating a certain kind of constrained behavior inconsistent with classical politics.

Democratic Alternatives

It should be clear by now that there is a conception of politics to which the opinion survey instrument is thoroughly appropriate, and another version of the political with which the instrument is incommensurable. Why not call a truce at this point, and let each side investigate its own kind of politics in the manner it sees fit? While this kind of compromise might displease survey enthusiasts who believe their findings should aspire to more universal validity, at least their community would secure a prominent place.

Unfortunately, the truce has already been violated by those with broader ambitions for the survey instrument. This section will explicate the nature

l implications of this violation through reference to three models of de-cracy Two of these models are recognized by the instrument's discourse e third is rooted in the classical conception of politics and so cannot be compassed by the survey instrument

Opinion researchers have always proclaimed an interest in major theoreti-questions about the participatory potential of the masses Referring to the dy of the determinants of vote choice, Asher (1983, p 341) states, "This earch agenda of course reflects enduring questions of democratic theory out the role, competence, and performance of a democratic citizenry" om Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) on, this interest led to the bunking of a so-called "classical" theory of democracy "Classical" theory portrayed by opinion surveyors for purposes of empirical test posits in-umentally rational, enlightened, politically aware, and issue-oriented ers making independent reasoned choices among candidates and parties is theory was seemingly refuted, and "contemporary" democratic theo-s erected in its stead a version of democracy which allows limited citizen ess to political power and applauds widespread political apathy for its ictional contribution to democratic stability This version bears a striking emblance to politics as actually practiced in the United States

The results of opinion research which undermined so-called "classical" mocratic theory were in fact corroborating liberal constitutionalist demo-tic theory—as a close reading of Natchez (1985) should make clear The ntemporary" theory itself proves just a warmed-over version of liberal nstitutionalism (Pateman, 1980, p 59) More recently, rational choice the-sts of the Rochester school have attempted to resurrect the so-called "clas-al" model, so far with questionable empirical corroboration (Weisberg 36) Thus, the discourse of opinion research recognizes just two demo-tic possibilities one "contemporary" and liberal constitutionalist the ier "classical" and hyperrationalistic

The curious aspect of "classical democratic theory as portrayed by opin-i researchers is that it never existed prior to its description in the works of relson and his successors It is either myth or caricature as Pateman 970, pp 16–21) makes abundantly clear Yet despite the expose of Pate-in and others, opinion researchers (even those who want to revive the del) cling to the myth So Asher (1983 p 376) equates instrumentally ional prospective voting (with an eye to what candidates actually will when in office) with rehabilitation of the rational independent citizen classical democratic theory" Similarly Beck (1986, p 246) states that ting on the issues (or policy voting) long has been a cherished ideal of mocratic theory"

This rational independent citizen thought to have been debunked by the rly voting studies, and now revived in the hands of the Rochester school

cannot come from liberal constitutionalist democratic theory's conception c political man. Nor can this citizen come from a correct understanding of classical politics, which has no place for atomistic individuals. So where does h come from? Let me suggest that students of voting behavior invented a "classical" theory within the confines of a discourse of individualism, instrumental behavior, and cogitation outside action This discourse allowed them t see nothing else—such as the true classical conception of politics

Perhaps the best way of highlighting the difference between the "classical theory of opinion researchers and the true classical theory is through refer ence to the role of ideology In the so-called "classical" theory, ideolog plays a positive role As Kinder (1983, p 391) puts it, "interest in the possi bility of ideological reasoning was and still is an expression of concern for th quality and very possibility of democratic forms of government " In true clas sical politics, ideology is despised as an impediment to unconstrained politi cal debate, fit only to be criticized and shattered (see, for example, Geuss 1981, pp 26–44)

Despite the omissions in their enumeration of democratic possibilities opinion researchers have clearly invaded the territory of classical politics an debates about democratic alternatives Survey discourse recognizes only lil eral constitutionalist and hyperrationalistic "classical" options The othe major strand in theories of democracy may be termed republican, pai ticipatory, or (more truly) classical Pateman (1980, p 59) refers to thi strand as the "neglected classical theory of participatory democracy "[11] Th opinion researchers' recognition of two models of democracy seems at firs sight able to address the question of mass political competence, but in fact i misses the point of the main democratic debate, which pits liberal constitu tionalists against classical participatory enthusiasts

Inasmuch as empirical opinion research calls into doubt mass politic competence (by refuting the so-called "classical" model) and corroborate liberal constitutionalism, it implies more participatory democratic option (such as the one sought by the true classical model) are unattainable A truc between opinion surveyors and the true classical model under such circum stances would merely cover a defeat for the classical

Some Larger Implications

Such a defeat might be greeted with equanimity in some quarters Per haps nothing is lost with the demise of classical politics and the absence c instruments to study it For is not this classical idea itself lost in the mists c time, along with the Athenian *polis*? Are not those who seek its resurrectio

[11]Not all classical republicans are sympathetic to democracy For example Arendt (196 p 233) believes true politics will always be for the few Nevertheless a republican strand exist within the democratic tradition

iantic dreamers with a normative vision, as opposed to the empirical ·ntists of opinion research? Is not instrumental, individualistic, reac-·, and limited power politics—allowing at best what Barber (1984) calls ın democracy"—now universal? It is noteworthy that Coleman (1986, 1317–18) explains the mid-century growth of survey analysis in Ameri- sociology through reference to the demise of integrated local commu- es (of the sort that might be hospitable to discursive classical politics) and concurrent development of national masses of atomistic individuals con- ıted as audiences by corporate and governmental actors

Classical politics is a minority interest in today's world, and in the form d for the critical purposes of the bulk of this essay, it may seem utopian , there is growing potential for movement toward a classical style of poli- in public life Advances in affluence, education, and communications hnology could all contribute to this realization (Habermas, 1981, Luke l White, 1985)[14] One finds growing interest in more truly participatory ns of politics in many locations A wide variety of community-based social vements and citizen actions evidence this participatory and egalitarian mentum (see, for example, Boyte, 1980) And it can be argued that a clas- il style of politics may become increasingly necessary in a world faced by ·r more complex and divisive problems (Dryzek 1987) Thus the classical ıception poses an authentic challenge to the liberal constitutionalist ver- ı of politics

n light of this choice the discourse of the opinion research instrument es a stand on behalf of a politics of thin democracy Moreover let me now m that the discourse helps to maintain and reconstitute this kind of poli- ., thereby contributing to the legitimacy of the political system where h politics may be found

t should be stressed that my central point here is not that the results of nion research used instrumentally by the powers that be maintains them d their system) in power These results are indeed used by commercial itical consultants and image makers to win elections and further contrib- to expert administration of political life But this use is beside the point e And perhaps the results of opinion research really are of limited value would-be manipulators So Butler and Stokes (1971, pp 529–30) argue t opinion researchers simply do not know enough to advise potential ma- ulators, and that even as their knowledge increases it is in principle "ac- sible to all," advantaging no one unduly If so we need not fear a tech- racy of those who wield the survey instrument

Rather, the important point here is that like any manifestation of any dis- urse, every application of the survey instrument reproduces the discourse l political vision embodied in the instrument Each use is a dialectical

[14]In this context, note the persistent finding of opinion surveys that tolerance and other politi- virtues increase with level of education

"moment" in the life of the discourse, both drawing upon and reinforcing the discourse (see Alker and Sylvan, 1986).[15] As Edelman (1977) notes, professional language can enter into and help shape everyday life—even as its dissemination occurs without any other significant or effective actions on the part of the professionals in question. Kelman (1987, pp. 93–94) makes a similar point about the negative effects of the production and diffusion of public choice analyses on norms of public spirit among government officials.

Opinion survey discourse is not just the preserve of a detached intellectual community (as may be the case with the discourse of some scientific instruments). This discourse has many of the same roots as the public philosophy of Western political systems (liberal constitutionalism) and plays a major part in the public life of these systems. Thus, survey discourse contributes to the legitimation of the dominant political order and, conversely, stands in the way of a more discursive and participatory politics.

This function is accomplished solely at the taken-for-granted level of discourse. Every time a survey is designed, or its questionnaire administered or its results analyzed, or its conclusions reported in textbooks, or discussed by students in a class, or noted by fellow-practitioners, political leaders, or the attentive public, then a conception of politics as properly instrumental individualistic, limited, reactive, and power-oriented is reinforced and furthered, at the expense of a politics of unimpeded discussion and interaction. The mismeasure of political man lies squarely in the path of attempts to promote alternative visions of political life, and, if Aristotle is right that man is indeed *zoōn politikon*, obstructs man's achievement of his true nature.

References

Achen, Christopher H. 1983. Toward Theories of Data: The State of Political Methodology. In Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

Alker, Hayward R., Jr., and David Sylvan. 1986. Political Discourse Analysis. Presented at the [illegible] Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

——— 1969. *Crises of the Republic*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Asher, Herbert. 1983. Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s: An Examination of Some Old and New Problem Areas. In Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

Ball, Terence. 1983. The Ontological Presuppositions and Political Consequences of a Social Science. In Daniel R. Sabia, Jr., and Jerald T. Wallulis, eds., *Changing Social Science: Critical Theory and Other Critical Perspectives*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Barber, Benjamin. 1984. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

[15]Technically, it may be said that the unification of "verbal productions" into "texts" draws from and reproduces the discourse in question (see Alker and Sylvan, 1986, p. 18).

Beck, Paul Allen 1986 Choice, Context, and Consequence Beaten and Unbeaten Paths Toward a Science of Electoral Behavior In Herbert F Weisberg, ed , *Political Science The Science of Politics* New York Agathon

Berelson, Bernard 1952 Democratic Theory and Public Opinion *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 16 313–30

Berelson, Bernard R , Paul F Lazarsfeld, and William N McPhee 1954 *Voting* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Berns, Walter 1962 Voting Studies In Herbert J Storing ed *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* New York Holt, Rinehart, and Winston

Blondel, Jean 1981 *The Discipline of Politics* London Butterworths

Boyte Harry C 1980 *The Backyard Revolution Understanding the New Citizen Movement* Philadelphia Temple University Press

Brown, Steven R 1980 *Political Subjectivity Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science* New Haven Yale University Press

Brunner, Ronald D 1977 An Intentional Alternative to Public Opinion Research *American Journal of Political Science* 21 435–63

Butler David, and Donald Stokes 1971 *Political Change in Britain Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* Harmondsworth Penguin

Campbell, Angus 1966 Review of V O Key *The Responsible Electorate American Political Science Review* 60 1007–8

Clausen, Aage 1968 Response Validity Vote Report *Public Opinion Quarterly* 32 588–606

Coleman, James S 1986 Social Theory Social Research and a Theory of Action *American Journal of Sociology* 91 1309–35

Dahl Robert A 1956 *A Preface to Democratic Theory* Chicago University of Chicago Press

——— 1984 *Modern Political Analysis* 4th ed Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-Hall

Dryzek John S 1986 The Progress of Political Science *Journal of Politics* 48 301–20

——— 1987 *Rational Ecology Environment and Political Economy* Oxford and New York Basil Blackwell

Dye Thomas R and L Harmon Zeigler 1987 *The Irony of Democracy An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics* 7th ed Monterey CA Brooks Cole

Eckstein Harry 1966 *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* Princeton Princeton University Press

Edelman Murray 1977 *Political Language Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail* New York Academic

Farr James 1985 Situational Analysis Explanation in Political Science *Journal of Politics* 47 1085–1107

Fiorina Morris P 1981 *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Gadamer Hans-Georg 1975 *Truth and Method* New York Seabury

Gant Michael M and Dwight F Davis 1984 Mental Economy and Voter Rationality The Informed Citizen Problem in Voter Research *Journal of Politics* 46 132–53

Garfinkel Harold Michael Lynch and Eric Livingston 1981 The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically Discovered Pulsar *Philosophy of Social Science* 11 131–58

Geuss Raymond 1981 *The Idea of a Critical Theory Habermas and the Frankfurt School* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Gewirth Alan 1954 Can Men Change the Laws of Social Science? *Philosophy of Science* 21 229–41

Gould Stephen Jay 1981 *The Mismeasure of Man* New York Norton

Habermas, Jurgen 1981 *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns* Vol 2 Frankfurt Suhrkamp

——— 1984 *The Theory of Communicative Action 1 Reason and the Rationalization of Society* Boston Beacon

Heelan, Patrick 1983 Natural Science as a Hermeneutic of Instrumentation *Philosophy of Science*, 50 181–204

Hempel, Carl 1965 *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* New York Free Press

Kelman, Steven 1987 "Public Choice" and Public Spirit *The Public Interest*, 87 80–94

Key, V O 1966 *The Responsible Electorate* Cambridge, MA Belknap

Kinder, Donald R 1983 Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion In Ada W Finifter, ed , *Political Science The State of the Discipline* Washington, DC American Political Science Association

Kinder, Donald R , and David O Sears 1983 Public Opinion and Political Action In Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds , *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3d ed , Vol 2 New York Random House

Kuhn, Thomas 1962 *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Lakatos, Imre 1970 Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave eds , *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Lane, Robert E 1962 *Political Ideology* New York Free Press

Laudan, Larry 1977 *Progress and its Problems* Berkeley University of California Press

Lindblom, Charles E 1982 Another State of Mind *American Political Science Review* 76 9–21

Luke Timothy W , and Stephen K White 1985 Critical Theory the Informational Revolution and an Ecological Path to Modernity In John Forester, ed , *Critical Theory and Public Life* Cambridge MIT Press

Miller, Warren E 1960 The Political Behavior of the Electorate In Earl Latham ed , *American Government Annual 1960–61* New York Holt Rinehart, and Winston

Natchez, Peter 1985 *Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy* New York Basic Books

Nie, Norman H , Sidney J Verba and John R Petrocik 1976 *The Changing American Voter* Cambridge Harvard University Press

——— 1981 Reply *American Political Science Review* 75 149–52

Niemi Richard G 1986 The Dynamics of Public Opinion In Herbert F Weisberg ed *Political Science The Science of Politics* New York Agathon

Orbell John M , Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Randy T Simmons 1984 Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors? *American Political Science Review* 78 147–62

Pateman, Carol 1970 *Participation and Democratic Theory* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

——— 1980 The Civic Culture A Philosophic Critique In Gabriel A Almond and Sidney Verba eds *The Civic Culture Revisited* Boston Little Brown

Popper, Karl R 1972 *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* 3d ed London Hutchinson

Presser Stanley 1984 The Use of Survey Data in Basic Research in the Social Sciences In Charles F Turner and Elizabeth Martin, eds *Surveying Subjective Phenomena* Vol 2 New York Russell Sage Foundation

Sartori, Giovanni 1962 *Democratic Theory* Detroit Wayne State University Press

Schuman, Howard 1972 Attitudes vs Actions *versus* Attitudes vs Attitudes *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 347–54

Seidel, Gill 1985 Political Discourse Analysis In Teun A van Dijk, ed *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* Vol 4 London Academic

Seidelman Raymond, and Edward J Harpham 1985 *Disenchanted Realists Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984* Albany State University of New York Press

Sudman, Seymour, and Norman M Bradburn 1983 *Asking Questions A Practical Guide to Questionnaire Design* San Francisco Jossey-Bass

Sullivan, John L , James E Piereson, and George E Marcus 1978 Ideological Constraint in

the Mass Public: A Methodological Critique and Some New Findings. *American Journal of Political Science*, 22: 233–49.

Taylor, Charles. 1971. Interpretation and the Sciences of Man. *Review of Metaphysics* 25: 3–51.

van Dijk, Teun A. 1984. *Prejudice in Discourse: An Analysis of Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

———, ed. 1985. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. London: Academic.

Weisberg, Herbert F. 1986. Model Choice in Political Science: The Case of Voting Behavior Research, 1946–1975. In Herbert F. Weisberg, ed. *Political Science: The Science of Politics*. New York: Agathon.

Wilson, Thomas P. 1984. On the Role of Mathematics in the Social Sciences. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 10: 221–39.

Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures

Peverill Squire
University of Iowa

Legislatures employ a variety of organizational schemes to determine how positions of power are distributed within them. I propose and test a theory relating the internal organization of a legislature to the political career goals of its members. Examining the lower legislative house in California, Connecticut, and New York, I demonstrate that each body offers its members a different political career path and that the particular ambition is promoted by the internal organization of the legislature. New York assemblymen have career ambitions and seniority matters in gaining positions of power in that body. California assemblymen have progressive goals and operate in a system which allows any member to gain power quickly. In Connecticut, where legislators have discrete ambitions, seniority is not important and power is centralized.

The way in which a legislature organizes to conduct its affairs is obviously significant, as has been demonstrated by empirical studies (e.g., Fenno 1965, Patterson, 1978, Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1985) and formal models (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). Legislative bodies in this country have adopted various organizational schemes. Power in some is decentralized among many members, while in others it is concentrated in the hands of just a few. The allocation of positions of power in a minority of legislatures is based on member seniority, in most others, that factor is ignored in favor of other less systematic and impersonal criteria. These differences have important consequences for the ways in which legislatures operate.

In this paper, I propose and test a theory relating the internal organization of a legislature to the political career goals of its members. My intent is not to establish why a legislative body adopted a particular organizational structure, but rather to explain why once one is in place, it tends to endure. I argue that any body offers the majority of its members only one of three possible career opportunities. The particular sort of career path presented is determined by the combination of financial incentives given to stay within the body and the prospects for using the office as a means to achieve other elective positions. I relate these different career opportunity structures to the internal organization of legislatures, the manner in which positions of power

I thank Nelson Polsby, Allan Sindler, Raymond Wolfinger, and John Wright for their comments on various drafts of this paper. Any errors are, of course, my responsibility.

e speakership and committee chairmanships, are distributed, the f committee memberships, and the level of participation in decig by individual legislators

ecific legislatures examined are the lower houses in California, ut, and New York during the period 1977 to 1981 These particular re chosen because they are good examples of three different career progressive, discrete, and static (Schlesinger, 1966, p 10) While sense ideal types, these legislatures vary from each other in the portunity members could pursue through service in them, which I ir particular internal organization structure

)rganization and Career Ambitions

rnal organization" I mean the system by which members of a legisribute positions of power, such as the speakership and committee hips A stable organization is one where there is little leadership nd such positions are gained through a process with an objective, component, usually a seniority rule Also, committee memberiot change to any great degree An unstable system is one where positions and committee memberships suffer high turnover, and ortant posts are awarded in an unpredictable, subjective manner, arding members of a winning coalition regardless of any other ons

s history, the U S House of Representatives has evidenced both Polsby's (1968) seminal study demonstrates that initially the House ble, it suffered from high turnover and little leadership or commitership continuity Positions of power were distributed on the basis nal success not length of service But as turnover decreased and began adopting career or long-term perspectives toward their serre stable system employing seniority evolved to impersonally and y reward them the longer they stayed in the House Thus the inanization of the House was adapted to meet the changing career its members Indeed, the body has become so refined that as 973) convincingly demonstrated committees have adopted differures and ways of conducting business so as to appeal to and satisfy member goals

othesis is that legislative organization reflects the career needs of . A body with members who intend long service should be stable y a system for the distribution of power which rewards them sysy As with the U S House of Representatives, such a legislature characterized by a seniority system

tures where members do not anticipate long service should be un-, because the career goals of their members may not be the same,

they take on different patterns of internal organization. The organization of a body where members have progressive career goals should allow any member to gain important positions quickly. Power should be decentralized so members have the ability to promote their own political fortunes, with junior members being able to influence legislative decisions. In a legislature where almost all members have discrete ambitions, power is likely to be centralized in the hands of a few (Garceau and Silverman, 1954), if only to provide the cohesiveness and continuity necessary to allow the organization to function. Here, seniority matters little, but most legislators do not have much influence on decision making.

The causal relationship between career goals of members and internal organization is not obvious. If legislators operate in an environment without any constraints on their actions, they are free to alter the internal organization of a body to better meet their needs. But legislators face significant obstacles in changing the existing conditions of legislative service. For example, in many states legislators face either legal restrictions on the amount of any raise in pay and when it can be made effective, or have their pay set by an external body. Moreover, under any circumstances, pay is politically difficult to increase, for the same reasons which limit the freedom of the U.S. Congress in this area (e.g., Fisher, 1980). Advancement opportunities are difficult to manipulate because they are essentially structural in nature. The reshaping of any legislature's internal organization is hard because members with a stake in the current system will resist changes, as witnessed with such attempts in Congress.

Thus, in effect, the causal relationship is that the existing internal organization attracts those individuals who find that it meets their career needs. The way a legislature distributes power within itself can change, as it has in the U.S. House, but not quickly, easily, or often. It is, for the most intents and purposes, fixed.[1]

Incentives to Continue Service

The three legislatures examined here varied enormously in the career incentives they offered potential and incumbent members. Legislators in New York and California were relatively well paid. In 1980, New York assemblymen earned $23,500, while their California counterparts received $25,555. The salary in each body was supplemented by per diem payments, and members were covered by life, health, and retirement programs. California assemblymen were even given funds to lease an automobile, and a credit

[1]The circumstances under which such changes occur is an important question which would be best addressed by examining legislatures over time, as advocated by Cooper and Brady (1981) and done by Polsby (1968).

card to pay for its gas and maintenance Thus, assemblymen in California and New York could afford to consider legislative service as their career

Legislators in these two states were also provided impressive facilities, including personal offices, both in the capitol and their district Personal and committee staffs increased the legislators' abilities to deliver constituent services Funds were given to pay for constituent newsletters The electoral value of these resources to potentially career-minded legislators is obvious

The situation in Connecticut House of Representatives differed dramatically The annual salary for 1982 and 1983 averaged $8,500 per year, a $1,000 increase over the salary in 1979 and 1980 Legislators serving in 1982 were also given $ 15 per mile for travel to and from Hartford, $2,000 to cover unvouchered expenses, and were covered by a health insurance program but not life insurance A minimal and optional retirement program was offered but required ten years of service to collect

This very modest level of financial incentives might have proved adequate if the time demands of service were minimal But, the House was in session an average of sixty-seven days per year and, according to figures compiled by the Council of State Governments (1982, pp 206–7), in 1979 and 1980, only the legislatures of New York and Massachusetts considered more bills and resolutions than did the Connecticut General Assembly Obviously, membership required significant sacrifice of time as well as income for most legislators

The working conditions also militated against long tenure Representatives were only first provided their own desk and telephone in 1979, the same year in which a reallocation of space in the capitol afforded each of them a private office cubicle A 1980 survey (Deziel, 1981 p 16) revealed that 75% of the legislators were unsatisfied with their office space No staff was provided to individual legislators only to the leadership and committees (Swanson, 1984, p. 87) All constituent problems and services were handled personally by legislators Thus there was no incentive for members to serve long tenures

Prospects for Political Advancement

There are many reasons why legislators might terminate their service Obviously, one way legislators leave is through defeat at the polls or retirement in expectation of such a loss This does not appear to be a significant cause for departure in any of the legislatures studied here. Members of the lower houses in California, Connecticut, and New York were reelected at rates over 90%, most by margins exceeding twenty percentage points

If members did not leave involuntarily, then they might have departed in order to run for higher office The prospects for advancing to higher office varied greatly among these legislatures In 1980 the eighty members of the

California Assembly had a multitude of higher electoral positions to run forty state senate seats, forty-three seats in the U.S. Hous constitutional offices,[2] and the mayor's seats in Los Angeles, San I San Francisco Most who left the assembly to run for higher office cessful, around 80% of the assembly members who ran for the state U S House of Representatives between 1974 and 1980 were elec

New York assemblymen did not enjoy the same advancement The 150 members of the lower house had only sixty state senate thirty-nine spots in the U S House of Representatives for which Moreover, the natural incentive to move from the larger assem smaller state senate was greatly reduced by the fact that memb upper house serve the same two-year term.

Other avenues of political mobility in New York were appointm ernment office or selection or election as a judge. What these mo common is their complete dependence on the assemblyman's goo with his state and local party organizations (Scarrow, 1983, p 51) upward mobility out of the assembly existed, whether by elect pointment, was controlled by party organizations. Even ambitious who entered the assembly with the intention of moving up had to others agreed to their progression Very few members were free ag to control fully their own political futures

Connecticut representatives also suffered from few advanceme tunities. The 151 members of the House had only thirty-six state U S House, and five statewide positions for which to aspire More New York, the incentive to move to the state senate was reduc senators serve the same two-year term According to Swanson (19 "Many lawmakers come to the Capitol with no particularly strong for higher office They stay a short time and then return to privat

Comparative figures on the use of legislative service as a sprin higher office in these three legislatures are given in table 1 In th umn are the mean turnover rates for each body The second colum the mean percentage of the total membership that left each session higher office As we would expect, California had a substantially h centage of members who left for a chance at higher office Conne New York have about the same low percentage

The third column in table 1 presents a different calculation wh more light on the contrasts among the legislatures the proportio members who left voluntarily and ran for a higher office Seventy California assemblymen who departed did so to pursue immediat to higher office This figure is twice that of New York where only such an attempt. But 68% of those who left the New York Ass

[2]These are governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, and treasurer In 1981, all of these offices except governor were held by ex-assemb

TABLE 1

THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE OFFICE AS A SPRINGBOARD TO OTHER ELECTED POSITIONS

	Mean Turnover	Mean % in Body Who Leave to Run for Higher Office	Mean % Who Voluntarily Leave to Run for Higher Office
Calif (1974–1980)	29	13	70
Conn (1978–1980)	39	4	22
New York (1976–1978)	22	5	34

Source Mean turnover is calculated from *The Book of the States* for 1974 to 1980 The information on attempts for higher office is collected from the following sources election-related articles in *California Journal* from 1973 to 1981 *State of Connecticut Register and Manual* for 1979 and 1981, and election-related articles in the *New York Times* from 1976 to 1979, and Ornicinski (1978)

move to some governmental position when appointed offices and judgeships are included Fewer than one out of four Connecticut representatives left to run for higher office The difference between New York and Connecticut results from contrasting career opportunity structures The majority of New York assemblymen were political careerists, many who left that body would be expected to continue in government Most Connecticut representatives were not interested in a long-term, full-time commitment to public service

The Distribution of Membership Seniority

The distribution of member seniority in 1981 for each legislature is presented in table 2 Because the U S House of Representatives is considered the epitome of a career body its seniority distribution can be used as a baseline against which to compare the other legislatures

The New York Assembly and the U S House look similar, especially at the fewest years of service The only substantial difference is in the percentage of members who have served ten or more years Over one quarter of the United States House membership had been in office at least ten years while 19% of the New York Assembly had served that long [3]

[3] Several reasons to explain this difference can be advanced First members of the assembly have somewhat better advancement prospects than do their congressional counterparts Consequently assemblymen are more likely to have an opportunity to move up than members of the house Second while the financial incentives offered in New York are adequate to allow legislative service to be undertaken as a career they do not equal those offered members of Congress Thus, outside opportunities to increase one's income may seem more attractive to a veteran assemblyman than to a representative resulting in the former terminating his or her elective career

TABLE 2

1981 MEMBERSHIP SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION, IN %

	Calif	Conn	N Y	U S House
0 years	24	34	18	18
1–2 years	28	20	20	17
3–4 years	17	19	13	14
5–6 years	11	15	17	15
7–9 years	10	6	13	8
10 or more years	10	7	19	28

Sources *California Legislative Handbook* for 1981, *State of Connecticut Register and Manual* for 1981, *New York Red Book* for 1981–1982 U S House of Representatives data collected from *The Almanac of American Politics* 1982

The lower houses in California and Connecticut had many more junior members and fewer senior ones than the other legislatures In both bodies, more than 50% of the legislators were freshmen or sophomores California had a somewhat higher percentage of veteran members than did Connecticut This is not surprising because California offered substantially better financial incentives Although most California assemblymen enter office with the intention of moving up, that opportunity may not occur early in their career The assembly affords them the chance to wait for their opening [4] In Connecticut, the low pay and relatively heavy workload provided no incentive for long service [5]

Internal Organization and Stability

The New York Assembly, with career-minded members, should be stable and seniority should count heavily in the allocation of positions of power, and in determining which lawmakers influence legislation The organizational systems in California and Connecticut should be unstable because of high turnover, but because the career goals of their members are not the same

[4] For example Assemblyman Tom Bates's (D-Berkeley) political advancement has been stymied for several years because the U S House member and state senator who represent the same geographic area are also Democrats who have held their positions longer than Bates has been in office According to an interview (Tom Bates Safe in Re-Election Quest, 1984) Bates also said he was somewhat stuck in his current position as an assemblymember He said he could not even conceive of running against Ronald V Dellums for his congressional seat And Nicholas C Petris is running for re-election to the state Senate this year, so Petris seat is closed for another four years That means there is nothing for me to run for four years until (and if) Petris retires ' Bates said "

[5] Few Connecticut legislators, however, favor making the job a full-time, well paying office A 1980 survey of general assembly members (Deziel, 1981, p 13) showed 63% opposed to such a plan Thus, it appears that the legislature is attracting a majority of members to whom its amateur characteristics are appealing

the systems are different from each other The organization of the California assembly should be compatible with the legislators' progressive career goals Power should be decentralized so all members, junior and senior alike, have the ability to promote their own political fortunes Connecticut's legislators have discrete ambitions, the leadership should be powerful, although seniority should matter little in gaining such positions The internal organization of each legislative body will be examined against these expectations

New York The speaker in the New York Assembly is the most powerful member of the assembly for many reasons he appoints all committees and names their chairmen, controls all legislative floor activity, and allocates office space, committee budgets, and other resources As leader of the majority party, the speaker also selects the majority leader and the holders of other party posts (Hevesi, 1975, Witt, 1974, pp 49–50, Zimmerman, 1981, pp 128–29) The office's powers are so extensive that the speaker controls (Hevesi, 1985, p 156), "not only the flow of legislation but also the destinies and careers of individual members"

The speaker, who is chosen by the majority caucus, usually has considerable seniority (Zimmerman, 1981, p 128) The speaker in 1981, Stanley Fink, had served ten years prior to gaining that post, which according to Rosenthal (1981, p 154), represented "a relatively rapid rise in New York" Fink's immediate predecessor had waited twenty-two years They were not the most senior members of the majority party in either case, but each had served for many years

The power to appoint all committees and party leaders allows the speaker to determine members progression to positions of influence This authority might be employed in an arbitrary and personal fashion, with those rewarded being allies without regard to any objective or impersonal criteria The speaker would only be constrained from abuses by the possibility of membership dissatisfaction producing enough votes to name a new speaker Under such circumstances, seniority would count little in committee assignments and in the selection of committee chairmen and party leaders However, because of assembly members long-term career perspectives we could also conceive of their desire for a more standardized and objective system, probably seniority-based, for the distribution of positions of power

These two systems are in obvious conflict, but the tension between them could be reduced by combining certain aspects of each Such a blending might produce a system in which seniority would be a major factor in gaining power but would not be absolute The speaker would retain some flexibility in making assignments

This compromise is, in fact, a reasonable characterization of the New York Assembly's internal power distribution system In his study of the assembly Hevesi (1975, p 73) observes of committee chairmanships that the stan-

dards for appointment are generally, but not exclusively, seniority and of course loyalty to the leader." The seniority of members appointed committee chairmen from 1977 to 1981 ranged from 6.3 years to 7.6 years. This significant level of prior service is consistent with the seniority-based system needed by the assembly's members. The speaker's flexibility in appointing chairmen is demonstrated by Speaker Fink's removal of the chairmen of the Banking and Codes committees right after he gained power in 1979. While the speaker had the unchallenged ability to replace these senior legislators as chairmen, he still needed to give them some consolation prizes: positions as assistant majority leader and majority whip. Likewise, in 1981, seven chairmen from the previous session were not reappointed: four were moved to chairmanships of more important committees, and three were given party positions.

In a body where seniority matters, it would be expected that veteran legislators would earn the right to be appointed to the more important committees. The Rules committee, by far the most powerful body in the Assembly,[6] had a mean seniority of more than eleven years in 1981. Almost 90% of the Assemblymen with ten or more years of service were on the Rules Committee. No freshmen were appointed. The other committees with above average levels of seniority were predictable: Ways and Means, Banks, Judiciary, Real Property Taxation, and Labor. Very few freshmen were appointed to these bodies. At the other end of the spectrum were committees like Health, Child Care, Aging, and Consumers Affairs and Protection, all of which were stacked with large numbers of freshmen and sophomore members. Moreover, the percentage of members who continued service on the more important committees was far higher than on the less important committees.

Evidence on the New York Assembly indicates strongly the importance of member seniority in gaining positions of power. Committee chairmanships were not awarded on the basis of absolute seniority, but only those members who had served for a number of terms got them. The most prestigious and important committees were populated by veteran assemblymen, the least important had the most recently elected members. Thus, a stable system of rewarding more senior legislators developed.

California. In the California Assembly, as in New York, the system is oriented around the speaker. The speaker makes all committee and subcommittee assignments—except to the Rules Committee—for both majority and minority party members, names all committee chairmen, and fills his party's

[6]The Rules Committee is considered the leadership body. The speaker serves as chairman and between 1977 and 1982, an average of nine chairmen of other committees also were appointed. On the power of the Rules Committee, see Hevesi (1975, pp. 20–22), Berle (1974, p. 32), Metz (1972, p. 37), and Zimmerman (1981, p. 133).

leadership posts The holder of this office also controls all activity on the assembly floor

Seniority, however, counts for little in the California Assembly, power is distributed by the speaker in a subjective and personal manner Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (*Is the Party Over?*, 1981, p 27) has stated, "the Speaker in California has an awesome amount of power over House organization and I don't use it based on party participation or party loyalty, I use it based on Speaker loyalty " In this system, a freshman's vote for speaker counts as much as any member's and correct votes are usually rewarded Junior members can attain power quickly (Bell and Price, 1975, pp 147–48, Salzman, 1980) It is not unusual for legislators with little seniority to occupy important positions of power The majority party floor leader in 1981, for example, had served less than two terms at the time of his selection Of the twenty-five committee chairmen appointed at the beginning of the 1981 session, nine were just starting their second term and three others were in their third [7]

The speaker rewards his friends and punishes his enemies through the use of his power to make committee assignments Surprisingly, the most sought seats are not on the Ways and Means Committee, the body which wields the most influence within the assembly Rather the most requested assignments in 1981, for example, were to the Finance and Insurance, and Government Organization committees (Rios 1981) Members of the Finance and Insurance Committee which oversees the state's banking and insurance industries, and Government Organization which controls the horse racing and alcoholic beverage industries receive far more in campaign contributions than do their colleagues on other committees Service on these two bodies, then, has great political benefit and is desired because it can help members finance reelection bids or attempts for higher office Positions on Ways and Means are not as coveted because power and prestige in the body are less important to legislators who harbor progressive ambitions

The speaker retains his position by doing more than rewarding his supporters with leadership posts or sought after committee assignments As leader of the majority party, the speaker is expected to help finance his party members' reelection campaigns Failure to do so can lead to a revolt, as it did in 1979–1980, when Speaker Leo McCarthy was challenged by his own political lieutenant, Majority Party Floor Leader Howard Berman (Pollard 1980, Salzman, 1980) Many assembly Democrats thought that McCarthy was not helping them achieve reelection and that Berman's political organi-

It should be noted that the 1981 numbers may be somewhat unusual because Speaker Willie Brown had given a number of chairmanships to low seniority Republicans who had supported his speakership bid But this does not diminish the point that members with little seniority can gain powerful posts

zation would provide them with more than enough money to st (Pollard, 1980, p. 198), and might even be of help when they war for higher positions (Salzman, 1980, p 49)[8]

While both McCarthy and Berman lost the fight—Willie Brow deadlock by assembling a coalition of Democrats and Republ point is clear. The speaker, as the most powerful individual in tl supposed to use his influence to get campaign funds to help make assemblyman electorally secure This lesson was not lost on Speal During the 1982 election, by which time his bipartisan coalition l apart, Brown secured the allegiance of assembly Democrats by be state's largest contributor to legislative races (Cook and Capps, 1

Overall, the California Assembly's internal organization is str a way which is compatible with its members' career goals By op der a system which rewards political skills rather than seniority members have the chance to exercise power within the body and policy early in their tenure The assembly leadership is permeab niority members can get committee chairmanships and party p bitious legislators can make their mark early, collect the political they need, and soon be in a position to exploit any opportunity higher office

Connecticut. In the Connecticut House, like the California there is no systematic reward for career longevity Power is concen relatively small group of legislators the speaker, committee chair few leaders of the majority party Some of these individuals are more senior members of the legislature, but others are not Few tatives outside this elite ever serve long enough to acquire the sul knowledge and political skill necessary to challenge the leadershi of the legislative process

The speaker is the most powerful individual in the house The this office refers all bills to committees, controls the flow of legisla house floor and the subsequent debate on it (Swanson, 1984, pp : majority party member committee assignments are made by th who also designates committee chairmen Up until 1971, the spea dition was limited to one term, with the majority leader aced higher office in the next session (Goodwin, 1981, p 113, Swan p 31) Now the norm is two-term tenures

The speaker and party leaders are elected to their positions b

[8]Typically, the speaker is only interested in helping finance his party's candidat sembly because those are the people whose support he needs to stay in charge Ber zation—actually the 'Waxman-Berman machine' (see Willens, 1982)—contribut cratic campaigns for many positions, not just the assembly Thus Berman could h be of some potential future assistance in running for higher office

spective party caucuses. The speaker is not necessarily a particularly senior member of the house. The holder of the position from 1979 to 1983, Ernest Abate, had only four years of service when he was selected. Abate's immediate predecessor had served eight years when he became speaker. Like the speaker, many representatives holding party positions have little seniority. In 1981, for example, of the nineteen individuals elected majority leader, deputy majority leader, or assistant majority leader, three had served just two years and another six had only four years of seniority. Thus, important party positions can be attained in a relatively short time. Seniority does not guarantee getting influential party posts. This is not a trivial matter because party leadership exercises considerable power over the legislative process. A 1983 survey of Connecticut legislators (Swanson, 1984, p. 34) reveals that over three quarters of members of both parties think that party leaders have either great power over outcomes on all issues, or at least on major ones. The same overwhelming majority agreed that power is either very or somewhat concentrated in the party leadership.

Committee chairmen are more senior than the house's general membership.[9] Between 1977 and 1981, no freshmen were given chairmanships, but seven appointees were just starting their second terms. There is a slight tendency for high prestige committees (Swanson, 1984, pp. 47–48) to be led by relatively senior representatives. Low-prestige committees, however, generally have even more experienced chairmen than high-prestige committees, and fairly junior people have led moderate prestige committees.

Only five of the fourteen committees in operation from 1977 to 1981 had the same chairman all three terms. Roughly half the turnover in committee chairmen was caused by members leaving the house. The other 50% of the changes occurred when representatives left chairmanships but continued to serve in the house. Indeed, 17% of the deposed leaders continued to serve on that same committee. Overall, there is little evidence of a systematic seniority system, or of much stability in committee leadership.

Freshmen hold slots on the most prestigious committees. The membership of the Finance Committee, ranked the second most important in the house, is close to half freshmen. Even the most prestigious committee, Appropriations, is composed of almost 25% first-termers. In terms of mean membership seniority, there is very little to distinguish high-prestige committees from low-prestige ones. Surprisingly, the committee ranked the least important, Banks, had the highest average seniority and the lowest percentage of freshmen.

Length of service in the Connecticut House of Representatives has very little to do with acquiring positions of power. Indeed, of the sixty-nine representatives who served in 1977, 1979, and 1981, thirty-five, or 51%, served

[9]The Connecticut General Assembly is one of two state legislatures – Maine is the other—to operate exclusively with joint committees.

on either Appropriations or Finance at some time during those three terms Of those who served in both 1979 and 1981, 33% were on Appropriations at least one term. Thus, service on prestigious committees seems a reasonble expectation for most representatives. The system is fluid, with frequent turnover in institutional, party, and committee leadership positions. Power is attainable quickly, but few members hold on to it for long

A Comparison of the Stability of Committee Assignments The pattern of internal power distribution in each of these bodies appears compatible with the political career goals of its members But, when compared to each other, does committee membership stability in these legislatures differ in anticipated ways? The New York Assembly, given its members' career orientation, should be the most stable California and Connecticut should have greater instability because of higher turnover and the short-term outlook of their membership

The first column of table 3 provides evidence in support of these propositions Committees in New York have a mean of 40% new members at the beginning of a term, while committees in California and Connecticut average 61% and 55% new members respectively Moreover, as the second column shows, the mean percentage of those eligible to return to a committee who do so is markedly higher in New York than in California and Connecticut.

Stability in committee memberships on the individual level is shown in table 4 This table summarizes data on the continuity of individual members committee assignments in each legislature New York assemblymen, as expected, have the most stable slate of assignments with 72% of their posts over two terms and 42% over three terms being the same Because New York assemblymen intend to serve for long periods, the way they organize them

TABLE 3

MEAN COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP TURNOVER

	Mean % Members New to Committee	Mean % Eligible Members Return to Committee
Calif (1979-1981)	61	57
Conn (1979-1981)	55	60
New York (1979-1981)	40	76

Sources *California Legislative Handbook* for 1977 to 1981 *State of Connecticut Register and Manual* for 1977 to 1981 *New York Red Book* for 1977 to 1981

TABLE 4

AGGREGATE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP CONTINUITY

	Percent Same Assignments Over	
	Two Terms*	Three Terms
Calif	29	24
Conn	53	27
New York	72	42

Sources *California Legislative Handbook* for 1977 to 1981, *State of Connecticut Register and Manual* for 1977 to 1981 *New York Red Book* for 1977 to 1981-82

*The figure for New York may be inflated relative to the other two legislatures because the two sessions used for New York were under the same speaker while California and Connecticut each experienced a switch The figure for three sessions contains a change in the speakership for all three bodies But in all three legislatures the same party was in control during the sessions studied

selves requires some stability Such a system benefits them because it makes the future predictable and they know more or less what to expect from their continued service

Concerns about future standing in the legislature are less important to members in California and Connecticut In the latter few legislators serve for very long which by itself produces instability In the California Assembly, the most unstable of the three legislatures, turnover also accounts for some of the internal flux But this tendency for instability is exacerbated by ambitious assemblymen who change committee assignments seeking to improve their chances for moving to higher office

Stability could indicate the presence of some systematic means of distributing positions of power This suggests that member seniority counts for more in New York than in California or Connecticut [10] When positions are given out based on non-systematic criteria like political alliances, then seniority matters much less, if at all The data presented in tables 5 and 6 address these assertions The percentage of freshman and veteran legislators serving on each legislature's most important and powerful committee is shown in table 5 As expected, the New York Assembly Rules Committee has no freshmen members, and twenty-one of the twenty-four Assemblymen

[10] Seniority on a committee is used to distribute committee and subcommittee chairmanships in the U S Senate and House of Representatives Seniority in the body is used as the explicit criterion for gaining committee chairmanships in the New Mexico State Senate (Hain Clark and Clark 1981, pp 42 43)

with ten or more years of service serve on it. Thus, in this body seniority appears to be critical in career advancement.[11]

Seniority appears much less important in California and Connecticut. Each of those bodies has some number of freshmen as members of their most important committee. Likewise, only a quarter or fewer of the veteran legislators in those two lower houses were appointed to these committees. One implication for members of these legislatures is that they can quickly attain positions of power. A second implication is that increased seniority in the body is no guarantee of holding powerful positions in the future. Thus, their short-term perspectives are reenforced.

More evidence on the relative importance of seniority in each legislature is presented in table 6. Here, the mean number of years of legislative service of members on the most important committees are compared with the mean for the entire legislature. The difference between the average seniority of Rules Committee members and the general memberships' average is substantial, in excess of six years. The magnitude of difference between members of the most important committees and all legislators in California and Connecticut is much smaller, illustrating the lack of importance attached to seniority in those bodies.

Participation in Decision Making. What is the role of the individual member in the legislative process? Do junior legislators enjoy more power in some bodies than in others? The California Assembly's nonseniority-based

TABLE 5

PERCENT FRESHMEN AND VETERANS ON MOST IMPORTANT COMMITTEE

	Percent of Committee Membership That is Freshmen	Percent of Veteran Legislators on Committee[a]
Calif. (1981) Ways & Means	17	25
Conn. (1981) Appropriations	27	10
N.Y. (1979) Rules	0	88

Sources: *California Legislative Handbook* for 1981; *State of Connecticut Register and Manual* for 1981; *New York Red Book* for 1979.

[a]Percent of total number of legislators with ten or more consecutive years of service who serve on this committee. In California, the total number of veterans was eight; in Connecticut there were ten; and in New York, twenty-four.

[11]The fact that so many chairmen of other committees serve on the Rules Committee may skew these numbers. The second most important committee, Ways and Means, had just 7% freshman members and 11% of veterans serving on it, and had a mean seniority level of 6.5 years.

TABLE 6

MEAN MEMBER SENIORITY IN LEGISLATURE AND ON MOST IMPORTANT COMMITTEE

	Mean Seniority of all Members in Legislature	Mean Seniority of Committee Members	Diff
1981) Ways & Means	4 1	5 2	+1 1
(1981) Appropriations	2 8	3 5	+ 7
979) Rules	5 0	11 1	+6 1

mpiled from *California Legislative Handbook* for 1981 *State of Connecticut Reg-ual* for 1981 *New York Red Book* for 1979

h its lack of committee service continuity results in a means of legislative business which is driven by the activities of individu- at majority of bills are singular products introduced and carried the process by legislators acting as entrepreneurs (Muir 1982 [12] Even minority party members enjoy some success in authoring and getting it passed (Muir, 1982 p 144) The participation of ju- ers is encouraged by senior colleagues (Bell and Price 1975, 80) Indeed, much of the assembly's workload is handled by first term members (Bell and Price 1975 p 170 There is very little between freshmen and veteran assemblymen in the numbers of es introduce or that get passed [1] The contrast between the active members of the assembly play compared to the passive role of erparts in the U S House has been lamented by veterans of both ier 1979 p 223, Bell and Price 1975 p 169)

portant pieces of legislation in the New York Assembly are intro- senior legislators particularly committee chairmen Freshmen not get the opportunity to author significant bills Party interests, an override this tendency According to the Secretary of the Ways Committee (A Committee Secretary's View of the Process 1980) s no secret that one of our prime considerations is the protection l district Assemblymen One of the ways that these marginal semblymen are protected is to assign them good bills and help them through the Assembly and through the legislative process" a few junior legislators—those with marginal electoral pros-

demonstrated in several case studies (e g Squire and Scott 1984 BeVier 1979 2)

ting data in Muir (1982 pp 142 44) reveals that in 1975 - 1976 the mean number uced by freshmen was fifty three and fifty six by non freshmen The success rate was 43% compared to 46% for the latter

ects—get the chance to affix their name to major bills Most freshmen must ide their time, waiting to accumulate enough seniority to gain influence in ie body (Williams, 1981, 1982, Dionne, 1981).

The ability of freshman in the Connecticut House to participate is even iore restricted Representatives are limited in their influence because they an only propose legislation in an informal one-page summary. Committees ave the exclusive right to formulate legislation in formal statutory language 'onsequently, all bills sent to the floor are committee bills (Swanson, 1984, p 74–75, Rosenthal, 1981, p 199) The effect of this rule is to place great ower over legislation in the hands of committee chairmen, who, in turn, are nder the tight control of the majority party leadership (Swanson, 1984, 50) This centralized system isolates most individual legislators from the ecision-making process. For example, 74% of the representatives think the eneral membership of the body does not have adequate participation in ie appropriations process (Deziel, 1981, p 52)

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion to draw from the data presented in this paper is clear the eans of internal organization in each of these legislatures attracts members hose career goals are consistent with it Career-minded assemblymen in ew York operate in a system which is stable and which rewards their lon-vity through the utilization of seniority as the important criterion for ad-ancement Members of the lower house in California are politically am-tious The assembly system is unstable in that positions of power are stributed in an arbitrary manner with little or no regard for seniority ius, members with political skills can gain influence early and use it to ieir long-range career advantage The same might be true of the Connecti-it House of Representatives because it also has an unstable system which es not base rewards on longevity The house's lack of advancement oppor-nities and career incentives, however renders its leadership permeability mething of a hollow prize

These institutional structures are enduring for at least two reasons First noted earlier, they are difficult to change because of structural, constitu-nal, and personal reasons Second, the existing structure attracts individu-s whose career goals are consistent with it and, therefore, unlikely to seek change it The way a legislature is organized meets the needs of most, if t all, of the body's members Scholars concerned with questions of institu-nal design must keep that in mind. When members' needs change, orga-zation can change, as Polsby (1968) demonstrated, but under most circum-ances they stay the same

References

Bardach, Eugene 1972 *The Skill Factor in Politics* Berkeley University of California Press

Bell, Charles G , and Charles M Price 1975 *The First Term* Beverly Hills, CA Sage Publications

Berle, Peter A A 1974 *Does the Citizen Stand a Chance?* Woodbury, NY Barron's Educational Series

BeVier, Michael 1979 *Politics Backstage* Philadelphia Temple University Press

A Committee Secretary's View of the Process 1980 *Empire State Report*, February 11, pp 55–57

Cook, Gale, and Steven Capps 1984 A Hard Look/Campaign Reform Reawakens *San Francisco Examiner*, April 8

Cooper, Joseph, and David W Brady 1981 Toward a Diachronic Study of Congress *American Political Science Review*, 75 988–1006

Council of State Governments 1982 *The Book of the States 1982–83* Vol 24 Lexington, KY Council of State Governments

Deziel, David 1981 *The Connecticut General Assembly An Evaluation of Structure and Procedure* Boston State Legislative Leaders Foundation

Dionne E J Jr For Albany's Freshmen, Baptism by Legislation *New York Times* July 14

Dodd Lawrence C , and Bruce I Oppenheimer 1985 The House in Transition Partisanship and Opposition In Lawrence C Dodd and Bruce I Oppenheimer eds *Congress Reconsidered* 3d ed Washington DC CQ Press

Fenno, Richard F 1965 The Internal Distribution of Influence The House In David B Truman ed , *The Congress and America's Future* Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall, Inc

——— 1973 *Congressmen in Committees* Boston Little Brown

Fisher, Lewis 1980 History of Pay Adjustments for Members of Congress In Robert W Hartman and Arnold R Weber eds *The Rewards of Public Service* Washington DC Brookings Institution

Garceau, Oliver and Corinne Silverman 1954 A Pressure Group and the Pressured *American Political Science Review*, 48 672–91

Goodwin, George Jr 1981 The State Legislatures of New England In Josephine F Milburn and Victoria Schuck, eds *New England Politics* Cambridge MA Schenkman Publishing Co

Hain, Paul L , Cal Clark and Janet Clark 1981 The Legislature In F Chris Garcia and Paul L Hain, eds *New Mexico Government* Rev ed Albuquerque NM University of New Mexico Press

Hevesi Alan G 1975 *Legislative Politics in New York State* New York Praeger

——— 1985 The Renewed Legislature In Peter W Colby ed *New York State Today Politics, Government Public Policy* Albany NY State University of New York Press

Is the Party Over? Nov /Dec 1981 *State Legislatures* pp 23–27

Metz Joseph G 1972 *The Politics of People-Power Interest Groups and Lobbies in New York State* Woodbury, NY Barrons Educational Series

Muir William K Jr 1982 *Legislature* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Omicinski, John 1978 The Battle is On! *Empire State Report* 4 7–8

Patterson, Samuel C 1978 The Semi-Sovereign Congress In Anthony King ed *The New American Political System* Washington DC American Enterprise Institute

Pollard Vic 1980 Will the Imperial Speakership Survive the Assault on Government? *California Journal*, 11 197–99

Polsby, Nelson W 1968 The Institutionalization of the U S House of Representatives *American Political Science Review*, 62 144–68

Rios, Delia M 1981 Squeezing of the Juice from Committee Assignments *California* 12 109–10

Rosenthal, Alan 1981 *Legislative Life* New York Harper & Row

Salzman, Ed 1980 The Bitter Berman-McCarthy Struggle for Speakership Power (*Journal* 11 48–49

Scarrow, Howard A 1983 *Parties, Elections and Representation in the State of N* New York New York University Press

Schlesinger, Joseph A 1966 *Ambition and Politics* Chicago Rand McNally

Shepsle Kenneth A, and Barry R Weingast 1981 Structure-Induced Equilibrium a lative Choice *Public Choice* 37 503–19

Squire, Peverill and Stanley Scott 1984 *The Politics of California Coastal Legislatio* ley Institute of Governmental Studies

Swanson, Wayne R 1984 *Lawmaking in Connecticut The General Assembly* New CT By the Author Connecticut College

Tom Bates Safe in Re-Election Quest 1984 *The Daily Californian* October 4

Willens Michelle 1982 Wee Henry Waxman, the New Power in the House *Califor nal* 13 269–271

Williams Lena 1981 Political Reality Tempers Dreams of Albany's New Legislators *Times* March 31

——— 1982 Freshmen Give High Marks to Albany Legislature *New York Times* Fe

Witt Stuart K 1974 Modernization of the Legislature *Proceedings of the Academy o Science* 31 45–57

Zimmerman Joseph F 1981 *The Government and Politics of New York State* New Y York University Press

Research Notes

...here Two Presidencies? Yes, But Only for Republicans

Richard Fleisher
Fordham University

Jon R. Bond
Texas A&M University

...alysis of conflictual roll call votes in the House and Senate indicates that presidents tend to ...more often on foreign policy than on domestic policy. And we find no evidence that the ...ences have diminished over the period from 1953 through 1984. The two presidencies ...nomenon, however, characterizes only Republican administrations. We analyze support for ...president from different party factions (i.e., liberal Democrats, conservative Democrats, ...ral Republicans, and conservative Republicans) and party and committee leaders to deter... ...e why the two presidencies phenomenon is limited to Republican administrations. We find ...Republican presidents tend to receive greater support on foreign policy issues from liberal ...ocrats and from Democratic party and committee leaders. Analysis of a subset of important ...es shows less difference between the two policy areas. The two presidencies phenomenon for ...ublican presidents does not appear on important votes because liberal Democrats are less ...portive on foreign policy.

...nce the publication of Wildavsky's (1966) classic article "The Two Presi...ncies," students of presidential-congressional relations have debated ...hether the president is more successful on foreign policy than on domestic ...licy (Peppers, 1975; LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Sigelman, 1979; Shull and ...eLoup, 1981; Edwards, 1986). This note seeks to contribute to the debate ...ith yet another analysis of the two presidencies thesis. The following sec...on briefly reviews the research questions raised by the two presidencies

We are grateful to the Department of Political Science and the College of Liberal Arts at ...xas A&M University and the Department of Political Science and the Graduate School of Arts ...d Sciences at Fordham University for providing financial support to collect and analyze the ...ta. Jon Bond is also grateful to the Brookings Institution for providing office space while he ...s in Washington, D.C. We appreciate the helpful comments of Charles O. Jones, Marc Pe...cce, George C. Edwards, and anonymous reviewers for the *Journal*. This note is part of a ...ger project dealing with the study of presidential-congressional relations that consists of mul...le papers; the authors share equal responsibility and agree to alternate the ordering of names.

thesis, and discusses the strengths and limitations of measures used in previous studies. This discussion suggests how the empirical analysis of the two presidencies thesis might be improved. Next we present evidence that presidents tend to win more often on foreign policy than on domestic policy. And we find no evidence that the differences have diminished over the period from 1953 through 1984. The two presidencies phenomenon, however, is limited to Republican administrations. We analyze support for the president from different party factions (i.e., liberal Democrats, conservative Democrats, liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans) and party and committee leaders to determine why the two presidencies phenomenon is limited to Republican administrations. Finally, we analyze a subset of important foreign and domestic policy roll calls to determine if behavior on important issues differs from behavior on all conflictual issues, and if so, why.

Issues in the Study of the Two Presidencies

Research Questions

The primary issue raised by the two presidencies thesis is whether the president wins more often on foreign policy than on domestic policy. If we discover that the president does indeed win more often on foreign policy, several other questions arise: (1) Has the tendency for greater success on foreign policy changed over time? (2) Does it occur to the same extent in both the House and Senate? (3) What are the sources of additional support that lead to more victories on foreign policy? That is, does the president receive more support from members of both parties on foreign policy, or does the additional support come only from members of his party or from members of the opposition?

Measures of Presidential Success in Previous Studies

Previous studies have used a variety of measures—boxscores, Key Votes, and individual presidential support scores—to test the two presidencies thesis empirically. Although the measures used are all appropriate indicators of presidential success, none is able to address all of the questions posed above. Following is an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the measures used in previous research.

Boxscores. The earliest empirical tests of the two presidencies thesis used boxscores to compare presidential success in the two policy areas (Wildavsky, 1966; LeLoup and Shull, 1979). Boxscores indicate the proportion of presidential proposals that are approved by Congress during a calendar year (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1954–1975). Analyzing boxscores can reveal whether the president wins more often on foreign policy than on do-

policy, and whether the differences change over time But this ap- to measuring presidential success is plagued with severe reliability lidity problems The editors at CQ recognized many of these prob- nd discontinued publishing boxscores in 1975 because they "decided it dubious measure of the president's record" (*Congressional Quarterly y Report*, 1982, p 19)

Votes Analyzing presidential victories on Congressional Quarterly's Votes" overcomes many of the problems with boxscores (Sigelman, Key Votes focus the analysis on issues of 'major controversy" and tests esidential power (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1953–1984) is of Key Votes can answer most of the questions raised by the two encies thesis We can determine whether the president wins more for- olicy votes, and we can identify any changes that might have occurred ime Furthermore, we can identify which types of individuals sup- l and opposed the president on each vote to determine the source of lditional presidential victories on foreign policy issues

ajor limitation of CQ's Key Votes is the small number Each year CQ s between five and twenty Key Votes in each chamber The president not express a position on all Key Votes which reduces the number of cases, and in some years the number of foreign policy votes selected is small Thus relying on CQ's Key Votes not only precludes analyzing nces that might occur across chambers but also the number of cases is nall enough to produce distortions in the success rates even after ag- ing votes in both chambers across the two years of a Congress Al- h Sigelman (1979, p 1199) is correct that we should base our analysis jor foreign and domestic issues the Key Votes selected by CQ are not ly important votes that occur in a given year In our efforts to avoid acterizing executive-legislative relations on the basis of a series of es- lly trivial roll calls' (Sigelman 1979 p 1199) we must be careful not trict the data base so much that it distorts results and precludes ad- ng important issues

ividual Presidential Support Scores A third approach to testing the residencies thesis is to use presidential support scores to compare dif- ces in individual members support for the president on foreign and do- c votes A presidential support score indicates the percentage of time g a calendar year that each member of Congress votes in agreement the president's preference on roll call votes on which he expresses a ion Analysis of presidential support scores can reveal whether the dent receives more support from individual members on foreign policy on domestic policy, the source of any additional support and whether ifferences vary over time (Edwards, 1986 p 253) Moreover there are

a sufficient number of cases to analyze the House and Senate separately, and to observe changes over time within administrations.[1] This approach, however, cannot address the primary issue raised by the two presidencies thesis: Does the president *win* more often on foreign policy than on domestic policy? Because policymaking in Congress results from collective decisions, the president may receive higher levels of support from certain types of individuals in one policy area, but the additional support may fail to change the collective results. The additional support may be insufficient to increase the number of victories, or it may occur on votes the president would have won anyway without the extra votes.

Thus, previous studies have been unable to resolve the issues raised by the two presidencies thesis, in part because of limitations in measures of success. Although no measure will solve all of the problems, the discussion of limitations in previous studies suggests how the empirical analysis of the two presidencies thesis might be improved.

Research Design

Our approach is to compare presidential success rates on conflictual foreign and domestic policy roll calls.[2] In addition to comparing success in the two policy areas, we analyze levels of support from members of party factions in Congress (i.e., liberal Democrats, conservative Democrats, liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans) and from party and committee leaders. This research design overcomes some of the shortcomings of previous research, and permits us to address the major issues raised by the two presidencies thesis.

Data Base: Conflictual Roll Calls

The basic data base is all conflictual roll calls in the House and Senate on which the president expressed a position from 1953 through 1984 (n = 1856

[1] *Congressional Quarterly* (1953–1984) calculates presidential support scores using all votes on which the president expresses a public position. Basing presidential support scores on all presidential roll calls presents validity problems because the inclusion of nonconflictual issues in the measure inflates the scores for minority presidents more than for majority presidents (Bond and Fleisher, 1984; Bond, Fleisher, and Northrup, 1986). In addition, CQ's method of calculation lowers support scores when members fail to vote. These problems have led some students of presidential-congressional relations to reconstruct presidential support scores that exclude noncontroversial votes (Bond et al., 1986; Edwards, 1985, 1986).

[2] Foreign and defense roll calls are those dealing with such issues as foreign aid, treaties, weapons systems, and war-related measures. All other roll calls are included in the domestic policy category. The authors independently classified the votes into the two categories. Intercoder agreement exceeded 90%. The few votes on which we disagreed were reevaluated and the disagreement resolved.

in the House and 2604 in the Senate) A conflictual roll call is defined as one on which less than 80% vote in agreement with the president's position [3]

Basing the analysis on conflictual roll calls is a way to exclude most routine and trivial issues While this procedure permits analysis of behavior on a representative set of nontrivial issues, it does not completely address concerns about the importance of roll calls raised by Sigelman (1979) and others (e g , Covington, 1986)

Important Votes

Among controversial issues, some votes are more important to the president than others Covington (1986, p 718) observes that "Presidents try to influence only those votes that are important to them, and no valid means of assessing the subjective importance that presidents attach to votes has been developed In the absence of such a data base, most studies have opted for reliability over validity by using Congressional Quarterly's (CQ's) Presidential Support Scores (PSSs) and derivatives thereof in their analyses " The question is whether subjective importance to the president is the only, or even the primary, criteria for selecting valid cases of presidential-congressional relations We argue that it is not

The president's perception of which votes are important to him is without question one consideration but only one An equally legitimate consideration in determining the importance of votes is the perception of members of Congress In short, the best judges of the importance of a roll call vote in Congress are the members who cast the votes Therefore if an issue on which the president takes a position is important to members of Congress then it is a valid case of presidential-congressional relations that should be included in the analysis

While we cannot directly observe members subjective assessments of importance, we can observe their behavior And members' behavior reflects subjective judgments about which votes are most important Riker (1959) presents a formula, based on turnout and closeness of the vote for determining the importance of roll calls The formula produces a "coefficient of significance" (*s*) that ranges between zero and 1 00 (values closer to 1 00 indicate the most significant roll calls) The most important votes using this method

[3]Of all votes on which presidents expressed positions from 1953 to 1984 24% of House votes and 26% of Senate votes were nonconflictual presidential victories Although the common practice is to exclude all votes on which 80% or more vote the same way we leave near unanimous presidential losses in the analysis on the grounds that the president s disagreement has injected conflict into the decision There are relatively few votes where the president stands virtually alone against Congress Such cases however are often important and clearly belong in the analysis For example the South Africa sanctions bill passed the Senate in August 1986 by a vote of 84 14

are those on which (1) all members vote, and (2) the difference betw majority and minority is the minimum possible under the decision ru

We use a combination of Riker's method and CQ's Key Votes to ide subset of more important presidential roll calls. We define important as all roll calls with s-coefficients greater than .90, plus Key Votes select Congressional Quarterly. This procedure yields a reasonable subset o portant issues on which the president and Congress interact. It takes a tage of votes identified as important by a respected organization, but it limited to an arbitrary number each year.[4] This subset of important roll is likely to include most issues that are important to the president an which presidential activity is high. Although some of these votes may n part of the president's program, they are important for other reasons, and president has expressed a public position on them.[5]

Identification of Party Factions

Congressional parties are ideologically diverse. The mainstream of Democratic party is generally liberal, while the Republican mainstrea more conservative. But each party has a minority faction of members w have an ideological orientation outside the mainstream of their party—c conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans. Because many con vative Democrats are from the South and many liberal Republicans are fr the Northeast, a common method of dealing with this diversity is to div members along regional lines. As a measure of ideology, however, region crude indicator. We have the ability to measure the ideological orientation members of Congress more directly in order to identify conservative Dem crats and liberal Republicans, regardless of the region they hail from.

Indexes calculated by Americans for Constitutional Action (a conservati group) and Americans for Democratic Action (a liberal group) are two fr quently used indicators of general ideology. Using ACA and ADA indexes an analysis of presidential-congressional relations, however, is problematic because some votes used in the indexes are also presidential roll calls used measure members' support for the president.

To avoid this tautology, we purged votes on which the president express

[4]With this definition, 21% (n = 388) of conflictual House votes and 14% (n = 360) conflictu Senate votes are included in the more important category. This division between more impor tant and less important is reasonable, while still identifying enough votes for analysis. In th House, 32% of the important votes were Key Votes, 52% were Riker votes, and 16% were on both lists. In the Senate, 37% of the votes were Key Votes, 47% were Riker votes, and 16' were on both lists.

[5]A spot check of some specific votes suggests that this method picks up issues of great impor tance to the president (e.g., the two Gramm-Latta budget votes and the tax cut in 1981), bu excludes the more routine issues on which the president takes a stand.

position from the lists of votes selected by ACA and ADA, and reconstructed liberalism scores for members of Congress from 1953 to 1984. We used the mean liberalism score for each party to define party mainstreams for each Congress. Members of each party's minority faction are defined as those who have liberalism scores closer to the mean of the opposition party than to the mean of their party. Levels of support from each party faction were coded as variables on each roll call vote in order to observe differences in support on foreign and domestic roll calls from each party faction.

Party and Committee Leaders

Building support for the president's policy preferences among the different party factions takes place within the institutional structure of Congress. Two of the most important institutions in Congress are (1) the party system under the leadership of elected party leaders, and (2) the committee system with each committee influenced to a great extent by committee leaders (the chair and ranking minority member) chosen on the basis of seniority. These leaders have the power to facilitate or block legislation as it runs the congressional obstacle course, and they serve as voting cues on floor votes (Kingdon 1981; Matthews and Stimson 1975). Although Congress is more open now, and leaders can no longer deliver blocks of votes as they once did, these formal leaders continue to wield considerable influence. For each vote in our data base, we can identify the positions of party leaders (majority and minority floor leaders) and committee leaders of the reporting committee (chair and ranking minority member) to determine if support from these key actors varies across the policy areas.

Results

Analysis of All Conflictual Votes

Table 1 presents presidential success rates on conflictual foreign and domestic roll calls for each Congress. The overall averages across all Congresses appear to support the two presidencies thesis. Presidential success is 12.5% higher on foreign policy than on domestic policy in the House and 15% higher in the Senate.

Some have argued that the president's advantage has decreased over time in large part as a result of increased congressional assertiveness on foreign policy issues after Vietnam (LeLoup and Shull 1979). Our analysis, however, reveals no such change over time. Following previous work (LeLoup and Shull, 1979), we compared presidential success on foreign and domestic policy before and after 1965.

In the House, the president's advantage on foreign policy declined only

TABLE 1

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON CONFLICTUAL FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY ROLL CALLS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE, 83RD–98TH CONGRESS

President & Congress	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Eisenhower						
83rd (1953–54)	93% (14)	70% (33)	23	86% (28)	73% (71)	13
84th (1955–56)	92% (12)	34% (35)	58	85% (26)	53% (53)	32
85th (1957–58)	63% (19)	54% (67)	9	85% (33)	63% (81)	22
86th (1959–60)	80% (15)	47% (68)	33	66% (38)	37% (123)	29
Total	80% (60)	51% (203)	31*	79% (125)	54% (328)	25*
Kennedy						
87th (1961–62)	96% (24)	72% (69)	24	85% (47)	76% (152)	9
88th (1963)	67% (12)	87% (30)	−20	78% (27)	88% (47)	10
Total	86% (36)	77% (99)	9	82% (74)	78% (199)	4
Johnson						
88th (1964)	60% (20)	94% (31)	−34	87% (23)	92% (154)	−5
89th (1965–66)	84% (25)	87% (121)	−3	70% (46)	77% (166)	−7
90th (1967–68)	67% (24)	66% (119)	1	69% (61)	63% (169)	6
Total	71% (69)	79% (271)	−8	72% (130)	76% (419)	−4
Nixon						
91st (1969–70)	83% (12)	64% (59)	19	90% (21)	51% (86)	39
92nd (1971–72)	93% (27)	69% (48)	24	65% (48)	41% (49)	24
93rd (1973–74)	44% (36)	44% (111)	0	64% (45)	30% (178)	34
Total	68% (75)	55% (218)	13*	69% (114)	38% (293)	31*
Ford						
93rd (1974)	47% (15)	39% (23)	8	46% (28)	30% (20)	16
94th (1975–76)	60% (25)	36% (99)	24	73% (30)	47% (72)	26
Total	55% (40)	37% (122)	18*	60% (58)	43% (92)	17*
Carter						
95th (1977–78)	70% (57)	62% (97)	8	92% (79)	64% (106)	28
96th (1979–80)	71% (94)	67% (117)	4	71% (68)	71% (143)	0
Total	71% (151)	64% (214)	7	82% (147)	68% (249)	14*
Reagan						
97th (1981–82)	57% (37)	54% (84)	3	76% (63)	82% (115)	−6
98th (1983–84)	69% (74)	25% (103)	44	90% (77)	70% (50)	20
Total	65% (111)	38% (187)	27*	84% (140)	78% (165)	6

Entries are the percentages of votes on which the president's position won. Number of votes in parentheses.

*$p < .05$ (significance test performed for each presidential administration).

slightly from a 16% difference in the early period to an 11% difference in the later period. In the Senate, the difference *increased* from an 11% foreign policy advantage in the early period to a 15% advantage after 1965.

A closer inspection of the results in table 1 suggests that the two presidencies phenomenon is largely a function of the party of the president, rather

something that has diminished over time—Republican administrations characterized by two presidencies while Democratic administrations are

Table 2 compares foreign and domestic policy success for Republican Democratic presidents. We see that Republican presidents have a 22% antage on foreign policy roll calls in the House and a 24% advantage in Senate. Democratic presidents, in contrast, win the same percentage of ign and domestic policy roll calls in the House and they have only a 4% antage on foreign policy in the Senate. Note that both Democratic and publican presidents have similar success rates on foreign policy votes. On nestic votes, however, Democratic presidents win about as often, while publican presidents have much less success. Thus, it is low success on dostic issues that generates the difference for Republican presidents.

Republicans were the minority for most of the time period of this study, l lack of party control may drive down domestic policy success rates for publican presidents. But the difference between foreign and domestic icy success rates is present even when Republicans controlled Congress ring periods of Republican control (Eighty-third Congress and Ninetyenth and Ninety-eighth Senates). Republican presidents did about as ll on domestic policy as Democratic presidents. But Eisenhower's foreign icy success in the Republican controlled Eighty-third Congress was 23% her than domestic policy in the House and 13% higher in the Senate. agan had Republican majorities in the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth ates. Although Reagan's foreign policy success rate was 6% lower than nestic policy in the Ninety-seventh Senate, he had a 20% advantage on ign policy in the Ninety-eighth Senate (see table 1).

Furthermore, the overall partisan averages are not disguising major differes from one Congress to another. There were ten Congresses with a Reblican president. During these Republican administrations, the presint's foreign policy success rate was more than 10% higher than domestic icy seven out of ten times in the House and nine out of ten times in the

TABLE 2

SUCCESS OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS ON CONFLICTUAL FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY ROLL CALLS

Party of President	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Republican	68% (286)	46% (730)	22*	76% (137)	52% (578)	24*
Democrat	73% (256)	73% (584)	0	79% (351)	75% (937)	4*

ntries are the percentages of votes on which the president's position won. Number of votes arentheses.

* $p < .05$

TABLE 3

SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON CONFLICTUAL FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ROLL CALLS FROM THE FOUR PARTY FACTIONS

	House			Senate		
	Foreign	*Domestic*	*Diff*	*Foreign*	*Domestic*	*Diff*
Republican Presidents						
Eisenhower						
Conservative Republicans	56% (60)	65% (203)	9	67% (124)	79% (328)	12
Liberal Republicans	66%	64%	2	77%	61%	16*
Conservative Democrats	28%	31%	3	35%	45%	10
Liberal Democrats	62%	40%	22*	58%	27%	31*
Nixon						
Conservative Republicans	70% (75)	66% (218)	4	78% (114)	68% (293)	10*
Liberal Republicans	57%	55%	2	46%	43%	3
Conservative Democrats	59%	49%	10*	62%	45%	17*
Liberal Democrats	44%	32%	12*	30%	24%	6*
Ford						
Conservative Republicans	56% (40)	66% (122)	10	78% (58)	69% (92)	9*
Liberal Republicans	55%	46%	9	50%	39%	11
Conservative Democrats	44%	49%	5	64%	44%	20*
Liberal Democrats	39%	25%	14*	31%	22%	9*
Reagan						
Conservative Republicans	78% (111)	60% (187)	18*	77% (140)	79% (165)	2
Liberal Republicans	54%	40%	14*	60%	63%	3
Conservative Democrats	73%	41%	32*	52%	53%	1
Liberal Democrats	33%	22%	11*	30%	23%	7
All Republicans						
Conservative Republicans	68% (286)	64% (730)	4*	74% (436)	71% (878)	6
Liberal Republicans	57%	52%	5*	60%	53%	7
Conservative Democrats	56%	42%	14*	52%	47%	5*
Liberal Democrats	43%	31%	12*	38%	25%	13*

Senate There were six Congresses with a Democratic president During these Democratic administrations, the president's foreign policy success rate was more than 10% higher than domestic policy only once in each chamber

Finally, the partisan differences in the two presidencies phenomenon persist over time Assessing changes over time within the party must be done cautiously Eisenhower was the only Republican president in the study who served before 1965, and Kennedy and Johnson's first year in office are the only observations of Democratic presidents in the early period Nonetheless, there is little evidence of a decline in the two presidencies phenomenon over time The only decline over time occurred for Republicans in the House Eisenhower enjoyed a thirty-one percentage point advantage in foreign policy in the House, compared to the substantially reduced nineteen

TABLE 3 (*continued*)

	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Presidents						
Democrats	90% (36)	90% (99)	0	77% (74	83% (199)	−6
ative Democrats	48%	53%	5	50%	53%	3
Republicans	63%	39%	24*	64%	48%	16*
ative Republicans	32%	19%	13*	35%	24%	11*
Democrats	87% (69)	86% (271)	1	65% (130)	76% (489)	−11
ative Democrats	39%	42%	3	45%	39%	6*
Republicans	60%	56%	4	73%	71%	2
ative Republicans	21%	24%	3	49%	40%	9*
Democrats	70% (151	69% (214	1	76% (147	70% (249)	6*
ative Democrats	33%	42%	9	49%	53%	−4
Republicans	62%	52%	10*	76%	65%	11*
ative Republicans	28%	27%	1	24%	33%	−9
rats						
Democrats	78% (256)	81% (583)	3	72% (351)	76% (937)	−4
ative Democrats	37%	44%	7	47%	46%	1
Republicans	62%	52%	10*	72%	65%	7*
ative Republicans	27%	24%	3	36%	35%	1

are the average percentage of the members of each party faction that voted in agree the president's position. Number of votes in parentheses.
5

age point advantage for later Republican presidents. In the Senate , Eisenhower's twenty-five percentage point foreign policy advan- nly slightly more than his Republican successors' twenty-three per- point advantage. For Democratic presidents, the trend over time is l. Before the Eighty-ninth Congress, Democratic presidents had a entage point disadvantage on foreign policy votes in the House and a centage point disadvantage in the Senate. After the Eighty-ninth s, Democrats won slightly more often on foreign policy roll calls (1% n the House and 8% higher in the Senate).

is the source of additional support that leads to more victories on policy for Republican presidents? Do members of both parties tend ort the president more on foreign policy issues, or does support in- n foreign issues only from the opposition party or from the presi- arty?

Sources of Additional Support

Table 3 shows support for the president on foreign and domestic roll calls from the four party factions. The most consistent source of additional support for Republican presidents on foreign policy issues is liberal Democrats. All four Republican presidents received significantly more support from liberal Democrats on foreign policy votes in both the House and Senate. The average difference between the two policy areas is twelve percentage points higher for foreign policy in the House and thirteen percentage points higher in the Senate. Notice, however, that while liberal Democrats support Republican presidents more on foreign policy than on domestic policy, the actual level of support from liberal Democrats is generally lower than support from the other party factions. Only Eisenhower received support from more than half of liberal Democrats on foreign policy votes.

Support for Republican presidents from the other party factions is not consistently higher on foreign policy. Conservative Democrats in the House average fourteen percentage points higher support for Republican presidents, but in the Senate the average is only five percentage points higher. Support from the two Republican factions does not differ greatly across the policy categories. Democratic presidents do not receive consistently greater support on foreign policy from any faction. When there is a significant difference, it is usually greater support from members of the opposition party, primarily liberal Republicans.

Thus, like Edwards (1986), we find that the primary source of greater foreign policy success is the opposition party. Members of the president's party are generally not more supportive on foreign policy than on domestic policy and in several cases the president's partisans are considerably more supportive on domestic policy.[6]

Why do Republican presidents attract more support on foreign policy from liberal Democrats? One possible reason is the behavior of the president. While we cannot observe presidential activities and politicking on individual votes, we can determine if presidents take systematically different types of positions on foreign and domestic issues. If Republican presidents are more supportive of liberal positions on foreign policy than on domestic policy, then we would expect increased support from liberals in Congress.

[6] We should note that in some cases it is difficult to find greater support on foreign policy from a particular faction because of ceiling effects. Kennedy and Johnson, for example, received support from over 90% of liberal Democrats in the House on domestic policy. It is difficult to observe significantly greater support on foreign policy when support on domestic policy is so near the maximum. Because levels of support from the opposition party factions are typically much lower, it is easier to find large differences, but the actual level remains low.

Presidential Ideology on Foreign and Domestic Issues

Table 4 reports liberalism scores for each president on foreign and domestic issues.[7] We see that presidents generally have similar ideology scores in the two policy areas Among Democratic presidents, Johnson and Carter have virtually identical ideology scores on both foreign and domestic issues Kennedy is nine points less liberal on foreign policy than on domestic policy, but the number of foreign policy votes is small

Among Republican presidents, Eisenhower was much more liberal on foreign policy than on domestic policy—presidential behavior that could attract more support from liberal Democrats on foreign policy Eisenhower's behavior, however, is not typical Nixon was only seven points more liberal on foreign policy issues, and Ford and Reagan were less liberal on foreign policy, yet all three still received significantly more foreign policy support from liberal Democrats in both chambers Thus, more liberal presidential positions on foreign policy issues provide only a partial explanation of why liberal Democrats support Republican presidents more on foreign policy than on domestic policy

Another possible explanation for increased presidential support on foreign policy is support from party and committee leaders in Congress If Demo-

TABLE 4

PRESIDENTS' LIBERALISM ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY

	Liberalism Score		
President	Overall	Foreign Policy	Domestic Policy
DDE	46% (164)	89% (47)	32% (117)
JFK	93% (106)	84% (19)	93% (87)
LBJ	91% (245)	90% (52)	91% (193)
RMN	25% (174)	30% (53)	23% (121)
GRF	14% (56)	9% (21)	17% (35)
JEC	82% (130)	81% (47)	83% (83)
RWR	12% (143)	4% (69)	19% (74)

Entries are the percentage of ACA ADA votes on which the president expressed a liberal position A liberal position is to disagree with ACA or agree with ADA Number of votes in parentheses

[7] These scores are based on ACA and ADA votes on which the president expressed a position A liberal position is defined as disagreement with the ACA position or agreement with the ADA position Although the liberal and conservative positions on foreign policy have changed over time, this measure matches the liberal foreign policy position as defined by ADA ACA at a given point in time with behavior of members of Congress at that time Note that presidential votes are not used to calculate ideologies of members of Congress

TABLE 5

SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON CONFLICTUAL FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ROLL CALLS

	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Republican Presidents						
Eisenhower						
Democratic Party Leader	81% (54)	49% (170)	32*	76% (124)	30% (316)	46*
Democratic Cmte. Leaders	69% (55)	44% (163)	25*	70% (120)	43% (307)	33*
Republican Party Leader	94% (53)	76% (175)	18*	87% (109)	91% (320)	-4
Republican Cmte. Leaders	78% (54)	66% (169)	12	86% (110)	79% (302)	7*
Nixon						
Democratic Party Leader	60% (65)	39% (190)	21*	13% (112)	21% (270)	8
Democratic Cmte. Leaders	83% (63)	41% (176)	42*	67% (101)	37% (244)	30*
Republican Party Leader	91% (66)	86% (194)	5	91% (112)	57% (285)	34*
Republican Cmte. Leaders	93% (68)	76% (176)	17*	73% (108)	60% (257)	13*
Ford						
Democratic Party Leader	37% (38)	29% (110)	8	28% (53)	26% (78)	2
Democratic Cmte. Leaders	80% (35)	40% (89)	40*	70% (41)	37% (76)	33*
Republican Party Leader	87% (38)	84% (103)	3	85% (55)	53% (86)	32*
Republican Cmte. Leaders	79% (34)	84% (88)	-5	87% (53)	65% (74)	22*
Reagan						
Democratic Party Leader	57% (108)	27% (169)	30*	43% (139)	24% (161)	19*
Democratic Cmte. Leaders	70% (103)	34% (171)	36*	50% (116)	40% (115)	10
Republican Party Leader	91% (109)	75% (176)	16*	90% (135)	87% (160)	3
Republican Cmte. Leaders	81% (104)	65% (168)	16*	62% (116)	79% (150)	17
All Republicans						
Democratic Party Leader	60% (265)	37% (639)	23*	43% (425)	25% (525)	18*
Democratic Cmte. Leaders	74% (256)	40% (599)	34*	63% (381)	40% (772)	23*
Republican Party Leader	91% (266)	80% (648)	11*	89% (411)	75% (851)	14*
Republican Cmte. Leaders	83% (260)	72% (601)	11*	75% (387)	71% (785)	4

cratic leaders in Congress are more supportive of Republican presidents on foreign policy votes, then mainstream liberal Democrats might be encouraged to increase their support on foreign issues.

Support from Congressional Leaders

Table 5 shows how often the party leaders and the Republican and Democratic leaders of the committee reporting the bill voted in agreement with the president's position. Republican presidents tend to receive more support on foreign policy votes from party and committee leaders in both parties. The most dramatic increase in support occurs among Democratic leaders. Democratic leaders of committees reporting foreign and defense bills voted with Republican presidents nearly three-fourths of the time in the House

TABLE 5 (*continued*)

	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Democratic Presidents						
Kennedy						
Democratic Party Leader	91% (34)	93% (90)	-2	92% (74)	84% (180)	8
Democratic Cmte Leaders	84% (32)	89% (79)	5	90% (69)	53% (169)	37*
Republican Party Leader	63% (32)	25% (85)	38*	57% (68)	22% (172)	35*
Republican Cmte Leaders	55% (33)	32% (76)	23*	74% (70)	23% (166)	51*
Johnson						
Democratic Party Leader	93% (58)	92% (227)	1	75% (127)	77% (462)	−2
Democratic Cmte Leaders	91% (58)	86% (232)	5	73% (114)	52% (326)	21*
Republican Party Leader	43% (63)	33% (239)	10	63% (126)	55% (442)	8
Republican Cmte Leaders	47% (59)	42% (232)	5	69% (125)	50% (343)	19*
Carter						
Democratic Party Leader	84% (127)	72% (170)	12*	73% (145)	71% (235)	2
Democratic Cmte Leaders	72% (134)	74% (159)	2	53% (122)	56% (201)	27*
Republican Party Leader	39% (123)	28% (162)	11*	62% (121)	40% (190)	22*
Republican Cmte Leaders	51% (135)	41% (155)	10*	70% (129)	47% (209)	23*
All Democrats						
Democratic Party Leader	88% (219)	85% (487)	3	78% (346)	77% (577)	1
Democratic Cmte Leaders	79% (224)	82% (470)	3	81% (305)	53% (696)	28*
Republican Party Leader	44% (218)	30% (486)	14*	61% (315)	44% (804)	17*
Republican Cmte Leaders	51% (227)	40% (463)	11*	70% (324)	43% (718)	27*

Entries are the percentage of votes on which the leader voted in agreement with the president's position. Number of votes in parentheses.
*$p < .05$

and nearly two-thirds of the time in the Senate. On domestic policy votes Democratic committee leaders voted with Republican presidents only 40% of the time in each chamber, resulting in a thirty-four percentage point difference in the House and a twenty-three percentage point difference in the Senate. The Democratic floor leader in both the House and Senate also voted in agreement with Republican presidents more often on foreign policy, but the differences between the policy areas are not as great as the differences for Democratic committee leaders. The differences in support from Republican leaders across the policy areas are typically much less than the differences for their Democratic counterparts.

Democratic presidents tend to receive greater support on foreign policy only from Republican party and committee leaders. The only case of Democratic presidents receiving more support from Democratic leaders on foreign policy is from Democratic committee leaders in the Senate. Notice, however, that committee chair support on foreign policy in the Senate is not un-

usually high for a committee leader of the president's party Instead, support from Senate committee chairs on domestic policy is unusually low, which results in a large difference between domestic and foreign policy

Hence, leader support may explain why the two presidencies phenomenon is limited to Republican presidents Both Democratic and Republican presidents receive more support on foreign policy from the opposition leadership. Republican presidents also tend to attract more support from party and committee and leaders of their party. Consequently, there are more likely to be reinforcing bipartisan cues on foreign policy under Republican presidents

Analysis of Important Votes

The analysis thus far has used all conflictual roll calls In this section, we analyze our subset of more important votes to determine if behavior on important issues differs from behavior on all conflictual issues

Table 6 shows success on important foreign and domestic votes for Republican and Democratic presidents On important votes, the two presidencies phenomenon for Republican presidents disappears in the House and is diminished in the Senate And as we found in the analysis of all conflictual roll calls, there is little difference in success of Democratic presidents on important foreign and domestic roll calls

Comparing success rates on important votes with success on all conflictual votes reveals why the foreign policy advantage of Republican presidents disappears Compared to success on all conflictual roll calls, Republican presidents are less likely to win important foreign policy votes and more likely to win important domestic policy votes The shifts in the House are large in both policy areas—success on important foreign policy votes is twelve percentage points lower, success on important domestic policy votes is fifteen percentage points higher In the Senate, success on important foreign policy

TABLE 6

SUCCESS OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS ON IMPORTANT FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ROLL CALLS

Party of President	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Republican	56% (62)	61% (166)	−5	72% (81)	62% (145)	10*
Democrat	73% (40)	73% (121)	0	68% (34)	69% (101)	−1

Entries are the percentages of votes on which the president's position won Number of votes in parentheses

$^{*}p < .05$

TABLE 7

SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FOUR PARTY FACTIONS ON IMPORTANT FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ROLL CALLS

	House			Senate		
	Foreign	Domestic	Diff	Foreign	Domestic	Diff
Republican Presidents						
Conservative Republicans	72% (62)	74% (166)	−2	79% (81)	82% (145)	−3
Liberal Republicans	52%	58%	6	50%	51%	−1
Conservative Democrats	58%	48%	10*	55%	52%	3
Liberal Democrats	32%	29%	3	27%	20%	7*
Democratic Presidents						
Liberal Democrats	77% (40)	83% (121)	−6	66% (34)	81% (101)	−15
Conservative Democrats	34%	38%	−4	51%	39%	12*
Liberal Republicans	58%	50%	8	57%	66%	−9
Conservative Republicans	25%	18%	7	31%	27%	4

Entries are the average percentage of the members of each party faction that voted in agreement with the president's position. Number of votes in parentheses.
*$p < .05$

roll calls is only four percentage points lower, while success on important domestic roll calls is ten percentage points higher.[5] Let's look at levels of support from the party factions on important votes to determine why success rates differ.

Table 7 reports levels of support from the party factions on important votes. Compared to all votes, the behavior of liberal Democrats on important votes becomes more partisan on foreign policy—support from liberal Democrats on foreign policy votes is eleven percentage points lower in both chambers than in the entire sample (compare table 4). Liberal Democrats support of Republican presidents on domestic issues is similar on both important votes and all conflictual votes. Consequently, on important issues Republican presidents do not receive much more support from liberal Democrats on foreign policy than on domestic policy.

The behavior of congressional leaders on important issues is similar to the behavior observed in the entire sample. Republican presidents continue to receive more support from Democratic party and committee leaders on foreign policy, although the difference in the House is less than in the entire

[5]We also looked at differences in success on important votes before and after 1965. The trends over time are different in each chamber. In the House, there was an eight percentage point advantage on important foreign policy votes before 1965 and a five percentage point disadvantage in the recent period. In the Senate, the president won four percent less on foreign policy before 1965, but after 1965 he won eight percent more often. None of the differences is significant at the .05 level.

sample Democratic presidents also continue to receive more supp eign policy from Republican party and committee leaders

Conclusions

The original theory of "two presidencies" sought to explain why dent is able "to control defense and foreign policies and so comple whelm those who might wish to thwart him" (Wildavsky, 1966, p davsky's argument clearly refers to presidential success on "majo He observes that during the "modern era" (which began with Fl 1930s), 'In the realm of foreign policy there has not been a single m on which presidents have failed" (emphasis added)

Although we find some support for the two presidencies thesis, gether, the findings of our analysis tend to dispute the original th publican presidents tend to win more often on conflictual foreign p calls than on domestic policy, perhaps because of increased support eral Democrats on foreign policy For Democratic presidents there is little or no difference in success rates in the two policy area important roll calls, the advantage that Republican presidents enj eign policy disappears in the House and declines considerably in th Thus, contrary to the original conceptualization the two preside nomenon does not appear on a subset of more important issues In difference shows up on votes that could be characterized as involvi decision making (i e , conflictual roll calls), and then it is limited to can presidents

These findings present two troubling questions (1) Why do R presidents get additional opposition party support on conflictual fo icy votes while Democratic presidents do not? (2) Why does the show up on all conflictual votes, but not on important issues? Whil not provide definitive answers to these questions, some possible tions follow

One possible reason for the partisan differences on conflictual ro volves the *responsibility for governing* In the American system of institutions sharing powers" (Neustadt, 1960, p 33), the president gress share responsibility for governing Because the president is visible actor, he is the one who is most likely to be held accountal voters for any failures Members of Congress, in contrast, are ins incumbency advantages, and are less likely to be held accountable ally for a failure to govern (Fiorina, 1984) But, collectively, Cong share the responsibility for governing, and that collective responsi more heavily on the majority party than on the minority

Thus, the president and the majority party in Congress bear th responsibility to maintain the operations of government Although

ing governmental operations is important in the domestic sphere, the stakes are higher on foreign and national security policy, largely for the reasons advanced in the original two presidencies argument.

In the American system, the presidency and Congress are frequently controlled by different parties. When there is divided party control, the responsibility to share in governance may constrain members of a majority opposition to cooperate with the president more on foreign and defense policy, in order to maintain the nation's security. While members of the minority party do not want to undermine the nation's security, there are legitimate political conflicts over foreign and defense policy. Because they have less responsibility for governing, members of an opposition minority in Congress have greater leeway to pursue their own political preferences on foreign policy as well as on domestic policy.

During the period of our study, divided control always involved a Republican president facing Democratic majorities in Congress. We found that Democrats were more supportive of Republican presidents on foreign policy than on domestic policy, and the most consistent difference in support came from liberal Democrats. Democratic presidents interacted with Democratic majorities in Congress, and conservative Republicans, who had less responsibility for governance as members of the minority, provided little additional support on foreign policy. Liberal Republicans were more supportive of Democratic presidents on foreign policy, perhaps because of ideological proximity. But there are relatively few liberal Republicans, and their additional support was typically insufficient to result in more success on foreign policy for Democratic presidents.

While the findings of our analysis are generally consistent with this "responsibility for governance" explanation, there are some nonconforming examples. Democrats were the minority party in the Eighty-third Congress (1953–1954) during the Eisenhower administration, and in the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth Senates (1981–1984) during the Reagan administration, yet Eisenhower and Reagan still received greater support on foreign policy from liberal Democrats. In the case of Eisenhower, liberal Democrats may have supported his foreign policy preferences because of greater ideological proximity on foreign policy. The Reagan case is more difficult to explain. Reagan's positions on foreign policy issues are more conservative than his positions on domestic policy, yet he still received 13% more support on foreign policy from liberal Democrats in the Senate. In this case, however, Republican control of Congress was incomplete. Because the Democrats controlled the House, the Democratic minority in the Senate may have felt a greater responsibility for governing than would normally be the case for a minority party. Moreover, Democrats had controlled the Senate for nearly thirty years, and they viewed their new minority status as temporary.

Thus, the responsibility to share in governance may explain why liberal Democrats are more supportive of Republican presidents on conflictual policy roll calls, but why do they become less supportive on more important foreign policy roll calls? The answer may lie in the types of cues and pressures involved on the subset of important issues

The set of all conflictual votes involves the maintenance of the foreign policy and defense establishment—the foreign aid bill, state department authorizations, votes for continuing operation of the military, etc While these issues involve controversy, most are not highly visible and salient to members' constituents. Therefore, members are less likely to receive constituency pressure that conflicts with cues from party and committee leaders And recall that congressional leaders are more supportive of presidents on foreign policy

The subset of important votes involves the most salient and conflictual aspects of foreign and defense policy These issues are more visible and more likely to be salient to members' constituencies While congressional leaders support the president about as often on important foreign policy votes as on more normal foreign policy votes, members of Congress are more likely to have information and constituency interests on visible, important roll calls that conflict with the bipartisan cues from the leadership As a result, behavior on important foreign policy roll calls is similar to behavior on important domestic policy roll calls Thus, there are two presidencies, but the phenomenon is limited and conditional

REFERENCES

Bond Jon R , and Richard Fleisher 1984 Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting A Re-examination of Public Opinion as a Source of Influence in Congress *Western Political Quarterly* 37 291–306

Bond, Jon R , Richard Fleisher and Michael Northrup 1986 Congress and the President The Effects of Public Opinion Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago

Congressional Quarterly Almanac Annually 1953–1984 Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly, Inc

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report January 2 1982 Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly, Inc

Covington, Cary R 1986 Congressional Support for the President The View from the Kennedy/Johnson White House *Journal of Politics* 48 717–28

Edwards, George C III 1985 Measuring Presidential Success in Congress Alternative Approaches *Journal of Politics* 47 667–85

——— 1986 The Two Presidencies A Reevaluation *American Politics Quarterly* 14 247 63

Fiorina, Morris P 1982 The Presidency and the Contemporary Electoral System In Michael Nelson, ed , *The Presidency and the Political System* Washington, DC CQ Press

Kingdon John W 1981 *Congressmen s Voting Decisions*, 2d ed New York Harper & Row

LeLoup, Lance T and Steven A Shull 1979 Congress versus the Executive The "Two Presidencies" Reconsidered *Social Science Quarterly*, 59 704 19

Matthews, Donald R., and James A. Stimson. 1975. *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Peppers, Donald A. 1975. The "Two Presidencies": Eight Years Later. In Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Perspectives on the Presidency*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Riker, William H. 1959. A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies. In John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Shull, Steven A., and Lance T. LeLoup. 1981. Reassessing the Reassessment: Comment on Sigelman's Note on the "Two Presidencies" Thesis. *Journal of Politics* 43: 563–64.

Sigelman, Lee. 1979. A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis. *Journal of Politics*, 41: 1195–1205.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. The Two Presidencies. *Trans-Action* 4: 7–14.

Closeness and Turnout: a Methodological Note

Gary W. Cox
University of California, San Diego

Many articles in political science have examined the statistical relationship between the closeness of elections and turnout. Usually a moderate relationship is found: closer elections tend to have higher turnout. This note shows that the operational variable almost universally used in the literature to measure closeness—viz., the percent of the vote garnered by the winner minus the percent of the vote garnered by the runner-up—is spuriously correlated with turnout. An alternative measurement of closeness which avoids this problem is described.

Many articles in political science have examined the statistical relationship between the closeness of elections and levels of turnout. Typically a moderate negative relationship is found: Closer elections tend to have higher turnout.

The theoretical motivation for examining the relationship between closeness and turnout usually stems from one variety or another of rational-actor model. In some cases interest has focused on *voters*, and an attempt has been made to test the rational voter models of Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The idea here is that voters in closer elections tend to believe that their chances of affecting the outcome are greater, and hence are more likely to vote. This notion has been tested with aggregate data by including closeness as a regressor in a multivariate explanation of turnout (see, e.g., Barzel and Silberberg, 1973; Silberman and Durden, 1975); the coefficient on closeness purportedly measures the response of voters.

Other scholars have emphasized the response of *elites* to closeness. V. O. Key's competitive threat theory, for example, posits that party leaders will try harder to mobilize voters in closely fought elections than in noncompetitive ones (Key, 1949, p. 307). In articles that recognize Key's or some other elite-level theory, the coefficient on closeness is interpreted as a mixed bag—consistent both with a voter response and with an elite response (see, e.g., Chambers and Davis, 1978; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983; Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Gray, 1976).

The question of whether elites, voters, neither or both respond to the closeness of an election is an interesting one, but not one that I shall address

I would like to thank Mike Munger for his encouragement and help and Gary Jacobson for his useful comments.

here (cf Cox and Munger, 1987) Instead, I shall argue that regardless of one's theoretical beliefs on this matter—one should not use the operational closeness variable that is almost universally used in the literature

The variable used in the literature is the percentage margin of victory (i e , the difference between the winning candidate's percentage of the vote and that garnered by the runner-up) [1] There are two objections to this variable, one conceptual (less serious) and one econometric (more serious)

A Conceptual Objection

The conceptual objection to using the percentage margin of victory (M) is simply that it does not always accurately reflect the pre-election probability that a single voter (or single elite actor) will be able to affect the outcome But it is this latter variable that is theoretically relevant

The point here is not that M is measured after the election, whereas what we are interested in is a pre-election probability belief It is not unreasonable to assume that pre-election beliefs are correct on average, in the same way that polls are, so that actual election results can be used as proxies for pre-election beliefs Instead, the difficulty is that a given percentage margin of victory can correspond to elections which are quite different in terms of the capacity of single agents to affect the outcome Consider as an extreme example, two different elections in which M equals 33% In the first the total number of voters is 100 000 and hence the number of votes separating the winner from the loser is about 33 000 This is a formidable obstacle, and no single voter (or campaign activist) who expects this to be the raw vote margin is likely to think that a single vote (or a little extra personal effort in the twelfth precinct) will swing the election On the other hand if there are only three voters, then a 33% margin corresponds to a two-to-one tally and a single vote is decisive The same point applies though less dramatically, in real-world elections For example, although the sixth Congressional District of South Carolina had a 5% margin in 1982, twice that of the first district of Maine, the raw vote margin was actually lower (5 962 votes as compared to 6,199) It may be misleading to think of the South Carolina race as less close because the percentage margin is larger What seems more directly relevant to the postulated calculations of individual voters or campaign workers is the raw vote margin What is the probability (calculated before the

[1] Other variables in use to measure closeness are econometrically equivalent to this Some authors (e g Gray 1976) subtract the percentage margin from 100 so that an increase in the numerical value of the closeness variable increases turnout This obviously does not change the magnitude of the correlation Other authors (e g Barzel and Silberberg 1973 use the percentage of the vote garnered by the winning candidate In terms of the notation introduced later in the text, they use $W = w/t$ rather than $M = (w - l)/t$ In two candidate races W is just a linear transformation of M For $w + l = t$ and hence $W = (M + 1)/2$ Nothing of substance is changed from the point of view of ordinary least squares or linear correlation

election) that a single vote or a few more votes generated by personal effort will be decisive?

Whether this same criticism of the use of percentage margin applies to the calculations of candidates or party leaders *with established organizations at their command* is less clear. For these actors, the percentage margin may be superior to the raw vote margin as a measure of perceived closeness. Consider, for example, the difference in political meaning of an expected raw vote margin of 100,000 in a California Senate race as opposed to one in New Hampshire. In California, a candidate might reasonably think he has a shot at 100,000 votes. This is because the task he faces is not that of personally convincing an extra 100,000 isolated individuals to vote for him. Rather, he can rely on the existence of various organizations which have already partially solved the free rider problem, and through which he can appeal (effectively) for a moderate additional effort. Moreover, because California political organizations are proportioned to the California electorate, they are large enough so that moderate additional effort on the part of already-organized individuals can potentially translate into vote gains on the order of 100,000. In New Hampshire, on the other hand, while there are also political organizations that have partially solved the collective action problem, they are proportioned to the size of the New Hampshire electorate and cannot so easily produce an extra 100,000 votes. Thus, to the extent that each candidate can command pre-existing organizations whose size is proportional to the task facing them, the relevant variable is the percentage rather than raw vote margin.

AN ECONOMETRIC OBJECTION

Putting these conceptual points to one side for the moment, let us consider the econometric objection to the use of percentage margins. This objection can be explained with the help of some notation. Consider a set of n districts in each of which two candidates compete for office. Let

e_i = number of eligible voters in the ith district,
w_i = number of votes received by the winning candidate in the ith district,
l_i = number of votes received by the losing candidate in the ith district,
$t_i = w_i + l_i$ = total number of votes cast in the ith district,
$m_i = w_i - l_i$ = raw vote margin of victory in the ith district,
$M_i = (m_i/t_i) \times 100$ = percentage margin of victory in the ith district,
$T_i = (t_i/e_i) \times 100$ = percentage turnout of eligible voters in the ith district.

The usual procedure, whereby T is regressed on M (and possibly some other variables), gives one pause because part of the dependent variable ap-

pears in the independent variable Is the negative correlation often observed between M and T due to the predicted responses of voters and elites, or is it due simply to the fact that we are correlating $M = m/t$ with $T = t/e$, and t appears in the denominator of one variable and the numerator of the other? Suppose, for example, that in a particular sample of elections e and m happened to be constant across all districts, but that t varied widely In this sample, there would certainly be a negative correlation between M and T, but it would be entirely artifactual, one could infer nothing about the response of voters and elites to closeness

In cross-sectional studies of American legislative turnout (at least those since Baker vs Carr and Wesberry vs Saunders) the condition that e is constant across districts is met more or less precisely One is then left to wonder whether the correlation between m/t and t/e is driven by (1) the theoretically predicted relationship between m and t (whereby lower values of m spark a reaction by voters and elites that drives t up, thus simultaneously lowering M and raising T), or by (2) the fact that holding m constant, there is an artifactual negative correlation between M and T The larger is the variance in m, the less worrisome is the possibility of an *entirely* spurious correlation, but a superior method (at least in the study of legislative turnout) is to use m rather than M to begin with

On Using Raw Vote Margins


The chief advantage of using m is that one does not have to worry about spurious correlation A disadvantage is that it may not be a good conceptual measure of closeness as perceived by candidates or party leaders (Recall the point made earlier about the differing meaning of a given raw vote margin in districts with considerably different numbers of eligible voters) This disadvantage can be mitigated by normalizing m by e rather than t The size of e can then serve to control for the size of political organizations much as t had done before, without the unfortunate econometric side effects If one confines attention to turnout in districts with comparable electorates then one can use either m or m/e—they will be roughly equivalent

One cannot, however simply substitute m or m/e for M The use of raw vote margins has its own econometric difficulties that must be overcome These difficulties can be seen more clearly if we digress to consider some examples—taken from the 1982 Congressional elections—of the practical difference between using m and M

Consider first the differences between raw margin (m) and percentage margin (M) in a context where the econometric criticisms of M do not apply It is reasonable to expect that aggregate campaign contributions ought to be greater in closer elections, all else equal One might predict this either because individual contributors are instrumentally motivated or because candi-

FIGURE 1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T AND m



T = percentage turnout
m = raw vote margin
e = eligible voters

dates in closer elections work harder at fund-raising and are willing to promise more in the way of favors for a contribution of given size. In order to investigate this idea, one might begin by looking at the bivariate correlation between total campaign receipts reported to the Federal Election Commission (R) and closeness, measured either by M or m. (There is no econometric objection to M in this case because it no longer definitionally contains part of the dependent variable.) As it turns out, the correlation between R and M (−.46) is quite comparable to that between R and m (−.44). The two variables seem to be approximately equivalent.

Now consider the correlation between *turnout* and closeness in the 1982 House elections. If one uses M to measure closeness, the correlation is significant and negative: −.27. If one uses m, however, the correlation is insignificant and positive: .08. This is a rather striking difference given that the variables seem conceptually to be fairly similar. One might be tempted to conclude that in this particular example the spurious part of the correlation between M and T is rather large.

This conclusion, however, is not necessarily warranted. One must recognize that the relationship between T and m is not linear, and indeed, not

even monotonic.[2] The relationship should be negative when m is near zero, but for large values of m it will be positive.

The reason for this is straightforward and is illustrated in figure 1. This figure refers to a two-candidate race in which there are e eligible voters. The horizontal axis corresponds to the raw vote margin, m, which can vary from a value of zero to a value of e (when the winning candidate gets all the votes and turnout is 100%). The vertical axis corresponds to the percentage turnout, T. Two lines and a curve are inscribed in the figure. The solid line plots the minimum possible turnout percentage as a function of m. For example if $m = e/2$, then the smallest that $t = w + l \geq w - l = m$ can be is $e/2$, in which case $T = 50\%$. In general, the minimum value of T, given m, is just $(m/e) \times 100$—a straight line through the origin of slope 100/e. The dotted line corresponds to the estimated regression line that would be fit between m and T if the value of m carried no more information about the value of T than that it exceeded $(m/e) \times 100$. This is by way of a null hypothesis and corresponds to assuming that $T = 50\% + (m/2e) \times 100 + f(m)$, where $f(m)$ is distributed with mean zero and variance decreasing in m (e.g., $f(m)$ might be uniformly distributed on the interval $[100(m - e)/2e, 100(e - m)/2e]$). The curve in figure 1 corresponds to the "closeness counts" hypothesis. Near $m = 0$, the turnout percentages fall as m increases because elites and voters exert less effort in less close races. Eventually, however, regardless of how large or small the magnitude of the slope near zero may be, the curve must bend back upwards. This is a mathematical necessity since $T \geq (m/e) \times 100$. Thus, one expects a negative slope near $m = 0$ but a positive slope for larger values of m. Simply regressing T on m (plus any other variables of interest) does not make sense. One should use both m and m^2 as regressors. The test of the "closeness counts" hypothesis is then whether the coefficient of m is negative and significantly different from zero.

In the case of the 1982 House elections, this procedure shows that closeness does count. The coefficient of m in a multivariate regression of T on m, m^2, various demographic variables, and various political variables (such as time between the close of registration and election day) is $-15 \times 10^{[illegible]}$, with a t of -3.48 (Cox and Munger, forthcoming). The tiny size of the coefficient

2. One reason to expect a nonlinear (if still monotonic) relationship between T and m has to do with the crudity with which m proxies for the theoretically relevant variables. What is theoretically relevant is the subjective probability of being decisive that various agents hold before the election. If we think of m as being a random variable before the election, then the probability of a single vote being decisive is roughly Pr[m = 1]. (If we adopt the viewpoint of a local voter before the election, who has beliefs about the raw vote margin (m) that would be generated by all *other* voters, then his or her subjective probability of being decisive is Pr[m' = 0] + Pr[m = 1 and the voter's preferred candidate is behind].) This theoretical variable will not be related linearly to the expected value of m, for which the realized value of m stands as a proxy, nor will it be linearly related to T (since it interacts with a benefit term—see Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Thus, there is no reason to expect a nice linear relationship between T and m.

is largely a consequence of the fact that the range of m is more th while the range of T is less than 1 In terms of beta weights, m is a tively as well as statistically significant variable Thus, the bivariat tion reported earlier between M and T is probably not entirely spu

Conclusion

Although, in this particular instance, the qualitative results are whether one uses raw or percentage margins, the arguments adv this note should certainly compel future researchers not to use pe margin as a measure of closeness when studying turnout across disti equal numbers of voters The possibility of spurious correlation in tl particularly clear, and there is a superior alternative measure—the margin—readily available When all districts have the same numb gible voters, the raw vote margin is a conceptually defensible m closeness, both as perceived by individual voters or party worke perceived by candidates or party leaders It is somewhat better tha centage margin as a measure of the perceptions of the organizatio powerful, while perhaps somewhat worse as regards the organi more powerful Moreover, regardless of whether all districts have number of voters, the raw vote margin is not spuriously correlated w out [3] A difficulty in using the raw vote margin is that, when it beco large, it must necessarily have a positive relationship with turno plained earlier, thus, one must include its square, which eats up a freedom Another difficulty, which also affects the percentage m simply the crudity with which margins of either kind measure what want to measure—the prevailing pre-election belief about how race will be Nonetheless, if one wants to proceed with empirical one has to use such variables as are available While it would be nic pre-election polls on which to base our judgments of how close voter the outcome would be in various elections of interests, in most case we can do is argue that prevailing pre-election opinions tend to be and hence that actual margins can proxy for expected margins

References

Barzel, Y , and E Silberberg 1973 Is the Act of Voting Rational? *Public Choice*, 1

Caldeira, G A , and S C Patterson 1982 Contextual Influences on Participation in Legislative Elections *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 7 359–81

[3]Another advantage is that the specification of the closeness variable significantly parameter estimates for other independent variables that are correlated with closene Munger (1987) for example, find that in a regression of Congressional turnout on var graphic features of the constituency, total campaign expenditures, and closeness the estimates for the expenditure variable is depressed when one uses percentage ma than raw margin

Chambers, W N , and P C Davis 1978 Party, Competition and Mass Participation The Case of the Democratizing Party System, 1824–1852 In Joel H Silbey Allan G Bogue, and William H Flanigan, eds , *The History of American Electoral Behavior* Princeton Princeton University Press

Cox, G W , and M C Munger Forthcoming Closeness, Expenditure Turnout The 1982 U S House Elections *American Political Science Review*

Downs, A 1957 *An Economic Theory of Democracy* New York Harper & Row

Gray, V 1976 A Note on Competition and Turnout in the American States *Journal of Politics* 38 153–58

Key V O 1949 *Southern Politics in State and Nation* New York Random House

Patterson, S C , and G A Caldeira 1983 Getting Out the Vote Participation in Gubernatorial Elections *American Political Science Review* 77 675–89

Riker W , and P C Ordeshook 1968 A Theory of the Calculus of Voting *American Political Science Review* 62 25 -42

Silberman, J , and G Durden 1975 The Rational Behavior Theory of Voter Participation The Evidence from Congressional Elections *Public Choice* 23 101 8

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Cecil L. Eubanks, Editor

Economic Development The History of an Idea By H W Arndt (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1987 Pp 217 $20 95)

The structure of this work is similar to many monographs on political thought—isolating a concept and tracing its intellectual lineage The method is also similar—not just to trace its history but also to see "how and why people's ideas changed or differed with circumstances in different parts of the world" (p 5) It is not an economic analysis of development, but a conceptual analysis of "development " As such it is a useful survey concise even elegant The author is professor emeritus of economics at The Australian National University If that locus makes itself evident at all it is in his attention to India and Indonesia as much as Nigeria and Mexico and his equal use of English and American sources

The book follows Arndt's earlier study *The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth A Study in Contemporary Thought* (1978) The two volumes are parallel in style and content Both are about the ends of economic policy growth in the West and development in the poorer countries Each traces a rough dialectic— pre-history ' of the concept enthusiasm for the idea and critical reaction from the Left and elsewhere Concluding prescriptions are cautious the 'right kind of economic growth in the first study and growth again in the second study as increasing the range of human choice (p 177 quoting the "wisest of development economists R M Sundrum to whom Arndt gives special acknowledgment along with I M D Little p 7) So the two books are connected not merely parallel since growth was not only the initial focus of the idea of development post - World War II 1945- 1965 (chap 3), but is its enduring means as well

What we have, then is the history of two related ideas the objectives of growth and development—as Arndt finds them in selected sources Omitted as sources are political and sociological studies (p viii) For those who would bring in Parsons and Pye, Huntington and Skocpol I recommend Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics* (1985)

Arndt uses development economists as primary sources He is aware that his focus on policy objectives, rather than theories, may lead some economists quoted to consider that he is dwelling on their *obiter dicta* But of

Closeness and Turnout: a Methodological Note

Gary W. Cox
University of California, San Diego

Many articles in political science have examined the statistical relationship between the closeness of elections and turnout. Usually, a moderate relationship is found: closer elections tend to have higher turnout. This note shows that the operational variable almost universally used in the literature to measure closeness—viz., the percent of the vote garnered by the winner minus the percent of the vote garnered by the runner-up—is spuriously correlated with turnout. An alternative measurement of closeness which avoids this problem is described.

Many articles in political science have examined the statistical relationship between the closeness of elections and levels of turnout. Typically, a moderate negative relationship is found. Closer elections tend to have higher turnout.

The theoretical motivation for examining the relationship between closeness and turnout usually stems from one variety or another of rational-actor model. In some cases interest has focused on *voters*, and an attempt has been made to test the rational voter models of Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The idea here is that voters in closer elections tend to believe that their chances of affecting the outcome are greater, and hence are more likely to vote. This notion has been tested with aggregate data by including closeness as a regressor in a multivariate explanation of turnout (see, e.g., Barzel and Silberberg, 1973; Silberman and Durden, 1975); the coefficient on closeness purportedly measures the response of voters.

Other scholars have emphasized the response of *elites* to closeness. V. O. Key's competitive threat theory, for example, posits that party leaders will try harder to mobilize voters in closely fought elections than in noncompetitive ones (Key, 1949, p. 307). In articles that recognize Key's or some other elite-level theory, the coefficient on closeness is interpreted as a mixed bag—consistent both with a voter response and with an elite response (see, e.g., Chambers and Davis, 1978; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983; Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Gray, 1976).

The question of whether elites, voters, neither or both respond to the closeness of an election is an interesting one, but not one that I shall address

I would like to thank Mike Munger for his encouragement and help and Gary Jacobson for his useful comments.

here (cf. Cox and Munger, 1987) Instead, I shall argue that regardless of one's theoretical beliefs on this matter—one should not use the operational closeness variable that is almost universally used in the literature

The variable used in the literature is the percentage margin of victory (i e , the difference between the winning candidate's percentage of the vote and that garnered by the runner-up) [1] There are two objections to this variable, one conceptual (less serious) and one econometric (more serious)

A Conceptual Objection

The conceptual objection to using the percentage margin of victory (M) is simply that it does not always accurately reflect the pre-election probability that a single voter (or single elite actor) will be able to affect the outcome But it is this latter variable that is theoretically relevant

The point here is not that M is measured after the election whereas what we are interested in is a pre-election probability belief It is not unreasonable to assume that pre-election beliefs are correct on average, in the same way that polls are, so that actual election results can be used as proxies for pre-election beliefs Instead, the difficulty is that a given percentage margin of victory can correspond to elections which are quite different in terms of the capacity of single agents to affect the outcome Consider, as an extreme example, two different elections in which M equals 33% In the first the total number of voters is 100,000 and hence the number of votes separating the winner from the loser is about 33,000 This is a formidable obstacle and no single voter (or campaign activist) who expects this to be the raw vote margin is likely to think that a single vote (or a little extra personal effort in the twelfth precinct) will swing the election On the other hand if there are only three voters, then a 33% margin corresponds to a two-to-one tally, and a single vote is decisive The same point applies though less dramatically in real-world elections For example, although the sixth Congressional District of South Carolina had a 5% margin in 1982, twice that of the first district of Maine, the raw vote margin was actually lower (5,962 votes as compared to 6,199) It may be misleading to think of the South Carolina race as less close because the percentage margin is larger What seems more directly relevant to the postulated calculations of individual voters or campaign workers is the raw vote margin What is the probability (calculated before the

[1]Other variables in use to measure closeness are econometrically equivalent to this Some authors (e g Gray, 1976) subtract the percentage margin from 100 so that an increase in the numerical value of the closeness variable increases turnout This obviously does not change the magnitude of the correlation Other authors (e g Barzel and Silberberg 1973 use the percentage of the vote garnered by the winning candidate In terms of the notation introduced later in the text they use $W = w/t$ rather than $M = (w - l)/t$ In two candidate races W is just a linear transformation of M For, $w + l = t$ and hence $W = (M + 1)/2$ Nothing of substance is changed from the point of view of ordinary least squares or linear correlation

election) that a single vote or a few more votes generated by personal effort will be decisive?

Whether this same criticism of the use of percentage margin applies to the calculations of candidates or party leaders ***with established organizations at their command*** is less clear. For these actors, the percentage margin may be superior to the raw vote margin as a measure of perceived closeness Consider, for example, the difference in political meaning of an expected raw vote margin of 100,000 in a California Senate race as opposed to one in New Hampshire In California, a candidate might reasonably think he has a shot at 100,000 votes This is because the task he faces is not that of personally convincing an extra 100,000 isolated individuals to vote for him Rather, he can rely on the existence of various organizations which have already partially solved the free rider problem, and through which he can appeal (effectively) for a moderate additional effort Moreover, because California political organizations are proportioned to the California electorate, they are large enough so that moderate additional effort on the part of already-organized individuals can potentially translate into vote gains on the order of 100,000 In New Hampshire, on the other hand, while there are also political organizations that have partially solved the collective action problem, they are proportioned to the size of the New Hampshire electorate and cannot so easily produce an extra 100,000 votes Thus, to the extent that each candidate can command pre-existing organizations whose size is proportional to the task facing them, the relevant variable is the percentage rather than raw vote margin

AN ECONOMETRIC OBJECTION

Putting these conceptual points to one side for the moment, let us consider the econometric objection to the use of percentage margins This objection can be explained with the help of some notation Consider a set of n districts in each of which two candidates compete for office Let

e_i = number of eligible voters in the ith district,
w_i = number of votes received by the winning candidate in the ith district,
l_i = number of votes received by the losing candidate in the ith district
$t_i = w_i + l_i$ = total number of votes cast in the ith district,
$m_i = w_i - l_i$ = raw vote margin of victory in the ith district,
$M_i = (m_i/t_i) \times 100$ = percentage margin of victory in the ith district,
$T_i = (t_i/e_i) \times 100$ = percentage turnout of eligible voters in the ith district

The usual procedure, whereby T is regressed on M (and possibly some other variables), gives one pause because part of the dependent variable ap

pears in the independent variable Is the negative correlation often observed between M and T due to the predicted responses of voters and elites, or is it due simply to the fact that we are correlating M = m/t with T = t/e, and t appears in the denominator of one variable and the numerator of the other? Suppose, for example, that in a particular sample of elections e and m happened to be constant across all districts, but that t varied widely In this sample, there would certainly be a negative correlation between M and T, but it would be entirely artifactual, one could infer nothing about the response of voters and elites to closeness

In cross-sectional studies of American legislative turnout (at least those since Baker vs Carr and Wesberry vs Saunders), the condition that e is constant across districts is met more or less precisely One is then left to wonder whether the correlation between m/t and t/e is driven by (1) the theoretically predicted relationship between m and t (whereby lower values of m spark a reaction by voters and elites that drives t up, thus simultaneously lowering M and raising T), or by (2) the fact that holding m constant there is an artifactual negative correlation between M and T The larger is the variance in m, the less worrisome is the possibility of an *entirely* spurious correlation, but a superior method (at least in the study of legislative turnout) is to use m rather than M to begin with

On Using Raw Vote Margins


The chief advantage of using m is that one does not have to worry about spurious correlation A disadvantage is that it may not be a good conceptual measure of closeness as perceived by candidates or party leaders (Recall the point made earlier about the differing meaning of a given raw vote margin in districts with considerably different numbers of eligible voters) This disadvantage can be mitigated by normalizing m by e (rather than t) The size of e can then serve to control for the size of political organizations much as t had done before, without the unfortunate econometric side effects If one confines attention to turnout in districts with comparable electorates then one can use either m or m/e—they will be roughly equivalent

One cannot, however, simply substitute m or m/e for M The use of raw vote margins has its own econometric difficulties that must be overcome These difficulties can be seen more clearly if we digress to consider some examples—taken from the 1982 Congressional elections—of the practical difference between using m and M

Consider first the differences between raw margin (m) and percentage margin (M) in a context where the econometric criticisms of M do not apply It is reasonable to expect that aggregate campaign contributions ought to be greater in closer elections, all else equal One might predict this either because individual contributors are instrumentally motivated or because candi-

FIGURE 1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T AND M



T = percentage turnout
m = raw vote margin
e = eligible voters

dates in closer elections work harder at fund-raising and are willing to promise more in the way of favors for a contribution of given size. In order to investigate this idea, one might begin by looking at the bivariate correlation between total campaign receipts reported to the Federal Election Commission (R) and closeness, measured either by M or m. (There is no econometric objection to M in this case because it no longer definitionally contains part of the dependent variable.) As it turns out, the correlation between R and M (−.46) is quite comparable to that between R and m (−.44). The two variables seem to be approximately equivalent.

Now consider the correlation between *turnout* and closeness in the 1982 House elections. If one uses M to measure closeness, the correlation is significant and negative: −.27. If one uses m, however, the correlation is insignificant and positive: .08. This is a rather striking difference given that the variables seem conceptually to be fairly similar. One might be tempted to conclude that in this particular example the spurious part of the correlation between M and T is rather large.

This conclusion, however, is not necessarily warranted. One must recognize that the relationship between T and m is not linear, and indeed, not

even monotonic[2] The relationship should be negative when m is near zero, but for large values of m it will be positive

The reason for this is straightforward and is illustrated in figure 1 This figure refers to a two-candidate race in which there are e eligible voters The horizontal axis corresponds to the raw vote margin, m, which can vary from a value of zero to a value of e (when the winning candidate gets all the votes and turnout is 100%) The vertical axis corresponds to the percentage turnout, T Two lines and a curve are inscribed in the figure The solid line plots the minimum possible turnout percentage as a function of m For example if $m = e/2$, then the smallest that $t = w + l \geq w - l = m$ can be is $e/2$, in which case $T = 50\%$ In general, the minimum value of T, given m, is just $(m/e) \times 100$—a straight line through the origin of slope $100/e$ The dotted line corresponds to the estimated regression line that would be fit between m and T if the value of m carried no more information about the value of T than that it exceeded $(m/e) \times 100$ This is by way of a null hypothesis and corresponds to assuming that $T = 50\% + (m/2e) \times 100 + f(m)$, where $f(m)$ is distributed with mean zero and variance decreasing in m (e g , $f(m)$ might be uniformly distributed on the interval $[100(m - e)/2e, 100(e - m)/2e]$) The curve in figure 1 corresponds to the "closeness counts" hypothesis Near $m = 0$, the turnout percentages fall as m increases because elites and voters exert less effort in less close races Eventually however, regardless of how large or small the magnitude of the slope near zero may be the curve must bend back upwards This is a mathematical necessity since $T \geq (m/e) \times 100$ Thus, one expects a negative slope near $m = 0$ but a positive slope for larger values of m Simply regressing T on m (plus any other variables of interest) does not make sense One should use both m and m^2 as regressors The test of the "closeness counts" hypothesis is then whether the coefficient of m is negative and significantly different from zero

In the case of the 1982 House elections this procedure shows that closeness does count The coefficient of m in a multivariate regression of T on m m^2, various demographic variables, and various political variables (such as time between the close of registration and election day) is -15×10 with a t of -3.48 (Cox and Munger, forthcoming) The tiny size of the coefficient

[2]One reason to expect a non linear if still monotonic relationship between T and m has to do with the crudity with which m proxies for the theoretically relevant variables What is theoretically relevant is the subjective probability of being decisive that various agents hold before the election If we think of m as being a random variable before the election then the probability of a single vote being decisive is roughly $Pr[m \leq 1]$ (If we adopt the viewpoint of a focal voter before the election who has beliefs about the raw vote margin (m') that would be generated by all *other* voters then his or her subjective probability of being decisive is $Pr[m' = 0] + Pr[m' = 1$ and the voter's preferred candidate is behind]) This theoretical variable will not be related linearly to the expected value of m for which the realized value of m stands as a proxy nor will it be linearly related to T (since it interacts with a benefit term see Riker and Ordeshook 1968) Thus, there is no reason to expect a nice linear relationship between T and m

is largely a consequence of the fact that the range of m is more than 10,000 while the range of T is less than 1. In terms of beta weights, m is a substantively as well as statistically significant variable. Thus, the bivariate correlation reported earlier between M and T is probably not entirely spurious.

Conclusion

Although, in this particular instance, the qualitative results are the same whether one uses raw or percentage margins, the arguments advanced in this note should certainly compel future researchers not to use percentage margin as a measure of closeness when studying turnout across districts with equal numbers of voters The possibility of spurious correlation in this case is particularly clear, and there is a superior alternative measure—the raw vote margin—readily available When all districts have the same number of eligible voters, the raw vote margin is a conceptually defensible measure of closeness, both as perceived by individual voters or party workers and as perceived by candidates or party leaders It is somewhat better than the percentage margin as a measure of the perceptions of the organizationally less powerful, while perhaps somewhat worse as regards the organizationally more powerful Moreover, regardless of whether all districts have the same number of voters, the raw vote margin is not spuriously correlated with turnout [3] A difficulty in using the raw vote margin is that, when it becomes very large, it must necessarily have a positive relationship with turnout, as explained earlier, thus, one must include its square, which eats up a degree of freedom Another difficulty, which also affects the percentage margin, is simply the crudity with which margins of either kind measure what we really want to measure—the prevailing pre-election belief about how close the race will be Nonetheless, if one wants to proceed with empirical research one has to use such variables as are available While it would be nice to have pre-election polls on which to base our judgments of how close voters thought the outcome would be in various elections of interests, in most cases the best we can do is argue that prevailing pre-election opinions tend to be accurate and hence that actual margins can proxy for expected margins

References

Barzel, Y., and E Silberberg 1973 Is the Act of Voting Rational? *Public Choice* 16 51–58

Caldeira, G A and S C Patterson 1982 Contextual Influences on Participation in U S State Legislative Elections *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 7 359–81

[3]Another advantage is that the specification of the closeness variable significantly affects the parameter estimates for other independent variables that are correlated with closeness Cox and Munger (1987), for example, find that in a regression of Congressional turnout on various demographic features of the constituency, total campaign expenditures, and closeness, the coefficient estimates for the expenditure variable is depressed when one uses percentage margin rather than raw margin

ıambers, W N , and P C Davis 1978 Party, Competition, and Mass Participation The Case of the Democratizing Party System, 1824–1852 In Joel H Silbery, Allan G Bogue, and William H Flanigan, eds , *The History of American Electoral Behavior* Princeton Princeton University Press

ıx, G W , and M C Munger Forthcoming Closeness, Expenditure Turnout The 1982 U S House Elections *American Political Science Review*

owns, A 1957 *An Economic Theory of Democracy* New York Harper & Row

rav, V 1976 A Note on Competition and Turnout in the American States *Journal of Politics* 38 153–58

ey, V O 1949 *Southern Politics in State and Nation* New York Random House

atterson, S C , and G A Caldeira 1983 Getting Out the Vote Participation in Gubernatorial Elections *American Political Science Review*, 77 675–89

ıker, W , and P C Ordeshook 1968 A Theory of the Calculus of Voting *American Political Science Review* 62 25-42

ılberman, J , and G Durden 1975 The Rational Behavior Theory of Voter Participation The Evidence from Congressional Elections *Public Choice* 23 101-8

Book Reviews

course, other economists have in fact also been policy advisors—to governments, international agencies, and to anyone else who would listen. Besides, as Louis Hartz used to say about political thought, it is the story of the misuse of earlier ideas by later writers.

Arndt means for his survey to be at least a reflection of "official and articulate public opinion" (p. 49). One can, however, always question the relationship between "official opinion" and policy-in-practice. The United States and its co-governors in the International Monetary Fund have been prescribing growth via lower taxes, less protection, deregulation, and, now, privatization (Arndt does not take his story to this recent flowering of neo-orthodoxy), but it requires closer study to see what happens in practice. Someone might, for instance, make a systematic study of the "Country Development Strategy Statements" of the U.S. Agency for International Development (unclassified, perhaps surprisingly). They might discover a push to deregulate agricultural prices, but with a recognition of the need for interim subsidies to urban consumers. The primary emphasis might be on growth, but that does not preclude some attention to equity, if only for reasons of political prudence.

Researching the relationship between ideas and practice would be a different book, however. Arndt's has its own usefulness. If you want to give your students of developing countries a brief, readable survey of what economic development has been meant to achieve, this is it. While the central theme, if there is one, is that of "increasing complexity and divergence" (p. 61), Arndt tells the story simply. It starts, after British beginnings, with modernization elsewhere motivated by "reactive nationalism" (p. 13, quoting Rostow). Colonies are seen to receive little attention from mainstream economists before 1945 (p. 29), when thinking about them flows into development, or rather "development," as growth, with its emphasis on capital formation and planning, foreign assistance, and prescriptions of foreign trade as the engine of growth over import substitution strategies. In turn, unequal growth gives rise to the insistence that the very concept of "development" embraces social concerns—over poverty and inequality, for equity and supplying "social needs." Following this, Arndt proceeds to critics of the Left—neo-Marxism, ECLA structuralists, dependency theorists, New International Economic Order enthusiasts, and, finally, to critics of the Right—Western skeptics, along with religious Easterners like Gandhi and Khomeini.

For all this, $20.95 is not bad these days, but a paperback edition would be better. Readers might appreciate the addition of a subject index to the index of names.

Elisha Greifer, *Northern Michigan University*

Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy B
Thomas J. Biersteker (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1987
Pp 344 $45 00 cloth, $12 50 paper)

Most Marxists see dependence on foreign investment as a structural featur of the economy of a developing country that gives a significant degree of eco nomic and political power to those groups whose interests are aligned wit foreign capital They maintain that foreign investments have the long-terr effect of decreasing the rate of economic growth and of increasing inequalit within a developing country Contrary to this view, classical economic theo rists see dependence on foreign investment as a flow of much-needed re sources into a developing country They maintain that economic growth i the Third World requires the infusion of foreign capital These differen viewpoints come to affect the way theorists and researchers working withi the framework of each perspective view economic nationalism in the Thir World Biersteker's work represents a significant contribution to this debate

In the opening chapter of this book, Biersteker identifies and presents brief review of six theoretical approaches to international political econom a conservative neoclassical realist approach, a liberal internationalist ap proach, a structuralist approach, a "vulgar" dependentista approach a so phisticated dependentista approach, and a "classical" Marxist approach Th first three approaches fall under the general framework of classical economi theory, and the latter three are Marxist in orientation Using these ap proaches as guides, Biersteker sets himself the task of "understanding wh economic nationalist programs like indigenization have been undertaker how they have been implemented and, most important, what has change as a result" (p 8) In order to accomplish this task the remainder of the boo is devoted to a detailed examination of economic nationalism in Nigeria, a manifested by the indigenization decrees of 1972 and 1977

From Biersteker's analysis of the first decree, the reader learns that only few actors influenced the decision of the state to promulgate an indigeniz tion decree The major actors involved in the policy-making process leadi up to the promulgation of the 1972 decree were local capital, foreign capita and the state The state and local capital were the primary force behind th first major effort at economic nationalism in Nigeria Local capital was inte ested in increasing its level of participation in the major sectors of the eco omy, whereas the state wanted to assume leadership of national develo ment Foreign capital wanted to stop the program altogether since any gai made by the other two actors would be at its expense However, the sta was careful not to do anything that would discourage the inflow of forei capital into the country Consequently, the final decree was not overtly n tionalistic None of the major actors was completely satisfied with the fin outcome

Unlike the first decree, the second indigenization decree had clear winners and losers. According to Biersteker, "the decree was a move on the part of the public sector on areas occupied by private sector in the Nigerian economy" (p. 198). The decree gave the state control of some strategic sectors of the economy. For example, the state became a majority partner in the major banking institutions in the country, and it forced foreign enterprises to relinquish control of substantial portions of their Nigerian operations.

In his analysis of how the provisions of the two decrees were implemented, Biersteker presents a picture of bureaucratic ineptitude. The various agencies that were established to implement and/or monitor the provisions of the decrees did not coordinate their efforts and often hindered each other's efforts. This was particularly true of the implementation efforts after the promulgation of the first decree.

Did anything change as a result of the two decrees? This is the major question addressed by this work. According to Biersteker, local capital accomplished most of its objectives, and the state gained control of the very important financial sector, and foreign enterprises were compelled to sell a significant proportion of their equity to local investors. Despite these changes, foreign enterprises continued their operations in Nigeria, and in some cases new operations were established. Foreign enterprises remained in the country because they were able to maintain control of their operations—even where they held a minority of the equity. Biersteker identifies a variety of strategies that multinationals employed to circumvent the provisions of the decrees and maintain control of their operations: reclassification, regrouping, increasing of share capital, applying for Nigerian citizenship, fronting, negotiating management or technical agreement, and company reorganization. Thus, although the decrees facilitated a few structural changes, they failed to contribute to indigenous control of the economy. Multinationals remain a dominant force in the economy, controlling resources, markets, and enterprises that affect the country's well-being. In short, not much changed as a result of the decrees.

Biersteker's analysis indicates that none of the six theoretical approaches that he identifies in his opening chapter adequately explains economic nationalism. Evidence both supportive and contradictory of all the approaches can be found in the Nigerian case. For example, the Nigerian evidence fails to support the expectation of some neoclassical theorists that multinationals are losing control over their operations. Likewise the neo-Marxists' contention that the state is the captive of capital is not supported by the evidence (the second decree was state-led).

This work is based on extensive interview material, data, and documents from various sources. It is indispensable to those who wish to understand the interactions among state, multinational, and local capital. It is also a useful source for students of comparative public policy. However, as Biersteker ob-

serves, "the Nigerian experience with indigenization is not necessarily generalizable to other policies or countries" (p 268). Situations of economic development are not homogeneous there are considerable differences in the dynamics of situations, such as level of industrialization, availability of local capital, and market size The historical context within which the two decrees were passed places further limitations on our ability to generalize the Nigerian experience. The decision to adopt a nationalistic economic policy, the degree to which limitations are placed on the operations of multinationals, and the response of multinationals to indigenization programs are likely to be influenced by domestic and global economic conditions It is noteworthy that the two indigenization decrees were promulgated in the 1970s when the Nigerian economy, fueled by increasing oil revenues, was experiencing a tremendous expansion

Iren Omo-Bare, *Louisiana State University*

The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge By Joseph G Bock (Westport, CT Greenwood Press, 1987 Pp xii, 215 $35 00)

For those of us who thrive on titillating tales of intrigue and controversy stemming from Executive Branch infighting Joseph Bock's new book will be a letdown We anticipate that every administration will have its internal power struggles, as national security advisors duel with cabinet-level officials at State, Defense, or Treasury, among others, for influence over policy Certainly the Reagan administration has not disappointed us in that respect

Bock's book deals with a set of White House relationships which have not been as widely examined by academics—those between the national security assistant and the political advisors to the president Not all national security policy alternatives are palatable to the president's domestic constituency It might be assumed that political advisors would be quick to react against any proposal that might alienate significant segments of the voting public, leading to a head-on confrontation with the national security assistant over policy substance

Friction could also occur if the national security assistant became a media "star" in his own right A president's image as chief decision maker might be undermined if the assistant appeared to be personally responsible for policy successes The president's political advisors would seem to be the most likely defenders against any popularity contest pitting their boss against a fellow White House staffer The Nixon and the Carter administrations would seem to be the most likely cases in which clashes of this type might have occurred

So, with expectations high, we dig into the Bock book, looking for a wide variety of juicy morsels to confirm our worst suspicions of skullduggery and

backbiting. But we are disappointed. Bock comes to the conclusion that "rather than continuous, vitriolic backbiting and power struggle among senior presidential assistants, the general picture that emerges is one of usually cordial relations interspersed with periodic, often issue-oriented, friction Much of what tension has existed between White House political aides . and the national security assistant relates directly to the assistant's public visibility" (p 171) Even in the Nixon administration, frictions stemming from Henry Kissinger's personal popularity seemed to emanate more from the president himself, with Nixon's personal staff merely serving as conduits of his pique

How can this be? Has Bock done his homework thoroughly? It certainly appears that he has. He has consulted memoirs, archives, and journals He has interviewed many of the participants who held the relevant offices He provides a review of every administration from Truman through Reagan, and he seems to have asked all the relevant questions Perhaps Bock should be praised for *not* trying to manufacture antagonisms to spice up the contents of his book

My only real criticism of the book is that the sheer number of endnotes per chapter sometimes seems to overwhelm the text In the chapter on the Nixon administration, for example, the text accounts for eighteen and a half pages, this is followed by nine pages of endnotes, 103 in all I am left with the feeling that Mr Bock could have told me much more, and it makes me wish that I could sit down and grill him personally to find out what he may not have told me

All in all, this is a decent book It is well organized and well written The voluminous endnotes and the selected bibliography at the end of the text will provide other scholars with a good starting point for additional research on the subject

Edward Platt, *Indiana University of Pennsylvania*

Spain in the 1980s The Democratic Transition and a New International Role Edited by Robert P Clark and Michael H Haltzel (Cambridge, MA. Ballinger Publishing Company Pp v, 206)

This book is a selected collection of the papers presented at the conference on post-Franco Spanish society and politics held in Washington, D C , in September 1985, sponsored by the West European Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in cooperation with Spain's Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana The book suffers from the malady that so often afflicts collections of papers presented at conferences. unevenness and repetitiveness For those who already know something about Spain, the ten papers, plus the introduction, do not give enough information, for

;e who are just learning about Spain, the papers do not give enough of already established information Thus, it is difficult to know who the k's readers are supposed to be

ewer than half of the papers are worth printing in expensive hardcover biggest disappointments are the papers given by the Spanish partici-ts José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, Jordí Sole Tura, José Maria Maravall, An-o Sánchez-Gijón, and Felipe González, the present prime minister, ose offering is by far the best of a mediocre lot. The Spaniards, all men of i distinction and accomplishment, were major players in the drama of in's transition to democracy, yet they reveal almost nothing of their per-al involvement and experience What they give us instead is superficial f which reads like material in a glossy publication put out for distribution n embassy waiting room *Spain Today*! Perhaps Spaniards are not yet ac-omed to being invited to international colloquia on politics (no politicians imilar positions would ever have been invited during the Franco years), perhaps they are not yet aware of the standards of scholarship that are ected of participants, even nonacademics and politicians

aymond Carr, the British scholar whose works about Spain are usually rate, offers us, in the introduction to the book (written after the confer-e), little more than do the Spaniards His rendition of the history of the isition is a variation of a tale that by now has become hoary The persons would most likely leaf through this book have read similar versions of transition story time and time again At this point, the eminent His-icist should be giving us something more Perhaps for the present time re have been enough publications about Spain's transition to democracy *he level of research that produced the majority of the papers at this con-ence* Publications appearing in 1987 are remarkably similar in content to olications that have been on the market for several years What is now ded is either the exposition and analysis of new data about the transition nore sophisticated analysis of the data that already exist

'he remaining contributions—Richard Gunther, Stanley Payne, Joseph veraker, Robert Clark, and Howard Wiarda—follow the latter route and the reader something of value Richard Gunther's chapter is the best in book. He argues that the instability in Spanish political parties since the fication of the constitution is the paradoxical consequence of the very suc-s of the transition and of the constituent process from 1977 to 1979 The d of moderate, quasi-consociational politics that accomplished the transi-ı and the creation of the constitution, performed by elites distanced and led from the electorate, was not the kind of politics needed to build mus-ar, partisan, competitive political parties whose elites are clearly visible l fully answerable to the party rank and file As Gunther writes In some pects the demands of party building and founding a new regime are in-npatible" (p. 38). Spain's task now is to build a strong durable party sys-

tem that is both competitive within itself but also allegiant to the democratic system that was created between 1975 and 1980.

Stanley Payne believes that the army will remain allegiant to the new democratic system and that the longer a legitimate, effective system exists the less likely it is that any military intervention in politics would take place "Historically, notable acts of military intervention have taken place only against relatively unpopular governments, those that denied reasonable access to major national political sectors, those facing severe internal division or breakdown Major instances of intervention against a national consensus or a clear majority of public opinion have been rare to nonexistent" (p 85)

Joseph Foweraker presents a new, insightful interpretation of the *comisiones obreras* (workers' commissions) as they existed during the Franco years Those clandestine organizations, nourished by the underground communist party, sprouted, grew within, and eventually colonized the official, syndicalist organization, ultimately creating an invisible independent labor organization within the visible corporativist state structure This invisible structure offered perhaps the first practical, representational experience within the Franco system and, according to Foweraker, prepared the workers for the transition to democracy "Just as the Francoist state succeeded, through the OSE [the syndicalist organization] in *coopting* many labor leaders, so the commissions were born and grew by *colonizing* the institutions of the OSE, and, in particular, its various representative committees at plant, provincial, and regional levels As this process continued the commissions progressively prepared the conditions for the transition to democracy by pushing back the boundaries of civil society and by making labor ready for its massive mobilization at the critical historical moment of the formal-constitutional transition" (p 107)

Howard Wiarda's article is the most provocative and piquant in the collection, and it could be possible that the Hispanicists who arranged the program of the conference may later have been sorry that they had invited him to attend Wiarda writes about the relationship between the newly democratic Spain and the reemerging democracies in Latin America and throws a pail of icy comments on Spanish pretensions and delusions of grandeur in regard to the former colonies toward which Spain still feels, oftentimes condescendingly, maternal and protective—after more than 150 years Many among the Spanish political elite are convinced that Spain should be offered to the Latin American nations as a model of renascent democracy, which nations in turn should emulate and welcome a special relationship between themselves and Spain as a counterweight to, if not a replacement of, the special relationship between the United States and Latin America. The relationship is often uncomfortable and sometimes painful but one to which Latin American nations have grown accustomed, and from which they draw great benefit in trade and investment, benefits Spain could not begin to replace

Wiarda views Spain's self-promotion as hubristic Equally hubristic is Spain's attempt to use its new membership in the EEC as the voice for Latin America in Europe, as if Latin Americans did not have their own voices, or as if they needed a duenna to monitor their behavior The subject matter of Wiarda's article is somewhat out of place among the other articles, but it is certainly thought provoking, as his work almost always is It would be great fun to know just how the Spanish participants at the conference reacted to his pungent comments

E Ramon Arango, *Louisiana State University*

Political Elites in Anglo-American Democracies Changes in Stable Regimes Edited by Harold D Clarke and Moshe M Czudnowski (DeKalb, IL Northern Illinois University Press, 1987 Pp x, 335)

This volume, the third in Northern Illinois University's *International Yearbook for Studies of Leaders and Leadership* series, focuses on elites in the stable Anglo-American democracies As in most such edited works, the contributions are a mixed bag, related to the overall theme of the book through the assumption that anything involving party leaders, legislators, prime ministers and cabinets, and top bureaucrats is an aspect of elite behavior The editors, Harold D Clarke and Moshe M Czudnowski describe the collection as a bit less heterogeneous than other collective efforts, and they seek to tie the selections together through an introductory essay They are not entirely successful in this attempt but in commenting at some length on the contribution by Peter Y Medding, they raise a number of provocative questions about regime stability and elite configurations

Of the twelve essays, four are theoretical and comparative, three deal with the United States, three with Great Britain, one with New Zealand, and one examines the British legacy and political leadership in the Commonwealth None of the selections are without merit, although as might be expected they vary a great deal in quality The best are those by Medding William L Miller, and Susan Webb Hammond

Medding gives a useful summary and some trenchant criticism of elite competition and elite consensus as models designed to answer problems in elite and democratic theories He develops an alternative model of elite consensus, with an approach that adds multidimensional elite and mass competition, and then applies his model to a brief analysis of Australian politics One looks forward to an elaboration of both the model and the Australian analysis Miller's essay treats the crisis in the British Labour Party's leadership as an example of "dealignment at the top In the course of his argument, he discusses changes in British political attitudes and the departure of the Gang of Four to form the Social Democratic Party He finds much of con-

tinued relevance in Michels's theories on party and oligarchy. This is an essay worth reading in conjunction with Medding's more theoretical discussion of political elites. Hammond looks at changes in recruitment of members of the House of Representatives through the election of candidates with prior service in the federal executive or, especially, on a congressional staff. She shows that staff experience has become an increasingly frequent route to election to the House, analyzes the likely reasons for the change, and points to fruitful areas for future research.

A number of the other essays have interesting observations or findings, though in some cases they cover ground that the authors have examined elsewhere or that has been surveyed in somewhat similar ways by other writers. Bruce E. Cain considers one of the clichés of British-American comparisons—the contrast between the constituency service of the congressman and the more limited "surgery" work of the M.P. He finds that constituency service does make a difference for the M.P.'s political career as the personal vote becomes more important in Britain, and he notes that legislators in both countries agree that constituency-related functions are more important than policymaking. Donald D. Searing's essay on political involvement and socialization in Britain provides useful empirical data to support the theory that the socializing effects of political involvement build support for the rules of the game and thus help safeguard political institutions.

Denis Kavanagh, writing on Margaret Thatcher as an example of the prime minister as mobilizer, contrasts her style with that of the prime minister as reconciler or fixer and considers how well the Iron Lady has carried out the various parts of her job. Although the essay may offer little new to those familiar with recent British prime ministers, it is a well-written description of Thatcher's political leadership. In a more theoretical and comparative vein, Brian Graetz and Ian McAllister pull together various strands of research on public evaluations of party leaders in the Anglo-American democracies. Elizabeth M. McLeay gives a comprehensive description of the process of cabinet selection in New Zealand and points to the impetus towards conformity existing in both the Labour and the National Parties despite their different ways of choosing cabinet ministers.

On the American side again, Burdett Loomis presents a good deal of valuable information on changes in political generations and the consequences for the members and for congressional policymaking of changes in opportunity structures and party seniority queues. The essay by Robert G. Brookshire and Dean F. Duncan III is an excellent historical analysis of the rise of congressional careerism and an examination of its consequences for the institution. Colin Campbell and Donald Naulls explore the roles of facilitator and policymaker as they are perceived and carried out by senior bureaucrats in the United States, Britain, and Canada.

The concluding essay by Jean Blondel is broadest in scope as he seeks to

assess the British legacy for political leadership throughout the Commonwealth He finds important differences between leaders in the Commonwealth and those in the rest of the world, but his attribution of these differences to the British inheritance needs more support than can be provided in a relatively brief essay (a criticism of the limitations of the format and not of Professor Blondel's treatment) He notes that the one widespread characteristic of Commonwealth members is that so many of them are island countries and suggests that this may be of some political importance, but fails to follow up on this intriguing observation

A review of an anthology must perforce be somewhat disjointed, and it is difficult to weave together the disparate strands of a collection The diversity of topics is at once a strength and a weakness of this book one is likely to be led into some new areas, but may also find that he or she is covering ground that has already been trodden An overall contribution of the volume is the realization, as the editors point out that in dealing with stable regimes one must consider change over fairly long time periods An obvious trend, not newly discovered by this collection but exemplified in many of its essays, is the continued Americanization of many aspects of political life in the Commonwealth democracies

Kenneth Miller *Rutgers University-Newark*

Presidents and Foreign Policy Making From FDR to Reagan By Cecil V Crabb, Jr and Kevin V Mulcahy (Baton Rouge LA Louisiana State University Press 1986 Pp 359 $35 50 cloth $15 95 paper)

Over a year before the Tower Commission found flaws in President Reagan's management style, Crabb and Mulcahy addressed the consequences for foreign policy of a disengaged president and badly coordinated advisers' (p 299) Based on an analysis of the early years, well before the Iran-Contra scandal broke, they correctly diagnosed a problem of "disarray in the decision-making process (p 299) Unfortunately for the authors this most significant example of disarray was revealed after the mid-1985 cutoff of their analysis Subsequent revelations about just how out of control the National Security Council (NSC) staff's involvement in making foreign policy had become serve only to strengthen Crabb and Mulcahy's conclusions They got it right intra-executive conflict is endemic in the foreign policy process reforms ' designed to eliminate or mitigate the problem have failed to do so and worse yet, such "remedial measures' as creation of the NSC have "become part of the problem" (p 307)

These conclusions are especially timely as scholars, commentators and policymakers focus, once again, on proposals to reform the foreign policy process Recommendations in *The Tower Commission Report* (1987) and

those forthcoming from the Iran-Contra congressional committees must be considered in light of previous fixes. This is the major lesson drawn by Crabb and Mulcahy. the process has been fixed before, by deliberate, structural reform, and by presidents determined to avoid the errors of their predecessors This study, which spans the entire postwar period, amply demonstrates the fallacies, risks, and unintended consequences of reform To this end, a useful part of this book is the survey of "postwar reorganization and reform" from the Hoover Commission through the Murphy Commission (pp 49–59). This section, plus the authors' recommendations for modifying the roles of the vice president and department of state, provide an analytical and historical context for considering Iran-Contra vintage reform proposals

Crabb and Mulcahy's study covers six administrations and their foreign policies. Each is categorized according to a typology of relations among the president, the secretary of state, and the NSC assistant Roosevelt, patriarchal pattern, Truman, classical, Eisenhower, personalistic, Johnson, consensual, Nixon, palace guard, and Reagan, anarchical pattern Some readers may be put off by labels in the typology A consensual pattern for Johnson-Rusk-Bundy/Rostow refers not, as the term implies, to a cooperative search for mutually acceptable options, but rather to the strain toward consensus and intolerance of dissent for which the Johnson administration is so well known Referring to the Nixon-Rogers-Kissinger pattern as "Palace Guard" is more satisfying and better captures the characteristics the authors seek to highlight This three-actor approach fosters longitudinal comparisons for each actor, as well as comparisons of the six composite patterns The authors do a very good job of integrating past and future parallels and contrasts without needlessly overburdening the reader Secretaries of defense are not included in the pattern summaries, but their roles and participation in intra-executive conflict are treated in the six-case analyses

Incorporating evidence from histories, the foreign policy and presidency literature, memoirs, biographies, and press reports, the authors survey each administration, its major policies and doctrines, personalities of the major actors, and institutional or procedural developments Much shorter assessments for intervening presidencies—Kennedy, Ford, and Carter—are also included The merits of this comprehensive approach are several Organizational structures and procedures and changes therein are analyzed in terms of individual characteristics and the doctrinal context The personalities of major participants are considered along with ideology, procedures, and specific policies. The interdependence of personality, organization, beliefs and process is emphasized throughout the book Obviously, policymakers who have been widely and intensively analyzed are treated in more detail than less-analyzed or less self-aggrandizing officials. This is an inescapable weakness for any policy study that deals with personality and interpersonal relations

Methodologically, the criteria Crabb and Mulcahy use to rank the influence of the three actors are sound. Anyone who has analyzed presidential leadership or has tried to measure a policymaker's influence is well aware of the pitfalls that making intra-executive and cross-administration comparisons entail. Crabb and Mulcahy use criteria that are grounded in the literature; they are self-conscious and judicious in applying these criteria to their cases and in making overall rankings.

Needless to say, the expert on one administration, actor, or issue will find small flaws and omissions in the six surveys. The description of the War Powers Resolution, for example, states that Congress can allow "a sixty-day extension of the hostilities" (p. 32) whereas the sixty-day period can only be extended for not more than thirty days. Concerning presidential compliance with this resolution (pp. 33–34), Crabb and Mulcahy cite fewer reports by President Ford to Congress compared to those usually counted, for example, by Pat M. Holt in *The War Powers Resolution: The Role of Congress in U.S. Armed Intervention*, 1978. Such a debatable point is of minor significance compared to the strengths of such a comprehensive study; its errors are few and infrequent. While Crabb and Mulcahy justify their selection of cases, this reader wished that they had done more with the Carter administration. It is treated briefly in the introduction to the Reagan-Haig pattern, but for a book focusing on disunity and disarray within the executive, the Carter years provide a much richer vein than is mined in this study.

While presenting little that is new or unusual about their six administrations, Crabb and Mulcahy provide a product of equal validity to new research: they integrate what we already know, but know only in segmented and often disjointed parts, into a broader whole. They combine assessments of personality and perception, institutional analysis, studies of organizational and policy process, and a survey of the content of postwar foreign policy. The result is a readable, well-organized, systematic survey of postwar executive and foreign policy. The scholarly function of using a general theme like intra-executive conflict to interpret existing research, including some of the authors' own, is a vital contribution to the progress of the discipline.

Margaret E. Scranton, *University of Arkansas at Little Rock*

Political Parties in Local Areas. Edited by William Crotty. (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1986. Pp. xi, 253. $27.95.)

The decline of the American party system, as evidenced by an eroding electoral base, loss of control of candidate selection, the shift from party to candidate-centered campaigns, and increasing competition from interest groups, has been the subject of much speculation and concern among political pundits and political scientists alike. Certainly much of the available in-

formation points to a weakening of national party systems. The authors of *Political Parties in Local Areas*, however, find abundant evidence of strong, viable, active local party organizations in five very different U.S. cities—Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and Nashville.

Hypothesizing that the urban culture with its variety of contexts may foster the development of local political parties quite different from those shaped by the forces affecting state and national party systems, the authors (William Crotty, Samuel Eldersveld, Anne H. Hopkins, Dwaine Marvick, Richard Murray, and Kent L. Tedin) set out to assess the value and relevance of urban political parties in today's setting, to evaluate empirically the contributions and activities of local parties, to establish a base for future research, and to see if urban parties, like state and national parties, are undergoing radical transformations and role changes (p. 160).

The cities examined by Crotty and his associates in these studies provide an excellent opportunity to examine urban parties in very different environments, ranging from the traditional, Democratic-dominated system in Nashville, to a system being transformed by the rising power of Republicans in Houston, to a competitive, rather ideologically oriented system in Los Angeles, to a system adapting to rapid changes in the electorate in Detroit, to the highly organized machine-based system in Chicago. The diversity of the environments makes all the more remarkable the numerous similarities found among the various systems.

In all five cities, the authors examined the characteristics and functions of the local party activists—usually people elected to positions such as precinct leader or county committee member. In all cases, the activists were predominantly people of relatively high socioeconomic status. They were largely college-educated, many were professionals, and most were married middle-aged males with families and very deep community roots. In other words, these were people with "the time and financial resources to afford politics, the information to understand it, and the skills to be useful" (p. 46).

One may wonder why the party activists in this study who are obviously relatively knowledgable and sophisticated (and, indeed, sometimes quite cynical) about the political process still find party work a rewarding and profitable way to spend their time. A partial answer may lie in the fact that these activists do not feel threatened by PAC activities in the campaigns studied and, except for the suburban Chicago Republicans (p. 179), are not involved with depersonalized high-tech campaign techniques such as polling and direct mail. In this setting, it may be that "old-style" activities continue to work, that activists feel efficacious and are willing to devote much time, energy, and money in support of their parties.

Most party activists, when asked about their motivations for being politically involved, listed the opportunity to influence public policy as their most important motivation, followed by a desire to fulfill one's obligation to one's

ımunity Very few listed such things as making business contacts as a major son for involvement, and even fewer saw their activity as a stepping-stone ıigher elected office Most were quite strong partisans, although large nbers (86% of Houston Republicans and 50% of Nashville Democrats, example) also stated that they felt no obligation to support candidates h whom they did not agree, and thus would consider splitting their tick- (p 75 and p 83) As might be expected, the most committed partisans ·e found in Chicago, where the city Democrats and the suburban Re-)licans are very strongly organized and 97% worked for the entire party et (p 185)

n all five cities, activists were involved in a wide range of political activi- such as voter registration, telephone canvassing, door-to-door campaign- , fund raising, and recruiting volunteers Again, the most intense activity urred in Chicago where 72% of the city Democrats reported spending y or more hours per week during election times on campaign activities 183) *Though less concentrated activity was reported in Nashville, for ex-* ple, the activists were still generally heavily involved (p 83)

)ne can, of course, raise minor methodological questions with this work ıut such things as data that is not exactly comparable from city to city or ·r time within a single city Overall however, the research is meticulously ıe and indeed provides a solid base for future examinations of urban ties

'hese studies obviously deal only with parties as organizations and do not lress issues of local party electorates or parties in government But the ılts of the five studies do, nevertheless, cast serious doubts on the apoca- tic view that American parties are in a state of near total collapse What authors find are local parties that "are active in critical areas of campaign- , that appear to be principal actors in the electoral process and t [show] no evidence of an atrophying of party activity or organiza- ı" (p 30)

Margaret Moody, *Auburn University at Montgomery*

'ging Peace The Challenge of Central America By Richard Fagen (New York, Basil Blackwell, 1987 Pp. 161 $7 95 paper)

'ging Peace has been published at a critical time Within the framework of Arias Plan, the leaders of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon- 'as, and Nicaragua have committed their nations to procedures which y hope will lead to peace But these same leaders recognize that their ›rts, alone, will not bring peace to Central America Any lasting peace will uire a change in United States policy In *Forging Peace*, Fagen not only ›lains why U S. policy must change, but also provides the core elements of

an alternative policy that would foster peace by eliminating the root causes of the current conflicts—poverty and injustice

The first crucial step in the development of an alternative policy is a re-evaluation of current policy which, as Fagen clearly demonstrates, "has been a disaster for the citizens of that war-torn region, and for the United States as well" (p 3) Basing policy upon a false premise that sees the cause of conflict as emanating from an external communist aggression that threatens hemispheric security, the United States has sought to eliminate the conflict by militarizing the region Since 1980, the Reagan administration has spent tens of billions of dollars, through overt and covert means, to provide the men, money, material, and training required to conduct the war Throughout the first chapter, Fagen demonstrates that this policy has not worked.

Rather than bringing peace to the region, current U S policy has only added to the carnage Close to 150,000 Central Americans have died as a direct consequence of the war (p 4) Promoting a military solution to the conflicts has not strengthened U S security, either Not only has the United States become the central player in an increasingly dangerous regional conflict, but it has done so in isolation and with condemnation European allies and Latin American democracies have denounced U S policy, and the World Court has found United States policy in violation of international law Within the United States the security of its own democracy was challenged when, in the pursuit of a military solution in Central America, officials in the Reagan administration found it necessary to bypass the legitimate governmental processes in Congress and consciously lie to both the Congress and the American people

In all aspects, the current policy has clearly been a disaster And, as Fagen convincingly argues, a military solution to the conflicts in Central America has not worked and cannot work precisely because it has failed to address the fundamental causes for the conflict In a few short but powerful pages the roots of the current crisis in Central America become clear as Fagen summarizes how, during the 1970s, "growth without equity, rising expectations, elite intransigence, and militarized repression" (p 22) led the impoverished majorities in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala to eschew nonviolence and violently attack the regimes that were killing them either slowly through hunger and abject poverty, or swiftly and brutally through military repression

The realities of the region are apparent Peace and security in Central America can only be achieved if the fighting stops *and* a comprehensive development emerges within just political and economic structures that ensure all people more equitable participation in and benefits from their society This is the challenge Fagen addresses. the formulation of an alternative U S policy that will forge lasting peace by promoting true development.

The components of such a policy are outlined and explained in chaps 5

and 6. Demilitarization of the region is essential Not only must the killing stop, but the resources wasted on attempts to impose a military solution must be diverted to productive tasks Demilitarization also must be a reciprocal process that removes "Central America from the East-West conflict, or at least from its military and geostrategic aspects" (p 37) Not only will reciprocal demilitarization enhance "short-term security throughout the region," but it is also a prerequisite for "equity-enhancing and stabilizing development—the ultimate guarantee of peace" (p 38)

Once the region is demilitarized, the "crucial development challenge" must begin· the task of "combin[ing] economic growth with more-equitable distribution of land, opportunities, and welfare" (p 46) Agrarian, industrial, and fiscal reforms will be necessary if the nations are to provide "for the delivery of basic goods and services to the majority of the population" and have the capacity to provide more than "an even-handed distribution of austerity" (p 51) A literate society must develop if the peoples of Central America are to become the subjects of policy formation rather than the objects of policy. Democracy, in its fullest sense of active participation as well as honest elections, is an essential component for all else to occur To ensure that this process is workable, regional cooperation and foreign assistance will be required

Here again, U S. policy must shift In addition to helping the region to demilitarize, the United States must foster development The nations are underdeveloped, devastated by the war, and debt ridden Reconstruction, let alone development, cannot occur without debt relief and large amounts of foreign assistance But where will the money come from? Fagen has an answer Divert the resources the United States would spend to continue an unworkable policy of militarization Working with estimates developed through Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA), Fagen states "$16 4 billion of additional foreign assistance would be needed by Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala from 1986 to 1992 simply to maintain zero per capita growth under conditions of continuing conflict Using the same starting point, but changing the assumption to a scenario of peace, (PACCA) estimates that $15 6 billion in foreign assistance would be needed over the same period for these four countries—*but the consequences for growth would be dramatically different*" (p 54)

Fagen, however, does not leave the reader with regional generalization or general policy prescriptions In the last two-thirds of the book, he examines the history of each country, explaining why conditions of poverty and injustice have led to violent conflict, and how the particulars of the alternative policy he proposes would forge a lasting regional peace that provides for and promotes regional security Each case study is addressed to those who are not experts in the region or its history, but draws upon authoritative sources who are. With reason and without rhetoric Fagen makes his case without

peace there can be no development, without development, there can be no peace Present U S policy will bring neither one Fagen presents a positive alternative

Margaret E Leahy, *California State University-Chico*

China Watch By John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1987 Pp 219 $20 00)

It is difficult to overestimate John King Fairbank's contributions to our understanding of China, contributions ranging over more than half a century, and including distinguished service in several roles historian of modern China, organizer and director of East Asian studies in the United States, trainer of more than one generation of American sinologists, and, not least, educator of the American public The work under review belongs in this last category It is an achievement in public education

The role of public educator is not merely a by-product of Fairbank's other scholarly endeavors He consciously adopted it From his experience as one of the lesser victims of McCarthyism's assault on those responsible for the "loss of China" came Fairbank's enduring resolve to educate the American people

China Watch is a collection of the most recent of Fairbank's public instruction efforts and his latest recommendations to America's China policy It contains twenty-six book reviews and five essays published over fifteen years, from February 1971 through May 1985, most in the *New York Review of Books* The pieces are organized around five broad topics, each with a short introduction fixing the historical context Many pieces were tailored to fit their new setting Some sections lack cohesion Part two ("Penetrating Mao's China") is the most well-knit, and parts two and four ("The Cultural Revolution") are of special interest to students of politics

The book is patterned after an earlier effort, *China Perceived Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (1974) The two works are identical in purpose and structure, and contain common themes Those familiar with Fairbank's views on such matters as the uniqueness of Chinese society and culture and the misperceptions which repeatedly misguide U S China policy will find little new in the present collection, except for fresh examples and metaphors Nonetheless, there is much in this slim volume that will appeal even to those familiar with Fairbank's work, especially if they share his fascination for the difference between Chinese and Americans, which he claims is "almost as fascinating as the difference between men and women" (pp. 95–96)

One major *China Watch* theme is misperception. From Fairbank's perspective, it appears that every effort to interpret China is surrounded by ob-

stacles One is ignorance "When we are unacquainted with a foreign culture, we seem condemned to understand it in light of our own" (p 86) In this circumstance misunderstanding is unavoidable, since conclusions drawn by analogy to the Western experience are inevitably false Even trained observers must be on guard against distortions resulting from their particular orientations. missionary, soldier, businessperson, or scholar Pitfalls awaiting outsiders trying to understand China are impossible to avoid, and this holds true even for the best China-watchers (pp 67–68)

Certain characteristics of Chinese society are more difficult for Americans to understand than others We seem to appreciate the nationalist ambitions of China's leaders, their desire to stand "tall and proud among the nations," says Fairbank, but we find it almost impossible to accept their commitment to the social revolution, to believe that they are serious about and dedicated to socialist goals (p 9) We paid a heavy price for failing to understand the Chinese revolution in the 1940s and may be setting the stage to pay again

Another topic given special attention is human rights The Chinese, we are reminded, are by custom and doctrine anti-individualist while at the same time, in the United States, human rights (defined in terms of individualism) has taken on the appearance of a new religion This perceptual mismatch will yield conflict The optimistic American response to the Chinese record on human rights is to anticipate progress on rights as a concomitant of economic development, believing, as commonly we do, that economic and political progress will advance China toward the American model, a conclusion which denies the importance of China's own experience and minimizes the depth of cultural contrast between China and America

A third Fairbank theme revisited in *China Watch* is the critical importance of history The past determines, for example, the character and style of leadership, including Chinese "readiness to accept a supreme personality" (p 87), which, at the least, encouraged the development of a cult of Mao Tse-tung, if it did not in fact make the Mao cult inevitable (p 105) An habitual cause for American policy failure in China is underestimating the extent to which the present depends on the past This viewpoint fixes heavy responsibility on the historian and belittles the contributions of others "There is more history behind politburo diatribes than is visible to the gimlet-eyed astigmatism of American political science" (p 110) Fairbank also specifies that social scientists' efforts to explain China following a comparative, developing-nations approach is inadequate

The argument for the paramount importance of history in understanding China is linked intimately to the argument for the uniqueness of China itself Not only is the Chinese revolution *sui generis*, as Fairbank states explicitly (p 108), but China itself is one of a kind and hence impossible to explain in terms of Western experience and values This position establishes Fairbank as a cultural relativist Ross Terrill, in *The China Difference A Portrait of*

Life Today inside the Country of One Billion (1979, p. 82), makes the point: "To Fairbank there are two ways to fit China into our own understanding of the world: as a latecomer to a universal process of modernization, or as a unique culture that has its own future as well as its own past," and Fairbank "is nearer to the second theory than to the first." Fairbank confirms Terrill's judgment: Chinese culture is "the most distinctive, separate, and ancient, the most self-sufficient, balanced, and massive, of any culture known to history" (p. 22).

In addition to these familiar themes, one quite provocative conclusion offered by Fairbank should be spotlighted, for it may stimulate research and debate on the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). It is the assertion that the Cultural Revolution was a *great* revolution, at least in terms of its size and short-term impact, requiring it to be ranked in importance beside the French (1789) and Russian (1917) revolutions (p. 144).

In conclusion, *China Watch* is vintage Fairbank, in this instance directed at nonspecialists. Best of all it contains, once more from the master, valuable lessons on the challenges and intrigues attending the effort to comprehend a people and society across a cultural gap.

C. Walter Clark, *Drake University*

Policy Design and the Politics of Implementation: The Case of Child Health Care in the American States. By Malcolm L. Goggin. (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1987. Pp. xv, 296. $29.95.)

Policy Design and the Politics of Implementation is an important contribution to both the policy process and implementation literatures, as well as an insightful account of two decades of initiatives in one child health care policy area. This book is destined to be compared with and judged by its contribution in advancing the knowledge gained since Pressman and Wildavsky's *Implementation* and Eugene Bardach's *The Implementation Game* seminal case studies. It is a path-breaking study which meets the challenge of comparison largely because Goggin builds upon what he calls "first generation" and "second generation" implementation studies to develop the theoretical and methodological seeds for a "third generation" implementation research agenda.

The first generation of implementation research was largely "single site case studies" which identified two principal sources of implementation failure: "the content of the policy itself, and the incapacities of the organizations and the people in the implementation system" (p. 16). Second generation studies "have rested on the observation that implementation is more successful in some cases than in others" and has "developed conceptual schemes that defined and measured implementation performance" (p. 19). Goggin's purpose, and the charge he passes to other third-generation scholars, is to

develop a "differentiated theory of implementation" (pp 21, 214), which takes into account variations in implementation success Such a theory can and should guide research on policy design (or redesign) to improve implementation success.

Despite its vast contribution to the implementation literature, this book's subtitle somewhat overstates its policy breadth Although some of the book's findings are more generally relevant to the study and design of "child health care in the American states," its focus is more limited. Child health policy, as reflected in one type of health policy, and as implemented in six states, is the lens through which implementation variability is viewed and analyzed The book is both a comparative and longitudinal study of the federal/state Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) Program (established to deliver early and periodic child health screening services for potentially disabling diseases, diagnosis, and treatment of detected disabilities to the 0 to 21-year-old Medicaid population), as implemented in California and five other states over a seventeen-year period (1967–1985)

The depth of Goggin's analysis is extensive Using a "building-block approach" (p 13) research design, Goggin proposes and tests a "candidate theory" of why and "how does implementation vary from setting to setting or year to year" (p 18) In so doing, Goggin moves from (1) a descriptive case study of EPSDT implementation in California, (2) a comparison of the implementation of EPSDT with the implementation of the state-initiated and funded Child Health and Disability Prevention (CHDP) Program (legislated as an effort to *redesign* California's EPSDT Program into compliance with federal implementation guidelines, EPSDT and CHDP "are now treated as a single program in California,' called CHDP [p 116]), to (3) descriptive and statistical analyses of the variability of EPSDT implementation in the five mid-South states of federal Region VI Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas Goggin applies process and variance implementation theories to the two California case studies, in order to build a prescriptive theory He analyzes why the implementation of EPSDT was so political and "fizzled" while CHDP "sparkled " The five comparative cases of EPSDT implementation, all having differing implementation styles and varying degrees of success, are utilized to test Goggin's 'differentiated theory" that implementation performance is a function of policy design

The critical policy design attributes which determine implementation style are "policy contents, organizational capacity, and personnel capacity (p 149) Goggin warns it is a "fatal" error to divorce policy design from its implementation (p. 56) such as occurred in EPSDT implementation in California According to Goggin, the American context or environment of implementation (i.e , political culture, federalism, pluralism interest group liberalism, capitalism, social and economic stratification) leads to systemic "patterned regularities," which are constants (p 48) that affect child health

policy implementation behaviors and capacities. These environmental features affect the *duration* of the initial start-up period of implementation and *modifications* in program content that occur during implementation One empirical indicator of successful implementation the author employs is program half-life, "the year in which the EPSDT program served 50% of eligible clients" (p. 169). Due to delayed implementation or program modifications, only two of the states of this study, Arkansas and Texas, had reached their half-lives by 1984

Goggin divides policy implementation into two stages. take-off—in which political and interpretive issues related to the ends of the policy are addressed, and capacity-building—concerned with operative decisions and administrative behaviors related to means Four implementation styles are derived based on a contingency table of two levels of policy modification and two levels of implementation duration (p 167) The five EPSDT comparative cases provide the raw data for this typology Implementation that is delayed and substantially modified is "political" compared to "administrative' implementation that is prompt and basically unmodified (p 115). The other two styles are politico-administrative and administrative-politico

This book is well written and impressively researched Goggin employs multiple data sources (interviews, speeches, agency memoranda, personal correspondence, public documents, and participant observation) and varied analytical approaches (frequency, contingency, and correlational analysis) to provide a study that captures the essence of implementation pitfalls, yet is perhaps the most methodologically rigorous implementation treatment to date There are also two highly informative appendices in which the author explicates his research design and his survey/interview instruments

Finally, this is one of only a few implementation studies that uses the state as the unit of analysis and reveals the role of certain interest groups (in this case the American Academy of Pediatrics) in administrative policymaking The book's biggest weakness is that it does not provide much guidance, other than by example, on how "third generation" scholars are to conduct more experimental and quasi-experimental studies of policy implementation *Policy Design and the Politics of Implementation* is highly recommended for graduate courses in policy implementation and for any student of child health care politics and the politics of implementation

Cheryl M Miller, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

John Locke's Liberalism By Ruth W Grant (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1987 Pp ix, 220 $24 95)

Ruth W Grant's analysis of John Locke's political philosophy exemplifies two recent trends in Locke scholarship (1) the rehabilitation of Locke from

earlier scholarship which regarded him as a sinister figure with a hidden agenda, and (2) the attempt to interrelate the epistemology of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* with the natural law theory of the *Two Treatises of Government*

Grant's book is not a refutation of earlier Locke scholarship, but it does take issue with various interpretations of Locke dating from the 1940s through the 1960s Grant does not believe that Locke's *Second Treatise* is a formula for unrestricted majority rule, as Willmoore Kendall and Leo Strauss did She does not believe that Locke had a hidden bourgeois capitalist agenda, as C B Macpherson does She also rejects the Straussian view that Locke was a Hobbesian or that Locke's political philosophy is an ode to selfishness Above all, she opposes the idea, also proposed by Strauss, that Locke engaged in "secret writing" to hide is real intentions Grant emphasizes Locke's belief that authors should make their views clear in order to avoid confusion and misinterpretation With the earlier literature in mind, she states that the "single most unusual claim" of her analysis is that Locke's work is a "coherent, orderly demonstration, carefully written" (p 9)

Recent Locke scholarship has tended toward this approach, though the earlier interpretations still have their defenders Locke scholars like John Dunn, James Tully, and Richard Ashcraft view Locke as a sincere thinker who wished to refute the Biblical absolutism of Sir Robert Filmer without embracing the secular absolutism of Thomas Hobbes In this effort the recent scholars indicate, Locke did not intend to establish a mindless democracy which ignored minority rights, nor a system of rights without duties nor an uncharitable bourgeois capitalist order

The new scholarship, however, has some problems of its own particularly regarding the relationship between Locke's epistemology and his political philosophy The *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* contains numerous doubts about the mind's ability to achieve certitude in several areas, especially religion and natural science The *Two Treatises of Government*, on the other hand, offers a very confident political theory based on a natural law morality that seems free of the epistemological reservations of the *Essay*

Grant resolves the apparent incompatibility of the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises* by claiming that morality and political theory were exempt from the doubts Locke raised about religious doctrines and natural science She accurately points to two of Locke's teachings in the *Essay* (1) mixed modes and relations, and (2) that moral principles are capable of demonstration

Grant reminds us that in the *Essay*, Locke draws a distinction between substances (e.g , bodies) and mixed modes, which are concepts about moral and other relationships (pp 16–17) Regarding substances, Locke is a nominalist who doubts that our names for substances can describe their "real essences," what Kant would later call the "thing in itself " Mixed modes do not involve this problem Since they are manufactured by the mind to express

abstract principles, we can know *both* their real and nominal essences Thus, moral concepts can be known with certainty

Grant then argues that these mixed modes are linked by logical demonstrations into valid moral rules and laws (pp. 20–21). Locke himself says this several times in the *Essay* Thus, Grant claims that our certain knowledge of mixed modes and the possibility of demonstrable morality provides the link between the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises*. The former makes possible the normative theory of the latter.

While this is a valid approach, I think that Grant's picture of Locke's moral certitude is a little too rosy While Locke endorses natural law morality in the *Essay*, his denial that moral laws are innately implanted in our minds is worded in language that approaches cultural relativism Locke also doubts that childhood indoctrination can be reversed by rational argument. He also claimed that human desires vary to the point where it is "vain" to inquire about the nature of the *summum bonum* From these and other remarks, one could get the impression that the normative theory implied by the *Essay* is more the theory of the *Letter Concerning Toleration* than that of the *Two Treatises of Government* Grant's valid remarks about mixed modes and demonstrable morality should be balanced against some of Locke's more timid epistemological statements

The remainder of the book is devoted to a very scholarly analysis of the *Second Treatise* The overall point of the analysis is that Locke's political goals were preservation *and* freedom (pp 65–66) This dual goal acquits Locke of being either a Hobbesian or a fanatical individualist From preservation, Locke deduces political obligation, from freedom, he delineates the limits of government's power

Grant's discussion of consent is most interesting While Locke says that government must be founded on free consent, consent is not retractable if government is performing its duties (p 114) Thus, a citizen might be required to risk his life in a war, even though this contradicts the self-preservation for which he joined the society (pp 132–33) People born into existing societies must give express (not tacit) consent to join when they "come of age", this seems to mean performing social obligations in return for receiving society's benefits (pp 124, 127–28)

Grant's lengthy analysis of Locke's theory of resistance warns that a severe blow to a state (e g , foreign conquest or extreme tyranny) could dissolve both society and government In the case of domestic tyranny, the people must move against the government before society, too, is destroyed (pp 146 150) This makes sense, but Grant does not quite resolve this argument with Locke's teaching that a long train of abuses is required before the people will revolt

In summary, *John Locke's Liberalism* is a significant contribution to the contemporary literature on Locke's political philosophy Grant has managed

o show how the *Two Treatises of Government* can be implied from the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, even if the analysis is epistemologically optimistic Her masterful analysis of the *Second Treatise* is, in my opinion, a great achievement in Locke scholarship

Robert F Cuervo, *St John's University*

The American Political Economy Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics in the United States By Douglas A Hibbs, Jr (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. xiii, 404 $35 00)

While considerable work predates it, many identify the publication of Tufte's *Political Control of the Economy* in 1978 as the essential starting point of the now burgeoning literature on political macroeconomics The excitement that greeted the work is understandable in retrospect It offered a coherent view of political macroeconomics by outlining and theoretically linking nearly all of the hypotheses later addressed in the literature and by highlighting their substantive implications As the literature developed, however it became increasingly complex and dense Indeed, it is now better characterized as several separate literatures, including those on economic voting and macro-policy manipulation Such a transition was inevitable and useful in terms of greater theoretical and methodological rigor Yet, something was lost as well As research on political macroeconomics came to be dominated by increasingly disparate journal articles, the unifying and substantively grounded perspective that was so characteristic of Tufte's work was muted

In many respects, Douglas Hibbs's *The American Political Economy* is an attempt to recapture the broad, synthetic quality of Tufte's work In this book, Hibbs attempts to integrate his many journal articles on the American political economy into a coherent view of the politics of macroeconomics The outlines of Hibbs's integration will be familiar to those who have followed his work, he remains the foremost proponent of the party cleavage model of political macroeconomics In Hibbs's view, parties represent class-based macroeconomic interests, with the Democratic party more likely to tolerate higher levels of inflation for somewhat lower levels of unemployment and the GOP the reverse Tracing this theme through the structure of public opinion, patterns of party affiliation, the policy action of elected officials, and the behavior of economic aggregates, he concludes that party control of the presidency is associated with a long-run difference of two percentage points in unemployment and six percentage points in real output

The party cleavage theme is ably developed throughout the book as Hibbs tours the major topics of political macroeconomics starting with three chapters on the fundamental problem the authoritative allocation of the consequences of unemployment and inflation in an economy that is progressively

less subject to the discipline of the market The next three chapters addre the demand for economic outcomes by focusing on public opinion on infl tion and unemployment and its relation to presidential support The dynar ics of public opinion and presidential support then are both examined in tl contexts of the 1980 and 1984 elections The final three chapters shift o attention to the political supply of economic outcomes by contrasting tl party cleavage and political business cycle models of political macroecono ics and examining the distributive consequences of the policies of the Reag administration

The major strengths of the book derive directly from Hibbs's effort to sy thesize more than a decade's worth of work on the political economy Firs by focusing on both supply and demand function, Hibbs reunites the mac policy and economic voting literatures While the link between them is a ways implicit, it needs to be made as explicit as possible, if macroeconom issues are to be viewed as endogenous to the political system Secon Hibbs's treatment of both of these issues is grounded on a substantial body rigorous theoretical and empirical inquiry. While he does not depart fro the basic models found in his earlier work, the analysis is fully updated a reworked using somewhat different methods The final strength of the bo is the strong substantive focus Hibbs is unrelenting in his linking of broad theoretical issues to the specific distributive consequences of the tax, spen ing, and macroeconomic choices of the Reagan administration

Unfortunately, several defects arise from the narrow base upon whi Hibbs tries to develop his broad interpretation of the now diverse politic macroeconomic literature Though the literature has grown vastly, he co structs his synthesis solely on the foundation of his own work The literatu is now dominated by many competing theoretical perspectives By focusi on single specifications of several key models, however, Hibbs simply i nores this conflict To illustrate with but one example, there is substanti disagreement in the literature over the relative importance of partisan a administration determinants of macro policy More often than not, diffe ences in empirical findings on this issue depend on small differences model specification By relying almost exclusively on single specifications models, Hibbs has missed an important opportunity fully to engage in the ongoing debates

This problem is further exacerbated by his apparent unwillingness to a dress his many critics Hibbs's work has attracted considerable critical co ment This should not be surprising, given its importance to the field I deed, large parts of the literature are organized around the propositions an findings developed in his research program Yet, one can find little eviden in *The American Political Economy* that these dialogues have ever tak place Hibbs has substantially revised and updated his own work, but not a manner designed to address the concerns of his critics. At best, thes issues are dismissed in inadequately developed notes on these controversie

In the end, *The American Political Economy* fails to provide the same kind of field-defining integration for the next decade's body of research as that provided by Tufte for the last decade. Instead, the book is better viewed as something narrower a strong summary and update of Hibbs's own research program Such a summary and updating is no doubt useful and worthy of attention At the same time, however, one cannot help but feel that an opportunity to do more—to shape the agenda for studying political macroeconomics for the next decade—was missed

David Lowery, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Crisis and Leviathan Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government By Robert Higgs (New York Oxford University Press, 1987 Pp 350)

Robert Higgs, the William E Simon Professor of Political Economy at Lafayette College, argues in this largely humorless book that the Great Depression and the two world wars brought on an accelerated abandonment of the free-market ideology and a corresponding acceptance of collectivist alternatives (p 260) He mourns this result throughout his quasi-historical analysis, hinting if not quite concluding in the penultimate chapter that this ideological change may be leading the United States toward "participatory fascism" (p 242)

Professor Higgs's initial assumption is that American government in the nineteenth century was "strong but limited Since the turn of the century, however, it has grown to suffuse every aspect of economic and social life" (p 4) He then proceeds to chastise his fellow economists for their mismeasurement of "Big Government," the essence of which, he says "is a wide scope of effective authority over economic decision-making" and not the easily quantified taxing, spending, and employment figures which merely derive from it (p 32)

The most interesting part of this book is in the early chapters where the author sets out his methodological and conceptual frameworks At the heart of these is that "Big Government" appeared in the United States because the ideological system that rejects it, faith in the free market, was left behind in the late nineteenth century In support of this he admirably dismisses the rational choice models of voting and economic behavior arguing instead that "people conduct their affairs in a dense fog of ignorance and uncertainty" (p 35) To guide their actions and substitute for knowledge people embrace an ideology "a somewhat coherent, rather comprehensive belief system about social relations" (p 37)

Higgs goes on to argue that ideology is itself something that people rationally can choose. Membership in a group which embraces a particular ideology provides the individual with an identity Such membership and the

active participation it entails is thus a collective good whose utility value can be as significant to the individual in his or her rational choices of action as that attached to the acquisition of things Participation in large-group political actions need not have attached to it the "stigma of irrationality" (p. 43) He thus agrees with the public choice theorists that people act rationally on their beliefs about their own self-interest His addition is that part of that self-interest is the identity acquired through group membership

"Big Government," these considerations are intended to demonstrate, was not imposed It was chosen on the basis of ideological commitments, which since 1900 have come increasingly to support and accept "Big Government" Empirically, Higgs's claims that he will analyze the words ("the rhetoric") of "elite opinion leaders" and the deeds of "elites and politically active masses" that accompanied the major crises of the twentieth century (principally though not exclusively the two world wars and the Great Depression) In so doing, he hopes to show that ideological forces "most likely to be decisive during crises" were crucial factors in the growth of "Big Government" in the United States (p 47).

Quite simply, Higgs does not deliver on this promise. He does not really analyze elite rhetoric to paint a portrait of dominant ideology, but relies instead on a limited selection of secondary accounts and after-the-fact autobiographies to provide ammunition and/or targets for his indignation at the abandonment of the Lockean creed Furthermore, his selective historical treatments and strident characterizations of the principal actors are sure to come under sharp attack

Crisis and Leviathan is one of a growing number of politico-economic histories that seek to explain why American government has gotten so large in size and cost and so pervasive in scope Like many of its companions, Higgs's work disapproves of this growth in government Higgs contributes a valuable perspective, only partially developed, that ideological change is an important factor in such historical phenomena. Perhaps he ought to have concentrated on an examination of the methodological question, because his treatment of history is little more than the retelling of a libertarian's nightmare Higgs's own ideology seems to have got the better of him

Gordon P Henderson, *Widener University*

Rousseau's Exemplary Life The Confessions as Political Philosophy By Christopher Kelly. (Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1987. Pp. xiv, 262 $29.95)

Two autobiographies, begun only years apart, appeared in the late eighteenth century One was Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*, the other Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions* Despite the important differences b

tween the accounts, both Franklin and Rousseau recorded their lives as magnificent projectiles Both were born in modest circumstances and became international figures, figures that in a way symbolized two great revolutions Each described how they had become "new men" in a worldly sense, and hence their autobiographies gave new meaning and form to traditional Christian confessional narratives Both men professed the superiority of their own self-constructed moralities (Franklin described his plan for "moral perfection" in part two of his autobiography, Rousseau his "morale sensitive" in Book IX of the *Confessions*) But both men admitted to theft and hustling and both men admitted to a compulsive womanizing, although Franklin discretely confesses to "intrigues" while Rousseau offers detailed accounts of all his affairs, including his discovery of the moral significance of Zulietta's asymmetrical anatomy

Perhaps most importantly, both autobiographers remained outsiders throughout their lives Franklin always emphasized the utility of appearances and Rousseau vividly described how at an early age he felt "outside himself " Allan Bloom's description of Rousseau fits Franklin as well "When dealing with others, [he] thinks only of himself, and on the other hand, in his understanding of himself, thinks only of others "

Franklin asserted that his life was "fit to be imitated " His autobiography is a narrative of the acquisition of material success, public service, and international celebrity It has its own complexities despite what detractors have said, but what kind of life had Rousseau hoped would be imitated in his *Confessions*? Burke complained that the *Confessions* outlined ' the worst of vices and the occasional mimic of them all " J L Huizinga a modern biographer, concluded similarly that Rousseau's autobiography is a ' hotchpotch of lyrical passages of evident sincerity and admirable artistry" sandwiched between "outpourings of equally evident malevolence, breast-beatings of gorilla-like absurdity and moral posturings of pitiful transparency very good in parts and appalling in the rest "

Not so, argues Christopher Kelly in *Rousseau's Exemplary Life* Through a careful, thorough, and sympathetic reading of Rousseau's works, Kelly persuasively amasses a body of evidence that suggests that the *Confessions* is a study of human nature in general and that it is a meticulously structured work designed to recommend a "new kind of exemplary life' for individuals born in corrupt society First he argues that Rousseau explored the form of the "moral fable" of which autobiography is an example as a method of conveying truths Drawing upon Rousseau's own comments on the *Confessions* as well as his observations on theater, history, and biography, and his plans for Emile, Kelly suggests that Rousseau believed that political life and the arena for moral fables were "coextensive "

Second, he examines those lives that Rousseau seemed most to have felt fit to be imitated. "Exemplary lives" are indirect forms of political teaching

in that as moral fable they inspire emulation without resorting to the presentation of abstract truths Rousseau's works are filled with references to exemplary lives including Brutus, Moses, Cicero, Solon, and Lycurgus, but Kelly contends, erring a bit toward exclusivity, that the most important were Cato, Socrates, and Jesus Each is praised in the most eloquent terms in many of Rousseau's works but each also is criticized, often very indirectly, as an exemplar whose influence is limited Socrates life illustrates the independence a philosopher can attain in the context of a corrupt society, but it also illustrates that such independence is achieved at the price of a version of *amour-propre* Cato's greatness lies in his example of how a patriot can redeem a society on the brink of corruption But Cato can only be emulated in circumstances in which citizenship is possible Founders are harsh in their policies, but Jesus created a revolution notable for its gentleness Yet despite the truths obtainable only through divinity, Christianity detaches individuals from the state even though it may make life in a corrupt society less vicious

Third, Kelly examines the *Confessions* itself as Rousseau's attempt to create an additional exemplary life Book I of the *Confessions* corresponds roughly to Books I–III of *Emile*, and Kelly contends that the beginning o Rousseau's autobiography is meant as a negative fable "While *Emile* give the natural psychology as it can develop in society, the *Confessions* gives a unnatural psychology of civilized corruption" (p 82) Emile is given *Robin son Crusoe* to read and even imagines that 'he is Robinson himself " Jea Jacques reads Plutarch, not a bad choice from Rousseau's perspective, b this does not excite his imagination in communal directions when that alte native is not available and, *tant pis*, the young Rousseau also reads nove Thus the "free and republican spirit' wars with "bizarre and romantic i tions of human life," and Rousseau loses the wholeness that Emile had p served for him Emile's punishments are carefully meted out, Jean-Jacqu imagination is confused by ill-conceived discipline, and he develops a zarre taste" for spanking at the age of eight that afflicts him for the re his life

Books II–IV involve Rousseau's descriptions of his travels and includ counts of his participation in a *ménage a trois* with Mme de Warens anc gardener and his philosophical-psychological reactions to an illness Kel fers to the goings on with Maman and company as Rousseau's discovery "unusual subpolitical community," one which Rousseau himself descril "a society possibly without another example on earth " The illness le the experience of another kind of wholeness In the face of death, Rou lives only in the present (much like the savage described in the *Secon course*) and finds escape from *amour-propre* Book VII includes Rou narrative of his arrival in Paris, a city of many dangers, pleasures, and tunities Rousseau's search for fame and fortune is quite similar in mai to Franklin's quests in Philadelphia and London, but for Rousseau the

of high society," the "sensuality of the dinners," "the glow of the spectacles," and "the fumes of vainglory" confuse and sadden him, at least so far as the *Confessions* is meant to be a moral fable. Public life in Paris then, argues Kelly, is another negative exemplar in Rousseau's life. On the road to Vincennes, Rousseau discovered his system and "saw another universe and became another man." Book IX recounts Rousseau's attempt to personally implement his discoveries by retreating to the countryside and forming another *ménage à trois* with Therese and Mme. le Vasseur. The *Confessions* does end badly with Rousseau's account of a conspiracy against him, and Kelly makes the implausible argument that Rousseau's paranoia was meant as a literary fiction.

Kelly completes one of his tasks successfully. He has established that the *Confessions* is a major contribution to political philosophy and that Rousseau meant this work to be read in part as a treatise on human nature. He even argues convincingly that Rousseau meant his life to be an exemplary one. But was it? Kelly argues in his concluding chapter that Rousseau's autobiography, in providing for "new perspectives about sincerity, the imagination, feelings, and individuality," improves upon the exemplary features of the lives of Jesus, Cato, and Socrates by showing that a turn away from heaven "need not be an abandonment of high aspirations in a quest for mere preservation or power" (p. 250). But does Rousseau's *Confessions* show this? Kelly admits that Rousseau's revelation on the road to Vincennes was only one of the "many universes" he claimed to have discovered in his life. In truth, there are too many conversions in Rousseau's account, too many discoveries and the communities that Rousseau does manage to construct along the way are more often than not pathetic replicas of the models he offers us in his directly philosophical works.

Yet the choice of an exemplary life is itself an arguable decision with high stakes, and one should not permit a disagreement with Kelly's assessment to be regarded as a general criticism of a fine work of interpretative political philosophy, especially if the historical choice available is only between Franklin and Rousseau.

Philip Abbott, *Wayne State University*

Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science of Politics. By John C. Koritansky. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 162. $17.50.)

John C. Koritansky's *Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science of Politics* attempts to discern the character of the "new science of politics" which Tocqueville set forth in his classic work *Democracy in America*. Koritansky's book has several virtues. It is clearly written, it presents a coherent account of the complicated structure of Tocqueville's argument and, most impor

tantly, it illuminates many parts of the book often ignored by Tocque scholars I especially liked Koritansky's interpretation of Tocqueville's v on the relations between the sexes, on the need for a strong executiv democracy as an antidote to majority tyranny, and on the positive valu war and commerce in inspiriting democratic citizens Koritansky also ar quite convincingly that Tocqueville's discussion of America's political constitutional arrangements was not intended to serve as a model for E pean statesmen, but rather to warn them against relying too much on A ica's example The success of these arrangements, he shows, was largely to America's unique geography and history

On the whole, though, Koritansky's book is disappointing The au treats the entire *Democracy* (more than 700 pages) in little more than pages. His work contains brief summaries of various parts of Tocquev argument which should have been omitted in favor of more in-depth ana of material directly related to his thesis His concluding chapter is espec sparse Although he promises to discuss the "value of reading Tocquevill day" (p 145), he does little more than briefly recapitulate points cov earlier Koritansky also fails to deal satisfactorily with the scholarly liter on Tocqueville While he discusses the important studies of *Democrac* Aron, Lively, Drescher, and Zetterbaum, he virtually ignores the signif work done on the book since 1967 This includes Lamberti's *Tocquevil les deux democraties* (1983), Manent's *Tocqueville et la nature de la d cratie* (1982), Schleifer's *The Making of Tocqueville's Democracy in Am* (1980), and a number of valuable journal articles

The main problem with Koritansky's book, though, lies in the thesis it Koritansky argues that Rousseau and, to a lesser extent Montesquieu, vided the theoretical framework for Tocqueville's analysis of democratic dom Koritansky's Tocqueville, following Rousseau, defined freedom as tive involvement in the general will" (p vii) He considered the chief ta democratic statesmanship to be preserving freedom from the despotic f unleashed by the equality of conditions This could best be done by pro ing a civil religion capable of inducing democratic men to transcend own self-interest In the end, however, Koritansky's Tocqueville consid the love of freedom to be an irrational passion which he was unable t tionally defend This disability prevented him from rendering final judg regarding whether democracy was profitable or harmful to mankind

Although Tocqueville was deeply influenced by Rousseau, as Korita points out, there are serious problems with trying to fit his analysis of dom too snugly into a Rousseauistic mold These problems emerge v Koritansky discusses Tocqueville's understanding of freedom in Ame Tocqueville linked America's political health in the 1830s to her Puritan gins. In doing so, he praised the Puritan definition as expressed by C Mather ("liberty for that only which is just and good"). Koritansky inter

Tocqueville's praise as endorsing Rousseau's version of freedom which stresses obedience to self-made law as opposed to Locke's version which is more oriented to private rights But the Puritan understanding of freedom presupposes a Christian frame of reference alien to Rousseau's thought, and Tocqueville does not seem to have tampered with it in describing it Nor could Rousseau have influenced the Puritans, who settled New England more than a hundred years before he wrote

Koritansky also assumes that freedom in Tocqueville's America remained essentially unchanged between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries Although some passages in *Democracy* support this interpretation, a careful reading of the work suggests that the foundation of American freedom shifted from Puritan piety to Lockean self-interest during this time and that Tocqueville approved of the change In a chapter which Koritansky slights, Tocqueville explicitly praised the American doctrine of "self-interest properly understood" as the "best suited of all philosophical theories to the wants of men in our time " He also defended private rights, a free press, the principle of representation, and other instruments of classical liberalism which remind one more of Locke than of Rousseau Most importantly, he described nineteenth century American Christianity as significantly compromised by the principle of self-interest While this compromise made American Christianity more of a civil religion than a transcendent faith, it was a civil religion with a Lockean rather than a Rousseauistic character

Finally, while Koritansky's observation that Tocqueville considered the love of freedom an irrational passion is correct, he does not prove that Tocqueville thought himself unable to defend it Much more analysis of this controversial point is needed Koritansky's assertion that Tocqueville withheld final judgment on the merits of democracy is also questionable At the end of *Democracy*, Tocqueville somewhat regretfully declared a preference for equality over inequality because of its greater justice and its greater contribution to the well-being of all To be persuasive, Koritansky must show why this was not Tocqueville's last word on the subject

In sum, Koritansky's book is worth reading for the many valuable insights he offers on *Democracy in America* It is not, however, the definitive work of Tocqueville's "new science of politics" the author leads us to expect

Sanford Kessler, *North Carolina State University*

The Political Dynamics of Japan By Jun-ichi Kyogoku Translated by Nobutaka Ike (Tokyo University of Tokyo Press, 1987 Distributed by Columbia University Press, NY Pp ix, 239 $24 50)

This is a translation, as well as a "revised abridged edition," of *Nihon No Seiji* (Japanese Politics), originally published in 1983 by Jun-ichi Kyogoku, pro-

fessor emeritus of Tokyo University's Law Faculty, who now teaches at Chiba University, Japan. Students of comparative government as well as specialists in Japanese politics will find the book of interest. Those convinced of the existence of a distinctive Japanese mystique in group activity, whether business or politics, are particularly likely to praise it. As translator, Nobutaka Ike, emeritus professor at Stanford University, was able to consult closely with Kyogoku in selecting those parts of the original text thought to be most likely of interest to foreign readers. This selectivity itself raises questions (unfortunately not answered in these pages) about both the author's and translator's assumptions regarding non-Japanese perceptions of things Japanese, including political behavior.

There is a plethora of writings on Japanese government by Western writers. But works by Japanese scholars on their nation's own politics "are conspicuous by their absence," as the translator puts it (p. vii). Kyogoku's own approach—at least as represented here—has tended to move in the direction of the web of cultural values, psychological nuances, and ritualized interpersonal sentiments, where only the anthropologically trained political scientist is likely to feel at home. The result is that Kyogoku's volume has become a curious mix of conventional, sometimes pedestrian, description and occasional analysis of formal political institutions and processes (e.g., chaps. 1 and 5), with provocative and revealing insights into social norms and cultural value systems that are said to influence Japanese politics (e.g., chaps. 2 and 3 with their accounts of "three codes" and various "paradigms" that are alleged to shape many aspects—not just political—of Japanese conduct). Kyogoku asserts that the "formal legal institutions provide a kind of framework for politics," but the real political dynamics are reflected in the less formal "although partly institutionalized, common understandings that are shared by those who participate in the political process" (p. 37).

It is here, precisely, that the main problem with the book lies. If one is to assume that all Japanese, and particularly professional politicians, are cognizant and at least to some degree observant of the range of the "codes" and "paradigms," let alone the other ideological norms presented in these pages, then one wonders if the Japanese governmental process today has not acquired such an arcane and ritualized complexity so as to doom those in it, as well as would-be participants, to inevitable and horrifying gaffes or to fear-ridden paralysis.

To observe, balance, or neutralize, as the case may be, what Kyogoku describes as "the collectivity code," or the "possessed individual's code," or the "equality code," all in conjunction with what he calls the "sin and punishment paradigm," the "paradigm on decision making based on atmosphere," and the "submission and resistance paradigm" (pp. 38–62) seems at one and the same time to aggrandize a few rules of common sense of ordinary social and political relationships, and to lift them through a scholastic exercise to

the level of a presumably uniquely Japanese mystique There also is raised the practical question of how so allegedly circumscribed an existence can lead to any social and political relationships and, therefore, to any functioning polity at all Since such a functioning Japanese policy exists, one asks if all these "codes" and "paradigms" of conduct are a helpful explanation of it

What is strikingly apparent from Kyogoku's emphasis on the importance of behavioral "codes" and "paradigms" and from their application in the sections on "role taking" (role playing?), "action," or "the plot" is a remarkable ethnocentricity It is as if certain key rules of political and social conduct, if only by implication, must somehow be understood as distinctively Japanese For example, on p 59, and *passim*, reference is made to *tatemae* or "form," the technique that those in authority employ to win compliance from their subordinates by stressing the public interest" or larger picture of a policy or decision Subordinates, who might wish to counter such *tatemae* (for reasons never fully explained by Kyogoku) have recourse to what is termed *honne*, in order to "express spontaneity, decision and responsibility" (p 59) In short, an appeal is made to ideas not in accord with official policy Now, the conflict between authoritative invocation of the higher good versus risky contrary personal judgment is about as old and universal as the phenomenon of the first humans living in groups Kyogoku offers a Japanese version of this theme, complete with appropriate idiomatic expressions But what is so noteworthy about the theme itself?

In his preface, translator Nobutaka Ike notes that Kyogoku's description of the ideological-political significance of the terms *seiron* and *zokuron* "is something new " And like the *tatemae-honne* antithesis, one wonders again what, exactly, is so new" about it *Seiron* seems a more subtle way by which those in authority seek to checkmate in advance any argument that can be made through the use of styles of *honne* *Seiron*, therefore, are *tatemae*-type arguments but made "from the side and from below" (p 135), or they reveal a new authoritative approach, but by entering "from outside the traditional faith" (p 142) Thus, an individual is daunted into compliance with an appeal that needs to be made in terms of a kind of new higher truth, "based on the vision of order " In other words, one cajoles a possibly reluctant or resistant follower by introducing into the argument an even more exalted or an even more unassailable position But the follower then may have recourse to an old political debater's technique enlarging "the area under discussion by changing its contents and premises (p 155) This type of rejoinder is called *zokuron*, and it may stress the impracticality of what the *seiron* advocates Now all this may be interesting to Japanese ritual, but as a technique of political counterpoint, it seems rather universal The whole *seiron-zokuron* interplay reminds this reviewer of what one seasoned Connecticut politician of his acquaintance likes to call "tunneling under the power structure "

Nothing in the preceding should be taken to mean that Kyogoku's concep-

tualizing about his country's political processes is not worth close reading. One wonders, though, how representative of contemporary Japanese thought the author's views are. Is Kyogoku's "battlefield paradigm" (p. 77), for example, with its premise of inescapably tough-minded aggressiveness, based on the proposition that the outside world is a jungle, where manners and courtesy don't matter, and in which even politics is to be viewed as essentially a "war model" (p. 175)? Is that "paradigm" still in conformity with Japanese public opinion, or with the nation's own practitioners of management or personal counseling—including those in the headquarters of the major political parties?

Kyogoku presents his "role" concepts and "paradigms" as something given. There is a brief list of suggested "further readings" in English at the end of the book. But Japanese references to his assertions, or to possibly contrary or more nuanced views, are altogether missing in the text. Lacking, too, is a more systematic application of his conceptual framework to Japanese government as a whole. As translator Nobutaka Ike notes, it isn't just the judiciary that hardly is mentioned in these pages. Absent as well is any reference to the function of local government, and to the "street level" of Japanese political dynamics. Bureaucracy receives short shrift too, getting brief attention in relation to political parties (pp. 115–18), and, again, in ten pages or so toward the close of the book. The section on the media is too brief, and, worse, it is filled with platitudes. "The newspapers, of course, carry advertising," or "When a [television] program attracts few viewers, it is quickly dropped because its sponsors feel that their commercials are not very effective" (p. 198). Yet, it would have been precisely in some of these areas where the author might have been able to elucidate his analysis by demonstrating, say, just how his "sin and punishment paradigm" or the *seiron-zokuron* interplay works out in practice. While Kyogoku does seek to demonstrate his conceptual approach in policy generalities in the discussion following each "role" or "paradigm," it is the weight of accumulated case histories, or even passing references to them, that would have given solidity to these pages.

As it is, however, the book leaves the impression of being essentially a selective, political-anthropological approach to some Japanese variants of normative political behavior, among them primarily leader-follower, and compliance-resistance mechanisms and processes. These have been mixed with brief, and not particularly distinctive, descriptive sections on political parties, the role of parliament, LDP politics, and so on. Given the paucity of writings by Japanese academicians on the government processes of their own nation, Kyogoku's book is valuable as an example of what one distinguished Japanese scholar thinks Japanese political science is. What broader, probative significance Kyogoku's conceptual analysis may or may not have for "political science" as a discipline is another matter.

Justus M. van der Kroef, *University of Bridgeport, Connecticut*

Placing Parties in American Politics By David R Mayhew (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1986 Pp 395)

Mayhew's book is a thorough, detailed analysis of American party structure at the local level This structural approach provides a refreshing contrast to other cross-state research which primarily analyzes election returns in order to determine the degree of party competition Mayhew successfully argues that too much emphasis has been placed on party competition As he states (p 5), "Did close electoral competition thirty years ago between party slates of organization politicians in say, New Jersey, have the same meaning and effects as close races between loose assortments of politicians who shared party labels in Oregon?"

Part I of the book is devoted to a state-by-state documentation of the city- or county-level party structure, as of the late 1960s He gives particular emphasis to traditional patronage organizations and their effect on the nominating process Each state is assigned a summary score to measure the overall incidence and prominence of such organizations These state sketches constitute the bulk of Mayhew's book Unfortunately some of these descriptions are quite brief and reveal little useful information beyond what would be helpful to a reader completely unfamiliar with a state or region One might also question the desirability of a snapshot view of each state's party structure in the late 1960s Mayhew states that data availability made focusing on the 1960s practical Even though he obviously had to rely on secondary sources for much of this material, more recent works would have given these state-by-state descriptions a less dated flavor The death of Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, the demographic shifts that contributed to the rise of Republicanism in the border and deep South, and the effect of media reliance on traditional functions of the parties are only a few of the more recent developments that threaten to make these state sketches more historical than is perhaps necessary

Part II of the book is devoted to an explanation of why state party structures emerged as they did in the late 1960s and this section of the book is more insightful In his chapter on historical background, Mayhew discusses the origin or existence of traditional party organizations, emphasizing that "geographically rooted traditions" are the major determinant of party structure He goes on to argue that this local culture appears capable of surviving even sweeping political and economic changes that occur at the national level Mayhew also discusses the implications of having or not having traditional party organizations, specifically with regard to the autonomy of party organizations and subsequent government activity His concluding chapter on the assault of Progressive reforms and the New Deal coalition is most perceptive, and here Mayhew is able to cite recent developments that have affected local party structures

Mayhew's book is quite an ambitious task, the data section is perhaps best

used selectively, for it is primarily descriptive in nature The footnotes in this first section, however, do provide a most useful review of the literature The strength of Mayhew's book lies in the later analytical sections where he is able to bring together different approaches and explanations in a thoughtful discussion of why these particular varieties of party structure emerged as they did in American states

Priscilla L Southwell, *University of Oregon*

Born Arming Development and Military Power in New States By A F Mullins, Jr (Stanford, CA Stanford University Press, 1987 Pp xvi, 147 $28 50)

This work explores the interesting question of how the growth of economic power and military forces are related to one another in development The author has taken a sample of 46 "new states" (those which achieved independence in the period 1957 through 1981 and which had a population over 500,000) and has gathered data on their military and other history, including year-by-year military force levels and GNP The resulting data set is of much potential interest because of the nature and variety of states included, the lengthy time period studied, and the historical detail to back up the statistical analyses

Unfortunately, those statistical analyses are flawed in several important respects Space permits only a brief discussion of the major difficulties The work compares the relationship between military force levels and GNP against what is termed "the European model,' a feedback model in which military forces produce economic growth and economic growth stimulates increases in force levels A minor problem of nomenclature is the work's failure to establish that the model was in fact characteristic of the European experience (This failure is acknowledged on p 109 but has been forgotten by p 111) A more serious problem is the lack of any statistical procedure (e g , structural modeling) by which a feedback process can be distinguished from a one-way process The problem is particularly acute when one is observing two growth processes (military forces and GNP) In addition, the possibility is never considered that all correlations between them are spurious, arising from the simultaneous growth of the variables against time

The correlational analyses are also flawed by the autocorrelation of errors that plagues time-series data of this nature This especially undercuts the various claims of "linearity" (e g , p 47) that are based on high correlations (In any case, claims of linearity should be tested by F-tests on the coefficient of a nonlinear variable, not by the size of the linear correlation coefficient)

Because data appears for each state after independence, the sample size grows over time This produces a bias in the analysis toward states achieving

independence earlier Some analyses (e g , figures 3 1–3 9) apparently do not control for the growing number of states in the group The author acknowledges this problem (p. 49) but does not fully appreciate its implications

The author's concern with military "force balance" leads him to use the Guttman-Lingoes Conjoint Measurement III (CM-III) program to construct summary military capability scores out of data on fourteen separate weapons categories Several problems arise, some from the concept of balance itself, and others from the use of CM-III

First, the author's discussion of force balance is cast in terms of strongly positive correlations among the various weapons categories over time Unfortunately, high correlations can be produced by any arbitrary mixture of force components as long as they grow together Contrariwise, the growth of a country's military forces from an initial, militarily unbalanced mix of weapons to a final, militarily balanced mix, would produce low or even negative inter-component correlations

Second, the author says (p 59) that the index of military capability should take into account both the quantity of weapons and their balance An algorithm like CM-III cannot take balance into account, however, because the determination of balance is a military judgment, not a statistical one, and CM-III obviously makes no military judgments A proper determination of balance should result in different ideal weapons mixes for different countries But the only way the index construction method incorporates balance is through measuring the degree to which each country's mix of forces resembles other countries' mixes To take one example, it is apparent that land-locked states have no need for a navy, but the author, worried about the algorithmic "penalties" for them this absence might produce, goes so far as to generate hypothetical naval force levels for them in order to produce an aggregate force index The author asserts (p 61) that producing hypothetical scores "is preferable by far to the alternative of ignoring landlocked status and simply giving those states a zero score in naval categories," but he does not explain why and apparently has not attempted the alternative

Third, because the index construction method is based on monotone transformations of the different force categories it should tend to restrict the range of variation among the different countries by shrinking the outliers Such a shrinking would undercut the work's analysis (pp 82ff) of the GNP-military capability regression slopes, because the restriction in variation of the independent variable (the military capability index) would make the slopes depend on the absolute size of the dependent variable (GNP) Larger states would then have greater GNP levels, show proportionately greater GNP variation, and have this greater variation divided by the restricted variation in capability levels This would produce the result that larger states would have higher slopes

The above concerns are consistent with the correlation figures given in

table 5.3, which show that the slopes are associated most closely with the standard deviation of the country's GNP, with the GNP growth rate (growth in absolute rather than percentage terms, presumably, although this is never stated), and with the size of the GNP itself. From the other direction, the slopes are much less correlated with the capability measures (standard deviation of capability, capability itself, and so on). So the conclusion to chap. 5 that "those states that did best in GNP growth appear to have paid less attention to military capability than others" seems likely to be only an artifact of the methods used. (This difficulty would also affect the conclusions on pp. 105–6, in chap. 6.) The author needs to validate the CM-III method to address this objection.

There are three final, severe problems in *Born Arming*. First, the restriction of the sample to "new states" makes it consist mostly (33/46) of African states. The African emphasis is increased by the fact that the average African state in the sample received its independence over three years earlier than the average non-African state. The sample would have been of greater theoretical interest if it had been taken from all developing countries, not just "new states."

Second, the author wishes to study "development" but only studies GNP. The Tower of Babel in development studies would be reduced if analysts of GNP, particularly GNP not adjusted for population, would call it GNP rather than development.

Third, no citation is given to the source of the GNP data, so it is not clear if the data are comparable across country-years. In addition, the GNP data do not appear to be in constant dollars.

The theoretical focus of this book and the data gathered by the author are of interest, and the two will undoubtedly be combined eventually in some meritorious way. Currently, however, the work must overcome many methodological weaknesses.

Stephen Chilton, *University of Minnesota-Duluth*

Media and Momentum: The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics. Edited by Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby. (Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987. Pp. iv, 200. $20.00 cloth, $11.95 paper.)

Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby's compendium of essays constitutes the most timely and complete analysis available of the crucial New Hampshire presidential primary. It is no small compliment to assert that this volume is devoid of the generally uneven quality, writing, and scope of chapters that frequently characterizes edited books. Each chapter is well written, original and contributes significantly to the overall project. The organization and development of the chapters, beginning with William G. Mayer's history of the

w Hampshire primary and concluding with Peter Yu's data in the appen- profiling this primary state, are logical and sound

The introductory essay by Orren and Polsby nicely sets the stage for the ,uing chapters They briefly review the well-documented and significant inges of the past two decades in our presidential selection process While ie of this material is new to readers of Polsby's earlier study, *Conse- ences of Party Reform*, it is appropriately reviewed at the outset of this ok to place in perspective the importance of the New Hampshire primary the presidential election

William G Mayer's opening chapter reviews and assesses the history and nificance of the New Hampshire primary From this chapter we learn how litical momentum is created by journalistic reporting of New Hampshire's mary results While the New Hampshire primary electorate chooses only to 3% of each party's national convention delegates, the amount and kind press coverage generated by this first primary greatly influences candi- es' successes in the subsequent nomination contests Given political jour- ists' propensity for focusing on the "horse-race" aspect of campaigns, an ly victory or "better-than-expected" showing can suddenly propel a can- late to the front stage of national news coverage The national news media, her than simply reporting campaign events, become crucial components the nominating process Mayer correctly notes that journalists create ex- ctations of candidate performances for the first primary and that quite en the candidates' electoral prospects are measured against these vague rnalistic expectations Two New Hampshire primary winners, Lyndon inson (1968) and Edmund Muskie (1972) suffered politically from not ing as well as journalists expected Mayer's analysis is good yet he could ve added to current knowledge by identifying the sources of these pundits newhat vague standards

Mayer assesses that an early primary state of such importance needs a od media system " to inform the electorate and assist voters in making po- cally wise choices While Mayer never makes clear what a "good media tem" is, he does want to convince the reader that New Hampshire does t have one He singles out the state's most dominant journalistic voice the *nchester Union Leader*, for rather strong criticism In fact, Mayer takes unneeded detour from an otherwise excellent chapter to discredit the er for its "intemperance," "incivility," instinct for the jugular," and "its ique combination of venom, vituperation, and smear " These criticisms of *Union Leader* do not add substantively to the text since David Moore's pter focuses on that newspaper's importance to the New Hampshire pri- ry Moore's contribution is to exhibit how politically powerful this news ly is in New Hampshire He does so by showing how the *Union Leader* ssibly saved Ronald Reagan's faltering campaign in 1980 by vigorously illenging George Bush's candidacy

Mayer concludes with suggestions for reforming the nomination process to limit New Hampshire's extraordinary influence on presidential campaigns His suggestions, which include raising individual contribution limits, adding a significant period of time for reflection between the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primaries, and calling for media restraint in interpreting the early contest results, are very sound given the problems he identifies earlier with our current nomination process

The ensuing chapters build logically upon Mayer's fine beginning William C Adams assesses national news coverage of New Hampshire's primaries as a proportion of national nomination campaign coverage Adams's data illustrates a point raised by Mayer that in relationship to all the presidential primaries, New Hampshire dominates national news coverage Adams is disturbed that journalists treat the New Hampshire race not simply as one of many nomination contests, but as "a definitive test which means disqualification for those candidates who do not pass with high marks" (p 51) Like Mayer, Adams concludes that New Hampshire's disproportionate influence on presidential selection need not be considered inevitable Adams also argues that journalists should practice more restraint than they have exhibited in the past when they assess the significance of the results of New Hampshire's primaries

Emmett H Buell, Jr. compares and contrasts the 1984 New Hampshire primary news coverage provided by two "local" publications (the *Manchester Union Leader* and the *Concord Monitor*) and three "cosmopolitan publications (the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Boston Globe*) Buell found that all five publications focused on "horse-race" coverage Yet the coverage of the campaign by "locals" and "cosmopolitans" cannot be characterized as uniform The news dailies of national scope provided disproportionate publicity to the front-runner candidates The New Hampshire news dailies gave more emphasis than the cosmopolitans to "minor candidates " In fact, "local newspapers in this connection are as likely to single out dark horses as front runners" (p 97) Buell correctly notes that most academic literature on "media effects" emphasizes national news coverage Undoubtedly, New Hampshire voters are influenced by local news dailies, and the differences between local and national dailies must be acknowledged

Henry E Brady and Richard Johnston's concluding chapter addresses the question of whether the current primary system "distorts" the presidential selection process Brady and Johnston assess whether available media information educates voters "about the character, purposes, electability, and leadership abilities of candidates" (p 133) Based upon UPI wire and CBS news coverage data, they conclude that voters do learn crucial information about candidates from the media Unfortunately, citizens learn slowly from the media about important candidate attributes, and they learn quickly about candidate viability

Orren and Polsby are commended for collecting these impressive papers for *Media and Momentum* This book makes an original and timely contribution to understanding the media's influence on electoral politics *Media and Momentum* should appeal primarily to students of the media and presidential elections Beyond this audience, I believe this book should be read carefully by political scientists, public leaders, and journalists concerned about the proper functioning of our presidential nomination process

Mark J Rozell, *Mary Washington College*

American States of Mind Political Beliefs and Behavior Among Private and Public Workers By Craig Reinarman (New Haven Yale University Press, 1987 Pp x, 263)

This book is about the tension between newly revived laissez-faire doctrines and welfare state liberalism following Reagans victory in 1980 The author takes this to be a crisis point in our political development, and he seeks to connect the issue of state versus market to major social theories and characteristic modes of experience and thought at the mass level Focus is provided by posing two questions Is the welfare state being defended? What is the prevailing sense of what can be legitimate about the state in its relation to the market? Reinarman wishes to examine such issues from the standpoint of an assumed relationship between work and class position on the one hand and political beliefs and behavior on the other

In pursuance of these interests, the author conducted field research in a profit-oriented private business and a welfare office in the same California town After getting a sense of the terrain he selected six workers in each setting for in-depth interviews The private sector workers are truck drivers for the "National Delivery Corporation" (NDC) who are well paid and have considerable independence in working their routes However, productivity incentives and incessant pressures to "break standard" enforce a hectic work pace Public sector interviewees are eligibility or social caseworkers (roughly matched with the NDC group for sex, year of birth and ethnicity) at "City Social Services" (CSS) The pay is a good deal less than at NDC and the workers experience the red tape, irrationality, and human suffering of welfare work as a continuous frustration However this group tends to be more highly educated than the other, and the work occasionally offers the satisfaction that one has helped people in need

The NDC people are "blue-collar middle class" and the CSS workers are "white-collar working class " In both milieus, interviewees are upscale from the working-class men Robert Lane interviewed in the late 1950s and described in his book *Political Ideology* Perhaps SES and period differences combine to explain why Reinarman's subjects seem more articulate and po-

litically aware than Lane's. Most of Lane's subjects believed that they lived in a just world where power was shared. These workers, on the other hand, uphold democratic values but believe that a corporate plutocracy holds the real power (p 154)

Reinarman provides valuable insight into two contrasting work situations and is successful in giving us "thick description" as well as useful reflection on what it all means CSS workers are less ambivalent ideologically and more clearly to the left, although social welfare programs find support in both settings Differences between the two groups are partly explained by potentials for discussion and "politicality," atomized work versus common office space with shared work breaks, greater opportunities at CSS for regular and overt opposition to management, and contrasting relationships between work and "life " Although he considers class to be quite significant, Reinarman maintains that "form of work" is more important than class categories in accounting for individual beliefs

At least ten of the twelve interviewees would appear to hold inconsistent attitudes if one only had the survey data available However, it turns out that various forms of rationality account for almost all of the inconsistencies "Each time I probed for an explanation of what appeared to be a contrary opinion, my respondents provided me with one, and in each instance their reasoning produced not only the appearance of consistency but a critical explication of their meaning" (p 217)

In both settings, interviewees express feelings of "populist delegitimation" and say, in effect, that they seek "a democracy of work " The latter concept includes ordinary notions of workplace democracy, but extends also to an emphasis on *quality* of work in terms of the worker's skill, and service to client or customer We learn that "all these workers were certain, though not at all in immodest ways, that they knew how to do their jobs better than those who directed them, that they could solve problems better than 'management' without increasing costs or decreasing productivity" (p 230) "Populist delegitimation" applies to both the state and the market Interviewees already know how corporate elites get what they want in the political realm, even though they have not read any G William Domhoff Few oppose efforts of the state to make up for market failure, but nearly all agree that these efforts are rarely successful Market institutions are no better Only one of the twelve believes the market to be legitimate regardless of social consequences, and most have doubts about the ability of markets to serve human needs better than any other imaginable arrangement

Some aspects of the analysis are more effective than others Economic factors in politics may be somewhat overemphasized, and cultural changes and conflicts deriving from the events of the 1960s may have a greater impact than Reinarman apparently believes Nine of the interviewees were young adults in 1968, and the author himself belongs to the same cohort I could

elp wondering if there was some generational affinity in the choice of iewees In the final chapter Reinarman delivers some roundhouse ies at voter surveys, marketing of political candidates, direct-mail fund-g, and two-party elections These are tempting targets, but the attack technology of electoral politics is not very convincing in the context of esearch design

spite of such reservations, the book broadened my understanding of nporary political thinking, and I have been able to use it to advantage ures and classroom discussions Reinarman brings an impressive body rature to bear on the questions he has posed, and he is admirably de-ied to get to the bottom of things The book is high priority reading for al scientists interested in public opinion, political sociology, and the nship between government and business in the United States

John A Crittenden, *Indiana State University*

d Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology By ichael Rogin (Berkeley University of California Press, 1987 Pp 366 25 00)

el Rogin seeks to move the study of American political demonology pression away from emphasizing extremists and toward the study of nstruction and use of demonic enemies in the political mainstream He his through studying political culture as represented in movies, state- of politicians and journalists, and the political stance of pluralism His ation is psychological and he asserts the interpenetration of the per-and the political in dominant political symbols (p xix)

in argues there is a countersubversive tradition at the center of Ameri-litics By "political demonology" and countersubversive tradition" he "the creation of monsters as a continuing feature of American politics inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes" (p xiii) lition, "The countersubversive needs monsters to give shape to his ies and to permit him to indulge his forbidden desires Demonization the countersubversive, in the name of battling the subversive, to imi-is enemy" (p xiii)

al political initiatives, for example, are interpreted as signs of alien where dissenters are stigmatized as social pariahs The demonological on, Rogin argues, confuses "Communism with terrorism and political ition with crime, drugs, and disease" (p xv) This characterization it easier to practice political repression and to avoid any personal re-ibility for the consequences (whether it be the slaughter of American is or ruining people's careers in Hollywood by implicating them in a iunist plot)

Rogin analyzes Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan and their differing degrees of mixing themselves with the body politic. Rogin sees the imperial presidency as the climax of American countersubversion wherein presidents "personified America by absorbing the members of the body politic into their own mystic bodies and leading the regenerated American nation against its alien, demonic foes" (p. xviii).

The construction of stereotypes of blacks, American Indians, Communists, and independent women is explained as a tool with which to attack and repress these people, yet also, to identify with the culturally forbidden behaviors projected onto them. "Cold war ideology . . . ," Rogin explains, "required America simultaneously to imitate practices attributed to the enemy and to demonize the subversive in order to defend against the resulting breakdown of difference" (p. 39). This is especially clear in three chapters on popular movies and their political messages. In the American mass culture classic *The Birth of a Nation*, the movies of the Cold War period, and Ronald Reagan's movies, the rationalizations for repression provided by demonology are displayed.

In one chapter Rogin analyzes Ronald Reagan's personality through his Hollywood movie roles. Rogin writes, "Unlike any other president since the end of World War II, Reagan has succeeded in making himself the benign center of America and placing malignancies outside our borders. . . . Evil, he reassures us, is out there in visible spots that can be identified and removed. It is not (any longer) in us or in me. In personalizing the political Reagan stands squarely within the countersubversive tradition" (p. xvii). Rogin argues that Reagan's personality was shaped by the movie roles he played. As evidence he cites the numerous instances where Reagan as president relies on lines and plots from his movies to explain his behavior. "Doing it for the Gipper," and "where's the rest of me?" (the title of Reagan's autobiography) are well-known examples of Reagan's reliance on his earlier roles. Rogin, though, underemphasizes the roles other influences in Reagan's life probably had in shaping his personality. Surely, movie roles alone did not make Reagan, and perhaps it was Reagan who chose the roles based on his personality to begin with. In addition, Reagan's movies were shaped by the politics and culture of the period and were not written in order to fill in what was lacking in Reagan's personality. Nevertheless, it is fascinating to see compiled in one chapter the influence of these movies on President Reagan. As Rogin asks, "Are we now being ruled by the fantasies of a 1940s countersubversive B movie?" (p. 3)

The actor in him, Rogin explains, allows Reagan a degree of detachment from the consequences of his actions because "movies allowed Reagan to dis own aggression and to enact it at the same time" (p. 10). In the late 1940s and early 1950s in Hollywood, for example, "Reagan helped orchestrate a blacklist whose existence he denied" (p. 31).

Reagan is not an aberration in American culture, though, according to

i. Implicated also is "the mundane language of interest group liber-" (p. xvii) which rationalizes popular disenfranchisement and turns po- weakness into strength (p xvii). Pluralist theory, for example, reifies roup and links the interest of the group with its ruling elite, thus isolat- nd stigmatizing dissenters He shows through studying the American ration of Labor that in group politics, "When objective conditions radi- sections of the masses the bureaucratic leadership becomes a both on the development of radical consciousness and on the creation w organizational structures" (p 132)

e strength of Rogin's study is his description of the suppression of inter- it the prepolitical stage He explains, "The tyranny of public opinion, leology of domesticity, and the creation of the asylum all limited politi- ssent in scarcely measurable ways Insofar as they succeeded, they did mply intimidate political opposition already formed but inhibited the ation of new opposition" (pp 58–59) This is achieved, in part, by "the ormation of potentially political discontent into problems of personal p 59) and social adjustment

other strength of Rogin's analyses is his linkage of racial class and sex- emonology to political repression and construction of a large, intrusive This imitates the enemy it was designed to destroy Reagan, for ex- , is a ' statist " To combat Communist penetration from 1940s Holly- to 1980s Washington, Reagan has supported a militarized surveillance ' (p 30) Furthermore, in his study of *The Birth of a Nation*, he explic- nks the racism and the sexism in the film Rogin's analysis of the inter- ig, confounding effects of various forms of repression (here racism and n) is commendable

e connecting thread throughout *Ronald Reagan the Movie*, according gin, is that the descriptions of political demonology ranging from Ameri- ndians to Communists to independent women "can be read together as iealogy for the Reagan administration' (p xvii) This is a challenging nt of American symbol building and enemy construction It is well re- hed and argued In places, though, it is over-argued, placing too much ausal link from small facts and coincidences to larger political and psy- gical motives

Laura R Wolver, *University of South Carolina*

'gger on Being and Acting From Principles to Anarchy By Reiner churmann (Bloomington, IN Indiana University Press, 1987 Pp ix 06 $37 50 cloth)

ook is excellent It strips away many of the misconceptions that have red around the name Heidegger It dismantles the slogan and restores inker Much of this work appears in the footnotes where brief comments

on the secondary literature abound. The reader gets an intense guided tour of the positions developed over the last thirty-odd years. Second, the volume makes very good sense of thought that many find incomprehensible. For example, the discussion of the fourfold (section 19 and footnotes) and of the problem of the will (section 41) are good.

There are some problems with Schurmann's interpretation. First, he insists on reading Heidegger backward, the later texts determining the earlier ones. But are the later ones not children of the earlier ones? A better approach comes from Heidegger's notion of the Same, which brings up a way to express nonidentical, nonnumerical unity. (One can think of specific and generic unity in Aristotle as a source.) This way of reading would let many of the later texts speak more forcefully, especially on the notion of the ringing of silence.

Second, Schurmann reintroduces many terms Heidegger avoided or rejected—term, category, and transcendental (p. 21). The effects of this maneuver are startling. Heidegger attempted to create an elaborate set of technical terms in *Sein und Zeit*, but his later work abandons many of them in favor of ordinary words used in unusual ways. The reintroduction of these traditional terms makes Heidegger comprehensible at the cost of making him read like Kant. This drive to clarity also appears when Schurmann sorts out things very well, too well. For example, world and earth, inextricably bound up with one another in Heidegger, become the clearly separable obverse and reverse in Schurmann (pp. 36–37). Politics coincidentally becomes the manifest order. Is politics so manifest, so available to all? Is there no concealment in politics?

Finally, the use of "anti-humanistic" to describe Heidegger's position is objectionable. To be sure, Heidegger does criticize humanism in his "Letter on Humanism," but he does so to replace it with another humanism. He desires to place man within the fourfold, to let man be man, mortal man. For only in this way can we see ourselves as human beings and pursue a politics that holds open the possibility of a better life for all.

This book comes close to being "a must read," but it must be carefully read in conjunction with Heidegger's works.

Jan Patrick Lee, *Johns Hopkins University*

Why Presidents Succeed: A Political Psychology of Leadership. By Dean Keith Simonton. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. 292. $22.50.)

In the era of the "personal president" (Lowi, 1986), the dynamics of presidential leadership continue to demand the attention of political psychologists. The most popular and influential works, such as Burns (*Leadership*, 1978) and Barber (*The Presidential Character*, 1977), have used historical

materials and individual case studies to develop qualitative insights about the characteristics of successful presidents Now, from a different corner of the discipline, comes a work which challenges that approach and proposes a quantitatively based theory of presidential leadership

According to Dean Keith Simonton empirical work in the social sciences is the key to developing more reliable generalizations about presidential behavior Simonton bemoans the "equivocations" of qualitative analysis, and seeks instead to "support accurate and secure predictions" with "mathematically forthright assertions" (p 5) His view, boldly stated, is that such predictions and assertions are already possible "I will show how we can predict almost without error the victor in the presidential general election (chapter 2), explain over two-thirds of the fluctuations in the president's approval rating during the course of his administration (chapter 3), anticipate at least half of the variation in certain aspects of an incumbent's legislative performance (chapter 4), and account for over three-fourths of the president's ultimate standing with posterity (chapter 5)" (pp 5–6)

Support for these claims is marshalled by pulling together in a single volume quantitative studies from social psychology, public opinion, political science, sociology, presidential studies, and other disciplines A personality, developmental, and social psychologist at the University of California at Davis, Simonton believes that "sufficient empirical work has been completed to permit some response, albeit preliminary, to the persistent question of the relative impact of person and context in the realization of political leadership" (p 10)

As the impressive eighteen-page bibliography at the book's end suggests, Simonton has set about his task with thoroughness and single-mindedness His major contribution is to give clearer definition to a scattered and fragmented literature, and to do so in terms that are accessible to both social scientists and the interested public

Simonton's dependent variable is presidential success, which he operationalizes by selecting four "criteria of presidential adequacy" (p 2) electoral success, popularity in the polls, administration performance, and historical greatness In chapters devoted to each of these four criteria, Simonton reviews the literature to assess which variables best predict presidential success, and what those predictors tell us about the relative significance of individual traits and situational variables The chapter on electoral success, for example, reviews studies on presidential primaries, general elections, and reelection campaigns, and looks at variables such as running mates, acceptance speeches, age, height, campaign rhetoric, birth order of candidate, incumbency, zeitgeist effects, and compatibility with voters' attitudes He concludes that "the bulk of the literature suggests that the personal traits of a presidential candidate carry rather less weight than the context of a political campaign for the presidency" (p. 73)

In the final chapter, Simonton summarizes the empirical findings and con-

used selectively, for it is primarily descriptive in nature. The footnotes in this first section, however, do provide a most useful review of the literature. The strength of Mayhew's book lies in the later analytical sections where he is able to bring together different approaches and explanations in a thoughtful discussion of why these particular varieties of party structure emerged as they did in American states.

Priscilla L. Southwell, *University of Oregon*

Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States. By A. F. Mullins, Jr. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987. Pp. xvi, 147. $28.50.)

This work explores the interesting question of how the growth of economic power and military forces are related to one another in development. The author has taken a sample of 46 "new states" (those which achieved independence in the period 1957 through 1981 and which had a population over 500,000) and has gathered data on their military and other history, including year-by-year military force levels and GNP. The resulting data set is of much potential interest because of the nature and variety of states included, the lengthy time period studied, and the historical detail to back up the statistical analyses.

Unfortunately, those statistical analyses are flawed in several important respects. Space permits only a brief discussion of the major difficulties. The work compares the relationship between military force levels and GNP against what is termed "the European model," a feedback model in which military forces produce economic growth and economic growth stimulates increases in force levels. A minor problem of nomenclature is the work's failure to establish that the model was in fact characteristic of the European experience. (This failure is acknowledged on p. 109 but has been forgotten by p. 111.) A more serious problem is the lack of any statistical procedure (e.g., structural modeling) by which a feedback process can be distinguished from a one-way process. The problem is particularly acute when one is observing two growth processes (military forces and GNP). In addition, the possibility is never considered that all correlations between them are spurious, arising from the simultaneous growth of the variables against time.

The correlational analyses are also flawed by the autocorrelation of errors that plagues time-series data of this nature. This especially undercuts the various claims of "linearity" (e.g., p. 47) that are based on high correlations. (In any case, claims of linearity should be tested by F-tests on the coefficient of a nonlinear variable, not by the size of the linear correlation coefficient.)

Because data appears for each state after independence, the sample size grows over time. This produces a bias in the analysis toward states achieving

independence earlier Some analyses (e g , figures 3 1–3 9) apparently do not control for the growing number of states in the group The author acknowledges this problem (p 49) but does not fully appreciate its implications

The author's concern with military "force balance" leads him to use the Guttman-Lingoes Conjoint Measurement III (CM-III) program to construct summary military capability scores out of data on fourteen separate weapons categories Several problems arise, some from the concept of balance itself, and others from the use of CM-III

First, the author's discussion of force balance is cast in terms of strongly positive correlations among the various weapons categories over time Unfortunately, high correlations can be produced by any arbitrary mixture of force components as long as they grow together Contrariwise, the growth of a country's military forces from an initial, militarily unbalanced mix of weapons to a final, militarily balanced mix, would produce low or even negative inter-component correlations

Second, the author says (p 59) that the index of military capability should take into account both the quantity of weapons and their balance An algorithm like CM-III cannot take balance into account, however because the determination of balance is a military judgment not a statistical one, and CM-III obviously makes no military judgments A proper determination of balance should result in different ideal weapons mixes for different countries But the only way the index construction method incorporates balance is through measuring the degree to which each country's mix of forces resembles other countries' mixes To take one example, it is apparent that land-locked states have no need for a navy, but the author worried about the algorithmic "penalties" for them this absence might produce goes so far as to generate hypothetical naval force levels for them in order to produce an aggregate force index The author asserts (p 61) that producing hypothetical scores "is preferable by far to the alternative of ignoring landlocked status and simply giving those states a zero score in naval categories" but he does not explain why and apparently has not attempted the alternative

Third, because the index construction method is based on monotone transformations of the different force categories it should tend to restrict the range of variation among the different countries by shrinking the outliers Such a shrinking would undercut the work's analysis (pp 82ff) of the GNP-military capability regression slopes, because the restriction in variation of the independent variable (the military capability index) would make the slopes depend on the absolute size of the dependent variable (GNP) Larger states would then have greater GNP levels, show proportionately greater GNP variation, and have this greater variation divided by the restricted variation in capability levels This would produce the result that larger states would have higher slopes

The above concerns are consistent with the correlation figures given in

table 5.3, which show that the slopes are associated most closely with the standard deviation of the country's GNP, with the GNP growth rate (growth in absolute rather than percentage terms, presumably, although this is never stated), and with the size of the GNP itself From the other direction, the slopes are much less correlated with the capability measures (standard deviation of capability, capability itself, and so on) So the conclusion to chap. 5 that "those states that did best in GNP growth appear to have paid less attention to military capability than others" seems likely to be only an artifact of the methods used. (This difficulty would also affect the conclusions on pp 105–6, in chap 6) The author needs to validate the CM-III method to address this objection

There are three final, severe problems in *Born Arming* First, the restriction of the sample to "new states" makes it consist mostly (33/46) of African states The African emphasis is increased by the fact that the average African state in the sample received its independence over three years earlier than the average non-African state The sample would have been of greater theoretical interest if it had been taken from all developing countries, not just "new states "

Second, the author wishes to study "development' but only studies GNP The Tower of Babel in development studies would be reduced if analysts of GNP, particularly GNP not adjusted for population, would call it GNP rather than development

Third, no citation is given to the source of the GNP data, so it is not clear if the data are comparable across country-years In addition, the GNP data do not appear to be in constant dollars

The theoretical focus of this book and the data gathered by the author are of interest, and the two will undoubtedly be combined eventually in some meritorious way Currently, however, the work must overcome many methodological weaknesses

Stephen Chilton, *University of Minnesota-Duluth*

Media and Momentum The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics Edited by Gary R Orren and Nelson W Polsby (Chatham House Publishers, Inc , 1987 Pp iv, 200 $20 00 cloth, $11 95 paper)

Gary R Orren and Nelson W Polsby's compendium of essays constitutes the most timely and complete analysis available of the crucial New Hampshire presidential primary It is no small compliment to assert that this volume is devoid of the generally uneven quality, writing, and scope of chapters that frequently characterizes edited books. Each chapter is well written, original and contributes significantly to the overall project. The organization and development of the chapters, beginning with William G Mayer's history of the

New Hampshire primary and concluding with Peter Yu's data in the appendix profiling this primary state, are logical and sound

The introductory essay by Orren and Polsby nicely sets the stage for the ensuing chapters They briefly review the well-documented and significant changes of the past two decades in our presidential selection process While none of this material is new to readers of Polsby's earlier study, *Consequences of Party Reform*, it is appropriately reviewed at the outset of this book to place in perspective the importance of the New Hampshire primary to the presidential election

William G Mayer's opening chapter reviews and assesses the history and significance of the New Hampshire primary From this chapter we learn how political momentum is created by journalistic reporting of New Hampshire's primary results While the New Hampshire primary electorate chooses only 2% to 3% of each party's national convention delegates, the amount and kind of press coverage generated by this first primary greatly influences candidates' successes in the subsequent nomination contests Given political journalists' propensity for focusing on the "horse-race" aspect of campaigns, an early victory or "better-than-expected" showing can suddenly propel a candidate to the front stage of national news coverage The national news media rather than simply reporting campaign events become crucial components of the nominating process Mayer correctly notes that journalists create expectations of candidate performances for the first primary and that quite often the candidates' electoral prospects are measured against these vague journalistic expectations Two New Hampshire primary winners, Lyndon Johnson (1968) and Edmund Muskie (1972) suffered politically from not doing as well as journalists expected Mayer's analysis is good, yet he could have added to current knowledge by identifying the sources of these pundits somewhat vague standards

Mayer assesses that an early primary state of such importance needs a "good media system" to inform the electorate and assist voters in making politically wise choices While Mayer never makes clear what a "good media system" is, he does want to convince the reader that New Hampshire does not have one He singles out the state's most dominant journalistic voice the *Manchester Union Leader*, for rather strong criticism In fact Mayer takes an unneeded detour from an otherwise excellent chapter to discredit the paper for its "intemperance," "incivility instinct for the jugular and its unique combination of venom, vituperation and smear These criticisms of the *Union Leader* do not add substantively to the text since David Moore's chapter focuses on that newspaper's importance to the New Hampshire primary Moore's contribution is to exhibit how politically powerful this news daily is in New Hampshire He does so by showing how the *Union Leader* possibly saved Ronald Reagan's faltering campaign in 1980 by vigorously challenging George Bush's candidacy

Mayer concludes with suggestions for reforming the nomination process limit New Hampshire's extraordinary influence on presidential campaign His suggestions, which include raising individual contribution limits, addi a significant period of time for reflection between the Iowa caucuses a New Hampshire primaries, and calling for media restraint in interpret the early contest results, are very sound given the problems he identifi earlier with our current nomination process

The ensuing chapters build logically upon Mayer's fine beginning W liam C Adams assesses national news coverage of New Hampshire's prin ries as a proportion of national nomination campaign coverage. Adams's d illustrates a point raised by Mayer that in relationship to all the president primaries, New Hampshire dominates national news coverage Adams is d turbed that journalists treat the New Hampshire race not simply as one many nomination contests, but as "a definitive test which means disqualifi tion for those candidates who do not pass with high marks" (p 51) L Mayer, Adams concludes that New Hampshire's disproportionate influen on presidential selection need not be considered inevitable Adams also gues that journalists should practice more restraint than they have exhibit in the past when they assess the significance of the results of New Ham shire's primaries

Emmett H Buell, Jr compares and contrasts the 1984 New Hampsh primary news coverage provided by two "local" publications (the *Ma chester Union Leader* and the *Concord Monitor*) and three "cosmopolita publications (the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Bost Globe*) Buell found that all five publications focused on "horse-race" cov age Yet the coverage of the campaign by "locals" and cosmopolitans" ca not be characterized as uniform The news dailies of national scope provid disproportionate publicity to the front-runner candidates The New Ham shire news dailies gave more emphasis than the cosmopolitans to "minor ca didates " In fact, "local newspapers in this connection are as likely to sing out dark horses as front runners" (p 97) Buell correctly notes that most ac demic literature on "media effects" emphasizes national news coverage U doubtedly, New Hampshire voters are influenced by local news dailies, a the differences between local and national dailies must be acknowledged

Henry E Brady and Richard Johnston's concluding chapter addresses t question of whether the current primary system "distorts" the president selection process Brady and Johnston assess whether available media in mation educates voters "about the character, purposes, electability, a leadership abilities of candidates" (p 133) Based upon UPI wire and C news coverage data, they conclude that voters do learn crucial informat about candidates from the media. Unfortunately, citizens learn slowly fr the media about important candidate attributes, and they learn quick about candidate viability

Orren and Polsby are commended for collecting these impressive papers for *Media and Momentum* This book makes an original and timely contribution to understanding the media's influence on electoral politics *Media and Momentum* should appeal primarily to students of the media and presidential elections Beyond this audience, I believe this book should be read carefully by political scientists, public leaders, and journalists concerned about the proper functioning of our presidential nomination process

Mark J Rozell, *Mary Washington College*

American States of Mind Political Beliefs and Behavior Among Private and Public Workers By Craig Reinarman (New Haven Yale University Press, 1987 Pp x, 263)

This book is about the tension between newly revived laissez-faire doctrines and welfare state liberalism following Reagan's victory in 1980 The author takes this to be a crisis point in our political development, and he seeks to connect the issue of state versus market to major social theories and characteristic modes of experience and thought at the mass level Focus is provided by posing two questions Is the welfare state being defended? What is the prevailing sense of what can be legitimate about the state in its relation to the market? Reinarman wishes to examine such issues from the standpoint of an assumed relationship between work and class position on the one hand and political beliefs and behavior on the other

In pursuance of these interests, the author conducted field research in a profit-oriented private business and a welfare office in the same California town After getting a sense of the terrain he selected six workers in each setting for in-depth interviews The private sector workers are truck drivers for the "National Delivery Corporation" (NDC) who are well paid and have considerable independence in working their routes However productivity incentives and incessant pressures to "break standard" enforce a hectic work pace Public sector interviewees are eligibility or social caseworkers (roughly matched with the NDC group for sex, year of birth and ethnicity) at "City Social Services" (CSS) The pay is a good deal less than at NDC and the workers experience the red tape, irrationality and human suffering of welfare work as a continuous frustration However, this group tends to be more highly educated than the other, and the work occasionally offers the satisfaction that one has helped people in need

The NDC people are "blue-collar middle class" and the CSS workers are "white-collar working class" In both milieus, interviewees are upscale from the working-class men Robert Lane interviewed in the late 1950s and described in his book *Political Ideology* Perhaps SES and period differences combine to explain why Reinarman's subjects seem more articulate and po-

litically aware than Lane's. Most of Lane's subjects believed that they lived i a just world where power was shared. These workers, on the other hand uphold democratic values but believe that a corporate plutocracy holds th real power (p. 154).

Reinarman provides valuable insight into two contrasting work situation and is successful in giving us "thick description" as well as useful reflectio on what it all means. CSS workers are less ambivalent ideologically and mor clearly to the left, although social welfare programs find support in both set tings. Differences between the two groups are partly explained by potential for discussion and "politicality," atomized work versus common office spac with shared work breaks, greater opportunities at CSS for regular and over opposition to management, and contrasting relationships between work an "life." Although he considers class to be quite significant, Reinarman main tains that "form of work" is more important than class categories in account ing for individual beliefs.

At least ten of the twelve interviewees would appear to hold inconsisten attitudes if one only had the survey data available. However, it turns out tha various forms of rationality account for almost all of the inconsistencies "Each time I probed for an explanation of what appeared to be a contrar opinion, my respondents provided me with one, and in each instance the reasoning produced not only the appearance of consistency ... but a critica explication of their meaning" (p. 217).

In both settings, interviewees express feelings of 'populist delegitimation and say, in effect, that they seek "a democracy of work." The latter concep includes ordinary notions of workplace democracy, but extends also to a emphasis on *quality* of work in terms of the worker's skill, and service t client or customer. We learn that "all these workers were certain, though no at all in immodest ways, that they knew how to do their jobs better tha those who directed them, that they could solve problems better than 'man agement' without increasing costs or decreasing productivity" (p. 230). "Populist delegitimation" applies to both the state and the market. Inter viewees already know how corporate elites get what they want in the politi cal realm, even though they have not read any G. William Domhoff. Fe oppose efforts of the state to make up for market failure, but nearly all agre that these efforts are rarely successful. Market institutions are no better Only one of the twelve believes the market to be legitimate regardless o social consequences, and most have doubts about the ability of markets t serve human needs better than any other imaginable arrangement.

Some aspects of the analysis are more effective than others. Economic fac tors in politics may be somewhat overemphasized, and cultural changes an conflicts deriving from the events of the 1960s may have a greater impac than Reinarman apparently believes. Nine of the interviewees were youn adults in 1968, and the author himself belongs to the same cohort. I coul

not help wondering if there was some generational affinity in the choice of interviewees. In the final chapter Reinarman delivers some roundhouse punches at voter surveys, marketing of political candidates, direct-mail fund-raising, and two-party elections. These are tempting targets, but the attack on the technology of electoral politics is not very convincing in the context of this research design.

In spite of such reservations, the book broadened my understanding of contemporary political thinking, and I have been able to use it to advantage in lectures and classroom discussions. Reinarman brings an impressive body of literature to bear on the questions he has posed, and he is admirably determined to get to the bottom of things. The book is high priority reading for political scientists interested in public opinion, political sociology, and the relationship between government and business in the United States.

John A. Crittenden, *Indiana State University*

Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology. By Michael Rogin. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Pp. 366. $25.00.)

Michael Rogin seeks to move the study of American political demonology and repression away from emphasizing extremists and toward the study of the construction and use of demonic enemies in the political mainstream. He does this through studying political culture as represented in movies, statements of politicians and journalists, and the political stance of pluralism. His orientation is psychological and he asserts "the interpenetration of the personal and the political in dominant political symbols" (p. xiv).

Rogin argues there is a countersubversive tradition at the center of American politics. By "political demonology" and "countersubversive tradition" he means "the creation of monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes" (p. xiii). In addition, "The countersubversive needs monsters to give shape to his anxieties and to permit him to indulge his forbidden desires. Demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name of battling the subversive, to imitate his enemy" (p. xiii).

Local political initiatives, for example, are interpreted as signs of alien power where dissenters are stigmatized as social pariahs. The demonological tradition, Rogin argues, confuses "Communism with terrorism and political opposition with crime, drugs, and disease" (p. xv). This characterization makes it easier to practice political repression and to avoid any personal responsibility for the consequences (whether it be the slaughter of American Indians or ruining people's careers in Hollywood by implicating them in a Communist plot).

Rogin analyzes Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan and their differing degrees of mixing themselves with the body politic. Rogin sees the imperial presidency as the climax of American countersubversion wherein presidents "personified America by absorbing the members of the body politic into their own mystic bodies and leading the regenerated American nation against its alien, demonic foes" (p. xviii).

The construction of stereotypes of blacks, American Indians, Communists, and independent women is explained as a tool with which to attack and repress these people, yet also, to identify with the culturally forbidden behaviors projected onto them. "Cold war ideology . . . ," Rogin explains, "required America simultaneously to imitate practices attributed to the enemy and to demonize the subversive in order to defend against the resulting breakdown of difference" (p. 39). This is especially clear in three chapters on popular movies and their political messages. In the American mass culture classic *The Birth of a Nation*, the movies of the Cold War period, and Ronald Reagan's movies, the rationalizations for repression provided by demonology are displayed.

In one chapter Rogin analyzes Ronald Reagan's personality through his Hollywood movie roles. Rogin writes, "Unlike any other president since the end of World War II, Reagan has succeeded in making himself the benign center of America and placing malignancies outside our borders. . . . Evil, he reassures us, is out there in visible spots that can be identified and removed. It is not (any longer) in us or in me. In personalizing the political, Reagan stands squarely within the countersubversive tradition" (p. xvii). Rogin argues that Reagan's personality was shaped by the movie roles he played. As evidence he cites the numerous instances where Reagan as president relies on lines and plots from his movies to explain his behavior. "Doing it for the Gipper," and "where's the rest of me?" (the title of Reagan's autobiography) are well-known examples of Reagan's reliance on his earlier roles. Rogin, though, underemphasizes the roles other influences in Reagan's life probably had in shaping his personality. Surely, movie roles alone did not make Reagan, and perhaps it was Reagan who chose the roles based on his personality to begin with. In addition, Reagan's movies were shaped by the politics and culture of the period and were not written in order to fill in what was lacking in Reagan's personality. Nevertheless, it is fascinating to see compiled in one chapter the influence of these movies on President Reagan. As Rogin asks, "Are we now being ruled by the fantasies of a 1940s countersubversive B movie?" (p. 3).

The actor in him, Rogin explains, allows Reagan a degree of detachment from the consequences of his actions because "movies allowed Reagan to disown aggression and to enact it at the same time" (p. 10). In the late 1940s and early 1950s in Hollywood, for example, "Reagan helped orchestrate a blacklist whose existence he denied" (p. 31).

Reagan is not an aberration in American culture, though, according to

Rogin. Implicated also is "the mundane language of interest group liberalism" (p. xvii) which rationalizes popular disenfranchisement and turns political weakness into strength (p xvii) Pluralist theory, for example, reifies the group and links the interest of the group with its ruling elite, thus isolating and stigmatizing dissenters He shows through studying the American Federation of Labor that in group politics, "When objective conditions radicalize sections of the masses the bureaucratic leadership becomes a brake both on the development of radical consciousness and on the creation of new organizational structures" (p 132)

One strength of Rogin's study is his description of the suppression of interests at the prepolitical stage He explains "The tyranny of public opinion, the ideology of domesticity, and the creation of the asylum all limited political dissent in scarcely measurable ways Insofar as they succeeded, they did not simply intimidate political opposition already formed but inhibited the formation of new opposition" (pp 58–59) This is achieved, in part, by "the transformation of potentially political discontent into problems of personal life" (p 59) and social adjustment

Another strength of Rogin's analyses is his linkage of racial, class and sexual demonology to political repression and construction of a large intrusive state This imitates the enemy it was designed to destroy Reagan, for example, is a "statist" "To combat Communist penetration from 1940s Hollywood to 1980s Washington, Reagan has supported a militarized surveillance state" (p 30) Furthermore, in his study of *The Birth of a Nation*, he explicitly links the racism and the sexism in the film Rogin's analysis of the interlocking, confounding effects of various forms of repression (here racism and sexism) is commendable

The connecting thread throughout *Ronald Reagan the Movie* according to Rogin, is that the descriptions of political demonology ranging from American Indians to Communists to independent women can be read together as a genealogy for the Reagan administration' (p xvii) This is a challenging portrait of American symbol building and enemy construction It is well researched and argued In places, though, it is over-argued placing too much of a causal link from small facts and coincidences to larger political and psychological motives

Laura R Wolliver, *University of South Carolina*

Heidegger on Being and Acting From Principles to Anarchy By Reiner Schurmann (Bloomington, IN Indiana University Press 1987 Pp ix 406 $37 50 cloth)

This book is excellent. It strips away many of the misconceptions that have gathered around the name Heidegger It dismantles the slogan and restores the thinker Much of this work appears in the footnotes where brief comments

on the secondary literature abound The reader gets an intense guided tou the positions developed over the last thirty-odd years. Second, the volu makes very good sense of thought that many find incomprehensible. For ample, the discussion of the fourfold (section 19 and footnotes) and of problem of the will (section 41) are good

There are some problems with Schurmann's interpretation First, he sists on reading Heidegger backward, the later texts determining the earl ones But are the later ones not children of the earlier ones? A better proach comes from Heidegger's notion of the Same, which brings up a way express nonidentical, nonnumerical unity (One can think of specific and neric unity in Aristotle as a source.) This way of reading would let many the later texts speak more forcefully, especially on the notion of the ringing silence

Second, Schurmann reintroduces many terms Heidegger avoided or jected—term, category, and transcendental (p 21) The effects of this ı neuver are startling Heidegger attempted to create an elaborate set of te nical terms in *Sein und Zeit*, but his later work abandons many of them favor of ordinary words used in unusual ways The reintroduction of th traditional terms makes Heidegger comprehensible at the cost of mak him read like Kant This drive to clarity also appears when Schurmann s out things very well, too well For example, world and earth, inextrica bound up with one another in Heidegger, become the clearly separable verse and reverse in Schurmann (pp 36–37) Politics coincidentally b comes the manifest order Is politics so manifest, so available to all? Is th no concealment in politics?

Finally, the use of "anti-humanistic" to describe Heidegger's position objectionable To be sure, Heidegger does criticize humanism in his "Let on Humanism," but he does so to replace it with another humanism He sires to place man within the fourfold, to let man be man, mortal man I only in this way can we see ourselves as human beings and pursue a polit that holds open the possibility of a better life for all

This book comes close to being "a must read," but it must be carefully re in conjunction with Heidegger's works

Jan Patrick Lee, *Johns Hopkins Univers*

Why Presidents Succeed A Political Psychology of Leadership By De Keith Simonton (New Haven Yale University Press, 1987 Pp 2 $22.50)

In the era of the "personal president" (Lowi, 1986), the dynamics of pre dential leadership continue to demand the attention of political psycho gists. The most popular and influential works, such as Burns (*Leadershi* 1978) and Barber (*The Presidential Character*, 1977), have used historı

materials and individual case studies to develop qualitative insights about the characteristics of successful presidents Now, from a different corner of the discipline, comes a work which challenges that approach and proposes a quantitatively based theory of presidential leadership

According to Dean Keith Simonton, empirical work in the social sciences is the key to developing more reliable generalizations about presidential behavior. Simonton bemoans the "equivocations" of qualitative analysis, and seeks instead to "support accurate and secure predictions" with "mathematically forthright assertions" (p 5) His view, boldly stated, is that such predictions and assertions are already possible "I will show how we can predict almost without error the victor in the presidential general election (chapter 2), explain over two-thirds of the fluctuations in the president's approval rating during the course of his administration (chapter 3), anticipate at least half of the variation in certain aspects of an incumbent's legislative performance (chapter 4), and account for over three-fourths of the president's ultimate standing with posterity (chapter 5)" (pp 5–6)

Support for these claims is marshalled by pulling together in a single volume quantitative studies from social psychology, public opinion, political science, sociology, presidential studies, and other disciplines A personality, developmental, and social psychologist at the University of California at Davis, Simonton believes that "sufficient empirical work has been completed to permit some response, albeit preliminary, to the persistent question of the relative impact of person and context in the realization of political leadership" (p 10)

As the impressive eighteen-page bibliography at the book's end suggests, Simonton has set about his task with thoroughness and single-mindedness His major contribution is to give clearer definition to a scattered and fragmented literature, and to do so in terms that are accessible to both social scientists and the interested public

Simonton's dependent variable is presidential success, which he operationalizes by selecting four "criteria of presidential adequacy" (p 2) electoral success, popularity in the polls, administration performance, and historical greatness In chapters devoted to each of these four criteria, Simonton reviews the literature to assess which variables best predict presidential success, and what those predictors tell us about the relative significance of individual traits and situational variables The chapter on electoral success, for example, reviews studies on presidential primaries, general elections, and reelection campaigns, and looks at variables such as running mates, acceptance speeches, age, height, campaign rhetoric, birth order of candidate, incumbency, zeitgeist effects, and compatibility with voters' attitudes He concludes that "the bulk of the literature suggests that the personal traits of a presidential candidate carry rather less weight than the context of a political campaign for the presidency" (p 73)

In the final chapter, Simonton summarizes the empirical findings and con-

structs a tentative theoretical framework for pulling together the data he h surveyed The findings are divided into three categories individual effec situational effects, and individual-situational interaction effects The auth holds that situational effects, such as the state of the economy, war, or co trol of Congress by the president's party, explain more variance than indiv ual effects, such as power motives, interpersonal dominance, or intelligenc While he acknowledges that individual and situational factors do not opera in isolation, his discussion of interaction effects is limited to a few illust tions For instance, he notes that "the president's birth order, by affecting l social development, may interact with the political zeitgeist, especially t key issues and crises of the day, to determine whether his time has come history Thus, an international conflict may favor the firstborn, where more settled periods call forth the middle child" (p 234)

Despite Simonton's stated goal of influencing how citizens and professio politicians size up potential candidates, readers will be hard put to find pr tical political advice in these pages We learn a great deal about president studies, but too little about presidents themselves Many of the conclusi are either broad and obvious—"Any given presidential behavior may be t result of individual characteristics, political setting, and the subtle intera tion of the two" (p 165)—or narrow and trivial—"The probability of reel tion as well as the prospects for being considered a great president incre with each inch of the president's height' (p 232) Indeed, there is much this book to confirm the oft-stated view that quantitative research gains heralded precision at the expense of distancing itself from the complexit and ambiguities of real-world politics At the very least, one wishes that monton had spent more time measuring the relative merits of various e pirical approaches and the salience of the conclusions

The last two chapters are the strongest Taking stock of the data on histo cal greatness, the author states 'In the last analysis studies of president greatness tell us more about how persons judge successful leadership th about how leaders actually achieve success" (p 228) This point become cornerstone of Simonton's own theoretical framework for interpreting pre dential leadership He develops what he calls an attributional model, bas on identifying elements of the "leadership schema" which people hold r garding the president He is at his most insightful in stating that "the respe or disrespect shown toward a president—whether registered in the voti booth, opinion polls, national or foreign capitals, or history books—tells at least as much about how people observe political actors as about ho those actors actually perform as leaders" (pp 259–60)

Simonton singles out Burns and Barber for criticism, arguing that they d velop theories by using "qualitative and idiographic illustration rather th by confronting systematically collected data" (p 7) Unless Simonton wou argue that only quantitative data can be systematically collected, it is hard

understand this charge, since both Barber and Burns do a better job of marshalling evidence to produce a unified thesis than Simonton There is a certain disconnectedness between the promising theory outlined in the book's final chapter—a theory which draws heavily on Simonton's previously published research—and the earlier review of the literature Simonton himself admits that the theory he is working on cannot subsume all the empirical findings documented in the book As a result, the book fails to communicate a clear and unambiguous thesis

More problematic than this, however, are Simonton's basic assumptions about what counts as successful leadership The premise of the book is that "leadership" equals "success" equals "electability, popularity and prestige " This is the sort of strained and shallow formula which the demands of operationalization force upon quantitative researchers Isn't the great leader the one who takes the people beyond the currently popular toward new horizons? Don't great presidents prove themselves by taking unpopular yet needed stands in times of crisis? Isn't it the inability of recent presidents to move beyond a public relations mind-set which helps explain their failures? Could it be that in today's political climate exceptional leaders are not very electable, given the need to play to public opinion?

These are the sorts of questions which Simonton's work cannot address, because the deeper psychology of presidential leadership is not readily tapped by quantitative research Simonton seems content with the limitations of his approach Thankfully, not all political psychologists are

David Campbell *Mercer University-Atlanta*

litically aware than Lane's. Most of Lane's subjects believed that they lived a just world where power was shared These workers, on the other han uphold democratic values but believe that a corporate plutocracy holds tl real power (p. 154)

Reinarman provides valuable insight into two contrasting work situatio and is successful in giving us "thick description" as well as useful reflecti on what it all means CSS workers are less ambivalent ideologically and mo clearly to the left, although social welfare programs find support in both se tings Differences between the two groups are partly explained by potentia for discussion and "politicality," atomized work versus common office spa with shared work breaks, greater opportunities at CSS for regular and ove opposition to management, and contrasting relationships between work a "life" Although he considers class to be quite significant, Reinarman mai tains that "form of work" is more important than class categories in accour ing for individual beliefs

At least ten of the twelve interviewees would appear to hold inconsiste attitudes if one only had the survey data available However, it turns out th various forms of rationality account for almost all of the inconsistencie "Each time I probed for an explanation of what appeared to be a contra opinion, my respondents provided me with one, and in each instance the reasoning produced not only the appearance of consistency but a critic explication of their meaning" (p 217)

In both settings, interviewees express feelings of "populist delegitimatio and say, in effect, that they seek "a democracy of work." The latter conce includes ordinary notions of workplace democracy, but extends also to emphasis on *quality* of work in terms of the worker's skill, and service client or customer We learn that 'all these workers were certain, though n at all in immodest ways, that they knew how to do their jobs better th those who directed them, that they could solve problems better than 'ma agement' without increasing costs or decreasing productivity" (p 23 "Populist delegitimation" applies to both the state and the market Int viewees already know how corporate elites get what they want in the poli cal realm, even though they have not read any G William Domhoff Fe oppose efforts of the state to make up for market failure, but nearly all agr that these efforts are rarely successful Market institutions are no bette Only one of the twelve believes the market to be legitimate regardless social consequences, and most have doubts about the ability of markets serve human needs better than any other imaginable arrangement

Some aspects of the analysis are more effective than others. Economic fa tors in politics may be somewhat overemphasized, and cultural changes a conflicts deriving from the events of the 1960s may have a greater impa than Reinarman apparently believes Nine of the interviewees were you adults in 1968, and the author himself belongs to the same cohort. I cou

not help wondering if there was some generational affinity in the choice of interviewees. In the final chapter Reinarman delivers some roundhouse punches at voter surveys, marketing of political candidates, direct-mail fund-raising, and two-party elections These are tempting targets, but the attack on the technology of electoral politics is not very convincing in the context of this research design

In spite of such reservations, the book broadened my understanding of contemporary political thinking, and I have been able to use it to advantage in lectures and classroom discussions Reinarman brings an impressive body of literature to bear on the questions he has posed, and he is admirably determined to get to the bottom of things The book is high priority reading for political scientists interested in public opinion, political sociology, and the relationship between government and business in the United States

John A Crittenden, *Indiana State University*

Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology By Michael Rogin (Berkeley University of California Press 1987 Pp 366 $25 00)

Michael Rogin seeks to move the study of American political demonology and repression away from emphasizing extremists and toward the study of the construction and use of demonic enemies in the political mainstream He does this through studying political culture as represented in movies, statements of politicians and journalists, and the political stance of pluralism His orientation is psychological and he asserts "the interpenetration of the personal and the political in dominant political symbols" (p xix)

Rogin argues there is a countersubversive tradition at the center of American politics By "political demonology" and "countersubversive tradition" he means "the creation of monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes (p xiii) In addition, "The countersubversive needs monsters to give shape to his anxieties and to permit him to indulge his forbidden desires Demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name of battling the subversive to imitate his enemy" (p xiii)

Local political initiatives, for example, are interpreted as signs of alien power where dissenters are stigmatized as social pariahs The demonological tradition, Rogin argues, confuses "Communism with terrorism and political opposition with crime, drugs, and disease" (p xv) This characterization makes it easier to practice political repression and to avoid any personal responsibility for the consequences (whether it be the slaughter of American Indians or ruining people's careers in Hollywood by implicating them in a Communist plot)

Rogin analyzes Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and their differing degrees of mixing themselves with body politic Rogin sees the imperial presidency as the climax of Amer countersubversion wherein presidents "personified America by absorl the members of the body politic into their own mystic bodies and leading regenerated American nation against its alien, demonic foes" (p xviii)

The construction of stereotypes of blacks, American Indians, Com nists, and independent women is explained as a tool with which to attack repress these people, yet also, to identify with the culturally forbidden haviors projected onto them "Cold war ideology ," Rogin explains, quired America simultaneously to imitate practices attributed to the en and to demonize the subversive in order to defend against the resul breakdown of difference" (p 39) This is especially clear in three chapter popular movies and their political messages In the American mass cul classic *The Birth of a Nation*, the movies of the Cold War period, and Ro Reagan's movies, the rationalizations for repression provided by demono are displayed

In one chapter Rogin analyzes Ronald Reagan's personality through Hollywood movie roles Rogin writes, "Unlike any other president since end of World War II, Reagan has succeeded in making himself the be center of America and placing malignancies outside our borders I he reassures us, is out there in visible spots that can be identified and moved It is not (any longer) in us or in me In personalizing the polit Reagan stands squarely within the countersubversive tradition" (p x Rogin argues that Reagan's personality was shaped by the movie role played. As evidence he cites the numerous instances where Reagan as pr dent relies on lines and plots from his movies to explain his behavior "D it for the Gipper," and "where's the rest of me?" (the title of Reagan's aut ography) are well-known examples of Reagan's reliance on his earlier r Rogin, though, underemphasizes the roles other influences in Reagan's probably had in shaping his personality Surely, movie roles alone did make Reagan, and perhaps it was Reagan who chose the roles based on personality to begin with In addition, Reagan's movies were shaped by politics and culture of the period and were not written in order to fill in v was lacking in Reagan's personality Nevertheless, it is fascinating to see c piled in one chapter the influence of these movies on President Reagan Rogin asks, "Are we now being ruled by the fantasies of a 1940s counter versive B movie?" (p 3)

The actor in him, Rogin explains, allows Reagan a degree of detachn from the consequences of his actions because "movies allowed Reagan to own aggression and to enact it at the same time" (p. 10) In the late 1940s early 1950s in Hollywood, for example, "Reagan helped orchestrate a bl list whose existence he denied" (p 31)

Reagan is not an aberration in American culture, though, accordin

Rogin. Implicated also is "the mundane language of interest group liberalism" (p. xvii) which rationalizes popular disenfranchisement and turns political weakness into strength (p xvii) Pluralist theory, for example, reifies the group and links the interest of the group with its ruling elite, thus isolating and stigmatizing dissenters He shows through studying the American Federation of Labor that in group politics, "When objective conditions radicalize sections of the masses the bureaucratic leadership becomes a brake both on the development of radical consciousness and on the creation of new organizational structures" (p 132)

One strength of Rogin's study is his description of the suppression of interests at the prepolitical stage He explains, "The tyranny of public opinion, the ideology of domesticity, and the creation of the asylum all limited political dissent in scarcely measurable ways Insofar as they succeeded, they did not simply intimidate political opposition already formed but inhibited the formation of new opposition" (pp 58–59) This is achieved, in part, by "the transformation of potentially political discontent into problems of personal life" (p 59) and social adjustment

Another strength of Rogin's analyses is his linkage of racial, class and sexual demonology to political repression and construction of a large, intrusive state This imitates the enemy it was designed to destroy Reagan for example, is a "statist " "To combat Communist penetration, from 1940s Hollywood to 1980s Washington, Reagan has supported a militarized surveillance state" (p 30) Furthermore, in his study of *The Birth of a Nation* he explicitly links the racism and the sexism in the film Rogin's analysis of the interlocking, confounding effects of various forms of repression (here racism and sexism) is commendable

The connecting thread throughout *Ronald Reagan the Movie* according to Rogin, is that the descriptions of political demonology ranging from American Indians to Communists to independent women can be read together as a genealogy for the Reagan administration' (p xvii) This is a challenging portrait of American symbol building and enemy construction It is well researched and argued In places, though, it is over-argued placing too much of a causal link from small facts and coincidences to larger political and psychological motives

Laura R Woliver, *University of South Carolina*

Heidegger on Being and Acting From Principles to Anarchy By Reiner Schurmann (Bloomington, IN Indiana University Press 1987 Pp ix 406. $37 50 cloth)

This book is excellent It strips away many of the misconceptions that have gathered around the name Heidegger It dismantles the slogan and restores the thinker. Much of this work appears in the footnotes where brief comments

on the secondary literature abound. The reader gets an intense guided tour of the positions developed over the last thirty-odd years. Second, the volume makes very good sense of thought that many find incomprehensible. For example, the discussion of the fourfold (section 19 and footnotes) and of the problem of the will (section 41) are good.

There are some problems with Schurmann's interpretation. First, he insists on reading Heidegger backward, the later texts determining the earlier ones. But are the later ones not children of the earlier ones? A better approach comes from Heidegger's notion of the Same, which brings up a way to express nonidentical, nonnumerical unity. (One can think of specific and generic unity in Aristotle as a source.) This way of reading would let many of the later texts speak more forcefully, especially on the notion of the ringing of silence.

Second, Schurmann reintroduces many terms Heidegger avoided or rejected—term, category, and transcendental (p. 21). The effects of this maneuver are startling. Heidegger attempted to create an elaborate set of technical terms in *Sein und Zeit*, but his later work abandons many of them in favor of ordinary words used in unusual ways. The reintroduction of these traditional terms makes Heidegger comprehensible at the cost of making him read like Kant. This drive to clarity also appears when Schurmann sorts out things very well, too well. For example, world and earth, inextricably bound up with one another in Heidegger, become the clearly separable obverse and reverse in Schurmann (pp. 36–37). Politics coincidentally becomes the manifest order. Is politics so manifest, so available to all? Is there no concealment in politics?

Finally, the use of "anti-humanistic" to describe Heidegger's position is objectionable. To be sure, Heidegger does criticize humanism in his "Letter on Humanism," but he does so to replace it with another humanism. He desires to place man within the fourfold, to let man be man, mortal man. For only in this way can we see ourselves as human beings and pursue a politics that holds open the possibility of a better life for all.

This book comes close to being "a must read," but it must be carefully read in conjunction with Heidegger's works.

Jan Patrick Lee, *Johns Hopkins University*

Why Presidents Succeed: A Political Psychology of Leadership. By Dean Keith Simonton. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. 292. $22.50.)

In the era of the "personal president" (Lowi, 1986), the dynamics of presidential leadership continue to demand the attention of political psychologists. The most popular and influential works, such as Burns (*Leadership*, 1978) and Barber (*The Presidential Character*, 1977), have used historical

materials and individual case studies to develop qualitative insights about the characteristics of successful presidents Now, from a different corner of the discipline, comes a work which challenges that approach and proposes a quantitatively based theory of presidential leadership

According to Dean Keith Simonton, empirical work in the social sciences is the key to developing more reliable generalizations about presidential behavior Simonton bemoans the "equivocations" of qualitative analysis, and seeks instead to "support accurate and secure predictions" with "mathematically forthright assertions" (p 5). His view, boldly stated, is that such predictions and assertions are already possible "I will show how we can predict almost without error the victor in the presidential general election (chapter 2), explain over two-thirds of the fluctuations in the president's approval rating during the course of his administration (chapter 3), anticipate at least half of the variation in certain aspects of an incumbent's legislative performance (chapter 4), and account for over three-fourths of the president's ultimate standing with posterity (chapter 5)" (pp 5–6)

Support for these claims is marshalled by pulling together in a single volume quantitative studies from social psychology, public opinion, political science, sociology, presidential studies, and other disciplines A personality, developmental, and social psychologist at the University of California at Davis, Simonton believes that "sufficient empirical work has been completed to permit some response, albeit preliminary to the persistent question of the relative impact of person and context in the realization of political leadership" (p 10)

As the impressive eighteen-page bibliography at the book's end suggests Simonton has set about his task with thoroughness and single-mindedness His major contribution is to give clearer definition to a scattered and fragmented literature, and to do so in terms that are accessible to both social scientists and the interested public

Simonton's dependent variable is presidential success which he operationalizes by selecting four "criteria of presidential adequacy" (p 2) electoral success, popularity in the polls, administration performance, and historical greatness In chapters devoted to each of these four criteria, Simonton reviews the literature to assess which variables best predict presidential success, and what those predictors tell us about the relative significance of individual traits and situational variables The chapter on electoral success for example, reviews studies on presidential primaries, general elections and reelection campaigns, and looks at variables such as running mates acceptance speeches, age, height, campaign rhetoric, birth order of candidate incumbency, zeitgeist effects, and compatibility with voters attitudes He concludes that "the bulk of the literature suggests that the personal traits of a presidential candidate carry rather less weight than the context of a political campaign for the presidency" (p 73)

In the final chapter, Simonton summarizes the empirical findings and con-

Articles P

Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society

Clifford Orwin
University of Toronto

We think of Thucydides as an analyst of war and so primarily of international politics He is equally concerned, however with the consequences of war for domestic politics and there is one aspect of his treatment of the latter which remains unsurpassed in the whole history of political thought—his analysis of the disintegration of society under unbearable stress Here I attempt a detailed interpretation and comparison of his treatments of two phenomena, the *stasis* or civil strife bred by the war which raged throughout the Hellenic world, and the more local but no less lethal plague of Athens *Stasis* displays the consequences of the radical "politicization" of life, the plague those of its depoliticization As the extremes between which all normal politics lies, these help us to grasp its conditions and limits

When we read Thucydides it is usually with our minds on foreign policy His subject is a war, domestic affairs figure in his work only insofar as they affect the course of war or are affected by it Yet it is above all as an analyst of this interaction that he speaks so directly to our own unquiet century In the words of Czeslaw Milosz (1983, p 81) "People always live within a certain order and are unable to visualize a time when that order might cease to exist The sudden crumbling of all current notions and criteria is a rare occurrence and is characteristic of only the most stormy periods in history In general the Nineteenth Century did not experience the rapid and violent changes of the next century, whose only possible analogy may be the time of the Peloponnesian War, as we know it from Thucydides "

Ours is not the first troubled epoch to find Thucydides timely That of Catiline and Caesar was one, and that of Cromwell and Hobbes another Hobbes was of course Thucydides' greatest admirer among political philosophers, as well as his greatest English translator Without suggesting that Thucydides followed anything like Hobbes's resolutive-compositive method, we may say that he foreshadows the political masterpiece of that

I wish to thank the John M Olin Center for the Study of the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago, and its co-directors, Allan Bloom and Nathan Tarcov the Earhart Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial and other support of this project I am indebted to my referees for helpful criticism

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol 50 No 4 November 1988

method, Hobbes's presentation of the state of nature. At the same time, as I will argue, his sounding of the lowest political depths, while unique among classical treatments of politics, and seemingly uniquely modern among them, shares the crucial features of classical thought which offer an alternative to modernity

Thucydides provides not one but two accounts of the breakdown of civil society These, his treatments of the plague of Athens (2 47–58)[1] and of the *stasis* or civil strife which swept much of the Greek world during the war (3 82–83[2]), are among the best known of his passages but also, oddly enough, among the least commented upon [3] While the critics may have felt that such horrors spoke for themselves, they also may have shied away from Thucydides' analyses as intense to the point of opacity The passage on *stasis* is of a density which strains the limits of language (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Thucydides*, chaps 31–33, but cf Macleod, 1979, pp 60–66), and that on the effects of the plague, briefer but no less compressed Having examined them in turn, I will attempt what I believe to be the first systematic comparison of the two

Stasis

Stasis is a pervasive theme of classical political philosophy (cf Plato, *Republic* 545a–569c, Aristotle, *Politics*, 1301a19–1321b3) [4] No other Greek thinker provides, however, an account of the descent into anarchy or worse which may accompany *stasis* at its most bitter, and so none accords this abyss the importance that it enjoys in Thucydides In his presentation, the worst seems to achieve a bearing on the guidance of political life which in theirs is reserved for the best It is thus that he most anticipates Hobbes and modern treatments of politics generally, and this is the place to begin in assessing the implications of his approach

Thucydides' thematic statement on *stasis* follows his account of a particular instance of it, that at Kerkyra (Latin Corcyra, modern Corfu) during the fifth year of the war (3 70–81, cf Kagan, 1974, pp. 175–81, Wilson, 1987

[1] I cite Thucydides according to the standard form book chapter (i e , paragraph), and, when necessary, sentence (e g , 3 82 2), except where otherwise noted, I follow the Greek text of Bodin, Romilly, and Weil (1963–1972) Translations are my own As the passage on *stasis* is notoriously difficult and renderings of it vary widely, the reader may wish to consult, in addition to the versions to be found in translations of the whole of Thucydides, the efforts of Gomme (1956, pp 383–85), Grene (1965, pp 9–12), and Pouncey (1980, p 33 and n 5 [pp 171–72])

[2] I follow most scholars, ancient and modern, in rejecting 3 84 as spurious

[3] I know of no schematic treatment of Thucydides' presentation of the political consequences of the plague English-speaking political scientists are fortunate that the five best treatments of *stasis* are in English Strauss (1964, pp 146–47), Edmunds (1975), Macleod (1979), Cogan (1981, pp 149–54), and Connor (1984, pp 95–105) I have learned from all five, overall my approach to Thucydides owes most to Strauss, although my errors are mine alone

[4] For a provocative recent treatment of Aristotle's discussion, see Davis (1986)

pp. 87–106). That account, a masterpiece of Thucydidean narrative (cf Connor, 1984, pp. 95–100) begins with disagreement between the few and the many over Kerkyra's allegiance in the war, leading to perversion of the laws of the city, both sacred and profane, in the service of factional ends, then to a bloody oligarchic *coup d'état*, and finally to open and desperate class warfare spurred by the intervention of fleets from both Sparta and Athens Following an attempt at conciliation by the decent (if naive) Athenian commander Nikostratos and a brilliant holding action by his small Athenian squadron against a much larger Spartan one, the ascendancy of Athens assures that of the Kerkyraian democrats, and these, with the complicity of Nikostratos' successor on the scene, proceed by means of treachery and sacrilege to the slaughter of the oligarchs.

It is these events which evoke Thucydides' longest comment on any aspect of the war (3 82–83), a comment unique as well in echoing his statement at the outset of the work that its purpose is to chart the enduring contours of politics (cf. 3 82.2 with 1 22 4 and 3 82 1 (*ekinêthê*) with 1 1 2 (*kinêsis* [Stahl, 1966, pp 117–18 and n 42]) Thucydides does not doubt that *stasis* is a permanent blot on human life, to which men are subject by their very nature and so until such time as nature relents He is not then suggesting that by reading him we will learn how to avoid it

For Thucydides the war which is his comprehensive theme is related to the excesses of *stasis* as a quasi-necessary condition, such excesses while rare in peacetime are next to normal in wartime He here inverts the tendency of today's liberals, who holding that peace is the natural condition of men because men are naturally peaceable, are likely to ascribe war to what they call extremism, rather than extremism to war Thucydides, for his part, sees no need to invoke domestic pathology to explain the prevalence of war among states, but he does stress how the rigors of war aggravate domestic pathology At 2 17, for instance, he notes an ominous pronouncement of the Delphic oracle to the Athenians "Better the Pelasgian ground left unworked " The Athenians had in fact left this otherwise prime property vacant, but wartime crowding of the city now compelled them to build on it In commenting on the forebodings thus aroused, Thucydides vindicates the truth of the oracle, but not as we might expect Most Athenians naturally took the warning to mean that evils would *result* from the occupation of the ground

"And in my opinion the oracle came to pass in the sense opposite to the received one For the misfortunes of the city did not arise from the illegal occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the war, and the oracle, although without specifying this, foresaw that no good would attend the day when this lot came to be occupied" (2 17)

The transgression was ominous with a view not to its consequences but to that of which it was a consequence, not for any evil which it entailed but as a symptom of the evil which entailed it (Strauss, 1964, p 178) A pious society

is a fortunate society, but not so much fortunate because it is pious as pious because it is fortunate. This prepares us for Thucydides' statement on the conditions of *stasis*: "In times of peace neither side had the excuse or the willingness to call in the two great powers, but when the war was on, alliances were easily obtained by those on both sides who, plotting a new order of things, sought through calling in outsiders both to harm their opponents and to acquire power for themselves. In times of peace and prosperity both cities and individuals have minds of a better cast, from not falling subject to unwelcome necessities But war, filching away the easy provision of the everyday, is a violent teacher, which brings most men's tempers level with their fortunes" (3 82 1,2)

As Thucydides differs from our liberals, so does he from our conservatives, for whom the worst evils of society are symptoms of moral or religious decay For him the decline of piety and the other virtues is a symptom of the worst evils of society, evils which nothing in most people, and surely not their piety, can withstand Men are not an evil but a wretched lot, they are playthings of the moment Accordingly, what stands between most cities and their disintegration is not a sound regime or civic education these, Thucydides knows, are not the real glue of many real societies Rather he stresses the rhythm of daily life—the whir and hum of the insistent, recurrent needs of the body For as long as these are smoothly greased, most men will put up with the status quo, or at any rate not seek to overturn it at the risk of their lives and fortunes This may sound surprisingly modern, as if Thucydides accepted the primacy of economics over politics or of prosperity over virtue In a sense, he does, for he sees that most men lack virtue in adversity and that few care for the body politic half so much as they care for their own Unlike most modern thinkers, however, he does not promote prosperity as a reliable hedge against *stasis*. prosperity, presupposing as it does peace, is for that very reason wholly unreliable Thucydides moreover regards prosperous societies as no less inclined to war by their wealth than poor ones are by their poverty (cf 3 45 with 8 24 and 40) His final preference is therefore indeed for that rare regime which rests on moderation rather than prosperity, of which I will say more below

The most celebrated aspect of Thucydides' presentation of *stasis* is his discussion of the debasement of language "And they scrambled, in their judgments, the usual evaluations of actions as expressed by the words for them" (3 82 4).[5] With no offense to the shade of Orwell, newspeak is a discovery of

[5]Cf Hobbes's translation (1975, p 222) "The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary " On the proper construction of this difficult and controversial sentence see most recently Hogan (1980), Proctor (1980, p 204), and Wilson (1982) Hogan, noting (p 139) that "scholars have usually taken this as an assertion that the political partisans changed the *meanings* of the words they used, and by this is understood the denotations of the words, their referents," goes on to propose that not only might a mindless daring

Thucydides. Indeed he presents it in an even more terrifying light not as something imposed from above, but as altogether spontaneous, an authentic voice from out of the political whirlwind Not Moscow, but Beirut and Belfast, and lately "Khalistan," are world leaders in newspeak in this Thucydidean sense.[6]

As I have suggested, Thucydides presents the effects of *stasis* in terms of transposition or inversion (Edmunds, 1975) "A mindless daring was held to be the courage of a loyal comrade, caution bred of forethought an excuse for cowardice, good sense a cloak of unmanliness, and an intelligent grasp of all sides of a question inability to act on any."

The suggestion here as to the structure of virtue implicitly foreshadows Aristotle's (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2 5–9) while offering some useful rigor to our own vague notion of "extremism" as the root political evil "Extremism" in a strict sense indeed defines the mentality of *stasis* The excess of a disposition comes to be admired in place of its mean, and the mean, to be despised as the deficiency of this excess Having supplanted the mean as the standard, however, the extreme continuously feeds upon itself it enjoins a striving for ever fresher extremes, a frenzied struggle to exceed one's rivals at excess itself

Thus was the way opened to the equation of rage with manliness and of brutality with trustworthiness And so too the premium now placed on plotting and the foiling of plots, while he who contrived to avoid the necessity for either, i e , to restore a situation of tolerable trust between the parties, was reviled as disloyal and cowardly "In a word, to thwart him who intended evil was praised, and likewise to suggest [it] to him who was contemplating none " The distinction between foiling and fostering transgression has dissolved, there is no community of lawful men warding off the attempts of the lawless, but a general recourse to lawlessness with no distinction made between defending and assailing

------

have come to be considered comradely courage and caution bred of forethought an excuse for cowardice, but that the first of these qualities might have come to be praised and the third to be blamed, under their usual names This I find unpersuasive and unsupported by Thucydides elaboration of his meaning Wilson, rejecting Hogan's suggestion, rejects also the usual rendering of this sentence as something like words changed their meaning,' which phrasing implies precisely that irrational daring became a term of praise and prudent hesitation one of blame Whatever the proper meaning of "meaning ' what scholars have meant and readers have read by "words changed their meaning" is a change in the denotations of words their referents, and, as Thucydides proceeds to make clear such is what in fact occurred—with some necessary qualifications (cf Strauss, 1964, p 147, n 8)

[6] For an opposing view see Muir (1969), who interprets Thucydides as decrying the manipulation of words by leaders and cliques and likens the degradation of language described to that of German under National Socialism Certainly Thucydides does decry such manipulation (cf 3 82 7, discussed below), but presents it as only one aspect of the problem, and not the main one

Thucydides now proceeds to note in short order the collapse of the th[ree] fundamental Greek institutions kinship, human law, and divine law.

> And so even the bond of kinship became more extraneous (*alliotrōteron*) than th[at of] faction, because of the greater readiness of the latter to dare no matter what For such a[sso]ciations aimed not at advantage[7] within the established laws, but at self-aggrandizeme[nt in] defiance of them, and the faith of the members in one another drew its strength no[t so] much from the divine law [sc of oaths] as from their common complicity in lawlessn[ess] Fair words on the part of opponents were greeted with precautionary deeds by those [who] had the upper hand, rather than with magnanimity (*gennaiotēti*) To avenge onesel[f on] someone counted for more than to avoid harm to oneself in the first place Oaths of re[con]ciliation, if any there were, were sworn by the two parties only because they were [mo]mentarily at a loss, and were otherwise powerless When opportunity offered, he who made bold to seize it and to take his opponent off his guard held it sweeter thus to ave[nge] himself by imposing on the others trust than to do so openly, calculating not only [the] safety of this course, but that by prevailing through treachery he carried off the priz[e for] intelligence (3 82 6–7)

I will comment on the collapse of each institution in turn. First, kinship makes excuses ("I can't do *that* to *him*"), faction none, stopping short was [out] of fashion and so too were excuses to do so Again it must be stressed t[hat] this is a symptom, not a cause of *stasis*, and Thucydides, in his narrativ[e of] events at Kerkyra, has already suggested that it is a routine one. "Death t[hen] raged in all its forms, and, as tends to happen at such a time, there was [no] length to which matters did not go Father killed son, and men were dragg[ed] from the altars or slain at them, and some were even walled up in the tem[ple] of Dionysus and died there" (3 80 5)

Not that such developments are any less dire for being routine For sta[nd]ing by one's *philoi*, one's "dear ones"—originally, one's kin, later or friends—was the true north of the Greek moral compass (cf Plato, *Repub[lic]* 332a–b) Its collapse represents the dissolution of the living bedrock of [morality] as usual in the Greek city (cf Connor, 1984, p 99) Politically, of course, [the] attachment to one's own is ambiguous treatments as varied as Perikles' [fu]neral oration (2 35–46) and the *Republic* itself (461e–465c) reprove it as [the] foremost barrier to political community, the primal spring of corruption a[nd] injustice (And the more so in that even its dignity rivals that of the public [As] the late Mayor Daley once admonished critics of his nepotism, a father [has] an obligation to give his sons a good start in life.) Here in Thucydides, h[ow]ever, the blood tie appears in a different light there are worse things t[han] devotion to family, namely devotion to party, the effectual truth of such [po]litical zeal as overwhelms attachment to the family

Thucydides proceeds in the passage cited from the decay of subpoliti[cal] restraints to that of political ones The erosion of law is identical with tha[t]

[7] Reading, with Dionysius, Valla, Stahl, and Poppo, *ophelíāi* (dative of purpose and so par[allel] to *pleonexíāi* at the end of the sentence) for *ophelíās* (genitive) of the manuscript accepted [by] Weil and Romilly

the public realm, or, if one prefers, of the common good, where this notion is seen for what it at least mostly is: something the nub of which consists not in some lofty substantive good transcending those available to men privately, but merely in keeping the struggle for private good within reasonable bounds. By hedging these bounds with evils—the punishments that the laws inflict upon transgressors—the common good enforces upon the citizens a salutary (and shaky) moderation. By restricting the advantage of each the laws serve that of all; the greatest good that laws do, they do simply by being laws. Unfortunately this truth appears for all to see only with the breakdown of law.

And from human laws Thucydides proceeds to the divine. However necessary to a decent society, piety, like kinship, figures here only as a prominent victim of *stasis*, not as any sort of bulwark against it. In the *stasis* at Kerkyra, piety very early comes to be perverted to factional ends (3.70.4–6), after which we hear only of lying oaths and breaches of the right of asylum, to say nothing of carnage in holy places. Politically piety mattered to the Greeks above all as the foundation of oaths, so it is on the emptiness of all sworn guarantees that Thucydides dwells here. In times of *stasis*, oaths are perverted and figure only as means of the very deceit against which they are supposed to guard. Kinship, laws, piety: cities boast no peaks to which to repair in times of *stasis*. This, not advice on staying high and dry, is the point of Thucydides' treatment here.

In the course of expounding the weakness of oaths, Thucydides notes also the ascendancy of considerations of revenge over those of safety. (A concern with safety is one source of the power of oaths.) While men ran no risks for the sake of noble generosity, they did run them for the sake of vengeance. Under *stasis*, the very narrowing of the focus of life to the demands of preserving it from one moment to the next involves men in an endless spiral of bloodshed, in which all other appetites cede to a thirst for vengeance, preferably vengeance preceded by reconciliation.[8] For intelligence having emancipated itself from decency, nothing gains such a reputation for the one as a deed which in normal times would have shocked the other. Even ordinarily, Thucydides suggests, men tend to cherish cleverness to the detriment of virtue (3.82.7); amid *stasis*, the foulest murder impresses merely as the neatest and sweetest.

All of which enables us to state the cardinal calamity of *stasis*: trust disappears from society, and with it society itself. *Stasis* destroys nothing less than the infrastructure of civil trust. Seem as it might that trust among citizens must depend upon their treating one another decently, in fact it is rather their decent behavior which proves to turn upon their mutual trust. This is

[8] Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 6: "... *Sudden Dejection* is the passion that causeth WEEPING, and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power. ... Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends, Others for their unkindnesse, others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation."

not to deny that the truly virtuous would trust each other, or that vi
the only sound basis for trust. It is only to say that in actual cities the ba
trust is much shakier What passes for virtue depends upon trust, wh
turn depends upon mutual interests which as such give rise to mutu
straint. It is not decency which holds most men in check, but rathe
ulterior constraints as make decency pay

After having expounded at length the manifold horrors of *stasis*, Th
des offers the briefest of statements as to its basis in human natur
blame for all of which was the pursuit of rule out of greed and ambition
which arose the zeal of those once embroiled in contention" (3 82 8)
what has preceded this statement may seem both bald and trite It i
Thucydides here anticipates the claim of this or that *stasis*-monger to
acted zealously for the public good—which he had loved not wise
too well.

> The leading men in the cities on both sides, each with fine-sounding names,
> extolling political equality for the multitude and the other moderation through the
> the best, made prizes of those common concerns which they served in speech, a
> ping at nothing in their contest to overreach one another, they dared the most
> things, and pushed their revenges further still, not respecting the bounds of what
> and in the interest of the city, but on both sides restraining themselves no furth
> pleased them at the moment Thus neither side set any store by piety, but the us
> words to accomplish some malicious deed was much applauded As for the citizens
> in the middle, they perished, either becaue they would not join the fray or from e
> they be spared (3 82 8)

Many today, impressed by the examples of Russia, Germany, Spai
China (and, more recently, Pol Pot's Cambodia and ubiquitous terror
both right and left), would stress ideology as the font of the worst do
evils, meaning by ideology lofty visions such as murderers sincere
pouse [9] Such a view both extenuates the crimes of the ideologues, wh
pear misguided philanthropists rather than lovers of imposing their
and inculpates ideology as itself the cause of their atrocities Thucydid
pears to demur He would not have us assign the excesses he descri
misguided zeal for the public good. the hotter the zeal and the grand
professions, the greater the indifference to the public good

This long chapter on *stasis* is followed by a brief but climactic on
must try to grasp how it is climactic how what it describes is the cro
evil of such a throng of evils

> Thus every form of malignancy took root in the Hellenic world as a result of th
> and ingenuousness, in which innate nobility plays so great a part, was laughed int
> ion, but the frame of mind that prevailed far and wide was that of two armies distr
> arrayed against each other For there was no word binding enough, no oath
> enough to reconcile them, and all alike, when they got the upper hand, calculating

[9] For such an interpretation of the *stasis* passage, see Cogan (1981, pp 149–54), who
the extremism of the partisans to "the abstractness of [their] ideological orientation "

> lasting security was to be expected, rather than bring themselves to trust others did what they could to protect themselves And it was the meaner minds who were most likely to prevail, for fearing their own deficiencies and the wits of their adversaries (lest they be overmatched in argument and the others in the resourcefulness of their wits contrive to pre-empt them), they boldly resorted to deeds Their opponents, on the other hand, in their contemptuous confidence that they would anticipate them and that they themselves had no need to obtain by deed what was theirs for the taking by wit, were likely to be caught off guard and destroyed (3 83)

Stasis is a war of all against all, in which no one can trust anyone, the pre-emptive strike is *de rigueur*, and those who might seem superior to others fare if anything even worse than they All these aspects of Thucydides' account resurface in Hobbes's state of nature This warrants a closer comparison of the two, with an eye to clarifying the distinctiveness of Thucydides' approach

Hobbes argues for what we may fairly describe as a negative political orientation We ought to take our political bearings not by what attracts us as best, but by what repels us as worst What is worst is no government, and so we should confess that all government, as the negation of no government, is good government For Hobbes that than which nothing is worse is the state of nature or of anarchy, in this he and Thucydides are at one Yet Hobbes's political counsels are much the more dogmatic of the two, in part because his orientation is much more dogmatically negative This will appear from comparing their presentations of anarchy itself

For Hobbes the crowning horror of the war of all against all is that with which it threatens all, a violent death at the hands of others This threat is the great equalizer, in particular it levels those who pretend to some politically relevant superiority to others Since all men are in fact equally capable of inflicting this greatest evil on another, "and they are equals who can do equal things to each other" (*De Cive*, 1 3), those who pretend to some natural title to rule are not in fact better entitled than others As equal (and therefore as impotent) by nature as you or I (and all the more vulnerable by virtue of their foolish vainglory), those who fancy themselves nature's anointed are in for a thundering comeuppance Needless to say, their fall will not pain the rest of us What angers or touches us in Hobbes's account is rather the fate of the humble and harmless, trapped in the crossfire of contending ambitions

Now this negative orientation owes something to Thucydides, whom Hobbes so admired He too shows that the chasms that yawn beneath us in politics are deeper than the peaks that beckon us are high Such, for example, is the basis of his sympathy for Sparta, a regime which aimed less at achieving the political best than at avoiding the political worst—vulnerability to the threat posed by its Helots (4 80, cf 8 24 with 8 40) The passage on *stasis* confirms, I think, better than any other in the work, how deeply mindful is Thucydides of the benefits of Spartan sobriety He notes that *stasis* convulsed "so to speak" all of Hellas, in fact it engulfed Athens but not Sparta (cf

1 18 1 with 2 65, 6 53–61, 8 47–98) Nothing bespeaks Sparta's
like the evils which her regime averts, evils the reliable absence
outweighs all other political goods Being negative, however, this
ment is inconspicuous (1 10)· Athens abounds in brilliant spokes
Perikles and Alkibiades, to say nothing of splendid and spectacular d
the case for Sparta needs a Thucydides to do justice to the horrors of

Yet Thucydides does not simply share the negative orientation of
His emphasis is decidedly different. Book 3, Chap 83 anticipates H
drawing our attention to the dire consequences of *stasis* for men
tend to be importantly better than others. Its tone, however, is not
but poignant Here there is no attempt at debunking Rather Th
registers, evidently with equal sympathy, the fates of two kinds
ority which appear to be wholly incompatible a noble guilelessnes
one hand, and a subtle wiliness, on the other

Guilelessness is one possible translation of *to euēthes*—I finally c
genuousness"—into which *to gennaion* largely enters *To euēthes* is
able term for simplicity and integrity, which commonly occurs in
Greek only in its ironic sense of simpleton As for *to gennaion*, mee
Plato or Aristotle, we translate it as good birth, to show that like th
ers we distinguish between it and true virtue. It is the old aristocr
for human worth, the root of which conveys that this is something n
Thucydides here uses old-fashioned terms to designate old-fashi
tues, which in the present context cannot but evoke nostalgia

As for *to polytropon*, Thucydides' term for the wiliness feared b
vanquished by the meaner minds, this is actually its only occurr
noun in classical prose As an adjective it had supplied Homer's fan
thet for Odysseus, "of many turns," which is to say resourceful It t
an old-fashioned term, although the type of man to whom it appli
thing but hidebound Though Thucydides uses it only here, it
think of characters of his to whom this term might apply, such as t
nian general Demosthenes, or even the Athenians collectively as
praises them (2 41 1), or as the Corinthians blame them (1 70) Th
context clearly locates this man of *to polytropon* at the opposite
from him of *to euēthes* and *to gennaion*—the one is the man most
by the factious intriguers, the other the man most scorned by then

And yet the extremes meet: that appears to be the point of this
and that is where its pathos lies. For Thucydides the crowning evil
notwithstanding that it menaces all, is that those whom it menaces
superior men, to whom in this worst of human situations their ver
orities are detrimental The man of *to euēthes* is moderate witho
sarily being intelligent, for him of *to polytropon* intelligence is all n
for intelligence to sever itself from moderation is for it to enter upc
game, which it can win only by assimilating itself to folly (cf Macle
pp 59–60) The straightest of men and the most devious, this latter

and Odysseus, have a common interest in avoiding *stasis*, and Thucydides by so warning them shows himself impartially a friend to both

PLAGUE

The plague of Athens descended on the city in the second spring of the war and raged unabated for two years Having discussed the obscurity of its origins, the course of its symptoms (his description of which is deservedly famous for its clinical precision), and the susceptibility of scavengers to it (2 47–50), Thucydides turns to its effects on the private lives of the various classes of those touched by it (2 47–51) The plague strips most citizens of all concerns in common with their fellows like *stasis*, it assaults even the family, but from the opposite direction It reduces men to solitary wretches, alone in their prostration before calamity and indifferent alike to kinsmen, party, and city.

Thucydides next discusses the consequences for the plague of the current political situation, and finally those of the plague for it The most lethal aspect of that situation was the overcrowding of the city due to the wartime influx from the countryside (2 52) Because of this the mortality raged uncontrollably, and the public places of the city, both profane and sacred, were strewn with heaps of the homeless unattended dead and dying It was from this in turn that the laws of the city were first disturbed (2 52 4), these being to begin with the sacred laws of burial, which the survivors, overwhelmed by the calamity, could or would no longer observe Thucydides begins his discussion of lawlessness, then, with those laws the flouting of which followed most directly from the specific character of the disaster, it may also matter that these were sacred laws

There follows an account of the more general lawlessness bred by the plague

> And moreover it was the plague which first fostered greater lawlessness in the city in other respects For people now blithely ventured what before they would have done covertly and not just as they pleased, seeing the sudden changes and how, some rich person dying suddenly, another man who before possessed nothing now straightway owned what had been the others And so they decided to spend quickly and for the sake of enjoyment, holding their bodies and their wealth to be alike but things of a day And no one was keen to persevere in what had been reputed noble [or honorable, *kalon*], holding it uncertain whether they would survive to achieve it But instead the pleasurable and whatever procured it, these were established as both noble and useful Fear of gods and law of men deterred no one, for as to the former, people judged it all the same whether they revered [the gods] or not, seeing that all died regardless and as for crimes none expected to stay alive long enough to come to trial or pay the penalty, but held rather that a much heavier sentence had been decreed against them, and that before it fell, it was only fair that they enjoy life a little (2 53)

"Lawlessness" (*anomia*) has a broader sense in Greek than in English, be-[...]e "laws" (*nomoi*) include all habits and usages sanctioned by public opin-[...] whether or not a penalty is specified for infractions And indeed the first

malfeasance that Thucydides notes is one that was clearly not on the statute tablets the unseemly use that desperate people made of their own lawful property Here, as throughout his account of the plague, Thucydides looks back to Perikles' famous funeral oration, which immediately precedes it Perikles had praised the Athenians for eschewing conspicuous consumption, and for instead regarding their considerable wealth as a resource for public action (2 40 1) Indeed a recurrent theme of his speech was the ultimate indifference of the true Athenian to private wealth in favor of dedication to the city and the endless glory that Athens in her transcendent uniqueness conferred in return (2 42 4, 43.5, 44 4). Under the rude impact of the plague, the Athenians indeed demonstrate a certain indifference to wealth, one which mocks, however, that graceful restraint so praised by their leader Indifferent indeed to amassing riches, but equally so to employing them for any public, seemly, or distant object, their sole and obsessive concern is to spend it before death wrenches it from them (or, more accurately, them from it)

The transition from this reckless squandering of one's own to criminality in the usual sense occurs by way of a sentence on the *kalon*, the honorable, noble or fine. "Fine things are hard," notes Glaucon to Socrates (*Republic* 435c), and what is hard requires perseverance, which as such makes sense only for the sake of its goal. Even in their desperation, however, men do not simply abandon the noble in favor of the pleasant, with the former ceasing to exert any hold over them Instead they assimilate the two, and here the noble shares the fate of the useful, another (if grayer) barrier to losing oneself in present pleasures As the useful (*chrēsimon*) shrinks to immediate gratification and whatever procures it, so does the noble, so that what before appeared merely pleasant or a means to pleasure now seems shining or honorable as well Moderation, severed from any prospect of reaping the anticipated benefits, appears the part of a fool, a slavish bondage to outworn constraints The appeal of (and to) the noble thus persists, but to the confusion of all decency and above all of the proud self-restraint which in better times expresses nobility of soul

Lastly Thucydides records the crime wave for which the collapse of the noble into the pleasant would naturally pave the way. Absent fear of disgrace, the restraints of last resort are fear of gods and law of men, but these now avail nothing If the gods cannot or will not protect their worshippers why think that they would punish transgressors? Law of men fails because law *is* law (that is to say is effective as law) only when it commands and not merely counsels, and it commands only where it can punish Where there is no fear of punishment there is then no law, relieved of this fear by their fear of the plague, men take whatever they can grab What is more, they believe that they have it coming to them. Sentence having been pronounced on them prior to the offense, they balk at perishing with their books unbalanced and without even a crime to fit the punishment (cf Xenophon's *Apology*

Socrates 28.) Whatever the dejection (*athymia*, literally, "want of spirit") which overwhelmed the actual victims of the plague (2.51.4), those still waiting for the ax to fall display spirit of a sort. They fight back, pathetically but as best they can, at a fate which they have done nothing to earn (and which, after the manner of most human beings, they persist in viewing in terms of justice). Doomed to end their lives with a whimper, they permit themselves a last squawk, that enjoying life a little is the goal suggests that their crimes are petty not great. Here, in sharp contrast to the presentation of *stasis*, there is no mention of greed, ambition, lust to rule, or of settling scores with (human) enemies; it would not be surprising if such scorching passions succumbed to the clammy chill of the plague. (The Athenian people as a whole, however, do go so far as to avenge themselves on Perikles for the plague by fining and temporarily deposing him [2.59, 65.1].)

For all its ravages, then, the plague succeeded in wringing from men neither their susceptibility to honor nor their sense of fairness. Rather it perverted or inverted these, leaving honor an inducement to debauchery and the sense of fairness a spur to injustice, in defiance of an arbitrary verdict which was not society's but from which society offered no protection. Justice, such as it was—such as it still figured in these lives of utmost desperation—was now itself a force tending to the dissolution of society.

Conclusion

Plague and *stasis* comprise opposite routes to the disintegration of the city: they are the extremes between which all normal politics lies which as such help clarify the conditions of political normality. *Stasis* displays the consequences of the radical "politicization" of life, the plague, those of its depoliticization. I bracket "politicization" because while the partisanship of *stasis* is political, it destroys politics, precisely by subverting all restraints on politics: justice and the common good prove to be deeply indebted to the private. In the case of the plague, on the other hand, the "state" (i.e., law) withers away, ceasing to command mens obedience or even their attention. Both accounts call attention to the body, the mute substratum of political life, out of sight when out of mind, but when troubled the source of the most profound disturbances in the political field. In the case of *stasis*, the real or anticipated threat to the body is itself of political origin: the interruption of daily supplies as a result of the vicissitudes of war. The response is therefore political: a struggle for mastery in the city which, by the strange logic of violence, breeds heedlessness of that very survival the insecurity of which spurred *stasis* in the first place. In the case of the plague the enemy is nonhuman, divine or natural but mysterious, and does not except incidentally lead to strife among human beings. Rather than poison civic relations it overwhelms them. It is not self-forgetting hatred which seizes men but a pro-

found apathy towards everything but scratching the itches of their
Yet here too the consequence is paradoxical: men both live for their
and act as if they were free of them, it is because hopelessness frees
anxiety for their bodies that they are so free to indulge them. *Stasis* and
concur in suggesting that there can be no greater political misfortune
than to be free from the constraints normally posed for them by their

From which we may conclude that both plague and *stasis* comment
Funeral Oration, that noblest of all visions of political life to be foun
pages of Thucydides. Perikles eulogizes citizens who, while retainir
individuality or fundamental self-concern, have emancipated the
their bodies, and live in anticipation of a glorious immortality for wh
were they exchange their bodies in their boundless devotion to Athe
city (2 43 2–3) Perikles does not go so far as to forbid the Athenians
for the survival of their bodies (2 43 1), or even to hope to acquire the
of their comfort and delectation (2 42 4) He does insist of them, h
that when vengeance on the city's enemies beckons, they resolutely
other hopes aside (ibid), care for the body is licit only to the extent t
will lay it down for the city Not that Perikles can or does forbid th
nians all attachment to flesh of their flesh He does insist, however, th
regard their children primarily as a resource for the city (2 44) Ero
tions he plays down entirely, while urging the citizens to enter into o
the city (2 43 1) Beautiful or mad as this may sound, Thucydides k
cases of the realization of this dream of liberation from the constraint
body—two such cases

The Funeral Oration, despite or because of its genre, consisten
stracts from death and the body The plague, by contrast, brings h
both the Athenians and the reader the primacy and frailty of the body (S
1964, pp 194–95, 229 n 92) and the extent to which politics as usual
nothing of the great politics urged by Perikles, depends on forgetful
these The plague displays the abyss that yawns when men can no lon
the city for their bodies The prospect of imminent death spurs men
in and for the moment, but the moment inevitably eclipses the city

Political life depends on hopes and fears for the future, and there
the expectation of one In particular the quests for honor and safety a
men's behavior in society we act so as to deserve the praise and av
anger of our fellows (Utility too, to the extent that it shapes politica
preeminently a future utility.) The city both coaxes and coerces a cer
difference to the pleasures and pains, the gains and losses of the mom
parading greater and worse ones in the future. The plague pre-empt
blandishments and so stifles political life. With nothing either to hope
from their fellow citizens, men immerse themselves in such pleasure
pend only on themselves, but on themselves as transformed by the
ference to the future, and the godlike (if fleeting) impunity which th

fers. Society proves to depend more fundamentally on men's hopes and fears for their bodies than (as Perikles would appear to wish) on their capacity to overcome these. In fact men cease to fear for their bodies only when they lose all hope for them, as in the case of the plague, and there the consequence of their ceasing to fear for them is a headlong rush to indulge them. The situation under *stasis* is different: there men continue to fear but despair of any solid security. The consequences are similar, however. In an ugly parody of the course commended by Perikles to the Athenians in their dealings with foreign enemies (2.42.4), the various parties, not out of free and noble choice but swept away by the torrent of violence, come to prefer vengeance upon their fellow citizens to their own safety.

Society then owes its stability largely to the ballast provided by our everyday concerns for the body and our ability to satisfy them, and most of all to our fear of death, coupled with the hope of postponing it. Thus far, at least, Thucydides corrects the funeral oration and anticipates a more moderate position. Not Hobbes's position, however, for Thucydides knows better than to anticipate Hobbes in hoping for too much from fear. He knows that men are readier to hope than to fear, and that we promptly forget even our best founded fears at the beckoning of groundless hopes. Hobbes's protoliberal solution to the political problem requires us to place our reason squarely in the service of our fears; Thucydides insists that reason tends to be dazzled and corrupted by our hopes. Men and even more so cities can never be counted upon to act on even the most reasonable fears: although fear may compel those whom it seizes, its grip is fickle and unpredictable, in particular its grip upon reason (cf. 3.45, 4.61–63, 4.108.4, 5.102–103). Nor, as we have noted, has Thucydides any faith in "development": prosperous cities (and citizens) are not a whit less likely to go awry than poor ones.

Like Hobbes, then, Thucydides stresses the depths into which fear may prevent us from sinking, without however offering Hobbes's hopes of effectively actualizing its benefits. He knows of only two cities that have succeeded in acting more or less consistently on reasonable fears: Sparta and Chios (cf. 8.24 with 8.40). In both of these cases the ineluctable persistence of a pressing danger has inspired a regime of steady habits of collectively self-protective virtue. If Hobbes stresses the solidity, Thucydides underscores the fragility of the floor furnished by fear, which is necessary but by no means sufficient for ensuring decent political restraint. And of the Spartans at least we must add that their habits are in fact too fearful: moderate in prosperity, they are too readily dejected in adversity (cf. 1.84.2 and 4.18.4 with 1.0.3, 4.15–20, 4.55–56). They lack, moreover, the decisiveness and daring needed for success in both diplomacy and war (8.96). Besides which their fearfulness is incompatible with magnanimity in their dealings with others; they are always looking anxiously over their shoulders and so see only to their safety and interests (5.105–109, cf. 3.68).

One last point concerning the distinctiveness of Thucydides' treatment. As we have seen in the case of *stasis*, the worst thing about the worst is its lethal enmity towards the better men (cf. also 2 51.5 on the plague). So stated Thucydides' concerns sound closer to those of Plato and Aristotle than to those of Hobbes, again his political orientation is not simply negative. This explains why he is not simply "conservative," why Sparta must share his admiration with Athens Each city achieves its distinctive excellence, Athens the more imposing but riskier one, Athens rises higher to fall lower. The worst too Thucydides views from the perspective of the better men without impugning their superiority, he shows them what they have to lose if, taking its political standing for granted, they fail to prevent things from getting out of hand He reminds them that even the most "Athenian" of men depends on "Sparta", that whenever life's fragile steadiness is shattered there is danger that the dregs will rise to the top. The crowning evil of anarchy is that it delivers the better men gift-wrapped to the worst ones In normal times this much at least can be avoided, which is not to say that good men have clear sailing But I have already said that for Thucydides the depths of politics are yawning, not the heights.

Manuscript submitted 23 November 1987
Final manuscript received 22 February 1988

References

Bodin, Louis, Jacqueline de Romilly, and Raymond Weil, eds and trans 1963–1972 *Thucydide Guerre du Péloponnèse* 5 vols in 6 Paris Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres

Cogan, Marc 1981 *The Human Thing The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides History* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Connor, W Robert 1984 *Thucydides* Princeton Princeton University Press

Davis, Michael 1986 Aristotle's Reflections on Revolution In Davis, ed , *Essays in Honor of Richard Kennington Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, *11 (2)* 49–63

Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1975 *On Thucydides* W Kendrick Pritchett trans Berkeley University of California Press

Edmunds, Lowell 1975 Thucydides Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 79 73–92

Gomme, A W 1956 *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* Vol 2 Oxford Clarendon Press

Grene, David 1965 *Greek Political Theory* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Hobbes, Thomas 1975 *Hobbes's Thucydides* Richard J Schlatter, ed New Brunswick NJ Rutgers University Press

Hogan, John T 1980 The *Axiosis* of Words at Thucydides 3 82 4 *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 21 139–50

Kagan, Donald 1974 *The Archidamian War* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Macleod, C W 1979 Thucydides on Faction (3 82–83) *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 205 52–69

Milosz, Czeslaw 1983 *The Witness of Poetry* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Muri, Walter 1969 Politische Metonomasie (zu Thukydides 3, 82, 4–5) *Museum Helveticum* 26 65–79

Pouncey, Peter R 1980 *The Necessities of War A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism* New York Columbia University Press

Proctor, Dennis 1980 *The Experience of Thucydides* Warminster, Eng Aris and Phillips

Stahl, Hans-Peter 1966 *Thukydides Die Stellung des Menschen im Geschichtlichen Prozess* Munich C H Beck

Strauss, Leo 1964 [1977] *The City and Man* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Wilson, John 1982 The Customary Meanings of Words Were Changed—Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides 3 82 4 *Classical Quarterly*, 32 (1) 18–20

——— 1987 *Athens and Corcyra Strategy and Tactics in the Peloponnesian War* Bristol Bristol Classical Press

Clifford Orwin is associate professor of political science, University of Toronto, Canada M5S 1A1

Economic Conditions, Causal Attributi and Political Evaluations in the 1984 Presidential Election

Alan I. Abran
Emory Un
David J. L
Illinois State Un
Subha R
State University of New York at Stony

Using data from the 1984 American National Election Study, this paper examines t ence of personal finances on political evaluations Evaluations of the presidential ca were affected by perceived changes in personal economic well-being only among citi held the government or society responsible for these changes Attributions of resp were, in turn, related to the direction of change in financial well-being and to politi est—those citizens whose economic well-being had declined and those who followed paign closely were more likely to attribute responsibility to the government (or soci those whose circumstances had improved, and those who paid less attention to the c

There is no longer much question about whether or not voters r changes in the economy Starting with the work of Mueller (1970) and I (1971), a large body of evidence has accumulated indicating that c sional election results and presidential popularity ratings are influen least in part, by fluctuations in a number of economic indicators these indicators are inflation (Kenski, 1977, Kernell, 1978, Monroe Hibbs, 1982, MacKuen, 1983, and Norpoth, 1984), real disposable (Kramer, 1971, Tufte, 1975, Bloom and Price, 1975, Hibbs, 1982, I 1987, and Abramowitz and Segal, 1986), and unemployment (Muelle Hibbs, 1982, and MacKuen, 1983) Such findings have survived nu operational definitions, control variables, and statistical techniques S for the viewpoint that economics is strongly related to political outc practically unanimous (for dissenting voices, see Stigler, 1973, Yantek

The data used in this paper were made available by the InterUniversity Consortium f cal and Social Research Neither the collector of the data nor the consortium is respo the analyses and interpretations presented here The authors would like to than Iyengar, Jeffrey Segal, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and sug

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol 50, No 4, November 1988

There is less consensus, however, on the question of how voters evaluate economic information. Do voters judge political leaders on the basis of their personal economic well-being (the "pocketbook" voting hypothesis), or on the basis of national economic conditions (the "sociotropic" voting hypothesis) as some recent studies (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979) have suggested?

The answer to this question may depend on how voters assign causal responsibility for changes in their personal financial circumstances Social psychologists have found that such causal attributions have powerful effects on opinions, attitudes, and behavior in a variety of domains including emotions (Schachter, 1964, Weiner, 1985), self-image (Bem, 1967, Lepper and Greene, 1978), impressions of others, and assignment of blame or credit for events (Schneider et al., 1982) Recently, political scientists have begun to explore the effects of causal attributions on evaluations of political leaders and voting behavior (Lau and Sears, 1981, Feldman, 1982, Peffley and Williams, 1985)

The key variable affecting political evaluations seems to be the location of responsibility for changes in economic well-being Citizens who attribute re- ›nsibility for their situation to purely personal factors such as changes in › or family circumstances (a child going to college, a spouse taking a job, a ›motion, etc) do not translate such changes into political evaluations ›wever, citizens who view their economic situations as dependent on gov- ›ment policies or macroeconomic conditions affected by government poli- ›s (such as inflation or recession) may translate changes in their personal cumstances into political evaluations Both Lau and Sears (1981) and Feld- ›n (1982) found that among voters who attributed responsibility for their rsonal finances to government policies or macroeconomic conditions, or ›o blamed the president for personal economic hardships, personal eco- mic circumstances did influence evaluations of the president and voting cisions However, both of these studies found that relatively few voters ›igned responsibility to the government or macroeconomic conditions for anges in their personal economic well-being As a result, the overall im- ›t of such "pocketbook" evaluations was rather weak

Why do most voters attribute responsibility for their economic condition personal factors? Feldman (1982) argued that belief in economic individu- sm causes many Americans to blame themselves for their economic prob- ns The belief that success comes to those who are willing to work hard, › "American Dream," is widespread and leads to attitudes of self-reliance ›hlozman and Verba, 1979, Brody and Sniderman, 1977) Economic indi- lualism consists of two dimensions belief in the "work ethic," and belief ›t the opportunity for advancement is available to all Feldman found that ›ong respondents giving societal explanations for their personal economic cumstances, adherence to economic individualism was very low Those ›ing personal explanations, however, were strongly committed to the ›ork ethic" and the concept of equal opportunity

These findings indicate that causal attributions provide a key link between

personal economic well-being and political evaluations However, all of the previous studies leave some major questions unanswered. What, for example, is the relative role of personal economic well-being and national economic conditions in political evaluations? Voters who attribute responsibility to the government (or society) for changes in their personal situation may see a close connection between their own well-being and the state of the national economy Also, what factors affect voters' attributions of responsibility for changes in their economic circumstances? Feldman argued that it is a belief in economic individualism We argue that other variables may be equally or more important, including attention to cues from the media regarding the locus of responsibility for economic problems


SETTING AND DATA

In 1980, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan suggested that Americans ask themselves whether or not they were better off financially than they had been four years earlier, at the beginning of Jimmy Carter's administration It is not surprising, therefore, that this question was one of the key issues in the 1984 presidential campaign when President Reagan sought another four years in the White House Despite a deep recession during 1982, by election day of 1984 most Americans were apparently satisfied with their economic situation, and Reagan won a landslide victory over his challenger Walter Mondale

Although it is clear that the economy was one of the key issues in the 1984 presidential campaign, it is not clear how economic conditions affected voter attitudes and decision making The question of the relative importance of "sociotropic" and "pocketbook" voting is especially interesting in connection with the 1984 presidential election because the Reagan administration's policies of cutting taxes and reducing spending on social programs were much more beneficial to some segments of American society than to others Real disposable income per capita rose by about 9% during Ronald Reagan's first four years in the White House (compared with an increase of about 5% under Jimmy Carter) However, because of reductions in transfer payments and increased social security taxes, the change in cash income for lower income families (earning $10,000 or less) was −1 2% (Bawden and Levy, 1982)

The data used in this study come from the 1984 American National Election Study In addition to the usual questions asking respondents to assess changes in their personal financial situation during the preceding year, an open-ended follow-up question asked respondents why they thought their situation had improved, deteriorated, or remained unchanged Up to three responses were coded We use the answers to these open-ended questions to determine attributions of responsibility for changes in financial well-being Responses were coded as either "personal" or "societal" (see appendix) Explanations for changes in financial circumstances were coded "personal

FIGURE 1
A MODEL OF CANDIDATE PREFERENCE IN THE 1984 ELECTION



ey referred only to events involving the respondent and his or her immedi-
family Explanations were coded as "societal" if they referred to either
acroeconomic conditions (such as inflation or unemployment) or to govern-
ent policies.[1] Explanations that did not fit into these two categories were
eated as missing data

Model of Candidate Support in 1984

In figure 1, we present a model of presidential preference in the 1984
ection. Our major independent variables are respondents' assessments of

Feldman (1982) combines macroeconomic attributions and governmental attributions into
"societal" attributions category We examined macroeconomic and governmental attribu-
ns separately and found that the behavior of these groups is too similar to warrant two sepa-
categories Therefore, like Feldman, we combine macroeconomic and governmental at-
utions into one group

change in their own personal economic fortunes and those of the nation as a whole It is hypothesized that positive economic assessments (both personal and national) should bolster the standing of the incumbent party and its president, Ronald Reagan. Likewise, negative responses should hurt Mr Reagan's popularity and thus his electoral prospects.

We also assume a causal link between personal and national economic evaluations Attitudes toward changes in personal economic conditions are probably more central and salient to the respondent than attitudes toward the national economy Social psychology informs us that more central attitudes can influence the formation of less central attitudes (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, Krosnick, 1986) Therefore, voters can use the state of their personal finances to judge the condition of the national economy While other information about national economic fortunes is available (through the news media, for example), there should also be a tendency to personalize national evaluations, believing that if things are going well or poorly for their families, this is probably also the case for the country as a whole

Our independent variables are not objective measures of the economy (both personal and national) but rather are the voters' *perceptions* of the economy. These perceptions may be influenced by a variety of forces Party identification and ideology, for example, may color voters' opinions about the economy If a voter supports the party in power or its policies, he or she might be more eager to accept claims that finances (both personal and national) are improving A citizen less enamored with the governing party might feel much less positive about his own economic well-being, and that of the country These effects should be particularly strong among those who attribute changes in their own finances to "societal" factors Such voters tend to think of economic fortunes in political (rather than personal) terms and are thus more likely to use political cues (such as party ID and ideology) in assessing the state of their economic circumstances

In keeping with the work of Lau and Sears (1981) among others, we also include a number of demographic control variables It is well known that the finances of women and minorities usually lag behind those of white males This may result in very different perceptions of economic well-being when our sample is broken down by gender and race Moreover, given the overwhelming support of black voters for the Democratic party, and the "gender gap," these variables may also exhibit an important direct effect on candidate evaluations Similarly, the family income of respondents might have some effect on assessments of personal and national economics, as well as on political evaluations

Our dependent variable is the difference between respondents thermometer score ratings of President Reagan and those of his challenger Walter Mondale. The same dependent variable is used by Page and Jones (197 for the 1972 and 1976 elections, by Niemi and Bartels (1985) for the 19

ection, and by Krosnick (1986) for the 1968, 1980, and 1984 elections This riable should be an accurate measure of a respondent's electoral prefer-ice. Voters who rate one candidate higher than the other will almost cer-inly support that candidate's election Further, the wider the gap between e ratings, the more confident we can be of that choice Thus, this variable ves us a great deal more information than the simpler question of vote oice. We are given some idea about the strength of preferences If eco-mic fluctuations influence evaluations of presidential performance, they ould affect not only voters' actual electoral choices but also the strength of eir feelings toward the candidates [2]

Our primary concern is with the role of attributions of responsibility in iking voters' assessments of their personal economic situation with their aluations of the presidential candidates If voters blame their economic oes on personal circumstances, we would not expect them to punish the esident or his party If, on the other hand, they attribute their plight to the vernment (or society), we should see some relationship between personal onomics and political evaluations To this end, we will divide the electo-te into two groups One group will consist of voters who, in their open-ided responses, give at least one governmental or societal explanation for ianges in their personal economic fortunes The other group will consist of ters who make only personal attributions According to this criterion, 49% respondents were classified in the "societal" attributions group, while 51% ere classified in the "personal" attributions group The causal model dis-ayed in figure 1 will be estimated separately for each of these groups

Table 1 presents the regression estimates for the respondents who make ily "personal" attributions In this group, national economic evaluations id party identification are the dominant influences on candidate evalua-ons The direct causal link between personal economics and candidate sup-rt is not statistically significant The relationship between personal and na-onal economic evaluations is statistically significant but not substantively eaningful Among these voters, the only economic voting taking place is ociotropic," based on national assessments Personal economic conditions parently have no political impact Our demographic control variables ith the exception of ideology) exert some influence on both voters' percep-ons of national (and, to a much lesser extent, personal) economic fortunes id their evaluations of the candidates Their total contribution to explaining ndidate support, however, is not substantial

Table 2, which considers those voters who make at least one "societal at-bution, tells a very different story Here, some "pocketbook" voting is ap-rently taking palce. The link between personal economic fortunes and can-

[2] The Pearson product moment correlation between our dependent variable and the vote ce is 0 97.

TABLE 1

REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR THE "PERSONAL" ATTRIBUTIONS GROUP

Variable	Beta	F
Dependent Variable = Personal Economic Condition		
Party Identification	15	(18 1)
Gender	− 06	(2 9)
Race	02	(2)
Income	11	(10 4)
Ideology	− 06	(2 8)
Dependent Variable = National Economic Condition		
Personal Economic Condition	15	(25 9)
Party Identification	34	(124 2)
Gender	− 12	(14 9)
Race	− 12	(15 8)
Income	11	(11 9)
Ideology	− 02	(3)
Dependent Variable = Candidate Preference		
National Economic Condition	22	(64 7)
Personal Economic Condition	01	(4)
Party Identification	55	(446 6)
Gender	00	(0 0)
Race	− 12	(23 1)
Income	07	(8 1)
Ideology	04	(2 8)
Total Effects on Candidate Preference		
National Economic Conditions	22	
Personal Economic Conditions	03	
Party Identification	63	
Gender	− 02	
Race	− 14	
Income	10	
Ideology	00	

didate evaluations is statistically significant and substantively meaning The relationship between personal and national evaluations has grown and now quite strong. The demographic variables show essentially the sa effects here as they did for the "personal" attributions group

As anticipated, party identification influences personal economic asse ments much more in the "societal" attributions group than it does in t "personal" attributions group. In addition, party ID and national econom assessments remain important to candidate evaluations, the rise in se interested evaluations has not diluted the role of partisan and "sociotrop judgments. Looking at the total effect of each independent variable over possible paths, personal economic evaluations and national assessments a

now of roughly equal importance Among those who blame or credit the government (or society) for their personal economic situation, both "sociotropic" and "pocketbook" voting are occurring

Our results, then, tell us a great deal about the role of attributions of responsibility in economic voting, and about the relationship between "sociotropic" and "pocketbook" evaluations Where voters see no connection between their own economic circumstances and national conditions, they are unwilling to punish or reward political leaders as their personal fortunes change However, when voters consider the government (or society) to have at least some influence over their personal finances, "pocketbook" voting does take place Further, these "pocketbook" voters tend to see a much stronger

TABLE 2

REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR THE "SOCIETAL" ATTRIBUTIONS GROUP

Variable	Beta	F
Dependent Variable = Personal Economic Condition		
Party Identification	32	(97 9)
Gender	- 02	(7)
Race	- 06	(3 3)
Income	24	(55 1)
Ideology	- 04	(1 5)
Dependent Variable = National Economic Condition		
Personal Economic Condition	35	(127 2)
Party Identification	27	(77 4)
Gender	- 10	(10 9)
Race	- 10	(10 3)
Income	09	(5 6)
Ideology	- 07	(5 5)
Dependent Variable = Candidate Preference		
National Economic Condition	22	(57 1)
Personal Economic Condition	14	(29 0)
Party Identification	49	(356 7)
Gender	- 01	(5)
Race	- 11	(20 1)
Income	02	(5)
Ideology	- 01	(3)
Total Effects on Candidate Preference		
National Economic Condition	22	
Personal Economic Condition	22	
Party Identification	62	
Gender	- 02	
Race	- 13	
Income	07	
Ideology	- 01	

relationship between their own economic situation and that of the n whole Also, voters who blame or credit the government for their nomic fortunes appear to evaluate their personal finances in a very manner, by contrast, partisanship plays a much smaller role in the economic evaluations of strictly "sociotropic" voters Finally, the demographic factors on perceptions of economic conditions is mini

It is clear that attributions of responsibility for economic conditi an important effect on evaluations of the presidential candidates, b known about why some voters attribute responsibility to the govern society) while others do not In the following section, we will attem termine what characteristics distinguish voters in each of these gr this way, we will have a better understanding of who the "sociotro "pocketbook" voters are

Determinants of Attributions of Responsibility

As we noted above, Feldman (1982, 1984) argues that the primar why many voters fail to attribute responsibility for personal econ cumstances to the government is their belief in economic individual 1984 SRC study contains eight questions which tap the major dime economic individualism, adherence to the work ethic, and belief in portunity A factor analysis (principal components with orthogonal ro these questions reveals a two-factor solution The first factor, "work e plains about 30% of the variance, while "equal opportunity," the se tor, explains about 15% No other statistically or substantively signif tors were found Table 3 contains the results of the factor analysis T variables are computed which will be used in later analysis. Belie nomic individualism may affect the probability that an individua tribute responsibility to society or to himself It may be useful, ho consider other explanations as well

Weiner et al. (1972) demonstrate that people are more likely to responsibility to themselves for an outcome if that outcome is perce success Likewise, the probability of attributing responsibility to so tors increases for results perceived as failures As such, it is likely th who have experienced a negative change in their personal finance more likely to attribute responsibility for this change to nonpersona cietal") factors Similarly, those respondents who are unemployed s less likely to attribute responsibility to personal factors than those employed

In order to see society as responsible for one's personal finances, vidual may need certain cognitive abilities. Wolfinger and Rosenston among others, suggest that a person's level of education can effect h ability to understand the political world Therefore, we expect vo higher levels of education to be more likely to attribute responsibili

TABLE 3

FACTOR STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM ITEMS

Belief	F1 Work Ethic	F2 Equal Opp	h^2
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed	05	27	08
Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame	40	− 17	19
Hard work offers little guarantee of success	− 29	44	27
One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance	− 18	50	29
If people work hard they almost always get what they want	68	− 13	46
Most people who do not get ahead in life probably work as hard as people who do	− 19	55	34
Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding	67	− 07	45
Even if people try hard they often cannot reach their goals	− 17	35	15
Variance Explained	29 8%	15 3%	

cietal" factors, since they are better able to perceive the influence of government policies and macroeconomic fluctuations on their own economic fortunes

In experimental studies, Iyengar (1986) found that the media can mold the causal attributions of subjects Specifically those subjects who were exposed o television news had a tendency to make more "societal" attributions than ubjects less exposed Iyengar and Kinder (1987) relate this phenomenon of priming" directly to assessments of the president and the national govern-ent They argue that the extent to which television news coverage empha-zes the role and influence of the president on an issue has a major impact how voters evaluate that issue and the president's handling of it As such, e expect political interest to be an important clue to whether a voter at-butes responsibility to him/herself or to society A voter interested in the mpaign receives many reminders from the media about the influence of national government's economic policies over his or her personal finan-. Therefore, we expect voters interested in the campaign to be more ly to attribute responsibility for their personal finances to "societal fac- than voters who are less interested

In this study we hypothesize that media attention influences attributions of responsibility, rather than the other way around. Experimental results, such as those discussed earlier, give us strong reason to believe that this is the case In addition, we would argue that political interest in general, and attention to campaign news in particular, represent more central orientations than attributions of responsibility for current economic conditions. As noted earlier, the literature in social and cognitive psychology points out that central attitudes generally influence less central attitudes. While it is certainly possible that some voters are drawn to the media by concerns about the government's role in their own changing economic fortunes, the causal ordering hypothesized here appears more plausible

Individuals dependent upon the federal government for a large portion of their income are probably more likely to view the government as responsible for their personal finances than those who are not One such group are the retired, most of whom receive a large portion of their income through the national government's social security program Thus, retired voters should be more likely than other voters to attribute responsibility for their economic fortunes to "societal" factors

Using the 1984 SRC/CPS study, we can test how each of these variables affects the likelihood that respondents will consider society (or themselves) responsible for their personal economic well-being The dependent variable in our analysis is the attribution of responsibility, which is coded zero for "societal" attributions and one for "personal" attributions As this variable is dichotomous, probit analysis is used The variables that may influence the probability an individual will view societal or personal factors responsible for his or her personal economic condition are belief in the work ethic, belief in the existence of equal opportunity, being financially better or worse off being unemployed, education, interest in the campaign (see appendix 2) and whether or not the respondent is retired Party identification, ideology and gender are included as control variables The results of the probit analysis are reported in table 4

As we can see, the model does a good job of explaining the attributions of responsibility The overall model is statistically significant at the .001 level as determined by the $-2 \times LLR$ statistic The mean of the dependent variable is .49. Given no further information, we could correctly predict a person's attribution of responsibility 51% of the time By adding our independent variables, we correctly predict 62% of the cases for a reduction in error of 22%

The estimates for interest in the campaign, belief in the work ethic and being better or worse off are statistically significant and are in the expected direction. As interest in the 1984 campaign increases, the probability of attributing responsibility to societal factors increases Belief in the work ethic is a factor variable comprised of the eight questions shown in table 3 Th

TABLE 4

PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Variable	MLE	S E	MLE/S E
Education	− 00	00	−0 69
Party Identification	− 02	02	−1 28
Ideology	− 02	02	−1 49
Interest in Campaign	− 13	03	−4 45**
Gender	32	07	−4 41**
Unemployed	− 13	16	−0 83
Retired	− 19	10	−1 88
Work Ethic	− 09	05	−1 99*
Personal Economic Condition	21	03	6 88**
Equal Opportunity	− 02	05	−0 48
Constant	− 07		
Est R^2	12		
−2 X *LLR* (X^2 10)	101 61**		
Mean of dependent variable	49		
Percent predicted correctly	62		

n = 1392

*p < 05

**p < 001

smaller the value of this variable, the greater the adherence to the work ethic The negative direction of the estimate indicates that the less credence one gives to the work ethic, the greater the probability of attributing responsibility to society for personal economic conditions The direction of financial change has the greatest impact on our dependent variable Changes in personal economic conditions range from −2 (much worse off) to +2 (much better off) Thus, the better off one is, the greater the probability that one will attribute responsibility to personal factors The estimate for the gender variable is also statistically significant This variable takes on a value of one for males and two for females The positive direction of the estimate suggests that women are more likely than men to attribute responsibility to personal factors We suspect that this is due to socialization differences between men and women Women may be socialized to perceive that personal factors are more salient than external factors

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings presented indicate that "pocketbook" voting depends upon e ability of citizens to connect changes in their personal financial situation broader economic trends and government policies Almost half of the merican electorate in 1984 mentioned either government policies or macro-

economic trends as factors responsible for changes in their personal financial situation. Among this group, evaluations of presidential candidates were directly influenced by perceived changes in personal finances, as well as by perceptions of the state of the national economy. Moreover, perceptions of the national economy were themselves strongly influenced by changes in personal finances. By contrast, among voters who cited purely personal reasons for changes in their financial situation, personal finances had no influence on evaluations of the presidential candidates and very little influence on perceptions of the national economy.

Personal problems become politicized when voters see a connection between their own problems and broader societal trends or government policies (Brody and Sniderman, 1977). But why do some voters perceive such a connection while others do not? Feldman (1982) argued that Americans tend to blame themselves rather than the government for financial problems because they adhere to an ideology of economic individualism which stresses personal responsibility for economic success or failure. In 1984, however, about half of the American electorate believed that government policies or macroeconomic trends beyond their control were at least partially responsible for changes in their economic circumstances. Further, belief in economic individualism had only a weak effect on attributions of responsibility for changes in personal finances—voters who supported the principles of economic individualism in the abstract were only slightly less likely to connect their personal financial situation to macroeconomic trends or government policies than voters who rejected these principles.

The strongest influence on attributions of responsibility for changes in personal finances was the direction of the change itself. Those who felt that their economic situation had declined tended to blame their misfortune on "societal" factors, those whose financial circumstances had improved tended to attribute responsibility to themselves. Beyond this "congratulation/rationalization" effect, the most important influence on causal attributions was interest in the political campaign. Voters who followed the presidential campaign closely in the media were more likely to connect their personal financial situation with macroeconomic trends or government policies than citizens who paid less attention to the campaign. This finding suggests that attributions of responsibility for changes in economic well-being are based in part on cues received from the political environment and particularly from the mass media. In 1984, the economy was the most salient issue in the political campaign (according to the 1984 SRC survey, 58.9% of respondents named the economy as the "most important problem" facing the country). Media coverage of this issue may have helped voters to perceive the consequences of government policies and macroeconomic trends for their own financial situation. If this is the case, then attributions of responsibility by voters for their economic well-being may vary over time depending on the extent and

content of media coverage of economic issues In summary, our data suggest that "pocketbook" voting becomes more prevalent during economic downturns, especially if media coverage emphasizes government responsibility for economic conditions. Future research should examine in depth the relationships among media coverage, attributions of responsibility, and "pocketbook" voting.

Manuscript submitted 27 March 1987
Final manuscript received 11 November 1987

APPENDIX 1

Codings for "Societal" and "Personal" Economic Attributions (from footnote 5 of 1984 SRC Codebook for Variables 141 144, and 147)

Societal 101 through 114, 118 through 199, 301 through 306 309 through 316, 320 through 324, 331, 332, 339 through 345, 349 350, 360 through 362 397 through 399 401, 403, 405, 410, 419, 501, 509, 510

Personal 312, 330, 342, 402 404, 406 through 409 411 through 413 502 504 through 506, 511 517 through 519

APPENDIX 2

Variables Used to Compute Index of Political Interest

Variable 75—Respondent's interest in the campaign

Variable 111—How often does respondent watch national network news?

Variable 114—How much attention did the respondent give to the presidential campaign news on television?

Variable 116—How much attention did the respondent give to the presidential campaign news in the newspaper?

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan I , and Jeffrey A Segal 1986 Determinants of the Outcomes of U S Senate Elections *Journal of Politics* 48 433-39

Bawden, Lee, and Frank Levy 1982 The Economic Well-Being of Families and Individuals In John L Palmer and Isabel V Sawhill eds *The Reagan Experiment* Washington DC The Urban Institute Press

Bem, Darryl 1967 Self-Perception An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena *Psychological Review*, 74 183-200

Bloom, Howard S , and H Douglas Price 1975 Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession *American Political Science Review*, 69 1240-54

Brody, Richard A , and Paul M Sniderman 1977 From Life Space to Polling Place The Relevance of Personal Concerns for Voting Behavior *British Journal of Political Science* 7 337-60

Feldman, Stanley 1982 Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 446-65

——— 1984 Economic Self-Interest and the Vote Evidence and Meaning *Political Behavior* 6 229-51

Hibbs, Douglas A Jr , with R Douglas Rivers and Nicholas Vasilatos 1982 On the Demand

for Economic Outcomes *Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany* *Journal of Politics*, 44 426–61

Iyengar, Shanto 1986 Framing Effects in Politics The Case of Television News Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington DC

Iyengar Shanto, and Donald R Kinder 1987 *News That Matters* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Kenski, Henry C 1977 The Impact of Economic Conditions on Presidential Popularity *Journal of Politics*, 39 764–73

Kernell, Samuel 1978 Explaining Presidential Popularity *American Political Science Review* 72 506–22

Kinder, Donald R , and D Roderick Kiewiet 1979 Economic Grievances and Political Behavior The Role of Personal Discontents and Collective Judgments in Congressional Voting *American Journal of Political Science*, 23 495–527

Kramer, Gerald H 1971 Short-Term Fluctuations in U S Voting Behavior, 1896–1964 *American Political Science Review*, 65 131–43

Krosnick, John 1986 Policy Voting in American Presidential Elections An Application of Psychological Theory to American Politics Ph D Dissertation, Department of Psychology University of Michigan

Lanoue, David J 1987 Economic Prosperity and Presidential Popularity Sorting Out the Effects *Western Political Quarterly* 40 237–45

Lau, Richard R , and David O Sears 1981 Cognitive Links Between Economic Grievances and Political Responses *Political Behavior*, 3 279–302

Lepper, Mark R , and David Greene 1978 *The Hidden Costs of Reward* Hillsdale Lawrence Erlbaum

MacKuen, Michael B 1983 Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity *American Journal of Political Science*, 27 165–92

Monroe, Kristen R 1978 Economic Influences on Presidential Popularity *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42 360–69

Mueller, John E 1970 Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson *American Political Science Review*, 64 18–34

Niemi, Richard J , and Larry Bartels 1985 New Measures of Issue Salience An Evaluation *Journal of Politics*, 47 1212–20

Norpoth, Helmut 1984 Economics, Politics, and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity *Political Behavior*, 6 253–73

Page, Benjamin I , and Calvin C Jones 1979 Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences Party Loyalties, and the Vote *American Political Science Review* 73 1071–89

Peffley, Mark, and John T Williams 1985 Attributing Presidential Responsibility for National Economic Problems *American Politics Quarterly*, 13 393–425

Petty, Richard E , and John T Cacioppo 1981 *Attitudes and Persuasion Classic and Contemporary Approaches* Dubuque, IA W C Brown

Schachter, Stanley 1964 The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Components of Emotional State In L Berkowitz, ed , *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* Vol 1 New York Academic Press

Schlozman, Kay L , and Sidney Verba 1979 *Injury to Insult* Cambridge Harvard University Press

Schneider, D , A Hastorf, and P Ellsworth 1979 *Person Perception* Reading Addison Wesley

Stigler, George J 1973 General Economic Conditions and National Elections *American Economic Review*, 63 160–67

Tufte, Edward 1975 Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review*, 69 812–26

Weiner, Bernard, Irene Frieze, Andy Kukla, Linda Reed, Stanley Rest, and Robert M Rosenberg 1972 Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure In Edward E Jones et al , eds , *Attribution Perceiving the Causes of Behavior* Morristown, NJ General Learning Press

——— 1985 Spontaneous Causal Search *Psychological Bulletin* 97 74–94

Wolfinger, Raymond E , and Steven J Rosenstone 1980 *Who Votes?* New Haven Yale University Press

Yantek, Thomas 1982 Public Support for Presidential Performance A Study of Macroeconomic Effects *Polity*, 15 268–78

Alan I Abramowitz is professor of political science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322

David J Lanoue is assistant professor of political science, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61761

Subha Ramesh is a graduate student in political science at the State University of New York, Stony Brook NY 11794

Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules

Joseph Cooper
Rice University
William F. West
Texas A&M University

This article focuses on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of agency rules, a major institutional innovation of the Reagan Administration which established central clearance of administrative rules for the first time in our history. It places OMB review in theoretical perspective by examining the traditional paradigm of public administration, the breakdown of that paradigm, and the manner in which the theory offered to justify OMB review both draws on prior elements of doctrine and combines them in new and distinctive ways. In addition, it measures practice against theory by analyzing the actual impacts of OMB review on presidential power, objective or impartial administrative decision making, and the formal safeguards established by administrative procedures and court review. Finally, the article analyzes the broader institutional significance of OMB review by assessing its theory and practice in terms of their implications for adapting republican political institutions in the United States to an administrative state.

One of the hallmarks of twentieth century American government has been the growth of bureaucratic discretion. If nineteenth century America could be accurately described as "congressional government," twentieth century America is often and aptly characterized as an "administrative state." The terms of this dichotomy are quite suggestive. Over time, the growth of the administrative state has been associated with a decline in congressional power and an expansion in presidential power. This article examines a recent institutional innovation that testifies both to the continuing strength of the long-term trend and to the broader tensions that impede the accommodation of an administrative state to representative democracy in modern America.

In 1981 the Reagan administration established a centralized process of review through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for all rules proposed by Executive Branch agencies. The opening section of this article examines OMB review in conceptual terms by relating its rationale to prior doctrines of public administration. The analysis focuses on three key areas in

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

ich choices among premises and positions must be made if basic institu-nal issues are to be confronted, assessed, and decided These three areas ›: the division of function and power that should exist between the presi-nt and Congress in controlling administrative decision making, the scope reach of objectivity or neutral competence in administrative decision ıking, and the role administrative procedures and the courts should play as ardians of fair and responsible administrative decision making Having ıced the theoretical foundations of OMB review in perspective, the next :tion of the article examines its actual impacts in the same three areas that med our analysis of its doctrinal implications The final section brings both eory and practice to bear to identify the issues and challenges OMB re-ːw presents for the maintenance of a balanced form of government in the ııted States.

OMB Review and the Doctrines of Public Administration

OMB review of administrative rules has emerged through an incremental ocess of institutional change that began in the Nixon administration (Ball, 84) In part, this development has been tied to the tremendous growth of ministrative rulemaking that occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s, and to e frictions generated by such an expansion of bureaucratic power How-er, OMB review has also been energized and legitimated by changes in e manner in which institutional roles and the task of policy analysis are nceptualized Thus, while the rationale offered for OMB review is rooted past patterns of thought, it also transcends them in important respects ıe end result is a challenging reformulation of the traditional doctrines of ıblic administration

ıe Traditional Paradigm of Public Administration

What is commonly referred to as the traditional model or paradigm of pub-› administration dominated thinking about bureaucracy and its role in gov-nment from the late 1800s well into the 1930s The foundation of this ıradigm was the notion that politics and administration were two concep-ally distinct and practically separable activities Politics, which entailed ılue judgments, involved responding to and accommodating society's de-ands through the articulation of policy, while administration in contrast was ı instrumental process of implementing stated policy goals (Henry 1975, ooper, 1984) Although it is doubtful that the most perceptive thinkers of e era believed that such a neat distinction was meaningful in any absolute nse, they did embrace the "politics/administration dichotomy" as a prem-e that was sufficiently viable to permit a coherent set of positions across all ıree key areas of institutional performance and responsibility identified ırlier

The compartmentalization of policymaking and administrative responsibilities permitted a clear differentiation of roles between the president and Congress Policy discretion was the province of Congress, while administration was an executive responsibility. As a result, the president's role as chief executive was objective and managerial, not political. It consisted of organizational design, recruitment, and supervision to ensure faithful policy implementation, as well as the rational coordination of activities within and among agencies The Brownlow Committee report of 1937 aptly reflected this conception of executive responsibility. In justifying its appeal for enhancing presidential power over the Executive branch, the report stated that its recommendations would " retain in the hands of the Congress complete control over the things which are to be done by government, that is, over policy . ," and that the president's task would be "reorganization in accordance with this policy" (Brownlow et al , 1937, p 36).

Similarly, the character of the discretion vested in executive officials posed little problem Given a politics/administration dichotomy, it naturally followed that implementation of the law could and should be neutral or value-free, save for the norm of efficiency Born of the Progressives' reaction against the spoils system, positivist philosophy, and an awareness of the tremendous advances wrought by technology in the industrial revolution, the traditional model held that agency decision making should be governed by substantive expertise and scientifically derived principles of sound administration (Gulick, 1937) Indeed, confidence that expert, scientific administration would lead to the efficient attainment of legislative objectives served as a prime justification for the tremendous expansion of bureaucratic responsibilities during the New Deal

Finally, analysts in the early decades of the twentieth century possessed a consistent and agreed upon set of guidelines concerning the role of the courts and administrative procedures A third element of the traditional paradigm was its highly formalistic conception of the judiciary's role as guarantor of the integrity of the politics/administration dichotomy and the accompanying standard of bureaucratic objectivity According to Richard Stewart, the "traditional model of administrative law" posited that statutes should define clear goals and that agency decision making should be structured in such a way as to ensure the "accurate, impartial, and rational application of legislative directives to given cases or classes of cases" (Stewart, 1975 p 1674) The role of the courts was thus to ensure that the "transmission belt" between legislative direction and executive action did not break down due to arbitrary or capricious interpretation or action However, the traditional model's faith in the scope and power of bureaucratic expertise also meant that judicial review should be exercised with circumspection, that it generally should be confined to procedural considerations and should avoid substantive policy issues (Stewart, 1975, Shapiro, 1982)

The Breakdown of the Traditional Model

Despite the appeal of the traditional paradigm, its prescriptions could not and did not survive the tremendous growth of government activity that the New Deal and Second World War entailed (Waldo, 1948) Politics, of course, had always interpenetrated administration to some extent However, the policy content of agency decisions became increasingly difficult to ignore as broad delegations to the bureaucracy multiplied Even in the 1930s, when the traditional model was still widely accepted, some students of government began to comment that statutes frequently left important political issues unresolved, making "the task of interpretation a continuation of the legislative process" (Herring, 1936, p 218) By the end of the next decade, scholars such as John Gaus (1947), Herbert Simon (1947), and Paul Appleby (1949) had issued convincing arguments that agency decisions were inevitably compounds of administrative and political considerations inextricably tied together

The traditional model thus lost its dominance by the late 1940s and it soon became a historical relic Its demise is reflected not only in the continuing expansion of bureaucratic discretion since the late 1940s, but also in the growing popularity of rulemaking as opposed to adjudication in implementing legislative mandates The heavy reliance agencies placed on case-by-case adjudication in the period before the New Deal lent creditability to the traditional model's view of the character of administrative as opposed to political decision making (West, 1985) In contrast, increased reliance on rulemaking beginning with the New Deal and accelerating after the late 1960s testify to a very different state of affairs (Diver, 1981) Because the processes of rulemaking provide far more visible and decisive means of creating policy than those of adjudication, increased and increasing reliance on it indicate massive losses of faith in the traditional model

Nonetheless, the demise of the traditional model has not been without its costs. Open recognition and acceptance of the fact that agencies make as well as execute policy has raised complex problems of legitimacy It has also led to a great deal of conflict over the nature of administrative discretion and how it should be structured and controlled Once shattered, the unity, breadth, and simplicity of the traditional paradigm have not been easy to recreate They rather have been replaced by a host of segmented, complex, and competing doctrines and prescriptions

The breakdown of the neat division of functional responsibilities, specified by the politics/administration dichotomy, has led to a number of conflicting approaches to the roles of the president and Congress in administrative policymaking. One prominent approach, pluralism, essentially abandons the attempt to specify institutional roles, rather, it views governmental decision making as a whirlpool of conflicting interests and actors As a result, the

executive and bureaucracy are seen merely as additional "access points," providing a richer medium for the representation and accommodation of interests (Truman, 1951, Lindblom, 1965).

Not all have viewed bureaucratic policymaking in such sanguine terms, however. A variety of approaches have emerged that would preserve the policy-making supremacy of elected institutions. As the fusion of politics and administration has become increasingly apparent, a number of observers have advocated strengthening Congress's ability to monitor and control administrative policymaking. These observers have often conceptualized the task as one of enhancing congressional "oversight" (Maass, 1983).

In contrast, some other proponents of traditional separation-of-powers values regard such an adaptive approach to maintaining Congress's proper policy-making role as futile and destructive. For them, the modern administrative state itself is the problem. Theodore Lowi (1979) and others have therefore advocated a return to the detailed specification of policy goals and standards in statutes, ensured through a revival of the non-delegation doctrine. In a sense these observers want, through a sheer act of will, to return to the state of affairs envisioned by the traditional paradigm—detailed laws implemented in a ministerial fashion.

However, the response to the breakdown of the traditional paradigm that has attracted the most adherents emphasizes the role of the president and seeks to broaden the scope of his responsibility and power. This approach rests on a modern conception of the presidency which sees him as chief executive while simultaneously recognizing that politics and administration are fused. As a result, the president's role in the process of execution easily expands to encompass the function of chief policymaker as well, and in the eyes of many the case for providing him with the structures and resources he needs to direct and control administrative decision making becomes unanswerable.

To view the president as chief policymaker in the administrative process clearly transcends his managerial role under the traditional paradigm. Adherents of presidential power ease the tension inherent in this transformation by extending traditional, organizationally based arguments and supplementing them with a new equation of the presidency and the public interest. Only the president, his partisans claim, has the institutional authority and programmatic incentives to coordinate the complex and often conflicting activities of the federal bureaucracy (Seidman, 1970, Nathan, 1983). Similarly only the president, they claim, is likely to represent the public interest because he alone represents a national constituency. In contrast, legislators and congressional committees are seen as entities which are consumed by narrow and parochial concerns. They are accordingly regarded as agents of special interests whose role must be limited in both the legislative and administrative processes by presidential policy control (Sundquist, 1981).

lew perspectives have also emerged to replace traditional faith in bureau-ic expertise and scientific principles of organization and management as es for administrative action The realization that administration involves itics has led some to question the very relevance of objectivity and to rec-mend political criteria such as representativeness, responsiveness, and ountability as guides for assessing agency decision making (Stewart, 1975, 'st, 1984). The traditional idea that administration should be neutral and cient has remained appealing to others however, who have attempted to urrect the doctrine of objectivity by broadening its scope and redesigning criteria The growing popularity of techniques, such as program budget-, and economic analysis, rests on the appeal of an overarching concept of ionality that goes beyond bureaucratic expertise or the faithful pursuit of tutory objectives Based on the realization that even the effective imple-ntaton of given programs can produce "suboptimization," the new doc-ne of objectivity employs a comprehensive, external standard under which ncy actions are judged as rigorously as possible in terms of their total ects on society (Thompson, 1980)

Finally, the breakdown of the traditional paradigm has led to an extensive conceptualization of the role of administrative procedures and the courts idents of administrative law from Louis Jaffe (1965) to Kenneth Davis 969) and James Freedman (1978) have argued that the administrative state n be tamed and legitimated through the use of procedures and processes at render the exercise of agency discretion open nonarbitrary, and ac-untable This approach in its own way has sought to establish a basis for asoned and responsive administration and thus has also responded to the ss of faith in a politics/administration dichotomy It has had a continuing d substantial impact

An important early development was the Administrative Procedure Act PA) of 1946, which established legislative standards for judicial review agency actions and imposed procedures to guide rulemaking and adjudi-ition (5 U S C Secs 551 et seq) Since the mid-1960s, Congress and e courts have supplemented the APA's requirements in a variety of ways is has been especially true in the case of rulemaking One general devel-ment has been a significant extension of opportunities for interested par-es to participate in agency proceedings This change has resulted both from urt expansion of standing to seek judicial review and from the provision of rious statutory entitlements (Stewart 1975 West 1984) Another has een the stipulation, imposed through enabling legislation and judicial pre-dent, that agencies base their rules on evidence contained in a record a equirement that has occasionally been supplemented by the provision of rocedural rights, such as cross-examination and rebuttal to participants in ulemaking hearings As a logical extension of these trends, the courts have ecome increasingly hostile to *ex parte* communications between agencies

and outside interests (Verkuil, 1980). All these procedures have gone far be yond the terms of the APA, which requires no rulemaking record and unde which hearings are optional and of an informal nature.

Procedural developments in the administrative process have been de signed to serve two, interrelated goals. One has been to protect and enhanc the quality of agency decision making, *per se*. The intent of expanding op portunities to participate in agency proceedings and insuring the impact o such participation through rulemaking on the record and other requirement has been to make administration open and democratic. Similarly, the change that require the grounds for rules to be made explicit and subject then to challenge in open proceedings have been intended to guarantee well reasoned agency decisions—to guarantee that sound factual and legal link ages exist between individual regulations and concrete statutes (Freedman 1978, West, 1985).

A second and complementary aim of recent developments in the adminis trative process has been to strengthen the role of the courts in overseeing and influencing the implementation of statutes The various requirements that have expanded opportunities for interested parties to participate in agency decision making have also strengthened the ability of the judiciary to intervene Even more important perhaps, the requirement that rules be based on evidence in a record has resulted in large part from judicial and congressional skepticism concerning the desirability of unconstrained bu reaucratic expertise. Thus, in marked contrast to their prescribed role under the traditional paradigm, the courts have become increasingly inclined to take a "hard look" at the substantive bases for agency decisions and to substitute their judgment for that of the agencies (DeLong, 1979, Melnick, 1983)

OMB Review in Theoretical Perspective

The breakdown of the traditional paradigm, together with the varied re sponses it has precipitated, allow us to identify the doctrinal foundations of OMB review of administrative rules Such review was established by Execu tive Order 12291, issued by President Reagan in February 1981 (46 *Federal Register* 131937) The system of control established by this order has two central elements, each of which reflects the influence of prior developments in administrative theory

The first is review of executive regulations by agents of the president "Major" rules (defined as those having a projected economic impact in excess of one hundred million dollars per year) proposed by executive branch agen cies must be submitted to OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) sixty days before the publication of notice in the Federal Reg ister, and again thirty days before their publication as final regulations. Non major rules must be submitted ten days prior to notice and to final publica tion In both cases, OMB is empowered to stay the publication of notice of

osed rulemaking or the promulgation of a final regulation by requiring agencies respond to its criticisms, and ultimately it may recommend withdrawal of regulations which cannot be reformulated to meet its ctions.

ie review provisions of E O 12291 give OMB a unique means for en-ing presidential control of the federal bureaucracy Whereas traditional hanisms, such as budgeting, appointments, and reorganization, often ict executive influence to the contours of administrative policy, the gan order allows the president and his agents to monitor and influence substance of individual regulations This expansion in presidential power ed both to doctrine and events Arguments for a strong presidency be-e more and more compelling in the 1970s as government continued xpand and allegations of "interest group liberalism" gained currency irly, the Reagan order reflects the view that the president, as the prime esentative of the public interest and as the official best suited to coordi- executive decision making, should control the administrative process in osition to the centrifugal forces of subgovernment politics As former A administrator Christopher DeMuth stated, for instance, "The presi-cy, of all the offices in our system of government, is the one most suited dvancing a consistent program against narrow political pressures" (De-h, 1982, p 18) And as he added some time later a key virtue of E O 91 is the requirement that the president's own staff evaluate each regu-n relatively free of the interest-group pressures faced by the regulatory ncies" (DeMuth, 1984, p 27)

y the same token, the premise of a strong presidency in control of admin-ative policymaking also has important consequences for the role of Con-s, given the broad scope of policy-making authority that has been dele-d to the bureaucracy The architects of the Reagan order have been nt on this subject, as might be expected Implicitly however, E O 12291 ects both a restricted conception of the legislature's constitutional au-rity to control the content of governmental policy and an expansive view he president's role as a policymaker in which Congress is seen as behav- most properly when it relies on the president to direct the exercise of eaucratic discretion This latter perspective has gained in popularity as ny have come to feel that Congress is best (and perhaps only) capable of resenting special interests (Sundquist 1981, DeMuth and Ginsburg 86) At a legalistic level of discourse the former perspective has also ned in popularity as partisans of the modern presidency have had success laiming that the grant of executive power to the president in the Consti-ion is far more plenary in its effects than it was understood to be in the ieteenth century (Rosenberg, 1981, Olson, 1984)

Economic analysis is the second key element of E O 12291 The Reagan ler requires Executive Branch agencies to prepare Regulatory Impact alyses (RIAs) for all proposed and final major rules An RIA must include a

rigorous and comprehensive assessment of a regulation's positive and negative effects (costs and benefits) as well as a similar examination of alternative courses of action E.O 12291 also requires that cost-benefit analyses be performed for proposed and final non-major rules, which of course comprise the vast bulk of agencies' regulatory output. The prescribed nature of non-major analyses is unclear, although presumably they need not be as rigorous as RIAs Regulatory analysis nonetheless provides the basis for executive review of both major and non-major rules under the terms of the Reagan order

The appeal of cost-benefit analysis lies in its apparent neutrality and its enlistment of knowledge from economics and other relevant disciplines to provide a tool for objectively measuring and weighing policy effects As indicated earlier, cost-benefit analysis is guided by standards of economic efficiency, and it claims to achieve a more comprehensive degree of rationality than that implied by the traditional model's transmission-belt metaphor Indeed, the criterion that the total social benefits of regulations should outweigh their total social costs provides a focus that transcends the instrumental pursuit of statutory goals to a consideration of the broader public interest Clearly then, the appeal of and quest for neutral competence in administration has not abated, despite past reverses and failures (Kaufman, 1956) Here too, however, events have also had an impact As a practical matter, the popularity of cost-benefit analysis has been amplified by widespread criticism of overregulation in recent years. At the same time, cost-benefit analysis has also been touted as a constraint that powerfully complements executive review as an antidote for the parochial tendencies of subgovernmental politics

The significance of cost-benefit analysis, nonetheless, is not limited to its ostensible advantages as a means of reasserting neutral competence What also should be noted is that, as a criterion for review, it helps to legitimate presidential power The breakdown of the politics/administration dichotomy has led to an acute awareness of the policy-making potential of a strong administrative presidency, and this has left the legitimacy of presidental control of agency rulemaking a delicate issue Presented as an objective mean of ensuring against arbitrary or parochial judgments on individual program goals, cost-benefit analysis has helped to dispel concerns that the president will interject his own values or act capriciously in controlling the administrative process.

By centralizing administrative power in agents of the president and by requiring all rulemaking in the Executive Branch to be based on cost-benefit analysis, OMB review combines and extends two of the major responses to the breakdown of the traditional paradigm. However, its importance in theory and in fact is not limited to these aspects of the administrative process OMB review embodies a new and striking set of doctrines, this is true

much because of its implications for the third area of administrative theory we have identified as for its positions in the first two

In this regard, the fact that E O. 12291 does not deal with administrative procedures and the courts should not be allowed to obscure the fact that OMB review implies far more limited roles for both than has been accorded them since the breakdown of the traditional paradigm To the extent that agency decisions reflect OMB control or influence, they obviously do not emerge out of an "administrative process" designed to be fair procedurally and open to the views of as broad a range of interested persons as possible OMB review further undermines the administrative process to the extent that it is informal and substitutes the methods and goals of cost-benefit analysis for a system in which public comment is designed to test the appropriateness of agency actions in light of statutory commands For similar reasons, E O 12291 limits and challenges the reach and impact of judicial review The effectiveness of the courts hinges on the role of administrative procedures in structuring the process of decision making and providing a written record for review. Insofar as informal executive influence renders procedures irrelevant and the written record a sanitized or rationalized version of the basis of decision making, the ability of the courts to perform a guardianship function simply evaporates (Kargman 1986, Presidential Management Report, 1987)

The Impact of OMB Review

The theory that underlies OMB review of agency rules challenges Congress's historic prerogatives in the administrative process as well as the key roles accorded to administrative procedures and judicial review in recent decades It does so in the interests of subjecting rulemaking to presidential control, which is ostensibly to be based on objective policy analysis Substantial grounds for skepticism exist concerning the Reagan administration's success in depoliticizing the administrative process through objective analysis With this skepticism noted, the impacts of OMB review on the distribution of power among and within the various branches of government have been those intended, either explicitly or implicitly by the doctrinal positions offered to legitimize it

The Extension of Presidential Policy Control

Although agencies retain legal authority to issue regulations over the objections of OMB or even the president under E O 12291 the architects of the Reagan order believed that review would carry substantial force To begin with, they felt that agency heads, who were chosen by the president on the basis of loyalty to his program, would be disposed to accept direction by his agents Moreover, they were confident that in cases of conflict agencies

would be hesitant to insist on their formal prerogatives due to OMB's su stantial powers over their operations with respect to budgeting, person ceilings, information gathering, and clearance for congressional contacts a requests As former OIRA administrator James Miller stated, "If you're t toughest kid on the block, most kids won't pick a fight with you" (Scalia a Brunsdale, 1981, p. 21).

The requirement that initial OMB scrutiny take place before notice of p posed rulemaking constituted a final guarantor of effective review in the e of its designers. Early review was seen as a means of curtailing resistance presidential policy preferences by permitting decisions to be tied down fore opposing views and interests could be mobilized and insuring that ag cies' sunk costs would be relatively low. These advantages of E.O. 122 were further augmented significantly in January 1985 by E O 12498, wh instructs agencies to prepare annual agendas consisting of all ongoing or c templated rulemaking activities and to explain to OMB how such activit are "consistent with the administration's regulatory principles " Includ under the reporting requirements of the new order is the "development documents that may influence, anticipate, or lead to the commen ment of rulemaking proceedings at a later date" (50 *Federal Register* 103 The new order further requires that OMB approve the rulemaking agend prepared by the agencies and bars proposals for rules not identified in the agendas or otherwise approved. Potentially, E O 12498 represents a sign cant extension of executive power because it gives OMB control of t boundaries within which individual rules may be formulated As yet, ho ever, there has not been sufficient experience under it to judge its impa Our analysis therefore focuses on the effects of the original order, E 12291, which establishes OMB review

The only quantitative data available concerning the impact of OMB revi are those provided by OMB itself [1] These data are often cited to suggest th OMB review has had limited coercive effect on agency rulemaking Defen ers of OMB review point out that 81% of the rules reviewed from 19 through 1985 have been approved as submitted, that another 13% have be approved after change in response to problems identified by OMB, and th only 4% have been returned for reconsideration or withdrawn due to OM objections (DeMuth and Ginsburg, 1986) [2] A careful inspection of the ev dence, nonetheless, confirms in good measure the expectations of those wh intended OMB review to be a powerful control mechanism

First, when examined in greater detail, the data support such a concl

[1] For data on OMB review see Executive Office of the President, Office of Management a Budget, *Regulatory Program of the U S Government*, 1986 See also West and Cooper 19 p 205, and Presidential Management Report, 1987, p 14

[2] The remaining 2% were sent improperly, exempt emergency in character, or subject various deadlines (Presidential Management Report 1987, p 14)

sion. The severity of OMB review has increased steadily over time as the fervor for deregulation has declined and more normal patterns of conflict over agency responsibilities and goals have reemerged Overall averages obscure this trend The percentage of rules approved without change has declined steadily from 87 3% in 1981 to 70 7% in 1985 Similarly, the percentage of rules approved after change has increased steadily from 4 9% in 1981 to 23 1% in 1985 It is not surprising, then, that OMB has been forced to redefine and broaden one of the key categories it uses to report data From 1981–1983 OMB reported all rules accepted after change in a category labeled "consistent after minor change" Since 1983 the term "minor" has been dropped, which in effect cedes the fiction that the concessions agencies are asked to make after rules are submitted to meet unresolved OMB objections are never of any real consequence

Second, the impact of OMB review cannot be assessed accurately in terms of overall percentages Given a total of 12 233 rules reviewed from 1981–1985, the 13% accepted after change amount to roughly 1500 rules or 300 per year Similarly, the 4% returned for reconsideration or withdrawn amount to roughly 450 rules or 90 per year These are not insignificant numbers, and this is especially so if they include a substantial portion of the rules dealing with important and controversial policy issues There are good reasons to believe that they do On the one hand OMB itself classifies only 320 of the 12,000 rules it has reviewed over the past five years as major as opposed to nonmajor rules On the other hand a growing body of case studies reveals that the Reagan order has enabled OMB to alter or block agency initiatives in a variety of instances where important policy questions were at issue [3] This has been particularly true in the areas of safety, health, and the environment Some prominent examples include EPA rulemaking proposals regarding nuclear waste disposal and asbestos production and use and OSHA rulemaking proposals regarding short-term exposure limits and warning labels for hazardous substances in the workplace (Olson 184 pp 62–73, Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985 pp 109–11) Indeed in the years from 1981–1983, 34 EPA rules were returned by OMB and 24 were withdrawn during the course of review (Energy Subcommittee Report 1985 p 113)

Third, and last, the data OMB reports clearly understate its influence This is true for several reasons The counts of the various types of OMB responses to agency rulemaking do not distinguish between responses to proposed and responses to final rules Yet, conflict between OMB and rulemaking agencies is far more likely to occur and have controlling results when rules are first proposed rather than subsequent to notice and comment proceedings. Given the indiscriminate character of OMB data, the fact that only

[3] For material on the imports of OMB review in individual instances see Tolchin 1983 Eads and Fix, 1984, Olson, 1984 Ball 1984 and Energy Subcommittee Report 1985 In addition see Rosenberg, 1986, and Kriz 1987

42% of the rules reviewed were proposed rules means that all percentag figures for rules accepted without change must exaggerate the degree (comity, similarly, all percentage figures for rules accepted after change, re turned, or withdrawn must underreport the degree of conflict. Of equal, i not greater importance, are consequences the data cannot capture. The fac that OMB does not object to or seek to change rules once submitted does no mean that it has failed to influence their formulation. The requirements o the Reagan order, together with the other sanctions available to OMB an the president, have encouraged a good deal of informal monitoring and com munication As a former staff member of EPA has stated, "You don't spen two years thinking about a regulation without thinking about whether OM is going to shoot it down (Maltzman, 1986, p 99). The evidence suggests tha interaction with OMB has often begun early and that agencies have taken it views into account even against their own policy inclinations and interpreta tions of statutory requirements As might be expected, such early influence has been particularly extensive in the areas of safety, health, and the en vironment A further point is that even in the absence of OMB communica tions, the anticipation of review has been a powerful influence in the early stages of administrative policy development [4] Indeed, informal communica tions and the anticipation of OMB resistance may well help account for the precipitous decline in the number of proposed rules since Reagan took offic (West and Cooper, 1985)

Both prior and subsequent to the submission of proposed rules for OMB review the leverage OMB derives from its power to delay rulemaking should also be noted (*Environmental Defense Fund v Thomas*, 1986) The Reagan order requires agencies to submit proposed rules to OMB sixty days in ad vance of the date intended for submission to the Federal Register in the cas of major rules and ten days in advance in the case of minor rules. However it does not require OMB to act within these time periods As a result OMB can extend its review unilaterally unless Congress has legislated a deadline or the courts have imposed one Agencies, of course, could choose to de OMB by submitting rules for publication before OMB review has been com pleted Their legal right to do so is less clear than their right to submit rule after review is completed, but it is far from unsustainable in cases of pro longed delay.[5] Nonetheless, the issue is highly academic Instances in whic agencies have chosen to defy OMB in either respect are rare (Olson 1984

[4] This point is based on interviews with officials of EPA, OSHA, OIRA and other agenci conducted in 1984 See also West and Cooper, 1985, and Weidenbaum, 1984

[5] For a review of articles, arguments and cases see Olson, 1984, p 3, Rosenberg 19 pp 219-34, Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985, pp 88-127 Governmental Affairs Subco mittee Hearings, 1986, pp 197-247, Presidential Management Report, 1987 pp 1 31-32, and Kriz, 1987, p 1404 See also *EDF v Thomas* (1986) and *Public Citizens Hea Research Group v Tyson* (1986)

In practice, then, OMB's ability to delay action provides yet another source of leverage to induce agencies to anticipate its desires, to consult it early, to respond to its suggestions for change when a rule is under review, and even to withdraw rules to which OMB strongly objects (Governmental Affairs Subcommittee Hearings, 1986, pp 69–96)

The notion, then, that OMB review has only had a minimal impact on agency rulemaking may be discounted In general, E O 12291 has been an effective means of identifying, evaluating, and influencing those agency policies most important to the president and his key constituencies It is true, of course, that oversight has not been comprehensive, given the small size of OIRA's staff (about eighty) and the large number of rules submitted for review each year (roughly 2,400) Yet the Reagan order has evoked a diffuse but effective set of mechanisms for bringing especially significant and/or politically troublesome rules to the attention of administration officials To this end, OMB has relied on an extensive "alarm system" which has included letters and calls from regulated interests informal contacts with agencies, and monitoring of trade publications as well as internal memoranda alerting OIRA staff to sensitive regulatory issues (Eads and Fix, 1984, Olson, 1984)

It is also true that the agencies subject to OMB review possess bargaining advantages of their own They can and do obtain leverage from their initiative in framing a rule, from their substantive expertise, from the character of the statutory language, from powerful external constituencies and from public and congressional support Thus, the situation is not one in which OMB can treat agencies simply like puppets on a string (Presidential Management Report, 1987, p 26). OMB may well have to make concessions and even on occasion to back down on major issues For example in early 1986 OMB reversed its prior opposition to a set of EPA rules phasing out the use of asbestos and allowed them to be implemented (Kriz 1987) Still, the overall balance of power is heavily tilted in OMB's favor "Typically OMB has been able to achieve its key policy goals through a combination of pressure and delay (Rosenberg, 1986) While the informal often secretive nature of the review process has made it impossible to measure the effects of E O 12291 with any high degree of precision, numerous documented cases of OMB influence in areas of public safety, health, and the environment strongly indicate that it has provided a very effective means of controlling policy in those instances where the administration has taken a strong interest (Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985, p 109) Indeed even OMB itself is not reluctant

[a] A former EPA Administrator notes that there are thousands of transactions with OMB a year' Hence 'if you've publicly humiliated OMB they'll get even—this can come in many different ways' (Olson, 1984, p 45) Similarly on a rare occasion in which EPA issued regulations over OMB's objections, a high OMB official told an EPA official that there was a price to pay for doing what we had done, and that we hadn't begun to pay (Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985 p 45)

to claim that the policies and procedures of E.O. 12291 have "held the number of new rules to the minimum necessary," "revised ill-conceived ones," and "imposed long needed discipline on the rulemaking process" (Governmental Affairs Subcommittee Hearings, 1986, p. 227).

The Uses of Cost-Benefit Analysis

The application of cost-benefit analysis is often complex, relying on expertise from a variety of fields. Still, its basic premise is simple. Decision makers examine the probable effects of proposed actions to determine whether their total benefits to society will outweigh their total costs. Under a "full" or "formal" analysis, such as that encouraged for major regulations under E.O. 12291, all policy effects are expressed in terms of real or imputed market values. With regard to the latter, several techniques have been developed for assigning dollar equivalents to such "soft values" as human life or a scenic environment (Thompson, 1980, Smith, 1984). Cost-benefit analysis thus possesses two attractive features as an aid to rational decision making. It forces hard choices to be faced systematically and comprehensively. In addition, it provides a methodology for simplifying the factors involved in decision making and enables them to be weighed with greater precision under a common unit of measure.

Given these advantages and the sophistication of the technique, many of the OIRA "desk officers" who initially examine agency proposals undoubtedly consider themselves to be objective analysts. Nonetheless, the Reagan administration's policy preferences have inevitably influenced the review process. Though obscured by the terms and methods of cost-benefit analysis, such preferences have significantly affected the initial targeting of regulations for close scrutiny, the remanding of regulations for further analysis, and the informal processes of interagency bargaining.

That this ostensibly objective method of decision making can be and has been used as an instrument for advancing predetermined policy goals is not surprising. Cost-benefit analysis is not an exact science, instead, its conclusions typically rest on a variety of more or less discretionary judgments (Baram, 1980). As a result, there has been a natural (and not necessarily dishonest) tendency for agency and OMB officials to base their analyses on assumptions that favor the policies they prefer. In analyzing the asbestos regulations alluded to above, for example, differing discount rates relied on by OMB and EPA staff produced dramatically different assessments of the value of human lives to be saved (Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985, pp. 77 ... Similarly, conflicts in assumptions have also characterized the assessment of risk and led to controversy between OMB and substantive experts in EPA and OSHA as well as other agencies (Havermann, 1986, Stanfield, 1986...

A good deal of evidence has been accumulated to confirm the political underpinnings of review under E.O. 12291. Olson, for example, finds th...

OMB has often acted at the behest of the White House, industry representatives, and other agencies in reviewing EPA regulations. On the basis of interviews with top OMB officials, he reports that "where OMB has budgetary, policy, philosophical, or political problems with a rule, the regulatory analysis is used as a 'key' in holding up or changing EPA action" (Olson, 1984, p. 53). George Eads and Michael Fix come to similar conclusions. After examining rulemaking by EPA, OSHA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and other agencies, they observe that, although oversight has been based on objective policy analysis in some instances, in others "OMB's involvement in regulation was *clearly* political—and nothing else" (Eads and Fix, 1984, p. 137). In perhaps the most comprehensive and in-depth treatment of analysis review, Thomas McGarity's interviews with officials from eight Executive Branch agencies bring to bear recurring allegations that OMB is highly influenced by political considerations. Consider the following quotations, for example:

> OMB input into Food Safety and Inspection Service rulemaking and regulatory analysis documents has typically been more in the nature of political review than analytical review. The agency (OMB) almost never finds fault with the agency's analysis, but it has on several occasions provided ideological and/or political input.
>
> Other analysts suggest that OMB . . . is more concerned with affecting the substance of rules themselves than with improving the quality of the agency's substantive analysis. . . . As in other Departments, there is some sense in EPA that a good analysis will not save a decision with which OMB disagrees and a poor analysis will not slow down a decision with which OMB agrees.
>
> The complaints of (OSHA) and (Department of Labor) officials . . . parallel those of other agencies studied in connection with this report. Agency officials who expressed a view on the subject generally felt that the regulatory analysts in OMB often attempted to usurp the agency's decision making authority under the guise of reviewing regulatory analysis documents (McGarity, 1985, III, pp. 72, 343, and 225–26).

Even aside from the question of the degree to which the review process has been affected by the policy preferences of the participants, a further point that deserves emphasis is that cost-benefit analysis itself contains intrinsic antiregulatory biases that tend to further the Reagan administration's conservative policy goals. Cost-benefit analysis is, in theory, a technically proficient way to attain the goal of economic efficiency (Meier, 1982). As discussed above, this criterion goes beyond the mere consideration of program goals, and takes into account all policy effects. In its pure form, it implies a weighing of these policy effects in terms of their direct or imputed market values. Yet, whatever its merits as a criterion, economic efficiency has frequently not been the defining goal of regulatory statutes. Nor is it necessarily consistent or compatible with statutory goals. Economic efficiency is predicated on the current distribution of resources and "revealed preferences" in the marketplace. In contrast, the creation of statutory rights or entitlements in a variety of new areas of social regulation has been re-

distributive in intent. As a House committee report stated in criticizing th impact of cost-benefit analysis on congressional goals:

> Clearly equity considerations were of utmost importance in the congressional delibe tions that established the legal framework for most of the more recent health and safe laws It was Congress that determined that the prices for consumer goods should r when steps were necessary to increase the occupational health and safety of workers improve the quality of the environment, to limit the annual carnage on our nation's hig ways, and to protect consumers from the little known safety and health hazards in t products they buy (Commerce Subcommittee Report, 1980, pp 28–29)

Cost-benefit analysis, in short, is not value free It does not purely a simply provide "objective decisions" because objectivity is always relative the ends chosen to be served

Another bias of cost-benefit analysis, also conservative in the context social regulation, is that it results more often "in the valuation of what we c measure than the measurement of all that we value" (Calabresi and Bobl 1978, p 204) Applications of cost-benefit analysis under the Reagan or and elsewhere have differed in their treatment of intangible policy effec such as improvement in the quality or length of life or the preservation c scenic environment Regardless of the approach taken, however, numero observers have commented that cost-benefit analysis is biased against de sional criteria that cannot be quantified with confidence (Commerce Su committee Report, 1980) McGarity's study attests to this when it conclu that cost-benefit analysis "can squeeze out variables, such as historic re reational, and aesthetic values that are difficult if not impossible, to qua tify" and in so doing "can yield an unidimensional view of the world that practice biases decision makers against unquantifiable values" (McGar IV, p 66)

In sum, then, cost-benefit analysis is only a technique and like all te niques it has limitations as well as strengths In controversial areas of n making, where priorities among ends are highly disputed and where qu tification often involves arbitrary assumptions, cost-benefit analysis can be neutral As applied by OMB, it has quite naturally served as a mean promoting the basic policy objectives of the Reagan administration Bot the absence of and in opposition to statutory guidelines, cost-benefit anal has been used to constrain and structure the exercise of agency discretion ways that give advantage to approaches to regulation and interests favo by the administration In reality, then, the doctrinal effort to tie the cen clearance of policy issues by agents of the president to the traditional still powerful norm of neutral competence through reliance on cost-ben analysis was doomed from the start. Despite its sophistication and the cla made for it, cost-benefit analysis is far more subject to being politicized t capable of transforming politics into objective decision making

Evasion of Procedural Safeguards

'he Reagan order's negative implications for the ability of administrative cedures and judicial review to serve as constraints on the abuse of bu-icratic discretion have been confirmed in practice Though OMB review taken place largely before the beginning of notice and comment proceed-; on proposed rules, it has nonetheless undermined the goals of such pro-dings. As our earlier discussion suggests, the leverage OMB possesses is great that its preferences have often dominated agency judgments in in-ices where it has taken a strong interest It has used its review powers, uding its power to delay, to induce agencies to alter and even withdraw ;s it opposed. Equally important, OMB has exercised much of its influ-e in secret so that little or no trace has appeared in any public record orrison, 1986, Noble, 1986) In general, then, OMB has restricted the im-t of an "administrative process" in rulemaking both by blocking its initia-i, per se, and by limiting its reach and rigor where initiated (Rosenberg, 6, pp. 210–19) Moreover, since 1985 OMB's power in this regard has n augmented by the agenda-clearing requirements imposed by E O 98 (Energy Subcommittee Report, 1985, pp 100–14)

Similarly, OMB's leverage over the discretion of executive agencies and its led mode of operation have undermined the role of the judiciary in rule-king (Kargman, 1986) As noted earlier, the courts in order to strengthen ir oversight capabilities, have insisted that agencies justify their rules ex-sively on the basis of the evidence contained in a record As a corollary v have frowned on ex parte contacts especially when such communica-is serve as a conduit for private interests However, OMB has adopted lax ndards for revealing the character and extent of its contacts with both cutive agencies and private parties (Presidential Management Report, 37, pp. 33–35) As already indicated, it has operated largely through infor-l, off-the-record contacts Indeed, it not only has kept much of its written nmunications confidential, but it has usually preferred oral communica-ns over the phone or through small staff conferences to written correspon-nce As a result, judicial review, which hinges on a full and open record, been subject to severe handicaps for rules in which OMB has taken a jor interest

In the early summer of 1986 OMB responded to intense congressional ticism of its disclosure practices by agreeing to make written aspects of its agreements with agencies over proposed rules a matter of public record addition, OMB agreed to make lists of its phone calls and meetings with ivate interests as well as written materials received from such interests ailable for public inspection upon the request of the agency involved ovner, 1986) While these changes will strengthen the influence of proce-

dures and courts, the conflicts central clearance involve for procedural saf guards have only been ameliorated, not removed Manifold opportunities f informal communication and influence remain. In short, then, despite t silence of E O. 12291 on the role of administrative procedures and t courts, OMB review has not been and will continue not to be neutral in impacts on these safeguards In essence, OMB review institutionalizes t primacy of politics. As a result, it inevitably clashes with a process that r sponds to a very different ideal—an ideal that subordinates political cont to formalized proceedings, to decision making that is closely tied to do mented evidence and to judicial review.

OMB Review in Institutional Perspective

The rationale that legitimizes OMB's powers over administrative rulem ing takes positions on fundamental questions regarding the proper cont structure, and character of administrative decision making at the fed level. Similarly, the practice of OMB review has institutional conseque that bear on the validity of these positions and points to the existence of resolved tensions in the range of institutional roles and values that prese tive theories of administrative decision making in the United States m somehow encompass The theory and practice of OMB review thus r issues of general significance for the operation and maintenance of repu can government in the United States

Institutional Consequences

As is true in other areas of expanding presidential power, OMB's pow over rulemaking have served to increase the degree to which administra decision making is centralized and politicized (Moe, 1985) Our prior dis sion adequately demonstrates the centralizing effects of E O 12291 need not be repeated here What is worth reemphasizing is that these eff are likely to be substantially reinforced by the agenda control powers ferred on OMB by E O 12948 in 1985

A related effect of OMB review has been to increase the degree of p calization in the administrative process, to increase the degree to which cisions are based on considerations relating to political goals and ince rather than considerations relating to the substantive implications or quirements of statute This effect has also been noted in our preceding cussion, but in a more circumscribed and implicit manner It can no more generally and explicitly delineated by examining the impacts of tralization on politicalization

In large part, heightened politicalization results directly from height centralization. Given the patterns of alliance, agreement, and depend that tie the president to core elements of the coalition that elected hi

ease the power of the president and his agents in administrative rule-ing is to increase the degree of access accorded to these elements and degree to which the administrative process will be responsive to their ns. In other words, within the bounds set by clear violations of statutory elines, to increase presidential power over agency decision making is to ease the degree to which the commitments a president shares with key ients of his electoral coalition will be given priority over legislative in- or technical expertise in the service of such intent (Newland, 1985) As prior analysis indicates, evidence of this effect is amply provided by a of recent rulemaking controversies between OMB, agencies, and public rest groups in the area of health, safety, and environmental protection his, of course, is not to pretend that the previously more decentralized ern of relationship between the president and rulemaking agencies was of politics Indeed, though the actual incidence of "iron triangles" was bably exaggerated, the more decentralized and less complex patterns of inistrative politics that prevailed before the 1970s were subject to a iological form of politicalization in which the feudalization of policy sec- relationships became so pronounced that agencies were captured by cted interests Nonetheless, it remains true on balance that in the United es, variegated and muted lines of political control and accountability pro- e greater leeway for line administrators to resist political pressure, which urn, creates greater opportunity both to interpret statutory intent in a re objective or impartial fashion and to bring technical competence to r in its service (Kaufman, 1956, Heclo 1975 Moe 1985) Nor, despite arguments made for cost-benefit analysis has the association between tral clearance and such analysis done much to mitigate the effect cen- ization has had in increasing politicalization As has been argued earlier t-benefit analysis easily becomes an instrument of political objectives h because it is value laden in directions congruent with administration icy goals and because the measurement operations required involve sub- tive and often highly controversial assumptions It thus has not served as instrument for perfecting statutory intent but rather as a means of con- ining congressional policy goals and agency expertise in order to advance osing and at times even highly conflicting presidential policy goals (Mor- on, 1986).

Centralization, however, has promoted politicalization not only because of direct impacts on the allocation of decision-making power but also be- ise of its indirect or secondary effects in limiting the role of procedural rriers If the continuing attempt to define an independent administrative ocess did not create a world free of politics, it did impose constraints on liticalization Thus, as our prior discussion suggests, heightened politi- ization has also resulted from the manner in which the exercise of OMB arance power has interfered with and to varying degrees displaced the

role of administrative procedures and the courts in the rulemaking process. In a basic sense the continuing effort since the mid–1940s to perfect notice and comment proceedings and to insure their efficacy through court review amounts to a formal or institutionalized attempt to resist politicalization and to promote the role of neutral competence in rulemaking. Here too, then, OMB review under E.O. 12291 has increased politicalization both because it has impaired the influence of notice and comment proceedings and because it has complicated the task of court review. Moreover, once again this effect of OMB review is likely to be substantially reinforced by the agenda control powers conferred on OMB in 1985 by E.O. 12948 (Rosenberg, 1986).

Tensions and Challenges

Given such impacts, the arguments offered to justify OMB power over administrative rules are far more successful in revealing the difficulties that have plagued administrative theory since the 1940s than in refashioning traditional doctrines into a set of propositions capable of rationalizing the expansion of presidential power. These difficulties largely take the form of tensions caused by fundamental conflicts among ends or between ends and means. They may be analyzed in terms of the same three areas of theory that frame our initial discussion of the traditional doctrines of public administration.

The first such area involves the legitimate basis and control of administrative authority and is thus primarily concerned with the proper roles of the Congress and president in the administrative process. In this area the theory and practice of OMB review testify to a deep-seated and continuing tension between presidential power and republican government.

It is true, of course, that the arguments made for OMB review deny the existence of such a tension. Here as elsewhere, proponents of presidential power assume a uniformly positive relationship among centralization, representativeness, and effectiveness (Sundquist, 1981, Mezey, 1986). As noted earlier, the president is seen as the sole or best representative of the public interest. In addition, effectiveness is regarded as dependent on coordination, and the president seen as the sole or best source of coordinating executive policymaking.

Nonetheless, these claims are no more capable of resolving the tension between presidential power and republican government in the administrative process than in the legislative process. Of the two, the claim regarding representativeness is the key one. Once it is recognized that administrative decision making often involves matters of broad policy discretion, the relationship between centralization and effectiveness can no longer be compelling. Even aside from the disharmonies that complicate this relationship, in a democratic political system centralization must be compatible with representative needs if it is to serve effectiveness in any but a narrow technical or mechanical sense.

t, little justification exists for any wholesale or comprehensive equation e presidency and the public interest (Cooper, 1986) The Madisonian ciples that underlie the balanced and overlapping distribution of power function in the American political system rather assume that the public est emerges out of a process of decision making, not out of the superior om and virtue of a particular branch or office And rightly so because all tituency principles distort as well as represent The president thus has igs as well as strengths as a representative of the nation If his constitu- is national in scope, he is still elected by a particular configuration of ests and in choosing him the electorate must compress a whole pan- ia of issues into a single choice Similarly, if the Congress has failings as a esentative of the nation, it also has strengths The interests it represents national as well as local in scope because the interests of its constituents not limited to the geographical boundaries of their districts In addition multiplicity of choices it offers provides advantages in summing the dis- ition and intensity of views on particular issues that a representative sys- telescoped into a single person cannot match

he relationship between presidential power and republican govern- it is therefore intricate and inconsistent not simple and straightforward amon, 1981) Once it is recognized that the American political system s to make policy through the clash of different constituency principles that administration involves policymaking presidential power cannot be imized in the administrative process so as to exclude or trivialize con- ssional influence without doing serious damage to representative govern- it in the United States Nonetheless, the fact that centralization is not an arnished good does not mean that presidential power involves no bene- for representation and effectiveness in the administrative process If this e true, the tension between presidential power and republican govern- nt could be resolved merely by reducing the president to a cipher Simply tate this proposition is to reveal its problems The point of our argument hus that, even in the administrative process the tension between presi- itial power and republican government is unresolvable once faith in the idity of a politics/administration dichotomy has been lost Given the disonian principles of the American political system each branch must n retain sufficient power to play an influential policy role in both the legis- ve and administrative processes with the result that neither rampant cen- lization nor rampant decentralization can be preferred in either process This conclusion, in turn, has significant implications for both theory and actice In terms of theory it suggests that current approaches to prescrib- g institutional roles in the administrative process are highly deficient The ncept of legislative oversight cloaks rather than legitimizes Congress's in- lvement in administrative policymaking and provides little guidance re rding how to structure congressional control so as to maximize its strengths a representative body. In truth, by proceeding as if a sound and sensible

distinction existed between "overseeing" and "interfering" in the admini trative process, the concept of legislative oversight accepts rather than cha lenges the validity of a politics/administration dichotomy. The leading ap proach to defining the president's role is no less problematic. The concept presidential leadership begs the question of the degree to which powe within the executive branch should be centralized under the president thus provides legitimacy and impetus for any and all attempts to expan presidential power. This is especially so because many proponents of presi dential power have never fully come to terms with the problems in a poli tics/administration dichotomy Rather, as recent controversies over th separation of powers indicate, they accept its validity when arguing that con gress's role in the administrative process is narrowly confined to lawmaking but reject its applicability when defending broad legislative grants of discre tionary authority to executive officials or arguing that the president's execu tive power gives him inherent or generic authority to direct and control in ferior officials in the exercise of such discretionary authority (Cutler, 198 Elliott, 1984)

The implications for practice are necessarily broad, given the lack of gui ance the current state of administrative theory can provide Still, they follo clearly from the proposition that centralization is not an unvarnished goo The crux of the problem is to maintain a balance of power between Congre and the president in national policymaking, despite the difficulties posed a modern administrative state of great range, complexity, and power In t case of OMB review, as in the case of other expansions in presidential pow such a goal does not require the elimination of any and all innovations th aid presidential power. On the contrary, given the advantages the preside does possess as a representative of the nation and a source of central coor nation, such innovations may well involve substantial benefits for repres tative government which should not be discarded lightly What is essenti however, is that Congress find ways of adapting to increases in presiden power and that the courts allow it to implement them.

With respect to OMB review, several adaptive strategies of substantial tential exist increased use of statutory deadlines and minimum standa multipurpose use of constitutional forms of the legislative veto to check b OMB control of agency rulemaking agendas and individual rules of major portance, and requirements for greater disclosure concerning policy putes between OMB and particular agencies [7] Congress has not yet app post–Chadha forms of the veto, but it is experimenting with them in o areas (Witt, 1986) It has become more inclined to set statutory deadl and it recently forced OMB to be more open about its dealings with age

[7] For discussion of various alternatives in subjecting OMB review to greater control see R berg, 1986; and Presidential Management Report, 1987

in rulemaking disputes (Rovner, 1986) Ironically enough, then, in the case of OMB review as elsewhere, the problems of perfecting theory are probably more serious than the problems of redesigning practice What is certainly rue is that current approaches to prescribing institutional roles have served is a barrier to adapting practice in the service of the separation of powers deals all profess to support.

The other two areas of theory, identified earlier as key components of traditional doctrine, concern the scope or reach of objectivity and the role of dministrative procedures and court review In these areas the tensions that xist pertain to the need both to provide for and to restrain political control

With respect to the potential for objective or impartial administrative decision making, the theory and practice of OMB review testify to a deep-eated and continuing tension between political control and neutral cometence. Here, as elsewhere, the arguments offered for OMB review ignore r downgrade the consequences of such a tension and rather propose to ombine heightened political control through agents of the president with eightened objectivity in decision making through the application of cost-enefit analysis (Demuth 1982, 1984, DeMuth and Ginsburg, 1986) As our rior analysis suggests, such an approach is rent with contradictions that are ifficult, if not impossible, to resolve It assumes that presidential power ver the administrative process enhances discretionary decision making in e public interest and at the same time that the exercise of administrative scretion can and should be subject to scientific determination and control bove and beyond politics

Here again, however, to recognize that proponents of presidential power onfront a tension they cannot resolve must also be to recognize that the relationships involved are complex, not simple (Kaufman 1956, Heclo, 1975) some very basic regards political control is not antithetical to neutral competence, but rather supportive This is commonly recognized in wide acceptance of the relationship between mechanisms of political accountability and sponsible and effective administrative decision making Yet, there is another and perhaps even more fundamental sense in which the relationship tween political control and neutral competence is positive To exist neutrality or objectivity requires a fixed standard The faith of democratic orders that standards for public or collective action should be determined in their ost basic aspects by elected officials and through law, i e , through the legative process (Freedman, 1978, pp 78–94) Political control in the form of v thus sets the parameters that make neutral competence possible and neficial. The notion that cost-benefit analysis implements a rationally sed, objective, and by implication superior standard of the public interest therefore not only a delusion, but also a conceit democratic orders cant abide.

Nonetheless, it is undeniably true that political control creates opportuni-

ties for politicizing the administrative process as well. To give elected officials, in either the executive or legislature, power to hold administrators accountable is also to give them power to pressure administrators to serve policy or political goals not sanctioned, intended, or even contemplated by law. As a result, political control can and does induce politicalization ranging from outright corruption to very subtle distortions of legislative intent. In contrast, the failure to exercise political control at the legislative level also leads to politicalization (Stewart, 1975, pp. 1683–84). The less relevant and controlling statutory standards the more decision making at the administrative level becomes functionally equivalent to decision making at the legislative level, and the more justified legislative participation and influence become in order to reduce the operational differences.

Once it is recognized that political control can neither be dispensed wit nor prevented from having detrimental effects and that objective expertise necessarily instrumental to some chosen set of ends, the key issues in copir with the tension between political control and neutral competence becon institutional, not substantive. Moreover, once it is also acknowledged that r valid dichotomy exists between politics and administration, these issues ca not be easily settled through some neat division of function between tl branches (Strauss, 1984). In short, in the American political system the san basic issues that are involved in devising ways to accommodate president power to republican government are involved in devising ways to accomm date political control to neutral competence. The proper strategy is therefo not to look for some maxim, formula, or technique that in and of itself w provide neutral competence. It is rather to design institutional roles and rangements so that they restrain the drive of politicians to politicize all de sion making and the inclination of experts of confuse personal arrogance w objective analysis.

In the case of OMB review, as elsewhere, these goals cannot be serv either by seeking to cripple the presidency or by placing primary reliance bureaucratic independence and the norms that support it. The former r resents a highly procrustean and in the end probably futile approach problems rooted in the complexity and dynamism of politics in a modern ministrative state. The latter clashes with the needs and realities of a re sentative system based on a separation of powers and weak parties. Inst the most promising approach is to enhance Congress's ability to ensure administrators are not pressured into sacrificing statutory intent to pr dential policy goals or resolving issues left open by statute simply in tern such goals. Once again, then, the most effective response is to check po with power through devising and implementing congressional mecham of the type identified earlier. In this way the compatibilities that link poli control and neutral competence can be emphasized and the American p cal system's need for both served.

The final area of theory encompasses the courts and involves issues no less difficult to resolve than the first two In this area the theory and practice of OMB review testify to a deep-seated and continuing tension between political control and the rule of law

While all would acknowledge that at some level of generality this tension is endemic to democratic regimes, neither partisans of presidential power nor partisans of an independent administrative process, rooted in procedure and court review, treat it as relevant to administrative rulemaking The approach of partisans of presidential power can be disposed of easily In response to criticism that secret negotiations between OMB and agencies over the substance of rules have undermined notice and comment proceedings and court review, defenders of this practice have argued simply that confidentiality is essential to protect the president's ability to direct and control executive policymaking (DeMuth and Ginsburg, 1986) However, this is to ignore the problem by assuming it away What is at issue here is the balance that needs to be struck between political control and institutional checks to ensure faithful and impartial administration of the law in an area of government where the dangers of politicalization have long been regarded as especially threatening Hence, the same logic that supports an independent judiciary supports limits on executive branch secrecy in rulemaking and a persuasive case can be made for full or substantial disclosure as an integral part of the exercise of OMB's power to review rules (Kargman, 1986)

In contrast, partisans of an independent administrative process do not ignore the tension, but rather believe that they have resolved it They see the rulemaking process as one that can be designed to satisfy the needs of democratic politics and the needs of faithful and impartial administration of the law at one and the same time (Davis, 1969, Freedman, 1978) In the former regard, a number of legal scholars and jurists treat administrative procedure and court review as ready instruments for providing balanced representation and responsiveness in administrative decision making (Stewart 1975) Indeed, some even argue that notice and comment proceedings are more open to the participation of interested parties than committee processes in the Congress and thus more representative in their outcomes than congressional decision making would be under similar circumstances (Bruff and Gelhorn, 1977) In the latter regard, the argument is more traditional and hinges on premises and approaches that are centrally involved in legitimizing legal or judicial decision making Thus, the emphasis partisans of administrative decision making place on the character of agency proceedings reflects a widespread belief in the ability of procedures to foster reliance on legal standards, deductive reason, and evidence, and in so doing to produce decisions that both serve statutory goals and are fair to the individual parties involved Similarly, the role accorded to court review reflects the hallowed belief that the courts are the proper institution to serve as the ultimate guarantors of

"reasonable" or "non-capricious" outcomes, and this emphasis combin neatly with an emphasis on procedure because formalism routinizes the cr ation of a record for court review (West, 1984; 1985).

Such reliance on procedure and court review underscores a point mac earlier in this article. Partisans of an independent administrative proce share objectives and assumptions with traditional and modern attempts render administration a matter of neutral competence. In both cases the go has been to limit partiality or bias in administrative decision making. In bo cases considerable faith has been placed in rational analysis based on tec nical expertise Here again, then, it is not that partisans of an independe administrative process do not recognize that a gap exists between statuto provisions and the determination of statutory intent in particular circu stances. It is rather that they assume that reason can bridge the gap, if t context is properly structured and guided by substantive knowledge St the form of objectivity involved is the objectivity of the law court, not t objectivity of the laboratory or research center The primary faith is the ability of procedures and courts to establish the rule of reason, in the virtues of expert knowledge per se It is therefore not surprising t as bureaucratic discretion has expanded in recent decades, both the for or judicial character of notice and comment proceedings has grown far m elaborate and the control exercised by courts over the outcomes of adm trative decision making has grown far more stringent (West, 1985, O'Br 1986)

Despite the veneration accorded to legal processes and courts in United States, proponents of an independent administrative process ca escape the conflicts modern government poses for combining political trol and the rule of law. Their approach to satisfying the needs of pol control is specious Even aside from the issue of how open notice and ment proceedings truly are, the form of representation they provide is h formal and attenuated It is the representation of the law court, wh open to interested parties, but requires them to plead for the favor of sion makers who are vested with superior authority and assumed to ha perior qualities of wisdom and impartiality It is quite clearly not the re sentation of democratic politics, nor, in a context in which administr decision making involves a complex mixture of policy and administrati it adequate for the needs of representative government Ironically enou is a form of representation which is adequate for the needs of political c only when no problems in terms of political control exist

Similar problems in the fit between assumptions and actual de making conditions beset reliance on administrative procedures and co view as instruments of faithful and impartial administration of the law effectiveness of an independent administrative process in this regard on the strength of the rational connection between statute and applic However, as noted earlier, because reason, whether guided by legal

dures or technical expertise, cannot clarify the relation between ends and means when ends are unclear, the degree of discretion a statute delegates determines how responsibly or objectively it can be implemented As a result, the effectiveness of administrative procedures and courts as instruments of depoliticalization is a variable, not a constant Indeed, they can and do become mere masks for the dominance of specific sets of interests in particular rulemaking agencies, or the entrance of the courts into areas of decision making that are far more appropriate to the control of political officials in the legislature and executive (Stewart, 1975, Melnick 1983, 1985) In short, then, though partisans of an independent administrative process may have adapted to the breakdown of the traditional dichotomy between politics and administration by inventing a rulemaking process that exists somewhere between lawmaking and adjudication, their claims and assumptions indicate that they still have not fully come to terms with the consequences of that breakdown Their attempt to combine rationality and responsiveness in structuring and legitimizing the administrative process cannot escape the intractable contradictions that derive from the unavoidable subjective qualities of representation and policymaking in democratic orders (West, 1984)

Once again, then, a tension exists in administrative theory with the result that the relationships between political control and the rule of law are no more simple and straightforward than the other relationships identified in this analysis The processes and institutions that provide political control oth support and undermine the rule of law and vice versa Nor here as lsewhere, is existing theory sophisticated enough to deal with the complexity that exists in these relationships Indeed, if anything, prescriptive theory egarding the role of legal or quasi-legal processes and courts vis-à-vis politial processes and institutions is even more deficient than prescriptive theory egarding executive-legislative relations Still as in other areas, the applicaion of basic Madisonian presumptions identifies balance as a primary guidene, and this standard permits a broad assessment of the practice of OMB eview On the one hand, because policy and administration are highly interoven in rulemaking, the same logic that supports vesting policy power in ected officials supports such innovations as OMB review or the legislative eto, despite their negative implications for notice and comment proceedgs and court review On the other hand, because rulemaking statutes are ot bereft of standards, concern for maintaining a role for notice and coment proceedings and court review is not misplaced Though they are not as e of defects as the partisans imagine, they do have utility as instruments of politicalization. Thus, OMB's recent concessions on disclosure, wrung om it by threatened use of Congress's appropriations power under which it s agreed to be more open about its disagreements with agencies and its tacts with private interests are steps in the right direction In short, here ain, inconsistencies in need make inconsistencies in institutional adaptan a source of strengthening, not weakening American democracy

CONCLUSION

The 1980s have witnessed the emergence of a mechanism for the cen-l clearance of administrative rules that not only complements the long-ablished processes of legislative clearance, but provides an even more ective means of controlling policy outcomes. This development is impor-it both because of what it indicates about institutional relations and trends the United States and because of what it indicates about the state of ad-nistrative theory as an instrument for assessing and adapting to these nds.

In the first regard, OMB review has increased the degree of centralization l politicalization in executive policymaking and appears to be part of the umption of a long-term trend toward increasing presidential power. As ·h, OMB review stands as a major systemic response to the growth of ad-nistrative discretion, grounded in the president's status and strengths as a ionally elected chief executive officer. Nonetheless, like other such re-onses, it is a response whose effects endanger representative government l the rule of law from another direction The theory and practice of OMB iew thus aptly illustrate the difficulties of adjusting prior balances of titutional power to the demands of an administrative state without dis-bing the American political system's ability to satisfy the host of con-ting needs its basic values establish as prerequisites of legitimacy and ectiveness

n the second regard, attempts to rationalize or attack OMB review teach once again how little progress has been made in creating a comprehensive l unified normative theory of administrative decision making to replace traditional doctrines of public administration. This fact in itself is not la-ntable If politics interpenetrates administration, then the tensions that iere in the conflicting needs of American democracy cannot be fully and itly resolved through institutional arrangements, technical expertise, or ne combination of both What is lamentable is that so little progress has en made over the past half century in conceptualizing and analyzing basic titutional roles and processes that our ability to delineate and assess these sions is scarcely more sophisticated than it would be if a dichotomy be-een politics and administration were still widely accepted We have, in rt, remained prisoner to categories and modes of analysis rooted in an umption we reject as untrue It is past time to surmount these limits both acknowledging their existence and by once again according normative in-utional analysis the importance and attention it deserves as a necessary nplement to empirical investigation and theory building

nuscript submitted 30 September 1987
al manuscript received 8 March 1988

References

Appleby, Paul 1949 *Policy and Administration* University, AL University of Alabama Press

Ball, Howard 1984 *Controlling Regulatory Sprawl Presidential Strategies from Nixon to Reagan* Westport, CT Greenwood Press

Baram, Michael S 1980 Cost-Benefit Analysis An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decision-Making *Ecology Law Quarterly*, 8 473–533

Brownlow, Louis, et al 1937 *President's Committee on Administrative Management Report* Washington, DC Government Printing Office

Bruff, Harold H , and Ernest Gelhorn 1977 Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation A Study of Legislative Vetoes *Harvard Law Review*, 90 1369–1440

Calabresi, Guido, and Phillip Bobbit 1978 *Tragic Choices* New York W W Norton

Cooper, Joseph 1986 Assessing Legislative Performance A Reply to the Critics of Congress *Congress and the Presidency*, 13 21–40

Cooper, Phillip J 1984 The Wilsonian Dichotomy in Administrative Law In Jack Rabin and James S Bowman, eds , *Politics and Administration* New York Marcel Dekker Inc

Cutler, Lloyd N 1982 The Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch *Tulane Law Review*, 56 830–48

Davis, Kenneth C 1969 *Discretionary Justice A Preliminary Inquiry* Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press

DeLong, Stephen 1979 Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy *Virginia Law Review* 65 257–356

DeMuth, Christopher C 1982 A Strong Beginning on Reform *Regulation*, 6 15–18

——— 1984 A Strategy for Regulatory Reform *Regulation*, 8 25–30

DeMuth, Christopher C , and Douglas H Ginsburg 1986 White House Review of Agency Rulemaking *Harvard Law Review*, 99 1075–88

Diver, Colin S 1981 Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law *Harvard Law Review*, 95 393–434

Eads George C , and Michael Fix 1984 *Relief or Reform Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma* Washington, DC The Urban Institute Press

Elliott E Donald 1984 *INS v Chadha* The Administrative Constitution the Constitution and the Legislative Veto In Phillip B Kurland et al eds *The Supreme Court Review*, *1983* Chicago University of Chicago Press

Environmental Defense Fund v Thomas, 627 F Supp 566 (D D C January 28 1986)

Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget 1986 *Regulatory Program of the U S Government April 1 1986 to March 31, 1987* Washington DC U S Government Printing Office

Freedman, James O 1978 *Crisis and Legitimacy The Administrative Process and American Government* Cambridge, Eng Cambridge University Press

Gaus, John M 1947 *Reflections on Public Administration* University, AL University of Alabama Press

Gulick, Luther 1937 Science, Values, and Public Administration In Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, eds *Papers in the Science of Administration* New York Institute of Public Administration

Havermann, Judith 1986 How Do You Estimate Cancer Risk? In *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, (July 28) 31

Heclo, Hugh 1975 OMB and the Presidency The Problem of "Neutral Competence " *Public Interest*, 38 80–98

Henry, Nicholas 1975 Paradigms of Public Administration *Public Administration Review* 35 378–86

Herring, Pendleton 1936 *Public Administration and the Public Interest* New York McGraw-Hill

Jaffe, Louis L 1965 *Judicial Control of Administrative Action* Boston Little, Brown

Kargman, Steven T 1986 OMB Intervention in Agency Rulemaking The Case for Broadened Record Review *Yale Law Journal*, 95 1789–1810

Kaufman, Herbert 1956. Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration *American Political Science Review*, 50 1057–73

Kriz, Margaret E 1987 Kibitzer with Clout In *National Journal*, (May 30) 1404–08

Lindblom, Charles E 1965 *The Intelligence of Democracy* New York Free Press

Lowi, Theodore J 1979 *The End of Liberalism* New York W W Norton

Maass, Arthur 1983 *Congress and the Common Good* New York Basic Books, Inc

Maltzman, Forrest A. 1986 *The Reagan Regulatory Program The Office of Management and Budget's Ability to Control the Regulatory Process* Unpublished Honors Thesis, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT

McGarity, Thomas D. 1985 *The Role of Regulatory Analysis in Regulatory Decision Making* Draft Report for Administrative Conference of the United States (mimeo)

Meier, Kenneth J 1982 Political Economy and Cost-Benefit Analysis Problems of Bias In Alan Stone and Edward Harpham, eds , *The Political Economy of Public Policy* Beverly Hills, CA Sage Publications

Melnick, R Shep 1983 *Regulation and the Courts The Case of the Clean Air Act* Washington, DC Brookings Institution

——— 1985 The Politics of Partnership *Public Administration Review*, 45 653–60

Mezey, Michael L 1986 The Legislature, the Executive and Public Policy The Futile Quest for Congressional Power *Congress and the Presidency*, 13 1–20

Moe, Terry M 1985 The Politicized Presidency In John E Chubb and Paul E Peterson, eds , *The New Direction in American Politics* Washington, DC Brookings Institution

Morrison, Alan B 1986 OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation *Harvard Law Review*, 99 1059–74

Nathan, Richard 1983 *The Administrative Presidency* New York John Wiley & Sons

Newland, Chester A 1985 Executive Office Policy Operations Enforcing the Reagan Agenda In Lester M. Salamon and Michael S Lund, eds , *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* Washington, DC Urban Institute

Noble, Kenneth B 1986 Federal Rules Cut Asbestos Permissible in Workplace by 90% *New York Times*, June 14, p 6

O'Brien, David 1986 Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and Regulatory Politics In Douglas H Shumavon and H Kenneth Hibbeln, eds . *Administrative Discretion and Public Policy Implementation* New York Praeger

Olson, Erik D 1984 The Quiet Shift of Power OMB Supervision of EPA Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12291 *Virginia Journal of Natural Resources Law*, 4 1–80

Presidential Management of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (1987) A report by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration Washington, DC National Academy of Public Administration

Public Citizens Health Research Group v Tyson, 796 F 2nd 1479 (D C Cir , 1986)

Rosenberg, Morton 1981 Presidential Control of Agency Rule-Making *Michigan Law Review* 80 193–247

——— 1986 Regulatory Management at OMB In U S Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Office of Management and Budget Evolving Roles and Future Issues*, 99th Cong 2d Sess Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

Rovner, Julie 1986 Senators Hail OMB Decision to Open Rule Review Process In *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, (June 21) 1409–10

Salamon, Lester M 1981. Beyond the Presidential Illusion—Toward a Constitutional Presidency. In Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Salamon, eds , *The Illusion of Presidential Government* Boulder, CO Westview Press.

Scalia, Antonin, and Anne Brunsdale 1981 Deregulation HQ Interview with Murray L. Weidenbaum and James C Miller III *Regulation*, 5 14-24

Seidman, Harold 1970 *Politics, Position, and Power The Dynamics of Federal Organization* New York Oxford University Press

Shapiro, Martin 1982 On Predicting the Future of Administrative Law *Regulation*, 6 18-25

Simon, Herbert A 1947 *Administrative Behavior* New York Free Press

Smith, Kerry V 1984 *Environmental Policy Under Reagan's Executive Order The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press

Stanfield, Rochelle 1986 Reducing Risk *National Journal*, (August 16) 2032

Stewart, Richard B 1975 The Reformation of American Administrative Law *Harvard Law Review*, 88 1669-1813

Strauss, Peter 1984 The Place of Agencies in Government Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch *Columbia Law Review*, 84 573-669

Sundquist, James R 1981 *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* Washington, DC Brookings Institution

Thompson, Mark S 1980 *Benefit-Cost Analysis for Program Evaluation* Beverly Hills, CA Sage Publications

Tolchin, Susan J, and Martin Tolchin 1983 *Dismantling America The Rush to Deregulate* Boston Houghton Mifflin Company

Truman, David B 1951 *The Governmental Process* New York Alfred A Knopf

U S Congress House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 1980 *Cost-Benefit Analysis Wonder Tool or Mirage*, 96th Cong, 2d Sess Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

U S Congress House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 1985 *EPA's Asbestos Regulations Report on a Case Study on OMB Interference in Agency Rulemaking* Washington, DC U S Government Printing Office

U S Congress Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations 1986 *Hearing on Oversight of OMB Regulatory Review and Planning Process*, 99th Cong 2d Sess Washington DC U S Government Printing Office

Verkuil, Paul R 1980 Jawboning Administrative Agencies Ex Parte Contacts by the White House *Columbia Law Review* 80 943-89

Waldo, Dwight 1948 *The Administrative State* New York The Ronald Press Company

Weidenbaum, Murray L 1984 Regulatory Reform Under the Reagan Administration In George C Eads and Michael Fix eds *The Reagan Regulatory Strategy An Assessment* Washington, DC The Urban Institute Press

West, William F 1984 Structuring Administrative Discretion The Pursuit of Rationality and Responsiveness American Journal of Political Science, 28 340-61

——— 1985 *Administrative Rulemaking Politics and Processes* Westport, CT Greenwood Press

West, William F, and Joseph Cooper 1985 The Rise of Administrative Clearance In George C Edwards, et al, eds *The Presidency and Public Policy Making* Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press

Witt, Elder 1986 High Court to Clarify Sweep of its Legislative Veto Ruling In *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (December 6) 3025-30

Joseph Cooper is Lena Gohlman Fox professor of political science and dean, School of Social Sciences, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251.

William F West is associate professor of political science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843

Aristotle's Three Cities and the Problem of Faction

Patrick Coby
Smith College

Aristotle describes the polis as a self-sufficient compound Its regime, he says, is responsible for shaping the whole character of the city's people But rarely is the city unified in its parts, and the formative power of the regime is not always this extensive There are in fact three kinds of cities depicted in the *Politics* They differ by the degree of partnership tying city members together Accordingly, the problem of faction and its cure differs for each for some cities, where the regime is unitary, the cure is consent, for others, with mixed regimes, it is participation but for the ideal city it is homogeneity

I Unity, Diversity, and Virtue

Aristotle is never more voluble in his criticism of Plato than when the subject is political unity. In the *Politics* Aristotle charges that Plato's Socrates wrongly imposed on the city the unity appropriate to a single individual, where all of the body's parts feel pleasure and pain together, or to a single family, where all family members say "mine" and "not mine" about the same things The city is by its nature a self-sufficient association, and too much unity destroys the diversity necessary for perfected communal existence

Aristotle explains that the city is self-sufficient in two respects, materially and spiritually In book 7 of the *Politics*, he lists several functions necessary to the city's survival, observing that "the city is not any chance multitude [*tuchon plēthos*], but one self-sufficient with a view to life" (7 8 8) [1] Here Aristotle is speaking of material self-sufficiency the city must provide itself with sustenance, artifacts, defense, finance, worship, and rule—all just to live [2] The city, Aristotle observes, comes into being for the sake of mere life (1 2 8) By diversity of population and specialization of trades, it continues the work of self-preservation begun in the household and the village. But the special function and final end of the city is to cultivate man's talent for reason

[1]Translations of the *Politics* are from Lord (1984), also from Lord are book, chapter, and section divisions, which are the same as those found in Barker (1958) Where more precise identification is required, the Bekker page numbers are used, with line citations corresponding to those in the Oxford Classical Text (1957)

[2]Three of these functions also contribute to the good life Thus those permitted to exercise them are counted as full partners in the association, as citizens

Journal of Politics, Vol 50, No 4, November 1988

nd speech, or to provide people with what Aristotle famously says is a good fe (1.2.8). Thus the city attains its self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) primarily in erms of the soul of man and only secondarily in terms of the body. Diversity again important because it is a source of disagreement, and the resolution f disagreements among different but equal people requires that city members act as moral reasoners (Yak, 1985, pp. 101–12) The family and the village, on the other hand, obviate the moral development of men because as raditional and hierarchical communities all matters therein are well settled nd accepted, and political authority is mostly beyond challenge [3] It is, herefore, a mistake to model the city after the family and to base the city's nity on the sameness of its members for the city necessarily is a compound *syntheton*) consisting of dependent and complementary parts [4] The interction of these diverse parts, to repeat, helps to perfect men as moral beings y demanding of them reflection and conversation about the advantageous nd the just (1.2 1) [5] And this achievement—far more than the division of abor—explains why the city is a self-sufficient association Accordingly, civic nity, as urged by Socrates, rather than the greatest good for cities, in fact estroys them (2.2 6–7) " . to seek to unify the city excessively is not ood For a household is more self-sufficient than one person, and a city than household, and a city tends to come into being at the point when the partership formed by a multitude is self-sufficient If, therefore, the more selfufficient is more choiceworthy, what is less a unity is more choiceworthy han what is more a unity" (2 2 8) Aristotle's apparent complaint then against he city of the Republic is that its institutions impose a oneness of life and hought that suffocates the individual and stifles his moral growth [6] Morality. ristotle believes, depends on diversity

[3]The distinction in Aristotle between unified and diverse associations might be compared to mile Durkheim's discussion of mechanical and organic solidarity to his critique of economic bertarianism and to his plea for reviving the corporation as a kind of industrial polis (1933 p 1–32, 70–232)

[4]Aristotle can be granted his initial point that the family is more unified than the city the amily approximates on the collective level the unity and oneness of the individual But in other espects the relation is reversed, for the household is composed of discrete parts (male-female aster-slave) with property related to specified and limited needs, whereas the polis is populated by equal citizens who rule and are ruled in turn, it also is the place where homogenized urrency (money) renders commensurate unlike things From this latter perspective the city eems homogeneous and the household diverse See Booth (1981 pp 222–25), Saxonhouse 1982, pp 211–13), and Blits (1985, p 223)

[5]Conversations about the advantageous and the just (1 2 1) are not the only way that the city eaches virtue It also habituates through education and law and uses coercion to make parental uthority effective (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1179b31–1180a24 hereafter *N E*) Like the city the ousehold is a moral association (1253a18), but it is incomplete for want of diversity and power ee Blits (1985, pp 234–38)

[6]This is not to deny that the larger part of Aristotle's critique concerns the failure of Socrates o achieve complete unity by means of communist institutions Aristotle's own preference for nity over diversity will be discussed below, at which point some attention will be paid to this nuch debated issue

But there is a limit to how much diversity the city can absorb and still accomplish its moral purpose. Larger communities, such as empires, are undoubtedly "less a unity" than the polis, but Aristotle does not say of them that they are the most natural associations. The explanation, apparently, is that their greater size and diversity compromises their self-sufficiency. The problem with empires, but more obviously with nation-states of today, is that they are too heterogeneous for virtue to be the public business. Because the citizens of large states are divided in their beliefs, moral discourse among them will rarely lead to communal agreement. And so the argument is made, and repeated as a maxim of liberal democracy, that politics cannot legislate morality, meaning that moral questions should be confined to lesser associations (to religious congregations and families especially) where their investigation is less a danger to public peace. Aristotle says that large states—in fact large cities—are unlikely to have a regime (*politeia*) "[the city] that is made up of too many persons is with respect to the necessary things self-sufficient like a nation, but is not a city, for it is not easy for a regime to be present" (7.4.11). A regime exists where there is agreement about who should rule and agreement about the community's way of life (4 11 3) Where there is instead competing life-styles that either oppress or tolerate one another, there is no regime, at least none that is complete And where there is no regime, it may be best that moral disputes remain more or less private and that the full potential of the political association—a common life of virtue—not be attempted. But to abandon public virtue is to retreat from self-sufficiency, accordingly the large state, with its greater diversity of people, is less self-sufficient than the small polis It can therefore be inferred from Aristotle that excessive size and excessive controversy are hindrances to human development since the lack of consensus results in the privatization of morality and the end of public reasoning about it

There is, however, another criterion for determining the optimal size of states. Small, unified cities and large, diverse nations have in common the fact that each affords a remedy for the problem of faction (*stasis*) Socrates, in the *Republic*, places a premium on civic unity because he is responding to the sophist's charge that political life is riven by faction and political rule the instrument for class oppression (338c–339a).[7] A unified and homogeneous city, Socrates reasons, will rid politics of injustice by preventing the emergence of factious unrest (462a–d). And with respect to the benefits of size, James Madison explains in *Federalist* 10 that an extended republic is the best defense against factions—which are otherwise permitted to exist—because the multiplication and fragmentation of interests minimize the chances that

[7] Political tranquility is not Socrates' only interest in unity He attacks the family, and more generally things private and particular, in order to prepare the way for philosophy, as that thing which is truly public and universal. See Strauss (1964, p 115), Bloom (1968, p 387), and Saxonhouse (1982, p 218)

any one faction will be a ruling majority by itself.[8] The lessons taught are that either unity or diversity can provide internal stability to a regime. But Aristotle opts for a position seemingly midway between the homogeneity of Socrates' Republic and the heterogeneity of Madison's extended republic.[9] He does so for the sake of the moral self-sufficiency of the polis, which, as noted, requires enough disagreement that people find it necessary to talk about right and wrong, but not so much disagreement that such talk is ruled unacceptable for public debate. Because Aristotle dedicates the polis to the moral development of citizens, he necessarily exposes it to a high degree of factional turbulence. Up to a point, Aristotle is accepting of faction. But how does he propose managing faction so as to stabilize the polis and make of it a defensible form of association? This is the topic of the present paper.

II. Three Cities

The polis is a species of human association (*koinōnia*), within the polis the regime is a type of rule. Before considering the polis and the problem of faction, some further discussion of the regime will be necessary. Aristotle identifies four constitutive elements of a regime or *politeia* (4.1.10). The first is the creation and arrangement of political offices: an assembly, council, magistracies, courts, etc. The second is the distribution of these offices to particular groups or individuals—the rules of eligibility, in other words. The third—and certainly most important—is the location of sovereign power (*kuros*), or the determination of the regime's kind, be it democratic, oligarchic, monarchic. The kind of regime is a function of citizenship, for the citizens are the governing body (*politeuma*), and the governing body is sovereign (3.6.1–2). In an aristocracy the aristocrats make up the citizenry and are the repository of authoritative power. Finally, there is the matter of purpose, each regime devotes itself to some end, such as freedom in a democracy.

Aristotle is known for the vast powers he attributes to the regime, much beyond the distribution of benefits and the regulation of competing interests, for it is the business of the regime, he says, to shape and mold the body politic (Newman, 1973, pp. 209–11). The expression *body politic*, even though modern in its origin, is particularly apt since the people, as Aristotle suggests, are like matter given form and identity by the regime (3.3.7–8). There are democratic people by virtue of their common life in a democratic city—likewise oligarchic and aristocratic people. Each is determined by its way of

[8]Other precautions and institutions serving to control the effects of faction are separation of powers, bicameralism, representation, federalism, and a written constitution. See especially *Federalist* 9 and 51.

[9]Barker (1959, pp. 403–5) maintains that Aristotle is unlike modern contract theorists in regarding the state as a moral unity, and that he is unlike Plato in thinking that differentiated unity is the cause of self-sufficiency and individual excellence.

life—by its collective view of happiness expressed through what it prais and blames, rewards and punishes—and this in turn is an issue settled l the choice of a regime and manifested by the regime thereafter (Yak, 198 p 98) Aristotle comments, "For it is through hunting for this [i e , ha piness] in a different manner and by means of different things that [grou of] individuals create ways of life and regimes that differ" (7.8.5).[10]

The above remarks speak to the social effect of the regime, that through i agency a multitude becomes a single people. But there is as well a politic effect concerning the question of rule. The affection, kind regard, or frien ship—all translations of *philia*—that the regime spreads among the comm nity, and itself reflects, is a function of the people's agreement about wl should rule (*N E* , 1167a34–1167b2) and to a lesser extent their agreeme about matters of policy (*N.E* , 1167a27–33) A body politic is defined by th political agreement perhaps more so than by its manners, habits, and trac tions People stand united as democrats if their regime is commonly su ported, or as oligarchs if oligarchy is what the people want But how feasib is it for all the people to want the same regime and for the regime, therefor to extend its authority to all the people?

Having considered the unifying effect of the regime, we return to Ari totle's central contention that the city is a compound made up of distinct ar complementary parts Aristotle sometimes remarks that the city, in truth, two cities, consisting chiefly of the rich and the poor (4 4 18–19, 5.11 3 6 3.4) More familiar though is his claim that the people are of two sorts, tl citizens, who are full partners in the regime, and the workers, whose labo are needed for the city's survival but who are not themselves participants the city's politics (3 1.6, 3 5.2, 4 4.14, 7 8 1–5) There seems then not to l a single people over whom the regime exerts its influence and formati power Citizens are educated by the regime, they share in a common life ar affirm its value, they occupy the offices of state But non-citizens are e cluded from and untouched by this educational, communal, and political a tivity The democratic poor in an oligarchy are not products of the regime i the same way that the ruling oligarchs are. By the same token, oligarchs an aristocrats living under democracy retain the habits and aspirations of oppo ing regimes, even though democratic equality affords them an equal role i political life The regime then is less influential than first impressions woul suggest But are we to conclude that oligarchs and democrats, rich and poo cannot be members of the same one city, participants in and embodiments (the same regime, that there cannot be a common life of virtue betwee

[10] It is reasonably clear that Aristotle lays greater stress on the political than on the social (the cultural. But the formative power of the regime spoken of in book 3 (3 3 8–9) is amende appreciably in later books where it is said that the regime must be compatible with the peopl (e.g., 6 4.1) Matter limits form almost as much as form shapes matter For a critical discussio of the influence of the polis and the regime, see Newman (1973, pp 69–83)

them? And is it the case, contrary to previous beliefs, that the city's muc vaunted diversity serves only its material needs, with the ruling rich extra ting labor from the multitude and the ruling poor expropriating wealth fro the few? Are we to understand that the spiritual benefits of city-living a reserved for those who are similar in kind and who rule and are ruled i turn? What responsibility then has the regime toward free people who a not citizens, or who are not the type of citizen (oligarchs in a democracy) th the regime admires? Finally, how does the city, seen now to be divided in the few and the many, handle their factious contests for sovereign power?

These questions arise because the city, that penultimately natural and sel sufficient association, undergoes significant change through the course of A istotle's discussion of regimes The city is not always the same, in fact the are three different cities that Aristotle refers to or has in mind. What disti guishes them is the level of partnership at work among the residents [11] Ci members are necessarily partners in a common enterprise, but the ente prise can vary widely in its scope In the first place, and as noted just abov the city can be two cities, its people divided into rich and poor and join together largely for material purposes. Those who are citizens, who rotate and out of office, are partners in a regime, their association is political B those who are not citizens, or who do not share in the spirit of the regim are members of an economic alliance The city for them lacks the humanizi features which Aristotle describes and extols These free persons, to the d gree that they are not resisting rule, are united contractually with their ci zen counterparts and are partners in the regime by virtue of their conser

The second sort of city is a single city, although it attempts to combi both unity and diversity The city is unified because rich and poor supp the regime and share in its offices, and because, in a modest way the regin extends its educational authority to all the people But the city is also diver because social classes continue to exist The regime best suited to such association is a middle class polity where the rich, the poor, and those moderate means all share in the exercise of power Thus the members of t city are partners, not by consent alone, but by their joint participation in t political life of the association

The third type of city is Aristotle's ideal, or what he calls the city to prayed for (7 4 1). This too is a single city, but unlike the previous exam its unity derives from the absence of social classes. Here, there are not f tions of rich and poor living in uneasy harmony, instead there are citize and slaves, between whom no partnership exists The citizens engage politics, or perform sundry public duties, and are sufficiently alike that th look to be members of an extended family, distinguished more by age th

[11] Yak (1986, pp 25-28) speaks of the different kinds of friendship equal and uneq present in the political community

by property. The partnership among them is complete on all counts, for they agree about who should rule, participate severally in public affairs, and share a common way of life, having been determined in their moral habits by the education of the regime.

III. The Problem of Faction

It would be a mistake to suppose that Aristotle's middle-way solution to the problem of *stasis*, between communist homogeneity and liberal heterogeneity, is as focused and developed as either of the extremes. Aristotle's remarks on the subject, while extensive, are often scattered, pragmatic, and regime-based.[12] Moreover, Aristotle adopts a tack different from Socrates and Madison, concerning himself more with the stability of existing regimes than with the just treatment of the ruled, thus the onus of Aristotle's analysis falls on rebellious subjects rather than on oppressive rulers. Nevertheless, there is a constant core and an interest in justice in all of what Aristotle says, and, with a little flushing out, even a theory of faction. To help explain this theory, the preceding three-city schema will be utilized.

1. *Unitary Regimes*

When the regime is unitary, that is to say, monarchic, aristocratic, oligarchic, democratic, or tyrannical,[13] domestic tranquility is maintained by the consent of the governed and, to a lesser degree, by cooperation among the rulers. The rulers include those who actually hold office and those who are eligible, or the citizen body. The support of the citizen body for the regime is partly taken for granted, although it is certainly possible that conflict among the privileged could occur. In oligarchies, for instance, disloyalty and private ambition are serious causes of civil unrest (5 6 1–9). Nevertheless, it is generally true that oligarchs support oligarchy, aristocrats aristocracy, and democrats democracy for the simple reason that those who are citizens are favored by the regime. The real source of trouble, therefore, in a unitary regime lies with the excluded. The democratic many in an oligarchy are given to faction since they are removed from power and treated as inferiors. Likewise the oligarchic few in a democracy think themselves mistreated since their putative superiority is unrecognized and their voices unheard amidst the clamor of the multitude. Is it conceivable then that the governed would ever support a regime which excludes or ignores them? Or do they merely suffer the rule of others while looking always for the opportunity to rebel? Is faction an inevitable feature of unitary regimes and sedition the necessary outcome of alterations in the balance of power?

[12] Newman (1973, pp. 527–28) goes further and says that Aristotle's teaching on revolution is inconsistent. But Newman treats the middle books as a wholly distinct section of the *Politics* and seems disturbed that all remarks bearing on revolution and faction are not gathered therein.

[13] Polity will be treated as a mixed regime.

However intractable the problem of faction, Aristotle does not despair of a resolution. In his first effort to classify regimes, he distinguishes between correct regimes (*orthai politeiai*) and deviant regimes (*parekbebēkuiai politeiai*). Correct regimes, of which there are three, look only to the common advantage, while deviant regimes promote the interest of the rulers. Insofar as a regime is correct, it is possible for non-citizen inhabitants, the ruled, to give their consent, because their interests are taken into account. What though are their interests? The most important point to note is that these people are not citizens bound morally and politically to the regime. Their relationship instead is essentially that of an ally, and, as Aristotle explains in book 3, the objectives of an alliance are more limited than those of a self-sufficing political partnership. Allies are joined together for military and commercial purposes. Accordingly, the interests of those elements of the city united to others as allies are confined to the common defense and the exchange of goods, and they are well-treated if their persons are secure and their property respected. A good regime owes to this segment of the people a system of law that provides them with rectificatory justice and that facilitates the transaction of business. Such is the position of democrats in an aristocracy. For them law is "a compact [*synthēkē*] ... a guarantor among one another of the just things" [*tōn dikaiōn*] (3.9.8), whereas for aristocrats in an aristocracy law communicates a way of life, it is "the sort of thing to make citizens good and just" (3.9.8). Every city with a unitary regime is a compound (two cities) which includes non-political elements. And the consent of these elements can be won if their contractual rights are respected and their material lives made tolerable and secure.

Even a good regime though is open to faction and sedition. Aristotle lists numerous sources of danger—some of them accidental, many of them a direct consequence of the city's limited size—and suggests precautions which might be taken. But the peculiar weakness of monarchy and aristocracy is the relative transience of human superiority. Both regimes define themselves by the excellence of their rulers. But these superior beings are liable to decline and corruption, and what is just as likely, the subjects under them are capable of improvement and growth. The mere effect of city-living is almost certain, in time, to turn mechanics, farmers, and slaves into politically conscious individuals. Indeed, the one great advantage of the city over lesser associations is that it has this edifying effect on people. To be sure, the full effect of city-living is reserved for those who play the part of citizen, but some residual benefits necessarily come to those who simply watch. In this regard Aristotle observes that kingship generally is an antique form of government, practiced among people whose primitiveness is responsible for the king's seeming greatness. But as these people emerge from barbarism, they have less need of a single ruler and are less able to find someone who is outstanding relative to themselves. Aristotle's advice to kings is that they surrender power gradually and gracefully (5.11.1–3), in part because kingship,

by definition, is consensual rule (5.10.37–38, 7.2.13, 3.14.12) and in part because the regime must fit the character of its people. It is almost a natural law with Aristotle that only a well-constructed regime is stable (4.12 6, 5.7 5, 6.6 4–5). And the first rule of good construction is that the regime be suitable to the people it rules Thus even if the regime is just in dealing with its subjects, there is no reason to suppose that these subjects will be forever content with their nonpolitical existence. Man is by nature a political animal, Aristotle avows (1.2 9, 3.6 3). Some men at some times may be incapable of politics, but life in a city will tend to awaken and develop what potential there is. Kingship and aristocracy can respond by co-opting the leadership of the rising class (Jaffa, 1972, p 125), and by doing so forestall their own demise and influence the conduct of their successors. But what they cannot do is perpetuate themselves, for the polis has a democratizing effect that militates against the long-term survival of nonegalitarian regimes.[14]

Among unitary regimes there are three listed as deviant democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny They are deviant because they serve the interests of the rulers to the detriment of the ruled Their injustice and abuse of power is the central cause of *stasis* Democrats, at the urging of demogogues, expropriate the property of the wealthy few, oligarchs grow arrogant in office and despoil the many, the tyrant, alone at the top, thinks himself a god to whom all is permitted Each regime has a defining principle or animating spirit that is defective in its own right and, if absolutized, leads the regime to excess In democracy this spirit is freedom (4 8 7) Aristotle observes that democratic freedom manifests itself in two ways First, freedom can be public and political, in which case it means majority rule. When combined with numerical equality as a principle of justice, it encourages the belief that "the multitude must necessarily have authority, and what is resolved by the majority must be final and must be justice" (6 2 2) Justice is whatever the multitude wants, even if what the multitude wants is to "distribute among themselves the things of the wealthy By Zeus," declare the many, this expropriation is just since "it was resolved in just fashion by the authoritative element" (3 10 1) Freedom also has a second meaning that is private and personal The democratic citizen is entitled to behave as he wishes, for subjection to the regime and its laws is treated as slavery (5 9 16, 6.2 3). Although disapproving of this attitude himself, Aristotle admits that personal freedom, or civil liberty, is what democrats mainly desire and that political liberty is a second-best alternative (6 2.4) In regard to the matter of faction, political liberty clearly carries the seed of civil unrest, personal liberty though seems less directly a cause of *stasis* except as it provokes the contempt of the few or as the lawlessness that might result necessitates deliverance by a despotic government.

[14]Where there is equality, Aristotle often remarks, the people must share in the exercise of power (2.2.6, 3 16 2–3, 4 11 8, 5 8 6)

Wealth is the defining principle of oligarchy (4.8.7). Because the wealthy are few in number, oligarchy has a small base of support. It is thus an unstable regime even if temperate in its rule. But oligarchies are not famous for their temperance. The insolence and greed of oligarchs usually leads to the oppression of the people, who are ready for revolt whenever some leader offers to champion their cause. Oligarchies are also threatened from within, by dissension among the rulers. The rulers quarrel, conspire, and rebel because they are timocrats who want honor and position as testimonies of their worth. Indeed, Aristotle maintains that it is the many who seek profit (6.4.3, 2.7.19) and that oligarchies are in fact small democracies if the rulers use office for the sake of gain (6.7.7). The defining principle of oligarchy, therefore, is altered to include not only wealth, but also pride. Since the pride of oligarchs cannot well be satisfied outside of politics, as can the love of freedom of the democratic poor, the competition among oligarchs will be especially intense. Accordingly one notices that of the eight sources of domestic revolution (*metabolē*) listed in book 5, chap. 6, five concern the struggle for position and the suffering of perceived indignities.

The essential feature of tyrannical government is rule without consent: the tyrant "may rule not only willing persons, but also those who are unwilling, for if this is thrown away, so is the tyranny" (5.11.18). Tyranny is inherently unstable, but Aristotle mentions two ways in which the tyrant can preserve himself. Conventionally, the tyrant undertakes to weaken his own subjects, making them frightened and servile, distrustful of one another, and so poor and burdened with work that they are incapable of political action (5.11.4–16). The other way, recommended though little practiced, is for the tyrant to imitate the king and thus win the admiration and affection of his people. This would require of the tyrant that he act as steward of the public funds and levy taxes for public purposes, that he adorn the city and show zeal for the cult of the gods, that he honor good men and discipline in the spirit of a father, that he support both rich and poor or align himself with the stronger faction, and that he cultivate military qualities, avoid sexual offense, and moderate his pleasures. In effect, Aristotle asks the tyrant to give up the very things he became a tyrant to enjoy—that he not exalt himself, bully his subjects, or indulge his appetites. The tyrant, in other words, is instructed to act contrary to the defining principle of the regime.[15] The lesson that Aristotle conveys is that only through moderation can tyranny endure (with a

[15]Oligarchs and democrats are similarly instructed, for they are told to educate the population in a manner consistent with the regime. "But to be educated relative to the regime is not to do the things that oligarchs or those who want democracy enjoy, but rather the things by which the former will be able to run an oligarchy and the latter to have a regime that is run democratically" (5.9.13). Oligarchy values wealth, it is thus incumbent on those who rule to make wealth respectable. Likewise, democracy values freedom; thus democrats must behave so as to preserve freedom's good name. In an oligarchy conspicuous consumption should be avoided, and in a democracy living as one wants should be discouraged.

similar lesson for the other deviant regimes).[16] Nature, it seems, is so constituted as to favor limitation and restraint. And nature is "lawful" in that th grasping and unrestrained are destroyed. On the surface Aristotle's teachin respecting tyranny is similar to Machiavelli's, but in fact they are profoundl opposite. Machiavelli would have the prince choose freely from the tw modes of tyranny depending on what circumstances required. Keeping pac with circumstances is all important, and if done well ensures the prince i his tyranny (Orwin, 1978, pp 1218–19). The reason given by Machiavelli i that nature favors the audacious over the cautious, nature condones tyrann (Machiavelli, 1970, pp. 118–24) Thus Machiavelli's prince, set free by nature, is fully a tyrant, whereas Aristotle's tyrant, constrained by nature, i indistinguishable from a king [17] According to Aristotle, deviant regimes ca best survive by ceasing to be deviant, moderation, Aristotle explains, is i the rulers' self-interest

2 *Mixed Regimes*

The one regime still to be discussed is polity. Polity is first introduced a the correct form of rule by the many (3 7 3), also as a regime where th people possess military virtue (3.7 4, 2 6 16), and later as a democratic regime under law (3 17 4) Mainly though polity is a mixed regime, one whic includes the rich, the poor, and the middle class—if a middle class exist (4 8 3, 4 12 4–6) It is not the only mixed regime, however, since aristocrac can be a mix of aristocrats, oligarchs, and democrats (4 7.4), or simply o oligarchs and democrats if the balance of power is with the former (4.8 3 5 7.6), but polity is the mixture that is most prominent As a mixed regime polity is noteworthy for its stability (5.7 6) The various classes of societ share in sovereign power and are thus secure, content, and supportive of th constitution But in order to share, they must first make their presence felt A mixed regime exists where the principal classes are sufficiently powerfu that their claims to rule are perforce recognized In unitary regimes, by contrast, the ruled are politically less important and can expect little more tha to be governed with their consent But why should multiple claims to rul

[16] Mulgan (1977, p 134) tends to hold this conclusion against Aristotle, who he thinks obliged to devise constitutional remedies consistent with the nature of each constitution, th only extremely democratic measures can be employed to correct the deficiencies of extrem democracy But Aristotle would never allow that people can have whatever they want, or that i is his job as a political scientist to tell them how to get it The most he can do is to show wh certain desires are unattainable—hence his conviction that moderation is the essence of virtu (virtue as the mean) and that virtue is the cause of happiness There is no point in the *Politic* where Aristotle dons the cap of the value-free empiricist, ignoring the importance of moderation to human welfare

[17] Morral (1977, p 100) discounts any difference, thinking Aristotle and Machiavelli to b similarly averse to tyranny

sult in peaceful sharing of power instead of dissention and civil war? Why, other words, is a mixed regime stable?[18] Aristotle does concede that not all ixtures are stable; for example, a polity composed only of rich and poor is a erilous arrangement since each party is anxious about slight increases in the ower of its rival—and it is especially dangerous when the balance between iem is perfect (5 4.11). Aristotle suggests that in order for the mixture to oduce the desired results, a middle class is necessary The material cir- imstances of the middle class help it to avoid the arrogance and malice of ie wealthy as well as the servility and envy of the poor The former are ven to mastery, the latter to slavery, but only the middle class is well juipped to rule and be ruled as citizens (4 11 5–9) Because of the modera- on of the middle class and of its ability to negotiate the differences between ie two extremes, a mixed regime featuring a middle class is the most free of ctional disturbance and the one most stable (4 11 12)

Aristotle, however, does not confine his analysis of *stasis* in mixed regimes this one sociological observation [19] After all, the middle class is a rare oc- irrence, and nothing much is done to make its appearance more common.[20] i fact, Aristotle has other means to promote civic concord in mixed regimes, cluding those mixed regimes called aristocracies In book 2, where Aris- tle faults Socrates for wanting too much unity, he offers reciprocal equal- y and rotation in office as substitute solutions to the problem of faction 2 4–6) Reciprocal equality is distributive justice—giving classes power oportionate to their contribution Reciprocal equality makes people friends ecause all believe that they are being treated fairly (2 5.3–5). But does reci- ocity actually solve the problem of faction, as Aristotle affirms, or is reci- rocity itself a major cause of faction, as Aristotle also affirms (5.1 3–5)? It

[18]Thomas Hobbes for one believes that a mixed regime is the least stable of all a political onstrosity that will either fly apart or convert itself into a unitary regime (1968, pp 372–73 178, pp 194, 248–49)

[19]Morral (1977 p 93) finds nothing else in Aristotle's treatment of faction besides his intro- iction of the middle class

[20]Aristotle points out that a middle class more frequently occurs in a large city than in a small ty, and that most regimes are either democratic or oligarchic because they lack the middle ement (4 11 12–16) Although a middle class is a function of size, and understood to be such nspicuously absent from the *Politics* is any effort to foster a middle-class polity by extending e size of the city (If a middle-class polity also depends on wealth—enough to make some of e poor moderate property owners—then it should be noted as well that Aristotle objects to the nd of economic activity that would most likely produce wealth namely *chrēmatismos* or busi- ess Regarding Aristotle's treatment of acquisition see Barker, 1959, p 376, Newman 1973) 134–35, Brown, 1982 pp 171–90, Nichols, 1983, p 179 Ambler 1984, pp 490–96, 1985, 174) As explained above, a large city or state forfeits the moral self-sufficiency of a polis For istotle, a small city is a given, and what remains optional is the regime—e g , the best simply, e best generally, the best for this or that people For James Madison, on the other hand —and the context of revolutionary America—a republican regime is a given and what people con- st is the size of the territory

happens that people quarrel over the true meaning of distributive justice Oligarchs believe that inequality of possessions means inequality in all things politically consequential, thus oligarchs should rule. Democrats believe that equality of freedom, such as free birth, means equality of power, thus the majority of the freeborn should rule (3.9.4, 5.1.3–4, 6.3.1–2). If either faction is excluded, it is wont to think itself abused and to conspire against the regime But if the factions share the offices, as in a mixed regime, they are likely to bring their discontents with them into the government, quarreling instead over the precise distributions of power. The only remedy for people judging in their own case and handicapped by fallible reasoning is that they be educated so as to appreciate and respect their counterpart's position. It is not enough for democrats to behave as partisans inside institutional arrangements that provide them sufficient power to protect their interests. They must also adopt the perspective of oligarchs, just as oligarchs must think as democrats, while both must respect and emulate aristocrats The success of a mixed regime depends on the creation of a single community (4.11.7–8), and this in turn, if a middle class is absent, depends on the kind of political education that Aristotle, acting as legislator, attempts to provide (Yak, 1986, pp 22–23)

In book 3, chap 13, Aristotle considers the case of a pluralistic city where multiple claimants to rule are present—the good, the wealthy, the wellborn, and the many (3.13 4–5) Aristotle sifts through their arguments with an eye to finding and establishing the most suitable unitary regime But the justice of a unitary regime is itself challenged by the existence of so many prominent classes (3.13.2–4),[21] and the thrust of the chapter is to make each class receptive to the opinions of its opponents Thus the net result, though not stated explicitly, is power sharing in a mixed regime

Aristotle very quickly shows that no defining principle (wealth, freedom virtue) is in the complete interest of those who advance and defend it (Jaffa 1972, pp. 113–14), for every principle is subject to monarchical usurpation If the wealthy merit rule by reason of their property, then the wealthiest among them deserves to rule those of lesser fortunes. Similarly, free birth must surrender to good birth, aristocratic virtue to kingly virtue, and strength of numbers to the greater strength of talent or resources (3 13 7–8, 6 3 3) But lest this line of argument too neatly conclude for the rule of one, Aristotle mentions, and to a surprising degree condones, the practice of ostracism The

[21] At the start of chap 13, Aristotle repeats the point that those who contribute to the city's good life have the best claim to rule and that equality or inequality in some one thing ought not to be extended to everything political, for "all regimes of this sort are necessarily deviations Aristotle then proceeds to consider regimes that "dispute justly in a certain way, but not justly in an unqualified sense " Included in these regimes is aristocracy Aristotle states that the wealthy, the free, and the wellborn have a claim, and "in a similar way [*homoiôs*] virtue has a just claim in the dispute (1283a37–38) See also 3 13 8–9

excellent risk banishment since pronounced superiority is inconsistent with the equality needed for politics and the rule of law (3.13.13–23).

The above admonition serves to dampen the fires of righteousness and fanaticism which might otherwise inflame adherents to the competing principles of rule. What is next required is for the members of each class to see the political landscape from the vantage of their rivals. In chap. 11 Aristotle defends the collective judgment of the many. As a group, the many are better judges of musical and poetic productions, just as taken together they can provide a dinner more sumptuous and various than that hosted by the few. The particular advantage of collective judgment is comprehensiveness—nothing passes undetected when the many bear witness. Thus were the many to deliver a literary review, their presentation would cover every conceivable aspect of the work. Aristotle proceeds to liken the virtuous individual to a painting in which all the excellent parts that nature normally scatters about are arranged into one beautiful ensemble. But no matter how wonderful the painted eye or ear, says Aristotle against this individual, somewhere in nature there is a real eye or ear that surpasses it (3.11.2–4). The multitude represent a great warehouse of human virtue needing only some organization and assembly in order to become politically useful; they are the audience who see everything in the play but who require a theater critic to bring coherence to their observations. Given this potential—and Aristotle cautions that not every multitude is so good (3.11.5)—the many need not be prejudiced by appeals to excellence. Collective judgment is thus defended aristocratically, in terms of its contribution to excellence, rather than on grounds that all opinions are equal. Treated as colleagues in an aristocratic venture, the democratic multitude are given an interest in aristocracy and are more inclined to share its values.

In chap. 15 Aristotle repeats this procedure but in reverse—he provides a democratic argument to defend aristocracy. The question in 15 concerns the corruptibility of judgment and the likelihood that a single individual is more prone to corruption than a crowd. Nevertheless, the choice favors the judgment of the one individual unless the many are good men and good citizens—aristocrats in other words. Aristocracy is susceptible to factional conflict, Aristotle admits, and this is an argument against it. But still he prefers aristocracy to kingship because of the security against corruption which numbers provide. "If, then, the rule of a number of persons who are all good men is to be regarded as aristocracy, and the rule of a single person as kingship, aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for cities than kingship . . . provided it is possible to find a number of persons who are similar" (3.15.10). There is no issue more central to the *Politics* than the best regime and no question more urgent to political men than who should rule. Here Aristotle decides this matter in favor of aristocracy using what is essentially a democratic argument—where there is rough equality of virtue, numbers are de-

terminative. The aristocrats find themselves protected against kingship l
the utility and justice of equality. Although accustomed to arguing their ca
in terms of excellence, they are made to see that democratic equality, ar
majority rule as its corollary (we aristocrats should rule because we are mo
numerous than a king), can serve their interests just as well.[22]

We pass over the wellborn and the wealthy because it is thought that
classes they are not so distinctive. Good birth is either a variation on fr
birth, or it is an accompaniment of wealth and virtue (3 13.2–3, 4.8.9). Ar
wealth is a commodity valued by the rich and poor alike. The class of wealt
oligarchs divide between the democratic multitude who join them in the
love of money, and the aristocratic few who share with them a love of hono
In effect they disappear as a class, leaving the field to democrats and arist
crats. The real ideological battle in politics then is between excellence ar
equality rather than between wealth and freedom. This is not to say that ari
tocrats fight with democrats, for it is reported that aristocrats are the lea
likely to force their claim to rule (5.1.6, 5 4.12), nor does it mean that dem
crats and oligarchs live happily in peace, for the contest between rich ar
poor is the central drama of politics (5 9 10). What is meant instead is th
the defining principles of aristocracy and democracy are at the furthest r
move and that therefore they are the most difficult to reconcile Aristocra
are wont to feel contempt for democratic freedom which is private, pu
poseless, and without standards, i e , egalitarian Likewise democrats a
likely to feel threatened by the ambition and presumption that marks t
aristocratic pursuit of excellence. Making friends of these two classes is a s
rious political challenge. As a practical measure, and apart from the instru
tion explained above, Aristotle recommends the following remedy "A ve
great thing in every regime is to have the laws and management of the re
arranged in such a way that it is impossible to profit from the offices" (5 8 15)
Although Aristotle maintains that oligarchy has the most to benefit from su
a law, his subsequent discussion focuses on democracy and aristocracy

> Indeed, the only way it is possible for democracy and aristocracy to exist together is
> someone instituted this For it would then be possible for both the notables and the mul
> tude to have what they want Having it open to all to rule is characteristic of democrac
> having the notables in the offices is characteristic of aristocracy But this is what will ha

[22] See 5 6 7 where this same argument is applied to oligarchs

[23] At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Benjamin Franklin recommended that no sala
be paid to the executive (June 2) (or to the senators [June 26], and that only moderate r
muneration be granted to representatives [June 12]) He reasoned that love of power and love
money were the two passions having the greatest influence on the behavior of men, that 'sep
rately each of these has great force in prompting men to action, but when united in view of th
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects And of what kind are th
men who will strive for this profitable pre-eminence ? It will not be the wise and the moder
ate It will be the bold and the violent. " Franklin's proposal was politely seconded
then tabled and forgotten (Farrand, 1966, pp 82, 216, 427)

pen when it is impossible to profit from the offices The poor will not want account of not profiting, but rather will want to attend to their private affairs, will be able to rule because they will need nothing from the common [funds] for the poor is that they will become well off through spending their time at w well off, that they will not be ruled by ordinary persons To prevent the steal mon [funds], then, let the transfer of funds occur in the presence of all the citiz records of this be deposited with each clan, company, and tribe But to ensur rule, there should be legislation assigning honors to those of good reputation (5

Aristotle stated that every regime is advantaged by having the pr out of politics, but the main advantage is that it allows the nota *gnōrimoi*) to rule under the supervision of the many Such an arran however, produces a mixed regime of the aristocratic kind. Thus th tage of profitless officeholding to every regime is that it turns ever into a mixed aristocracy And let it be noted that the oligarchs ha peared as a separate class—either they are money-loving and are ou tics—with the many, pursuing their private affairs, or they are wel *poroi*), indifferent to profit, and in politics for the honor of it, i e , timocratic/aristocratic.[24]

[24]There are other institutional arrangements that are good for domestic harmon seem appropriate to a mixed regime They are alluded to by Aristotle but left developed Still they are worth mentioning if only because they make Aristotle lo forefather of liberal democracy In book 2 Aristotle speaks of the division of power a tan kings To its proponents this division is an important means of preventing factio (2 9 30) Aristotle though seems unconvinced and to prefer an education that w gentlemen of the kings Even so the idea of dividing governmental power as a cure f on the table But Aristotle adds to it, in a fashion, when he delineates in book 4 the tions or branches of government He never quite proposes the separation of these fu safeguard against tyranny rather his purpose is to fit the right arrangement of legislat tive, and judicial powers to the right regime But throughout the discussion there is in achieving balance and moderation so as to minimize the chances of factious disco 4 14 12-16) Along the same lines Aristotle warns against the concentration of politic nomic power and counsels their separation (5 8 13-14) And with an eye toward e opposed to justice, he recommends specialization of functions (4 15 6) and even in decentralization or localism (4 15 9) Also mentioned in passing is legislative rep (4 14 13) and, at somewhat greater length, popular control of executive offices throu and audits (6 4 5-7) When discussing polity Aristotle advises various strategies democratic and oligarchic elements such as a system of incentives and disincentive a balanced participation of the social classes (Resnick 1979 pp 78-85), he conclu best mix is one that defies precise identification (4 9 2-4 6) Finally he suggests ce arrangements which sound suspiciously like bicameralism Of course the term is no the proposal in book 6, chap 3 that the rich and the poor be provided separate votı amount to the same thing each body is to vote, with the votes weighted by prop ments, if there is a difference in outcome, the majority of one joins with the min other—and vice versa—and the larger of the two combined votes wins the decis case, as in most of the cases above, the purpose is to control faction by dispersing p all of the relevant groups (Jaffa [1972, p 119] suggests that the purpose is additio courage the poorer of the rich and the richer of the poor to combine against the ext creating a middle class interest)

Before leaving this review of actual cities and actual regimes, mention is in order of the method used by Aristotle to organize the empirical evidence bearing on faction. He never quite says so, but his account of faction in the early chapters of book 5 seems to rely on the four operative causes outlined in the *Physics* (2 3). efficient, material, formal, and final. For instance, faction has its efficient cause in the beginning points, occasions, and opportunities (1302a21: *archai*) which trigger civil unrest These include, to name but a few, fear of punishment, contempt for the rulers, and election intrigue. The material cause of faction is the unsuitability of a regime to its people, a disproportion that occurs at some time in the regime's history or at the moment of its founding (1302b3 *auxēsin tēn para to analogon*, 1302b5 *anomoiotēta*) [25] An increase of the poor in an oligarchic regime or an extreme democracy forced upon an agrarian people are examples (6.1 8) The formal cause (1302a20 *pōs te echontes*) is the disagreement among citizens about who should rule, those disputes over distributive justice and reciprocal equality "Factional conflict," Aristotle declares, "is everywhere the result of inequality, at any rate where there is no proportion among those who are unequal" (5 1 11) The last is final cause (1302a21 *tinōn heneken*), or the objectives people pursue when they resort to faction. There are two objectives that Aristotle allows profit (*kerdos*) and honor (*timē*) The many want profit, while the few seek honor To all of these causes the solution is fundamentally the same, namely institutional arrangements and adjustments in the distribution of power such that a majority of the people always supports the regime (4 12 1, 5 9 5, 6 6 2)

3 *The Ideal Regime*

There is a still more serious cause of *stasis* which no amount of institutional tinkering will cure, and consideration of it will serve as an introduction to Aristotle's ideal city The underlying cause, says Aristotle, is human depravity (*mochthēria*). Bad people—the vicious, the greedy, the unjust—lack control of their appetites and are unable to live amicably with others. They are the natural enemies of good people who are constant, reliable, and attentive to the commonweal (*N E* , 1167b5–16) "The greatest factional split is perhaps that between virtue and depravity" (5 3 16).[26] What then is to be done with the bad? If it is possible—as it might be in the founding of a new city, especially a city of one's dreams—the bad should be excluded from membership The legislator should not even attempt to work his art on those

[25]The three beginning points and causes (*tas archas kai tas aitias*) spoken of by Aristotle at 1302a18 are here increased to four by identifying two "material" causes within the list of eleven "efficient" causes given at 1302a37–1302b5

[26]Lord translates *isōs* as *perhaps* An alternate rendering is *in like manner*, which if used would remove the note of uncertainty from Aristotle's statement

whose natures are unpromising and whose evil ways are likely to defeat efforts at correction. The city can be no better than its human material good city, therefore, will not admit as citizens those who lack spirit (*thum* and thought (*dianoia*), such as the barbarians of excessively cold and cessively hot climates (7.7 2–4). For those who pass inspection and are mitted, their own wicked tendencies can best be controlled by an edu tion designed to moderate desire (2.7.8, 12). Education is the princi means whereby the potentially good become good in fact, and the prir pal means for averting future problems of faction But poverty can also b cause of faction (2.6 13),[27] thus some additional advantage is to be found equalizing property. The advantage though "is by no means a great o (2 7.18), since equality of possessions causes disaffection among those w believe themselves more than equal The final judgment seems then to that equalization of property is an uncertain good at best. On the other ha communization of property is a manifest evil. True, "this sort of legislat has an attractive face and might be held humane, he who hears of it accept gladly, thinking it will produce a marvelous affection in all for each oth (2.5.11) But in reality communism offends most people's sense of justice a makes the difficult business of living together to be more difficult s (2.5 3–4) Civil concord (*homonoia*) is more surely provided if property private and its use communal. A community is blessed if there is affect (*philia*) among the people "For we suppose affection to be the greatest good things for cities, for in this way they would least of all engage in f tional conflict" (2.4 6) Affection exists among similar people, people who spirited in temperament (7 7.5–7), joined together by marriage (3 9 13), a partners in a common enterprise "The city wishes," says Aristotle, " . be made up of equal and similar persons to the extent possible" (4 11 8) I tween dissimilar and unequal people—slaves and masters at the extreme there can be no affection and no political partnership, for "the ones are c sumed by envy, the others by contempt" (4 11 7) A perfect city, an id city, is composed of good, spirited, and like-minded people, who beca of these qualities feel affection for one another, and the property arran ment that is suited to their partnership is private possession and public (7.10 9, 2.4.9)

These reflections, scattered throughout the *Politics*, provide the ration for Aristotle's ideal city, at least as regards the subject of faction Now notes that this city of his prayers is in two respects homogeneous First, citizens are more alike than those in existing unitary regimes because t are products of a common education that seeks to make them good thro

[27] Wheeler (1951, pp 151–55) discusses the economic factors at work in faction but reg Marxist interpretations as out of place Likewise Lintott (1982, pp 257–58), who nonethe gives primacy to the economic (p 248) Barker (1959, p 488) says that "the economic in pretation of Greek *stasis* . . . finds little support in [Aristotle's] pages "

habituation and instruction (8.1.3–4) (nature having made them freedom-loving and capable of ruling, i.e., spirited and thoughtful).[28] As adults they lead similar lives of leisure, lives devoted to virtue, culture, and politics. They are property owners, with land on the border and at the center to give them common interests (7.10.11) (although differences of fortune are permitted since some citizens are expected to be too poor to contribute to the common messes [7.10 10]). All are politically active as soldiers, governors, and priests, depending on age. And since each age group receives its turn at rule, there is less resentment of those who actually hold the deliberative and judicial offices. "Nature has provided the distinction by making that which is the same by type have a younger and an older element, of which it is proper for the former to be ruled and the latter to rule No one chafes at being ruled on the basis of age or considers himself superior, particularly when he is going to recover his contribution when he attains the age to come" (7.14.5) In effect, the city is a family, with duties and powers distributed appropriately among the generations.

But the city is also a materially self-sufficient association. In addition to citizens there are workers in this community, farmers, mechanics, and tradesmen Of course the same holds true of all unitary regimes, that an inferior class of workers cohabit the territory with citizens But in these cities the workers are free people who expect to be ruled voluntarily and often are, whereas in Aristotle's ideal city, the workers are slaves or spiritless barbarians [29] Because other cities are heterogeneous, composed of at least two classes, the ruling class is obliged to deal politically[30] with the ruled, if only because their presence is a threat to the stability of the regime But the ruled in Aristotle's city are politically irrelevant—and this is the second sense in which the city is homogeneous The ruled are slaves, and the slaves of this

[28] Yak (1985) argues persuasively that political friendship for Aristotle is a mixture of interest friendship and virtue friendship, and that the conflicting expectations associated with each are a source of disappointment, recrimination and dissension Because Aristotle accepts these consequences, thinking them in fact useful for the citizens rational development, Yak concludes that the Aristotelian polis is marked by strife and that contemporary critics are mistaken who see the polis as a nurturing, fraternal society and an implicit reproach to the alienation of liberal contractarianism But is Aristotle content to have the citizens of his ideal community united—and torn—by this political friendship so described? In order to replace the mixture with the camaraderie of virtue friendship, Yak suggests, "one would have to find a way of turning [all citizens] into virtuous individuals" (p 108) Yak presumes this to be impossible (also Yak, 1986, p 25) but is not communal virtue precisely what Aristotle is up to in books 7 and 8?

[29] Only of the farmers does Aristotle actually say that they are slaves or barbarians lacking in spirit The *other* workers are *not* described, *except that as necessities* (*anagkaia*) of the city, rather than as parts (*moria*), they are likened to the instruments of a craftsman (7 8 3) This, however, is the same characterization that Aristotle elsewhere uses of slaves

[30] "Political" here is not used in the full sense to denote a partnership in a common moral life, *rather it refers to that lesser order of politics that regulates the contractual agreements of an* economic alliance

city pose little danger of rebellion since Aristotle "prays for" their pusillanimity and ethnic dissimilarity (7.10.13, 2.5 25) It is as if the city were populated by ideal citizens only, with material necessities provided by animate tools (1.4.2), or by the human equivalent of machines (Strauss, 1964, p. 37). Under such circumstances the problem of faction is of minimal import, because the diversity is missing of which faction is born. by nature and by nurture all citizens are politically competent and morally good—the servile and the depraved are removed, all belong to the ruling class and among themselves relate generationally, as children (soldiers), parents (rulers), and grandparents (priests), property is private and in varying amounts, but its use is partly common, moreover, the chief purpose of private property is to promote like-mindedness and affection among citizens Although the city is constructed more for the sake of virtue than for the sake of stability, still the homogeneity of the virtuous proves to be the city's primary cure for faction. Aristotle attacks Socrates for homogenizing the city too much, but Aristotle acknowledges that homogeneity is a valuable means for promoting domestic harmony: "For just as in war the crossing of ditches, even if they are small, splits apart the ranks, so every difference, it appears, makes a factional split" (5 3 16). Aristotle, as it were, has filled in most of the ditches and has evened the terrain over which his army of citizens will march

What then has become of Aristotle's argument that the city, a diverse and self-sufficient compound, is unlike the family and superior to it because "what is less a unity is more choiceworthy than what is more a unity" (2 2 8)? Is Aristotle's ideal city any less unified than Socrates' Republic? To be sure, Aristotle does not eliminate the family, private possessions, or sexual differentiation But then he understands these institutions and differences to be conducive to civil concord, and he accuses Socrates of electing means incongruous with the end of civil unity At the very moment when Aristotle is championing diversity, in book 2, he is also explaining the conditions for the successful unification of the city, namely, the lessons of love, piety, and ownership as taught by the family [11] Furthermore, Aristotle nowhere introduces a philosopher king, as does Socrates, nor are his age-based distinctions

[11] Okin (1979, p 85) notes an inconsistency in Aristotle's argument, she asks "If doing away with the family would severely dilute the bonds of kinship how could it at the same time lead to much unity?" A good question to which the answer presumably is that it would not lead to much unity, on the contrary, it would cause a general disaffection that would undermine the city's friendship Perhaps Aristotle's position can be stated thus Socrates erred in trying to turn the city into a single human being by abolishing private families and private property, this could not be done and should not be tried because real human beings, so reared, would relate to each other as selfish and distrusting strangers, but by retaining private families and private property some semblance of the communal family is possible, and—in light of books 7 and 8 of the *Politics*—even desirable On the significance of families and private property for civic *philia*, or *homonoia*, see Saxonhouse (1982, pp 214–16) and Dobbs (1985, pp 36–41), Blits (1985, pp. 229–34) provides a discussion of piety

within the ruling class as constant a barrier as Socrates' educational division of guardians and warriors, and his working class, being all or mostly slaves, are less politically visible than Socrates' farmers and artisans. Socrates' Republic begins with the division of labor—one man, one art—and ends with a class society. Aristotle's polis, on the other hand, is a place where equals rotate through office, and in his ideal city there is such singleness of purpose that the same education is given to all citizens—for it is said that the individual belongs not to himself but to the whole (8.1.3–4). It is at least arguable, therefore, that the best city of Socrates' devising contains more internal diversity than Aristotle's ideal.

Aristotle said of diversity that its purpose in part is to provide the material base of the city's existence. This much of the original position is retained, for there are slaves and metics who do the work of society. But it was also, and more importantly, said that diversity is needed for self-sufficiency, that self-sufficiency makes for happiness, and that happiness is a matter of practicing virtue. The city's diversity was credited with turning amoral children (family members) into morally mature adults (free and equal citizens). Their virtue, of course, was practical in nature—deliberating about good and evil in order to do the good (*N.E.*, 1095a6). If the city were a school and its citizens philosophers, then presumably no limit to diversity would be necessary, for the wider the range of opinions, the better the chances of reaching truth through debate. But since its people are less than philosophers, and since its purpose is action rather than thought, the city needs agreement and thus a limit to diversity. This limit has its focal point in the regime, for the regime itself represents agreement and choice respecting the most central political question, namely, who is worthy and who should rule. Moral dispute then takes place within the context of a regime. But regimes are good and bad with numerous gradations in between. What is the value of deliberation about the advantageous and the just in a bad regime? Is it of any moral benefit, for instance, to have oligarchs debate their strategy for despoiling the poor, those oligarchs who take an oath to treat the poor with malice and contempt (5.9.11)? One recalls that Aristotle argues in book 3 that a good person must be a citizen of a good regime, to say nothing of being the ruler of a good regime (3.5.10). Apparently the political life of citizens in bad regimes counts for little morally. But does diversity help to bring about good regimes? Perhaps. Diversity brings about faction. If properly handled, faction can lead to the compromise of a mixed regime—and a mixed regime is preferable to a bad regime.[12] But mixed government is not on the same plane with aristocracy. Compared with the best, mixed government is itself a deviation (*parekbasis*), for where there is a mixed regime, aristocrats must accommodate themselves to the lesser standards of democrats and oligarchs. Such diversity

[12]A polity seems to be the only regime that thrives on and is improved by spiritual diversity.

of standards is injurious to aristocrats, since political debate proceeds on the assumption that freedom and wealth are more admirable than virtue, or that all principles are equal. Again, were it Aristotle's purpose to make his aristocrats philosophers,[13] then the challenge of defending virtue before the freedom-loving and the money-loving would be beneficial. But given Aristotle's distinction between being virtuous and knowing virtue, his aristocrats do not need the company of democrats and oligarchs in order to develop themselves spiritually—for theirs is a "partnership of similar persons for the sake of a life that is the best possible" (7 8 4) [14] In Aristotle's ideal city, diversity is replaced by a public education that endeavors to make all citizens good, not by the clash of opinions in a marketplace of ideas, but by exhortation, habituation, and law, using the morally serious man of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *spoudaios*, as the model

IV Conclusion

Aristotle's theory of faction is tailored to each of the three variations of the civic compound In some cities the rulers govern themselves and their class as members of a political partnership, but are also joined in an economic alliance to other classes which complete the city by contributing to its material self-sufficiency. These are the unitary regimes, and they are either correct or deviant Correct regimes guard against faction by protecting the interests of the governed, they rule with consent But they are still not durable since the effect of city-living is to encourage the disfranchized to seek a political life and a partnership that is more than contractual Deviant regimes are even less durable since their selfish injustice induces the ruled to rebel In order to stabilize themselves they must imitate the justice of their counterparts or share power with the ruled and gradually surrender their identities as unitary regimes

The city governed by a unitary regime is in fact two cities, usually one of the rich and one of the poor But where a mixed regime is in power, there the city is single and whole, for no class of free persons is excluded from office Power sharing is the principal means by which a mixed regime diffuses factious discontent But if the city is not blessed with a middle class, then something additional is needed to keep all elements living together in harmony. This something is an education designed to teach the meritorious their interest in equality and the mediocre their capacity for excellence Ar-

[13]See Lord (1982, pp 34–35) whose thesis is that music education in Aristotle is primarily moral rather than aesthetic, that it instructs adults as well as children, and that it is preferred as a curriculum to science or philosophy because it is within the reach of most people which is to say egalitarian On the dubious status of philosophy in the city see pp 64–65

[14]What is truly the best association is friendship among philosophers But Aristotle does not regard such a relationship as a suitable model for politics The best for politics is a community of the morally virtuous

istotle himself supplies this education in the *Politics*, but it is expected t regimes will teach these same lessons to their citizens.

The ideal city is also a single city because its working class of slaves metics is politically insignificant and because everyone else is regarded a c zen. Also citizenship in the ideal city is a far more homogenizing experie than it is in any other city, because a citizen here is fully set in his chara by the education of the regime and because all citizens, with allowances m for age, lead comparable lives of leisure. Aristotle's city-to-be-prayed-fo homogeneous then in these two respects, and it relies on this homogen as its remedy for faction. Thus in the contest between Socratic unity Madisonian diversity, Aristotle, in the end, comes to side with Socrates.

Manuscript submitted 19 March 1987
Final manuscript received 5 November 1987

References

Ambler, W 1984 Aristotle on Acquisition *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 17 487-
——— 1985 Aristotle's Understanding of the Naturalness of the City *Review of Po* 47 163–85
Aristotle 1957 *Aristotelis Politica* W D Ross, ed Oxford Clarendon Press
——— 1970 *Physics*, vol 1 P H Wicksteed and F M Cornford trans Cambridge Ha University Press
——— 1985 *Nicomachean Ethics*, T Irwin, trans Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Com
Barker, E 1958 *The Politics of Aristotle* London Oxford University Press
——— 1959 *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* London Oxford University 1
Blits, J 1985 Privacy and Public Moral Education *Educational Theory*, 35 225–38
Bloom, A 1968 Introduction, *The Republic of Plato* New York Basic Books
Booth, W 1981 Politics and the Household A Commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* Book *History of Political Thought*, 2 203–26
Brown, W 1982 Aristotle's Art of Acquisition and the Conquest of Nature *Interpret* 10 159–95
Dobbs, D 1985 Aristotle's Anticommunism *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 2
Durkheim, E 1933 *The Division of Labor in Society* G Simpson, trans New York Mac Company
Farrand, M , ed 1966 *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* vol 1 New H Yale University Press
Hamilton, A , J Madison, and J Jay 1961 *The Federalist Papers* New York New Am Library
Hobbes, T 1968 *Leviathan* New York Penguin Books
——— 1978 *Man and Citizen* Gloucester, MA Peter Smith
Jaffa, H 1972 Aristotle In L Strauss and J Cropsey, eds , *History of Political Philosop* ed Chicago Rand McNally
Lintott, A 1982 *Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City* Baltimore Hopkins Press
Lord, C 1982 *Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle* Ithaca Cornel versity Press
——— trans 1984 *The Politics* Chicago University of Chicago Press
Machiavelli, N 1970 *The Discourses* New York Penguin Books

Morral, J 1977 *Aristotle* London George Allen and Unwin
Mulgan, R 1977 *Aristotle's Political Theory* Oxford Clarendon Press
Newman, W. L 1973 *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol 1, rprt New York Arno Press
Nichols, M 1983 The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition Aristotle's Introduction to Politics *Interpretation*, 11 171–83
Okin, S 1979 *Women in Western Political Thought* Princeton Princeton University Press
Orwin, C 1978 Machiavelli's Unchristian Charity *American Political Science Review* 72 1217–28
Resnick, D 1979 Justice, Compromise, and Constitutional Rules in Aristotle's *Politics* In R Pennock and J Chapman, eds , *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics* Nomos XXI New York New York University Press
Saxonhouse, A 1982 Family, Polity and Unity Aristotle on Socrates Community of Wives *Polity*, 15 202–19
Strauss, L 1964 *The City and Man* Chicago Rand McNally
Wheeler, M 1951 Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of Political Struggle *American Journal of Philology*, 72 145–61
Yak, B 1985 Community and Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy *Review of Politics* 47 92–112
——— 1986 Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Class Conflict Unpublished paper

Patrick Coby is associate professor of government, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063

Preempting Quality Challengers in Hous Elections

Jonathan S. Kra
Donald Philip Gr
University of California, Berk

Why do strong challengers oppose incumbents in some House districts and not in ot This paper compares the influence of several different strategic considerations which attr dissuade good challengers national political tides (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983), district political forces (Bond et al , 1985), and preemptive spending by incumbents (Goldenberg 1986) Examination of House races from 1972 to 1980 suggests that the local political cl plays the greatest role in determining the quality of a district's challenger, while the imp national tides fluctuates, and preemptive spending has little effect These findings shed li the actions of House incumbents and the dynamics of congressional elections

INTRODUCTION

Every other year hundreds of candidates challenge incumbents for ele to the House of Representatives These challengers range from experie local politicians well known to the voters, to obscure and occasionally ec tric candidates with no experience in politics Clearly, the first kind of c date is a better bet on election day than the second Indeed, strong candi have been shown to receive substantially more votes than weak candidat both individual level (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980) and aggregate (Greer Krasno, 1988, Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) analyses of House elections Rep Guy Vander Jagt, head of the National Republican Congressional C mittee, has put it "Just as they say pitching is 80 percent of baseball, Congressional race the candidate is 80 percent of winning A good cand can win it, no matter how bad the conditions, and a bad candidate can lo no matter how good the conditions" (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983, p 9

What then determines whether incumbents face strong or weak lengers in a given election? One answer, derived from Jacobson and

*We would like to thank Jim Glaser Michael Hagen, and Ray Wolfinger for their l comments The Institute of Governmental Studies and the Survey Research Center at th versity of California, Berkeley, provided assistance for this research We are grateful to Bertozzi, Kymberly Snead, Lisa Waxman, and Marcy Berkman for data coding

[1] Born (1986) is the sole exception

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol 50, No 4 November 1988

nell's "strategic politicians model" (1983), is that national conditions create expectations about the election (e.g., "It's a good year for the Democrats") which encourage strong challengers of the favored party to run and convince good candidates of the other party to wait. An additional answer, implied by Bond et al.'s (1985, p. 523) analysis of the 1980 election, is that the quality of the challenger is influenced by the electoral history of a given district. Incumbents who have a record of close calls attract strong opponents, while incumbents who put together a string of routs draw only token opposition[2] These two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but as we will show, they do have different consequences for our understanding of House elections

In addition, there is the question of whether the quality of a challenger may be influenced by incumbent fund-raising and spending in advance of the election (Goldenberg et al , 1986) Do large bankrolls or an early media blitz preempt quality opponents? In order to compare the relative contribution of each explanation, we examine a series of five elections from 1972 to 1980 In the end, it is local political forces, beyond any other factor, which have the greatest influence on the political quality of a district's challenger

Challenger Quality

Let us first take up the question of what makes a good candidate, and how candidate quality may be measured We regard challenger political quality as the *personal* characteristics which contribute to the strength of a candidacy In general terms, we believe that quality is the sum of two traits, attractiveness and political skill The term attractiveness includes the full range of attributes which may be appealing in the eyes of the voter qualifications for office in the form of education or occupational experience, familiarity resulting from name recognition, and personal attractiveness due to appearance or personality Political skill refers to the ability to organize and conduct an effective campaign

The importance of attractiveness and skill to a person running for Congress is fairly evident What is not clear is how one might determine how much of each a candidate possesses Our approach is to delve as deeply as possible into each challenger's background in order to inventory all characteristics which imply attractiveness or skill By focusing on a candidate's background, our measure of quality concentrates exclusively on the challenger's fixed personal qualities This implies that challenger quality exists in advance of and separate from the other aspects of the campaign, political quality is a resource a candidate brings to his or her campaign, an attribute

[2] Bond et al. (1985) also test a series of other hypotheses concerning district diversity ideological extremity, advertising, and casework, for which they find marginal and statistically insignificant results

that is not a function of the campaign's success or failure This differs sig cantly from Bond et al.'s "composite quality' index (1985) and Ragsdale Cook's "challenger effectiveness" measure (1987), which include both characteristics and campaign spending, thus reflecting the strength of a *didacy*, rather than a *candidate*. Although the correlation between a ca date's quality and spending is high, previous analysis of the 1978 ele demonstrates that the effect of a challenger's personal characteristics o vote is distinct from his or her campaign spending (Green and Krasno, 1

The main difficulty with this approach involves information, both ac ing and assessing it Certain aspects of a candidate's political quality, su the ability to charm the voters on their doorsteps, are unobservable, cially prior to the campaign In addition, some observable traits go u ceived due to the relative paucity of background information availab each candidate. However, by referring to *Congressional Quarterly W Report*'s biennial "Election Outlook" issue, we were able to glean an u standing of each challenger's background. From there our search for date attractiveness and skill begins

To utilize these data we simply added together the number of can attributes which imply attractiveness, skill, or both to create a single m quality. In essence, this amounts to an interval scale with each candid tribute worth a single challenger quality "point "[3] Following Jacobso Kernell, we began with the conviction that the most basic distincti tween the candidates exists between those who have held political offi those who have not [4] Elective office establishes one's occupational qu tions and furnishes a measure of celebrity, both elements of attractiv In addition, having run successfully for office provides a candidate wi political connections so important to campaigning, as well as the p skills gained as a candidate Since this encompasses four attributes o lenger quality (see figure 1), we started by giving all challengers with ence in elective office a baseline quality rank of "4," with the remainı didates receiving "0."


Obviously, neither all 0's nor all 4's are created equal To further entiate among these groups we assigned additional points according to ety of criteria Since candidates with previous office begin with a b score reflecting their experience as elected officials, additional crit volve only those characteristics relating to the nature of their office an

[3]Clearly, this is a somewhat arbitrary method of assignment But despite the provis ture of the scoring procedure, the scale has been shown to be a much more effective pr the vote than previous, dichotomous measures (Green and Krasno 1988) We hope data about challengers become available it will be possible to estimate the 'value o pect of challenger quality separately

[4]Many other authors also measure quality as a dummy variable based on previou office These include Bond et al 1985, Born 1986, Bianco 1984, and Canon 1985

FIGURE 1

CONSTRUCTION OF CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY



Key Political office = elective office

Group 1 Type of office based on perceived size of electoral constituency, usually state senator or mayor, council person, or commissioner of large city Currently in office = present office-holder Previous congressional run = has run for the House seat in past Celebrity status = nonpolitical basis for being well known (e g athletics, military heroism famous family)

Group 2 Previous congressional run (see above) Previous candidate for political office = has run for office in past Nonelective office = public nonelective office like district attorney Type on nonelective office based on perceived status of office like district attorney or public services commissioner Political activist etc based on record of past involvement in political affairs present support from political party, or former political employment (e g aide) Professional status = record of being gainfully employed Celebrity status (see above)

toral experience in the congressional district [5] A complete list of these standards can be seen in figure 1 For example, State Senator R W "Red" Noonan, a 1978 Democratic challenger in Alabama's 1st Congressional District, received a high challenger quality score of 7, the sum of his baseline score (4) plus credit for being a relatively high-level elected official (+1), cur-

[5]The exception is celebrity status Since name recognition is almost always beneficial to congressional candidates, individuals could receive an additional "point" for celebrity regardless of their baseline score

rently in office (+1), and a celebrity through his football career at the U versity of Alabama (+1). Among challengers without experience in elect office, a 1980 Democrat challenger, Carey Peck received points for hav run for office previously (+1), having run for the same congressional s previously (+1), being a former congressional aide (+1), a senior citi housing director (professional status, +1), and a celebrity by virtue of father, actor Gregory Peck, (+1) These add to his baseline (0) for a f quality rank of 5 And, on a different level altogether, perennial candi Dorothy Cleveland, a retired secretary from Mississippi's 3rd Congressi District, received a total quality score of 2 as a result of having previo run for the congressional seat In theory, candidates with experience in e tive office could receive a final quality score ranging between 4 and 8, w those lacking this experience may receive scores from 0 to 7.

Because the model which we will eventually test includes variables f the previous election, we are forced to restrict our analysis to elections single decade to avoid the complications which arise from redistricting. cordingly we have measured the political quality of all major party ca dates opposing House incumbents in general elections from 1972 to 1 This set of elections, which Jacobson and Kernell examined to derive "strategic politicians" model, gives us ample opportunity to measure effects of changing national forces Because some districts feature in bents who face no opposition from major party challengers, while other

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY, 1972–198(
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Challenger Quality Score	1972	1974	1976	1978	198
0	2	2	12	7	4
1	43	49	40	44	51
2	19	14	15	14	11
3	13	7	6	13	8
4	6	7	7	8	9
5	9	13	12	5	10
6	7	6	6	6	6
7	2	3	2	3	2
Total	101%	101%	100%	100%	99
Cases	321	325	332	312	338
Mean	2 42	2 42	2 26	2 25	2

Source Data compiled by authors
Note Numbers do not always sum to 100% due to independent rounding.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY BY PARTY, 1972–1980 (IN PERCENTAGES)

Challenger Quality Score	1972		1974		1976		1978		1980	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
0	1	2	1	3	7	15	6	8	4	3
1	39	47	31	67	34	43	34	50	52	51
2	20	17	17	11	16	14	20	10	11	11
3	16	10	8	6	11	3	12	13	7	8
4	7	6	8	5	6	8	10	7	9	9
5	8	10	22	4	14	11	5	6	9	10
6	5	8	7	4	10	4	6	5	6	6
7	4	1	6	1	2	2	6	2	2	1
Total	100%	101%	100%	101%	101%	100%	99%	101%	99%	99%
Cases	143	178	163	162	122	210	109	203	128	209
Mean	2 52	2 33	3 12	1 73	2 62	2 05	2 57	2 07	2 27	2 30

Source Data compiled by authors
Note Numbers do not always sum to 100% due to independent rounding

main open seats without incumbents, the number of challengers in any given year is less than 435, ranging from 312 to 338 The distribution of challenger quality scores for these years, seen in table 1, is fairly stable over time Mean scores show little variation, ranging from 2 24 (1978) to 2 42 (1972 and 1974) Overall, the level of quality is generally low, in each year at least 45% of the challengers fall in the two lowest categories, and no more than 28% of the challengers are rated as a "4" or better in any year In addition, no challenger received the highest possible score of "8" in any year While there are occasional shifts among the categories between years, these changes are small and appear to be isolated phenomena rather than sustained trends Indeed, the distribution of challenger quality in the first year of this study looks remarkably similar to the distribution in the final year

Controlling for challenger party changes this story Comparing the quality of Democratic and Republican challengers during this period reveals a distinct Democratic advantage through 1978 This contrast is particularly sharp in 1974 when 43% of Democratic challengers were quality "4" or better, the highest level of the decade, as opposed to just 14% of Republicans, and the Democrats enjoyed nearly a one and one-half point edge in mean challenger quality. The Democrats' advantage in challenger quality persists, but less markedly, in 1976 and 1978, when Democratic challenger quality scores on average were one-half point higher than the Republicans' on the 9-point

quality scale. This disparity changes, however, in 1980 In this year Repul can challengers achieved their second-highest quality score (mean = 2.: while the Democrats tumbled to their lowest level (mean = 2.28), result in a very slight edge for the Republicans in challenger quality nationwi The full distribution of Democratic and Republican challenger quality ra ings is shown in table 2.

ANALYSIS

Having defined and measured candidate quality, we are ready to inv gate which factors lead strong candidates to oppose House incumbents begin with the assumption taken from Jacobson and Kernell (1983) that c lengers behave strategically When the chances of victory are greatest, best challengers are inspired to run, when the odds are hopeless the op tion is relegated to hopeless challengers This common sense hypothe consistent with our concept of political skill We would expect polit skillful people, above all others, to emphasize winning in politics

If the question potential candidates consider when deciding wheth run for Congress involves their chances for success, what factors inform calculations? One possibility may be the national standing of their pol party (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) [6] For example, if the coming electi expected to be a good year for Democrats, such as 1974, large numb strong Democratic challengers might take heart and run, while good R licans would wait for a more opportune moment As Jacobson and K explain, "short-term partisan forces will have opposite motivational i on prospective Democratic and Republican candidates" (1983, p 2 fact, table 2 shows that 1974 did feature many good Democratic cand and few strong Republicans By contrast, in the Republican landslide y 1980, Republican challengers enjoyed their only mean quality advant the decade

The 1974 and 1980 elections are examples Jacobson and Kernell demonstrate the importance of national political forces in creating th mate for good challengers to run Since national forces may favor one or the other, the result is that one of the parties may end up with an tage in candidate quality nationwide This advantage varies according t ditions "(t)he more extreme the electoral climate, the greater will divergence between the parties in the overall quality of their cand (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983, p 23) The distribution of quality betwe parties, according to Jacobson and Kernell's strategic politicians mo one of the factors which shape the choices in each election, and eve influences aggregate election results Since good challengers fare s

[6] According to Jacobson and Kernell's account (1983), a party's national standing is pr function of presidential popularity and economic performance

tially better at the ballot box than bad ones, a party with better candidates will pick up more votes and, in the end, more seats[7] Thus, by Jacobson and Kernell's account, parties gain seats in House elections because high national expectations lead strong candidates to run under that party's banner For vote swings to occur, the individual voter need only respond to attractive candidates, not to national political conditions as such Thus, national expectations seem to have a self-fulfilling character due to the strategic behavior of potential candidates.

Potential candidates may also assess their chances in light of the political climate closer to home There is ample reason for believing that factors particular to each district, such as the popularity of the incumbent, might play a large role in determining each challenger's perception of his or her chances. The local forces argument and the national forces argument have very different consequences If the local political climate is paramount in influencing strategic politicians to run, then we would expect good challengers to appear in marginal districts regardless of national tides This would run counter to Jacobson and Kernell's strategic politicians model, since national forces would not necessarily lead to a net "quality advantage" for one party As a result, vote swings could not be attributed to the influence of *national* expectations on the parties' challengers If national political forces have little effect on challenger quality, then perhaps they influence the voter directly This would imply that voters, and not just elites, are sensitive to political events and economic conditions (cf the exchange between Jacobson and Kernell 1983, and Uslaner and Conway, 1986, Uslaner and Conway, 1985) Thus, the validity of Jacobson and Kernell's theory is of relevance to the longstanding debate over the capabilities of the American electorate (Campbell et al , 1960, Key, 1966)

We can compare these explanations by regressing challenger political quality on measures of national and local political climate Since national forces are thought to favor one party or another, we can see their effect by looking at the relationship between party and challenger quality The effect of this variable reflects the net advantage which political events confer on one party (Jacobson, 1978) Measuring local political climate is more complicated Our solution, and Jacobson's (1978), is to measure local political forces by the challenger's party's percentage of the vote in the previous House election. This figure represents the challenger's vote base in the district Alternative approaches might include analysis of the normal vote, ideological discrepancy, incumbent activities between elections (Bond et al , 1985), or elite judgments about the vulnerability of incumbents We feel that the previous election outcome has several advantages. First, it reflects both the distribution of partisanship in a district and the popularity of the incumbent Sec-

[7] Green and Krasno (1988) estimate that the effect of challenger quality is an additional 1 6% of the vote for every scale point

ond, it is a unitary variable, a factor which facilitates comparison with
unitary variable used to measure national forces. While we conceive of
local political climate as the function of multiple factors, for this analysi
are interested in the whole, not the components.[8]

The results of this regression for the four elections from 1974 to 198
shown in table 3. The 1972 election is eliminated due to redistricting fo
ing the 1970 census. The number of cases in this analysis is some
smaller than the number of challengers scored in tables 1 and 2 due t
need to select cases with a contested House race in the previous cy
order to furnish local forces data For instance, we would discard a di
with a Democratic challenger in 1980 if no Democrat ran for the seat in
Noteworthy from our results is the large unstandardized regression c
cient associated with challenger's party in 1974 This number, 1 286, r
sents the effect of being a Democrat (rather than a Republican) on chall
quality Thus, in 1974 Democratic challengers scored on average almo
and one-third points higher on the nine-point quality scale than Re
cans, holding the previous election outcome constant But, in the other
the effect of challenger's party on quality is substantially lower and f
achieve statistical significance, including the Republican landslide in
In that year, the effect of being a Democrat, taking the previous ou
into account, cost only .383 of a quality point, Republicans scored
than Democrats On the whole, this pattern of results casts doubt on t
portance of the national political climate

In fact, controlling for the previous election result changes the simp
tionship between the challenger's party and quality shown above in
for 1976 and 1978 In these years the mean political quality of Dem
challengers exceeded Republicans by one-half of a quality point Yet
local forces are controlled, the effect of being a Democrat slightly decı
challenger's quality in 1976 and has almost no effect in 1978 These f
hint at a large role for local political climate in determining cha
quality

This suggestion is borne out by the effect estimates for local fc
table 3 Although the unstandardized coefficients associated with thı
nation appear smaller than our estimates of national conditions' effe
is the result of differences in the scaling of the independent variable
paring the standardized coefficients reveals that the influence of loc
on challenger quality far exceeds the influence of national forces. Onl
year, 1974, do these effects approach one another in size, in all oth

[8]The previous election outcome might provide a distorted view of local forces bec
cludes factors not part of the local climate (such as national forces), and because it do
into account changes in local conditions which take place between elections Presu
kind of measurement error would tend to attenuate the apparent effects of local co
challenger quality If anything, then, the strong influence of local forces discusse
underestimated

TABLE 3

EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL AND THE LOCAL POLITICAL CLIMATES ON CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY, 1974–1980
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CHALLENGER QUALITY)

		1974	1976	1978	1980
National	b	1 286	– 238	– 115	– 383
Forces*	(SE)	(223)	(224)	(206)	(193)
	Beta	336	– 060	– 029	– 101
Local	b	055	077	091	094
Forces**	(SE)	(013)	(010)	(010)	(010)
	Beta	251	416	482	496
Constant	b	– 099	– 349	– 847	– 754
	(SE)	(486)	(370)	(356)	(350)
R^2		182	159	226	244
Cases		245***	301	289	297

Source Data compiled by authors
* National forces are scored 0 for Republicans and 1 for Democrats
** Local forces, the percentage of the vote won by the challenger's party in the last election, are scored from 0 to 50
***Excludes cases from California and Texas due to 1973 redistricting
Note Estimates are ordinary least-squares coefficients
b = unstandardized regression coefficient
(SE) = standard error
Beta = standardized regression coefficient

district conditions appear paramount in influencing the quality of the candidate who will emerge to oppose the incumbent For example, in 1980 a challenger who runs in a district which cast 45% of the vote for his or her party in the previous election is likely to be two quality points higher than a challenger whose party was held to 25% in the last House election On the other hand, the value of being a Republican is worth only one-third of a quality point

One interesting characteristic of the local political climate is that its effect (both unstandardized and standardized) on challenger quality increases in each year of our analysis Other than sheer coincidence, there are several possible explanations for this. One might be that the effect of Watergate artificially depressed the impact of the previous outcome on challenger quality by inspiring strong Democrats to oppose Republican incumbents in 1974 regardless of the district's electoral history The same was true for many Republican challengers in 1976 who viewed the results of 1974 as an aberration. This explanation implies that the effects of the national and the local political climates are somehow at odds A more straightforward interpretation could be that the impact of district politics systematically increases during the redistricting cycle. In this case, the small effect of local forces early in the decade could be seen as the result of redistricting introducing uncertainty into

local politics (Giles and Pritchard, 1985). Over time, as the nature of the drawn district becomes better known, the effect of the local political clin on challenger quality grows. Though we cannot choose between these ex nations, we do point out that the influence of local forces on challer quality, always large, actually increases during the period of our analysis

One possible objection to our general conclusion that local forces are primary determinant of challenger quality is that the analysis fails to into account the potential interaction between national and local politica mates It may be the combination of favorable national and local forces w inspires strategic politicians to run for Congress. To test this hypothesis added an interaction term to our equation. The results of this analysis vide little support for the idea that national forces are especially potent the incumbent appears vulnerable in the light of past electoral perform Inclusion of the interaction term into the regression did nothing to im the fit of the model in any of the years studied, nor did the interaction c cient ever exceed its standard error It seems clear that when condition district are favorable, good challengers are likely to emerge, regardless national political climate

At this point, it is worth considering the statistical fit of this mod measured by R^2, our analysis only explains approximately one-fifth variance in challenger quality in any year There are several reasons f perhaps disappointing fit First, there is measurement error in the d dent variable, challenger quality, due to gaps in our information abou candidate and the provisional nature of the quality scale In additio worth pointing out that the decision to run for Congress depends on pe considerations outside of the model, as well as strategic factors. Runn riously for Congress is at best a tremendous personal ordeal (Kazee, pp 88–91, Maisel, 1982) The extent to which strong candidates act in dance with their family obligations, for instance, inevitably affects th our model of strategic decision making All of these issues would ten duce the R^2 of this analysis Still, without attempting to answer what is big enough, it does seem that there is room in this model to examin tional explanations for the political quality of a district's challenger

One possibility is the impact of preemptive saving and spending incumbent. In an analysis of campaign spending in the 1978 election enberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner (1986) suggest that there is a pa incumbent fundraising and spending in the year before the electio By their account, incumbents stockpile and spend campaign dollars fore the election to dissuade strong challengers from opposing them.[5] test this hypothesis by amending our model to include incumbent and expenditures in the year before the election, if the hypothesis is challenger quality would decrease as incumbents raise and spe

[5] Goldenberg et al neither define nor attempt to measure challenger quality

money in the year prior to the election Unfortunately, disaggregating the spending data by time is an extremely painstaking process As a result, we chose to examine only the case investigated by Goldenberg et al., the 1978 election cycle.

Because of the high correlation between incumbent receipts and expenditures in 1977 ($r =$ .830), we tested their impact on challenger quality separately in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity Controlling for the influence of local and national forces, the effect of incumbent fundraising and spending in 1977 on challenger quality in 1978 was almost nonexistent Nor did the inclusion of these variables affect the statistical fit of the model These results provide no support for Goldenberg et al.'s conjecture about the effect of preemptive spending in 1978

One explanation for these negative findings is the possibility that early spending is both a cause and a consequence of challenger quality. Incumbents may spend money in anticipation of high-quality opposition, even as early as the year before the election Under these circumstances a better test of the preemptive spending hypothesis might be to measure the effect of incumbent spending in the previous election on the present challenger's quality, since incumbents are unlikely to react to 1978's challengers in 1976

For challengers, previous incumbent spending is a readily available clue to the incumbent's fundraising capabilities Adding this variable requires restricting the analysis to districts with the same incumbent in two consecutive election cycles However, after controlling for national and local political forces, past incumbent expenditures have no effect on current challenger quality in any of the four elections Neither test of the preemptive spending hypothesis therefore suggests that high-quality challengers are dissuaded by spendthrift incumbents

To this point we have controlled for the reactive component of incumbent spending, but it could still be argued that the effect of early spending might be masked by the strength of the pool of available challengers in a district An incumbent in a district with a large supply of high-quality opponents may actually succeed in preempting the best potential challenger but appear to be wasting money in comparison to an incumbent who spends nothing in an area with a weak challenger pool To assess the effect of early spending, then, it is necessary to control for the strength of a district's challenger pool This is a difficult task, particularly with the cross-sectional data employed here However, we can begin to get a sense of the strength of a district's challengers by looking at past challenger quality We find that controlling for previous challenger quality reveals no preemptive effect for spending in the previous cycle [10]

[10] Canon (1985) suggests that the size of the challenger pool may be measured by the number of legislative seats in the state held by the challenger's party This variable, too exerts almost no influence on challenger quality in our regression and doesn't change the finding on preemptive spending

It would appear then that the inclusion of preemptive spending fails improve the predictive accuracy of the model. While these results may a pear counterintuitive, they are consistent with Kazee's (1980, 1983) in-de investigations of districts' challenger pools In these interviews with pot tial challengers much was made of the chances of winning in light of incumbent's past electoral success but little was said of the incumbent's ba roll in advance of the election year.[11] Incumbents often raise and sp money in the year before the election, but the preemptive effect of th activities on challenger quality has managed to elude both quantitative qualitative analyses.

Discussion

Running for reelection to Congress can be a trying business, regardle how safe the seat or how favorable the circumstances As Fenno (1978) serves, "(n)o matter how secure their electoral circumstances may se members of Congress can always find reasons to feel insecure " One im tant component of electoral threat is the political quality of the opposit Good challengers raise more money and get more votes than weak lengers (Green and Krasno, 1988) Under these circumstances it is cert reasonable, as Goldenberg et al and others claim, that incumbents w seek to preempt high-quality challengers

Our research has shown that the best way for a House incumbent t this is to trounce his or her opponent in the previous election It is the sonal aura of electoral invincibility far more than the national popular one's party, that deters strong opponents from taking on incumbents aura—in essence the local political climate as it relates to House electic is best cultivated by rolling up the largest possible margins of victory cost of a tight election for an incumbent is the increased probability of f an even tougher challenger (if possible) the next time around, in turn le to another close call, or worse By contrast, as an incumbent wins by gr amounts, potential high-quality challengers will see him/her as increa unassailable, leaving the opposition to lesser candidates, or none at all luxury of weak opponents only aids the incumbent's attempts to gain

[11] This corresponds with Ragsdale and Cook's (1987) finding that there is little relat tween incumbent and challenger resources Their analysis of challenger spending sho previous electoral outcome has a large effect, while incumbent actions between electi virtually meaningless

[12] Incumbents who crush their opposition in one election increase their chances of unopposed the next time around For example, 95% of the incumbents who won less tl of the vote in 1978 faced a challenger in 1980 By contrast, those incumbents who won more in 1978 faced opposition in the 1980 election only 76% of the time This relationsh for each election from 1974 to 1980 Evidently, winning big not only scares off good chal it sometimes scares off bad ones as well

larger victories. The ultimate payoff is a safe district featuring little or no opposition.

Naturally, there is more to a safe district than an incumbent's prosperity in the last election. Some districts are only winnable for candidates from one party. Even here, however, we would expect incumbents to value big victories (especially in primaries) in order to deter opposition from within the party (Fenno, 1978). More to the point, factors between elections may also contribute to the local political climate. For example, in 1978, the year of Koreagate, we created dummy variables for incumbents involved in "big" or "small" scandals.[13] Thrown into the regression with the national and local forces variables, incumbents with big scandals on average faced challengers who were 1.7 quality points higher, while the effect of the small scandals variable was .4 of a quality point.[14] However, these events generally apply to just a fraction of incumbents, for example, only twenty incumbents faced "big" or "small" scandals in 1978. Clearly, nonelection events can affect a district's political climate. Representatives face scandals, cast impolitic votes, lose touch with their districts. Still, the best way to take care of these problems is winning big. A large margin of victory in today's election is the best insurance that the next opponent will be weak and harmless. For incumbents, winning bigger is better.[15]

One thing an incumbent may do which has almost no direct effect on the quality of the challenger he or she will face is to raise and spend campaign money early in the election cycle. Neither possessing a large war chest before the campaign, nor spending it, seems to make much difference to potential challengers. This directly contradicts Goldenberg et al.'s contention that "(m)oney can be raised and spent preemptively to dissuade serious challengers (1986, p. 11)." Our results show that this strategy will not be effective. The fact is, when good candidates sense electoral vulnerability, large amounts of incumbent campaign money do not deter them from challenging the incumbent.[16] On the other hand, a safe incumbent will probably face no serious opposition, even if he or she has no campaign stockpile. The real in-

[13] Obviously, this is a subjective distinction. Generally, scandals serious enough to warrant mention in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report's* "Election Outlook" were coded as "big" scandals. These ranged from Joshua Eilberg's (PA-4) bribery indictment to Charles Carney (OH-19) legally taking 60,000 free books from the Library of Congress. "Small" scandals included Morris Udall (AZ-2) having once accepted a small, legal campaign contribution from a Korean agent, Tongsun Park. Peters and Welch (1980) distinguish the "severity" of the scandal according to a nine-point scale.

[14] Peters and Welch (1980) report that candidates facing scandals do significantly worse in general elections.

[15] Naturally, this is subject to diminishing marginal returns. The value of winning 60% of the vote, rather than 50%, is probably greater than the value of receiving 90% instead of 80%.

[16] Incumbent vulnerability positively influences an opponent's ability to raise money (Ragsdale and Cook 1987).

e, Thomas A 1980 The Decision to Run for the U S Congress Challenger Attitudes in e 1970s *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 5 79–100
— 1983 The Deterrent Effect of Incumbency on Recruiting Challengers in U S House lections *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 8 469–80
V O (with the assistance of Milton Cummings) 1966 *The Responsible Electorate* Camidge Harvard University Press
don, John 1966 *Candidates for Office Beliefs and Strategies* New York Random House
el, L S 1982 *From Obscurity to Oblivion Congressional Primary Elections in 1978* noxville University of Kentucky Press
ı, Thomas E , and Raymond E Wolfinger 1980 Candidates and Parties in Congressional ections *American Political Science Review*, 74 617–32
s, John G., and Susan Welch 1980 The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavr in Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review*, 74 697–708
lale, Lyn, and Timothy E Cook 1987 Representatives' Actions and Challengers' Reacms Limits to Candidate Connections in the House *American Journal of Political Science*, 45–81
ier, Eric M . and M Margaret Conway 1985 The Responsible Electorate Watergate, the onomy, and Vote Choice in 1974 *American Political Science Review*, 79 788–803
— 1986 Controversy Interpreting the 1974 Congressional Election *American Political ience Review*, 80 593–95

nathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green are graduate students in pod science at the University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720

Sex, God, and Liberalism

Ron Replogle
New York University

My aim is to understand the liberal's commitment to religious and sexual liberty. Liberal theorists characteristically try to generalize from these paradigm cases to a broader social agenda. First of all, I try to understand the claim that these liberties are not subject to any calculus of social interests. I argue that the two most prominent arguments to that effect in the liberal tradition, those of Locke and Rawls, uphold various liberties only on the basis of unacceptable background assumptions. I then propose an alternative account which, by holding there is more to being a person than liberal theorists usually acknowledge, better explains the higher-order value liberal activists attach to religious and sexual liberty. Liberals are distinguished from their political opponents less by their determination to respect persons than by their viewing religious communion and sexual expression as an unchosen feature of the nature of persons. So conceived, liberalism turns out to be a less robust, and a more political, ideal than its proponents have usually thought.

Liberal Politics and Liberal Principles

Liberalism is a complicated phenomenon comprising both a history of political practice and theoretical reflection on that history. I shall call the practice *liberal politics* and the reflection *liberal principles*. My aim is to understand the interaction between liberal politics and principles in credible political argument about liberty.

By "liberal politics" I mean the effort to resolve conflicts of interest by carving out a sphere of life in which people are at liberty to do as they please. The liberal activist favors not only an unobtrusive state, but a culture mitigating conformist social pressures. Historically, the outstanding example of liberal politics in the English-speaking world is undoubtedly the creation of religious liberty beginning in the seventeenth century. I take it that liberal politics with respect to religious practice is now a settled matter in western democracies. In this century there is more controversial but widespread liberal sentiment for the decriminalization and social tolerance of abnormal sexual practices performed in private among consenting adults (voiced, for example, by Richards, 1982). Driving state and society out of churches is the most secure achievement of liberal politics to date. The uncertain future of sexual liberty suggests that liberal politics retains its partisan edge.

*I'd like to thank Julie Mostov, Margaret Paternek, Mark Roelofs, Richard Sinopoli and the anonymous reviewers of the *Journal of Politics* for comments on an earlier draft.

Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

"Liberal principles" are the moral standards purporting to justify these
litics as part of a much broader liberal agenda. There is a recognizably lib-
al social agenda extending beyond religious and sexual liberty. Particular
ligious and sexual practices are to be tolerated not in virtue of facts pecu-
r to religion and sex, but because everyone's life is morally his or her own
lead. Liberals think that when one of a plurality of conceptions of the good
e finds political favor, a moral principle urging equal respect for persons
s been violated. Accordingly, they would uphold every person's moral title
execute one's own "conception of the good" subject only to the constraints
justice (Rawls, 1971, chap IV, 1982, 1982a, Dworkin, 1985; Ackerman,
80)

In religious and sexual cases alike, liberal politics seems to have preceded
e formulation of justifying liberal principles chronologically. Indeed, lib-
al principles owe most of their credibility to their having explained the
despread sentiment that people should be at liberty, first in religious, and
er in sexual matters In turn, liberals extend the principles that best ac-
unt for the paradigm cases to other social conflicts where no liberal con-
nsus has emerged They traffic on the plausible idea that those who would
ibrace religious or sexual liberty without upholding other sorts of liberty
e guilty of inconsistency, not to say political opportunism In western po-
cal cultures people are obliged to explain how they can endorse liberty in
e area, like sexual expression, without endorsing it in others, like the pri-
te disposition of capital, "the right to work" without joining a labor union,
edom of speech for Nazis in Skokie, Illinois, or the production or sale of
rnography

I do not mean to deny there are gray areas in which liberals disagree
iong themselves It is not always clear what counts as a protected religious
sexual practice (e g , a Christian Scientist's refusal of medical care for his
her child, or activities covered by the legal definition of sodomy) Nor is it
vious who counts as a consenting adult (e g., a fourteen-year-old request-
; contraceptives) But there is a stable liberal consensus about central
ies. There are, of course, western people who disapprove of liberal politics
en in religious and certainly in sexual matters. But antiliberals are surely
are that they stand against a formidable current in our political culture In
y case, they seem to spend a good deal of their time deploring the spread
"permissive" (i e., liberal) values. So it is not surprising that liberal poli-
s should provoke theoretical explanations. The most influential contempo-
y theorists assume that what separates liberal activists from their oppo-
nts is the commitment to distinctively liberal principles.

The conceptual relation of liberal principles to liberal politics admits of
o interpretations. One might take liberal theorists at their word and say
it the principles they uphold *justify* the politics in matters besides religion
d sex, or could upon suitable development Or one might take the cynical

view that familiar liberal principles are an ideological *rationalization* of liberal practice, lending local political victories a spurious moral pedigree I shall be urging the latter view with respect to some distinguished efforts to fashion distinctively liberal principles That is hardly an unusual position, but there are more or less interesting ways of arguing in its behalf Less interesting strategies contest liberal politics on the basis of normative premises that reflective liberals are inclined to reject in the first place (e g , Sandel, 1982) This maneuver leaves the liberal's core commitments and justificatory aspirations intact. More importantly, it does not explain why liberal politics with respect to the core cases retains its attraction even to people reluctant to buy into a broader liberal social agenda At most such arguments remind us that liberalism is not the only coherent or powerful view of political things

A more interesting strategy is to establish that liberal principles are problematic on the basis of ethical assumptions that reflective liberals share An argument along these lines is more powerful insofar as it accounts for the moral motives behind liberal religious and sexual politics in the process of debunking the principles liberals offer as justification. If successful, it might undermine at least parts of the liberal social agenda by showing that there need be no inconsistency or opportunism in the denial that the commitment to respect persons settles political conflicts in nonreligious and nonsexual matters This is the path I shall be taking in this paper

My argument proceeds as follows I begin by trying to understand the view that distinctively liberal politics upholds the dignity of persons Liberal theorists have not been notably successful in defending this crucial assumption I examine the seminal arguments of Mill, Locke, and Rawls to this effect None succeeds, I conclude, in supplying an account of respect for persons that accounts even for the paradigm cases of religious and sexual liberty The problem, in each case, is that they rely on too insubstantial a notion of personhood to do the normative work liberal religious and sexual politics require A thicker conception of the person accounts for the credibility of demands for religious and sexual liberty. It shows, I believe, that the liberal's commitment to *these* liberties is intelligible and defensible. But it secures these conclusions without invoking principles that straightforwardly justify liberal politics outside of religious and sexual matters The distinctive moral springs of liberal politics consist not in the determination to respect persons, but in recognition of persons in their acts of self-assertion.

Liberalism and the Incommensurability Assumption

J S Mill's "harm principle" furnishes a prototype of liberal principles Recall his language· "The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others . The only part of the conduct of anyone, for

which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body or mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill, 1972).

I shall not add to the voluminous commentary on this formulation. It is an admirably straightforward repudiation of political paternalism. But despite appearances, Mill's elaboration of the harm principle says next to nothing about what counts as an ethically protected liberty. His liberal credentials are not in question: Mill wrote, famously, of a "sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest " And he delimited that sphere so as to betray his sympathy for liberal politics (Mill, 1972, p. 78) But until we arrive at a credible interpretation of "harm," we do not even know that this formulation dictates the religious and sexual liberties that form the core of the liberal consensus

Officially, Mill interprets harm in utilitarian terms, as a function of the preferences of actual people.[1] On any recognizably utilitarian interpretation, one has harmed someone whenever one has so acted as to deprive her of utility To be sure, not all harm so interpreted constitutes an *injury* calling for redress When we look at the act's (or the relevant social rule's) total consequences, we might find that the losses suffered by anyone in particular are outweighed by the utility gained by other people, the actor included If so, the disadvantaged person has no cause for complaint Mill speculated that when we complete these felicific calculations, we shall find that something like the liberal social agenda enjoys a utilitarian rationale

Contemporary liberals are understandably disinclined to rest their case for the priority of liberty on this foundation. For one thing, under a cardinal utilitarian interpretation, the harm principle is not even clearly intelligible

[1] *Ibid*, p 74 When Mill speaks of 'utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being, I take it he was not retreating from the reduction of value to actual wants Rather, he was correcting actual wants for insufficiencies of information Part of the argument for liberty, then, is that it helps supply information that makes the attitudinal preferences of people a more accurate expression of their real, because informed, preferences I think this reading is corroborated by this crucial, obscure, and strictly speaking, incoherent passage in *Utilitarianism* (1972a, p 8) "If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount there is but one possible answer Of two pleasures, if they be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison of small account " Some readers of Mill might find in his words a foundational commitment to the heterogeneity of wants, and something like the incommensurability assumption If this reading is correct, however, Mill did little or nothing to justify incommensurability

since its application requires obscure interpersonal utility comparisons. Statements to the effect that "I get more satisfaction out of X than you get out of non-X" are notoriously hard to interpret. A commitment to liberty is not even clearly compatible with the less assuming aggregative procedures of the ordinalist theory of social choice (Sen, 1976, 1979) Moreover, granting the harm principle's intelligibility on some utilitarian interpretation, it takes strenuous and highly speculative psychological assumptions to make it issue in liberal conclusions. These assumptions inspire too little confidence to provide a very firm justification for liberal politics.

Liberal theorists' disenchantment with utilitarian defense of liberty runs deeper than these objections suggest (Rawls, 1982, Dworkin, 1978) Even when we admit to interpersonal comparisons, a utilitarian account does not explain the motives behind liberal politics Those who demanded religious liberty when it was politically contested believed that interference in their religious practice was an affront to their *dignity* as persons. They certainly did not think that the justice of toleration turns on any assessment of its overall felicific consequences Instead, liberal activists have always treated the abridgement of religious liberty as a grievous wrong to particular persons, even when abridgement redounds to the good of a great number of other people Contemporary liberals characteristically take the same view of sexual liberty

I shall take liberals at their word and assume that liberal politics is animated by the belief that no one's claim to liberty is subject to a calculus of social interests (Rawls, 1971, p. 3) To put this liberal belief abstractly: there are some practices *X* such that my desire to *X* overrides everyone else's desire that I not *X* in ethical deliberation When I am prevented from *X*-ing, I suffer a harm incomparably greater than the benefit afforded everyone else by my not *X*-ing. We might call my desire to *X* an *agent-want*, and another person's desire that I not *X* a *patient-want* And call the view that some agent-wants are incomparably more important ethically than conflicting patient-wants *the incommensurability assumption*

Utilitarians are hard pressed to account for the dignity of persons because they reject the incommensurability assumption out of hand They can come to the liberal conclusion that, all things considered, my desire to lead a certain sort of life should take priority over your desire to stop me But they get there through aggregative calculations treating anyone's desire for liberty as just one more want to be added in the social hopper, suitably weighted for intensity. The utilitarian's general strategy is to reduce agent-wants and patient-wants to a single measure, both produce quantities of utility When it comes to making interpersonal comparisons, we might imagine that I probably care more than you about what I do. But that need not be so If I am a lukewarm Catholic and you are a rabid anti-Catholic, your wants with respect to my religious practice might well outweigh mine in the utilitarian

calculus. Or, if there are enough lukewarm anti-Catholics relative to the number of sturdy Catholics, the felicific balance might favor the former. Utilitarians, then, are circumstantial liberals, their commitment to liberty turns on contingent, even heroic, assumptions Liberal activists, however, do not hold their commitments hostage to such psychological facts.

Granted, the utilitarian can explain why someone subjected to religious intolerance experiences it as an assault on his or her dignity. Mill offered an important argument to this effect (Mill, 1972a, pp 38–60) On balance, it might promote the general welfare that people develop uncompromising convictions about the inviolability of persons and the social priority of their liberties. So it is to be expected that people are socialized to have these reactions in a just or near-just society When viewed in connection with the history of liberal politics, however, this sort of explanation clearly gets things the wrong way around It leaves the motives of those dedicated to creating various sorts of liberty quite unintelligible. The experience of assaults on the dignity of persons has always motivated liberal politics in illiberal societies The utilitarian explanation applies only after the fact of successful liberal politics, too late to explicate the moral motivation that prompted it in the first place

It seems, then, that some version of the incommensurability assumption is invoked by any recognizably liberal principle Incommensurability is especially plausible with respect to the paradigm case of religious practice For it is odd to say the commitments animating religious practices are nothing but *preferences* from which utilitarians build their conclusions The language of preferring does not differentiate one's desire to commune with one's god from one's preferring to buy grapes over olives with a marginal dollar Yet on any remotely sympathetic account of religious experience the difference is considerable. Even a lukewarm Catholic does not see himself or herself as being in a position to choose religious doctrine as he or she chooses grapes over olives Genuine beliefs are discovered not chosen There may be people who *choose* to attend mass because of the social or economic opportunities it affords. But, strictly speaking, they are not even lukewarm Catholics but people affecting Catholicism from ulterior motives Our language underscores qualitative differences among wants by making different terms available to describe the changes of religious "preference" and changes of consumer preference In the former case, we are inclined to speak of a *conversion*, in the latter a change in *tastes*. Evidently sincere religious profession cuts more deeply into the identity of persons than consumer behavior. This is a fact that any serviceable account of liberal politics has to explain

So long as the language of conversion pertains, we are inclined to uphold the incommensurability of the relevant agent and patient-wants. A devout Protestant, when told to change his religious practice might intelligibly say. "Here I stand I can do no other." Yet that would sound odd coming from

meone bent on preventing him from acting on his religious commitments he frustration of that intolerant patient-want does not seem to compare to e frustration of a religious agent-want. Your desire that I refrain from worshiping God as I deem appropriate counts as evidence of what you *want* My esire to worship God as I think He requires counts as evidence of *whom I ke myself to be,* a creature obliged to make God's purposes his own

The centrality of the incommensurability assumption to liberal politics is nderscored by persisting conflicts over sexual liberty Unusual sex is a more ontroversial candidate for toleration in our public culture than unusual religious practices [2] That uncertainty is reflected in the language used to deribe statistically abnormal sexual dispositions Consider the alternative deriptions of homosexuality as a "sexual preference," on the one hand, or a exual orientation" on the other The first term assimilates abnormal sex to atters of taste, the second adverts to an unchosen state of the person exibiting the orientation Presumably, those who understand sexual dispositions as a matter of preference are more inclined to see one person's desire to ngage in a sexual practice as being commensurable with another person's esire that he desist. But one who describes sexual dispositions as an orientation will balk at the idea that these wants weigh against each other in atters of social choice The availability of linguistic alternatives points to an nresolved political conflict

Lockean Incommensurability

When canvassing liberal defenses of the incommensurability assumption, ocke's immensely influential argument for religious liberty in *A Letter Concerning Toleration* is a good place to start (Locke, 1965) The argument is raightforward and, so long as one accepts the theological underpinnings, easonably persuasive Moreover, its implicitly decision-theoretic structure utterly familiar to those conversant with modern liberal theory

When assessing the merits of religious liberty, Locke distinguished the civic interests" that fall properly under the purview of the magistrate, from e interests secured through religious worship The former include everyne's interest in "life, liberty, health, and the indolency of body, and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the ke" (Locke, 1965, p 172) Religious practice is an entirely different matter. iming as it does at the "salvation of souls" Locke held that two considerations guarantee the incommensurability of civil and spiritual concerns

[2]The less certain status is shown by the fact that roughly half the United States have laws gainst sodomy, most of which are now unenforced The Supreme Court ruled in *Bowers v ardwick* (1986) that the right to engage in private and consensual sodomy enjoys no constitu onal protection And powerful institutions, like the Catholic Church contest liberal politics in xual matters (Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, 1986)

First, the objects of civil interest are things to which a sane person assigns a finite value. There are things for which it is rational, or at least not irrational, to trade one's life, liberty, health and possessions. But the salvation of one's soul is *invaluable*; no one who believes that eternal salvation was possible can reasonably exchange it for any earthly good. "[T]here is nothing in this world," Locke insisted, "that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity" (Locke, 1965, p 206). Thus, the expected value of salvation or disvalue of damnation is infinite, no matter how uncertain we are of God's existence and merciful inclinations On any finite probability that God dispenses salvation, everyone has sufficient reason to seek it (Locke, 1975, pp. 281–82). No reasonable person, then, could find in a magistrate's commands or fellow citizen's admonitions, sufficient reason to act so as to prejudice his salvation, however *he* thinks it is best secured If he did, that would show that he does not understand what salvation is Since no one else stands to gain or lose infinitely by interference in his religious practices, their patient-wants are incommensurable with all his agent-wants pertaining to the health of his soul. No matter how many people would have him refrain from seeking salvation as he sees fit, their interests could never measure up to the value he attaches to his own religious communion

What of cases where a person neglects his own salvation? If his salvation is infinitely valuable to him, might it not be extremely valuable to other people who take his spiritual interests to heart? And since he neglects to secure salvation for himself, those things in which he takes an interest need not outweigh other people's interests implicating his religious practice Might not other people have sufficient reason to interfere paternalistically in his religious life? Locke answered each question negatively By its nature religious communion is a personal matter between God and each of His creatures. No one, then, can act so as to secure another person's salvation. "[T]rue and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force" (Locke, 1965, p 173)

This is the second basis for the incommensurability of the agent and patient-wants connected with religious practice The infinite value of the good secured through religious worship offers no rationale for the intrusion of state or society into each person's solitary dealings with God When spiritual busybodies affect a concern for the immortal souls of those they would compel on matters of religious doctrine, Locke detected worldly ambition masquerading as religious piety (Locke, 1965, pp. 167-73) As he understood it, the creaturely predicament makes all spiritual paternalism self-defeating

These considerations moved Locke to the ringing liberal conclusion that religious toleration is the only policy consistent with true religion and the dignity of persons alike. No rational person, then, could give his consent to

any political arrangement denying him the liberty to pursue salvation as he sees fit. So long as the practice of religion does not render one unable to recognize the magistrate's authority in matters involving civil interests, and does not itself prejudice the civil interests of other people, every person enjoys an indefeasible right to be left to his own devices in his dealings with God.

As far as I can see, Locke's argument is sound Yet its soundness does little to encourage a belief in the liberal principles to which I alluded in the introduction of this paper. Locke's arguments secure a liberal conclusion only by appealing to peculiarities of the Christian predicament, and on a less than universal Protestant interpretation of Christian communion at that. Accordingly, the argument does not lend itself to generalization to many of the other liberties liberals embrace Consider how much weight theological dogmas carry in Locke's formulations

Above all, his argument turns on the *infinite* value of eternal salvation to the person graced with it. On Locke's account, my religious liberty is infinitely valuable to me while interference in my religious practice can be only finitely valuable to everyone else No one claiming the liberty to pursue any finite good, however valuable one takes it to be, can avail oneself of this argument In that case, one's agent-wants are not so clearly incommensurable with other people's patient-wants Unless good sex is infinitely good, Locke's argument cannot even be generalized to the core cases of sexual liberty, much less to the more embracing doctrine of the neutral state.

And this is not all. For Locke it is only the promise of eternal life or damnation that gives anyone a reason to observe the natural laws pertaining to the administration of people's conflicting civil interests All finite creatures, on his view, act from an uneasy drive to secure pleasure and avoid pain (Locke, 1975, pp. 229-30, 272-81). Unless there is an infinitely pleasurable payoff in the afterlife, no one has sufficient reason to observe natural laws in their interpersonal relations whenever nonobservance affords more expected value. Natural law is God's will promulgated through scripture and right reason. It commands our obedience, according to Locke, only in virtue of being issued by our creator, and backed by His sanctions (Locke, 1975, p 352, 1954, pp 187–89, 1980, p 9) Atheists, then, lack sufficient motive to observe moral constraints in their dealings with other persons This reasoning led Locke to a resoundingly illiberal position even with respect to religious practice " . those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all, besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration (Locke, 1965, pp. 212–13).

Thus, the magistrate is not supposed to be neutral with respect to religion and non-religion, but only among religions promising eternal salvation. So while Locke's view might have made for neutrality among the contending parties of late seventeenth century Britain, it could supply nothing like neutrality among us. Embracing the theological underpinnings of his argument with admirable self-consciousness, he was under no illusion that his arguments for religious toleration admit of generalization to secular interests

There is another respect in which Locke's argument turns on disqualifying theological assumptions. The infinite goodness of salvation (or badness of damnation) explains why each person's religious affairs mean incalculably more to him than they mean to anyone else This assumption, however, proves too much for liberal purposes. Religious practices warrant toleration, in Locke's view, only so long as they do not prejudice the civil interest of other people He could hardly have thought otherwise, the liberal settlement of 1689 that he urged and celebrated was predicated on the normative priority of civil rights to people's different religious affiliations The contending parties could agree to disagree in matters of religious dogma only because none interpreted their religious calling as involving an ambitious intervention in temporal affairs (Dunn, 1969, chap 4).

This liberal strategy presupposes that no one involved has a religious duty to interfere with anyone else's secular interests If God issues commands implicating the civil interests of other people, presumably the infinite stakes this raises for a believer would override any liberal scruples he might have about the conduct of civil affairs. Only the Protestant belief in the priesthood of all believers, and political realism of English Catholics, averted this possibility in Locke's England To put things a little crassly, it was Locke's great good fortune that the Christian god, in all manifestations, turns out to be a scrupulous liberal The prospect of a liberal settlement of religious conflict exists only insofar as the relation between each creature and God is personal and unconnected to the doings of other people In any culture including more social religions, where one person's communion depends on social interaction with others (e.g , a culture nurturing Islamic fundamentalism), Locke's argument underscores the impossibility of religious toleration

Rawlsian Incommensurability

Contemporary liberals need a secular basis for the incommensurability assumption. A survey of modern liberal theory does not, I think, encourage the belief that such a basis lies ready at hand Many liberals sidestep the problem by summarily asserting that individuals have rights that trump the aggregated claims of other people (e.g., Nozick, 1974, p. ix and passim; Dworkin, 1978). They are not notably successful, however, in reaching a consensus as to what those rights entitle us to. Unless the content of rights

can be specified more convincingly, such strategies amount merely to a restatement of the question, not the answer liberals require.

Of contemporary liberal theorists, John Rawls has devoted the most attention to the incommensurability assumption. In doing so, he sees himself as trying to generalize from a history of liberal argument urging toleration that stems from Locke (Rawls, 1982, 1985) It is fair to say, moreover, that he follows a secularized version of the Lockean strategy, he tries to found the social priority of liberty on its lexical priority over such things as wealth and power in the deliberation of moral persons And his argument shares a decision-theoretic dimension with Locke's But his persons are betting, not on their eternal salvation, but on the mundane prospect of well-being measured by an index of "primary goods."

I assume that Rawls's famous argument needs no detailed summary Mutually disinterested moral persons are placed behind a "veil of ignorance" that denies them any knowledge of their particular capacities, idea of the good, or social position They are then asked to choose principles to govern their social and political cooperation The argument models moral choice as self-interested choice under conditions of extraordinary uncertainty Rawls concludes, roughly, that all rational persons so situated would choose a society that first of all guarantees everyone the largest equal share of liberty available, and then, maximizes the minimum share of wealth and power In the spirit of Locke, he regards "liberty of conscience" as the paradigm case for all liberties But unlike Locke, Rawls insists that any argument for liberty must "be supported by ordinary observation and modes of thought which are generally recognized as correct" (Rawls, 1971, p 213) In a society including atheists, this means having no recourse to such notions as "eternal salvation "

Behind the veil of ignorance, rational people know that they might have a religious, moral, or philosophical commitment, although they do not know what it is Moreover, they know enough about such commitments to know that it is very painful to be prohibited from professing them publicly. By the same token, they are not much impressed with any gains that might attend to living in an orthodox society Under these circumstances, Rawls thinks it rational to choose conservatively in accordance with the maximin rule (Rawls, 1971, p 152–61, 1982a, p 47) Wanting above all to avoid being persecuted for a heterodox belief, his contractors eliminate that possibility by choosing a society that guarantees liberty of conscience Rawls concludes that no rational person will trade any prospect of being at liberty to profess his deepest commitments for any other good thing, and so choose a society that neglects to guarantee the liberties familiar to liberal democracies

I think it is perfectly clear that this argument is inconclusive It is important to see that it fails precisely because the secular decision-problem it poses affords no infinitely bad or good outcomes Rawls believes that the

prospect of being persecuted for one's religious and moral commitments is incomparably worse than anything that can happen to one in an orthodox society. But if that were so no one could ever have reason to maintain one's beliefs in the face of persecution The predicament of the martyr presupposes that, contrary to Rawls's argument, there are worse things than earthly intolerance. The only way Rawls can simulate the infinite payoffs in Locke's decision-problem is to deny that the benefits of living in an orthodox society are worthy of the contractors' consideration. He assumes, accordingly, that patient-wants against liberty of conscience are of negligible importance to any rational person beside the agent-wants generated by one's religious, philosophical, or moral commitments

Whatever else speaks for this view, it conveys no support to the incommensurability assumption If no persons have patient-wants that other people refrain from practicing their religion, there is nothing for the incommensurability assumption to do Toleration of religious unorthodoxy is guaranteed by the majority's indifference If, on the other hand, the incomparability of agent and patient-wants needs to be upheld, it is just because some people attach considerable value to the satisfaction of such patient-wants. Having access to general empirical truths, Rawls's contractors can take that fact into account in their deliberations They would not ignore the probabilities of having such patient-wants, or their intensity compared to conflicting agent-wants (Barry, 1973, pp. 116–27, Williams, 1981) Rawls's case owes its plausibility, I think, to the presumption that individuals embrace conceptions of the good that do not implicate the behavior of other people That view, however, is just what opponents of toleration, and Rawls himself in other connections, deny emphatically (e g , Rawls, 1971, pp 520–29)[3]

It seems, then, that no decision-theoretic argument could issue in liberal conclusions without invoking assumptions as powerful and as controversial as Locke's theology If Rawls's is the best secular defense of the incommensurability assumption available, we should conclude that only subterranean religious impulses account for its survival (cf Gauthier, 1977).

A Person-Centered Account of Incommensurability

I now want to propose an alternative explanation of the incommensurability assumption focusing on the nature of persons capable of *agent*-wants of any

[3]Dworkin (1985, p 198) characterizes the principal antiliberal ideology in western societies as putting a premium on the patient-wants Rawls assumes away "The conservative supposes that the good man would wish to be treated in accordance with the principles of a special sort of society, which I shall call the virtuous society A virtuous society has these general features Its members share a sound conception of virtue, that is, of the qualities and dispositions people should strive to have and exhibit They share this conception of virtue not only privately, as individuals, but publicly they believe their community, in its social and political activity, ex

ort. This argument employs none of the decision-theoretic strategies of ocke and Rawls It does not assert that certain agent-wants are incommensurable with conflicting patient-wants because the agent stands to gain incalculably more expected value than the patients. A better way of proceeding, I uggest, is to focus on the motivational conditions of personhood When we ake this approach, we shall see that there are norms prior to those that exercise decision-theorists, observance of which is a necessary condition of naking even irrational choices I shall argue that we can best account for the ncommensurability assumption at the heart of liberal politics in their light Ve might not, however, emerge from this accounting with all of our liberal nthusiasms intact

There is ample reason for entertaining a person-based account when we ppreciate how decision-theoretic views distort even the least controversial ccasions for liberal toleration connected with religious and sexual practice Veither religious communion nor sexual expression are goods that lend hemselves to decision-theoretic representation With respect to religious ommitment, we should be especially impressed by the testimony of the inentor of decision-theory, Pascal True, he represented the rationality of religious faith as a wager. It was from Pascal that Locke got the idea that religious faith is rational in view of its expected value (Pascal, 1958, pp 65–69, Hacking, 1972, pp 186–89, 191) Pascal never assumed, however, that anyone could *choose* to have religious faith Decision-theoretic considerations ertain to religious experience, in his view, only on the controversial assumption that, having chosen rationally to bet on the existence of a Catholic od, the bettor will eventually come to believe for non-decision-theoretic easons Pascal did not think one can summarily choose to believe in view of he expected payoff, at most, one could choose to initiate a causal process hat will end in the bettor's genuine faith Presumably, in the course of that rocess, the bettor must forget that he initiated it strategically or the strategy could not work [4] It is one more sign of God's infinite mercy, that, despite lis omniscience, He allows Himself to be taken in by this stratagem Need-

ibits virtues, and that they have a responsibility as citizens to promote these virtues In that ense they treat the lives of other members of their community as part of their own lives

[4] See Pascal (1958, p 68) where an unbeliever asks I am forced to wager, and am not free I m not released, and am so made that I cannot believe What, then, would you have me do?

True But at least learn your inability to believe since reason brings you to this and yet you annot believe Endeavor then to convince yourself not by increase of proofs of God but by the batement of your passions You would like to attain faith and do not know the way you would ike to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it Learn of those who have been bound ike you, and who now stake all their possessions These are people who know the way which ou would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured Follow the way by which they began by acting as if they believe, taking the holy water, having mass said etc Even his will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness " For the view that Pascal's trategy is incoherent, or at least unlikely, see Elster, (1983, pp 74–75)

less to say, many have thought that this assumption is unfaithful to religious experience.[5] If they are right, we should say that liberal theorists' tendency to understand value as a function of choice has distorted their view of religious toleration. But even Pascal's account respects the traditional view that faith is an unchosen condition, a matter of being touched by God's grace.

The case of abnormal sexual practices reinforces the point. When we understand sexual dispositions as tendencies to choose to act one way or another we assimilate the case of a closeted homosexual to that of an unlucky heterosexual, each, for different reasons, suffers from the lack of desirable sexual partners. When they find themselves in a more favorable situation, on this view, they reveal their different sexual preferences There is an abundance of first-person accounts, however, that describe closeted homosexuality in much different terms. Repression of sexual orientation is experienced not as an optimal choice in a unhappy situation, but as an dissemblance of what one is Some people claim to experience their homosexuality not as a disposition to make a certain sort of sexual choice, but a constitutive feature of their identity as choosers

Judgments made from the first-personal viewpoint, of course, need not be taken at face value One can be mistaken about who or what one is And homosexuals seeking social space for their sexual choices have obvious strategic reasons for representing their predicament in these terms. Accordingly, opponents of sexual liberty continue to regard talk of sexual orientation, indignantly, as self-serving glorification of immoral or perverse preferences. But the fact that such descriptions are contentious in our public culture shows that proponents and opponents of sexual liberty recognize that they are politically crucial So this much is clear as soon as we decide to understand sexual dispositions in decision-theoretic terms, we have begged a political question to which liberals and nonliberals alike attach great importance We have decided to disregard the putative features of sexual experience that are supposed to make sexual agent-wants incommensurable with conflicting patient-wants

I believe that outside the confines of academic liberal theory, a richer notion of personhood lies ready at hand (cf Rawls, 1985) We do not regard persons merely as the maximizers of expected utility insofar as we recognize various things in which persons take an interest which are not, properly speaking, objects of choice To be sure, many good things are good because they are chosen Take a consumer who, having satisfied her compelling needs, finds herself with a remaining dollar to spend on a garnish for her

[5] "We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted willfully after such a mechanical calculation would lack the inner soul of faith's reality, and if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option" (James 1963, pp 196–97)

dinner table Narrowing the alternatives to a dollar's worth of grapes or olives, she is surely presented with a choice Once she has sufficient information about the affective relation among grapes, olives, and herself (e g , how they look and taste, whether she is likely to have an allergic reaction to either, their long-term effects on her health), she merely has to determine which commodity she prefers. The alternative she selects is revealed to have more value *to her* just because it is the object of her informed choice So long as she possesses all the relevant information, she cannot be mistaken about whether she prefers olives or grapes. Theorists of rational choice, and most liberal theorists, endeavor to assimilate all valuation to this model

Yet there are things in which we take an interest that resist description in these terms Compare a case where a person in a dark alley is accosted by an armed thief demanding, as philosophically observed thieves do "Your money or your life!" The person reluctantly hands over his wallet His reluctance is evidence that he would prefer not being confronted with this threat Being so confronted, however, he experiences no indecision about what to do Under the circumstances it is odd to say he is presented with a choice among alternative courses of action When he recounts the incident to his friends, he will naturally deny that he was ' What could I do? The man held a gun to my head so it's not like I had a choice ' And in this he is surely right Were he, without any prospect of retaining both, to keep his money at the expense of his life, that would show any attentive observer that he was quite out of his mind The suggestion that he was presented with a choice is as laughable as the reply Jack Benny gave to a different thief, impatiently awaiting an answer to the same proposition "I'm thinking, I'm thinking!"

Notice that we are not inclined to say Jack Benny responded to the thief *mistakenly* It is not that he is contemplating making the wrong choice for the lack of information or sound ratiocination If he kept his money, I take it, we would not be inclined to attribute to him any sort of irrational *act* We would suspect he is not the sort of individual that can be held responsible for choices So then the first victim sanely says, "I had no choice but to hand over my wallet," he is speaking literally, electing to keep one's money in that situation evinces a personality defect that impugns the victim's credentials as a chooser Strictly speaking, he was confronted with no choice because no one can be in a position to choose whether to be a *competent chooser* The theory of rational choice cannot explain our sense that the thief left the victim no choice

Consider a third, more complicated case intermediate between the first two An Orthodox Jew expresses his piety, among other ways, through strict observance of dietary laws Suppose he is offered some shellfish and, perhaps having always wondered how it tastes, is tempted to accept If he succumbs to temptation, no one present will know or care about his transgression Yet upon reflection, he might feel he is presented with no choice, even while he is tempted by the shellfish Being an Orthodox Jew is a feature of

his identity, it is so central to his sense of who he is that he cannot imagine *himself* without these primary identifications. He did not choose to be a person to whom these dietary laws apply, he sees himself as a chosen person, but he did not do the choosing [6] Recognizing who he is, he does not regard himself as being at liberty to choose whether or not to keep kosher. There are other people presented with this choice; an unusual gentile might choose to act in accordance with (but not from) those dietary laws because she thinks observance makes for good eating, or a healthful diet. But that choice presents itself to her just because she does not identify herself as an Orthodox Jew

It would misleading to say that the Jew in this case is constrained by a personal *moral* code. We normally think of moral laws as being impersonal in the sense that their application does not turn on the identity of the people to whom they apply It is just as misleading to say that eating shellfish is an irrational choice for an Orthodox Jew The question is not which alternative affords more expected utility, but what sort of person will enjoy it It is better to say that, were the Jew to eat the shellfish, it would be a case of his forgetting who he is Presumably he would regard it as a pathological episode of one sort or another if he maintained his religious identification Perhaps he would think of his behavior as a case of weakness of will, a matter of his having *done* something that, upon reflection, he wants not to have done Or he might regard it as a case where he was temporarily "not himself" so that it is pointless to hold himself responsible for a misdeed His behavior might seem not a transgression but a pathological symptom But were he to find himself disposed to eat shellfish, or even continually tempted to do so, he would have to confront questions about himself, he might come to think of himself not as an unobservant Jew, but as a quite different person The fact he experienced a choice whether or not to eat shellfish would count as evidence in his eyes that he had already undergone not merely a change of taste, but some sort of conversion In either case, only he, and perhaps not even he, is in a position to say which is the correct description of the situation But this much is clear the situation we have imagined provides a resolutely Orthodox Jew not with a menu, but with an occasion either for affirming or discovering who he is

The intelligibility of all three cases suggests that things in which persons

[6] This might seem incorrect if we do not distinguish between two senses of the term "conversion" There is, in the first place, *first-person* conversion, the process in which one reidentifies one's self in one's own eyes And there is *third-person* conversion, where one reveals the fact of one's first-person conversion to other people I am assuming that first-person conversion is not a matter of choice while third-person conversion generally is When one's first-person conversion itself involves the public display of commitment, even third-person conversion is unchosen We shall see that the first-person status of conversion experiences raises crucial issues for liberal theory

ake an interest can stand in three distinguishable relations to the nature of he person that desires them. The goodness of things can be *contingent* with espect to *everyone's* personality, so that those things may be said to be an bject of everyone's choice, like grapes and olives Or the apprehension of a hing's goodness can be *necessary* to *everyone's* personality, like the preser-ation of one's life in the dark alley Or finally, some good things, like keep-ng kosher, seem to be a possible object of choice for some people but not for thers, desiring them is *necessary* only to *some* individual's personality, but *ontingent* to *others* We need some terminology to distinguish these different inds of goods, so call them respectively. (1) *elective goods*, (2) *constitutive oods*, and (3) *differentiating* goods Consider each category in turn

Elective goods (*E-goods*) are the objects of every person's choice, things we an imagine any person taking or leaving They are good just because of omeone's having chosen to pursue them on one occasion or another Other ersons, however, may attach no value to them at all, or more or less value elative to other available satisfactions Thus, elective goodness is a rela-ional notion, something is electively good for someone in particular, and eases to be so as soon as she undergoes a change of taste The desire for lective goods is always a contingent fact about a person, she counts as a ompetent person, and some person in particular, whether or not she is noved by a thing's elective goodness Indeed when we encounter someone vho regards herself as standing in some more intimate relation to an E-good, hat throws her competence into question To return to our example, imag-ne someone who said, upon picking grapes over olives, "here I stand, I can lo no other " Here we have prima facie grounds for saying she is in the grip f an addiction or a neurotic compulsion Grapes are not the sort of things hat competent people find inescapable Let us say that people for whom a hing is choiceworthy have an *elective interest* (*E-interest*) in enjoying it vhich might give them reason to lodge an *elective claim* (*E-claim*) against ther persons that they have it

Constitutive goods (*C-goods*) are things or states of affairs the desire for vhich is a necessary condition of being a person Thus, they are the objects f no person's choice, their being desired by an individual is a necessary con-lition of his making attributable choices. These are goods, then, that no per-on can be understood to renounce in favor of E-goods When an individual loes, everyone has prima facie grounds for doubting he is responsible for is behavior We might say that such indifference to a C-good is evidence or *third-person* attributions of incompetence So interpreted, constitutive oodness also has a relational structure something is constitutively good for omeone in particular, and the same relational state of affairs for every par-icular person. But this is not to say that every person necessarily takes an nterest in other people's enjoyment of C-goods We shall see that taking an nterest in the C-interests of other persons is plausibly a moral requirement

that competent persons may choose, wrongly, to ignore. But indifference to one's own enjoyment of C-goods evinces one's deficiencies as an agent capable of applying any moral constraints to one's self C-goods are similarly the object of ***constitutive interests*** (*C-interests*) and ***constitutive claims*** (*C-claims*)

Finally, ***differentiating goods*** (*D-goods*) are things or states of affairs, the desire for which is a condition of being some person in particular We can imagine other persons taking or not taking an E-interest in them But there are persons for whom they are not optional, they cannot choose an E-good over a D-good. There can be unusual, and particularly unhappy circumstances where their C-interests and D-interests come into conflict. To modify our earlier example, someone might threaten a devout Jew with death if he does not worship what he takes to be a false god Such occasions will severely test the depth of his religious identification If it is strong enough, he may experience no choice but to sacrifice his C-interest to his D-interest, ***his*** life will be lost either way. If his religious identification is weaker but still very strong, he may be indifferent between a C- and a D-good And if it is weaker still, he might experience no choice but to take the C- over the D-good But such difficult cases underscore the priority that anyone's D-interests take over all E-interests Evidence of indifference to D-goods supports no third-person attributions of incompetence or irrationality Yet things must look different from the standpoint of one who takes a D-interest in something. Her "choice" of an E- over a D-good must supply evidence for ***first-person*** attributions of incompetence It follows from the definition of a D-good that the person in question does not see herself as doing what ***she*** really wants, if she really prefers an E-good the thing she exchanges for it is not really a D-good after all Again, we shall say that D-goods are the objects of ***differentiating interests*** (*D-interests*) and ***differentiating-claims*** (*D-claims*)

This is all regrettably abstract We shall see that it is no simple matter to decide which concrete goods fit within each category But the categories themselves furnish a basis for the incommensurability assumption Any competent person values C-goods and D-goods incomparably more than E-goods, while C- and D-goods weigh commensurably in her deliberation The priority relation within each person's deliberation suggests an ***interpersonal*** ordering which any social arrangement must embody before persons can have a moral obligation to institute or maintain it

any C-claim > *any* D-claim > *any* E-claim

Moreover,

any C-claim > *all* D + *all* E-claims

and,

any D-claim > *all* E-claims.

Any person who tolerated a social order denying him C-goods when a prospect for securing them presented itself would thereby exhibit his incompetence to everyone. His honoring an obligation to support that social order is therefore inconsistent with his being a person to whom it makes sense to attribute obligations in the first place. So the claims others might make upon him involving his renunciation of a C-good can carry no weight in his practical deliberation. By the same token, once everyone's C-claims were taken care of, anyone who committed herself to a social order that gave priority to anyone's E-claims over her D-claims, would exhibit her incompetence in her own eyes. She could entertain no moral obligation to institute or contribute to the maintenance of those social arrangements without becoming someone else. So long as there are C- and D-interests, then, they must be accommodated in all morally acceptable interpersonal relations. They carry the same infinite weight over other people's E-claims that religious agent-wants carried over patient-wants in Locke's argument for religious toleration. Thus, the incommensurability assumption and the priority of liberty can be sustained without disqualifying theological presuppositions. We maintain ethical neutrality among persons when we put their C- and D-interests ahead of our E-interests.

Liberal Politics Reconsidered

This schematic account of persons and their interests raises many questions that fall beyond the scope of this paper. Assume that our culture conveys a rich enough notion of "personhood" to make sense of the incommensurability assumption. Claims for liberty owe their credibility, on this view, to goods in which the claimant takes a constitutive or differentiating interest. Whatever might be said against it, a richer notion of personality does plausibly explain the paradigmatic status of religious communion and sexual expression in our political culture. Both are plausibly described as D-goods. Claims to their enjoyment, accordingly, should trump competing E-claims. At least with respect to these two paradigm cases, then, the incommensurability assumption is upheld.

Two consequences of a person-based account will probably disappoint doctrinaire liberals. First, so interpreted, respect for persons is not as robust an ideal as liberals like to think. Liberal resolution of conflict is possible under a restricted set of cultural conditions, where people already happen to embrace compatible conceptions of the good apart from their determination to respect persons. Second, liberals must often lack the moral resources to resolve political conflict; their moral principles do not summarily disarm the nonliberal opposition. Liberal settlements presuppose *public* recognition of the D-interests of political contestants, and political struggle seems to be an indispensable vehicle of that recognition. Consider each consequence in turn.

We can appreciate the imposing cultural preconditions of neutrality among persons when we notice a feature that person-based accounts of incommensurability share with Locke's. Recall he showed that anyone's interest in attaining salvation means incalculably more to him than the satisfaction of other people's conflicting patient-wants mean to them. So it was only the happy accident that everyone's salvation is consistent with keeping out of everyone else's way in religious and civil matters, that made a liberal solution to religious conflict possible The person-based account of incommensurability I have proposed yields a similar result. Neutrality among persons is possible only to the extent that no one happens to develop a D-interest that conflicts with the C- or D-interests of other people When persons come to understand themselves as having incompatible C- and D-interests, their personhood can bring them into conflicts which are intractable insofar as the incommensurability assumption holds In these circumstances of moral scarcity, political contestants have no occasion to respect those persons who are their political opponents So liberal politics is a possibility only in social contexts in which persons are already disposed to embrace compatible conceptions of the good

Religious communion, as it has been widely understood in predominantly Protestant cultures since the time of Locke, is plausibly a D-interest meeting this condition Liberal politics can find roots in this cultural soil But the idea that persons deserve respect furnishes no one with more socially ambitious D-interests with reason to adjust one's self-conception to accommodate other persons Indeed, the integrity of such persons should fuel illiberal intransigence To this extent, liberal politics are not independent of, but parasitic on, conceptions of the good (cf Dworkin 1985, Ackerman, 1980).

But suppose that liberals find themselves in the propitious cultural circumstances where people's D-interests are compatible The analysis I have proposed implies that claims pursuant to those interests should override mere E-claims in public deliberation This straightforward proposition conceals a political problem I have said D-interests are revealed principally in the first-person perspective Yet if D-claims are to take social priority over other people's E-claims, they must somehow win public recognition We do not know whether a given agent-want warrants toleration until we can assure ourselves that it answers to the D-interests of assignable persons How is it that dissenter's D-interests come to be recognized?

In the English-speaking world, religious communion is a paradigmatic D-good, owing to the history of sectarian conflict and its liberal resolution. We are inclined, accordingly, to view religious intolerance as a moral aberration, a stubborn refusal to respond to the dignity of religious dissenters But that reaction presupposes that dissenting religions answered to the D-interests of the dissenters, just what the defenders of religious orthodoxy denied The orthodox characteristically thought heterodox practices implicated E-

interests, dressed up in pious rhetoric. In their eyes dissenters were either sinners, who chose wrongly to depart from true religions or diabolically possessed souls, pathologically incapable of renouncing what are objects of choice for competent choosers. Under the first description, punishment is in order, under the second, exorcism that would restore the dissenter's competence to receive God's grace. When toleration came to be recognized as an appropriate reaction to religious dissent it was not because people decided it was time to start respecting persons, but because they came to see dissenters as competent persons having no choice in how to present themselves to God.

The uncertain social status of homosexual practices illustrates the point I have alluded to first-person accounts of sexual orientation, which describe it as constitutive of the identity of some persons They testify to the fact that some people have a D-interest in performing unusual sexual acts It follows on the account of incommensurability I have proposed that if we accept such descriptions of sexual orientation, we morally must tolerate the sexual behavior it generates This line of reasoning is evident in Justice Blackman's opinion in Bower v. Hardwick (1986, p. 159) dissenting from the majority view denying consensual sodomy constitutional protection "It is precisely because the issue raised by this case touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are," he insists, "that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose [sexual] choices upset the majority" We might quibble with Blackman's use of the word "choice", if a sexual orientation constitutes the nature of the chooser, it cannot, strictly speaking, be an object of his choice But Blackman's recognition that abnormal sexual expression answers to D-interests is clear nonetheless

Yet the language of personhood makes alternative descriptions of that behavior available with utterly different moral and political ramifications For homosexual preferences might be treated as an E-interest subject to partisan misrepresentation and first-person wishful thinking One or the other description of homosexual practices follows, for instance, from the official view of the Catholic Church The Church denies the reality of anything like a sexual orientation "The human person, made in the image and likeness of God, can hardly be adequately described by a reductionist reference to his or her sexual orientation . Today the Church provides a badly needed context for the care of the human person when she refuses to consider the person as a 'heterosexual' or a 'homosexual' and insists that every person has a fundamental identity the creature of God, and by grace, His child and heir to eternal life" (Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, 1986, section 16).

Some such view lies behind the familiar allegation that homosexual preference is willfully misrepresented for political purposes On this view the homosexual activist, and those liberals who would uphold his claims, are demanding a privilege, they insist that political institutions give their elective

agent-wants priority over other people's intolerant patient-wants. First person testimony about sexual orientations merely stakes out a bargainin position in a continuing political conflict

The language of personhood makes still another description of homosexuality available. If sexual preferences implicate only E-goods, one could gran the sincerity of testimony to the effect that homosexuals lack "a choice" ı the selection of sexual partners, but count it as evidence of a pathologica compulsion. The fact that some people are compulsively bent on satisfyin E-interests indicates that they suffer from a personality defect that impugn their competence In this respect, they are like the woman who experience no choice but to buy grapes over olives with her marginal dollar The appro priate response to homosexual practices so interpreted is not punishmen but therapy The history of psychiatric interpretation of sexual devianc shows that this is not idle speculation (Bayer, 1987)

I am *not* saying that the liberal consensus on sexual liberty is unfounded My point is to show that there is more to liberal sexual politics than the de termination to respect persons That commitment in the abstract does no of itself determine whether homosexual preference implicates anyone's D interests Such determinations can be made only through third-person as sessment of the gravity of various public acts of homosexual self-assertion There is, and can be, no distinctively liberal procedure for validating thes claims. As I have been trying to understand it, liberal politics *presupposes* description of the relation between persons and the practices with which in terference is contemplated Sexual politics, then, is largely a contest ove which description should be the basis of public deliberation

Throughout this paper I have been assuming that most of us are liberal willing to acknowledge the right of homosexuals to substantial sexual liberty On what basis are non-homosexuals confident that this position is correct The answer, I suggest, is dismaying Non-homosexuals have grounds fo granting the reality of D-claims when they find otherwise competent peopl whose behavior suggests that their interest in sexual expression is of a highe order than their E-interests The sad fact is that the incommensurability of th agent and patient-wants connected with homosexuality is plausible in light c the long and painful history of gay people defying steady and often viciou social and political persecution In *retrospect* non-homosexuals can recog nize that as a history of injustice, a grievous affront to the dignity of som persons. But non-homosexual liberals lack the moral clairvoyance to hav determined this fact in advance Just as Locke drew on the record of sec tarian conflict to cement his commitment to religious toleration, they draw on a painful story of gay self-assertion in upholding sexual toleration Liber als can react morally to such conflicts but, regrettably, they cannot pre-emp them by moral means Like the owl of Minerva, the moral commitments lıc

hind liberal politics assert themselves only at dusk, after the dreary business of politics has run its course

Manuscript submitted 26 February 1987
Final manuscript received 14 October 1987

References

Ackerman, Bruce 1980 *Justice In the Liberal State* New Haven Yale University Press

Barry, Brian 1973 *The Liberal Theory of Justice* Oxford The Clarendon Press

Bayer, Ronald 1987 *Homosexuality and American Psychiatry The Politics of Diagnosis* Princeton Princeton University Press

Bowers v Hardwick U S 92 (1986)

Dunn, John 1969 *The Political Thought of John Locke* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Dworkin Ronald 1978 *Taking Rights Seriously* Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

——— 1981 What is Equality? Part I Equality of Welfare Part II Equality of Resources *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10 185–246 283–345

——— 1985 *A Matter of Principle* Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

Elster Jon 1983 *Sour Grapes Studies in the Subversion of Rationality* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Gauthier, David 1977 Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes and Locke *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 7 423–46

Hacking, Ian 1972 The Logic of Pascal's Wager *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9 186–92

James, William 1963 *Pragmatism and Other Essays* New York Washington Square Press

Locke John 1954 *John Locke Essays on the Law of Nature* Wolfgang von Leyden ed and trans Oxford The Clarendon Press

——— 1965 *Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration* New York Meredith Publishing

——— 1975 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* P H Nidditch ed Oxford The Clarendon Press

——— 1980 *Second Treatise of Government* C B Macpherson ed Indianapolis Hackett Publishing

Mill John Stuart 1972 On Liberty In H B Acton ed *On Liberty Utilitarianism and Representative Government* London J M Dent & Sons

——— 1972a Utilitarianism In H B Acton ed *On Liberty Utilitarianism and Representative Government* London J M Dent & Sons

Nozick, Robert 1974 *Anarchy State and Utopia* New York Basic Books

Pascal Blaise 1958 *Pascal's Pensées* W F Trotter trans New York F P Dutton & Company

Rawls, John 1971 *A Theory of Justice* Cambridge MA The Belknap Press

——— 1982 Social Unity and Primary Goods In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams eds *Utilitarianism and Beyond* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

——— 1982a The Basic Liberties and Their Priority *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* Vol 3 Salt Lake City University of Utah Press

——— 1985 Justice as Fairness Political not Metaphysical *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 223-51

Richards, David A J 1982 *Sex, Drugs Death and the Law An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization* Totowa, NJ Rowman & Littlefield

Sandel, Michael J 1982 *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Sen, Amartya 1976 Liberty, Unanimity and Rights *Economica*, 43 217–45.
——— 1979 The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds , *Philosophy and Economic Theory* Oxford Oxford University Press
Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1986 Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons Rome Vatican Press Office
Williams, Bernard 1981 Rawls and Pascal's Wager *Moral Luck* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Ron Replogle is assistant professor of politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003

The Causal Relationships between Issues, Candidate Evaluations, Party Identification, and Vote Choice—the View From "Rolling Thunder"

Paul F. Whiteley
University of Arizona

This paper uses the theoretical framework developed by Granger in his analysis of causality in dynamic systems to examine the short-term causal relationships between party identification, issue perceptions, candidate evaluations, and voting behavior in the United States. The results show that the revisionist analysis, which suggests that partisanship is an endogenous function of cognitive-based issue perceptions, is not supported. However, the revisionists are correct in asserting that partisanship is unstable over time. But the stability of partisanship is a separate question from its exogeneity in the vote function. It is argued that partisanship is a tally of affective evaluations, which are quite distinct from issue-based evaluations. Partisanship, candidate evaluations, and issues all independently Granger-cause voting behavior, and the former is more important than the latter in determining the vote choice.

For a number of years mainstream research on voting behavior has focused on a triad of factors as explanations of vote choice. These are party identification, issue perceptions, and candidate evaluations (Asher, 1983). Beginning with Goldberg's (1966) early work, many different models of the relationships between these variables have been specified. These specifications have varied from simple recursive models in which party identification is the chief exogenous variable, to complex nonrecursive models in which partisanship is wholly endogenous (Schulman and Pomper, 1975, Jackson, 1975, Page and Jones, 1979, Markus and Converse, 1979, Hartwig et al., 1980, Fiorina, 1981).

The early recursive models followed the Michigan tradition in emphasizing the exogeneity of partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960, Nie et al., 1976). This was partly because partisanship forms early in the individual's life cycle and is assumed to remain fairly stable over time, but it was also because partisanship predicts vote choice more efficiently than anything else does. How-

I would like to thank Harold Clarke, Lee Sigelman and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

ever, more recent "revisionist" work has challenged this interpretation, suggesting that partisanship is largely endogenous (Fiorina, 1981, Franklin and Jackson, 1983, Franklin, 1984) Perhaps the most forthright statement of the revisionist position is by Fiorina, who regards partisanship as merely a cumulative tally of issue-based retrospective evaluations (Fiorina, 1981, pp 65–83) By this account, partisanship is not at all stable and responds to changing political events and voter perceptions of those events.

Revisionism has created potential problems for the specification and testing of vote models, since in order to be able to estimate models, researchers often have to make what can appear to be arbitrary assumptions about which variables are exogenous or predetermined In the absence of such assumptions empirical specifications are underidentified, since everything can be said to cause everything else (Page and Jones, 1979) For example, Fiorina simply assumes that partisanship is a function of retrospective issue evaluations without at any point really testing this assumption (Fiorina, 1981, pp 90–91)

We require a systematic procedure for investigating causal links in order to assess the relationships among partisanship, issues, candidate evaluations, and vote choice The purpose of this paper is to test alternative specifications of the vote model, using the theoretical framework developed by Granger in his analysis of causality in dynamic systems (Granger, 1969, Pierce and Haugh, 1977, Kang, 1981) To do this we use Box-Jenkins transfer function modeling procedures, which are ideally suited for examining Granger causality (Box and Jenkins, 1976) The analysis involves a unique dataset, the 1984 Continuous Monitoring Survey of the U S election study It has been dubbed "Rolling Thunder" by its authors, and it gives a unique insight into the short-term dynamics of electoral choice

The results of the analysis show that party identification is exogenous both to vote choice and candidate evaluations, and thus the revisionist case is not supported. In this respect Campbell and his associates (1960) were closer to the truth in their assessment of the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior than the revisionists However, the revisionists are correct in asserting that partisanship is unstable and shifts over time This means that partisanship can be interpreted as a running tally of political evaluations However, the evidence suggests that this tally does not appear to be a product of issue-based evaluations, at least in the short run, and so we interpret it to be a function of affective judgments about parties.

We begin by examining alternative theoretical analyses and empirical specifications of the vote model This is followed by a theoretical reinterpretation of partisanship and its relationship to voting behavior After a brief discussion of the methodological approach, we then examine evidence which evaluates the alternative models.

Alternative Specifications of the Vote Model

The triad of variables referred to earlier as determinants of the vote have produced at least five alternative models, which are summarized diagrammatically in figure 1. These are either exact or simplified specifications of models developed by different researchers.

The first model in figure 1, referred to as the "classical" recursive model, derives directly from *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) and was estimated in this form by Goldberg (1966). The key variable which drives the model is party identification, and this is regarded as exogenous for two main reasons. First, early cross-sectional evidence suggested that partisanship is much more stable than issue perceptions or voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1960, Converse, 1964, 1969). Secondly, the literature on political socialization suggested that children and young adults acquire their partisan attachments before they become aware of issues, or in some cases, before they voted (Hyman, 1959, Greenstein, 1965). Partisanship appeared to be a stable and enduring feature of the beliefs of most voters, and thus it was argued that it largely explained voting behavior. However, the authors of the model were aware of the potential weaknesses in their case for the exogeneity of partisanship, which they qualified by stating "Our statement of causal priorities is in the end an inference" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 136).

The other models in figure 1 represent, in effect, different revisions of the classical recursive model, each relying on a different conception of the role of partisanship. Model (2), the issue-causal model, represents the strongest form of the revisionist analysis, and it has been most clearly articulated by Fiorina (1981) and Franklin and Jackson (1983). Franklin (1984, p. 461) discusses the revisionist model with the help of the following equation

$$P_t = \beta_1 E_t + \beta_2 P_{t-1} + u_t \quad (1)$$

where P_t is current partisanship,
E_t is current evaluations of issues, and
u_t is a well-behaved error term.

Franklin interprets the β_1 and β_2 coefficients as providing evidence of the exogeneity of partisanship (1984, p. 461). Thus, if $\beta_1 = 0$ and $\beta_2 = 1.0$, he interprets that as the classical partisanship model; similarly if $\beta_1 = 1.0$ and $\beta_2 = 0$, that is interpreted as a purely issue-based "Downsian" style model.

Equation (1) can be written as follows


$$P_t = \sum_{i=0}^{k} \omega_i E_{t-i} + \epsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where $\beta_1 = \omega_0$, $\beta_2 = \delta^1$, $\epsilon_t = \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta^i u_{t-i}$,

and $\omega_i = \omega_0 (\delta^i)$, $0 < \delta^i < 1$

FIGURE 1

ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE VOTE MODEL



Thus, partisanship is a distributed lag with geometrically declining weights (δ^i) which measure the speed of adjustment of partisanship to a change in issue evaluations. As δ^1 approaches 1.0, more remote evaluations influence current partisanship and adjustment is slow, as it approaches zero, only very recent evaluations influence partisanship and adjustment is rapid In all of these cases, partisanship is endogenous In the limiting case when $\beta_1 = 0$, current evaluations do not influence partisanship at all, but this does not mean that the latter is exogenous, since that would require demonstrating that P_t is not a function of lagged values of E_t as well as P_{t-1}, something which requires a different specification Thus, contrary to Franklin's argument, equation (1) cannot be used to test the exogeneity of partisanship The estimates in his analysis suggest that the model is an issue-causal model with a fairly rapid period of adjustment

The valuable part of the issue-causal model, as Fiorina points out (1981, p 90), is that it provides an explicitly political basis for partisanship, and it also accounts for the short-term changes in partisanship that are now well-documented in both the United States and other countries (Cain and Ferejohn, 1981, Markus, 1982, Clarke and Stewart, 1985) Moreover, since it has been shown that party identification is not fixed in childhood and responds to the policy preferences of adolescents, the theoretical underpinnings of the original model have been considerably weakened (Franklin, 1984)

The weakness of the revisionist case, however, is that it sees changes in partisanship as resulting from largely cognitive processes of issue evaluation In the "Downsian" tradition, issue perceptions are assumed to be exogenous, and partisanship responds to changes in these However, partisanship need not be tied to specific issues For Campbell and his associates, party identification was "the individual's affective orientation to an important group object in his environment" (1960, p 121) They cited reference group theory and small group studies of influence to support this interpretation. Thus, partisanship could be a cumulative tally of affective evaluations which have their own dynamic separate from issue evaluations and which result in changes in party attachments over time There is no reason why such evaluations should produce unchanging partisan attachments, they may work differently from the cognitive processes of utility calculation discussed by the rational choice theorists, but nevertheless they can change in response to shifting party images, as well as to changes in the individuals' group affiliations.

The essential point in this discussion is that the stability of partisanship is largely irrelevant to the question of whether or not it has a causal influence on voting behavior Party identification can change over time in response to affective evaluations and still be exogenous to both issues and the vote The instability of partisanship can be explained by processes other than retrospective or prospective evaluations of issues, so that the instability of partisanship is not evidence that the issue-causal model is valid. We return to this question below.

A second problem with the revisionist approach concerns the distinction between the evaluation of issues and of candidates In Jackson's model, for example, candidate evaluations are a function of the perceived distance between the candidate's position on issues and the voter's position (1975, p 164). In other words, candidate evaluations are another type of issue evaluation However, recent work has suggested that candidates are evaluated in terms of their "personality" characteristics, rather than on issue concerns or partisan group connections (Miller et al , 1986). This means that judgments about candidates make an independent contribution to determining the vote apart from issue perceptions which makes equation (1) misspecified

The third model in figure 1 was the first viable nonrecursive model to be developed Introduced by Jackson (1975), it postulates an interaction between candidate evaluations and party identification The problem with this model is that once reciprocal relationships between variables are specified, there is no valid theoretical reason for confining such reciprocity to just two variables The fourth model meets this objection by postulating interactions between all three pairs of predictor variables in the vote model This three-way interaction is a simplified version of the model by Page and Jones (1979)

The problem with both the evaluation-partisanship and the three-way interaction models is that researchers have to make rather strong assumptions in order to ensure that the models are identified For example, Page and Jones include a measure of ideology in their model, which they assume influences partisanship and issue perceptions, but not candidate evaluations Similarly, they assume that several socioeconomic variables influence issue perceptions, but not candidate evaluations These assumptions are difficult to justify, and if theoretically incorrect, produce misspecified estimates

The fifth model in figure 1 is a simplified version of Markus and Converse's (1979) dynamic model of electoral choice In their view, the vote is determined primarily by candidate evaluations modified by current party identification They explore the extent to which issues and candidate evaluations interact through a process of projection or through the mechanism of persuasion In the former case, voters adjust their perceptions of a candidate's issue positions closer to their own views if they evaluate him or her favorably In the latter case, they adjust because they are persuaded by the views of the candidate they prefer. Both processes involve a complex interaction of issue perceptions and candidate evaluations

It can be seen that the classical recursive and the issue-causal models represent two ends of a continuum of models At one end, partisanship is wholly exogenous and causes other variables, and at the other end it is wholly endogenous and responds to these variables The other models in figure 1 represent intermediate cases On the basis of their estimates, Page and Jones (1979) argued that issues have a more significant influence on partisanship than vice versa, which places them towards the revisionist end of the contin-

um Markus and Converse, by contrast, are closer to the classical position nce they argue that partisan attachments "appear to make repeated inputs of ıbstantial magnitude throughout the process (of electoral choice)" (1979, 1069). Jackson (1975) falls somewhere in between these two positions

In the light of these discussions we go on to specify a model of electoral noice that provides a framework for testing these alternatives

especifying the Vote Function

We have seen that the vote can be specified as a function of partisanship, sue perceptions, and candidate evaluations distributed over time Accordıgly we can specify the following general theoretical model

$$V_t = \omega_{12} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_1{}^i P_{t-i} + \omega_{13} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_2{}^i I_{t-i} + \omega_{14} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_3{}^i E_{t-i} \qquad (3)$$

'here V_t is the vote choice at time t,
P_t is partisanship,
I_t is issue perceptions,
E_t is candidate evaluations,
ω_{12}, ω_{13}, ω_{14} measure the immediate impact of a variable, and
δ_1, δ_2, δ_3 are adjustment coefficients, measuring the weight of past evaluations

Thus the vote is a finite distributed lag function of partisan, issue, and canıdate evaluations with a geometrically decreasing set of weights The dif·rent models in figure 1 make different predictions about the ω_{ij} and δ_j oefficients in this and related equations

The classical recursive model requires two additional equations which ıake issues and candidate evaluations functions of partisanship.

$$I_t = \omega_{32} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_4{}^i P_t \quad , \qquad (4)$$

$$E_t = \omega_{42} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_5{}^i P_t \quad , \qquad (5)$$

Different predictions can be made about the coefficients in these equaıons depending on whether or not we take "weak" or "strong" versions of he model In a "strong" or "pure" partisanship model only ω_{12} and δ_1 would ›e significant in equation (3), since this would imply that any relationship ›etween issues, candidate evaluations, and the vote depends solely on parisanship By implication ω_{32}, δ_4 and ω_{42}, δ_5 in equations (4) and (5) would lso be strong and significant

A weaker version of the partisanship model would allow issues to have an

independent influence on the vote, but following Jackson (1975), this would rule out an independent effect from candidate evaluations on the grounds that this is another form of issue evaluation. Thus, ω_{13} and δ_2 would be significant, though weaker than ω_{12} and δ_1, and ω_{14} and δ_3 would be zero.

A third version of this model, recognizing the work of Miller et al. (1986), would allow ω_{14} and δ_3 to be significant as well as the other coefficients in equation (3). This would recognize that personality effects can operate in linking candidate evaluations and voting behavior, and that these effects are independent of issues.

The issue-causal model can be evaluated using equation (3) and the following additional equation

$$P_t = \omega_{23} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_6{}^i I_{t-i} + \omega_{24} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_7{}^i E_{t-i}. \quad (6)$$

Again, "strong" and "weak" versions of the revisionist model can be specified. In a strong version ω_{12}, δ_1, and ω_{14}, δ_3 in equation (3) would be zero and ω_{13}, δ_2 would be strong and significant. This accords with Fiorina's (1981) retrospective evaluation model. In equations (4) and (5), the various coefficients might well be non-zero, but the relationships would be spurious, reflecting the omitted influence of issues on partisanship over time A weaker version would allow partisanship to play a separate role in influencing the vote, if for example it represents affective evaluations as opposed to judgments about issues This specification would be distinguished from the partisanship model, by the magnitude and significance of the coefficients, ω_{13} and δ_2 would be stronger and more significant than ω_{12} and δ_1 Thirdly, candidate evaluations may also be important in the issue-causal model, but again the effects would be weak in comparison with issues. As far as equations (4) and (5) are concerned, the issue-causal model implies that the effects are zero, or spurious

The evaluation-partisanship interaction model implies that ω_{24} and δ_7 are significant, but not ω_{23} and δ_6 in equation (6), in addition a test of this model requires the following equation·

$$E_t = \omega_{42} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_8{}^i P_{t-i} + \omega_{43} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_9{}^i I_{t-i} \quad (7)$$

All the coefficients in this model should be significant and, in addition, diagnostic tests of the type described below on the relationship between P_t and E_t in equations (6) and (7) should reveal two-way causation

The three-way interaction model implies that all the coefficients in equations (6) and (7) are significant as well as the coefficients in the following equation:

$$I_t = \omega_{32} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_{10}{}^i P_{t-i} + \omega_{34} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_{11}{}^i E_{t-i} \quad (8)$$

In addition, diagnostic tests of these models should reveal evidence of 'o-way causation.

Finally, in the lagged nonrecursive model we should expect ω_{12}, δ_1, and $_{14}$ in equation (3) to be significant and the other coefficients of this model to · zero. In other words, contemporaneous values of candidate evaluations fluence the vote, but not lagged values. By contrast, current and lagged lues of partisanship should influence the vote, but not issue perceptions addition, the lagged nonrecursive model predicts that all the coefficients equations (5) and (7) should be significant, together with the coefficients in e following equation

$$P_t = \omega_{21} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_{12}{}^i V_{t-i} \quad (9)$$

We can derive estimating equations for these theoretical models and with e aid of diagnostic tests investigate the exogeneity of particular variables ıe methodology of Granger-causality makes it possible to identify and estiate the optimal model which accurately represents the causal processes be'een the variables

Granger Causality and the Methodological Approach

The estimating equations for the classical recursive model can be written follows [1]

[1]The derivation of the estimating equations can be seen with the following example from (4)

$$I_t = \omega_{32} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_4{}^i P_{t-i}$$

that

$$I_{t-1} = \omega_{32} \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_4{}^i P_{t-i-1}$$

ıltiply throughout by δ_4 and subtract from the first equation

$$I_t - \delta_4 I_{t-1} = \omega_{32} \left[\sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_4{}^i P_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{k} \delta_4{}^{i+1} P_{t-i-1} \right]$$

$$I_t(1 - \delta_4 B) = \omega_{32} P_t$$

The noise model is then added to the theoretical specification for purposes of estimation

$$V_t = \frac{\omega_{12}}{1-\delta_1 B} P_t + \frac{\omega_{13}}{1-\delta_2 B} I_t + \frac{\omega_{14}}{1-\delta_3 B} E_t + n_{1t} \quad (3')$$

$$I_t = \frac{\omega_{32}}{1-\delta_4 B} P_t + n_{3t} \quad (4')$$

$$E_t = \frac{\omega_{42}}{1-\delta_5 B} P_t + n_{4t} \quad (5')$$

The other theoretical equations can be written as estimating equations in the same way Each of these models is a transfer function having a univariate ARIMA noise model of the following type

$$n_{it} = \frac{\theta(B)a_t}{\phi(B)}$$

where θ are moving average coefficients,
ϕ are autoregressive coefficients,
B is the backshift operator, $((B)a_t = a_{t-1})$
and $E(a_t) = 0$ $E(a_{t-i}, a_{t-j}) = \sigma_a^2$ when $i = j$, 0 otherwise

In the different noise models the parameters are estimated, where they exist, at the same time as the transfer function weights (see Schofield et al , 1986) The model building strategy involves estimating the theoretical specifications of the equations, together with the error terms, but where necessary improving on those estimates by the use of various diagnostic tests (Norpoth, 1986)

Granger-causality has been discussed by political scientists (Freeman, 1983, Yantek, 1984) but has not been applied extensively One series X_t can be said to Granger-cause another series Y_t, if after extracting all the prior information from Y_t the use of X_t as a predictor reduces the residual variance of Y_t. In other words, one variable causes another if it explains variation in the residuals of that variable which cannot be explained by its own past history[2] (Granger, 1969).

A variety of different methodological approaches has been used to test Granger-causality in the economics literature (Bishop, 1979) In a Monte Carlo investigation of different methods, Nelson and Schwert recommend the use of reduced form vector ARIMA methods in the multivariate case[3] (1982, p 18) This is an approach used by a number of authors (Sims, 1980, Gordon and King, 1982) It has the advantage of ensuring that the past his-

[2] A second requirement of Granger-causality is that X_t should influence Y_t with a lag, otherwise causal relationships are ambiguous

[3] In this approach each regressor is a linear function of its own lagged values, the lagged values of all other regressors in the system, and a white noise error term As a result, every variable in the system is treated as being endogenous in one of a set of equations

tory of the dependent variable is adequately controlled, a potential problem with conventional regression methods.[4] But it does make great demands on the data (because it involves estimating many parameters) since the researcher proceeds "without pretending to have too much a priori theory" (Sargent and Sims, 1977).

In this paper we use Box-Jenkins transfer function modeling procedures (Box and Jenkins, 1976, pp. 337–418) which involve identifying and estimating univariate models for the time series, then filtering the dependent variables with prewhitened independent variables in order to identify causal innovations before constructing multivariate specifications. The great majority of the univariate models proved to be low order moving-average processes which represent the error structures in the multivariate models. These methods are an efficient alternative to vector ARIMA models when the underlying theory is comparatively well-defined, and when data limitations are a problem. In addition, they allow the contemporaneous effects of predictor variables to be estimated, something not generally true of vector ARIMA methods.

In this approach a statistically significant reduction in the error variance of a multivariate model, in comparison with the univariate model, together with evidence of lagged effects, confirms Granger-causality. In the present paper we evaluate the reduction in error variance by means of an F-test, and this together with a significant adjustment coefficient is taken as evidence of Granger-causality.

Another advantage of using transfer function models relates to the "noisy" character of the dataset, the Continuous Monitoring Survey of the 1984 CPS Election Study. It is very important to utilize methods which can control for the stochastic behavior of this series; as we see below, the standard assumptions about error terms that are made in conventional regression models are not appropriate for many of these models. Instead of assuming the form of the error structures we estimate that form, making most of the resulting equations non-linear.

Once a model is estimated, diagnostic tests serve as further evidence of exogeneity. One of the most useful tests involves cross-correlating the model residuals with the prewhitened independent variables to examine any effects

[4]The most common form of Granger-causality test is the so-called direct F-test, in which past and future values of predictor variables are used in regression equations, and asymmetries in the statistical significance of leading and lagged coefficients provide evidence of causality. However, these methods are only reliable if the linear filter used to control the history of the dependent variable is accurate. If it is not, then results can be misleading. For example, an early application of a direct test by Sims (1972) purported to show that the money supply causally determined nominal income. Later work, however, showed this result to be incorrect, because Sims had failed to filter the income variable properly (see Feige and Pierce, 1979). Box-Jenkins methods ensure that this filter is accurate.

that might have been omitted. For example, in equation (3′), if the specifications were wrong so that the vote actually causes party identification, then the residual cross-correlation function will reveal significant effects when the vote lags party identification. In this way the misspecification can be identified (see Schofield et al., 1986, pp. 209–11)

The Model Estimates

Since Granger-causality is defined in the context of time series analysis, we require a dataset with adequate numbers of variables and observations over time One alternative would be to use poll data of the type used in popularity function models (e.g , Monroe, 1984) Unfortunately, polls typically contain inadequate numbers of indicators of partisanship and candidate evaluations to test these models A second alternative would be to use panel data While valuable for some purposes, panels typically contain too few waves of observations over too long a period of time to fully capture the short-term dynamics of these processes Accordingly, we use the Continuous Monitoring Survey of the 1984 CPS Election Study as the best dataset available The study consists of forty-six small, independent, consecutively administered cross-section samples taken from January 11, 1984, to December 7, 1984 The average sample size was seventy-six, two-thirds of whom were usually interviewed within a seven-day period (Institute for Social Research, 1984, p 1) Despite the small sample sizes, this is the best dataset available for tracking the short-term dynamics of vote voice over many time points It has already been used by a number of researchers in model building (Bartels, 1987, Flanigan and Zingale, 1985, Shanks et al , 1985)

One complication is that the voting intention question was asked from June 20 onward, which gives twenty-four observations available for analysis This means that the number of indicators in the vote function has to be kept restricted if the transfer functions are to be estimated.[5] Accordingly, one indicator was used for each variable Later in the paper we examine the robustness of the vote model by testing different specifications

The dependent variable in equation (3) is the percentage of respondents who said they would vote for Ronald Reagan, party identification includes strong and weak Republican identifiers, candidate evaluations are the percentage of respondents who approved of Reagan's performance in handling his job, and issue evaluations are measured in two ways—first, in terms of economic evaluations, i e., the percentage of respondents who felt that the economy was getting worse This was chosen as the best retrospective issue

[5]It is commonly supposed that transfer function modeling requires a large number of observations, say at least fifty While this is obviously desirable it is not essential Jenkins (1979, p 64) for example, estimates a transfer function of employment for West Germany with only fifteen observations

TABLE 1

ESTIMATES OF THE CLASSICAL RECURSIVE MODEL

Predictor Variables		Dependent Variable: Republican Vote (N = 24)	Republican Vote (N = 24) [3′]	Issue Evaluations (N = 46) [4′]	Reagan Evaluations (N = 46) [5′]
Republican Partisanship (∇)	ω	0.29	0.36	−0.14	0.14
		(1.3)	(1.6)	(2.5)	(1.2)
	ω (B)	0.35	0.34	—	—
		(1.6)	(1.5)		
	ω (B^2)	−0.23	0.22	—	—
		(1.8)	(1.3)		
	δ	0.65	0.84	0.38	0.63
		(2.1)	(2.8)	(1.0)	(1.2)
Evaluations of President Reagan	ω	—	0.52	—	—
			(3.1)		
	δ	—	−0.37	—	—
			(1.8)		
Issue Evaluations	ω	—	−0.37	—	—
			(2.3)		
	δ	—	0.75	—	—
			(5.0)		
Noise Model	θ_1	—	0.43	—	0.34
			(1.8)		(2.3)
	θ_2	—	—	0.74	—
				(7.4)	
Residual Mean Square Statistic		27.0	17.3	15.7	27.9
Percent Improvement on Univariate Model		17.1	47.0	9.7	0
Statistical Significance of Improvement (F-test)		2.3*	5.5***	3.6**	0
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (d.f.)		14.0	20.0	20.0	30.0
		(15)	(15)	(20)	(20)

Note: $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** t-ratios in parenthesis

indicator because an extensive body of research has shown it to be particularly important (Bloom and Price, 1975, Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, Lewis-Beck, 1986). A second approach involved measuring prospective issues by constructing an aggregate policy distance variable from the available issue indicators in Rolling Thunder. The details of the variables used appear in the appendix.

Estimates relating to the classical recursive model with the economic issue indicator appear in table 1. There is an additional bivariate model of the rela-

tionship between party identification and the vote in this table in order to check the parameter stability of the multivariate model. The impact and adjustment coefficients for each variable appear together with the t-ratios and diagnostic statistics. The residual mean square statistic is the standard goodness of fit measure in time-series analysis. The F-test measures the significance of the reduction in the residual sum of squares achieved by the multivariate model in comparison with the univariate model, and Q is the Ljung-Box statistic.[6]

The first point to make about the estimates in table 1 is that the original specification of the vote model set out in equation (3′) was inadequate, as revealed by the diagnostic tests. It turns out that the impact of party identification on the vote is more complex than is implied by the original specification. In the bivariate model, we can see that partisanship impacts the vote at three successive time points, with lags zero, one, and two. All these effects are statistically significant at the 0.10 level or above (one-tail test). In addition, there is a highly significant adjustment coefficient. Since the bivariate model represents an improvement in fit of 17% compared with the univariate ARIMA model, which according to the F-test is a statistically significant improvement, this is strong evidence of Granger causality. It can be see that party identification is modeled in differenced form since the univariate identification analysis revealed it to be nonstationary during the period. This confirms the instability of partisanship referred to earlier.[7] Clearly partisanship is both unstable and an exogenous causal influence on the vote, which shows that instability does not rule out exogeneity. The steady-state or long-run solution indicates that an increase in the rate of change of partisanship of 1% in the bivariate model produces a long-run increase in the vote of about 1.2%.

The multivariate model in table 1 represents a considerable improvement in fit over the univariate and bivariate models. The 47% reduction in the RMS is, according to the F-test, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This, together with the statistical significance of the coefficients, suggests that the economic issue variable and candidate evaluations also Granger-cause the vote. An increase in evaluations of one percent increases the vote by about half a percent immediately, and the same increase in the issue variable reduces the vote by just over one-third of one percent. In addition both variables have significant adjustment coefficients.

[6]This is a "badness of fit" measure calculated from the residual autocorrelation function. It has a chi-square distribution which, if significant, implies that the residuals contain systematic information not picked up by the model. Lack of significance indicates that the residuals are white noise. See Ljung and Box (1978).

[7]The short-term instability of partisanship in 1984 was independently confirmed by examining the pre- and post-waves of the CPS Election Study. In 1984 only 59% of respondents were stable in both the direction and intensity of their partisanship. However, only 3.7% switched from Democrat to Republican, and 3.6% went in the other direction. So, most movement was to and from the independent category.

t is fairly clear that partisanship is considerably stronger in its impact on · vote than the other two variables in the vote function It impacts at three cessive time points giving a larger cumulative effect than the other two iables Moreover the effect of partisanship is larger in the multivariate del than in the bivariate model To put this in perspective, a 1% increase the *level* of partisanship produces a 1% increase in the vote after an aver- · period of about forty days, other things being equal

Turning to the third equation in table 1, partisanship improves the good- ss of fit of the issue model by about 10% in comparison with the univariate del. Despite this, the evidence that partisanship causes issue perceptions mbiguous because the adjustment coefficient is not significant at the usual els Partisanship clearly has a strong contemporaneous influence on issues, t in the absence of a significant lagged effect the causal relationship is un- tain This result is confirmed if the model is estimated over the same pe- d as equation (3′), suggesting that the findings are stable over time

Causal processes are also ambiguous in the candidate evaluation model t for a different reason In this case, the bivariate model does not improve · fit in comparison with the univariate model, moreover, the magnitudes the partisanship coefficients are small Again, the same result appears ien the model is estimated over the shorter period

Before accepting the causal links in the vote model, it is important to carry t diagnostic checks on the models This is done using two different proce- res First the cross-correlation function of the prewhitened predictor vari- le and the vote model residuals can be used to examine omitted effects is function appears for the vote and partisanship variables in figure 2, and s apparent that no significant relationships exist between partisanship and · vote, other than those captured by the model Similar results were found the other models

A second diagnostic test involved estimating equation (9′), the empirical rsion of equation (9), in which vote acts as a predictor of partisanship No tistically significant relationships emerged from this exercise [*]

In the earlier discussion we saw that equation (6) was a key equation for stinguishing between the classical recursive model and the issue-causal odel If issues and candidate evaluations Granger-cause partisanship then · case for the latter model is greatly strengthened The transfer function timates of equation (6′) appear in table 2 The adjustment coefficients are

The estimates were as follows

$$P_t = \underset{(0.43)}{\overset{(0.59)}{\frac{0.013}{(1 + 0.76\,B)}}}\, V_t + a_t\,(1 - \underset{(3.1)}{0.53}\, B)$$

IS = 35 9 $F = 0$ % Improvement = 0 Q = 25 15 d f

The Crosscorrelation Function of the Vote Model Residuals and Pre-whitened Partisanship

```
Plot of Cross Correlations
                -1 0  -0 8  -0 6  -0 4  -0 2   0 0   0 2   0 4   0 6   0 8   1 0
Lag   Corr     +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
                                             I
-12    0 029                 +               IX              +
-11   -0 171                 +           XXXXI               +
-10   -0 028                  +             XI              +        Vote
 -9    0 108                  +              IXXX           +        Leads
 -8   -0 033                    +           XI            +          Party ID
 -7   -0 219                    +       XXXXXI            +
 -6   -0 234                    +      XXXXXXI            +
 -5   -0 209                     +      XXXXXI           +
 -4   -0 044                     +          XI           +
 -3   -0 227                     +     XXXXXXI           +
 -2   -0 157                      +      XXXXI          +
 -1   -0 044                      +         XI          +
  0   -0 047                      +         XI          +
  1    0 047                      +          IX         +
  2   -0 100                      +       XXXI          +
  3   -0 242                     +     XXXXXXI           +
  4    0 136                     +           IXXX        +
  5    0 207                     +           IXXXXX      +
  6    0 310                    +            IXXXXXXXX    +
  7    0 136                    +            IXXX         +
  8   -0 209                    +       XXXXXI            +
  9    0 245                  +              IXXXXXX        +        Party ID
 10    0 229                  +              IXXXXXX        +        Leads
 11    0 005                 +               I               +       Vote
 12    0 019                 +               I               +
```

TABLE 2

ESTIMATES OF A KEY EQUATION IN THE ISSUE-CAUSAL MODEL

Predictor Variables		Dependent Variable: Republican Partisanship (∇) (N = 46) [6′]
Evaluations of President Reagan	ω	0 02
		(1 4)
Issue Evaluations	ω	−0 06
		(1 3)
Noise Model	θ_1	0 97
		(38 9)
Residual Mean Square Statistic		32 3
Percent Improvement on Univariate Model		3 7
Statistical Significance of Improvement		2 0*
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (d f)		20 0
		(20)

nitted from this equation because parameter redundancy made it impos-
ıle to estimate the model when they were included in the specification *
ıis fact, together with the very small improvement in fit and the small
·atios, indicates that the issue-causal model is not supported Clearly, is-
es and evaluations do not appear to be an exogenous causal influence on
ırtisanship

The other two models discussed in figure 1 are estimated in table 3 In
ıuation (7′) of this table, issues and partisanship are exogenous to candidate
'aluations, and there is clear evidence of a causal relationship The im-
ovement in fit is rather modest, though significant, and the impact and
ljustment coefficients for both variables are significant Both variables ap-
·ar to weakly Granger-cause evaluations A one percent increase in issue
·rceptions produces an immediate reduction in candidate evaluations of
ıout one-tenth of one percent and a long-run reduction of just over half of
ıe percent The equivalent effects of a one percent increase in the rate
change of partisanship are one-fifth of one percent immediately, and two-

*Parameter redundancy is examined using the correlation matrix of parameter estimates If
ıse are high it suggests that one or other of the coefficients is redundant (see Box and Jenkins
76, pp 248–50) In this case, the correlations were so high that the model could not be esti
ıted at all if the full specification of equation (6) was used

TABLE 3

ESTIMATES OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS AND ISSUES

Predictor Variables		Dependent Variable: Reagan Evaluations (N = 46) [7′]	Dependent Variable: Issue Evaluations (N = 46) [8′]
Republican Partisanship (∇)	ω	0.18	−0.14
		(1.5)	(2.4)
	δ	0.70	0.32
		(1.9)	(1.1)
Evaluation of President Reagan	ω	—	−0.004
			(0.05)
	δ	—	0.32
			(0.03)
Issue Evaluations	ω	−0.09	—
		(1.4)	
	δ	0.83	—
		(5.7)	
Noise Model	θ_2	—	0.75
			(7.2)
	θ_3	−0.41	
		(2.8)	
Residual Mean Square Statistic		26.6	16.5
Percent Improvement on Univariate Model		4.5	0
Statistical Significance of Improvement		1.7*	0
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (d.f.)		25.0	21.0
		(20)	(20)

thirds of one percent increase in evaluations in the long run. The effects are not large, but they are significant.

This result does not confirm the evaluation-partisanship model, since that required statistically significant effects in equation (6′). It is, however, consistent with a modified classical model in which the vote depends upon all three variables as in equation (3′), and candidate evaluations depend on issues and partisanship.

The second equation in table 3 suggests that the three-way interaction model does not apply, since it is fairly clear that neither partisanship or candidate evaluations Granger-cause issues. For the most part, the statistical significance of the coefficients is low, and the model does not improve the fit in comparison with the univariate model. The impact coefficient for partisanship is significant, but since the adjustment coefficient is not, causality is ambiguous.

Overall, we can see that none of the models in figure 1 are fully confirmed

the data. The full version of the classical recursive model does not apply, ice it is not clear that partisanship causes issues or evaluations Both the aluation-partisanship interaction and the three-way interaction models are t supported because they include causal links not validated by the evince. Finally the lagged nonrecursive model does not apply since the vote not exogenous to partisanship Instead, it appears that the evidence is content with a modified classical recursive model which includes equations) and (7′)

Final conclusions about the optimal model depend on the robustness of e estimates particularly in the case of the vote model, in view of the fact at it was estimated with so few observations We briefly examine this quesin next

ie Robustness of the Vote Model

The robustness of the estimates is examined by means of three different rsions of the vote model The first version involved substituting an index prospective issue evaluations for the economic issue indicator with the ea of exploring whether or not the model was influenced by a change from trospective to prospective issue evaluations The second version involved corporating a measure of attitudes to the Democratic candidate, Walter ondale, in the vote model Obviously, this is an important aspect of candite evaluations, although incorporating this variable pushed up against the nits of statistical estimation in the nonlinear vote model The third, and ost radically different version was to estimate the vote model for the emocrats which included a measure of Democratic partisanship, a thermometer scale of attitudes to Walter Mondale as well as the percentage of spondents who voted Democrat The three models appear in table 4

The first model in table 4 indicates that issues, lagged one period, signifintly influence the vote in addition to partisanship and candidate evaluaons Parameter redundancy made it impossible to estimate impact and adstment coefficients for issues in this model, but nevertheless the lagged ipact of issues is evidence of Granger-causality even though the effect does ot persist over time In the second model in table 4, all three variables conue to influence voting behavior when the Mondale thermometer score as incorporated into the model The only notable change was in the adjustent coefficient of the Reagan evaluation variable which ceased to be signifint This is not really surprising, though, since the model now contains two ndidate evaluation indicators which serve to reduce the impact of the iginal one

The third equation in table 4 contains the Democratic vote model, and it in be seen that partisanship Granger-causes the vote, as does the economic sue indicator. The effect of partisanship on the Democratic vote is rather mpler than in the Republican model, and as might be expected, the ecoomic issue indicator positively impacts the vote, since the Democrat was

TABLE 4

ESTIMATES OF THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE VOTE MODEL

Predictor Variables		Dependent Variable: Republican Vote (N = 24)	Republican Vote (N = 24)	Democratic Vote (N = 24)
Republican Partisanship (∇)	ω	0.24	0.37	—
		(1.1)	(1.6)	
	$\omega(B)$	0.38	0.29	—
		(1.7)	(1.2)	
	$\omega(B^2)$	−0.13	0.25	—
		(0.8)	(1.5)	
	δ	0.62	0.92	—
		(1.5)	(6.4)	
Democratic Partisanship	ω	—	—	0.17
				(1.7)
	δ	—	—	0.86
				(4.2)
Evaluations of President Reagan	ω	0.40	0.58	—
		(1.7)	(2.7)	
	δ	−0.58	−0.11	—
		(2.2)	(0.4)	
Evaluations of Walter Mondale	ω	—	−0.37	0.07(B)
			(1.4)	(1.2)
	δ	—	−0.01	—
			(0.1)	
Issue Evaluations	ω	—	−0.35	0.22
			(2.1)	(1.5)
	δ	—	0.70	0.80
			(3.5)	(4.3)
Policy Distance Evaluations	$\omega(B)$	−2.8	—	—
		(1.5)		
Noise Model	θ^1	—	0.03	—
			(0.1)	
Residual Mean Square Statistic		25.3	17.7	30.7
Percent Improvement on Univariate Model		22.8	45.9	3.4
Statistical Significance of Improvement		2.5**	5.2***	1.2
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (d.f.)		26.0	16.0	14.0
		(15)	(15)	(15)

the challenger who would benefit from a poor economic performance. Again parameter redundancy prevented separate estimations of impact and adjustment coefficients for evaluations of Walter Mondale, but it appears that this variable has a rather weak, lagged impact on the Democratic vote, independent of issues and Democratic partisanship.

Overall, the estimates in table 4 suggest that the vote model is robust in he face of different specifications. In each case partisanship causes the vote s do issue and candidate evaluations. This supports our inference that the lassical recursive model is closer to the truth than anything else

Discussion and Conclusions

These results suggest that the revisionist analysis, which holds that partisanship is a function of issue perceptions, is not supported by the evidence rom Rolling Thunder However, it is also true that partisanship changes significantly over time which accords with revisionist expectations Since the uthors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al , 1960) stressed the imporance of affective evaluations in explaining partisanship, it is reasonable to nfer that changes in party attachments, in the short run, derive primarily rom affective feelings rather than from cognitive judgments about issues

An important qualification to this conclusion, however, is that Rolling Thunder measures only the very short-term dynamics of electoral behavior t is possible that in the longer run, say over a four-year period of presidential incumbency, issues have an important influence on partisanship Certainly, that possibility is consistent with recent theories of partisan dealignment (Carmines et al , 1987) and is not ruled out by the present shorterm evidence Nevertheless, this evidence does suggest that there is more o changes in partisanship than issue evaluations, and thus there is a need to go beyond a narrow focus on issues in order to fully explain the dynamics of partisanship

Manuscript submitted 8 June 1987
Final manuscript received 25 January 1988

Appendix

The following variables were used from the Continuous Monitoring Survey, 1984

1 The votes for Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale (var 164, versions 5–11 var 168, versions 12–13)
2 Strong and weak Republican and Democratic identifiers (var 734)
3 Percent approval of Ronald Reagan's handling of his job (var 301)
4 Thermometer score for Walter Mondale (var 222)
5 Percent who think that the economy has gotten worse (var 601)
6 The policy distance scale was calculated as follows

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{i=1}^{4} (|X_{ij} - X_{ij}|/n)$$

where

X_i^p: the voter's position on a 5-point scale for issue i,

X_i^r: the voter's perception of Reagan's position for issue i, and

n the number of respondents

The issues were

Government spending (vars 803, 805),

Defense spending (vars 875, 877),

U S. involvement in Central America (vars 840, 842), and

Improve the position of women (vars 903, 905)

References

Asher, Herbert B 1983 Voting Behaviour Research in the 1980s An Examination of Some Old and New Problem Areas In Ada W Finifter, ed , *Political Science The State of the Discipline* Washington, DC American Political Science Association

Bartels, Larry M 1987 Candidate Choice and the Dynamics of the Presidential Nominating Process *American Journal of Political Science*, 31 1–30

Bishop, Richard V 1979 The Construction and Use of Causality Tests *Agricultural Economics Research*, 31 1–6

Bloom, Howard S , and H Douglas Price 1975 Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession *American Political Science Review*, 69 1240–54

Box, George E P , and Gwilym M Jenkins 1976 *Time Series Analysis, Forecasting and Control* San Francisco Holden-Day

Cain, Bruce E , and John A Ferejohn 1981 A Comparison of Party Identification in the United States and Great Britain *Comparative Political Studies* 14 31–47

Campbell, Angus , Philip E Converse, Warren E Miller, and Donald E Stokes 1960 *The American Voter* New York Wiley

Carmines, Edward G , John P McIver, and James A Stimson 1987 Unrealised Partisanship A Theory of Dealignment *Journal of Politics*, 49 376–400

Clarke, Harold D , and Marianne C Stewart 1985 Short-term Forces and Partisan Change in Canada 1974–80 *Electoral Studies*, 4 15–35

Converse, Philip E 1964 The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics In David E Apter ed , *Ideology and Discontent* New York Free Press

Converse, Philip E 1969 Of Time and Partisan Stability *Comparative Political Studies* 2 139–71

Feige, Edgar L , and Douglas K Pierce 1979 The Casual Causal Relationship between Money and Income Some Caveats for Time Series Analysis *Review of Economics and Statistics* 61 521–33

Fiorina, Morris P 1981 *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Flanigan, William H , and Nancy H Zingale 1985 Changing Perceptions of Presidential Candidates during the 1984 Primary Season Presented at the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, NV

Franklin, Charles A , and John E Jackson 1983 The Dynamics of Party Identification *American Political Science Review*, 77 957–73

Franklin, Charles A 1984 Issue Preferences, Socialization, and the Evolution of Party Identification *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 459–78

eeman, John R 1983 Granger Causality and the Time Series Analysis of Political Relationships *American Journal of Political Science*, 27 325–55

ıldberg, Arthur S 1966 Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting Behavior *American Political Science Review*, 60 913–22

ırdon, Robert J, and Stephen R King 1982 The Output Costs of Disinflation in Traditional and Vector Autoregressive Models In William C Brainard and George L Perry, eds, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1 205–43 Washington DC Brookings Institution

anger, C W J 1969 Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross Spectoral Methods *Econometrica*, 37 424–35

eenstein, Fred I 1965 *Children and Politics* New Haven Yale University Press

ırtwig, Frederick I, William R Jenkins, and Earl M Temchin 1980 Variability in Electoral Behavior The 1960, 1968, and 1976 Elections *American Journal of Political Science*, 24 553–58

ıman, Herbert H 1959 *Political Socialization* Glencoe Free Press

stitute for Social Research 1984 *American National Election Study 1984 Continuous Monitoring Survey Codebook* Ann Arbor Center for Political Studies

kson, John E 1975 Issues, Party Choices and Presidential Votes *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 161–85

nkins, Gwilym M 1979 *Practical Experiences with Modelling and Forecasting Time Series* St Helier Jersey G J P Publications

ung, Hsiao 1981 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Causality Testing in Multivariate ARMA Models *Journal of Time Series Analysis* 2 95–101

nder, Donald R, and D Roderick Kiewiet 1979 Economic Discontent and Voting Behavior The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting *American Journal of Political Science* 23 495–527

wis-Beck, Michael 1986 Comparative Economic Voting Britain France Germany Italy *American Journal of Political Science* 30 315–46

ung, G M and G E P Box 1978 On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series Models *Biometrika*, 65 297–304

arkus, Gregory B 1982 Political Attitudes During an Election Year A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study *American Political Science Review* 76 538–60

arkus, Gregory B, and Philip E Converse 1979 A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice *American Political Science Review* 73 32–49

ıller, Arthur H, Martin P Wattenberg and Oksana Malanchuk 1986 Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates *American Political Science Review* 80 521–66

onroe, Kristen 1984 *Presidential Popularity and the Economy* New York Praeger

elson, Charles R and G William Schwert 1982 Tests for Predictive Relationships Between Time Series Variables A Monte Carlo Investigation *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 77 11–18

ıe, Norman H, Sidney Verba and John R Petrocik 1976 *The Changing American Voter* Cambridge Harvard University Press

orpoth, Helmut 1986 Transfer Function Analysis In William D Berry and Michael S Lewis-Beck, eds, *New Tools for Social Scientists* Beverly Hills Sage

ge, Benjamin I, and Calvin C Jones 1979 Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences Party Loyalties and the Vote *American Political Science Review* 73 1071–89

erce, David A, and Larry D Haugh 1977 Causality in Temporal Systems Characterizations and a Survey *Journal of Econometrics*, 5 265–94

omper, Gerald M 1975 *Voter's Choice* New York Dodd, Mead

ırgent, Thomas and Christopher Sims 1977 Business Cycle Modeling Without Pretending to Have Too Much A Priori Economic Theory In Christopher Sims ed *New Methods of Business Cycle Research* Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Schofield, Norman, Steve E Satchell, Monojit Chatterji, and Paul F Whiteley 1986. *Advanced Statistical Methods in the Social Sciences* New York Praeger
Schulman, Mark A , and Gerald M Pomper 1975 Variability in Electoral Behavior Longitudinal Perspectives from Causal Modeling *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 1–18
Shanks, Merrill J , Warren E Miller, Henry E Brady, and Bradley L Palmquist 1985 Viability, Electability, and Presidential "Preference " Initial results from the 1984 NES Continuous Monitoring Design Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL
Sims, Christopher 1972 Money, Income and Causality *American Economic Review*, 62 540–52
Sims, Christopher 1980 Macroeconomics and Reality *American Economic Review*, 48 1–48
Yantek, Thomas 1984 Box-Jenkins Transfer Function Analysis *Political Methodology*, 11 377–411

Paul F Whiteley is professor of political science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721

Feminists and the Gender Gap

Pamela Johnston Conover
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

In recent years, analysts have devoted considerable attention to the gender gaps in party identification and voting Despite its importance, substantially less attention has been concentrated on the gender gap in public opinion In an effort to remedy that situation, this paper focuses on gender differences and differences among women in political values and basic moral orientations The findings suggest that feminists are distinctive in their fundamental values and that feminists account for a large part of the gender gap in specific issue preferences The implications of such findings for feminist theory are discussed

During the 1980s, the discovery of "the gender gap" drew attention to the *women's movement* and to the topic of sex differences in public opinion and participation Now that a substantial body of research has accumulated, it is possible to assess what is known about this phenomenon The following paper investigates the gender gap in basic values in order to explain the growing gender gap in public opinion Before turning to that topic, however, the general nature of the gender gap must be considered

The Nature of the Gender Gap

The term "gender gap" is a catch-all phrase referring to a variety of phenomena (Wirls, 1986) First, there may be gender gaps in levels of *mass participation*, however, recently these gaps have narrowed if not disappeared and consequently currently attract little attention (see Poole and Ziegler, 1985) More interesting are the *electoral* and *partisan* gender gaps The electoral gap refers to the differing vote choices of men and women In recent years, women have been more likely than men to support Democratic candidates (see Klein, 1985, Wirls, 1986) Closely related to the electoral gap

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago April 9–11 1987 The data used in this paper are from the 1985 National Election Study Pilot Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, supported by a long-term grant from the National Science Foundation and made available through the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research I appreciate the assistance of Frank Zinni and the helpful comments of Virginia Gray David Lowery Sue Tolleson Rinehart, Donald Searing, and several anonymous reviewers Of course I alone am responsible for any errors of interpretation or analysis

Journal of Politics Vol 50 No 4 November 1988

is the partisan gap which refers to the differences between men and women in their party identifications. During the eighties, women have increasingly given their allegiance to the Democratic party so that currently they comprise a majority of Democratic identifiers (see Frankovic, 1982)

Both the electoral and partisan gaps have been the subjects of considerable research (see for example, Baxter and Lansing, 1983, Burris, 1984, Frankovic, 1982; Gilens, 1988; Klein, 1985, Mansbridge, 1985, Poole and Ziegler, 1985, Smeal, 1984, Wirls, 1986) Yet, although this research has clarified the extent of a gender gap in electoral results and partisan distributions, it has faltered in explaining *why* such gender gaps exist Most studies point to the changing behavior of women (e g , Abzug, 1984, Klein, 1985, Smeal, 1984) though some argue that the changing behavior of men has produced the gaps (e g , Wirls, 1986). And most accounts hint that underlying these electoral and partisan gender gaps are sex differences in policy preferences and ideology (see Gilens, 1988)

That brings us to the fourth, and perhaps the most critical, variant of the gender gap the growing disparity in the political attitudes of men and women This gender gap in public opinion is important for several reasons (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986) For one thing, to the extent that they are issue-based, the full explanation of the electoral and partisanship gaps becomes dependent upon understanding the gender gap in political preferences More generally, the gender gap in public opinion may alter the salience of various political issues thus prompting changes in the political agenda And, as the gender gap widens on particular issues there may be aggregate shifts in the public's preferences which in turn create pressure to change the direction of public policy (Page and Shapiro, 1983) As Robert Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan (1986) point out, women are such a large group that even the emergence of small sex differences in issue preferences can have substantial consequences on public policy

Yet, despite the potential importance of the gender gap in public opinion, it has attracted less attention than the other three Moreover, the research that has been done has concentrated on documenting the existence of this gap rather than on explaining it (e g , Erskine, 1971, Schneider, 1984, Smith 1984, an exception to this is Gilens, 1988) In this vein, Shapiro and Mahajan's (1986) study is perhaps the most exhaustive Their examination of public opinion data collected over the last twenty years reveals sizable and persistent gender differences in attitudes toward issues involving the use of force, and smaller, but growing sex differences toward other policies concerning regulation and public protection, social welfare, and traditional values (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). Shapiro and Mahajan (1986, p. 42) go on to conclude that "the salience of issues has increased greatly for women, and as a result differences in preferences have increased in ways consistent with the interests of women and the intentions of the women's movement."

But what accounts for such changes? In addressing this question, two distinct bodies of literature will be brought together feminist political theory and empirical research on the gender gap Specifically, insights gleaned from feminist theorists advocating a "woman-centered perspective" will be integrated with empirical evidence on gender differences to produce a fuller interpretation of the origins of the gender gap in public opinion

"A Woman's Perspective"

Most explanations of the gender gap in public opinion are based on the notion that men and women have different political values and priorities which stem from fundamental value differences (see for example, Friedan and Dector, 1982, Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986, Tolleson Rinehart, 1985, and for a related argument, Carroll, 1985) Such an explanation triggers three questions First, how and why do women's values differ from those of men? Second, how do such value differences manifest themselves in political preferences? And finally, what is the empirical evidence pertaining to a gender gap in political values? Let us address each of these in turn

The Nature and Origins of "A Woman's Perspective"

The question of whether men and women differ in their fundamental values has concerned feminist theorists for some time Nineteenth century American feminists often entertained the idea that, compared to men women naturally embrace morally superior values (Stoper and Johnson, 1977) Writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, contemporary feminist theorists described basic differences between the sexes as social constructions emanating from the different roles that men and women play in a patriarchal society (see Jaggar, 1983, Firestone, 1970, Millett, 1970) More recently, in analyzing such male-female differences as a source of oppression, feminists began to return to the themes of the nineteenth century and to perceive women's differences from men not as a "form of inadequacy or as a source of inferiority," but instead as a matter of pride, confidence hope, and superiority (Eisenstein, 1983, p 46) And so there emerged in the mid-1970s a "woman-centered perspective" focusing on the female experience as an unique source of values for society (see Eisenstein, 1983, Massey, 1985)

Advocates of this woman-centered perspective stress the distinctive aspects of women's lives, the values fostered by such life experiences, and the positive contributions to society that such values can make (see Chodorow 1978, Dinnerstein, 1977, Rich, 1976, Ruddick, 1980, 1984) Moreover in the course of these analyses some theorists have shifted away from a view of gender differences as socially constructed toward a perspective which stresses intrinsic, biological differences underlying femaleness and maleness (Eisenstein, 1983) As Marilyn Chapin Massey (1985, p 7) explains, these radical

feminists (e.g., Daly, 1984; Irigary, 1981, Kristeva, 1981) claim that "women speak a new truth arising from their unique physical experience . . (a truth that) does not complement Western male moral discourse, but instead aims to subvert it "

What is this "new truth" that women speak? In "Maternal Thinking," Sara Ruddick (1980) suggests that women's interests in the preservation, growth, and acceptability of their children shape the way they look at the world Some also argue that women approach ethical problems differently from men Perhaps the most influential statement of this kind is Carol Gilligan's (1982) she posits that women are more oriented toward interpersonal relationships, and that this results in a conception of morality that stresses caring and responsibility toward others. In contrast, men are more concerned with rights and rules, and thus they emphasize justice and fairness in their moral decisions (for an examination of Gilligan's argument and more generally the "ethic of caring" see Tronto, 1987, Noddings, 1984)

It is argued, then, that a "woman's perspective" is responsive to growth and accepting of change, embodies compassion and caring for others, and manifests humility in its sensitivity to the realities of the environment (Grimshaw, 1986, p. 241) [1] It is also a perspective with uncertain origins it might be fostered by different social roles or it might be an intrinsic manifestation of the innate differences between men and women But, regardless of its origins, the question must be asked how does a woman's perspective come to influence politics?

Politics and "A Woman's Perspective"

Proponents of a woman-centered analysis argue that an infusion of women's values into the political arena will transform society in a positive fashion (see for example, Daly, 1984, Massey, 1985, Ruddick, 1980) But, as critics have pointed out, it is not altogether clear precisely how this injection of values and subsequent cultural transformation are to take place (see Grimshaw 1986, Dietz, 1985, Eisenstein, 1983) If it is to be argued that a "woman's values have the potential to transform politics, some mechanism of transformation must be identified

From the perspective of some feminists, the most obvious mechanism to fill such a role is a *feminist identity and consciousness* Specifically, it is argued that in the absence of a feminist identity a woman's values usually lie dormant beneath the male-oriented values of the dominant culture But, in the process of becoming a feminist, women develop a sense of consciousness that enables them to discover their true values which may then serve as a basis for their politics (see Ruddick, 1980, Rich, 1976). Thus, becoming a

[1] A more specific variant of the "woman's perspective" argument is the "maternalist" argument advanced by such theorists as Ruddick (1980, 1984), Hartsock (1985), and Elshtain (1981)

feminist helps women "recover" their basic values which, in turn, shape their sense of political consciousness, and ultimately their preferences on political issues.

Some would object, however, that a feminist *political* consciousness rooted solely in a woman's values is not enough to ensure either the infusion of those values into politics or the subsequent adoption of distinctive issue preferences. Instead, they argue that if the public world is to be transformed a woman's values must be coupled with, if not subordinated to, democratic political values (see Grimshaw, 1986, Dietz, 1985, 1987, Eisenstein, 1983). As Mary Dietz (1985, p. 32) asserts ". . . the only consciousness that can serve as a basis for this transformation . . . is a distinctly political consciousness steeped in a commitment to democratic values, participatory citizenship, and egalitarianism."[2] In essence, such theorists posit that if women are going to alter the political agenda, a particular set of political values may be more crucial than a "woman's" values.

These theoretical arguments have several implications that are potentially testable. First, at the aggregate level, they suggest that the widening of the gender gap in the late 1970s may be linked to the growing strength of the women's movement. And indeed, this is an argument that a number of scholars have made though not empirically tested (see for example, Friedan and Dector, 1982, Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986, Tolleson Rinehart, 1985). Second, these theoretical arguments imply that a woman's values should be more readily expressed by feminists and more obviously reflected in their politics. Third, and finally, the injection of a woman's values into politics may be related to a commitment to democratic values.

Empirical Evidence

A number of psychological studies have generated evidence concerning male-female differences on some of those dimensions central to the definition of a women's perspective such as empathy (see Greeno and Maccoby, 1986, Eisenberg and Lennon, 1983), styles of social interaction (Maccoby, 1985), and conceptions of morality (Gilligan, 1982).[3] In contrast, empirical investigations of a "woman's perspective" as it relates to politics and issue preferences are relatively scarce (see Carroll, 1985, Conover and Gray, 1983; Vaux, 1985, and Wassenberg, et al., 1983). And, researchers have failed to consider directly whether an ethic of caring actually underlies women's political issue preferences. Similarly, very little empirical attention has been

[2] Dietz (1987) goes a step further and argues that there are real dangers inherent in arguing that women are morally superior to men. Among the most serious of these dangers is that such a perspective fosters a vision of politics and citizenship that, in the end, is unlikely to produce the transformation of the political world that feminists desire.

[3] Gilligan's work, however, has been criticized on methodological as well as theoretical grounds (see Luria, 1986).

devoted to the question of whether there is a gender gap in political values such as egalitarianism and individualism (exceptions to this are Christenson and Dunlap, 1984, Rokeach, 1973) Finally, the empirical links between values, a feminist identity, and issue preferences have gone unexplored.

With that in mind, three questions will be addressed empirically in this paper First, is there a gender gap in political values and more basic value orientations? Second, do women's values differ according to the strength of their feminist identities? And third, if there are gender differences in values, to what extent are they attributable to feminists?

Data and Methods

In order to explore these questions, I shall use data collected in the 1985 National Election Study Pilot [4] Three sets of measures are created from these data a measure of feminist identity, measures of value orientations, and measures of issue preferences

A Measure of Feminist Identity

In order to explore the above hypotheses, women with a feminist identity must be distinguished from those who lack such an identity In approaching this measurement question, a feminist identity will be treated as a form of social identity, and as such it has two components. a sense of membership in the category or group and a sense of psychological attachment to the group (Tajfel, 1981) With that in mind, previous studies may be examined in order to determine possible measurement strategies

One approach is to use objective indicators (e g Poole and Zeigler, 1985) But, this would require the questionable assumption that specific objective categories, such as work status or education, are reliably and highly correlated with a feminist identity A second, more direct, approach to identifying feminist women is based on an assessment of beliefs For instance, as Gurin (1985) explains, a "collective orientation" and an awareness of gender inequities are beliefs which may be treated as indicators of a feminist consciousness and identity Yet, a third, even more direct, approach is to focus on the extent to which women consciously identify themselves as feminists

The third approach is the one adopted here In so doing, it is assumed that how a woman thinks of herself is as important as her objective status and beliefs in determining her behavior In effect, whether a woman actually ***thinks*** of herself as a feminist is assumed to have a fundamental impact on how she looks at the world (Crosby, 1982, Tajfel, 1981) Though the potential importance of social identities in shaping political outlooks has been recog-

[4] The 1985 NES Pilot Study is based on a sample of respondents who participated in the 1984 National Election Study The pilot study includes an oversample of elderly people, consequently, to analyze the entire set of 429 respondents the use of a weight variable was required

nized, previous efforts to examine feminist identities empirically have been handicapped by the absence of good measures Until recently, for example, the National Election Study "group closeness" question has served as the basis for the most commonly used measures of group identification This question first asks respondents how close they feel to a variety of groups including women and feminists, and then asks them to pick the one group they feel closest to Unfortunately, there are two problems with using this question as a measure of identity First, the term "closeness" is vague and ambiguous, it could mean, for example, sympathy, empathy, proximity, or identification And second, for a measure of feminist identity, not enough women pick "feminists" as the group that they feel closest to [5]

These problems are alleviated by a new measure included on the 1985 National Election Study Pilot Study Specifically, *women* were asked the following questions "Sometimes a woman might think of herself as a woman, as a working woman, and sometimes as a homemaker Do you think of yourself as a 'homemaker' most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or never?" (repeated for woman, working woman, and *feminist*) Thus, this question directs women to think about their different social identities, and in that context, forces them to consider whether or not they consciously think of themselves as feminists When couched in these terms, 26 4% of the women "never" think of themselves as feminists, 30 9% do so "occasionally", 19 8% do so "some of the time", and fully 22 9% think of themselves as feminists "most of the time " Unlike the "old" group closeness question, then, this item offers us a more direct measure with greater face validity

But, as defined earlier, self-categorization is only one part of a social identity, psychological attachment is another component that must be measured Accordingly, responses to the above question tapping "feminist" self-categorization were multiplied by the respondent's feeling thermometer rating of feminists These scores were then rescaled to a zero to one format so that a "1" on the measure indicates a woman who both thinks of herself as feminist most of the time *and* rates feminists at 100 degrees on the feeling thermometer Thus I have combined affective intensity with self-categorization to produce the final measure of feminist identity

How good a measure of feminist identity is this? One way to judge it is to examine its relationship with certain criterion variables that it *should* be related to if, indeed, it is adequately measuring feminist identity The results of such an analysis are quite encouraging Specifically, as it should be a strong feminist identity is very strongly correlated with positive affect (as measured by feeling thermometers) towards women (Pearson's r = 33), the women's movement (r = 53), and the women's liberation movement (r =

[5]The low number of strong feminists revealed by the group closeness measure should not be taken as indicator of the number of feminists in the population There are sufficient problems with the measure to dictate against such an interpretation

.50). It is also positively related to aspects of group consciousness. In particular, a strong feminist identity is associated with the position that the government should "make every effort to improve the social and economic position of women" ($r = .28$), and that it is extremely important that the government act now on that issue ($r = .33$). Finally, a strong feminist identity is also positively related to having a sense of interdependence with other women; that is, strong feminists believe that if "women were more actively involved in running the affairs of this country" it would increase the respect that they personally receive ($r = .28$). Thus, the measure of feminist identity taps the underlying concept more directly than previous measures, and it is correlated in the expected fashion with crucial criterion variables.

Measures of Value Orientations

As discussed by recent theorists, the central values in a woman's perspective are not hypothesized to be political in nature. Nonetheless, for two reasons it is important to investigate whether there is a gender gap in political values. For one thing, a gender gap in political values may help to explain the gender gap that we already know exists in specific policy preferences. More important, even though particular political values such as egalitarianism may not be central to a woman's perspective, they may be essential to the political expression of that perspective.

Therefore, three political value orientations and one measure of political identity are used in the analysis (see appendix A for a more detailed description). All four variables have been rescaled so that they range from zero to one.[6] An "egalitarianism" scale measures attitudes toward equality of opportunity, high scores indicate a strong commitment to equality. An "individualism" measure taps attitudes toward the work ethic and individual effort; high scores signify a strong sense of individualism. The "symbolic racism" scale deals with a mixture of the protestant ethic and negative affect toward blacks, high scores represent a strong sense of symbolic racism. Finally, the traditional liberal-conservative identification measure is employed, high scores indicate "very conservative."

Four more basic value orientations that relate to a woman's perspective are also considered in the analysis. Two of these, moral traditionalism and religious fundamentalism, tap conceptions of morality. The third one, sex roles, while not central to a woman's perspective should provide insights into the nature of differences among women. And, the final one measures sympathy for the disadvantaged.

To explain further, the "moral traditionalism" measure taps a preference for traditional patterns of family and social organization that reflects an un

[6] When variables are rescaled to a zero to one interval, they are not dichotomized. The lowest value is set to zero, the highest value to one, and all intermediate categories to corresponding fractional values.

derlying reverence for the past and a resistance to change (see Conover and Feldman, 1986, for a discussion of this measure). High scores on this measure indicate a strong commitment to moral traditionalism The "fundamentalism" scale measures a "born-again" religious orientation in which the Bible is interpreted literally and religion plays a guiding role in daily life, high scores signify a strong fundamentalist bent. The "sex role" measure taps the respondent's preference for traditional vs "modern" conceptions of sex roles, high scores represent a preference for modern sex roles Finally, because it is so central to a woman's perspective, it is essential to consider as well an "ethic of caring" Unfortunately, the NES Pilot Study does not include questions that directly tap sympathy and caring for others Consequently, "sympathy for the disadvantaged," a measure that indirectly assesses an ethic of caring, must be relied upon This measure is the average feeling thermometer rating for three disadvantaged groups—people on welfare, poor people, and older people—calculated so that high scores indicate positive feelings or caring for the disadvantaged While this measure does not directly assess the emotional responses of sympathy and caring, it does get at the general emotional reaction of the respondent to the disadvantaged and thus represents a reasonable approximation As in the case of the political value measures, all of these measures have been rescaled so that they range from zero to one

Measures of Issue Preferences

Finally, in order to examine the extent to which value differences contribute to the gender gap in public opinion, it is necessary to measure issue preferences Accordingly, a variety of domestic and foreign affairs issues were analyzed for gender differences This examination uncovered gender differences on six of seven foreign policy issues on three of ten racial issues, and on nine of fourteen economic and social issues For further analysis, issues with significant gender differences were selected from each of these categories In all instances, the relevant items have been recorded so that *low* scores indicate the issue preference most congruent with a liberal perspective. Specifically, in the foreign affairs arena low scores indicate a fear of war a desire for peace and nonintervention in Central America, and less commitment to a strong national defense In the domestic policy area, low scores represent support for social spending and abortion, and opposition to school prayer

FINDINGS

Value Differences Between Men and Women

Do men and women differ in their political values? Table 1 provides a clear answer to this question As can be seen, there are no significant differences

TABLE 1

MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS

Orientations	Mean		Pearson's R
	Male	Female	
Political Value			
Egalitarianism	54	57	07
Individualism	54	57	06
Symbolic Racism	64	61	− 05
Liberal-Conservative Identification	63	61	− 03
Basic Value			
Moral Traditionalism	49	52	07
Religious Fundamentalism	26	41*	18**
Sex Roles	69	67	− 01
Sympathy for the Disadvantaged	67	71*	13**

* = T-test significant at 05 level

** = Pearson's R between gender and value orientation significant at 05 level

at the 05 level between men and women on any of the three specific political value orientations—egalitarianism, individualism, and symbolic racism This is in keeping with what little previous work there is on the subject For example, Milton Rokeach (1973) failed to find any sex differences in the importance accorded the value of equality as did James Christenson and Riley Dunlap (1984) [7] Moreover, and somewhat more surprisingly, although women tend to identify themselves as liberals more frequently than do men, the sex differences for this variable are not statistically significant If there is a distinctive woman's perspective, it is not apparent in the political values of women as a whole

Is there, then, anything at all that might meaningfully be called "a woman's perspective"? Men and women differ very little in their commitment to modern conceptions of sex roles, the mean value for men on the sex role scale is 69 and for women .67 Yet, in and of themselves these sex role orientations are not a crucial element in defining a woman's perspective In the same vein, there is also a lack of significant sex differences on the moral traditionalism measure (mean value for men = 49, for women = 52) (Recall, high scores on this measure express a concern with maintaining traditional patterns of family organizations as well as traditional moral standards) But, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of this finding Some argue that a concern with the sanctity of the traditional family is an element of a woman's perspective (see Elshtain, 1981, 1982), whereas others vigorously oppose the idea

[7] However, Rokeach (1973) did find that women ranked the value of freedom lower than men

of linking the traditional family with an argument about women's values or democratic values in general (e g., Dietz, 1985, Ehrenreich, 1983, Berman, 1983). Thus, whether such a finding is supportive or contradictory to a woman's perspective argument is a matter of controversy Moreover, although in general women do not differ from men in moral traditionalism, it is possible that subgroups of women (e g , feminists and nonfeminists) may differ from men in ways that would shed light on the argument This possibility will be considered at a later point

In contrast with the findings above, women do differ from men in religious fundamentalism, they average 13 higher than men on the religious fundamentalism scale Thus, religion plays a bigger role in the daily lives of women than it does in the lives of men And, this has important implications for how women approach the world In particular, religious fundamentalism may give rise to a strict sense of morality that shapes how women think on political issues (for general evidence on the impact of religious fundamentalism on political preferences see Conover and Feldman, 1986)

Women also differ from men in their sympathy for the disadvantaged In keeping with the notion of a feminine ethic of caring women feel more warmly than men toward the disadvantaged in society, women average 71 on the sympathy measure as compared to 67 for men This is a crucial finding Though the measure of sympathy is a general one, this finding lends credence to the woman's perspective argument

In summary, the evidence for a woman's perspective is mixed Women do not seem to differ from men in political values Thus, if there is a woman's perspective in terms of fundamental values it has yet to emerge in the political values of the mass public [8] On the other hand, women do differ from men in religious fundamentalism and most importantly, in their sympathy for the disadvantaged Such findings lend preliminary support to the woman's perspective argument

Value Differences among Women

Paradoxically, the lack of large sex differences in basic orientations and especially in political values can also be seen as consistent with that part of the woman's perspective argument which suggests that feminine values are typically overwhelmed by masculine values in a patriarchal society such as the United States (e g , Rich, 1976, Ruddick, 1980, Massey, 1985) If a woman's

[8] An alternative interpretation is that both men and womens values had been reshaped by 1985 thus diminishing inter-gender differences In effect a womans perspective may have emerged, but its appearance among women might be masked by changing values among men so that they, too, moved closer to the values embodied in a "womans perspective" This interpretation seems less plausible because the value orientations of the mass public—women and men alike—are not fully in keeping with theoretical notions of what constitutes a womans perspective

perspective is to emerge, the argument goes, women must experience a sense of feminist identity and consciousness. Thus, it is misleading to consider women as an undifferentiated group. Women differ in how they think of themselves—in the strength of their feminist identity—and such differences may well be related to variations in values and issue preferences.

In more formal terms, the model suggested by this argument is one in which the development of a feminist identity and consciousness leads to the reshaping of values that were originally formed by early socialization experiences and by adult social location (for a more general discussion of this type of model, see Sears and Huddy, 1987) The feminist's "reshaped" values then determine her more specific issue preferences both by creating preferences on issues that were formerly unimportant and by changing existing issue positions. In effect, the development of a feminist identity constitutes a resocialization experience for a woman, it directly influences her values, and through her values it indirectly affects her specific issue positions For present purposes, however, we need not test the full-blown model but only the implications of this model that are central to understanding the gender gap In particular, the model suggests that women should differ in their values and issue preferences according to the strength of their feminist identity Is this the case?

Bivariate correlations between the measure of feminist identity and the various value orientations clearly demonstrate that a strong feminist identity is indeed related to a distinctive set of values It is positively correlated with a sense of egalitarianism ($r =$ 25), a lack of symbolic racism ($r = -$ 24) a liberal ideology ($r = -$ 26), a tendency to reject moral traditionalism ($r = -$ 34) and to adopt a modern conception of sex roles ($r =$ 26), and perhaps most important with respect to the woman's perspective argument, a feminist identity is strongly related to the expression of sympathy for the disadvantaged ($r =$ 32) But what the simple correlations do not tell us is whether a strong feminist identity actually causes women to adopt specific value orientations Women with a strong feminist identity may, for example also be distinctive on other dimensions—early-life socialization experiences self-interests, or symbolic predispositions—that might shape the development of particular values (for a discussion of these alternative theoretical explanations, see Sears and Huddy, 1987) Thus, it is possible that the correlations between a feminist identity and value orientations are spurious

To test this possibility, each of the value orientations was regressed on the feminist identity measure *and* on a number of variables that represent competing theoretical explanations Specifically, early-life socialization is tapped by two variables, education and generation as measured by age, high scores indicate, respectively, high education and increasing age Income and race provide rough indicators of current self-interests, high scores denote, respectively, high income and non-white Finally, party identification measures a symbolic predisposition that often develops early in life and which

TABLE 2

REGRESSIONS OF VALUES ON EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Values— Dependent Variables	Independent Variables						
	Feminist Identity	Party Identification	Age	Education	Race	Income	R^2
Egalitarianism	15*	− 20*	− 16*	11	16*	− 06	16
	(11)	(− 10)	(− 17)	(10)	(10)	(− 04)	
Individualism	01	22*	− 10	− 02	− 13*	09	11
	(01)	(12)	(− 10)	(− 02)	(− 05)	(06)	
Symbolic Racism	− 13*	25*	− 14*	− 11*	− 15*	07	19
	(− 12)	(16)	(− 19)	(− 13)	(− 12)	(06)	
Liberal-Conserv Identification	− 17*	23*	11	12*	− 07	− 18*	15
	(− 20)	(20)	(18)	(17)	(− 07)	(− 19)	
Moral Traditionalism	− 29*	17*	31*	02	06	03	24
	(− 21)	(09)	(33)	(02)	(04)	(02)	
Religious Fundamentalism	− 03	14*	14*	− 11	14*	− 15*	10
	(− 04)	(14)	(29)	(− 21)	(29)	(− 20)	
Sex Roles	18*	− 22*	− 21*	17*	− 06	09	21
	(21)	(− 19)	(− 37)	(26)	(− 09)	(10)	
Sympathy for the Disadvantaged	24*	− 22*	17*	10*	04	− 24*	26
	(13)	(− 08)	(14)	(07)	(01)	(− 12)	

Unparenthesized entries are beta weights
Parenthesized entries are unstandardized regression coefficients
* = $p \leq$ 05

potentially influences a variety of values, high scores on this measure signify a "strong Republican" (for a similar interpretation of the use of these measures, see Sears and Huddy, 1987)[9] It should be noted that the nature of the relationship between party identification and a feminist identity is especially difficult to specify Women raised as Democrats may be predisposed to become feminists, yet, at the same time, the development of a feminist identity should clearly prompt changes in party identification And, in fact, there is a moderate correlation between party identification and the feminist identity measure ($r = -$ 29) Thus, it is particularly important to control the relationships between values and a feminist identity for party identification[10]

The results of these regressions are presented in table 2 Of the two vari-

[9]The interpretation of party identification as a long-standing symbolic predisposition is a very traditional and accepted one It has, however been questioned in recent years (e g Fiorina 1981) For our purposes, the traditional interpretation of party identification presents the greatest challenge to the power of feminist identity as a determinant of values

[10]For our purposes it is not essential to sort out the precise nature of the relationship between feminist identity and party identification, though obviously that would be important if one were going to test the complete model underlying the womans perspective argument

ables measuring early-life socialization, education, and age, the latter has the strongest effects on values, particularly the more basic ones. Race and income, the two variables tapping self-interests, have a less consistent effect on values. In contrast, party identification has a consistently significant effect on all the values. In particular, in comparison to Republicans, Democrats tend to be more egalitarian, less individualistic, less racist, more liberal, less traditional in their moral stances, and more sympathetic to the disadvantaged.

Compared to these other variables, how does the measure of feminist dentity fare? Very well. On the political values, the effects of a feminist dentity are as strong or stronger than all of the other variables except party lentification. And, on the more basic value orientations, a feminist identity as an even stronger impact, an impact which rivals, and in some instances xceeds, that of party identification. In summary, the strength of a woman's minist identity is not the sole determinant of her values, but it clearly ems to be an important one which provides firm support for the basic rust of the woman's perspective argument. Furthermore, the relationship a feminist identity with basic values provides an important clue to the oris of the gender gap in public opinion. In particular, to the extent that sic values structure specific issue positions, this relationship suggests that eminist identity may be related to distinctive issue positions.[11]

To explore this possibility, the relationship between specific issue preferces and the feminist identity measure are presented in table 3. There it is parent that a feminist identity is clearly and consistently related to foreign icy issue positions. Specifically, the stronger a woman's feminist identity, more she is fearful of both conventional and nuclear war (r's = −.26 and 19 respectively), opposed to involvement in Central America (r = −.21), l likely to want to cut defense spending (r = −.17).

The strength of a woman's feminist identity is also significantly related to ie preferences on a wide range of domestic policies. In particular, a strong minist identity is associated with support for increased spending on most ial programs, especially those dealing with the poor (e.g., aid to the unployed and food stamps), and with support for guaranteed jobs. Thus, the itive feelings for the disadvantaged demonstrated by women who think of mselves as feminists are reflected in their issue preferences.

In more formal terms, the model underlying the woman's perspective argument suggests a feminist identity should structure values which in turn influence specific policy prefers. Thus, much of the impact of a feminist identity on issue preferences should be indirect rovide a rough test of this possibility, all of the issue preferences presented in table 4 were essed in a stepwise fashion on the feminist identity measure and the values as well as party tification. Specifically, first the feminist identity measure was entered, and then the eight es and party identification were entered. Generally, while by itself a feminist identity has a ficant impact on women's issue preferences, when the other variables are added to the ition the direct effects of a feminist identity decline often to the point of being statistically nificant. Instead, political and basic values, and party identification have the most direct ct on womens issue preferences.

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POLICY PREFERENCES AND A FEMINIST IDENTITY

Issue Type	Feminist Identity
Foreign Affairs	
Conventional War	− 26*
Nuclear War	− 19*
Central America	− 21*
Defense Spending	− 17*
Domestic	
Spending On	
Older People	08
Social Security	− 07
Medicare	− 04
Food Stamps	− 26*
Unemployed	− 15*
Big Cities	− 20*
Women	− 25*
Child Care	− 14*
Affirmative Action for Women	− 22*
Equal Opportunity for Blacks	− 23*
Guaranteed Jobs	− 26*
Abortion	− 12*
School Prayer	− 08

Entries are Pearson Product Moment Correlations
* = $p \leq 05$

But, though the issue stances of women with a strong feminist identity are consistent with an ethic of caring, it is not clear which of their values are most important in determining their issue preferences The woman's perspective argument suggests that basic, "newly recovered," moral orientations such as sympathy for the disadvantaged are most important in determining a feminist's issue positions, alternatively, other feminists (e g Dietz, 1985, Grimshaw, 1986) argue that democratic, political values are more critical than "a woman's values" in producing distinctive issue preferences To address this question, the issue preferences considered in table 3 were regressed on the eight values and party identification for feminist women, who were defined as those scoring 30 or higher on the measure of feminist identity By this broad definition, 42% of the women were classified as feminists [13]

[13]This proportion is almost exactly the same as the proportion of women who said that they thought of themselves as feminists "some of the time" or "most of the time" Moreover when this dichotomous measure of feminists vs nonfeminists is correlated with various criterion variables, the correlations decline only slightly from what they were with the interval level measure of feminist identity Thus, this cutting point appears to be an appropriate one Finally even when a narrower definition of feminists is employed the general thrust of the findings remain the same

These regression analyses suggest that both arguments have some merit.[13] Among feminists, basic value orientations do have a significant and substantial impact on domestic issue preferences particularly those involving social spending, though they have little effect on foreign policy issues. Moreover, of the basic value orientations, sympathy for the disadvantaged is clearly the most influential in shaping policy positions At the same time, however, party identification and political values also have a significant effect on issue preferences, in fact, they are the key determinants on foreign policy preferences. Thus, both types of values play a critical role in shaping the specific issue preferences of feminists

In summary, our examination of the relationships between a feminist identity, and values and issue positions has been quite revealing. Women who strongly identify themselves as feminists tend to have distinctive political and basic value orientations· as compared to nonfeminist women, they are more liberal, less racist, more egalitarian, less traditional morally and with regard to sex roles, and more sympathetic to the disadvantaged Furthermore, as suggested by the woman's perspective argument, a feminist identity is not only *related* to a distinctive pattern of values but it also helps to *produce* those values In particular, though the strength of a woman's feminist identity is by no means the only determinant of her values, it is a *major* factor in shaping those values Moreover, the values of feminists clearly manifest themselves in the issue preferences which they adopt. Women with a strong feminist identity do, indeed, embrace a set of policy preferences which if implemented would fundamentally alter the nature of public policy In this regard, it is important to recognize that both political values and more basic value orientations (e g., sympathy for the disadvantaged) shape the policy preferences of feminists Thus, our findings tend to support the argument (see Dietz, 1985, Eisenstein, 1983) that a feminist consciousness must affirm not only a woman's perspective, but also democratic values if it is to be politically distinctive

Are these findings surprising? No, not really Certainly in the context of the woman's perspective argument, it would be surprising if we did *not* find that women with a strong feminist identity have distinctive values and issue preferences More generally, the very nature of political ideologies and social identities suggests that people who identify with a particular movement should adopt those values and issue preferences associated with it It would be startling, for example, if Marxist workers did *not* differ in their policy preferences from non-Marxist workers Thus, the substance of these findings is not particularly astonishing It is surprising, however, that previous

[13]On the seventeen issues examined, the independent variables had a significant impact on the following number of issues party identification—seven, individualism—three, egalitarianism—three, symbolic racism—four, ideology—six, moral traditionalism—zero, sex roles—one fundamentalism—five, and sympathy for the disadvantaged—six

searchers have not explored more fully the value orientations and issue eferences of feminists This may reflect a more general tendency to give sufficient attention to the considerable variations among women Yet, re-gnizing such variations may alter our interpretation of the gender gap ius, these findings about feminists are surprising in the sense that they ggest an unexplored explanation of the gender gap· the idea that perhaps ly a subset of women, such as feminists, rather than women in general, ffer from men We explore that possibility now

ie Gender Gap and A Feminist Identity

Women differ in their political values depending on the degree to which ey identify as feminists Is it mainly feminists, then, whose views explain e gender gap in issue preferences? As a first step toward answering this iestion, table 4 presents the mean position on the value scales for men, and r feminist and nonfeminist women as defined earlier

As illustrated in table 4, nonfeminists, like women in general, do not differ om men in political values The feminists, however, do differ from men sig-ficantly on three of the four political value orientations egalitarianism, mbolic racism, and ideology Specifically, feminists are more committed an men to the value of equality, they evidence less symbolic racism than en, and they are considerably more liberal than men

TABLE 4

ALUE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALES AND NON-FEMINIST WOMEN AND BETWEEN MALES AND FEMINIST WOMEN

		Mean		Significance of T-Test	
Orientations	Males	Non Feminists	Feminists	Males-Non-Feminists	Males-Feminists
litical Value					
Egalitarianism	54	34	62	69	00*
Individualism	54	58	55	06	65
Symbolic Racism	64	64	58	94	02*
Liberal-Conserv Identification	63	66	54	31	02*
isic Value					
Moral Tradit	49	54	48	01*	62
Religious Fundamentalism	27	41	42	00*	00*
Sex Roles	69	65	77	15	01*
Sympathy for the Disadvantaged	67	68	74	31	00*

* = $p \leq$ 05

With respect to the more basic value orientations, recall that our earlier analysis uncovered sex differences in religious fundamentalism and sympathy for the disadvantaged. When men are compared separately to feminist and nonfeminist women, the sex difference in religious fundamentalism persists in both cases Feminists and nonfeminists alike tend to be more religious than men [14] For the remaining values, however, the pattern of sex differences changes when women are divided into feminist and nonfeminist groups. Specifically, nonfeminist women compared to men have a stronger sense of moral traditionalism, in contrast, feminists resemble men in their level of moral traditionalism

But, most important are the findings with regard to sympathy for the disadvantaged. Nonfeminist women are similar to men in their degree of caring for the disadvantaged, the mean value for nonfeminist women is .68 on the disadvantaged scale as compared to .67 for men By contrast, feminists differ greatly from men in the stronger sense of caring that they display, they average .74 on the sympathy scale. Thus, the gender gap in sympathy for the disadvantaged is due entirely to the more caring posture adopted by feminist women This finding may be interpreted in several ways On the one hand, it may indicate that a feminist identity is, indeed, necessary to express in politics a woman's natural tendency toward caring Alternatively, the high degree of sympathy that feminist women display may be an outgrowth of their other political values (e g, egalitarianism) and not their femaleness per se Or, some combination of these two explanations may be at work

One way of testing these alternative explanations is to compare feminist women to feminist men. If the differences in sympathy persist between these two groups, it would tend to support the argument that women are naturally more sympathetic and caring than men On the other hand, if the sex differences in sympathy disappear when feminist women are compared to feminist men, it would suggest that the political values associated with feminism help to account for the greater sympathy of feminist women Unfortunately, the 1985 NES Pilot Study does not include a comparable measure of feminist identity for men [15] Thus, at this time it is impossible to deter

[14] At first glance, the religious fundamentalism of feminists appears contradictory and puzzling However, there are a number of possible explanations that though beyond the scope of this paper, future research might explore On the one hand the apparent fundamentalism of feminists may be a vestige of early socialization experiences Alternatively, a feminist identity might actually promote religiosity though not necessarily of the sort that nonfeminist women pursue Certainly for example, the value that feminists place on an ethic of caring might be considered as consistent with Christian ethics

[15] It *was* possible, however, to create two *indirect* measures of a male feminist identity whether men said they felt close to feminists, and men's feeling thermometer ratings of feminists and women's groups (feminist men were defined as those men whose average rating of feminists the women's movement, and the women's liberation movement placed them in the upper 40% of men) Unfortunately, contradictory findings were obtained when feminist men identified by

TABLE 5

DIFFERENCES IN ISSUE PREFERENCES BETWEEN MALES AND NON-FEMINIST WOMEN AND BETWEEN MALES AND FEMINIST WOMEN

	Mean			Significance of *T*-Test	
Issues	Males	Non-Feminists	Feminists	Males-Non-Feminists	Males-Feminists
Foreign Policy					
Conventional War	3.5	3.6	3.0	.60	.01*
Nuclear War	3.5	3.4	3.0	.41	.00*
Central America	2.9	2.4	1.9	.00*	.00*
Defense Spending	4.1	4.0	3.7	.42	.00*
Domestic					
Spending On					
Older People	1.5	1.3	1.3	.00*	.00*
Social Security	1.6	1.5	1.5	.07	.01*
Medicare	1.7	1.5	1.5	.02*	.01*
Food Stamps	2.2	2.3	2.0	.89	.01*
Unemployed	1.9	1.7	1.5	.00*	.00*
Big Cities	2.0	2.0	1.7	.36	.00*
Women	1.9	1.8	1.7	.47	.02*
Child Care	1.8	1.7	1.6	.09	.01*
Affirmative Action for Women	2.0	2.0	1.9	.99	.09
Equal Opportunity for Blacks	2.8	2.6	2.3	.08	.00*
Guaranteed Jobs	4.5	4.4	3.6	.80	.00*
Abortion	1.1	1.2	1.1	.31	.56
School Prayer	2.0	2.6	2.2	.01*	.38

* = $p \leq .05$

mine if feminist women are more sympathetic to the disadvantaged than men because of their femaleness or because of their political ideology.

Finally, we can turn to the question of the gender gap in issue preferences. Earlier it was discovered that a feminist identity is associated with a distinctive pattern of issue preferences. This raises the possibility that the gender gap in issue preferences may be mainly due to the liberal policy positions of feminist women. This hypothesis is tested in table 5 where the policy preferences of men are compared to those of nonfeminist and feminist women.

---

ese two methods were compared to feminist women. Specifically, when feminist women were mpared to feminist men as identified by feeling thermometer ratings, the women still had a gnificantly higher level of sympathy for the disadvantaged. But, when the feminist women ere compared to feminist men as identified by the closeness measure, there were no significant differences in sympathy for the disadvantaged. Thus, even with indirect measures of femi ist men it is impossible to resolve this question at this time.

Previous research has demonstrated that consistently the largest gender gap is on foreign policy issues (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). With respect to such issues, nonfeminist women do not differ significantly from men with the exception of the issue of Central America In contrast again, feminists differ significantly from men on every foreign policy issue. Thus, in most cases, the sizable gender gap on foreign policy issues appears to be due to the antiwar, anti-involvement positions adopted by feminists

In the domestic policy realm, nonfeminist women differ significantly from men on issues affecting the old (e g., medicare and spending on older people) as well as spending on unemployment. Beyond that, however, the nonfeminist women resemble men in their spending preferences In contrast, on virtually every domestic policy issue feminists differ significantly from men, adopting on average more liberal positions than those of both men and nonfeminist women Only on social policies such as abortion and school prayer do feminists resemble men in their issue preferences Thus, both nonfeminist and feminist women contribute to the gender gap on domestic issues, but the contribution of the feminist women is by far the greater of the two Taken together, these findings on domestic and foreign policy issues suggest that the gender gap in policy preferences is only rarely due to widespread differences between men and women as a whole Instead, on most issues the gender gap in public opinion is a function of the liberal positions that a subset of women—feminists—consistently adopt

Conclusions

In recent years, a great deal of attention has been focused on the gender gap in electoral behavior The appearance of this gap has both intrigued and puzzled analysts In seeking to explain it, researchers stumbled upon an even more interesting gender gap, a gap between men and women in policy preferences Various explanations for the gap in policy preferences have been offered men and women are socialized differently, or, feminist consciousness has altered opinions Most such explanations share an underlying theme the idea that, for whatever reason, women have different values and priorities than men In effect, it is argued that there is a distinctive woman's perspective that shapes how women view politics

Our findings suggest that, in fact, men and women do not generally differ in their political values As a group, women are no more or no less egalitarian, individualistic, racist, or liberal than men Gender differences do exist however, in more basic value orientations Thus, women are more committed to fundamentalism than are men, and they have more positive feelings than men do toward the disadvantaged in society This finding is important because it provides preliminary evidence in support of the argument that there is a distinctive woman's perspective characterized by an ethic of caring

Yet, the lack of more pervasive value differences between men and women is puzzling and makes the growing gender gap in policy preferences difficult to explain. Feminist theorists provide a key to solving this empirical puzzle by positing that becoming a feminist may be a catalyst that helps women recognize their underlying "female" values [16] This argument suggests that it is essential to look at differences among women if we are to understand the origins of the gender gap

Accordingly, I investigated the manner in which a feminist identity influences women's values and policy preferences This identity proves to be strongly related to political values, to basic value orientations and ultimately to issue preferences These findings have implications for both our understanding of the gender gap and for feminist theory With respect to the gender gap, they suggest the possibility that there is not so much a gap between men and women as there is a gap between men and feminist women When ien are compared to feminist women there is a significant gender gap on very type of issue, however, on most foreign policy issues (where the gen- er gap is largest) and many domestic issues, this gap evaporates when men re compared to nonfeminist women In effect, a substantial part of the gen- ler gap can be attributed to the liberal issue positions adopted by feminist vomen Moreover, while it is not very surprising to find that feminist women re more liberal than men in general, it is startling to discover that there are nough feminists who are liberal enough to create almost on their own the ppearance of a widespread gender gap

With regard to feminist theory, the distinctiveness of feminists' values uggests several things First, it lends support to the argument that a femi- ist identity fosters the expression of a woman's perspective In particular, ur analysis reveals a gender gap in sympathy for the disadvantaged that is lue almost entirely to feminist women Thus, *if* there is an underlying voman's perspective that encompasses an ethic of caring, its expression is acilitated by a feminist identity Second, it is important to recognize that the listinctive policy preferences of feminists do not stem solely from a woman's alue perspective, instead, their issue positions are also shaped by a commit- nent to democratic political values as well as by a strong identification with he Democratic Party This finding provides empirical support for the theo- etical contention of Dietz (1985) and others (e g , Grimshaw, 1986, Eisen-

[16] It is of course possible that what feminist theorists have called a woman's perspective is in act, simply a *feminist* perspective This would provide an alternative explanation of why femi ists express the womans perspective while nonfeminist women do not Unfortunately testing he feminists' assertion that a womans perspective lies dormant in all women until uncovered n the process of becoming a feminist would be very difficult outside of an experimental setting)n the other hand, the fact that nonfeminist women also differ from men in some values issue preferences, and moral orientations (see Gilligan 1982) suggests both that the expression of a voman's perspective may not be solely dependent on the catalyst of a feminist identity and that a womans values are not simply a misnamed version of feminists values

stein, 1983) namely, that to be politically effective a feminist consciousness must embrace not only a woman's values but perhaps more importantly, democratic political values. Only when the two are combined do you arrive at a distinctive set of policy preferences which if pursued would substantially alter the political agenda.

Manuscript submitted 22 June 1987
Final manuscript received 28 March 1988

Appendix A
Description of Measures

I Feminist Identity

The self categorization question (V7329) was first reversed so that it ran from "never think of oneself as a feminist" to "think of oneself that way most of the time " Then it was multiplied by the feeling thermometer for feminists (V8121), and the resulting score was rescaled to a zero to one format

II Value Orientations

A Political Value Orientations

Egalitarianism—based on V8201, V8203, V8205, V8401, V8403, V8405 Items reversed where necessary, added, and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = 57 High scores equal high egalitarianism

Individualism—based on V8202, V8204, V8206, V8402, V8404, V8406 Items reversed where necessary, added, and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = 60 High scores indicate high individualism

Symbolic Racism—based on V8222, V8224, V8225, V8226 Items reversed where necessary, added, and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = 63 High scores indicate high symbolic racism

Liberal-Conservative Identification—V8211 rescaled to a zero to one format

B Basic Value Orientations

Moral Traditionalism—based on V7101, V7102, V7103, V8101, V8102 V8103, V8104, V8105 Items reversed where necessary, added, and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = 73 High scores indicate a high sense of moral traditionalism

Religious Fundamentalism—based on V5917, V5918, V5919 One point given for a response of "1" on V5918 and V5919, and a response of "3" on V5917 Points summed and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = 51. High scores indicate a strong sense of religious fundamentalism

Sex Roles—based on V447, V407, and V454. Items combined and rescaled

to a zero to one format. Coefficient alpha = .54 High scores indicate modern conceptions of sex roles

Sympathy for the Disadvantaged—feeling thermometers for the poor (V5219), people on welfare (V5228), and older people (V5222) were averaged and rescaled to a zero to one format Coefficient alpha = .72 High scores indicate very positive feelings for the disadvantaged

III Other Criterion Variables

Party Identification—V7110 rescaled to a zero to one format
Feeling thermometer for women—V8119
Feeling thermometer for the women's liberation movement—V5233
Feeling thermometer for the women's movement—V8116
Close to feminists—V5927
Closest to feminists—V5940
Interdependence with women—V7335
Importance of improving women's economic position—V733

IV Background Variables

Sex—V407
Age—V810
Education—V819
Income—V1119
Race—V1202

IV Issue Preferences

A Foreign Policy Issues

—Worry over Conventional War V444 (1–5)
—Worry over Nuclear War V445 (1–5)
—Involvement in Central America V830 (1–7) reversed
—Defense spending V727 (1–7)

B Domestic Policy Issues

—Spending on
Older people V7230 (1–3)
Social Security V5744 (1–3)
Medicare V5746 (1–3)
Food Stamps V5745 (1–3)
Unemployed V7238 (1–3)
Big Cities V7235 (1–3)
Women V7233 (1–3)

Child Care V7240 (1–3)
Affirmative action for women V7237 (1–3)
—Equal opportunity for blacks and whites. V7106 (1–5) reversed
—Guaranteed job and standard of living. V5839 (1–7)
—Abortion· V803 reversed (1–4)
—School prayer V5829 reversed (1–5)

References

Abzug, Bella, and M Kelber 1984 *Gender Gap* Boston Houghton Mifflin Co

Baxter, Sandra and Marjorie Lansing 1983 *Women and Politics The Visible Majority* 2d ed Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Berman, Marshall 1983 Feminism, Community, Freedom *Dissent*, 30 247–55

Burris, Val 1984 The Meaning of the Gender Gap A Comment on Goertzel *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 12 335–43

Carroll, Susan 1985 Gender Schema and Mass Politics A paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1985

Chodorow Nancy 1978 *The Reproduction of Mothering Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* Berkeley University of California Press

Conover, Pamela Johnston, Stanley Feldman 1986 Religion Morality and Politics Moral Traditionalism in the 1980s A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington DC, September 1986

Conover, Pamela Johnston and Virginia Gray 1983 *Feminism and the New Right Conflict Over the American Family* New York Praeger

Christenson, James A , and Riley E Dunlap 1984 Freedom and Equality in American Political Ideology Race and Gender Differences *Social Science Quarterly*, 65 861–67

Crosby Faye J 1982 *Relative Deprivation and Working Women* New York Oxford University Press

Daly, Mary 1984 *Pure Lust Elemental Feminist Philosophy* Boston Beacon Press

Dietz, Mary G 1985 Citizenship with a Feminist Face The Problem with Maternal Thinking *Political Theory*, 13 19–35

——— 1987 Context is All Feminism and Theories of Citizenship *Daedulus*, 116 1–24

Dinnerstein, Dorothy 1977 *The Mermaid and the Minotaur Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise* New York Harper and Row

Ehrenreich, Barbara 1983 On Feminism, Family and Community *Dissent*, 30 103–9

Eisenberg, Nancy, and Roger Lennon 1983 Sex Differences in Empathy and Related Capacities *Psychological Bulletin*, 94 100–31

Eisenstein, Hester 1983 *Contemporary Feminist Thought* Boston G K Hall & Co

Elshtain, Jean 1981 *Public Man Private Woman Women in Social and Political Thought* Oxford Princeton University Press

——— 1982 Feminism Family and Community *Dissent*, 29 442–49

Erskine, Hazel 1971 The Polls Womens Role *Public Opinion Quarterly* 35 275–90

Fiorina, Morris P 1981 *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Firestone, Shulamith 1970 *The Dialectic of Sex The Case for Feminist Revolution* New York Bantam Books

Frankovic, Kathleen 1982 Sex and Politics—New Alignments, Old Issues *PS*, 15 439–45

Friedan, Betty, and Midge Dector 1982 Are Women Different Today? *Public Opinion* (5)20, 41

Gilens, Martin 1988 Gender and Support for Reagan A Comprehensive Model of Presidential Approval *American Journal of Political Science*, 32 19–49

Gilligan, Carol 1982 *In a Different Voice Psychological Theories and Women's Development* Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press

Greeno, Catherine G , and Eleanor Maccoby 1986 How Different is the "Different Voice"? *Signs*, 11 310–16

Grimshaw, Jean 1986 *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* Minneapolis, MN University of Minnesota Press

Gurin, Patricia 1985 Women's Gender Consciousness *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49 143–63

Hartsock, Nancy C 1985 *Money, Sex and Power* Boston Northeastern University Press

Irigary, Luce 1981 This Sex Which is Not One In Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivson, eds , Claudia Reedev, trans , *New French Feminisms An Anthology* New York Schocken

Jaggar, Alison 1983 *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* Totawa NJ Rowman and Allanheld

Klein, Ethel 1984 *Gender Politics* Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press

——— 1985 The Gender Gap Different Issues, Different Answers *The Brookings Review* 3 33–37

Kristeva Julia 1981 Woman Can Never Be Defined Translated by Marilyn August In Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivson, eds , *New French Feminisms An Anthology* New York Schocken

Luria, Zella 1986 A Methodological Critique *Signs*, 11 317–25

Maccoby, Eleanor 1985 Social Groupings in Childhood Their Relationship to Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Boys and Girls In Dan Olwens, Jack Block and Marian Radke-Yarrow, eds , *Development of Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior Theories Research and Issues* San Diego Academic Press

Mansbridge, Jane J 1985 Myth and Reality The ERA and the Gender Gap in the 1980 Elections *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49 164–78

Massey, Marilyn Chapin 1985 *The Feminine Soul The Fate of an Ideal* Boston Beacon Press

Millett, Kate 1970 *Sexual Politics* Reprint New York Avon Books

Noddings, Nel 1984 *Caring A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* Berkeley University of California Press

Page Benjamin I , and Robert Y Shapiro 1983 Effects of Public Opinion on Policy *American Political Science Review* 77 175–90

Poole, Keith T , and L. Harmon Zeigler 1985 *Women Public Opinion and Politics* New York Longman

Rich Adrienne 1976 *Of Woman Born Motherhood as Experience and Institution* New York W W Norton

Rokeach Milton 1973 *The Nature of Human Values* New York Free Press

Ruddick, Sara 1980 Maternal Thinking *Feminist Studies* 6 342–67

——— 1984 Preservative Love and Military Destruction Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace In Joyce Trebilcot ed *Mothering Essays in Feminist Theory* Totowa NJ Rowman and Allanheld

Schneider, William 1984 Opinion Outlook The Democrats are Counting on the Gender Gap But it May Not be Much Help *National Journal* June 23 1242–43

Sears David O and Leonie Huddy 1987 Women as a Political Interest Group in the Mass Public In P Gurin and L Tilly, eds , *Women in Twentieth Century American Politics* New York Russell Sage Foundation forthcoming

Shapiro, Robert Y , and Harpreet Mahajan 1986 Gender Differences in Policy Preferences A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 42–61

Smeal, Eleanor 1984 *Why and How Women Will Elect the Next President* New York Harper and Row

Smith, Tom W 1984 The Polls Gender and Attitudes toward Violence *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 48 384–96

Stoper, Emily, and Roberta Ann Johnson 1977 The Weaker Sex and the Better Half The Idea of Womens Moral Superiority in the American Feminist Movement *Polity* 10 192–217

Tajfel, Henri 1981 *Human Groups and Social Categories* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Tolleson Rinehart, Sue 1985 Political Cognition and Political Style Differences in Male and Female Orientations to Politics A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 1985

Tronto, Joan 1987 Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care *Signs*, 12 644–63

Vaux, Alan 1985 Variations in Social Support Associated with Gender, Ethnicity and Age *Journal of Social Issues*, 41 89–110

Wassenberg, Pinky S , Kay G Wolsborn, Paul R Hagner, and John C Pierce 1983 Gender Differences in Political Conceptualization, 1956–1980 *American Politics Quarterly*, 11 181–204

Wirls, Donald 1986 Reinterpreting the Gender Gap *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 50 316–30

Pamela Johnston Conover is associate professor of political science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514

The Puzzle of Midterm Loss

Robert S. Erikson
University of Houston

This paper examines midterm election results since 1902, in order to account for the regularity with which the party controlling the presidency suffers an electoral decline at midterm. Standard interpretations account for midterm loss in terms of withdrawn presidential coattails (or regression-to-the-mean), surge-and-decline, or a negative referendum on presidential performance. None of these explanations is compatible with the historical data. A "presidential penalty" explanation, however, fits the data nicely. By this explanation, the midterm electorate penalized the president's party for being the party in power: holding constant the presidential year House vote, the president's party does much worse at midterm than it would if it did not control the presidency. Some implications of this finding are examined.

In midterm elections, the president's party almost always suffers a decline in its share of the congressional vote and a net loss of House seats. The congressional elections literature has had considerable success at accounting for variation in the *size* of this midterm slump—based on variables like presidential popularity, economic conditions, and the strength of the withdrawn presidential coattails (Tufte, 1975, 1978; Hibbs, 1982; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; J. E. Campbell, 1985; Oppenheimer, Stimson and Waterman 1986; Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986; Born 1986). Yet this growing literature has added more confusion than clarity regarding the question that motivated the study of midterm elections in the first place: namely, why does the president's party lose seats at midterm instead of gaining or maybe holding its own?

Any satisfactory explanation of midterm loss must take into account that the phenomenon is more than a mere *tendency*. Midterm loss is an almost invariable historical *regularity*. In terms of seats, the one recorded midterm gain for the presidential party was the Democratic gain of 1934. Even this instance of a seat gain was accompanied by a slight vote loss for the president's party. In terms of votes, the twentieth century shows but one very modest instance, in 1926, of midterm gain by the presidential party.[1]

This paper has benefited from comments from several scholars. Special thanks are due James Campbell, Kathleen Knight, Bruce Oppenheimer, Marianne Stewart, and Gerald C. Wright.

[1] As Niemi and Fett (1986) show, different accounts of the historical time series of the national two-party vote vary somewhat. This paper uses what Niemi and Fett call the Stokes-Iverson

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

Explanations of Midterm Loss

By definition, midterm loss regularly occurs because the vote share for the president's party almost always declines between the presidential election year and midterm. This regular vote loss could be the natural drop following an abnormally *high* vote for the winning presidential party in the previous *presidential* year. Or, the drop could result from an abnormally *low* vote for the president's party in the *midterm* year. Congressional election scholars disagree on which version of the story is correct, even though the matter seemingly could be settled by a careful examination of the historical record. To complicate matters further, each version comes in two distinguishable forms, so that we have four competing explanations for midterm loss.

The simplest and perhaps the most naive explanation for midterm loss would be the possibility that electorates are biased or predisposed to vote against the presidential party, regardless of the objective circumstance. This possibility can be labelled the "presidential penalty" explanation for midterm loss. But this notion of the midterm electorate punishing the presidential party solely for being the party in power has not appealed to all scholarly tastes. Political scientists have introduced several plausible theories that might account for midterm loss without requiring the awkward baggage of a punitive electorate. Below, I attempt to revive the case for the "presidential penalty" explanation. But first, let us consider the more popular alternatives.

Midterm Loss as Regression to the Mean. One prevalent way of explaining midterm loss is in terms of the midterm withdrawal of presidential coattails. The stronger the presidential victory margin (Hinckley, 1967; J. E. Campbell, 1985) or the more seats won in the presidential year and therefore "at risk" (Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman, 1986), the greater will be the subsequent midterm seat loss. Although it is rarely stated as such (one exception is Kiewiet and Rivers, 1985, pp. 211–12), this explanation in terms of withdrawn coattails is an example of statistical "regression to the mean"—the same phenomenon which causes students who perform well on midterm exams to do more poorly on the final exam (D. T. Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

The coattails or "regression to the mean" explanation supposedly works as follows. Helped by presidential coattails, the winning presidential party does better than usual in the on-year House election. For the following off year, the presidential party's expectation is only an average outcome, so its vote share is likely to decline from its on-year high.

---

time series, first reported in Stokes and Iverson (1966). This is the same time series reported in Ornstein et al. (1982, pp. 38–39) and in the various *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*. For recent elections the vote for Washington, DC delegate must be excluded from the *Statistical Abstract* computations.

Midterm Loss as Surge and Decline Angus Campbell's (1966) theory of "surge and decline" takes the withdrawn coattails argument one step further "Surge and decline" posits a basic difference between on-year and off-year election outcomes. With even peripheral voters stimulated by the presidential race, on-year congressional election outcomes surge in favor of the victorious presidential party In contrast, off-year midterm elections are "low-stimulus" affairs, largely decided by core partisan voters voting for their party's ticket The midterm outcome therefore is something close to the "normal vote" of about 54% Democratic, 46% Republican

"Surge and decline's" notion of a stable normal vote at midterm would handily account for midterm loss With the vote for the president's party returning predictably to normal following the on-year surge, the net change is a decrease in the fortunes of the presidential party

Midterm Loss as a Referendum on Presidential Performance Rather than inflated support in the presidential election year, the source of midterm loss could be abnormally low voter support for the in-party at midterm The possibility of the "presidential penalty" explanation has already been mentioned But poor midterm support for the president's party does not necessarily require that the electorate is motivated to penalize the presidential party under all circumstances Conceivably, the midterm electorate punishes the president's party only when the president performs poorly or at least is perceived to do so Thus, another explanation of midterm loss attributes the midterm verdict as a negative "referendum" on poor presidential performance

Recent research shows economic conditions and presidential popularity to be important predictors of the size of midterm loss (Tufte, 1975, 1978, Born, 1986) Thus, midterm election outcomes contain a referendum component To the extent that presidents are unpopular and the economy is slumping at midterm, the "referendum" explanation could account for midterm loss

Midterm Loss as a Presidential Penalty To these three possible explanations of midterm loss we can add a fourth, which was introduced above the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate If midterm electorates punish the presidential party for being the party in power, this would handily account for midterm loss But why would midterm electorates behave in such a manner?

One reason for a "presidential penalty" could be a general propensity toward "negative voting" that has been observed in several survey analyses of the midterm electorate At midterm, citizens are more likely to vote when they hold negative views of the president And when citizens vote at midterm, they respond more to negative cues than to positive cues regarding

presidential performance (Kernell, 1977, Lau, 1985; but see Cover, 1986) A midterm electorate that is particularly responsive to negative cues would give the appearance of punishing the presidential party rather harshly, as if it held the in-party to extremely high expectations. The skewed result would be the appearance of a "protest vote," even when the electorate as a whole has little to protest.

A "presidential penalty" at midterm could also be the result of the electorate's rational calculation instead of negative voting. Suppose that a significant share of midterm voters see themselves as in between the Republican and the Democratic positions on policy issues On policy grounds, such voters would prefer split partisan control of the presidency and Congress to either party controlling both To create a balance of power between the two parties, these voters would be motivated to oppose the presidential party at midterm

This simple "balance" theory receives little or no discussion in the literature on congressional elections However, a similar "balance" theory is familiar to students of Canadian politics, as an explanation of why the ruling party at the national level generally suffers in provincial elections (Underhill 1955, Wrong, 1957, but see Scarrow, 1960) For American elections, Fiorina (1988) offers a relevant speculation to account for the declining coattails in presidential years Fiorina suggests that when American parties differ ideologically from one another, voters in the middle will split their presidential congressional tickets as an ideological hedge It is an easy step to carry Fiorina's argument forward to midterm elections, when the party controlling the presidency is known in advance That is, according to the balance theory the midterm electorate gives what seems like an excessive share of its vote to the "out" party as a moderating corrective to the ideological excesses of the presidential party

In sum, a "presidential penalty" explanation for midterm loss has more theoretical support than one might suppose The midterm electorate's penalizing of the "in" party is the expectation from both the theory of "negative voting" and a simple "balance" theory of midterm elections. This explanation does not depend on the regularity of withdrawn coattails, "surge and decline," or the exact political circumstances of midterm years But is the "presidential penalty" explanation correct? The answer to that question depends on the analysis of national election returns

Midterm Loss and the On-Year Off-Year Vote Scatterplot


Consider a scatterplot, where the vertical axis represents the Democratic percent of the national vote at midterm and the horizontal axis represents the Democratic percent of the vote in the previous presidential year Consider also a diagonal line, representing the values at which the presidential (or on-) year vote and the midterm (or off-) year vote divisions are identical

iven midterm loss, observations are below this line under Democratic residents (Democratic loss) but above this line under Republican presients (Democratic gain)

Accounting for midterm loss can be understood as identifying the process hat produces a scatterplot with cases below the diagonal line under Demoratic presidents but above it under Republican presidents Each of the four ossible explanations of midterm loss implies a particular pattern to the off-

FIGURE 1

FOUR MODELS OF MIDTERM LOSS



year on-year scatterplot, so it should not be difficult to determine which explanation is correct. Let us now consider the four possible explanations for midterm loss once again, to see how each might produce the required scatterplot of the off-year on-year vote—below the diagonal under Democratic presidents and above under Republican presidents. The predicted scatterplots from these explanations are shown, in stylized form, in figure 1.

Regression to the Mean. The "regression to the mean" explanation involves strong coattails in presidential years that are withdrawn at midterm. The magnitude of any regression toward the mean depends mathematically on the size of the lagged effect of prior observations on current observations. To the extent that successive observations are statistically independent (the smaller the lagged effect), the greater will be the regression toward the mean. Here, let us consider the best scenario for "regression to the mean" as the explanation for midterm loss: the extreme case of totally independent observations, whereby on-year results are uncorrelated with the next off-year result. In other words, consider election outcomes as the result of truly short-term forces that are independent of the short-term forces of the prior election.

Figure 1a shows an example of the on-year off-year scatterplot when there is no lagged effect. In this example, the correlation between the off-year vote and on-year vote is zero, with the same standard deviation for the on-year and for the off-year vote. Here, most of the hypothetical cases show midterm loss. But the difficulty is that there are so many exceptions. Mathematically it can be shown that even with independent time 1 and time 2 scores and a constant standard deviation, the time 2 score will regress toward the mean (i.e., be on the meanward side of the time 1 score) only 75% of the time. Thus, "regression to the mean" may be unable to account for the overwhelming regularity of midterm loss.

Surge and Decline. With "surge and decline," the off-year on-year scatterplot would be something like figure 1b—a fluctuating on-year vote and a stable, normal, off-year vote. "Surge and decline" presents the image of national congressional election results that are close to "normal" in midterm years but bounce about for presidential years. This implies that the standard deviation of the national congressional two-party vote would be considerably larger for presidential years than for midterms. As Jacobson and Kernell (1983, p. 63) point out, however, this image is decidedly incorrect. Jacobson and Kernell report the standard deviation of the congressional vote to be 4.9 percentage points for midterms from 1946 to 1978 and 2.4 percentage

[3] *Proof.* Assume independent samples of time 1 and time 2 scores, each with mean 0 and variance 1. Half the cases will have time 2 scores in the same direction from the mean as their time 1 scores. Of these, half (or one-quarter overall) will have a time 2 score more extreme than the time 1 score.

ınts for presidential years from 1944 to 1980 Thus, contrary to "surge and ›clıne," the national congressıonal vote actually ıs more volatıle ın mıdterm ;ars than in presidentıal years! Since midterm outcomes are not predictable ·turns to normal followıng presıdentıal year surges, we probably need to ok elsewhere to understand mıdterm loss

Referendum on Presıdential Performance. Suppose mıdterm loss repre·nts the electorate's negatıve reactıon to unsuccessful or unpopular presı·nts Could poor presıdentıal performance at mıdterm, as measured by ad;rse economıc condıtıons and low popularıty readıngs, be responsıble for ıe regularıty of mıdterm loss? If so, we would find presidents to be un)pular and the economy to be slıdıng at mıdterm, resultıng in the presı;nt's party beıng punished for poor performance

But are mıdterm readıngs of presıdentıal popularıty and economıc condıons unusually low? The evidence ıs mıxed Presıdentıal approval ratıngs are oticeably lower at mıdterm than at eıther early or late ın the president's ·rm (Stımson, 1976) Tufte (1978) suggests that late-term surges ın popu;rity may be the result of presıdents manıpulatıng the tımıng of busıness ·cles for maxımum polıtıcal advantage ın the presıdentıal year But ıf presıents do manıpulate the busıness cycle, they do not tıme the low points for ıdterm elections. Accordıng to Tufte (1978) mıdterm years actually tend to e more prosperous than odd-numbered, non-electıon, years

Wıth presıdentıal popularıty usually down but the economy usually lookıg up at mıdterm, a referendum explanatıon ıs a questıonable way to ac)unt for mıdterm loss Stıll, there ıs some evıdence that the electorate punhes the "ın" party wıth low support at mıdterm Based on seven recent lectıons, Jacobson and Kernell (1983) find that each party tends to do better ı mıdterm electıons when ıt does *not* control the presıdency

If mıdterm losses represent negatıve referendum verdıcts on presıdentıal erformance, how would thıs be reflected ın the on-year off-year scatterram? The result would have to be the appearance of a mıld penalty for eıng the party ın power Fıgure 1c shows one example Holdıng the on-year ote constant, each party tends to do worse when ıt controls the presıdency here would be no clear requırement for the slope predıctıng the off-year ote from the on-year vote, so figure 1c shows a mıddle-of-the-road slope of bout 50 The result ıs a scatterplot wıth most—but not all—electıon outomes showıng mıdterm loss.

Presıdentıal Penalty The explanatıon of a "presıdentıal penalty" of course lso ımplıes that the mıdterm electorate penalızes the presıdentıal party But nlike with negatıve mıdterm referendum verdıcts, the potentıal sıze of thıs -party penalty is not lımıted by the measurable range of presıdentıal rength and weakness If the mıdterm electorate punıshes the presıdentıal

party for the reason that it is the party in power, it would punish even the most popular and successful presidents at midterm.

Punitive voting could most clearly account for midterm loss if the presidential penalty is accompanied by a steep slope predicting the off-year vote from the on-year vote. Figure 1d shows a midterm verdict about the same as the previous on-year verdict—except for the inevitable penalty for the president's party. When the Democrats control the presidency, the midterm Democratic vote is the prior on-year vote minus the Democrats' presidential penalty. When the Democrats are out of power, the midterm Democratic vote is the prior on-year vote plus the Democrats' gain from the Republicans' presidential penalty. In every instance, the in-party loses strength at midterm.

The Data 1946–1986

Analyses of midterm elections typically restrict their data base to post-WWII elections. One reason is that monthly economic data first became available in time for the 1946 election. A more important reason for our purposes is that the post-WWII period supposedly is one of stable equilibrium with a fairly constant normal vote. Therefore, our first glance at the data is for the eleven post-WWII midterm elections, 1946–1986.

Figure 2 shows the actual scatterplot, predicting the midterm Democratic vote from the Democratic vote in the prior presidential election. The figure shows parallel, but distinctly separate slopes for Republican and Democratic administrations—as if the same on-year outcome leads to a party getting almost nine percentage points more of the vote when out of power than when it is in power. The separate vote-on-vote slopes for Democratic and Republican administrations are quite steep—above 1.00. The fit of the cases around the slopes is snug, but with room for variables not taken into account to also do their work. The exact equation for the scatterplot is


$$\begin{aligned}\text{Midterm vote}_t = &-4.92 \\ &(16.66) \\ &+1.17 \times \text{Presyear vote}_{t-2} \\ &(0.32) \\ &-8.78 \times \text{Party} \\ &(1.54)\end{aligned} \qquad (1)$$

$$N = 11, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .75, \quad SEE = 1.78,$$

where Midterm vote$_t$ is the Democratic percentage of the midterm vote in year t; Presyear vote$_{t-2}$ is the Democratic percentage of the House vote in the previous presidential year two years earlier, and Party is a dummy vari-

Figure 2

Midterm Vote by Presidential Year Vote, 1946–1986



ible, 1 if a Democratic president at midterm and 0 if a Republican president at midterm. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Figure 2 provides a clear victor in the contest to explain midterm loss. Of the four hypothetical scatterplots introduced above, the actual scatterplot clearly fits the pattern of a presidential penalty. That is, national electorates give about the same two-party vote division in the off-year as they had in the prior on-year, except for strongly penalizing the in-party and reward the out-party. Consistently, with the House vote in the previous presidential year held constant, the president's party loses almost 9% of the midterm vote that it would have won if it did not control the presidency.

Not only does the "presidential penalty" explanation fit the data, all other explanations clearly fail the empirical test. Consider first the fate of "regression to the mean." According to the "regression" or "coattails" argument, midterm loss results when strong on-year showings by the winning presi-

dential party are followed by more normal on-year results. The strongest presidential year triumphs should be followed by the greatest falls. But contrary to this expectation, the data show no tendency for the strongest on-year showings to be followed by the greatest midterm loss Actually, the off-year vote is strongly responsive to the on-year vote In fact the slope of greater than 1.00 suggests that the strongest on-year vote outcomes are followed by the *least* off-year losses If it were not for the presidential penalty, presidential parties would actually *gain* slightly at midterm. For whatever reason there exists no on-year to off-year regression to the mean

"Surge and decline" fares no better "Surge and decline" fails not only because the off-year vote is so strongly determined by the previous on-year vote, but also because midterm outcomes vary so much As Jacobson and Kernell were the first to point out, midterm verdicts are even more variable than House election results in presidential years

The "referendum" explanation also fails The size of the penalty given the presidential party is far too large and far too regular to attribute to a pattern of persistently adverse circumstances for presidents at midterm To see why consider the answer to the following question How strong must the president's popularity and the economy be in order for the president's party to overcome the penalty for being the presidential party?

Born's (1986) recent update of the Tufte model for 1946–1982 shows coefficients of + 086 for presidential approval and + 692 for percentagized income change We can interpret these coefficients to mean that a ten percentage point increase in presidential approval adds almost one percentage point to the administrative party's vote while a 1% annualized gain in per capita income means about seven-tenths of a percentage point gain

How much of an increase in presidential approval or income gain would be enough to void the in-party penalty of about nine percentage points? Clearly the thresholds are in the impossible range A fifty percentage point increase in presidential approval would only gain 4 3% of the vote (086 × 50) Similarly, a "record" 6% increase in annual income would only add an additional 4 2% of the vote (692 × 6) over what a no-growth economy would provide Extrapolating, even the combination of near universal presidential popularity plus unreachable levels of economic growth would not allow the president's party to attain the same degree of midterm support as it would get if it were out of power[1] In sum, the electorate's imposition of an in-party penalty on the presidential party at midterm is as if the electorate imposes standards of performance on the president's party that are so high as to be impossible

[1]This updated equation is based on Tufte's specification of change in annual income from one year to the next Other specifications of the time interval have been suggested based on quarterly data (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983 Born, 1986) Also, the discussion above of how prior voting should be placed in the regression model implies that Tufte's (and others') control for the "standardized" past vote is the inappropriate specification However it is not necessary to consider these side-issues here


to fulfill. Put another way, no matter how popular or successful, the president's party gets fewer votes at midterm than it would if it had not won the presidency

THE DATA: 1902–1986

Of course one must be cautious about making bold claims based on only eleven electoral observations Despite the comfort of small standard errors for the coefficients of equation 1 (indicating significance at .01 or better), one might still consider the possibility that the configuration of eleven observations in figure 2 is nothing more than a chance occurrence Fortunately, however, there is no compelling reason to stop with eleven cases There is no reason why the "presidential penalty" explanation must depend on the presence of a stable normal vote or party alignment Therefore, the presidential penalty explanation can be put to an additional test by doubling the number of cases to consider all twenty-two midterms of the twentieth century, from 1902 through 1986

FIGURE 3

MIDTERM VOTE BY PRESIDENTIAL YEAR VOTE 1902–1986



$$
\begin{aligned}
&+0.06 \times \text{Midterm vote}_{t-4}\\
&\;(0.17)\\
&-7.28 \times \text{Party}\\
&\;(1.57)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .70, \quad SEE = 2.47$$

Adding the presidential year results six years earlier

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Midterm vote}_t = {} & 4.43\\
& (7.36)\\
& +0.91 \times \text{Presyear vote}_{t-2}\\
& \;(0.18)\\
& +0.02 \times \text{Midterm vote}_{t-4}\\
& \;(0.20)\\
& +0.05 \times \text{Presyear vote}_{t-6}\\
& \;(0.13)\\
& -7.45 \times \text{Party}\\
& \;(1.66)
\end{aligned}
\tag{4}
$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .68, \quad SEE = 2.53$$

Inserting the eight-year average, or "standardized" vote

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Midterm vote}_t = {} & 2.65\\
& (9.28)\\
& +0.90 \times \text{Presyear vote}_{t-2}\\
& \;(0.15)\\
& +0.11 \times \text{Standardized vote}_{(t-16 \ldots t-2)}\\
& \;(0.21)\\
& -7.25 \times \text{Party}\\
& \;(1.58)
\end{aligned}
\tag{5}
$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .70, \quad SEE = 2.46.$$

The evidence could not be clearer. Election results four and six years earlier have no predictive power and their inclusion in the equation actually causes the adjust R^2 to decline from the .71 of equation 2's simpler model. Adding the average of the prior eight elections (equation 5) also causes the adjusted R^2 to drop. Only the vote in the immediately prior presidential election and the party in power are useful as predictors of the midterm verdict.

The implication is important. The last on-year House election result—not some semi-static normal vote—is what is important for predicting the next

midterm verdict. Put another way, changes in the congressional vote are not short-lived phenomena but rather carry forward to the future. At least this is the case between presidential and midterm years.

Predicting Presidential Year Outcomes from Midterm Verdicts

The surprising results when we predict midterm results from presidential year results provide strong reason to examine the other side of the process predicting the congressional vote in presidential years from the prior midterm vote, plus the usual dummy variable for the party controlling the presidency. This equation, for elections 1900–1984, is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Presyear vote}_t = {} & \underset{(11.75)}{11.88} \\ & + \underset{(0.23)}{0.76} \times \text{Midterm vote}_{t-2} \\ & + \underset{(1.98)}{0.89} \times \text{Party} \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .30 \quad SEE = 4.62$$

Note that when we switch the dependent variable to be the congressional vote in presidential years, the party-in-power dummy variable has a negligible coefficient. The president's party therefore does not gain back in the next presidential year what it lost at midterm. Instead, the midterm in-party penalty carries forward to the next presidential year.[5]

Therefore, being the party in power hurts in presidential years as well as at midterm. We can see this directly from the equation predicting the presidential year House vote from the House vote in the previous *presidential* year plus the party control dummy.

[5]The coefficients of equation 6 help solve two minor puzzles. First, if the slope predicting the next election result from the previous election result is about 1.0, as it is for the equation predicting the midterm vote, then over time the variance of the vote division must keep increasing. (The variance would equal the previous variance plus the error variance.) Ever-increasing variance is avoided because the slope of about 1.0 for the midterm equation is balanced by a slope of .76 for the presidential year equation.

A second minor puzzle is why the variance of the vote division is actually greater for midterms than for presidential years, so contrary to the prediction of "surge and decline." Equation 6 reveals why. The predicted presidential year vote divisions are relatively compact, due to both the relatively low coefficient for the midterm vote and the negligible coefficient for the party term.

Still, as indicated from the standard error of estimate for equation 6, the *unexplained* variance for presidential years remains relatively high. But much of this variance that is unexplained by the previous vote can be accounted for by the vote for president. Including the presidential vote division in the right-hand side of the equation reduces the standard error of estimate to 2.37, slightly lower than for midterms.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Presyear vote}_t = {} & \underset{(12.47)}{11.42} \\ & + \underset{(0.26)}{0.83} \times \text{Presyear vote}_{t-4} \\ & - \underset{(2.86)}{5.68} \times \text{Party} \end{aligned} \qquad (7)$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .28, \quad SEE = 4.70.$$

With the in-party penalty of about six points in presidential years, we would expect the president's party generally to decline in its share of the vote from the year of the presidential victory to the next presidential year. Over the twenty-two, four-year intervals between presidential election years of the twentieth century, the administration party has lost congressional vote strength eighteen times and gained only four times (1904, 1936, 1948, and 1964).[6]

THE 'SEATS' EQUATION

So far, this paper has addressed the midterm loss only in terms of changes in the national two-party vote, but not in terms of seat changes. The reason for stressing votes instead of seats is that the vote division is the variable that voters affect directly. The seat division is determined by the vote division, via the swing ratio and its momentary aberrations (Ferejohn and Calvert 1984). Some scholars, however, prefer the seat division as the dependent variable on the grounds that seats and not votes determine policy (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984, Campbell, 1985, Oppenheimer et al., 1986). In consideration of this preference, I briefly explore the parallel equation and its scatterplot, predicting the midterm two-party *seat* division from the prior on-year two-party *seat* division.

In terms of seats, the relevant equation for 1904–1986 is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Midterm seats}_t = {} & \underset{(6.89)}{19.10} \\ & + \underset{(0.14)}{0.76} \times \text{Presyear seats}_{t-2} \\ & - \underset{(3.50)}{11.42} \times \text{Party} \end{aligned} \qquad (8)$$

$$N = 22, \quad \bar{R}^2 = .56, \quad SEE = 5.72.$$

[6] As for midterms, the presidential year House vote does not appear to be directly affected by previous House voting except for the immediately preceding election. With the presidential vote, the party in power, and the prior midterm vote all on the right-hand side of the equation predicting the presidential year House vote, adding the House vote for earlier elections lowers rather than raises the adjusted R squared.

Figure 4 presents the scattergram. The results essentially mirror the picture in terms of votes but with some slight differences. The relatively low R^2 and standard error of estimate reveal that seat divisions are less predictable than the vote division. In terms of seats, the slope predicting the off-year division from the on-year division is less than unity, but still a hefty .76. Of greatest interest is the size of the in-party penalty. In terms of seats instead of votes, the in-party penalty increases to a whopping 11.5%—which translates into about 50 seats. The interpretation of course is the same as from an analysis of votes. The presidential party loses seats (as it does votes) because the electorate exacts a strong penalty on the party controlling the presidency for being the party in power.[7]

The Presidential Penalty: A Discussion

The electorate's punishment of the presidential party at midterm bears some kinship to the tendency of the electorate to withdraw its support for sitting presidents. The usual downward slide of presidential popularity suggests a cycle of unrealistically high expectations about an incoming president followed by inevitable disillusionment (Stimson, 1976). But the presidential penalty at midterm appears to reflect more than voters' unhappiness with their president. Seemingly, even a president who maintains his initial high approval rating would see his party suffer greater electoral adversity at midterm than if his party were out of power.

The reason why the midterm electorate punishes the in-party so harshly is not immediately evident. Negative voting is one possibility, presenting the constant appearance at midterm of a "protest" vote. The presidential penalty could also be the calculated hedge by a rational electorate that chooses to balance off a president of one ideological persuasion with a Congress tilted in the opposite ideological direction.

The aggregate evidence regarding midterm elections cannot distinguish among these important nuances in the interpretation of the presidential penalty. Further analysis is required both of survey data and of aggregate data in other electoral contexts beyond that of the midterm election. For instance, do electorates tend to exact mischief on the party in power only from the safe haven of midterm elections, or is being the party in power a universal handicap in elections generally?

Conclusion

This article has been motivated by the familiar purpose of trying to account for why the president's party almost invariably suffers losses in mid-

[7] In terms of seats, the slope for the presidential year result is less than 1.0. This implies some regression to the mean and is consistent with Oppenheimer et al.'s (1986) seat equations interpreted in terms of "exposure." But as an explanation for midterm loss, this modest role for regression to the mean (or "exposure") in terms of seats is overwhelmed by the size of the incumbency penalty.

term House elections. The goal was to identify which explanation of midterm loss is compatible with the historical record. Despite their plausibility or theoretical charm, standard interpretations in terms of withdrawn coattails (or regression to the mean), surge and decline, or a negative referendum verdict on presidential performance are all incompatible with the empirical evidence from the historical time series On-year vote surges for the winning presidential party carry forward to midterm rather than fade with the withdrawal of coattails Midterm outcomes do not hover around a normal vote baseline. At midterm, the president's party always performs poorly—even when the president is popular and the economy is thriving The one explanation that does fit the data is that of a presidential penalty At every midterm, the electorate turns against the presidential party for being the party in power

Manuscript submitted 8 June 1987
Final manuscript received 12 February 1988

References

Abramowitz, Alan I Albert D Cover and Helmut Norpoth 1986 The President's Party in Midterm Elections Going from Bad to Worse *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 562–76

Born, Richard 1986 Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters *American Political Science Review* 80 599–612

Campbell Angus 1966 Surge and Decline A Study of Electoral Change In Angus Campbell Philip E Converse, Warren E Miller and Donald E Stokes eds *Elections and the Political Order* New York Wiley

Campbell Donald I and Julian C Stanley 1963 *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* Chicago Rand McNally

Campbell James E 1985 Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections *Journal of Politics* 47 1140–57

Cover, Albert D 1986 Presidential Evaluations and Voting for Congress *American Journal of Political Science* 30 786–801

Ferejohn John A and Randall L Calvert 1984 Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective *American Journal of Political Science* 28 127–46

Fiorina, Morris 1988 The Reagan Years Turning to the Right or Groping for the Middle? In Barry Cooper Allan Kornberg, and William Mishler, eds *The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies* Durham Duke University Press

Hibbs Douglas A Jr 1982 President Reagan's Mandate from 1980 Elections A Shift to the Right? *American Politics Quarterly* 10 387–420

Hinckley Barbara 1967 Interpreting House Midterm Elections Toward a Measurement of the In Party's 'Expected' Loss of Seats *American Political Science Review* 61 691–700

Jacobson, Gary C and Samuel Kernell 1983 *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Kiewiet, D Roderick, and Douglas Rivers 1985 A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting In Heinz Eulau and Michael S Lewis-Beck, eds , *Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes* New York Agathon Press

Kernell Samuel 1977 Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting *American Political Science Review*, 71 44–66

Lau, Richard R 1985 Two Explanations of Negativity Effects in Political Behavior *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 119–38

Lewis-Beck, Michael S , and Tom W Rice 1984 Forecasting U S House Elections *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 9 475–86

Niemi, Richard, and Patrick Fett 1986 The Swing Ratio An Explanation and an Assessment *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11 75–90

Oppenheimer, Bruce I , James A Stimson, and Richard W Waterman 1986 Interpreting U S Congressional Elections The Exposure Thesis *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11 227–47

Ornstein, Norman J , Thomas E Mann, Michael J Malbin and John E Bibby 1982 *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1982* Washington American Enterprise Institute

Scarrow, Howard A 1960 Federal-Provincial Voting Patterns in Canada *The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*, 26 289–98

Stimson, James A 1976 Public Support for American Presidents A Cyclical Model *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 40 1–21

Stokes, Donald E and Gudmund R Iverson 1966 On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition In Angus Campbell Philip E Converse Warren E Miller and Donald E Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* New York Wiley

Tufte, Edward R 1975 Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections *American Political Science Review* 69 812–26

——— 1978 *Political Control of the Economy* Princeton Princeton University Press

Underhill, Frank H 1955 Canadian Liberal Democracy in 1955 In G F Ferguson and Frank H Underhill *Press and Party in Canada* Toronto Ryerson

Wrong, Dennis 1957 The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 252–64

Robert S Erikson is professor of political science University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004

Research Notes P

The Limits to Citizen Participation in Local Education: A Cognitive Interpretation

John M. Bolland
University of Alabama
Kent D. Redfield
Sangamon State University

The ineffectiveness of citizen participation in local education, commonly attributed to an "information gap" between citizens and administrators, may be exacerbated by the inability of citizens to develop a common cognitive model of local education and educational issues. An analysis of the cognitive models of educational administrators, teachers, citizens, and school board members in two communities supports this explanation and suggests the need for an alternative model of educational governance.

The citizen's role in government has generated considerable literature in political theory and in practical politics. Theoretical concern centers on the citizen's responsibility to participate (e.g., Rousseau, 1968), as well as his or her ability to participate responsibly (e.g., Wallas, 1962). Practical concern centers on the effectiveness of grass-roots organizing strategies (e.g., Boyte, 1980). Bridging the gap is a growing interest in the responsibility of government to invite citizen participation, as well as its openness to citizen input. Recent research on policy and administration, particularly in public education, has focused on this issue. Most notably, Zeigler and his colleagues found that even school board members usually have little or no effective voice in the policy development process (Zeigler and Jennings, 1974; Zeigler and Tucker, 1981; Tucker and Zeigler, 1980).

They explained this phenomenon in terms of the information gap separating professional administrators and the lay governing body. We develop a

We wish to thank Rodney Muth, Philip Coulter, Kathleen Bolland, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft. We also thank William Gore, who worked with us on this project and was instrumental in the development of the methodology. The Chillicothe study was supported by the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University, the Port Angeles study by the Division of Community and Organization Development at the University of Washington. A more complete description of our field sites, data collection procedures, and results is reported by Redfield, Bolland, Gore, and Foster (1981).

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

supplemental explanation: citizens, including school board members, hav diverse understandings of local education, which disadvantages them i their dealings with educational administrators, who have a much more un fied understanding of local education. Specifically, we develop two hypothe ses concerning the similarity of these understandings among and betwee citizens, board members, teachers, and administrators We test these hy potheses with data collected from two school districts.

Citizen Participation in Education

In recent years, many governmental units have demonstrated their open ness to public input by instituting citizen advisory committees These ve hicles for public participation have become quite popular and widespread with estimates of more than one million participants *in education alon* (Davies, 1980) This, coupled with the governing power given to schoo boards, should give citizens considerable input into the educational polic process

From a practical perspective, however, citizen participation has been in effective in shaping public policy The urban reform movement, with its de lineation between policy and administration, has led to an absolute declin of the power of the citizen This separation admirably achieved its goal o insulating the administration of governmental programs from the corruptin influence of politics (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967)

The separation between policy and administration was even more success ful in public education, where it was intended to keep politics out of th schools (Zeigler and Jennings, 1974) However, the great power and authorit concentrated in the superintendent's office (Salisbury, 1980) served to exac erbate the professionalization and specialization inherent in the policy administration split This resulted in an information gap between educa tional administrators and the public The part-time school board, whose members may have limited experience, must depend on the administrativ staff for the information and expertise it needs to interpret events and de velop policy And the typical citizen, lacking this formal access to expertis and information, is at a severe disadvantage in educational politics (e g Wirt and Kirst, 1972, Morgan, 1987) Zeigler and Tucker (1981) conclude that district superintendents are accorded greater deference than any othe governmental administrators, which Tucker and Zeigler (1980) argued lea to relative impotence for most school boards, and we would add, complet impotence for most citizens [1]

[1]For an alternative view of the superintendent under public siege, see McCarty and Ram (1971)

Cognitive Conflict Among Educational Participants

Beyond information and expertise, administrators also share a common cognitive model of local education, providing them with additional advantage over the public in the policy process. An individual's cognitive model reflects his or her understanding of the relationships between organizing concepts and specific exemplars and attributes within a given cognitive domain (e.g., Scott et al., 1979).[2] Within the domain of local education, concepts might derive from routine activities performed within the school district (e.g., teaching basic skills, curriculum development). Also within this domain, exemplars might include district personnel, programmatic resources they use to perform the activities (e.g., libraries) and organizational units affecting or affected by the activities (e.g., P.T.A.).

An individual's cognitive model generates expectations about local education. Based on this model, an individual expects certain outcomes if teachers demand a greater voice in curriculum development. He or she knows what to expect if the P.T.A. volunteers to campaign for a school levy, or what is meant when basic educational skills are discussed. Herein lies a difficulty, however, for individuals' cognitive models are born of their own unique experiences. Thus, when two people discuss basic educational skills or curriculum development, they bring to that discussion their own unique meanings for, interpretations of, and expectations about those activities. And those unique interpretations may preclude consensus about school district goals and policies. For example, Kuhlman, Miller and Gungor (1973) showed that individuals with different cognitive models have difficulty reaching a common solution to a problem, since they begin with different premises about the problem. Additionally, Bolland (1977) showed that people with different cognitive models evaluate educational activities in different ways. Finally, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) showed that even if a common problem *solution* is reached by people with diverse cognitive models, consensus will disintegrate during implementation of the solution, as participants discover their previously-masked differences.

Thus, we differentiate cognitive conflict (growing out of different cognitive interpretations) from value conflict (growing out of different desired outcomes). A number of writers (e.g., Coser, 1956; Madison, 1966) have con-

[2]We might have referred to these cognitive representations as schemata (e.g., Taylor and Crocker, 1981), cognitive maps (e.g., Neisser, 1976) or personal constructs (e.g., Kelly, 1955). Each of these theories makes rather restrictive assumptions about cognitive structure (e.g., schema theory assumes hierarchical structure), however. Rather than commit ourselves to one or another of these structural assumptions, we opt for the more generic term "cognitive models." Thus, we indicate organized knowledge without implying anything about the exact nature of that organization.

cluded that value conflict serves a number of useful social functions (e g protection of minority rights) and that it can be resolved through compr mise In contrast, cognitive conflict is dysfunctional in that it is not amenal to compromise or other forms of resolution. people find it difficult to chan their understandings (e.g., Festinger, 1957) In turn, the inability to achie cognitive consensus may preclude value consensus.

Some cognitive conflict is inevitable, since different people have differe experiences As cognitive similarity increases, however, greater consens about problem definition is possible, in turn, the way in which a problem initially defined constrains the policies that are developed to ameliorate (Kingdon, 1984, Dery, 1984) In education, administrators' ability to gene ate cognitive consensus places great power in their hands. For example, sume that educational administrators in a school district share a comm cognitive model of local education, and that teachers, citizens, and sch board members do not Administrators can achieve both a consensual pro lem definition and a consensual solution But the school board or a citiz advisory committee that cannot reach a common problem definition will unable to agree to a solution, as a result, it may adopt the problem definiti (and in turn, the preferred solution) of administrators, perhaps rationaliz that administrators have greater experience and access to information Th explanation is consistent with Tucker and Zeigler (1980) But we suggest th deference based on an information gap occurs only if educational adm istrators share a common cognitive model of local education *and* the defere tial group (e g , school board members, citizens, teachers) does not

Several factors lead us to hypothesize that educational administrators ha a common cognitive model of local education. First, most have a comm education (i e , a bachelor's degree in teacher education, an advanced educ tional degree) Second, most have taught in the district and have an und standing of its intricacies Third, all have been socialized as professional ed cators and have accepted occupational norms Finally, administrators a required by their positions to take a broad view of local educational issu again contributing to their common perspective

In contrast, most classroom teachers do not share enough experienc to develop a common understanding of local education, and we hypoth size that their cognitive models diverge Although most have a comm education, the demands of their jobs vary according to grade level a subject matter, this leads them to develop idiosyncratic cognitive mode reflecting their individual interests and teaching philosophies. We also h pothesize that citizens (including members of advisory committees), w have neither a common education nor everyday contact with educatio issues, have divergent cognitive models of local education. Salisbury (19 found that advisory committee members often are chosen because of th diversity, guaranteeing cognitive as well as value conflict Neither the sh

terms of their appointments nor their infrequent interaction is sufficient to overcome diverse experiences and lead to the development of a shared cognitive model.

We further hypothesize that any common themes among the cognitive models of teachers are similar to those of administrators. Both groups share common educational experiences, providing them with a common core of beliefs. But over time, idiosyncratic experiences disrupt commonalities, particularly among teachers. Given the assumptions that (a) the remaining commonalities reflect this common core of beliefs, and (b) the beliefs of administrators are more similar than those of teachers, we conclude that teachers' cognitive models are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other teachers.[1] Communication between administrators and teachers concerning school district policy and protocol reinforces this similarity. We also hypothesize that any common themes found among citizens' cognitive models are similar to those of administrators. Contact with teachers, and local news accounts of education, provide citizens with a greater understanding of local education than they gain from either common experiences or from discussion with one another; both of these sources are influenced by administrators. When this understanding mixes with their own idiosyncratic experiences, it produces cognitive models that are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other citizens.

Hypotheses concerning school board members are more complicated, for they develop a common cognitive model only under favorable conditions. Unlike advisory committee members, board members do not see themselves as spokespersons for various segments of the community (Lipham, Gregg, and Rossmiller, 1969). This removes one impediment to their development of a common cognitive model. A second impediment is removed by their longer terms and their more frequent interaction. Under favorable conditions (i.e., a core of long-tenure board members), we hypothesize a common cognitive model of local education; under unfavorable conditions (i.e., new board members), we hypothesize divergent cognitive models. As noted in the following summary, the substance of these models also differs under favorable and unfavorable conditions.

Hypothesis 1. Educational administrators share a common cognitive model that is different from those of teachers or citizens.

A. The cognitive models of administrators are more similar than are those of teachers or citizens.

[1] We can mathematically state these assumptions as follows: (a) the cognitive models of administrators and teachers have a similar (if not identical) centroid, and (b) the variance around this centroid is greater for teachers than for administrators. Given these assumptions, the hypothesis follows mathematically. The same logic holds for the next hypothesis.

B. The cognitive models of teachers are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other teachers.
C. The cognitive models of citizens are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other citizens.
D. The cognitive models of administrators are more similar to those of other administrators than to those of either teachers or citizens.

Hypothesis 2. School board members' cognitive models of local education grow more similar as their tenure on the board increases.

A In districts with a core of long-tenured board members, the cognitive models of board members are indistinguishable from those of administrators and different from those of other citizens
B In districts without a core of long-tenured board members, the cognitive models of board members are indistinguishable from those of other citizens and different from those of administrators

Method

We tested these hypotheses with data from two cities Chillicothe, OH with a population of approximately 25,000 people and Port Angeles, WA with approximately 15,000 inhabitants [4] We identified respondents' cognitive models of local education using a card-sorting task in which they indicated the relevance of a number of educational exemplars (e g , elementary school teachers) to several educational activities (e.g , curriculum development) We developed our sample of activities and exemplars in consultation with administrators, teachers, board members, and citizens in each city In Chillicothe, we used 11 activities and 52 exemplars In Port Angeles, we used 9 activities and 46 exemplars [5]

During the interviews, respondents sorted exemplar cards into two categories for each educational activity; one category contained those exemplars that were highly relevant to the activity, the other those that were not We enforced no distributional patterns on the task After cards were sorted for each activity, we recorded responses and shuffled the cards to prevent order bias The typical interview lasted an hour In Chillicothe, we interviewed 38 people (15 administrators, 4 teachers, 5 school board members, and 14 other

[4]Our choice of Chillicothe and Port Angeles as field sites was largely governed by practical considerations (i e , proximity to Columbus and Seattle respectively) But we also employed several theoretical criteria First, neither city is part of an MSA so its politics are relatively independent Second, each city is sufficiently small so as to make data collection practical on a small budget Third, both cities had maintained relatively stable populations during the previous decade

[5]The complete list of activities and exemplars, as well as a description of the data transformation procedure, is available from the first author

citizens). In Port Angeles, we interviewed 71 people (16 administrators, 20 teachers, 5 school board members, and 30 other citizens).[6] In both cities, we sampled citizens from advisory committees, but we also included those identified as influential in educational policy during previously-conducted reputational studies in the cities (Bolland, 1979, Redfield and Gore, 1975).

We deviated from the typical *Q*-sort strategy of multiple categories and a forced quasi-normal distributional pattern to allow respondents to sort the exemplar cards for multiple activities in a limited amount of time. Bolland (1985) showed that this trade-off does not adversely affect information yield. It does, however, wreak havoc on the correlational model, which assumes both continuous and normally-distributed data. Instead, we analyzed data using a distribution-free statistical procedure developed by Bolland (1985).

For each city, we constructed a dissimilarity matrix *D*, with D_{ij} equal to the dissimilarity between respondent *i*'s and respondent *j*'s cognitive models of local education. *D* ranges between 0.0 and 2.0, with a value of 1.0 indicating randomness. As *D* approaches 2.0, systematic dissimilarity between *i*'s and *j*'s cognitive models of local education is indicated. As *D* approaches 0.0, systematic similarity between *i* and *j* is indicated.

Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we estimated a sampling distribution around the expected value of $D = 1.0$; this yielded a 95% confidence interval of $.72 < D < 1.28$. This interval provides the basis for testing the hypotheses; the cognitive models of *i* and *j* differ significantly from randomness and toward similarity if $D_{ij} < .72$. We calculated the overall similarity among respondents within any category (e.g., administrators) and between respondents in any two categories (e.g., administrators and citizens) as the percentage of the values of *D* falling below the confidence interval. We discuss this overall similarity measure as *S*.

Results

An analysis of *S* among and between administrators, teachers, citizens, and school board members supports the hypotheses (see table 1). As hypothesis 1 suggests, administrators clearly share a common cognitive model in both sites, with $S = .86$ in Chillicothe and $S = .76$ in Port Angeles.[7] Also as hypothesized, teachers' cognitive models differ from those of administrators, with $S = .67$ in Chillicothe and $S = .58$ in Port Angeles. Finally, the hy-

[6] The number of interviews we conducted in each city was limited by the level of funding we obtained for each project.

[7] In other words, 86% of the ½n(n − 1) pairs of administrators in Chillicothe and 76% of the pairs of administrators in Port Angeles had cognitive models of education that were more similar than would be expected by chance. The greater dissimilarity among the cognitive models of Port Angeles administrators may be due, in part, to the recent hiring of the school district superintendent from outside the district. His cognitive model did not reflect the idiosyncracies of the Port Angeles School District, and as a result it diverged from those of other administrators.

TABLE 1

CLUSTER ANALYSIS SOLUTIONS FOR AND SIMILARITIES (S) AMONG AND BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS

	Chillicothe			
	Administrators	Teachers	Citizens	Board Members
Administrators	86[a]	67	77	89
Teachers		33	54	70
Citizens			57	80
Board Members				90
Clustered[b]	13	2	6	2
Unclustered	2	2	8	3
N	15	4	14	5
	Port Angeles			
	Administrators	Teachers	Citizens	Board Members
Administrators	78[a]	58	54	57
Teachers		57	50	43
Citizens			49	41
Board Members				50
Clustered[c]	13	7	12	1
Unclustered	3	13	18	4
N	16	20	30	5

[a]Values of S, as defined in the text

[b]Goodness of fit for the Chillicothe cluster solution: $r_{pb} = .54$

[c]Goodness of fit for the Port Angeles cluster solution: $r_{pb} = .49$

pothesized difference between the cognitive models of administrators and teachers is clear in Port Angeles, with $S = .54$; this difference is less clear in Chillicothe, however, with $S = .77$.

Hypothesis 1A receives support in both sites. In Chillicothe, the cognitive models of administrators are more similar than either those of teachers (Fisher's exact $p < .001$) or citizens ($X^2 = 18.53$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).[4] In Port Angeles, the same results hold for both teachers ($X^2 = 14.03$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$) and citizens ($X^2 = 31.64$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$). Hypotheses 1B and 1C

[4]In each of these analyses, interpersonal comparisons are the units of analysis. For example, to derive the first result, we set up a contingency table as follows:

	similar	not similar
administrator-administrator pairs	90	15
teacher-teacher pairs	4	8

Our focus on relationships violates the independence assumption of the chi square procedure, increasing the potential of a Type 1 error. Most of the results are quite significant, however, largely obviating this problem. Alternative parametric analyses, based on the raw values of S, yielded very similar results to those reported here.

receive only marginal support. In Chillicothe, the cognitive models of teachers are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other teachers (Fisher's exact $p = .01$), and the cognitive models of citizens are more similar to those of administrators than to those of other citizens ($X^2 = 11.40$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$). In Port Angeles, neither effect is statistically significant. Finally, hypothesis 1D is supported in both sites. In Chillicothe, the cognitive models of administrators are more similar to one another than to the cognitive models of either teachers ($X^2 = 7.19$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$) or citizens ($X^2 = 2.70$, $df = 1$, $p = .10$). In Port Angeles, the hypothesized effect holds for both teachers ($X^2 = 14.54$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$) and citizens ($X^2 = 22.55$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

We tested hypothesis 2 by comparing the school boards in Chillicothe and Port Angeles. In Chillicothe, the average tenure of the five board members was nearly four years, with two members having served for six years or longer and only one member having served for fewer than two years. In Port Angeles, the average tenure of board members was fewer than two years, with no member having served for longer than 3.5 years. The difference in the similarity among the cognitive models of board members in the two communities is clear, with $S = .90$ in Chillicothe and $S = .50$ in Port Angeles (Fisher's exact $p = .065$).

The Chillicothe data support hypothesis 2A. The difference between the cognitive models of board members and those of citizens is not as large as expected, with $S = .80$. But an analysis of within-group and between-group similarities shows board members and citizens to differ ($X^2 = 11.96$, $df = 2$, $p < .001$). This primarily reflects differential within-group similarity ($S = .90$ for board members, $S = .57$ for citizens). An analysis of board members and administrators shows little between-group difference ($X^2 = .60$, $df = 2$, $p \approx .75$), providing additional support for hypothesis 2A.

The Port Angeles data support hypothesis 2B. Administrators and board members differ ($X^2 = 11.43$, $df = 2$, $p < .001$), both between groups ($S = .57$) and within groups ($S = .78$ for administrators, $S = .50$ for board members). Also as hypothesized, board members are almost indistinguishable from citizens, with the between-group similarities ($S = .41$) comparable to those within each group ($X^2 = 3.10$, $df = 2$, $p = .25$).

A hierarchical cluster analysis (Johnson 1967) based on the values of D and using the median method, clarifies these findings. We found a good-fitting solution (as reflected by the point-biserial correlation between D and cluster membership, see Milligan, 1980) in each city, as reported in table 1. Each solution contains a single large cluster, consisting of people who shared a common conception of local education, and a number of non-clustered respondents. In both Chillicothe and Port Angeles, the results support the hypotheses. In Chillicothe, 87% of the administrators were clustered, compared with only 50% of the teachers, 43% of the citizens, and 40% of the

board members ($X^2 = 7.18$, $df = 3$, $p < .10$), the two clustered board members had each been on the board for at least six years, providing additional support for hypothesis 2. In Port Angeles, 81% of the administrators were contained in the cluster, compared with 54% of the teachers, 40% of the citizens, and 20% of the board members ($X^2 = 10.73$, $df = 3$, $p < .05$). Notably, the superintendent, recently hired from outside the district (see footnote 7), was unclustered. In addition, the only board member who was clustered had a tenure of more than three years.

Conclusions and Implications

We began by questioning the citizen's role in government, particularly in local education. Although a number of observers are encouraged about citizen participation in education (Cochran, Phelps, and Cochran, 1980, Cole and Cole, 1983, Davies, 1981), we are more pessimistic. Tucker and Zeigler's (1980) findings, for example, cast doubt on the ability of school boards to act independently from the superintendent. They noted that while many school board handbooks caution members to avoid involvement in administrative matters, none caution members to guard against the superintendent's involvement in policy matters. In fact, board members are encouraged to invite administrative input on policy issues. As a result, school boards typically defer to the administration.

It is unclear whether this deference stems from an information gap or a reluctance among board members to interfere in the day-to-day operation of the schools. But whatever its cause, our findings suggest that the problem runs deeper than other discussions have suggested. Consider, for example, a school board that demands a "return to basics." This demand may indicate consensus among board members that more attention and resources be devoted to teaching basic educational skills. But for an inexperienced board this consensus may mask cognitive conflict about the meaning of basic educational skills and how to teach them effectively. Without a common understanding of the specific meaning of broad goals and the operations necessary to achieve them, the board may accept the shared and better articulated conception of the administration. Thus, it commits itself to certain policy alternatives and precludes others. In contrast, the more experienced school board may share a common definition of basic educational skills. But our results suggest that this definition may evolve from that held by administrators, thus promulgating their policy preferences. Either way, policies support the position of the administration. Even without an information gap, the board remains subservient to the administration. For citizen advisory committees, situational factors (e.g., loose structure and an ambiguous mandate) combine with members' short terms and lack of interaction to create even greater impediments to the development of consensus about educational problems

We must conclude that lay participants in local education are unlikely to generate independent policy initiatives. For unorganized citizens, this is consistent with other formulations, which prescribe a watchdog function to citizens (see Boyd, 1976, for a review). For example, McGivney and Moynihan (1972) suggested that the local community affords district leadership considerable latitude in educational policy development, corresponding to a tolerance zone. When district policies exceed the boundaries of this zone, however, and conflict with community values, they face controversy and opposition. Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) found that citizens typically react to such violations by voting incumbent board members out of office. In turn, the newly-elected board typically fires the superintendent. Thus, as Peterson (1974) noted, the superintendent is ultimately responsible to the community and violates the tolerance zone at his or her own risk.

From this perspective, neither citizen advisory committees nor school boards need initiate policy proposals to be effective. Advisory committees can focus their energy on coordinating community resources and improving school-community relations. And the board can be content with its power to hire and fire the superintendent. For Iannaccone and Lutz, the citizen-board-superintendent linkages are sufficient to guarantee citizen control over local education, *even if they are invoked only episodically*.

Our data support several aspects of the Iannaccone-Lutz model. First, the superintendent in each school district had been recently appointed: in Chillicothe, he had been in his position for three years, whereas in Port Angeles he had held his position for less than a year. As the model might predict, the long-tenured school board in Chillicothe appointed the new superintendent from within the district (he had previously been an assistant superintendent) while the short-tenured board in Port Angeles appointed an outsider. Also consistent with the model, the cognitive orientation of the insider was indistinguishable from that of other Chillicothe administrators, while that of the outsider was very different from other Port Angeles administrators.

But although these specific data are consistent with the Iannaccone-Lutz model, our overall results raise several questions about the viability of its ultimate conclusion about citizen control of local education. Our data show that hiring a new superintendent will bring a new cognitive orientation—and potentially new policies—to the school district only if he or she is replaced from outside the district; otherwise old policies are likely to continue. But even if a superintendent is replaced from outside the district and brings with him or her a cognitive model that diverges from those of other administrators, it is not necessarily consistent with citizens' cognitive models or with those of board members.

The decision to hire a superintendent from outside the district may also disrupt the cohesiveness of the administration's cognitive orientation, thus

giving the board relatively greater influence in the policy process. Ironically, however, an experienced board, which would benefit most from this decision due to its common cognitive model of education, is unlikely to look beyond the district to replace the superintendent. And the inexperienced board, which may look beyond the school district for a replacement, is unlikely to have a common cognitive model of local education and will benefit least from the decision. In either case, the administration is likely to retain its advantage over the board. Just as important, the experienced board, with its common cognitive model, may be able to agree about the qualifications they desire in a superintendent (e.g., a cognitive orientation consistent with community norms), but its experience constrains it to search within the district. And while the inexperienced board is able to search beyond the district for a replacement, its lack of a common cognitive model may prevent it from agreeing about what community norms are important.

The result may be more symbolic than real. The community demands that board members and, in turn, administrators who cross the tolerance zone be replaced, and it is satisfied with the *act* of replacement rather than with specific policy changes that may result. For Iannaccone and Lutz, that represents community control and the fulfillment of the democratic promise. We are not so sure.

Manuscript submitted 6 August 1987
Final manuscript received 29 January 1988

References

Bolland, John M. 1977. Data Collection and Data Display as Approaches to Social Problem Solving. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis.

———. 1979. Conflict and Consensus in American Communities: Agenda Setting as Prelude to Social Change. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University.

———. 1985. The Search for Structure: An Alternative to the Forced Q-Sort Technique. *Political Methodology* 11:91–107.

Boyd, William L. 1976. The Public, the Professionals, and Educational Policy Making: Who Governs? *Teachers College Record* 77:539–77.

Boyte, Harry C. 1980. *The Backyard Revolution*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Cochran, Leslie H., L. Allen Phelps, and Linda L. Cochran. 1980. *Advisory Committees in Action*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Cole, Jacquelyn M., and Maurice F. Cole. 1983. *Advisory Councils*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Coser, Lewis. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Davies, Don. 1980. School Administrators and Advisory Councils: Partnership or Shotgun Marriage? *NASSP Bulletin* 64:62–66.

———. 1981. Citizen Participation in Decision Making in the Schools. In D. Davies, ed., *Communities and Their Schools*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Dery, David. 1984. *Problem Definition in Policy Analysis*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

nger, Leon 1957 *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* Stanford, CA Stanford University Press
accone, Laurence, and Frank W Lutz 1970 *Politics Power, and Policy The Governing of Local School Districts* Columbus, OH Charles Merrill
son, Stephen C 1967 Hierarchical Clustering Schemes *Psychometrika*, 32 241–54
y, George 1955 *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* New York Norton
gdon, John W 1984 *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* Boston Little, Brown
lman, Carl E , Monroe J Miller, and Erol Gungor 1973 Interpersonal Conflict Resolution he Effects of Language and Meaning In D A Summers and L Rappoport, eds , *Human Judgment and Social Interaction* New York Holt Rinehart and Winston
berry, Robert L and Edmund P Fowler 1967 Reform and Public Policies in American Cities *American Political Science Review* 61 701–16
iam, James M , Russell T Gregg, and Richard A Rossmiller 1969 The School Board Resolver of Conflict? *Administrator s Notebook* 17
lison, James 1966 *The Federalist Papers* R T Fairchild ed Garden City NY Doubleday
Carty, Donald J and Charles E Ramsey 1971 *The School Managers* Westport CT Greenwood
Givney, Joseph H , and William Moynihan 1972 School and Community *Teachers College Record* 74 317–56
ligan, Glenn W 1980 An Examination of the Effects of Six Types of Error Perturbation on Fifteen Clustering Algorithms *Psychometrika* 45 325–42
rgan Edward P 1987 Technocratic versus Democratic Options for Educational Policy In J DeSario and S Langton eds *Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making* Westport CT Greenwood
sser Ulrich 1976 *Cognition and Reality* San Francisco Freeman
erson Paul E 1974 The Politics of American Education In F N Kerlinger and J B Carroll eds *Review of Research in Education* 2 Itasca IL Peacock
ssman Jeffrey L and Aaron B Wildavsky 1973 *Implementation* Berkeley University of California Press
lfield Kent D and William J Gore 1975 *An Innovative Approach to Community Intervention Influence Charting Cognitive Mapping and Community Development* Seattle Division of Community and Organization Development University of Washington
dfield Kent D John M Bolland William J Gore and James Foster 1981 *Program Mapping An Exploration of the Context of Policy Making in Education* Columbus Mershon Center Ohio State University
usseau Jean Jacques 1968 *The Social Contract* M Cranston trans New York Penguin
lisbury Robert H 1967 Schools and Politics in the Big Cities *Harvard Educational Review* 37 408–24
—— 1980 *Citizen Participation in the Public Schools* Lexington MA Lexington
ott William A , D Wayne Osgood and Christopher Peterson 1979 *Cognitive Structure* Washington, DC Winston
ylor Shelly E , and Jennifer Crocker 1981 Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing In E T Higgins C P Herman and M P Zanna eds *Social Cognition* Hillsdale NJ Erlbaum
cker, Harvey J , and L Harmon Zeigler 1980 *Professionals Versus the Public* New York Longman
allas Graham 1962 *Human Nature in Politics* Lincoln University of Nebraska Press
rt Frederick M , and Michael W Kirst 1972 *The Political Web of American Schools* Boston Little, Brown
igler, L Harmon, and M Kent Jennings 1974 *Governing American Schools* North Scituate, MA Duxbury

Zeigler, L Harmon, and Harvey J Tucker 1981 Who Governs American Education One More Time In D Davies, ed , *Communities and Their Schools* New York McGraw-Hill

John M Bolland is research social scientist at the Institute for Social Science Research, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487.

Kent D. Redfield is associate professor of political studies, Sangamon State University, Springfield, IL 72708

Oil PACs and Aggressive Contribution Strategies

Diana Evans
Trinity College

Scholars have found oil PACs to be the most ideological of all corporate PACs In the 1980 elections, oil PACs contributed to Republican challengers to an extent more typical of nonconnected PACs than the usually more pragmatic corporate PACs This study examines oil PAC contributions in the 1980 House elections It assumes that corporate self-interest underlies even an ideological strategy, thus actual allocation decisions are likely to be driven by both pragmatic and ideological considerations The statistical analysis shows that to be true for oil company PACs Although they show some tendency to be more pragmatic in contributing to incumbents and more ideological in giving to challengers collinearity problems make conclusions on this point problematic However in giving to incumbents oil PACs helped conservatives regardless of party and friends regardless of ideology when they contributed to challengers on the other hand they concentrated on Republicans and opponents of influential liberal incumbents

Republican victories in the 1980 elections inspired reams of analysis, both scholarly and journalistic The *Boston Globe* attributed at least a portion of Republicans' success in both houses of Congress to the newly aggressive contribution behavior of the oil industry whose political action committees gave heavily to challengers in both Senate and House races (Rogers, 1981) Although Republican challengers certainly owe far more of their success to other factors than to contributions from oil PACs, scholars have found oil PACs to be the most ideological of corporate PACs seeking to change the composition of Congress in a conservative direction, whereas corporate PACs are often pragmatic taking the composition of Congress as given, and, being loathe to antagonize incumbents, seeking access to them instead (Handler and Mulkern 1982, Gopoian 1984)

The purpose of this study is to examine the contribution behavior of major oil company PACs in the 1980 House elections, where they followed unusually aggressive pro-challenger strategies Table 1, which compares major oil company PACs with two of the Federal Election Commissions standard PAC categories, indicates that while oil PACs were less challenger oriented than nonconnected PACs, a category which is heavily populated by ideolog-

A previous version of this paper was delivered at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington DC August 28 31 1986

Journal of Politics, Vol 50 No 4 November 1988

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOUSE CANDIDATES IN THE 1980 ELECTIONS

	Incumbents		Challengers		Open Seats		
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Total
Oil PACs	20[a]	33	2	32	4	9	100
All Corporate PACs	35	31	2	20	2	10	[illegible]
Nonconnected PACs	20	14	6	[illegible]	5	16	[illegible]
All PACs[b]	43	23	6	15	5	8	[illegible]

Source: Figures for corporate, nonconnected, and all PACs are taken from The Federal Election Commission, *Reports on Financial Activity 1979–80, Final Report: U.S. House and Senate Campaigns*, January 1982, pp. 85–88.

[a]The figures exclude contributions to third party or independent candidates.

[b]Includes labor, corporate, nonconnected, trade membership health, cooperative, corporation without stock PACs.

cal committees (Latus, 1984), they gave far more of their total of $939,259 to challengers than did all corporate PACs. Moreover, similar to nonconnected PACs, oil PACs gave much less to Democratic incumbents and more to Republican challengers than corporate PACs overall, and more to Republicans than either corporate or nonconnected PACs.

The central hypothesis of this study is that even when corporate PACs are committed to an ideological strategy, as oil PACs evidently were in 1980, they are likely to follow an allocation strategy which mixes ideology with pragmatic, short term self-interest.

ALLOCATION CRITERIA

A number of scholars have categorized PAC behavior (Gopoian, 1984; Handler and Mulkern, 1982; Herndon, 1982; Welch, 1979; Eismeier and Pollock, 1986; Wright, 1985; Sabato, 1984). However, the research either focuses on contributions to incumbents alone, or analyzes contributions to challengers and incumbents together. Separate analysis of contributions to each, on the other hand, allows consideration of whether PACs use different

[1]The American Petroleum Institute supplied a list of major oil companies. The companies from the list that had PACs which were active in the 1979–1980 election cycle were: Amoco, American Petrofina, Atlantic Richfield, Cities Service, Conoco, Diamond Shamrock, Exxon, Getty, Gulf, Kerr-McGee, Marathon, Mobil, Pennzoil, Phillips, Shell, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of Ohio, Sun, Tenneco, Texaco, and Union Oil. All contribution figures are totals for each PAC.

eria to decide which incumbents and challengers to support. This study
amines that question.

Although the classification schemes in the literature vary, all include in
ne form categories for pragmatic PACs, which seek access to influential
cumbents, and ideological PACs, which seek a more ideologically pure
ongress through a change in its composition. Despite the overall diver-
nce of the two strategies, one should not lose sight of the fact that both
agmatic and ideological PACs may aim at the same ultimate goal: favorable
ecisions from Congress. A PAC's choice of strategy may simply rest upon
fferent assumptions about the effect of money on the recipient (Welch
979). An ideological strategy arises from the assumption that members' be-
avior cannot be influenced by PAC contributions; to change the decisions
at Congress makes, the PAC must change its composition. A pragmatic
rategy, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that members can be
nfluenced; hence, contributions to powerful incumbents and those who may
e ideologically incompatible but have supported the PAC in the past are
ational. Thus, in the larger sense, even an ideological strategy may be prag-
matic if it arises from a long-term concern with practical results. However
he two strategies are distinguishable means to the end of corporate self-
nterest.

Although those who have examined pragmatic and ideological behavior in
orporate PACs have found some diversity among them, with many corpo-
ate PACs heavily pragmatic, Handler and Mulkern (1982) found the oil
PACs in their sample uniformly ideological and argued that they are unique
among corporate PACs. "No other industry has recently been the target of so
many legislative proposals for restriction, for regulatory alternatives to the
free market, even for fundamental restructuring" (p. 32). Indeed, oil PACs in
1980 faced a Congress which in 1979 had passed the hated windfall profits
tax, just one of a string of negative decisions in the 1970s.

At first glance, it does seem rational for such corporations to contribute
heavily to challengers, as they seem to have little to lose and possibly a great
deal to gain by intimidating the incumbent even if the challenger loses.
However, they risk forgoing the opportunity of gaining access to an addi-
tional incumbent by giving money to a challenger, who usually loses, and
possible retaliation by a victorious incumbent.

Thus, it is possible that even a self-consciously ideological corporate PAC
which nevertheless has its self-interest to consider, will adopt a mixed strat-
egy, by which the decision to contribute to the challenger of an unfriendly
incumbent may be driven by a somewhat different, more ideological ap-
proach than one to contribute to an incumbent. That is, in principle, an ideo-
logical PAC, committed to electing a conservative, free market-oriented
Congress, would like to support only conservative incumbents and replace

more liberal members with conservatives. But when making decisions about incumbents with whom corporate lobbyists must work regularly, the PAC might find it impossible to target for defeat or even to ignore liberal but friendly incumbents. Similarly, it might seem reckless not to give to members of committees whose jurisdictions affect corporate interests When choosing incumbents to target for defeat, the PAC might use an ideological strategy, targeting the most liberal members, even if they occasionally cast a favorable vote, especially if they are electorally marginal Implicitly, the PAC is hedging its bets about the effect of money on the recipient.

Thus, it is quite possible that even corporate PACs which profess to be ideological follow a mixed strategy of pragmatism and ideology in their allocation decisions, combining cautious short-term protection of corporate interests with aggressive attempts to help elect a more ideologically pure Congress The following OLS regression analysis tests that hypothesis for oil PACs.

Operational definitions of pragmatic and ideological behavior emerge from the literature The most common indicators of ideological behavior are contributions to ideologically compatible members (Handler and Mulkern, 1982 Sabato, 1984, Gopoian, 1984, Wright, 1985, though he calls this a "Type I strategy, Latus, 1984, Brown, 1983), to members of the more ideologically compatible party (Handler and Mulkern, 1982, Gopoian, 1984, Wright, 1985 to candidates in close races (Gopoian, 1984, Welch, 1979, Wright, 1985) and challengers (Handler and Mulkern, 1982, Gopoian, 1984, Wright, 1985 Sabato, 1984) A pragmatic strategy involves accommodation by which the PAC seeks to gain or maintain access to incumbents, especially those on key committees (Sabato, 1984, Gopoian, 1984, Wright, 1985, Brown, 1983), members who have cast favorable votes on the PAC's key issues (Sabato, 1984 Gopoian, 1984), those with whom the PAC must work because they represent districts in which the PAC has a plant or operations (Sabato, 1984 Gopoian, 1984), and those in safe seats (Welch, 1979, Brown, 1983, Wright 1985) However, the effects of marginality may not be as clear cut as the literature suggests. Just as ideological, electoral change-oriented PACs are likely to target close races, seeking to protect ideologically compatible and defeat incompatible members, pragmatic, access-oriented PACs might believe that the more the members need the contributions, the more likely they are to respond gratefully later on Thus, both types of PACs may contribute in close races and marginality may not differentiate them

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This study examines contribution decisions from the perspective of the characteristics and behavior of House incumbents during the Ninety-sixt Congress, which preceded the election, i e , how did oil PACs respond t

incumbents in making their contribution decisions in the 1979–1980 election cycle? Thus, contributions to both incumbents and their challengers are estimated as a function of the characteristics and behavior of the incumbents.[2]

The dependent variables are the summed contributions from major oil companies to incumbents and their challengers. To assess the role of ideology in allocation decisions, measures of both party and ideology were included: Republican = 1 if the incumbent is a Republican, 0 otherwise, ADA Score rates the liberalism of the incumbent's voting record in the Ninety-sixth Congress on a scale of 0 to 100, purged of votes on the windfall profits tax. Marginal * ADA is the member's ADA rating multiplied by 1 if the member won by less than 60% in 1978, and by 0 otherwise, it accounts for the possibility that ideological oil PACs concentrate on close races, seeking especially to protect conservatives and defeat liberals.

The following variables are indicators of a pragmatic approach. Oil Support is the number of roll call votes the incumbent cast against the windfall profits tax (the range is 0 to 5),[3] Ways & Means = 1 if the incumbent was a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, 0 otherwise, membership on Interior and Insular Affairs (Interior) and Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Commerce) is denoted the same way. Oil Production is petroleum production in the member's state in 1978.[4] Seniority is the number of years served by the incumbent. Seniority is included because pragmatic PACs hope for influence with winners; junior members who have not established positions on every issue may be more open to persuasion while senior members may be more electorally vulnerable than they appear (see Fenno 1978, for a discussion of this point). Closeness of the race is indicated by the incumbent's 1978 election percentage.[5]

[2]It is certainly the case that contributors are also influenced by the quality of the challenger (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). However, the model estimated herein examines contributions to challengers strictly as a response to the characteristics and behavior of incumbents on the assumption that whatever the qualities of the challenger, the PAC bases its contribution decision first and foremost on its evaluation of the incumbent. Thus, ideological contributions are attempts to purge Congress of members who have created the hostile regulatory climate to which Handler and Mulkern (1982) attribute much ideological contribution behavior; pragmatic contributions indicate a PAC's accommodation of itself to incumbents.

[3]Cronbach's Alpha for this measure is .5; while that is lower than is usually desired, the Independent Petroleum Association of America included all five of those votes in their 1979 nine-vote rating scale of House members' voting records; moreover, Oil Support predicts major oil PAC contributions better than their rating scale.

[4]Figures were not available by congressional district. Statewide figures were obtained from *Comparative Analysis of 1975 Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production by State*, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. The variable is crude oil production rounded to the nearest 100,000 barrels.

[5]Because congressional election outcomes are partly a result of national forces which differ from year to year, one could argue that the actual results of the 1980 election better approximate the expected results than the results of the previous election. Because contributions to incum-

Finally, several interaction terms take account of an intermediate combining ideological and pragmatic considerations, specifically the bility that oil PACs contribute only to conservatives or against liberals committees The interaction terms are as follows. Ways & Means * the member's ADA score times the dummy variable for membership Ways and Means Committee, Interior * ADA and Commerce * ADA calculated similarly for members of the Interior and Commerce comm respectively

The results of the regression analyses for incumbents and challeng pear in table 2 [6] With incumbents the oil PACs did employ a mixed stra combining pragmatic and ideological considerations Thus, although members liberalism did have a negative effect on contributions the members opposed the windfall profits tax, the more money they rec from the oil PACs, regardless of the liberalism of their voting record other issues Moreover, a spot on the Interior Committee prompted an a tional $2,716 in contributions from major oil companies (Commerce worth $2,124), members from oil-producing states received higher contri tions as well All of these except ADA score are pragmatic consideratio The coefficients of two of the committee-ideology terms also suggest a mi strategy, the more conservative the member of a key committee the m he or she received from oil PACs, in addition to whatever that member n have received on the basis of ideology alone However, note that the co mittee coefficients and committee interaction terms must be interpret cautiously, as the correlation between each committee variable and its respe tive interaction term is substantial, hovering around .8 in all three cases

Finally, even among incumbents, oil PACs do target close races not sa seats in particular, they tend to give to marginal conservatives

bents (or more precisely the expenditure of those contributions) do not affect incumbents el tion percentages, one could use the 1980 figure without worrying about simultaneous causati But challengers expenditures do affect the outcomes thus the 1980 figures cannot be used the challenger equation (Jacobson 1980) Rather the 1978 figures are used for both

[6]The equations were estimated only for candidates in contested races to facilitate comparis between the results for incumbents and challengers The incumbent equation was also e mated for all incumbents who ran, including those who were unopposed The results were s stantially the same, except that contribution levels were slightly lower and the unstandardiz coefficients were slightly smaller The author will supply those results on request

[7]To determine whether the ADA-committee interaction terms together made a signific contribution to the models, for both incumbents and challengers, I first estimated each mo without those interaction terms, then with them, and calculated the increment in F attribut to the addition of those terms Without the ADA-committee terms R^2 for incumbents was for challengers, R^2 = .24 The increment in F is 5.90 and 4.04 for incumbents and challeng respectively Both statistics are significant beyond the .01 level of confidence Thus despite t multicollinearity of these variables with their respective committee dummy variables, there a grounds for concluding that the interaction terms do make an independent contribution

TABLE 2

Determinants of Oil PAC Contributions to Incumbents and Challengers 1980

	Incumbents		Challengers	
	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient
Intercept	3068.93[a]		4329.98[a]	
	(837.53)		(1062.43)	
Republican	104.66	.024	749.12[c]	−.145
	(308.50)		(391.54)	
ADA Score	14.27[a]	.210	2.05	−.025
	(5.40)		(6.85)	
Oil Support	242.94[b]	.161	44.28	−.025
	(120.26)		(152.55)	
Oil Production	0.06[c]	.106	0.06[c]	.110
	(0.03)		(0.04)	
Seniority	5.01	.018	40.15[c]	.122
	(13.57)		(17.22)	
1978 Election %	−27.98[b]	.152	57.41[a]	−.263
	(11.02)		(13.99)	
Marginal*ADA	6.94	.065	11.55	.134
	(4.72)		(5.96)	
Ways & Means	341.79	.044	265.35	.030
	(660.45)		(837.53)	
Commerce	2124.90[a]	.306	645.95	−.079
	(550.14)		(695.11)	
Interior	2716.46[a]	.391	−381.55	−.046
	(620.01)		(786.50)	
Ways & Means*ADA	4.70	.037	15.90	.125
	(11.79)		(14.45)	
Commerce*ADA	23.16[c]	.205	26.34[c]	.195
	(9.28)		(11.77)	
Interior*ADA	31.77[a]	.305	32.15[a]	.260
	(9.58)		(12.15)	
	$R^2 = .36$		$R^2 = .27$	

Source: Contribution data supplied by the Federal Election Commission

$N = 324$

[a] $p \leq .01$

[b] $p \leq .05$

[c] $p \leq .10$

* Figures in parentheses are standard errors

In their contributions to challengers, oil PACs sought to reduce the ranks of Democrats, and especially certain liberals in Congress, although their contribution strategy was less reckless than one might have supposed from popular accounts. In these contributions as well, both pragmatic and ideological considerations played a role In interpreting the coefficients, remember that except for the dependent variable, all variables in the challenger equation pertain to incumbent characteristics and behavior. Thus, the positive coefficient for Marginal * ADA indicates that the more liberal a marginal incumbent, the more the oil PACs gave to his or her challenger. Even though the coefficient for ADA score is small and has the wrong sign, oil PACs did target certain liberals for defeat In particular, the results suggest that although the challenger of a member of the Commerce Committee could, ceteris paribus, expect to receive $649 less than other challengers, for every point increase in such an incumbent's ADA score, that challenger received another $24 29 (obtained by summing −2 05 and 26 34)

Of the other indicators of a pragmatic strategy, only Seniority and Oil Production attain significance Several scenarios may account for the fact that oil PACs also contributed to challengers in oil states One is that local donors to the PAC sometimes request that contributions be made to candidates to whom the PAC would otherwise not contribute (Handler and Mulkern, 1982). Additionally, one PAC official admitted in an interview that in some cases, the PAC has a hard time choosing between two candidates for a seat and thus contributes to both, a pragmatic strategy if there ever was one Finally, and most obviously, some oil state members are not friends of the industry, oil PACs would naturally tend to contribute to their challengers

Oil PACs also contributed to the challengers of more senior incumbents who may be weaker electorally than election returns indicate, given a stronger challenge than usual Jacobson and Kernell (1983) note that the Republican party and conservative PACs in 1980 targeted Democrats likely to have lost touch with their districts, such as leaders and committee chairs

No leadership variable was included here because of the limited number of committee and subcommittee chairs of critical importance to the oil industry A case-by-case analysis reveals a somewhat mixed picture, however The major oil PACs gave a substantial amount, $13,500, to the challenger of Morris Udall, chairman of Interior, but contributed $1,300 to John Dingell, then chairman of the Energy and Power Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee Harley Staggers, chairman of Commerce, retired [8]

Thus, consistent with the major hypothesis, both ideological and prag

[8] It might be argued that this mixture of ideological and pragmatic strategies evident in the aggregated contribution decisions of oil PACs masks variation in relatively pure strategies among individual corporations, as Gopoian (1984) found in his study of the contribution decisions of fourteen oil PACs in 1978 Thus I performed separate analyses of the contributions of the PACs which he found in that year to have had relatively pure strategies, whether ideological or pragmatic In the 1980 elections all of those PACs had similar strategies For example he

matic considerations figured in both sets of decisions, although they cut somewhat differently for incumbents and challengers. A critical question in determining whether oil PACs were more ideological in their contributions to challengers and more pragmatic in giving to incumbents concerns the interpretation of the coefficients of the committee and committee-ideological interaction terms. If those coefficients could be taken at face value, we could say with assurance that the oil PACs were more pragmatic in giving to incumbents, as two of the committee variables in that equation are the most important variables in the model, whereas none of the committee variables is significant in the challenger equation. The interaction terms, which indicate ideological as well as pragmatic considerations, are significant there. As noted earlier, however, high correlations between each committee variable and its corresponding interaction term pose interpretational problems.

It is not possible to overcome completely such problems, but analysis in addition to that reported in footnote 7 sheds more light on the question. I reestimated both equations twice, once omitting only the committee-ideology interaction terms and once omitting only the committee variables. For incumbents, the R^2 of the equation with the committee variables was higher than that of the equation with the interaction terms (.30 compared to .27, respectively). Moreover, the interaction terms were not significant, while two of the committee variables were highly significant. The reverse was true for the challenger equations. That is, the R^2 of the equation including the committee-ideology interaction was higher than that of the equation with the committees (.24 vs. .21, respectively), and although two of the committee variables were significant, all three of the interaction terms were significant. Thus, the additional analysis provides some support for the hypothesis that ideology played a somewhat larger role in oil PACs' contributions to challengers than to incumbents.

Conclusions

Regardless of the tentative conclusion concerning the balance between ideological and pragmatic strategies, however, the results are clear on one thing: major oil company PACs did use different strategies in making contributions to incumbents and challengers: contributions to challengers were

challenger contributions. PACs that had been pragmatic and those that had been ideological in 1978 were influenced by the same variables in their 1980 contribution decisions. For each of them, the top three variables included at least two and usually three of the ideology interaction terms. The 1978 Election percent was also in the top three for several of those PACs. Thus, the strategies of PACs that had been different in 1978 were similar by 1980. Additionally, Rogers (1981) documents a large movement of oil PACs between 1978 and 1980 to more ideological behavior. Thus, it is apparent that the contribution strategies of oil PACs converged during the Congress which passed the windfall profits tax, and the summed contribution variables do not mask significant variance among separate corporations.

thus not simply a mirror image of contributions to incumbents. When oil PACs went after incumbents, they were usually Democrats, especially liberal ones who were electorally vulnerable and liberals on key committees Thus, their attempts to change the composition of the House were ideological as well as partisan and aimed to succeed Clearly, if oil PACs had their druthers, Congress would be Republican On the other hand, when they gave to incumbents, they helped members of key committees and conservatives, regardless of party, thus displaying a pragmatic willingness to accommodate themselves to the reality of Democratic dominance of the House It is a shrewd strategy, calculated to produce both electoral success and subsequent access

Manuscript submitted 13 February 1987
Final Manuscript received 21 January 1988

References

Brown, Kirk F 1983 Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago IL

Eismeier Theodore J and Philip H Pollock III 1986 Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections The Role of Political Action Committees *American Journal of Political Science* 30 197–213

Fenno, Richard F, Jr 1978 *Home Style House Members in their Districts* Boston Little Brown

Gopoian, J David 1984 What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups *American Journal of Political Science* 28 259–81

Handler, Edward and John R Mulkern 1982 *Business in Politics* Lexington MA D C Heath & Co

Herndon James F 1982 Access, Record and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns *Journal of Politics* 44 996–1019

Jacobson Gary C 1980 *Money in Congressional Elections* New Haven Yale University Press

Jacobson Gary C and Samuel Kernell 1983 *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* 2d ed New Haven Yale University Press

Latus, Margaret Ann 1984 Assessing Ideological PACs From Outrage to Understanding In Michael J Malbin, ed *Money and Politics in the United States* Chatham NJ Chatham House Publishers

Sabato, Larry J 1984 *PAC Power* New York W W Norton

Rogers David 1981 How Oil Money Helped to Change the Face of Congress *The Boston Globe* Sept 10

Welch, W P 1979 Patterns of Contributions Economic Interest and Ideological Groups In Herbert E Alexander ed *Political Finance* Beverly Hills Sage

Wright John R 1985 PACs Contributions, and Roll Calls An Organizational Perspective *The American Political Science Review*, 79 400–14

Diana Evans is associate professor of political science, Trinity College Hartford, CT 06106

A Comparison of Two Distance Metrics Through Regression Diagnostics of a Model of Relative Candidate Evaluation

James M. Enelow
Nancy R. Mendell
Subha Ramesh
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Regression analysis is widely used to estimate the effects of relative policy proximity on relative candidate evaluations. Using the 1984 NES data, we show that the functional form for specifying distance between voter and candidate can lead to different results concerning which policy variables significantly affect relative candidate evaluations. Simple statistics do not allow us to choose the distance specification most consistent with least-squares assumptions. A series of diagnostic tests are offered to make this determination.

Introduction

Measures of policy proximity have become commonplace in models of voting choice and relative candidate evaluation. Policy distances between voter and candidate are used to construct independent variables in the predictive models of Markus and Converse (1979), Page and Jones (1979), Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby (1982), Niemi and Bartels (1985), Krosnick (1986), Enelow, Hinich, and Mendell (1986), and many others.

In this note, we show that substantive conclusions about which policies significantly affect relative candidate evaluations can be an artifact of how policy distance is measured. This point is illustrated by fitting two regression models, different only in distance measure, with data from the 1984 NES survey.

The analyst who employs policy proximity variables in predictive models of voting choice or relative candidate evaluation should use the distance measure which best approximates the assumptions of the model. For the two models we analyze, no simple statistics exist to test which distance measure

This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant SES 8310591. The authors are grateful to Steve Finch and Mel Hinich for their comments.

Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

is more appropriate. We offer, and apply, a series of diagnostic tests which are useful for making this decision.

Model and Methods

To illustrate that distance specification is an important matter in models of relative candidate evaluation, we will examine two forms of a spatial model of relative candidate evaluation, one form based on the squared Euclidean distance between voter and candidate, and the second form based on city-block distance. Both kinds of distance have been used in election studies, and each is a "norm" by Wendell and Thorson's (1974) definition, meaning that it generates a set of symmetric indifference contours about the voter's policy positions.

The underlying model on which our analysis is based holds that voter i's utility for candidate r, $u_i(r)$, is linear in two terms: c_{ir}, the nonpolicy value of r to voter i, and $d(i,r)$, the policy distance between r and voter i. Expressed formally,

$$u_i(r) = c_{ir} - d(i,r) \tag{1}$$

The nonpolicy term in equation (1) may represent such factors as the candidate's experience, his party, his perceived competence, or any factor (or summation of factors) independent of $d(i,r)$.

To define squared Euclidean distance, assume x_i is an nx1 vector of ideal policy positions for i on issues 1 to n and R_i is also nx1, representing i's perception of r's positions on these same issues. Then, if A_i is an nxn diagonal salience matrix which measures the relative salience of these n issues to voter i, the squared Euclidean distance between voter i and candidate r in the n-dimensional policy space is

$$\begin{aligned} d(i,r) &= (R_i - x_i)^T A_i (R_i - x_i) \\ &= a_{i1}(R_{i1} - x_{i1})^2 + \dots + a_{in}(R_{in} - x_{in})^2 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Distance, as defined by equation (2), induces preferences which can be represented by ellipsoidal indifference contours. The a_{ij}'s, termed salience weights, measure the shape of these ellipses. Squared Euclidean distance is the most common type found in the spatial voting literature (e.g., Davis and Hinich, 1966, Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1970, Enelow and Hinich, 1984).

A different definition of distance is the city-block norm. This norm has received theoretical attention in Rae and Taylor (1972), and in Wendell and Thorson (1974). The indifference contours induced by this norm are parallelograms, with the degree to which the shape departs from a square determined by the relative size of the salience weights. Defined formally, if A_i is

an nxn diagonal matrix of salience weights, $d(i,r)$ is the city-block distance norm if and only if

$$d(i,r) = a_{11}|R_{i1} - x_{i1}| + \cdots + a_{nn}|R_{in} - x_{in}| \tag{3}$$

where $|z - y|$ is the absolute value of the difference between z and y. Linear specifications of policy proximity, similar to the city-block norm, can be found in the regression models of Markus and Converse (1979), Page and Jones (1979), Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby (1982), and others.

Suppose we are given the thermometer score T_{ir}, which measures the warmth of voter i's feelings toward candidate r on a 0-to-100 scale. Suppose also that we are given a measure of the degree to which voter i likes the nonpolicy attributes of candidate r (c_{ir}). Finally, suppose we know the most preferred policy x_{ij} ($j = 1, 2, \ldots, n$) of voter i on each of n issues as well as i's perception of candidate r's positions, R_{ij}, on these same issues. If we also have data on these same questions for candidate m, (c_{im} and M_{ij}) then we can use equations (1)–(3) to specify two forms of an empirical model of relative candidate evaluation depending on the functional form of $d(i,r)$. The first specification in regression form is

$$\begin{aligned} T_{ir} - T_{im} &= b_0 + b_1(c_{ir} - c_{im}) \\ &+ a_{11}([M_{i1} - x_{i1}]^2 - [R_{i1} - x_{i1}]^2) + \cdots \\ &+ a_{nn}([M_{in} - x_{in}]^2 - [R_{in} - x_{in}]^2) + e_i \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where e_i is a random error. Under the assumptions of ordinary linear regression, the e_i are identically and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance.

The second specification of the regression equation used to predict relative candidate evaluations is

$$\begin{aligned} T_{ir} - T_{im} &= b_0 + b_1(c_{ir} - c_{im}) \\ &+ a_{11}(|M_{i1} - x_{i1}| - |R_{i1} - x_{i1}|) + \cdots \\ &+ a_{nn}(|M_{in} - x_{in}| - |R_{in} - x_{in}|) + e_i \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Either regression equation (4) or (5) is consistent with the underlying voter utility model given by equation (1). The estimated regression coefficients in each equation represent the relative salience of the issues to the group of voters being analyzed.

Results of the Data Analysis

The data we use to fit equations (4) and (5) come from the pre-election wave of the 1984 National Election Study. Thermometer scores are elicited

by asking respondents to rate a candidate (or group) on a scale from 0 to-1[illegible] The difference in thermometer scores between Ronald Reagan and Walt[illegible] Mondale ($T_r - T_m$) is the dependent variable in our analysis. The same d[illegible] pendent variable is used by Page and Jones (1979) for the 1972 and 1976 el[illegible] tions, by Niemi and Bartels (1985) for the 1980 election, and by Krosnic[illegible] (1986) for the 1968, 1980, and 1984 elections.

There are sixteen questions asked in the pre-election interview that con[illegible] cern the personal qualities of Reagan and Mondale. The sixteen variables ob[illegible] tained from subtracting Mondale's score from Reagan's score on each of the sixteen questions were factor analyzed to derive a single factor measure of the nonpolicy value ($c_r - c_m$).[1]

The pre-election interview contains seven policy questions. Each ques[illegible] tion asks the respondent to place himself and the candidates on separate 7-point scales. The issues concern the level of government spending and ser[illegible] vices (GS), aid to minorities (MA), American intervention in Central Amer[illegible] ica (CA), the level of defense spending (DS), the role of women in America (WM), relations with the Soviet Union (RS), and the responsibility of gov[illegible] ernment to provide citizens with a job and guaranteed standard of living (GJ). From the responses to these questions, we can compute the difference in squared-distance, and the difference in absolute distance between the voter and Mondale, and the voter and Reagan on each of these seven pol[illegible] icy scales.

Table 1 shows the results of two multiple regressions, using the nonpolicy and policy variables defined above to fit equations (4) and (5).[2]

The estimated percentages of the variance in the dependent variable ex[illegible] plained by the two regressions (the values of R^2) are virtually identical as are the estimated standard errors of the estimate (these two comparisons yield the same result because the scale of the dependent variable is the same in both regressions). With respect to their ability to predict the better-liked candidate, the two regressions also are about the same (95.2% correct pre[illegible] dictions for both equations).

Table 1 does reveal an unexpected difference in the two regressions: only two policy variables are significant at the .05 level in the squared-distance model (GS and MA), while in the city-block model four policy variables are

[1] A single factor accounts for 61.6% of the total variance with an associated eigenvalue of 9.86. The second factor explains only an additional 5.7% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 0.91.

[2] Since it is a factor score variable based on sixteen separate variables, the nonpolicy variable is measured with greater precision than the individual policy variables. In addition, the non[illegible] policy variable is highly correlated with the dependent variable and moderately collinear with the individual policy variables, so the coefficients of the policy variables are likely to be nonsig[illegible] nificant (Jamner and Finch, 1985). Moreover, in single variable regression with error in mea[illegible] surement of the independent variable, the estimate of the coefficient is downwardly biased (Snedecor and Cochran, 1960). For all these reasons, our approach to estimating the predictive importance of individual policy issues is very conservative.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF REGRESSION RESULTS USING POLICY DISTANCE VARIABLES IN CITY-BLOCK AND SQUARED-DISTANCE FORM

	City Block		Squared Distance	
Variable[a]	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Government Spending (*GS*)	2.46**	.52	.38**	.10
Aid to Minorities (*MA*)	1.92**	.57	.45**	.11
Guaranteed Jobs (*GJ*)	1.29*	.51	.18	.10
Relations with Russia (*RS*)	.99*	.49	.16	.09
Central America (*CA*)	.32	.47	.12	.09
Defense Spending (*DS*)	.96	.51	.14	.10
Role of Women (*WM*)	−.07	.51	.18	.10
Nonpolicy Difference[b]	33.45**	1.55	35.77**	1.32
Constant	4.41**	.98	4.79**	.91
R^2	.52		.51	
Standard Error of Est	22.16		22.54	
F	407.85**		391.45**	
N = 725				

[a]Dependent variable in both equations is voter's thermometer score for Reagan minus voter's thermometer score for Mondale

[b]Linear in both equations

$* = p < .05$, $** = p < .01$

significant (*GS*, *MA*, *RS* and *GJ*). City-block variables are measured on a smaller scale than squared-distance variables, so the estimated coefficients are expected to differ for the same policy issue. However, there is no a priori reason to expect different variables to be significant in the two equations.

Distance specification is now a significant problem. An important concern in testing issue voting models is determining which policy issues are salient to subsets of voters. We see that different specifications of policy distance produce different answers to this question for regression analysis. These differences are not enormous (the value of the test statistic drops from 2.49 ($p = 0.01$) to 1.86 ($p = 0.06$) for *GJ* and from 2.07 ($p = 0.04$) to 1.80 ($p = 0.07$) for *RS*. Still, the drop is sufficient to yield different conclusions if we consider one distance specification and not the other. In addition, it stands as evidence that results about the significance of different policy issues are not robust to different distance specifications. If we are told, for example, that policy proximity is unimportant for explaining candidate evaluations in a given election, how do we evaluate this claim if we know that this conclusion may depend on the specific distance measure employed by the analyst?

Before proceeding further, we need to determine whether the differences in the results of the two regressions are due to the influence of outliers or to the incorrect specification of the scale of the dependent variable. To perform

the first check, the ten cases with the largest absolute standardized residuals (≥ |2.8|) were deleted and the regressions rerun. We find *RS* nonsignificant in both scales but again, *GJ* significant in the city-block scale and not in the squared-distance scale. We conclude that the difference in significance levels between the two scales for *GJ* is not due to a few influential cases.

To determine the propriety of the scale of the dependent variable, we use a Box-Cox technique (Box and Cox, 1964) to test whether the scale of the dependent variable should be transformed. Performing this test for both the city-block and squared-distance models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that $Q = 1$ is the optimal power transform of the dependent variable, obtaining p values > 0.3 for both scales and $|Q| < 1.05$

Since the city-block and squared-distance regression models are not nested, there are *no* simple statistics to enable us to answer the question of which model to accept Further, neither specification is a single-valued transform of the other, ruling out the use of nonlinear least squares to estimate the exponent of some generally defined distance measure

Instead, to decide this question, the two models must be compared to determine which better meets the assumptions of ordinary least-squares Examining the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the four policy variables found to be significant in one or both regressions, we look at the two distance specifications with respect to each of the four variables to see which leads to the fewest violations of the assumptions of the regression model We also examine the predicted values of the dependent variable in both regressions for the same purpose of detecting violations of regression assumptions

These tests, or "regression diagnostics" are appropriate even if we do not reach conflicting results using the two metrics (cf. Kramer et al., 1985) Consider, for instance, our finding that the standard errors of the estimate are both twenty-two thermometer points for these two regression equations The standard error of the estimate measures the *average* absolute deviation of the predicted value from the observed value It remains to be determined whether the average absolute deviation is uniformly the same for all values of the independent variable, which is required by least-squares assumptions

Comparing Two Specifications of Policy Distance

We use three criteria to determine which distance specification is more appropriate for our regression model (1) evidence of linearity in the relationship between the dependent and each independent variable, or equivalently, no evidence of nonlinearity, (2) mean-zero residuals for all values of each independent variable and for all predicted values of the dependent variable, and (3) constant variance of the residuals for all values of a single independent variable or for all predicted values of the dependent variable

The first test of goodness of fit to the linear model can be seen as a multivariate extension of a method outlined in many textbooks (for example, Snedecor and Cochran, 1980) for the bivariate situation in which one has several observations of Y (the dependent variable) for each value of X (the independent variable). In our case, since there are seven other independent variables, we instead first obtain Y_i^*, the value of Y after adjusting for the influence of all variables but X_i, the independent variable of interest, and then do this test on the linearity of Y_i^* on X_i.

For example, to test the linearity of the regression of Y on GJ, we first compute the value of Y adjusted for RS, MA, GS, CA, DS, WM, and NP (the nonpolicy variable), Y_{GJ}^* say, as

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{GJ}^* = Y - [&b_{GS\,GJ}(GS - \overline{GS}) + b_{RS\,GJ}(RS - \overline{RS}) + b_{MA\,GJ}(MA - \overline{MA}) \\ &+ b_{CA\,GJ}(CA - \overline{CA}) + b_{DS\,GJ}(DS - \overline{DS}) \\ &+ b_{WM\,GJ}(WM - \overline{WM}) + b_{NP\,GJ}(NP - \overline{NP})] \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Here $b_{i\,GJ}$ denotes the coefficient of X_i obtained on regressing Y on all variables but GJ, and $\overline{X}_i$ is the sample mean of X_i.

Employing the test for linearity just described, we perform eight regressions, one for each of four independent variables for each of two distance specifications. In each regression, the difference between Reagan and Mondale's thermometer scores is regressed on all the independent variables except one, with the remaining variable either GS, MA, RS, or GJ. This leads to four regressions for the policy variables in squared-distance form and four regressions for the policy variables in city-block form. The difference in thermometer scores adjusted for all variables but one is then computed from equation (6).

Next, we perform a one way analysis of variance of the adjusted thermometer score differences by the groups defined by the values of the remaining independent variable. Wherever there are too few observations of an X value, groups are combined and assigned the value of the mid-range observation.

Table 2 summarizes the results of the one-way analyses of variance just described. The significance of the deviations mean squared error (on comparing it to the within groups mean squared error) tells us whether nonlinear terms are needed or equivalently whether the linearity assumptions require transformation of the independent variable.

As indicated in table 2, there are no significant deviations from linearity for any of the four policy variables in city-block form. Two variables in squared-distance form, GJ and GS, show significant deviations from linearity at the .05 level. A deviation from linearity is a violation of the regression assumptions and indicates that the linear model, if used for prediction, is invalid for some values of the independent variable.

The results of table 2 indicate that the city-block specification of GJ and of

TABLE 2

RESULTS OF ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN THE THERMOMETER SCORES ADJUSTED FOR ALL BUT A SINGLE POLICY VARIABLE. P VALUE ASSOCIATED WITH DEVIATIONS FROM LINEARITY

Variable	City-Block	Squared-Distance
Government Spending (*GS*)	0 96[a]	0 04
Aid to Minorities (*MA*)	0 15	0 12
Guaranteed Jobs (*GJ*)	0 06	0 02
Relations with Russia (*RS*)	0 08	0 11

Dependent variable in both equations is voter's thermometer score for Reagan minus voter's thermometer score for Mondale adjusted for all covariates except row variable

[a] Significance of *F* associated with deviations from linearity in mean-squared error

GS better fits the linearity assumption than the squared-distance specification The test results of *MA* and *RS* are inconclusive in that there is no evidence of nonlinearity for either specification

To fully satisfy ourselves that the four significant city-block variables meet the criterion of linearity we perform another test The coefficient of an independent variable in multiple regression is equivalent to the coefficient obtained from regressing the above described adjusted values of Y on the adjusted values of X (Draper and Smith, 1981) Thus, as a further test of the linearity of the relationship of Y on *GS*, *MA*, *RS* and *GJ* in city-block form we first regress each independent variable on all other independent variables and then obtain adjusted values for the independent variable The observations on the independent variable are then ordered and grouped with respect to its adjusted values As before, these values are grouped into intervals with the mid-range value assigned to all observations in the interval If X^* is the adjusted value of X, then $X^{*\prime}$ is the mid-range value assigned to X^*

With the X^* values so grouped, we observe both significant linearity for the regression of Y_{GJ}^* on $GJ^{*\prime}$ (city-block) and a nonsignificant deviation from linearity Similar results are observed on adjusting and grouping adjusted values of *MA*, *RS*, and *GS* in city-block form Thus we have no evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between Y and the four significant predictors in city-block form

Scatterplots of the mean adjusted values of the dependent variable by subgroup of the remaining policy variable provide a simple method of illustrating our results Since *GJ* and *GS* show evidence of nonlinearity in squared

istance but not city-block form, we give scatterplots for these two policy ariables. Figures 1 and 2 are the two plots of mean adjusted values of the ependent variable by *GJ* in its city-block (figure 1) and squared-distance orm (figure 2) with each independent variable resliced into seven subgroups the first four out of twelve subgroups are combined and so are the last hree) Figures 3 and 4 are the two plots for GS (figure 3, city-block, figure 4, quared-distance) The vertical lines show the width of one standard error, plus or minus, around each mean adjusted value

The plot for *GJ* in squared-distance form shows evidence of the non-

FIGURE 1

MEAN ADJUSTED THERMOMETER SCORE DIFFERENCE (±1 S E)
VS
VALUE OF GJ (CITY-BLOCK) VARIABLE





FIGURE 2

MEAN ADJUSTED THERMOMETER SCORE DIFFERENCE (±1 S E)
VS
VALUE OF GJ (SQUARED-DISTANCE) VARIABLE



linearity reported in table 2 The mean adjusted values of the depende variable for very low and very high values of GJ show a sharper departu from linearity than for the same subgroups when the variable is measured city-block form The two plots for GS in city-block and squared-distan form show the same difference

As a second criterion for deciding which distance specification to accej we can examine the distribution of the residuals for each subgroup defin either by values of an independent variable or by predicted values of tl dependent variable, when the residuals are computed from the full mod (either [4] or [5]) The predicted values of Y are divided into ten groups conform with regression theory, we should find no significant betwe group differences in mean residuals or in the variance of the residuals

Table 3 reports the results of the tests for the significance of the betwe group differences in mean residuals We are unable to reject the hypothe that the mean residuals are equal across the subgroups defined by each the four city-block variables, indicating further that for the city-block sca the assumptions of regression are satisfied For the squared-distance var ables, significant between-group differences in mean residuals are found

S and GJ For the predicted values of the dependent variable, significant etween-group differences in the mean residual are found when the independent variables are expressed either in city-block or squared-distance form

Our third criterion is a test for heteroscedasticity Computing the residuals from the full models as given in (4) and (5), we can test for equality in the variance of the residuals across the twelve subgroups into which we have partitioned each of GS, MA, RS, and GJ and the ten subgroups into which we have partitioned the predicted values of the dependent variable In accordance with regression theory, the Bartlett-Box test for between group differences in the variance of the residuals across groups should be nonsignificant

FIGURE 3

MEAN ADJUSTED THERMOMETER SCORE DIFFERENCE (±1 S E)
VS
VALUE OF GS (CITY-BLOCK) VARIABLE




FIGURE 4

MEAN ADJUSTED THERMOMETER SCORE DIFFERENCE (±1 S E)
VS.
VALUE OF GS (SQUARED-DISTANCE) VARIABLE




Table 4 reports the results of the Bartlett-Box test for homogeneity of the variance of the residuals across subgroups of *GS*, *MA*, *RS*, *GJ*, and predicted values of the dependent variable For predicted values of the dependent variable, expressing the independent variables in city-block form leads to nonsignificant between-group differences in the variance of the residuals while expressing the independent variables in squared-distance form lead to significant between-group differences in the residual variances Again city-block specification of the independent variables is superior to squared distance specification from the standpoint of meeting regression assumptions

Inspection of table 4 reveals one anomalous result For *MA*, the city-block specification leads to a rejection of the equal variances assumption while the squared-distance specification leaves us unable to reject the null hypothesis Here is the only instance where squared-distance is superior to city-block from the standpoint of meeting the assumptions of regression. However examining the twelve standard deviations of the residuals for the city-block form of *MA*, it is clear that one or two low-valued outliers among the standard deviations are causing the null hypothesis to be rejected Reslicing the variable into four larger groups eliminates this effect, causing the Bartlett Box F to become nonsignificant ($p = 25$)

An additional finding emerges from examining the variance of the re

TABLE 3

RESULTS OF ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RESIDUALS

	P Value for Between Groups Mean Squared Error[a]	
	City-Block	Squared-Distance
GS	0 97	0 02
MA	0 25	0 14
GJ	0 13	0 02
RS	0 12	0 13
$\hat{Y}$	0 00	0 00

$\hat{Y}$ is the predicted value of the dependent variable

[a]Entry is significance of *F* Null hypothesis is equality of mean residual for all values of independent variable indicated

TABLE 4

RESULTS OF BARTLETT-BOX TEST FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE IN RESIDUALS

	City Block	Squared-Distance
GS	74[a]	72
MA	02	21
GJ	82	05
RS	02	04
$\hat{Y}$	05	01

$\hat{Y}$ is the predicted value of the dependent variable

[a]Entry is significance of *F* Null hypothesis is equality of variances in residuals across subgroups of the indicated variable

siduals across subgroups of each independent variable in city-block form Performing a Box-Cox analysis of these variances similar to the one that was performed on the dependent variable, we obtain a nonsignificant relationship between the variance of the residuals and the value of the independent variable across subgroups This finding supports the conclusion reached earlier that a transformation of the dependent variable is not indicated

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this note has been to explore a basic point that has been overlooked in studies based on regression models of relative candidate evaluation. Specifying policy distance between candidate and voter in such models

is an important matter. As we have found, using the city-block norm and the squared Euclidean distance norm to measure distance between candidate and voter in the policy space of the 1984 presidential election leads to different results concerning which policies are statistically significant for the voters we analyze Some method must then be employed for deciding which distance specification to accept. For the two models we examine, there are no simple statistics that can be used to make this decision, and so we have shown how tests for model failure can serve this purpose

Other regression models using other data sets may reach different conclusions about the most appropriate distance specification Our argument is simply that whatever functional form is given to the concept of distance in election models that use policy proximity measures, some attempt should be made to test for the propriety of that specification As we have shown for the 1984 NES data, different specifications lead to different substantive conclusions about the election

Manuscript submitted 20 August 1987
Final manuscript received 7 January 1988

REFERENCES

Belsley D A E Kuh, and R E Welsch 1980 *Regression Diagnostics* New York John Wiley and Sons

Box, G E P and D R Cox 1964 An Analysis of Transformations *J Royal Statist Soc B* 26 211–52

Davis, O and M Hinich 1966 A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society In Joseph L. Bernd, ed *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II* Dallas Southern Methodist University Press

Davis, O M Hinich, and P Ordeshook 1970 An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process *American Political Science Review* 64 426–48

Dixon, W J ed 1983 *BMDP Statistical Software* Los Angeles University of California Press

Draper N and H Smith 1981 Applied Regression Analysis, 2d ed New York John Wiley and Sons

Enelow, J and M Hinich 1982 Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition *Journal of Politics*, 44 115–30

——— 1984 *The Spatial Theory of Voting An Introduction* New York Cambridge University Press

Enelow J, M Hinich and N Mendell 1986 An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative Spatial Models of Elections *Journal of Politics* 48 675–93

Jamner, A, and S Finch 1985 Stepwise Regression With Errors in the Predictors The Two Predictor Case Presented at the Joint Statistical Meetings of the American Statistical Association and Biometric Society, Las Vegas, NV

Kramer, W H Sonnberger J Maurer and P Havlik 1985 Diagnostic Checking in Practice *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 47 1, 118 27

Krosnick, J 1986 Policy Voting in American Presidential Elections An Application of Psychological Theory to American Politics Ph D diss, University of Michigan

Markus G and P Converse 1979 A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice *American Political Science Review* 73 1055–70

mı, R., and L. Bartels. 1985. New Measures of Issue Salience: An Evaluation. *Journal of Politics*, 47: 1212–20.
e, B., and C. Jones. 1979. Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties, and the Vote. *American Political Science Review*, 73: 1071–89.
ınowitz, C., J. Prothro, and W. Jacoby. 1982. Salience as a Factor in the Impact of Issues on Candidate Evaluation. *Journal of Politics*, 44: 41–63.
., D., and M. Taylor. 1972. Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1: 71–90.
edecor, G. W., and W. G. Cochran. 1980. *Statistical Methods*. Iowa: Iowa State University Press.
ndell, R., and S. Thorson. 1974. Some Generalizations of Social Decisions Under Majority Rule. *Econometrica* 42: 893–912.

James M. Enelow is professor of political science. Nancy R. Mendell is ssociate professor of applied mathematics and statistics, and Subha Ramesh a graduate student in political science at the State University of New York, tony Brook, NY 11794.

Review Essays

Space and International Relations

Darryl Roberts
Duke University

Militarization of Space By Paul Stares (New York Cornell University Press, 1985 Pp 352 $29 95)

Space Weapons and International Security Edited by Bhupendra Jasani (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1987 Pp 366 $65 00)

The Space Station By Hans Mark (Durham NC Duke University Press, 1987 Pp 288 $24 95)

Outerspace New Challenges to Law and Policy By J E Fawcett (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1984 Pp 169 $34 00)

Space and international relations is the study of the exploration and exploitation of space for social political economic and military purposes and the consequences for relations between sovereign states in the international system As the exploration and exploitation of space has expanded a new set of relations between states have emerged Indeed, the struggle for dominance in space between the United States and the Soviet Union has transformed the administrative state in each country In the absence of managerial and regulative bodies designed to address problems related to space international political and bureaucratic structures emerged to assume these roles Intelsat is only one of the many products of this experience According to Walter McDougall, at least four major realms have been affected by the dynamics of the space age They are (1) international politics (2) the political role of science and scientists (3) the relationship of the state to technological change and (4) political culture and values in nations of high technology The study of space and international relations remains at the boundaries of two fields, science and technology and international relations The exploration and exploitation of space is therefore a special source of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research and explains in part the failure of students in the field of international relations to treat it as a formal dimension of their discipline The books under review underline the importance of space and international relations as a field of knowledge and point to several issues that need to be addressed in much greater detail The first task is to place the study of space and international relations in comparative and historical per-

Journal of Politics Vol 50 No 4 November 1988

spective and to examine their relationship to international relations more formally The second task is to delineate the figures and ideas that have come to define the field as we know it. The third task is to provide the kind of substantive elaboration that is essential for understanding the core issues of the field. The core issues are (1) territorial imperatives, (2) technological change, (3) challenge and response, (4) the role of the state, (5) the militarization of space, (6) space and international law, (7) space and international political economy, and (8) war and space Let us now turn to four excellent works that address these issues

Paul Stares's *The Militarization of Space* is one of the finest works on space and international relations available Comparative and historical analysis of the militarization of space is not only necessary for working scholars but essential for understanding the complexities and intricacies of more contemporary issues as well Stares demonstrates that the militarization of space constitutes a complex set of theoretical problems and ideas whose historical origins are as important to understand today as they were at the dawn of the space age in 1957

The major purpose of Stares's work is to explain why there was not an arms race in space in the 1960s and what changed in the late 1970s to reverse this trend, and what are the likely consequences of the contemporary arms race in space? In broad-based terms Stares's work is a detailed case study of U S and Soviet relations, and he offers three possible explanations of the lag in the struggle for military dominance in space

The first explanation of the limited arms race in space during the 1960s is what Stares refers to as the common interests hypothesis Officials in the Soviet Union and the United States realized the mutual benefits of reconnaissance satellites and the necessity to refrain from the development of weapons to counter them The second explanation is that bargaining and negotiations constrained the arms race in space A long and arduous struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union finally turned to more positive ends The third and more positive explanation is that the constraints of militarization were a result of a convergence of national interests, military disincentives and technical constraints which were supported at important times by formal agreement In addition, there were important exogenous conditions such as the Cuban Missile Crisis that must be referenced to explain the highly limited arms race in space The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most important points in this respect because it exposed the capabilities of U S officials to gather intelligence regarding Soviet terrestrial forces via satellite Stares's leading assumption is that once the Soviets came to terms with this reality there was a greater incentive to negotiate an arms limitation agreement regarding outer space

This latter explanation plays an important role in Stares's division of labor and as one might expect, he begins his work by illustrating the complexities

faced by American policymakers in efforts to project the imagery of a peaceful space program in the face of activity to exploit space for military purposes

Long before Sputnik was launched, outer space was an area of considerable importance in both the United States and the Soviet Union In the United States there were a number of analyses throughout the 1940s and 1950s of the possible uses of outer space for military purposes Stares argues that from the beginning the major concern was how space might be exploited for military purposes In point of fact, U S officials knew for some time before Sputnik I was actually launched that the Soviet Union was on the verge of an important breakthrough in space They simply failed to understand the dramatic impact Sputnik would have on American foreign policymakers Whether Eisenhower was caught by surprise or not was of little significance State and society in the United States were thrown into chaos by Sputnik, and Eisenhower struggled to find a means to match the Soviet effort in space without sacrificing the essence of democracy the abiding principles of liberalism Americans unleashed their scorn for what was seen as a serious policy failure American government officials tried desperately to reduce the level of anxiety caused by the launching of Sputnik In response to this condition the state expanded to accommodate novel institutional arrangements related to a comprehensive space program And within the state there was intense competition between factions of the military Bureaucratic politics became the order of the day as each wing of the military services sought to convince Eisenhower that one project or another was more important to national security

To balance militaristic tendencies within the state there was a strong push for a civilian program This was seen as the basic solution for resolving the contradiction between liberal values on the one hand and the exploitation of space for military purposes on the other Further scientific programs would not be compromised by men who were purely interested in exploiting space for military purposes Thus the grand legislative debate began over space administration Where the state was not prepared to deal directly with its own institutions in the administration of the space program ad hoc committees were set up to investigate variable dimensions of the existing program or some grand scheme that had been developed

In effect, the metamorphosis of the U S space program actually took place between 1957 and 1960 By 1960 it had been subjected to a whole series of experiments, and a new kind of diplomacy emerged as U S officials sought to deny the Soviets an opportunity to enhance their development and deployment of space instruments that might threaten U S security Hence the space weapons proposals were perceived to be instruments that might constrain Soviet activity The major objective, as well as the constant statements by U S officials regarding the peaceful uses of outer space were part of an effort to prevent the Soviets from pursuing countermeasures At the same

time the U S. pursued every possibility to exploit space for military pu poses. The greatest victory of the Eisenhower administration, however, wa the replacement of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union with the gathering (intelligence information from reconnaissance satellites.

In John Kennedy's campaign for president he took special interest in th U.S. space program This was not surprising since Lyndon Johnson was hi running mate and played a critical role in the U S space program during th Eisenhower administration When Kennedy finally became president, h launched a series of investigatory studies of the balance between the Ameri can and Soviet space program The findings were mixed, but it was generall acknowledged that the Soviets were ahead in the space race Kennedy ha argued this point during the course of his campaign and promised to expan the space program to meet the Soviet challenge This led to a round of com petition between various sectors of the state for resources and more specifi cally between various factions within the military

Of the many problems that pose difficulty for Stares's analysis, perhaps th unit of analysis is the most important one The treatment of U S presidentia administrations as units of analysis obscures some of the important change that have taken place in Soviet activity in space The tremendous body (information on the American space program is not balanced by the same vol ume and forms of information in the Soviet case In this sense, Stares's wor is much more a study of the militarization of space by Americans than it is comparative study of the militarization of space It is to Stares's credit that h turned over every stone to corroborate his statements regarding the role o the United States in space, but the same options for exploring the Soviet cas were clearly unavailable The failure to exploit each of his cases as controls i a systematic and rigorous fashion for understanding changes in American an Soviet policy leaves many unanswered questions

Rather than illustrating the major conditions that shaped the struggle fo military power in space on both the American and Soviet sides, America policy in space is treated as somewhat linear until Stares begins the analysi of the Reagan administration. Unfortunately, this approach magnifies the im portance of Reagan's efforts This is also the weakest case although it consti tutes a critical part of his analyses The anomaly Stares seeks to explain her is essentially the radically different policies of the Reagan administratio compared to other presidential administrations The problem in this case i that Reagan's policies must be viewed as the culmination of a whole series o institutional changes in the United States and Soviet space programs, an not simply an idea that Reagan discovered in some dream This is one of the major points of Stares's work, but in the conclusion to the book he blames the failure to limit the struggle for military dominance in space flatly on Reaga as if the arms race in space began with the Reagan administration. As Stare puts it, "In hindsight, the early part of the 1980s will most probably b

iewed as a fundamental watershed in the militarization of space During his period the chance for a significant antisatellite arms control agreement was lost—possibly for ever The Reagan administration squandered an opportunity to take advantage of unprecedented Soviet flexibility on the issue" (p 235). Whether this is true or not, we must clearly look beyond the Reagan administration for answers to the more complex questions As the Soviets continue to move forward with the exploration and exploitation of space, the rhetoric of the Reagan administration pales in the face of Soviet successes

If Stares provides us with a broad-based comparative and historical account of the militarization of space, then the appropriate sequel to his study is Jasani's collection of essays on space and international security This is one of the more outstanding works on the subject of space, weapons, and war The essays were taken from a conference held in Stockholm in July 1985 Several basic questions are addressed by the contributors to the volume What are the major political and technical issues related to space weapons? How realistic is the idea that nuclear weapons might be made obsolete? Can a defense be constructed against nuclear weapons, and what are the implications of a shift from offense to defense? What are the consequences for European security and international stability? What are the effects of space weapons on the substance and structures of arms control treaties?

The work begins with a description of the basic concepts and problems associated with space weapons and their place in the international context First the authors embark on a discussion of the appropriate systems for supporting the use of space weapons The leading assumption is that military spacecraft will become increasingly complex and sophisticated in the near future and become an integral part of command and control systems for battle management in the event of war in space These systems constitute a variety of different satellites, and play different roles depending on the attributes of space weapons This depends in part on whether they are offensive or defensive weapons, or instruments that possess both offensive and defensive attributes The authors then turn to a discussion of institutional constraints that might limit the deployment and use of space weapons in the event of a crisis Here we have a discussion of the prospects for an ASAT Treaty and the problematics of the ABM Treaty that arise from a detailed discussion of space weapons

The second source of discussion is a complex rendering of the bureaucratic and technical issues related to space weapons and their operationalization in the strategic context. A discussion of the architecture of defensive systems in space follows. The major conclusion is that however we conceive of such a system, it will almost certainly be permeable It may nevertheless prove to be valuable and change the balance between offensive and defensive forces such that a novel force structure may enhance security Richard Garwin ar-

gues that the construction of a defense is more costly and dangerous given the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the effort to build a defense will make it more difficult to reduce the actual number of nuclear warheads on either side. Soviet scholars Kokoshin, Vassiliev, and Gerasyov provide a detailed discussion of the counter measures that might be used against space weapons They address the "neutralization and destruction of different elements of the antimissile system echelons, and the buildup, modification, and diversification of strategic nuclear weapons" (p 91). Although their discussion is very brief, they lay out the major theoretical considerations for counteracting space strike weapons of both an offensive and defensive nature

The third source of discussion is a critical assessment of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the Strategic Defense Initiative as compared with Mutual Assured Destruction This is a complex exploration of the pros and cons of SDI versus MAD

Gray and Schneider conclude that three major considerations might make SDI a reality (a) offensive force negotiations might set ceilings on offensive forces (progressive reductions if possible), (b) banning or limiting offensive countermeasures to emerging defenses, (c) agreeing to confidence-building measures that would help protect space-based ballistic missile defense systems from attack Should these issues be resolved in an environment of progressive reductions in offensive forces, the likelihood of moving from an offensive to a defensive world may become a reality

Sidney Drell argues that U S and Soviet officials should reaffirm the ABM Treaty and calls for stringent limits on American efforts so that they comply with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty In Drell's opinion, this would prevent a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty One of the more interesting points made by Drell is that the central questions related to ballistic missile defense are not simply technological In fact, Drell argues further that we are faced with a situation where applied research will ultimately lead to the development of defensive systems that are integrated into a larger network of offensive forces Thus the key question relates to the interaction between defensive systems, countermeasures on offensive weapons systems, and the basic stability of the balance. According to Drell, the fundamental political and strategic problems have not changed from the early ABM debates The notion that the Strategic Defense Initiative might change the nature of the basic political and strategic problems facing both the Soviets and Americans is a case of mistaken identity

In a highly insightful discussion of the ramifications of SDI for the ABM Treaty, Danielsson argues that the major source of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is political, and no technical fix can resolve the conflict The ABM Treaty should be reaffirmed because both the United States and the Soviet Union have more to gain from cooperation than conflict, and both can enhance their security The ABM Treaty is not only

ymbol of cooperation but an instrument of cooperation that has served to tabilize U.S. and Soviet relations for more than 13 years There is no real ieed for the redefinition of the ABM Treaty, for it clearly prohibits the de- relopment, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems Finally, J.S and Soviet officials must take a much broader view of the prospects of iuclear war Discussions of this order must always take into account the con- equences of strategic weapons for the whole international community in heir analysis

Given the lack of substantial change in discussions between U S and So- viet officials regarding antisatellite warfare, Walter Slocombe considers some of the possible variations in a potential ASAT Arms Control Agreement Slocombe identifies two key problems that govern any discussion of such an agreement First, under current circumstances of secrecy regarding anti- satellite weapons and warfare verification is virtually impossible Second, there is considerable overlap between antisatellite weapon systems and the conceptions and realities of ballistic missile defense Hence, U S and Soviet officials must agree to substantial limits on activities in a variety of areas that fall outside ASAT weaponry While agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is possible it requires formidable political power and leadership on behalf of the American and Soviet states

The last major discussion in the Jasani volume is about the implications of space weapons and ballistic missile defense for other countries in the inter- national system, particularly for NATO Several major conclusions emerge from this discussion Sanford Lakoff concludes that a total moratorium on re- search related to space strike weapons and a BMD system is virtually impos- sible under the present circumstances It is therefore impossible to make precise statements about the consequences of research and development As Lakoff puts it, 'Inevitably, therefore discussions of the most fundamental issue at stake bear a disquieting resemblance to the dispute of theologians over whether in the last days lambs will lie down with lions or the world will be consumed by the fires of Armageddon One side may turn out to be right but there is no earthly way to judge in advance whether either of them is anticipating what will actually come to pass (p 229)

Ronald Mason argues that the development of ASAT and BMD systems rests primarily on two considerations 1 The changes that may occur in the present mix of offensive and defensive systems would probably introduce a series of shifts and disruptions in the overall balance of forces which in turn would lead to counterreaction It is therefore misleading to assume that there could be a smooth transition between two hypothetical stable strategic systems whose architecture could be well defined and handsomely balanced 2 The security and the role of third parties will continue to be directly affected by the evolution of the bilateral superpower relationship, an evolu- tion which would become more difficult to anticipate

In a brief essay on Strategic Defense and nonaligned nations Mukund

Dubey argues persuasively that the major objective of U.S. officials is to achieve dominance in space and enhance the possibility of launching a first strike should war with the Soviet Union become necessary. If the arms race is extended to space, argues Dubey, the entire international security system will be altered, and we will move back to the bipolar world of the 1950s. In contrast to Dubey, John Wilkinson argues that Western European states have much to gain from the successful operationalization of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Wilkinson goes to great lengths to defend the theory and practicalities of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In the words of Wilkinson "Although no defensive system could ever be totally effective, the denial of certainty of destruction for any particular target would remove the premium upon the potential benefit of preemptive action. It would be a factor for stability and peace" (p. 305).

Jasani's volume adds a measure of complexity and diversity to the discussion of space that is unparalleled by few other single discussions of space and international relations. There are a variety of lessons to be learned from a review of this volume. First, the study of space and international relations is multidimensional and requires much more than sound technical expertise. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is primarily political in nature, and the answers to many of the questions regarding arms control and international stability must be examined in this context. Second, the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union must be placed in comparative and historical perspective. The struggle for dominance in space began several decades ago, and many of the issues examined in the volume under review were the subject of discussion. Third, the lines between offense and defense are less important in the face of weapons that can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. Fourth, it obscures the issue to argue that SDI will not work. As Sidney Drell notes, there are bound to be major technological breakthroughs that will necessitate a more meaningful understanding of space and international security.

Hans Mark's book provides an interesting and impressive account of the development of the American space program, and efforts to build policy support for an American space station. It is also an important account of the fits and starts in the development and administration of the American space program, and might more properly be viewed as the study of space, science and government.

The first design of a space station was carried out in 1928 by an Austrian engineer named Hermann Potocnik, writing under the pseudonym Herman Noordung. This conception consisted of three interconnected but separate units: a habitation wheel, a power house, and an observatory. Wernher Von Braun argued some years later, fully aware of Noordung's work, for a triple decked wheel, 250 feet in diameter to be placed in polar orbit. Von Braun believed this would serve as a wayward station to other planets. American

ok up the matter of a space station in the early 1960s under the Kennedy lministration but dropped it because of Kennedy's fear that the Soviets ight meet the challenge and deliver another blow to American techno-gical superiority. In retrospect, it would appear that Kennedy was correct he Soviets have today a fully operative space station while Americans de-ate about design and operations. To make matters worse, the space station as become a major source of international political debate between mem-ers of the western alliance because of the Pentagon's insistence on using the roposed space station for military purposes

Until the launching of U S Skylab on May 14, 1973, in response to the oviet launching of the first Salyut space station on April 19, 1971, Ameri-ans could not boast of a space station However Skylab was only a tempo-ary system and in many ways a symbolic response to the Soviet achieve-ent When Skylab fell from space in an uncontrolled reentry over Australia nd the Indian Ocean in July 1979, it was nothing more than a piece of gar-age, and Americans failed to initiate a program to build and deploy a sub-stitute. In contrast, the Soviets managed to establish a permanent space sta-ion with the launching of Salyut 6 on September 29, 1977 Since 1977 the oviets have made tremendous progress in this area, and this assumes spe-ial importance for both civilian and military matters With this in mind, we urn to a discussion of Hans Mark's description and discussion of the space tation

Hans Mark begins his work by describing his personal experience in the American space program under the guidance and inspiration of Edward Teller at the Livermore nuclear laboratory The line of discussion here is par-icularly important because the social bonds developed during his early ex-perience at Livermore played an important role far beyond the limits of that experience in the American space program It demonstrates that simple ules of organizational behavior fail to explain the activities of executives in he absence of detailed comparative and historical analyses of the lives and ca-reers of executives Mark and his colleagues called on each other for advice and support on numerous occasions, and this played a critical role in shaping the American space program This is one of the central lessons of Mark's work

Why did Mark write, *The Space Station*? It is much more than a critical assessment of American efforts to construct a space station The book is clearly part of an effort to marshal widespread private and public support for the space program and particularly the space station in the face of the tre-mendous damage to the American space program caused by the explosion of Challenger in January 1986 It is the story of a government official and a sci-entist concerned with the security of his country and a vision of man's rela-tionship to space As Mark demonstrates we are on the brink of major breakthroughs unlike anything we have experienced in the past Like many luminaries, Mark would rather we pushed ahead today rather than tomor-

row. And why not, the American space program has made tremendous progress since the space age began in 1957. Nevertheless, the pessimism regarding the American space program persists, and much of Mark's work is directed towards his efforts and those of his colleagues to institute their programs in spite of considerable opposition.

Of the many insights provided by Mark's work, the first is the expansion and contraction of the state to accommodate the novelties of space technology in the face of the Soviet challenge The second insight is the importance of bureaucratic struggles to institute programs that may be crucial to national security, but have come to assume a life and momentum of their own and increasingly reflect the interests of social and political forces within the state The third insight is the exceptional role of scientists in the political process that leads to the call for changes in strategic theory and technology The fourth insight is the primacy of politics in the determination of space policy The merits of the development and deployment of space technology is often less important in the final analysis than politics, especially presidential politics Fifth, as U S dependence on instruments in space has grown, particularly dependence on navigational and communication satellites, the penetration of NASA by social and political forces for military purposes has increased The explosion of Challenger provided an opportune moment for a variety of social and political forces within the military to increase their power, and for them to argue that the management of the civilian space program was a danger to national security

There are a number of different arguments about the merits of the space station that are important to understand and allow us to place Mark's advocacy of the space program in proper perspective The first argument is that the commercialization of space is going to continue growing at a pace that will require many more manned flights to outer space Establishing a permanent manned mission in space might allow a reduction in costs Telecommunications, space manufacturing, and prospects for a solar-power satellite are major sources of discussion These projects are said to lend support to the necessity for several space stations The opposition argues that while telecommunications is an area that a space station might enhance, it is unnecessary because of the tremendous advances in existing features of telecommunications and a number of major advances in other areas created as a result of unmanned missions As for space industry and solar-power satellites, the opposition argues that it will take years before we can even begin to give either of them serious attention since there are no clear set of realizable benefits at the moment In the interim, the billions of dollars that might be spent on a space station could be redirected towards more meaningful programs such as space science.

The second argument is fairly simple. A space station is required because there are tasks in space that require the resourcefulness of men, and these

activities could be vital to the security of the United States and other nations. Furthermore, it is argued that many of the experiments that are crucial for understanding space might be conducted within the confines of a space station. The opposition argues that this is unnecessary as indicated by the tremendous success of unmanned missions in space

The third argument is that the United States must consider the Soviet challenge in space and act accordingly to construct a space station to match that of the Soviets The counterargument is that the Soviets built a space station because their technology is so primitive that a space station is required to carry out many of the tasks that Americans can carry out with high technology Americans need not respond!

In contrast to these arguments, Mark delineates several additional arguments and variations of the arguments described above that he encountered in the struggle to give life to the space station For example, he points out that Weinberger and other members of the Defense Department argued that support for the space station might force American officials to move large amounts of money and resources from areas of more immediate importance to America's national security Once the space station was sanctioned by Reagan and became an acceptable part of the political and organizational fabric, the Defense Department vehemently argued for a role of direct military significance in its construction and operations Another argument was that conceptions of the space station were too limited and should be made part of a larger project such as the establishment of a permanent base on the moon Should the Soviets achieve this breakthrough first it would be a tremendous blow to the United States Finally he presents the argument that people in space are a liability rather than an asset Their presence in space is unnecessary since any tragedy in space related to people would have major political consequences for American political leaders

As Mark argues in his book the opposition to the space station was formidable, and there was no sound reason to believe that he and other proponents of the space station would receive a favorable decision Mark's argument is not fundamentally different from many other proponents of the space station As Mark pointed out in Reagan's words, America is too great for small dreams " The space station was a major and intermediate layer in the space program that would have long-term consequences of the first order, and we must have the courage to move forward in spite of the limited benefits that we might accrue initially In effect the space station would serve as a laboratory in space, a maintenance and repair base and a staging base for more ambitious ventures All of these functions are of vital and growing importance to U S security because of the exceptional dependence of the United States on instruments in space for purposes of communication, intelligence, and naval operations The space station must be manned because there is no substitute for human judgment

In comparison to other arguments raised during the debate on the merits of the space station, there was nothing terribly distinctive about Mark's argument for the space station, and on these grounds it was not so unusual for him and others to expect an unfavorable decision from Reagan. That Reagan reached a positive decision in the face of the various arguments is therefore a very curious matter, and one that Mark either fails to understand, or simply does not have the appropriate information to explain.

One thing is clear according to Mark The decision by the Reagan administration to construct a space station was politically motivated. As Mark puts it, "We often do the right things for the wrong reasons " The lessons for organizational theory are simple A kind of unilinear and unitary policy process has no place in the determination of decisions regarding space policy Space policy is a product of politics because it has enduring symbolic and political value to a president and his men It illuminates the vision of a president and allows him to place his markings on the face of history Few other opportunities are so grand, sweeping, enduring, and far-reaching in nature

For all the evidence marshaled to support the space station, in the end the primacy of politics prevailed Whether coalition politics mattered or not those political coalitions that developed in response to the challenges posed by the proposal of the space station often supported it for fundamentally different reasons, and in some instances highly contradictory reasons If a coalition opposed the space station initially, once a positive decision was rendered they reentered the policy process to minimize damage to their interests The same forces that so vehemently opposed a policy directive often reenter the policy process demanding a unique role to create new sources of legitimacy and power to determine policy To shore up their political position they often agreed to assume a portion of the costs associated with constructing the space station

The politicization of the scientific community with respect to the proposal of the space station is most instructive It demonstrates that the boundaries between the scientific community and the political community are often fictitious The lines drawn between politicians or policymakers and technocrats only serve to obscure our understanding of policy, and particularly space policy

Mark's account demonstrates that policy parameters are often a function of exogenous factors Sudden shifts in strategic policy can have a tremendous and overwhelming impact on the policy process and the policy decision Support for the space station was not only a product of bureaucratic encounters in Washington It was a product of international collaboration or the prospects for international collaboration that would serve to enhance the standing of the United States in the eyes of its allies and enemies

Finally, Mark's work is an invaluable account of the relation between space, science, and government This is an area that deserves considerably more attention than it has received. Mark's story needs to be examined in

comparative and historical perspective We might compare the processes that led to the decision to construct the space station with other comparable moments. The decision to travel to the moon constitutes one possible comparison We have many historical and bureaucratic accounts of strategic decisions related to space and strategic weapons programs, but we have few comparative studies Mark drew on his early professional experience for comparative assessments to determine what strategy would be appropriate to push the proposal for the space station through the policy process

There are few basic books on space and international law of high scholarly merit J E Fawcett's work is an important introductory guide on space and international law In this respect, Fawcett's work proves to be a valuable source for the uninitiated but should not be treated as much more than this Surely Fawcett understands this and for this reason it would be unfair to engage in any sustained criticism of the text

The major point of Fawcett's work is that we are living in an era of tremendous and unprecedented change in space technology, and this is of special significance for comprehending the logic of change in international relations There is virtually no dimension of international activity that is not affected by activity in space, and in the future the impact of such activity is likely to be even more radical than it has been in the past This change in international relations presents a novel set of challenges to theoreticians and policymakers in international security, international organizations within the administrative state and transnational industries and within political states Moreover, the complexity and rapidity of change in space makes it increasingly difficult to meet such challenges What are these challenges?

The first challenge is related to space and sovereignty The definition of space remains vague and open to a variety of interpretations The geographical scale of space and the saturation of geostationary orbit with telecommunications and military instruments simply does not allow for the definition and stabilization of frontiers in space And as war has become the central focus of activity in space for both the Soviets and Americans the monopolization of force has become the basis for order in space While students of international relations look to the Outer Space Treaty for basic answers to these problems, the politics of ambiguity prevails

The second challenge concerns the responsibility of states for activity in space The time has passed when space was conceived as simply a domain through which vehicles might simply pass Given current patterns of travel and the decay of objects in space, uniform rules must be established for both travel and the occupation of space The United States Space Shuttle actually allows for the establishment of space stations and in time we may have human settlements in space if activity in space continues at the current pace Of more immediate concern, argues Fawcett, is the construction of geostationary satellites for purposes of converting solar radiation into electric power to

be used for consumption on Earth. What rules of international conduct will govern such activity? Rules of registration, rules for evaluating whether states are getting their equitable share of the resources made available by such activity, and rules regarding the dangers and liabilities of states for damage to human life and property must be written and rewritten to reflect the changing realities of man's exploration of space Fortunately, international law provides some guidance on such matters, as is embodied in the U N Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, but how do institutions monitor pollution of the upper atmosphere? The effects of pollution in space are largely a mystery If pollution of terrestrial areas is any guide to the problems of pollution in space, we could be in deep trouble by the time we actually discover the significance of pollution in space

The third challenge is related to the range of actors in space As is true in international relations, there are three major actors in the international political system of particular importance for understanding activity in space states, entrepreneurs, and international agencies The basic nature of their activity is transnational. This simple view of actors of space, however, conceals many separate institutions within the state that play important roles in space Moreover, it conceals the fact that there is often collaboration between the state and transnational corporations for both scientific and military purposes Fawcett fails to give sufficient attention to the whole set of relationships, but otherwise does a fine job of summarizing their more formal roles

Fawcett draws on the Law of the Sea Convention for explicating some of the more complex issues regarding the exploitation of space by private corporations But the key point of the exercise is that while the Law of the Sea provides for special rules governing the use, exploitation, and conservation of resources in the seas, there are no comparable rules governing the use and exploitation of space by private corporations This is true in spite of open collaboration between many states and private industry in space

Perhaps one of the more interesting features of the collaboration is the growing financial debts that are being incurred by corporations for space activity As debts of private corporations rise, the debts of public agencies like NASA decline In addition, the commercialization of space has brought with it the institutionalization of organizations that transcend state boundaries The area of telecommunications is a special area of concern in this regard The challenge posed by these developments are exceedingly complex In the latter case, transnational organizations are exceptionally difficult to monitor because of various working coalitions within the larger membership of organizations.

The fourth challenge articulated by Fawcett is related to telecommunications and remote sensing These are areas where considerable institutionalization of controls exist The fascinating thing about telecommunications

that unlike most resources it cannot be consumed in total As telecommunications depend entirely on an association of electric and magnetic fields, these resources are available on an indefinite basis

The major problem is noise created by forces that are either unknown to man, or created by the use of instruments in space that interfere with the normal transmission of information The question of sovereignty would appear to be a moot problem on the face of it, but states have gone to great lengths to draft principles governing the transmission of information, and ensuring that member states follow these principles closely These principles are embodied in the guidelines of the International Telecommunications Union, and the Interim Arrangements for a Global Communications Satellite System Efforts to make these rules work, and the expansion of activity in space has led to spillover effects as geosynchronous orbit has been continually subjected to increasing patterns of saturation

What began as an outstanding effort to prevent interference with such elements as tracking, telemetry command control and monitoring has increasingly become obsolescent in a world characterized by anarchy in space

The catalogue of changes described heretofore are usually considered only with respect to international law but are of more general importance to students of political science as well And this is a subject that deserves much greater attention than it has received in the past Students of international law often write as if international law existed outside the domain of political science Many political scientists assume all too often that international law is of little consequence in high politics and an anarchical world

Force and the threat of force continue to lie at the very core of outstanding research in international relations One cannot assume that Fawcett is unaware of this viewpoint for his work touches on problems of special interest to political scientists While the political scientist takes special note of these problems, the student of international law rarely sees any special substance that might be provided by the ideas and methods of political science Furthermore, the student of international law often fails to consider that the study of activity in outer space has a special relationship to other areas of political science that could prove crucial to understanding the impact of changes in outer space on international law

In summary, Fawcett's work constitutes a basic and good introductory text to the field of outer space and international law It points to several of the more interesting and complex problems faced by students of international law and international relations This is particularly revealing because it demonstrates that outer space law still remains in the formative period of development. Students of space law are increasingly faced with radical changes in the field, and these changes often require theoretical and empirical research beyond their scope of expertise At a time when war in space is a major subject of discussion, it would behoove students of international law particu-

larly political scientists, to take Fawcett's summary analysis of outer space law more seriously.

Conclusions

This review demonstrates that space and international relations is an important dimension of the field of international relations in its own right. It includes a body of assumptions, theoretical ideas, evidence, and conclusions that are essential for understanding international relations. The time has passed when we could speak of space and space technology as objects beyond man's mastery. Furthermore, space and international relations transcends many of the recent discussions of space, weapons, and war, and the failure to address this assumption may only serve to limit our understanding of international relations more generally. Those who find it convenient to speak of space and international relations as if it were a creature of the ABM debate or the Strategic Defense Initiative would do well to place contemporary discussions in comparative and historical perspective. Scholars and other parties to the discussion of space and international relations who lack historical consciousness are like trees without roots.

Political Leadership

H. G. Peter Wallach
Central Connecticut State University

Women Leaders in American Politics. Edited by James David Barber and Barbara Kellerman. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986. Pp. xii, 401. $19.95 paper.)

Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis. By Jean Blondel. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1987. Pp. viii, 216.)

Leadership and Organizations. By Alan Bryman. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Pp. xi, 235. $32.50 cloth, $16.95 paper.)

Classic Advice on Leadership. By the Harvard Business Review. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Pp. 224. $6.95 paper.)

Political Leadership: A Source Book. Edited by Barbara Kellerman. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986. Pp. xv, 462. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.)

Politics is not yet defined as leadership,[1] but these 1986–1987 titles, added to those published at the beginning of the decade,[2] establish political leader-

[1] See Robert C. Tucker. 1981. *Politics as Leadership*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

[2] See Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus. 1985. *Leaders: The Strategies of Taking Charge*. New York: Harper & Row; G. W. Breslauer. *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Political Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics*; James MacGregor Burns. 1984. *The Power to Lead: The Crisis of the American Presidency*. New York: Simon and Schuster; Barbara Kellerman. 1984. *Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; R. S. Khare and David Little. 1984. *Leadership: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Karl A. Lamb. 1982. *The Guardians: Leadership Values and the American Tradition*. New York: W. W. Norton; Alistair Mant. 1983. *Leaders We Deserve*. Oxford: Martin Robertson and Co.; Bert A. Rockman. 1984. *The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System*. New York: Praeger; William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor. 1984. *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Dean Keith Simonton. 1984. *Genius, Creativity & Leadership: Historiometric Inquiries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Charles B. Strozier and Daniel Offer. 1985. *The Leader: Psychohistorical Essays*. New York: Plenum Press; Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. *Essays on Leadership: Comparative Insights*. 1985. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Tucker, op. cit.; Aaron Wildavsky. *The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader*. 1984. University, AL: University of Alabama Press; Ann Ruth Willner. 1984. *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

ship as a growing subfield. Old categorizations are now set aside, analysis placed in perspective, and the foundations of theory are furthered by t questioning of Kellerman, the analytical descriptions of Bryman, and Blo del's critical appraisal of past efforts. Applied treatments, as the *Harva Business Review* reader and the Barber and Kellerman volume demonstrat further teaching and research on the topic. Ideas for expanding political sc ence and leadership studies are evident in every book, future compariso among Carter, Reagan, Gorbachev, Gandhi, and all other individuals w have had an effect on political efforts will further this effort

Current theoretical questions about political leadership are evident in t classics collected by Kellerman and referred to by Blondel and Bryma They are What is the effect of leadership? Why do leaders lead? Why followers follow? Is there a leadership for all seasons? But in a behavior age, applied issues help shape theory, and because the answers by Carly and Spencer, Lasswell and Freud, and all the other writers Kellerman i cludes, are exclusive rather than integrative, her selections provide persp tives rather than answers By leaving out a section on what leaders do sl furthers the assumption that leadership is largely understood through t leader-follower relationship The resulting gap is considered by Blondel ar Bryman, who highlight the effect of leadership on organizations and decisi making by concentrating on how leaders do the what.

In political science, where systemic analysis, normative themes and i stitutional perspectives are dominant, such questions are sometimes left person-oriented psychologists or event-oriented historians When politi scientists discuss leadership, they describe conditions, systems, and offic more than the actions of individuals or small groups As a result, those wh interpret politics in terms of personalities find our discipline lacking Th authors under discussion however, explain that the study of leadership f cuses on individuals, though they do not emphasize personalities at the e pense of an analysis of the locus of power

Theorists on leadership go beyond examining where power exists, to th nature of its components Bryman, for instance, finds the Weberian distin tion between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority too e clusive (included in Kellerman, pp 232–44) He disagrees with Weber "suggestion that the bureaucratic form of organization is universally sup rior" (p 169), because it diminishes the importance of individuals, or even small and cohesive leadership group In this rational-legal age Bryman va ues institutions, but he also finds the actions of Reagan and Gorbachev rel vant For him, overlapping streams of analysis, joining institutional and ch ismatic perceptions, for instance, are appropriate

Each volume provides a variety of unique explanations about such jun tures between organizations and individuals In the Kellerman antholo Eugen Lewis classifies political leaders as entrepreneurs Bryman goes a st

ırther by criticizing researchers for studying leadership in order to understand organizations, by pointing out that the societal impact of a leader may e more important than his or her effect on established units The Blondel heory redefines Weber's idea of "charisma" and indicates that national leadrs unify traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal attributes Each writer hus explains how the impact of individuals transcends non-charismatic circumstances Whether the leader manipulates, has an other-directed sense of ower (David C McClelland and David H Burnham, *Classic Advice on eadership*, pp 103–18), or uses gender specific attributes to motivate and ocus the energy of followers (Barber and Kellerman), the results cannot be xplained by institutional action or interaction theory Nor, as is so often lamented, are leaders straightjacketed by culture and structure Bryman finds hat "the individual is capable of effecting desired alternatives" (p 175) Leaders have "institutional and other resources" in Blondel's view (p 182) They define circumstances, plan resolutions to problems and mobilize for the effectuation of those resolutions

However, no contemporary author claims leaders are unchecked The question (the major question when building theory according to Blondel) is what possibilities for action exist The answers vary by author Time, the development of skills, or the dynamics of organizational life are relevant according to Barber and Kellerman Bryman and Zeleznik (in the *Harvard* reader), respectively But in every limit there is of course a potentiality, and thus Blondel warns that the measurement of maneuverability demands means for evaluating all possible actions Comprehension of all appropriate perspectives is thus required to explain what leaders can do

One problem with such practical assessments is that leadership as more than the adept discovery of tactics is forgotten This promotes discussion of whether management is leadership the one referring to those who fulfill goals, the other to those who set them "Managers do things right Leaders do the right thing," write Bennis and Nanus (*Leaders The Strategies of Taking Charge*, p 22), Burns, in Kellerman (pp 419 27) indicates that transformational leadership is morally elevating, and Zeleznik, in a *Harvard Business Review* article not included in this reader writes that "leaders are active rather than reactive shaping ideas instead of responding to them Managers view work as an enabling process involving some combination of people and ideas interacting to establish strategies and make decisions" (55 3, p 91) Organizational goals they all indicate capture managers more than leaders However, Blondel and Bryman, who are especially concerned with organizational leaders find this distinction too stark they see goals inherent in any kind of leadership whether it is management or not So Blondel posits a hierarchy wherein managers are just leaders of "narrow scope" (p 97)

The goal-defining role of leadership is now so well accepted that at the

least it is assumed leaders reorder the values and tastes of followers. The examples in Barber and Kellerman show women who further personal as well as gender and societal goals And Ohmann, in the *Harvard Review* reader, points out that "skyhooks" give meaning to corporate purpose and thus motivate employees. As value setters, rather than technologists of mobilization, leaders measure their environment, posit direction, and promote achievement of goals. Leaders are not just measured for what they do and how they do it, but for the goals they pursue

Among these works, the major differences are not about the nature of goals, but about the linkage between pursuit of goals, actions by leaders, and environmental pressures Bryman, who feels leadership is sometimes only a part of management, emphasizes the effect of organizational environments on results (pp 197–99) Blondel differentiates leaders by the scope of their goals and their interest in change, and then indicates that "the overall aim is to assess the leeway that leaders appear to have . by confronting the goals with the underlying conditions of the society " It is this last view that is implicitly accepted by Barber and Kellerman, as they describe how specific conditions provide tools for the political advancement of women There is no leadership for all seasons, Kellerman concludes So the question remains, to what degree are goals and methods constrained by environment?

Such analysis indicates cohesiveness is growing among leadership theorists, strict distinctions are declining in importance, and a consciousness that description will help ascertain the place of leadership in political activities is advancing Less attention to specific events and singular leaders is encouraging a focus on the dynamics and evolving aspects of leadership When Aaron Wildavsky described how Moses progressed through regimes of slavery anarchy, equity, and hierarchy, a model for understanding changes in regimes and leaders was established (*The Nursing Father Moses as a Political Leader*) Now Bryman and Blondel define the parameters of organizational interaction between conditions and leaders, the *Harvard Business* reader provides advice on how to take the measure of organizations in order to act, and Barbara Jordan, in Barber and Kellerman, relates the experiences that shaped her initiatives on impeachment The organization theorists, especially those represented in the *Harvard Business Review* reader, look at how the environment can promote creativity In Blondel and the two volumes edited by Kellerman, attention is directed to the role of socialization and recruitment in bringing forth leaders who can use their environments effectively Thus within leadership studies, a division remains among those who emphasize individuals and those who emphasize environment and institutions The differences are fundamental to political science, where discussions about institutions, functions, and conditions are distinguished from those about the impact of individuals, which emphasize what elections, journalistic focus and individual capabilities of mobilization really mean

All of these issues are evident in the Kellerman volume as a collection of classics, it is outstanding Largely organized to highlight the impact of leaders, and the relation of leaders to followers, it ignores what leaders do otherwise, and provides a background of fundamentals Though the editor rarely takes a firm position, she highlights the major questions and adds thoughtful essays that link the articles The result is especially effective as an ancillary text on political leadership

The volume edited by Barber and Kellerman is less successful Although it contains outstanding reprints from newspapers, professional journals, and memoirs, it is not cohesive or focused in terms of the role of leadership One problem is that there is a new category for every article, and the categories are only roughly assembled sections dealing with "Constitutional Democracy," "Civil Liberties," "Government by the People " and "Running the Government " A result is that one hears much about the successes and defeats of women leaders and is drawn into the concerns of feminist activists

Classic Advice on Leadership is similarly aimed at a specific audience businesspeople rather than political scientists are being addressed But several articles, especially "Power Is the Great Motivator" by David C McClelland and David H Burnham and Power and Politics in Organizational Life," by Abraham Zeleznik provide a linkage between debates about leadership by organization scholars psychologists sociologists and political scientists

Blondel's *Political Leadership* bears the subtitle "Towards a General Analysis," which indicates what it is a prolegomena It carefully examines prevalent thought about the role of national leaders The result highlights the pressures on the rulers of national states and nearly ignores the impact of charismatic leaders heads of interest groups and the dynamos who give localities or minorities a significant identity Nevertheless the last chapter, on future research provides ideas for empirical investigators of any kind of leadership

Bryman includes a similar last chapter The greatest value of his book is the analysis applied to most institutional theories of leadership He proves to be a master at identifying subtle similarities and relevant distinctions As a prolegomena, students of institutions may find this books offers more than Blondel's

Once again political scientists can find insights into leadership in a variety of new works At a time when bookshelves are filling with far more shallow books on business leadership this indicates where goals should be set

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Edward B. Portis, Editor

Art, Ideology, and Politics. Edited by Judith Balfe and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski (New York: Praeger, 1985. Pp. ii, 369. $41.95.)

To a growing body of literature focusing on the political and sociological dynamics of the art world, Judith H. Balfe and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski have added a significant collection of essays. Most of them emanate from the Tenth Annual Conference on Social Theory and the Arts held in 1983. Richard Peterson in the work's foreword reminds us that the sociology *of art* as a subfield within sociology had its origins approximately seventeen years ago. Similarly, political scientists paid sparse attention to the relationship of government and the arts (with the exception of first amendment issues) until the rapid budgetary growth of the National Endowment for the Arts in the 1970s. *Art, Ideology and Politics*, serves as a vehicle for its contributors to provide an analysis of group and institutional behavior within the art world and an understanding of government's interaction within that world.

Balfe and Wyszomirski divide the volume into four parts. The first, "Conceptions of Culture and Social Structure," contain chapters by Wilson Carey McWilliams and Herbert Gans. McWilliams provides an interesting review of religious and political philosophical outlooks about the arts and their impact upon the role of the arts in American public life. Gans updates his discussion of "taste cultures" found in his 1974 work, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste*. He provides a societal analysis and comments on among other things the completed transformation of the original counterculture into conventional culture and the emergence of the "yuppies."

"Artists and Art-World Institutions: Social and Economic Factors" constitutes the second part of the work. Two chapters within this section explore the subcultures within which artists are differentiated from one another. Barbara Rosenblum assists the reader in understanding the dynamic marketplace in which artists reside. She analyzes strategies employed by artists to enhance their economic standing and the role of critics, dealers, collectors, and others in determining that standing. She focuses primarily on the visual artist and behavior found within the art marketplace. Cristina Bodinger-deUriate shares the results of her study on the status system of free-lance

JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 1988

musicians in Boston. Social skills as well as musical skill, instrument, ar idiom play a distinctive role in the status hierarchy among these musician The status system is a functional one for the musical world in which the musicians coexist

The second part concludes with two chapters that examine the behavior cultural institutions Audience studies have demonstrated that those who a tend artistic events tend to be better educated and of higher income than tl general population. There are some differences in the characteristics of tl audiences of the various arts, but the general proposition regarding incon and education holds for the major artistic forms Given this, cultural institu tions which benefit from public subsidy either through direct cash paymen or tax exemption confront arguments about subsidization of the wealthy the expense of those in economic need As Linda Fritschner and Mil Hoffman state in their chapter, "If arts organizations are to legitimate the public funding, they must demonstrate a certain amount of audience app for the services and products that they supply " They report on the results a Local Arts Center effort to expand its audience composition through tl marketing of arts classes and an open house They suggest that it is not on important to understand audience attributes of the arts but also the contribu tion of the service attributes of cultural institutions in the determination audience mix Paul DiMaggio and Kristen Stenberg studied American res dent theaters and factors that contribute to the selection of their repertoir Their findings regarding growth and institutionalization of theater compani have implications for policymakers interested in fostering greater cultur diversity

"Ideological Redefinition of the Arts Under Changing Conditions" consti tutes the third part of the Balfe and Wyszomirski work and contains fo chapters that examine this topic Michael Kimmel provides an insightful lo at the "Arts and Crafts" movement in England and the United States Bor out of an anti-industrial, antimodernism sentiment, Kimmel examines th transformation of the movement into one that even viewed some machines works of art Gene Metcalf supplies an interesting review of the way bla art has been viewed in the United States and the consequences emanatin from its categorization by the larger society He comments on the politic and social significance of the process by which art is defined Lars Bjorn his chapter, traces the evolutionary process of jazz through twentieth cen tury America and discusses the changing relationship between the jazz aud ence and performer He pays particular attention to the social composition the audience through the years of jazz's development In the concludin chapter of this section, Margaret Wyszomirski and Judith Balfe use coalitio theory to explain the behavior of the American Ballet Theater (ABT) Th identify the significant members of the coalition that has supported the danc company and the impact of changes in ABT's dance repertoire on that coali

ion. Wyszomirski and Balfe provide an interesting history of ABT which is enriched by the insightful application of coalition theory

Political scientists will find the fourth part of the volume "Aesthetic Ideologies and Public Policy," to be of particular interest Political and governmental interaction with the art world is discussed by each of the contributors in his part. Terri Cornwell reviews the emergence of cultural issues into the political consciousness of the body politic by examining the platforms of political parties She reminds us that research supports that much which is advocated in the major party platforms is enacted either through congressional or executive action The first significant statement regarding the arts by one of the major parties can be found in the Democratic Party's 1960 platform calling for the creation of a federal advisory panel on the arts The Republicans first included an arts plank in their 1972 platform seven years after the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts Cornwell provides an interesting review of party platforms and statements of candidates through 1984 Helen Townsend examines the first major government initiative into the arts in her discourse on the depression era art programs of the Roosevelt administration She is particularly interested in exploring the ideological underpinnings of the art programs and the consequences for their operations Townsend concludes that there were several groups whose ideologies influenced the arts programs Gary Larson reviews the national government's relationship to the arts during the years between the depression era experiment with government art programs and the establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts The negative political ramifications stemming from the arts programs of the WPA effectively eliminated the possibility of any major domestic government arts initiative at the national level however, as the "Cold War" emerged, the government included the arts within cultural exchange programs He also looks at measures taken during the end of the Eisenhower administration and during the Kennedy years that assisted in establishing the groundwork for another major national government domestic initiative in the arts Kevin Mulcahy examines that initiative in his chapter on the National Endowment for the Arts He discusses the operations of the agency, the leadership styles of its directors reasons for the Endowment's success, and controversies surrounding public funding of the arts Mulcahy presents an informative analysis of the National Endowment for the Arts and gives the reader an understanding of significant policy issues confronting the agency and the arts

The last part of *Art, Ideology and Politics* is devoted to concluding thoughts by the editors They note the richness of an interdisciplinary approach to their subject matter and identify several major themes within their book Balfe and Wyszomirski remind the reader that they only touch upon a part of the universe in which their subject matter falls and there is much that remains to be explored The editors have provided a fine collection of readings

that clarifies behavior within the art world and government agencies interested in intervening in that world. It is a welcomed addition to the literature on public policymaking and the arts.

Lawrence D. Mankin, *Arizona State University*

Leadership and Innovation. A Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government Edited by Jameson W Doig and Erwin C Hargrove (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Pp ix, 459 $39.50)

Jameson Doig and Erwin Hargrove have made a significant contribution to both public administration and organizational theory in their editing of *Leadership and Innovation* The twelve case studies survey a range of governmental executives who can be characterized as "administrative entrepreneurs," that is, "individuals who held high-level positions during a period of years when their agencies had devised new programs or other significant innovations and who on first inspection appeared to be personally involved both in devising and in implementing those changes" (p 5) The group ranges from Gifford Pinchot to Robert MacNamara and includes agencies as different as the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office Most of the agencies are part of the federal executive, and, while most of the agency heads are noncareer officials, all would be characterized as "public servants" rather than "politicians "

"There are here no Julius Caesars or others who believed that they could impose their will on the world" (p 7) Nevertheless, the individuals studied tried to make a significant difference in the management of their agencies They were "statesmen" in the formulation of Philip Selznik, that is those who can make "the transition from administrative management to institutional leadership" (*Leadership and Administration* [New York Row and Peterson, 1958], p 154) Not all of these would-be leaders succeeded Robert MacNamara left the Defense Department personally disillusioned and widely criticized, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestall, committed suicide a few weeks after having been forced out of office. None, however, were distinguished simply by time-serving Doig and Hargrove selected their cases with a delicate eye toward advocates of bureaucratic innovation—administrators who sought to transform the bases of how the agencies performed

This emphasis on entrepreneurship and the individual is a deliberate effort to redress what the editors see as the "pessimistic view" about the potential for bureaucratic leadership that pervades the political science literature. Herbert Kaufman's *Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs* is cited specifically for its conclusion that the accomplishments of public officials are modest and incremental, measurable in inches rather than mil

For Doig and Hargrove, this assessment amounts to a *form of defeatism that* "is likely to convey a message to society's best potential leaders if you are interested in using your talents and energies to accomplish challenging tasks, government service is not for you" (p 3) The editors believe that it is important to reclaim individual leadership as an important element of public administration and rather unabashedly seek to rebalance the theoretical scales

The first category of leadership is identified as "rhetorical" where, through the evocation of symbols, an agency head promotes his political resources and galvanizes public support Agency and head may become synonymous as with J Edgar Hoover and the F B I Irwin Hargrove provides a compelling study of David Lilienthal and his passionate commitment to public power and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) As TVA's head during the 1930s the 1940s, Lilienthal articulated the agency's organizational myth The official *persona* of TVA was that of an efficient agency for regional development and one whose internal decision making was based on "grass-roots democracy" Equaling if not surpassing Lilienthal in zealotry was Admiral Hyman Rickover, the "father of the nuclear Navy Eugene Lewis analyzes the means by which the embattled Rickover constructed a shield of technological expertise to protect himself from enemies within the Navy hierarchy and to expand the resources available for nuclear engineering and his submarine program " He also developed along the way a new constituency and a public persona which became a marvelous resource He remained the no-nonsense guy just trying to do his job despite the public bureaucracy p 115)

A second kind of administrative entrepreneur is skillful in bureaucratic politics Margaret Wyszomirski describes how Nancy Hanks, when chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA from 1969 to 1977, forged an alliance in support of public culture The allies included cultural institutions, newly formed arts service organizations influential members of Congress, and White House staffers In essence she argued to President Nixon that public support for the arts was politically a no lose" especially given the magnitude of the investment The result was unparalleled growth in the NEA's public funding and influence within the cultural community Wyszomirski skillfully charts the methods by which Nancy Hanks leveraged the Arts Endowment's small funding into an institutional seal of approval for an array of artistic endeavors In his study of Marriner Eccles who ran the Federal Reserve Board during Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Donald Kettl shows a contrasting form of bureaucratic politics Although not very adept at coalition building Eccles had a carefully cultivated relationship with President Roosevelt, which was reinforced by his vocal support for the New Deal's political philosophy Roosevelt found in Eccles a skillful and vocal defender for expansionary fiscal programs (p 331) "By the time Roosevelt began his third term Eccles had restored the Federal Reserve to a

position of unquestioned prominence and had established himself as an intellectual force of great importance within the administration" (p. 332)

In his study of Austin Tobin and the Port of New York Authority, Jameson Doig asks the central questions that underline all of the cases included "In view of the many political and economic forces that impinge upon an organization, can the efforts of particular leaders modify the organization's goal and behavior in significant ways? Or, as Herbert Kaufman and others have suggested, do the values and strategies of individual leaders have little influence on their organization's direction" (p. 128)? Based on the biographical perspectives in *Leadership and Innovation*, the answer is yes and no Doig and Hargrove would have us say yes to the first and no to the second, but the answer overall is yes *and* no As the editor tells us, there are two generalizations that can be made from their cases about the *relation* between skill and circumstance to achievement "Achievement is formed by a good match of individual skill and the organizational task attempted," and "The favorable match of skill to task must be reinforced by favorable historical conditions if there is to be significant achievement" (pp 13–14)

Leadership and Innovation is an interesting, informative and intelligent study about the opportunities for leadership within the confines of bureaucratic regularities The cases are uniformly well researched and well written and adhere to a common analytical framework The result is a significant increase in our theoretical and practical understanding of how bureaus are ruled

Kevin V Mulcahy *Louisiana State University*

Power Elites and Organizations Edited by G William Domhoff and Thomas R Dye (Newberry Park, CA Sage Publications, Inc , 1987 Pp 292

This series of essays makes clear that there is a varied group of political and social organizations and situations to which interest in elites can be focused And while accessibility to elites in the United States is remarkably available compared to most societies, it is accessibility that is far from perfect This is a characteristic of power elites demonstrated in the book's four chapters of part I Women and other minorities still have a difficult time climbing the corporate ladder, a phenomenon not much improved since the 1960s In this of course, there is little that is new However, such an observation does not tell the whole story For example, women are enthusiastically recruited by business for their public affairs skills at the managerial level As Beth W Ghiloni observes, though, "Women are playing an increasingly important role in maintaining corporate power, but they are not likely to gain corporate power as a result" (p 22) It gets worse, discrimination in corporate elite recruit-

nent is uneven. Jewish males do better than women and blacks as long as they don't seem excessively "Jewish" (pp 37–62)

While the volume's editors assume that elites are both identifiable and powerful the validity of this assumption becomes paramount only with the six essays that compose part II The chapter authored by Scott M Soloway, for instance, gives much credence to the assumption that some elites have rather historical bases Not that the elites are themselves well known their social and educational origins are, however Elite members themselves are aware of their status early in life In New Haven a single but reputable grammar school "connected the mayors and the economic elites" (p 111) from 1784 to 1958 This is not to say that this or any elite is stagnant After all, the discussion here is upon elites Public offices were held by patricians who tended to be succeeded by entrepreneurs and then by representatives of immigrant and working class elements Perhaps the only thing these three sets of elites had in common was their attendance at Hopkins Grammar School (pp 111–12)

There is, then, a strong degree of "interlocking" (pp 134–46) that tends to socialize as well as recruit members of elites This point is very thoroughly addressed by Donn M Kurtz II He rather persuasively argues that "both leaders and groups are well connected within the top setting and to other institutions within the state" (p 148) of Louisiana Professor Kurtz also makes the observation that "all top positions and institutions are not equal but scholars (the author included) tend to treat them as though they were" (p 150) This may be an unavoidable fashion in elite studies but it can be acknowledged Correcting it is another and much more difficult matter It may involve a serious consideration of who and what actually compose the membership of elites and agreement among students of elites will not be easily arrived at

Professor Elizabeth Useem's essay is on the relationship between corporate elites and higher education as necessary and mutually beneficial—indeed, the reliability of the school system for recruiting capable people by corporations The problem is of course the school system itself since the students produced are not always of the best quality particularly compared to other western societies and Japan The decline in American education for example, "has prompted the corporate elite along with many other groups to push for an upgrading of public schools" (p 154) The business relationship with education may not be an evil thing at all As public funding continues to be inadequate and/or declining corporate America may actually turn out to be the instrument of a rebirth of learning The corporate link to and support of "think tanks" is indispensable to the study of American elites and is as intriguing as the relationship between corporate America and public education Professor Thomas R. Dye disposes of any remaining illusions that think

tanks are simply communities of selfless scholars who neither seek nor possess power. Academics, "many of whom are personally enamored of power" (p. 186), like to formulate governmental policy when they have the chance. The Brookings Institution is a worthy example, but the think tanks themselves operate in a somewhat chaotic environment. "There is no consensus. Issues change almost daily; no one controls the agenda" (p. 187). Perhaps it is just as well.

In a brief but revealing essay, G. William Domhoff asks the question "Where Do Government Experts Come From?" He answers it by using the Council of Economic Advisors as an example. Domhoff differs with the theory suggested by most social scientists that experts who come to government do so because they belong to the "'general stock of higher educated specialists'" (p. 191). Instead Domhoff reasons rather convincingly that there is a "policy planning network" which includes the think tanks alluded to by Dye. The think tanks in turn have strong financial relationships with powerful corporations.

Part III includes three chapters which are both distinct in themselves but complementary to the previous essays. For example, Mark S. Mizruchi in "Why Do Corporations Stick Together?" answers that they do, but recognizes that the extent of their cohesion is uncertain. Their cohesion is assumed to be substantial by the authors of several chapters in parts I and II. Mizruchi carefully investigates why this is so. But this is not the end of the story since there are two schools of thought on corporate cohesion—"resource dependence perspective and social class perspective" (p. 204). Mizruchi prefers the former, but argues that it is compatible with the latter.

Michael G. Burton and John Higley in "Invitation to Elite Theory" go back to basics, the assumed inevitability of elites, definition, and the interdependence between elites and nonelites. The authors cite the classical elite theorists such as Pareto and Mosca. This is one of those essays that easily could have been placed at the beginning of the volume. It is a useful introduction to the other chapters because it reviews elites as a proper study by political sociologists.

There is no such equivocation about the appropriate placement of the last chapter by Clarence N. Stone, "Elite Distemper Versus the Problem of Democracy." The author presents a defense of political democracy arguing that the alarm of an "excess of democracy" is itself excessive (p. 239). This is the case if only because of what might replace democracy. Elites, for example, have a number of problems associated with them, "oligarchy, factionalism and rigidity" (p. 252).

This volume adds to a literature of elite theory that is already substantial. The import of these essays, though, remains impressive. They are worthy additions to building elite theory. Several of the essays explore areas that are

in need of further investigation Their relevance is further enhanced by the inclusion of a helpful bibliography and index

Martin Slann, *Clemson University*

Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences Edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York Agathon Press, Inc , 1986 Pp xiv, 335 $16 50 paper)

International research concerning electoral systems was neglected for many years—well into the 1970s The two editors of this volume have already compiled a collection including the most important arguments in favor of roportional representation as well as those in favor of the majority system rend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman eds *Choosing an Electoral System sues and Alternatives*, New York Praeger 1984) The editors also referred ack in part to the same authors in the subsequent volume (Duverger, Fishurn, Johnston, Riker, and Taylor) Several differences appear when comared with the "predecessor" most of those involved are Americans, the ineteen articles tend to handle a larger field and have a somewhat more mpirical tone There are none of the more combative types of articles that ere a part of the previous volume (amongst others the old masters" such as eorge H Hallett Jr in favor of proportional representation and Ferdinand Hermens in favor of the majority system) This is not necessarily disadantageous in the face of the empirical handling of the theme although the olume does indeed lose a little color because of this

Grofman and Lijphart were led by three principles first of all general esays on important research subjects were included having been underestinated by specialists until then (thus there is an interesting part on Taylor/udgin/Johnston on the "The Geography of Representation"), secondly ome articles appear handling neglected fields (e g there is a comparison etween the Japanese and Spanish electoral systems based on the principle f the "single non-transferable vote written by Lijphart, Pintor Sone— a ricontinental collaboration [p 9]) thirdly those themes that had already been treated in depth in other works were left out (an example being Great Britain's electoral system)

In the first section the foreground is taken up by the problem of how much influence various electoral systems have on the party system here the question of how far Duverger's Laws apply is of special interest As is well known, Maurice Duverger had formulated the following three laws at the beginning of the 1950s He claimed that (1) Proportional representation leads to plurality systems with rigid parties (2) The relative majority systems leads to a two party system (3) The two-ballot majority system creates more parties

However, in contrast to the conditions found in proportional representation these show a high degree of stability as well as being able to form coalitions easily. Riker makes a slight modification, whereas Sartori basically attempts to support Duverger's position, without admitting to the effectiveness of proportional representation. Even Duverger himself admits in his contribution that there is not an automatic and mechanical connection between the electoral system and the party system, as can be seen in the development under proportional representation conditions in Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany, however, he notes that no plurality systems appeared either. The two party system in Great Britain could also, under certain conditions be replaced by the rise of the Alliance, judging by current developments. Duverger is very self-critical in his contribution, making no attempt to justify his earlier theses at all costs.

The second section contains case studies and comparative analyses of proportional and semiproportional systems. What is noticeable is the difference between the electoral systems presented in each case. One type of proportional representation is not necessarily the same as other types. Lijphart's article about "Proportionality by Non-Pr Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe" (pp. 113–23) is especially new and illuminating. The author discusses the advantages and disadvantages of PR versus non-PR methods for ethnic minorities, achieving the surprising result that "non-PR methods for ethnic representation may be preferred to normal PR" (p. 121). The trend in most countries confirms these facts.

In the third party plurality and pluralitylike systems are analyzed, largely with regard to the conditions in the USA. Perhaps not enough attention has so far been payed to the fact that there are countless transitional stages between the majority system and proportionality (the aspect also gets the shorter end in this work). Peter Fishburn's article "Social Choice and Pluralitylike Electoral Systems" (pp. 193–202) is particularly informative although his topic has only recently received any attention. He considers the analysis of alternative electoral systems for large-scale elections, especially those in which more than two viable candidates compete for a single office (p. 193). He bases political behavior on two axioms: (1) Various electoral processes influence not only the result, but also the basic political structures. (2) Politically powerful individuals or political parties oppose proposed electoral changes, because these could run counter to their own interests. Fishburn also analyzes the effects of elections systems on candidate strategy, voter behavior, and inner-party democracy. The election systems referred to by Fishburn are simple plurality, the double-ballot system, double plurality (here, each voter has two votes, and the winner is the one in favor of whom most of the voters combine) and approval voting. This electoral system, developed by Fishburn and Steven J. Brams (*Approval Voting*, Boston: Birkhaus

1983), enables the voter to elect each candidate that he finds suitable. Thus the voter does not need to limit himself to merely one person. The author believes that the wasted-vote phenomenon could thus be checked. Until now, "approval voting" has not been put into use, but one must assent to the author that the method could be put to the test in primary elections without doing any harm.

The final section concentrates on "redistricting issues," that is to say with the redistribution of the electoral districts due to the changes in the electorate. These problems are naturally important in the majority system, so that the USA and Great Britain are largely referred to. As far as Great Britain is concerned, Johnston shows that although a fair procedure has been planned, it will not necessarily lead to a fair result. This problem also plays an important part in Ireland, as Peter Mair proves in his contribution. His theory is that smaller election districts are not necessarily favorable to larger parties owing to several factors, this being on the condition of "the single-transferable vote." This example stresses to what extent the basic assumptions concerning electoral systems vary from the complex reality.

The volume in question is a further milestone in research into electoral systems. It also makes plain that the former controversy regarding the right electoral system is being determined more and more by empirical conditions, although factual scientism cannot completely eradicate the fundamental problem, not even in the best electoral system. The authors could perhaps have looked further into the problem of to what extent the respective party systems are affected by the type of electoral system. This (important) aspect gets the shorter end in the volume, which is incidentally rounded off with a first-rate subject index.

Eckhard Jesse, *University of Trier*

Politics and Society in the South. By Earl Black and Merle Black. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. ix, 363. $25.00.)

This is an important book because it provides, for the first time since V. O. Key's 1949 classic *Southern Politics*, a comprehensive, scholarly overview of Southern political life and its attendant socioeconomic environment. Anyone interested in understanding the South's fascinating political transformation of recent decades will profit from studying this long-awaited work of Earl and Merle Black, twin brothers who are natives of East Texas and teach at the University of South Carolina and the University of North Carolina, respectively.

This is not a book that flows easily from chapter to chapter unfolding an elaborately developed, sharply articulated central theme in an orderly fashion. Rather, it reads more like a collection of essays and research papers

linked together by a common subject. Recognizing this organizational scheme helps the reader understand why the authors' central theme—and they certainly have one—is restated anew every few chapters It revolves around "the manifold advantages possessed by conservative and moderate-to-conservative politicians, in contrast to the multiple obstacles that confront flagrantly liberal campaigners in the South" (p. 58) and is expressed as follows, to quote several other statements conveying the theme: "A politics constructed around the problems and aspirations of have-littles and have-nots can make little headway in such a climate" (p. 72). "A successful biracial coalition based on liberal or radical issues presupposes a white electorate with very different experiences, concerns, values, and expectations from those documented in this book" (p. 142) "Conservatism occupies an exalted ideological position in the South" (p 213) "The obdurate and unresolved dilemma of the liberal elites is that too many white voters welcome conservative positions and candidates and reject the symbols, policies, and beneficiaries of contemporary liberalism" (p 230)

Their theme is not an uncommon one In fact, it represents a popular caricature clothed in scholarly attire The reader must determine if the evidence marshaled in support of the theme warrants the clear-cut, deterministic view of the South's future that the authors offer as flowing from their analysis

For the reader who undertakes to grapple with the Blacks' formidable battery of data in support of their theme, here are a few points to consider Conservatism and liberalism are never precisely defined, nor is there any consistent recognition that such concepts necessarily break into several diverse dimensions, specifically economic-class and role-of-government questions public morality and racial questions, and foreign and defense policy questions. Nor is there adequate attention given to comparison with public attitudes outside of the South Applying these points to the 1984 National Election Study, one finds that there was hardly any difference between northern and southern whites on the first dimension, on the other two dimensions southern whites were somewhat—but hardly excessively—more conservative than northern whites The failure to make such differentiated comparisons unnecessarily restricts the Blacks' perspective and leads them to exaggerate southern political distinctiveness by the 1980s

Further, in the authors' various discussions of public attitudes, there is a failure to recognize that public opinion rarely controls political action Instead, it operates, in the words of V O Key, "as a system of dikes which fix a range of discretion within which debate at official levels may proceed (*Public Opinion and American Democracy*, p 552), and the responsibility for exercising that discretion rests with politial elites (ibid , p 556) The southern dikes of opinion—if one views them correctly, that is, comparatively and through their logical dimensions—are plenty broad enough to offer the promise of a southern political future quite different from the one the Blacks' prophesy

As pervasive as is the above theme of a South suffused in a sea of undifferentiated conservatism, *Politics and Society in the South* offers much more The first three chapters depict the major demographic and economic changes that have transformed Southern society since 1950, emphasizing the region's industrialization and urbanization In an effective use of census data (table 1 2), the Blacks demonstrate, among other things, that white in-migration from the North has been quite low except in Florida and, to a lesser extent, in Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas, writing "When native whites born in the South compose between 88 and 92 percent of the total white population, as they did in 1980 in all Deep South states North Carolina, and Tennessee, such limited northernization cannot explain much of the political change that has occurred" (p 17)

The Blacks are particularly adept throughout in imaginatively employing and displaying census data For example in their excellent figure 3 1, they chart the highly significant growth of a "new middle class," composed of those "with professional technical managerial administrative, sales and clerical positions" (p 52) from 30% of all white Southerners in 1940 to over 55% by 1980 Over the four decades the white working class remained about the same at 40% Also traced is the exodus of blacks from the traditional agricultural lower class into the working class where nearly 60% of blacks were by 1980 Ending this valuable statistical tour, the authors write "Judged by labor force characteristics the South's social structure is now scarcely distinguishable from the non-South (p 57)

The next four chapters describe the changes that have occurred in race relations, beginning with the oft-told tale of the demise of legal segregation and continuing through the mixed and uneven success in altering the intermediate color line that is integration in schools jobs and housing (p 152) One of these chapters, entitled Limited Leverage of a Franchised Minority " examines the important biracial Democratic coalition that emerged in the mid-1960s, stating Democratic candidates no longer need to win a majority among white voters but they always need a sizable minority of the white vote Successful Democrats have usually acquired that substantial white minority by emphasizing some mixture of progressive and conservative themes" (p 143)

In further skillful use of census data in tables 7 2 and 7 3 the authors document the great disparity in income between southern blacks and whites Then, through the use of fine regional maps they contrast the county-level location of isolated pockets of white poverty with widespread black poverty concentrations (pp 164–65)

The first of the remaining seven chapters charts the growth of the southern electorate, depicting sharp increases in participation rates since the 1950s in presidential elections and in general elections for governor Democratic gubernatorial primaries on the other hand, have suffered a participation fall-off since the late 1960s The next two chapters treat racial attitudes

and what the authors call "the conservative advantage in public opinion," the latter topic contributing to the work's central theme already reviewed.

The last four chapters (a total of 84 pages) directly explore electoral and party politics. It is at this point that the book's devotion to regional generalization at the expense of state-by-state coverage becomes a serious handicap. Professor Key wrote separate chapters for each southern state because he recognized that "the variations within each state that made each state different from the other states made it impossible to treat the electoral process in the South ... as a process across the entire region without explicit recognition of the individuality of each state," to quote Key's associate Alexander Heard from a 1984 interview. The Blacks' failure to grapple with the messy details of the party struggle in each southern state is magnified by their decision not to conduct any interviews with those involved in politics (Key's project, for example, interviewed 538 politicians and political observers) and not to analyze voting returns beyond a few regional aggregations. In essence, the Blacks' research strategy plus the relatively brief amount of space devoted to the politics of the South as opposed to its socioeconomic environment gives the authors a less than rock solid base upon which to build their final generalizations.

In conclusion, the Black brothers have produced an important book that no student of southern political affairs should ignore. It is a book, however, that bears careful scrutiny for it is not without problems, as mentioned at several points above.

Alexander P. Lamis, *Case Western Reserve University*

The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. By Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. 268. $25.00.)

The received wisdom about the "personal vote" in the two main Anglo-Saxon democracies was that, in Britain, no candidate was worth more than 500 votes but that in the United States, an incumbent was as secure as his constituency service could make him ("What have you done for me lately?"). Therefore, that part of the vote which could be described as "personal," that is, a quotient that is dependent on "personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" would seem to be potentially higher in the USA than it is in Britain. How far does recent research bear out this thesis?

The weight of research reviewed in this book indicates that the picture is changing. One can underline the demands that American legislators still have made on them as far as their constituents are concerned. Constituency service is highly important and seems to be becoming increasingly more so as the years go by. In Britain, where constituency service was regarded as

relatively unimportant some twenty or thirty years ago, it now is salient and British MPs must look to their "surgeries" and other direct contacts with their constituents to at least assist in the process of electoral support. Partisanship, and the electoral fortunes of the party as a whole, have always been the motivating force in British elections and few MPs with only marginal support will resist a considerable swing against their party. However efficient constituency service does now appear to provide a cushion against modest electoral swings. Party loyalty is less of a clear-cut or class-oriented division than it was a generation ago and constituency service must now be taken as an element in the incumbent MP's bid to remain in office through a general election.

In the American Congress, the incumbency factor has become the strongest element in electoral success. Some of this seems due to the record that an incumbent can build up in his district or state. The rise in the size of an incumbent's staff, a factor still in stark contrast with the relative paucity of staff help in the House of Commons, means that the congressman can offer a service to his constituents whenever one, or a group, has a grievance or a need that, it is felt, can be answered by the federal political system. If a congressman becomes noted for his constituency service, this becomes a vital part of the incumbency factor and the voter will tend to support the candidate he knows via personal service rather than a challenger who may be an unknown quantity in service to his constituency (as he must be if he is a relative newcomer to the politics of the district.

This far, the conclusions of this book tend to mirror the conventional wisdom but they do buttress it with more data than has previously been available and, in particular, do note the rise in constituency service and therefore the personal vote in Britain during a period of general change in electoral behavior as observed over the last twenty years. Does this increased level of expectancy by voters in both the USA and Britain have any more fundamental message for those who rise in the political system, and what would be a likely conclusion from a broader comparison of constituency behavior in other systems?

The so-called "escalation of expectation" among voters in the Western democracies can place a strain on elected politicians and, according to the evidence addressed here, leads to a lowering of job satisfaction and a tendency to retire earlier than in the past. Even in democracies with list systems or proportional representation, some degree of constituency service is expected from the elected representative by the voter. The limiting case seems to lie collectively in the Scandinavian countries where the electoral system and culture patterns result in parliamentarians being indifferent to constituency needs unless prodded by the party elite, one reason for the origin of the ombudsmen in that part of the world.

One sign of an intriguing contribution to the discipline is the feeling that it

should generate more research work in the future. Perhaps this should be directed toward the voter rather than the elected politician? If, as seems to be true, voters are now more demanding of politicians for constituency service, what are the factors which have caused this phenomenon? Does it correlate with affluence or educational standards which have risen in the Western democracies, certainly, it seems to bear some relation to the evident decline of class-based voting. Perhaps a follow-up volume by the three writers responsible for this book would be in order, hopefully taking less than the nine years that this book was in gestation.

Alec T. Barbrook, *University of Kent at Canterbury*

Gramsci dopo Gramsci. tra storia e progretto By Giuseppe Normanno (Lecce Capone, 1986 Pp. 318.)

Despite the fact that it continues to command the support of about a third of the electorate, the Italian Communist Party, like its less successful counterparts elsewhere, has clearly been put on the defensive. As the present author puts it, today the Italian left is reduced to the possibility of proposing a few "socialist elements" within an overall parliamentary system (p. 305). Democracy in something like its liberal form is a political given in Italy, and Marxists must inevitably reformulate their politics as the effort to promote a "higher standard" for democracy, one which goes beyond the present and yet remains "realistic." In Italy, the work of Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), as the epitome of the native Marxist tradition, continues to be fundamental to any such project.

Yet it is never easy for a political tradition as long-standing, and based on convictions as intense as those of Italian Marxism, to make such a decisive shift. Thus it is no accident that Giuseppe Normanno, while clearly a man of the left, is a Catholic sympathetic to Marxism rather than a strictly Marxist writer. His book should thus be read simultaneously as the latest in a long and distinguished Catholic reading of Italian Marxism, and as one of several recent efforts by liberal-minded leftists, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, to insert the Marxist tradition into the debate about democracy.[1] To do this Normanno argues, we must learn to treat the Marxist tradition as a whole

[1]The most distinguished among a number of books representative of the former tradition which could be cited probably remains Giorgio Nardone, *Il pensiero di Gramsci* (Rome: De Donato, 1971). Among the latter books, one should mention Biagio De Giovanni and Gianfranco Pasquino, *Marx dopo Marx*, (Bologna: Cappelli, 1985) and Umberto Cerroni, *Teoria della societa di massa*, (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1983). The contemporary debate about democracy in Italy, involving the liberal and Marxist left, might be dated from 1976. See especially "Egemonia e democrazia: Il marxismo e lo stato. Il dibattito aperto nella sinistra italiana sulle tesi di N. Bobbio," *Nuova serie dei Quaderni di Mondo Operaio* 4 (1976).

self-consciously as "classical," that is, as historically superseded in the sense in which it understood itself, yet alive if we learn to read it symptomatically, for its conceptual richness and political suggestiveness In other words, we must learn to reread Marxism in the manner in which all great "classical" political theories are read

But can Gramsci legitimately be seen as a contributor to the contemporary theory of democracy despite his antipathy to the "parliamentarism" and liberal state of his day? Normanno's answer is a qualified yes On the one hand he argues that "the interpretation of Gramsci as the father of the Italian road to socialism based on pluralism is somewhat forced given that Gramsci is being assimilated to completely new problematics wholly unlike those of the historical context in which he himself moved" (p 11) But, on the other hand, he views Gramsci's political theory as a creative departure from Lenin's and from other more orthodox Marxisms above all in its insistence on the need to avoid an imposed top-down "hegemony" in favor of a genuine legitimacy deriving from a popularly based culture

In Normanno's view, Gramsci was deeply ambivalent about democracy The tenor of his inspiration by October 1917 was truly democratic, and his democratic spirit is further expressed in his "strategy of the historical bloc as the involvement of diverse social forces in the realization of an intellectual and moral reform" (p 304) as well as in his theory of the Constituent Assembly as a means of making the transition to socialism Yet there remains "the germ of a totalitarian conception" in Gramsci (p 304) He favored a "complete overcoming of the representative political system," and had no notion of pluralism in a representative sense At the same time his opposition to parliamentarianism should not be taken to be antidemocratic in intention Normanno argues, but as an indication of his commitment to a different sort of democracy (p 306)

This last point strikes this reader as a key one which helps us to appreciate Gramsci's distinctive position within his tradition Yet today we inevitably must ask What might Gramsci's "different sort of democracy" have to offer to the contemporary debate? Normanno's discussion is helpful in suggesting that Gramsci's theory points to our need for a fuller interrelation of political culture and democracy, that is, for a revitalized concept of citizenship Today's "citizen" is generally reduced to the position of a consumer in the political marketplace, in response to advertisements he or she casts occasional votes for the product of choice The notion of an active citizen who by participating in a public sphere constitutes the "public opinion" that in turn becomes the basis of informed choice is likely to strike us as a hopeless anachronism.

Yet to see if such a citizen can be retheorized on the basis of Gramsci's writing, it will be necessary to take a further step beyond those Normanno has taken to return to the theoretical climate of the late 1930s and early

1940s, and to reposition Gramsci in the debate about the nature of modern democracy involving Schumpeter and Kelsen, among many others. Are there possibilities of a nontechnocratic interpretation of democracy, compatible with the scale and character of contemporary political systems, which were overlooked in that debate? If the future study of Gramsci should lead to a positive answer to this question, Normanno's book will have been an important stimulus that made such an answer possible

Walter L. Adamson, *Emory University*

The Struggle for Black Political Empowerment in Three Georgia Counties By Lawrence J Hanks (Knoxville University of Tennessee Press, 1987 Pp 227)

Lawrence Hanks recounts political events in three Georgia counties during the period 1960–1982 It was during this period that all across the South blacks were challenging the hegemony of the white establishment There were few if any southern states in which blacks did not offer for elected offices, and in many instances win Lawrence Hanks's objective is to show how three different levels of organizational effectiveness yield three different results His argument rests upon the view that black political empowerment is dependent upon the "proper interrelationship between leadership, organization, and resources"

Probably the flaw in this treatment of attempts at black political empowerment is the failure of the author to view political empowerment in a broader context

Toward the end of the 1950s the American South began to rethink its image and ability to progress The United States Supreme Court had ruled segregation unconstitutional, blacks were reasserting themselves, and industry was finding the northeast and midwest increasingly more uncomfortable Industry was beginning to look to the South and West At the same time southern white leadership was becoming more moderate in terms of its stand on such issues as outside industry, social progress by blacks, and the white underclass In short, the moderate white leadership of the South was putting forth a program of progress based upon upward mobility for all After all the question of racial segregation and most of its underpinnings were now legally obsolete. Thus, these moderate leaders were able to speak in terms of rapprochement between the races and point to efforts by southern states to more closely reflect the rest of the nation in terms of race relations and the willingness to accept outside industry—industry which posed a challenge to the traditional industries of the region

Hanks's analysis should be played against this broader context It is this

context which would help make some sense of the variety of outcomes which he discovered in the course of his research Blacks in some communities were able to capitalize on the attempt by white moderates to lure industry into the area, while others were less successful The degree of desire on the part of the moderates to carry the day in their communities may well have been the measure of the degree to which blacks in these communities were able to win concessions

Certainly Hanks is correct when he states that organizational skills are an important variable in analyzing black political empowerment However, such a limit on analysis takes the political activities of blacks out of the circle of dominant events which occur in American and in this instance southern, politics.

We are treated to three condensed stories of attempts by blacks to gain political empowerment the first (Hancock County) is a very successful attempt to gain electoral power, a second (Peach County) is a tale of a somewhat less than mediocre attempt by blacks to gain power, and a third tale (Clay County) in which blacks fail miserably in their attempt to gain political empowerment Hanks treats all of the counties in essentially the same fashion, that is, events are recounted under identical headings This technique is a two-edged sword It certainly provides a consistent frame by which to compare the counties However events falling outside of the frame are overlooked Within Hancock County there erupted a deep cleavage between factions in the black community So severe was the split that the disbursement of federal funds was jeopardized The event also highlights the extent of the class differences in the community Eventually the solidarity that the author mentions is lost and the situation only abates when John McCowan, one of the faction leaders dies In defiance of this organizational rift blacks continued to win electoral offices Why?

Hancock County is the most successful of the counties treated by Hanks There is a long history of political activism by blacks in Hancock This activism predates the upsurge of activity of the 1960s No such extended history exists for Peach and Clay counties Hanks mentions this but fails to note the importance of this variable Hanks would better serve the topic if he would fully explain the significance of this rather long history of activism by blacks in Hancock compared to the relative recent history of activism by blacks in Peach and Clay counties A fuller explanation would add to our knowledge of whether the longevity of the Hancock experience is the prevailing variable in the success of the county s blacks

Secondly, the "outsider" in Hancock County brought with him certain resources not available to all three counties Peach County had outside influence, however it was short-lived It also represented another agenda The establishment of new communities in nearby Albany possibly drained re-

sources from the original goal of black political empowerment in Peach County.

The value of Hanks's effort lies in several areas. His work does focus upon the organizational activities of black political organizations in rural counties in one southern state, thus providing a glimpse of the political activities of this population. Lastly his epilogue provides the beginning of a very significant discussion of the impact of black elected officials. Hanks concludes that there is value in having black elected officials, but their value has yet to be proven. There is a recognition that black elected officials have less in the way of resources to work with, and thus are not capable of providing the material resources that the community expects.

The prime limitation in Hanks's work is his attempt to separate political and economic empowerment. It cannot be done. The American South failed in its earlier attempts at economic advancement when it attempted to separate politics and social advancement. It was only after the recognition that the two were inseparable that the southern region began to move economically. The same holds true when attempting to analyze black political empowerment.

William H. Boone, *Atlanta University*

China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao. By Harry Harding. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987. Pp. xx, 369. $32.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.)

A full decade plus a year has passed since the death of Mao Zedong. It is high time for analyses of how far the post-Mao reforms have gone, and an inventory of their returns.

For Harding, the scope of China's reforms since 1976 has been both broad and deep. In fact, he adopts Deng Xiaoping's description of the reform movement as China's "second revolution." He proceeds to show that the phrase is meaningful.

Harding begins with three chapters analyzing the origins of the reform movement. This material is hardly more than clearing underbrush but is nonetheless interesting. The core of the book is found in the next four chapters, which examine the full scope of the post-Mao reforms. He argues persuasively that T-shirts, blue jeans, and free roadside markets are merely the tip of the reformist iceberg. Beginning with economic issues, Harding examines changes in China's internal economy and in her international trade and investment policies. He then turns to politics, devoting two chapters to domestic politics and one to China's foreign affairs. Harding finds that liberalization has, without fail, fully penetrated each sector

Harding also sounds a note of caution, however. This, he reminds us, is not the first time China's leaders have attempted political and economic reform. Harding mentions the abortive "100 Days" of reform of the Kwang-hsu emperor in 1898, and the failure of the Empress Dowager to modernize China from 1905 to 1911. More recently, the Nationalist regime made an attempt to reform China in 1928–1937. Each effort, he notes, failed to sustain the reforms over time.

Harding looks carefully at the current political situation, searching for cracks in the reformist edifice. He states that the dismissal of Hu Yaobang as party secretary in January 1987 "reflected the collapse of a major part of Deng's plan for the succession," and speculates that Hu's fall could mark the zenith of the current reform movement. Harding catalogs six sets of issues which, he says, are critical to the reform program: economic shortages and imbalances, inflation and hyperinvestment, social and economic inequalities, corruption and crime, political dissent, and the uncertainties of a more open economy. All are the result of the uneasy coexistence of "plan and market," and "political relaxation and authoritarianism." He suggests that while each issue could be fatal, none is beyond the abilities of the reformers to solve or at least defuse.

Unfortunately, Harding finished writing before the Thirteenth Party Congress in November 1987. The elevation of Zhao Ziyang to permanent party secretary during the Congress appears to have strengthened the position of the reformers. Had Harding been able to incorporate the results of the Congress into his analysis, he might have argued more forcefully that the reformers are in control of the present situation, and might have speculated that the succession question has again been solved. The reformers' smooth performance at the Party Congress, including Hu Yaobang's retention of his Politburo seat, is evidence of their political potency and agility.

Those inclined to see foreign affairs as "high politics" unsullied by economic imperatives may quibble with Harding's attention to economic issues in each facet of his analysis. The discussion of foreign policy devotes considerably more space to China's interaction in the world economy than to China's relations with the two superpowers. However, the concentration of China's leaders on modernization suggests the importance of political analysis which reflects the leadership's energetic pursuit of economic development.

China's Second Revolution is a rich and comprehensive guide to China's recent past and present status. If Harding is reluctant to predict China's future course, his hesitancy is warranted. A Chinese joke has three men sitting in prison. One says he is in jail because he supported Deng Xiaoping. The second replies that he's there because he failed to support Deng. The third says, "I'm Deng Xiaoping."

Michael Minor, *University of Tulsa*

Opening Up the Soviet Economy. By Jerry F. Hough. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988. Pp viii, 100. $8.95 paper.)

In this short book, Jerry Hough, one of the leading Sovietologists in the United States, tackles a central question facing the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. As one has come to expect from Hough, he is thorough, sophisticated, and the argument provocative The thrust of his analysis indicates that a change in U S. economic policy toward the Soviet Union is warranted In a tone reminiscent of the detente during the 1970s, he suggests that the key to Soviet foreign policy is through its economy, and the United States can have an ameliorating effect through cooperation, not confrontation

Of the five chapters in the book, all of which are well reasoned, the most interesting and original chapter analyzes Gorbachev's strategy for reform As usual, Hough is at his best with his masterful command of personal changes and the meaning behind such moves. In the author's view, five characteristics describe Gorbachev's political strategy for reform So as not to duplicate the mistakes of Nikita Khrushchev, he has to avoid alienating several important actors simultaneously First, Gorbachev was very cautious prior to the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in 1986 He "correctly" concentrated on changes in personnel and emphasized conservative themes such as discipline, higher investment, and an attack on alcoholism The result was that in the period up to the party congress, most Western observers concluded that Gorbachev was not a serious reformer

Second, to the extent Gorbachev began to reform ideology, he did so in a way that attempted to reassure conservatives Somewhat disingenuously he accomplished this by mixing behests for economic reform with attacks on logical consequences of the program he was promoting For example while urging the need for greater reliance on the market, he criticized by name an economist who suggested that unemployment may be desirable

A third element has been Gorbachev's association of reform with patriotism and nationalism Fourth, while speaking about economic reform the actual emphasis (prior to June 1987) was on political change, summarized by the word *glasnost* Last, Gorbachev has "almost foolhardily" identified himself with reform, thus staking his prestige, credibility, and perhaps future to the success of his program

In Hough's opinion two additional factors weigh heavily in Gorbachev's prospects for success. First, the composition of the Soviet population is changing, and moving in a direction supportive of reform One indicator of demographic change is found in a higher level of education among the population. Second, the economic structure, and legitimacy, of the system rested on the claim it contributed to the defense of the country It is now recognized that the old system has a negative impact on the realization of this requirement

After a discussion of Soviet foreign economic policy, the last chapter dis-

cusses the policy choices facing the United States The combination of Gorbachev's economic and political strategies, along with societal forces and the requisites of real economic reform, portend an opening up of the Soviet economy. This opening will pose several questions and choices for U S policy The author presents a number of political and economic issues U S policymakers must think through before being able to make a political decision regarding trade with the Soviet Union

Politically, the questions are more difficult than in the 1970s Human rights linkages are more complex To what extent should human rights be an integral component of U S foreign policy? Even more vexing is the central issue of technology transfer To what extent would Gorbachev's reforms increase the Soviet military and ideological threat? Last, what is the political cost of maintaining a hardline economic policy and how effective can the United States be if it stands alone? To what extent does the United States have a veto over its allies in developing a coordinated policy on licensing arrangements, joint production and joint ventures?

Economically, a number of concerns confront U S businesses Economic opportunities must be weighed against the risks and political hazards of doing business inside the Soviet Union First how fragile is the USSR? Would an embargo, combined with a continued arms buildup be effective in straining and even destroying the Soviet system? Will the Soviet leadership decide to nationalize foreign enterprises sometime in the future with little or no compensation? Another group of concerns revolves around the operation of joint ventures since joint production and joint ventures involve qualitatively different levels of technology transfers than do outright sales of products Last, the most worrisome question is over the repatriation of profits

His prescriptions for U S policy include a mix of political and economic considerations He argues that the ideological challenge to the West in the 1980s and 1990s is not communism but rather right-wing religious or semireligious fundamentalism Second confrontation has not proved to be an effective tool in liberalizing communist systems, and exposure to market forces will have a liberalizing effect The author thus concludes that the ratio between risk and reward favors a modification of U S economic policy toward the Soviet Union He reasons that any movement toward the normalization of the Soviet dictatorship toward its de-ideologization and toward an opening to the West is a healthy and welcome development

The author covers a lot of ground but unlike a lot of short books his brevity is a virtue Because the decisions facing the United States are so important, his argument is both stimulating and timely The breadth and depth of Hough's knowledge make the book suitable for the nonspecialized reader policymakers, or the interested scholar

Stephen Wegren *Columbia University*

Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion. By Richard Ned Lebow (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987 Pp. 232. $24.95)

This is a clear, concise, thought-provoking treatise that should be required reading for the national security and defense community in general and in particular for those selected to work at the recently approved "Risk Reduction Centers" being set up in Washington and Moscow Director of Cornell's Peace Studies Program, a former visiting professor at the National War College, and a former scholar in residence at the Central Intelligence Agency's Strategic Evaluation Center, Lebow is a scholar who has had an insider's view of the behavior of U S. nuclear strategists

Building from his previous work *Psychology and Deterrence* (1985) with Jervis and Stein, his *Between Peace and War* (1981), and extracting key facts from works by Janis, Perrow, Steinbruner, B. Blair, Bracken, and D Ball (to name a few), Lebow offers prognostications about, and criticisms of, the behavior of political and military leaders under acute crisis conditions He looks into some of the political and psychological components of crisis to provide new insight into conflict management He claims that some of the strategic realities responsible for crisis instability stem from political and conceptual factors, not simply structural factors He pursues this argument through the book's core chapters on preemption, loss of control, and miscalculated escalation, respectively

He avers that if there is a World War III, it is most likely to be caused by a miscalculation or by an act of desperation in a crisis or conventional war, not unlike the conditions under which World War I was triggered Actually much of his analysis draws from the causal sequences of World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis Yet, he has not ignored the significance of modern nuclear and technological circumstances An adage goes, "The more things change, the more they stay the same," and so Lebow argues that despite radical technological advances since World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis, human behavioral limits, human ignorance, and psychological pressures persist as confounding forces in international disputes

Lebow believes that the strategic establishment has made retaliation too high a priority when "the more serious danger is war arising through loss of control" (p 32) He complains that too much attention has been focused on the technical shortcomings of strategic forces and their command and control, but too little toward the limitations of the people ultimately responsible for making them both work He laments that, "technology, divorced from politics, has come to dominate strategy" (p 59) so much so that war could be triggered by a human misjudgment or error, a subject area he claims (and the reviewer agrees) is of little interest to most strategic analysts Lebow walks the reader through U.S strategic preparedness in both a procedural and technological sense, but later demonstrates how appallingly under

prepared most recent presidents, from Johnson to Reagan (Carter the single exception), have been For example, he observes that President Reagan postponed his briefing on the U S war plan for nearly three years after taking office. Interservice rivalry, bureaucratic compartmentalization, excessive secrecy, ideological biases, an overdeference of political actors to military technocrats, perceptual and cognitive failures, military rigidity, cross-cultural ignorance, and an inability to identify war thresholds are a few other political-psychological matters addressed in the study

Lebow reminds students of international relations and defense policy that crisis management study is a worthy tool for both theory building and application This reviewer sees a logical bridge between "emergency management" and "nuclear crisis management" The former involves the pressures, conditions, and limitations of decision making before or during a natural or man-caused disaster The latter as Lebow explains, involves decision making in the environment of a superpower confrontation There are elements common to each that the national security and international relations community should recognize

Richard T Sylves University of Delaware

Managing Public Policy By Lawrence Lynn Jr (Boston Little, Brown, 1987 Pp 282)

Why are some public managers able to have a significant impact upon the organizations and policies they administer while others with similar skills and experiences, seem unable to achieve even the smallest change? Why will a public executive be successful in one position or at one time and achieve little in another position or at another time? Lawrence Lynn's book is designed to address these questions and to provide public managers with a guide to improve their performance In doing so Lynn's presentation is filled with recent examples of managerial success and failure which illustrate both the complexities of the task and the circumstances under which those complexities can be overcome

This is not an original study of administrative behavior No new data are presented and little is discussed which ranges beyond the conventional wisdom of public administration Indeed Lynn has developed many of these themes in his numerous other writings What makes this book an important contribution to the field, however is the way the material is organized and integrated into a coherent whole He takes dozens of disparate studies and based on some simple assumptions and definitions constructs an interesting and useful guide to what he terms "strategic public management"

The book begins with a view of executive autonomy that suggests considerable scope for governmental executives to exercise initiative and discretion

f the Constitution. Thus, in the best part of the book, the author exposes lobert Bork's moral skepticism, concluding that "the legal positivism that indergirds Bork's position, the idea that the Constitution is authoritative beause of its source in popular will, is deeply at odds with the founding genertion's belief that principles of justice and natural rights are morally binding n any act of will" (p 20). The notion that the legitimacy of a law is derived rom its character as the expression of the will of the sovereign lawmaker also eads Bork to develop the doctrine of original intent, according to which judges should adhere not simply to the text of the Constitution, but to the ext interpreted in light of the specific intents of its Framers" (p. 3) Bork's eliefs that moral judgments are matters of personal preference yields yet nother principle unacceptable to the Constitution's framers—majoritarianm, the conviction that "democracy is the basic constitutional value" (p 3) he consequence of the New Right's jurisprudence is a restrained judiciary ıd thus powerful state and federal legislatures, dangerous to individual eedom and privacy

Its title notwithstanding, Macedo's book is a critique of the jurisprudence the left as well as of the right He characterizes Justice Brennan's reading the Constitution as "partisan and selective" (p 27), whose goal is "demoatic egalitarianism" incompatible with property rights, which are "closely ound up with personal autonomy" (p 51) He castigates Brennan for suporting a double standard, under which laws infringing on economic freeom must meet the mere rationality test of constitutionality, while statutes oridging personal liberties or employing suspect classifications are subcted to strict scrutiny Macedo, in fact, has drawn our attention to one of ıe most interesting aspects of contemporary jurisprudence, viz , that both ıe advocates of judicial restraint and of judicial activism are descendants the Legal Realism movement, which appeared in the United States during ıe progressive era and which had at its core a rejection of natural law, a ıncept, as Macedo rightly points out, central to the thought of the founders

The author's thesis is that the Constitution established a government upon hich it placed severe limitations in the name of protecting individual rights ecause the Constitution does not specify these rights, the Supreme Court, the primary expositor of the document, must do so The definition of ghts is a exercise in moral theory, however, so justices must heed Oliver 'endell Holmes's advice to become philosophers Macedo has in mind conmporary moral theory, especially as pursued by Ronald Dworkin Indeed workin's influence on the argument is pervasive

Macedo calls his jurisprudence "principled activism" and holds up as jually admirable models of judicial reasoning in constitutional cases *Lochr v. New York* (1905), where the Court invalidated a legislative limit on the orking hours of bakers in the name of an hypothesized "liberty of contract d *Griswold v Connecticut* (1965), in which the majority struck down a

statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by citing an hypothesized "right of privacy." The goal of principled activism is a libertarian society marked by great diversity in values and life-styles, where the chief public virtue is tolerance, "respecting the rights of people who lead different lives" (p. 95). Liberty is threatened both by efforts to redistribute income and by Christian morality, which Macedo alleges is rushing in to fill the void created by Bork's skepticism.

Macedo claims that the doctrine of principled activism is true to the intent of "the founders of the American republic" (p. 59), but this claim, central to the author's thesis, cannot be sustained. Macedo's libertarian vision of America was not shared by the founding generation, as witnessed by the existence of the states' police power, the power to restrain liberty in order to promote the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public, and by Justice Joseph Story's comment in his famous *Commentaries on the Constitution* that this is a Christian nation. Nor did James Madison share Macedo's enthusiasm for judicial government.

At the heart of the Constitution's theory, explained Madison in *Federalist* 10 and 51, is the belief that in a large commercial republic featuring representation, separation of powers, checks and balances, and bicameralism, laws, as the product of bargaining among self-interested groups, will be just and in the public interest. The Constitution will be preserved by the counteracting ambition of representatives, senators, and the president. According to Madison, liberty did not need a judicially enforced bill of rights.

Macedo, on the other hand, believes that legislative majorities are necessarily "unjust and arbitrary" (p. 59), that "political and regulatory processes . . . cannot be trusted to produce equitable economic arrangements" (p. 81), and that "politics presents innumerable opportunities for the pursuit of private interests at the expense of other people" (p. 82). As a method for making policy, he says, adjudication, with its eschewal of compromise and its insistence on rational justification, is preferable to legislation. Macedo's quarrel with the framers is actually a quarrel with the philosophers who most influenced the Constitution—John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith—who taught that the pursuit of personal gain is an engine of the public good, a pursuit Macedo dismisses as "a corrupt motive" (p. 82).

The depth of the author's estrangement from the framers is also signaled by the fact that the most frequently cited provision of the Constitution in the book is the Ninth Amendment, a mandate, he says, to the Court to recognize and enforce rights not mentioned in the text. As Justice Potter Stewart explained in his dissent in *Griswold*, such a reading "is to turn somersaults with history," because the purpose of the Ninth Amendment, as drafted by Madison, was to assure the states that the federal government possessed only "express and limited powers," and thus can never be used by a federal court to annul a state law.

Although he frequently invokes the founding generation, Macedo's proach to the Constitution is entirely a product of the twentieth century reflects the crisis of legitimacy faced by Western democracies described Juergen Habermas and others. The subordination of equality to indivi autonomy, the preaching of moral relativism, the contempt for bourg morality, and the disgust with politics suggest the emergence of what long been anticipated—a jurisprudence inspired by existentialism.

Kenneth Holland, *University of Verm*

Soviet Leaders. From the Cult of Personality to Collective Rule By (Narkiewicz (New York St Martin's Press, 1986 Pp ix, 256 $33 50)

This book provides a study of top Soviet leaders since the death of St (Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev) Ess tially, the book is a chronological, historical approach, dealing with eac the leaders individually In her preface, Narkiewicz criticizes the bull Western scholarship for "mythologizing" the Soviet leaders, not trea them as "human beings, with normal feelings and reflexes" (p vii) She p poses to make up the lack in this book

Olga Narkiewicz has produced some fine works of scholarship, but book is not among them. It is marred by unsupported generalizations liance on very dubious sources, misinterpretations, and downright fa hoods Some, far from all, are presented here She asserts that Beria did have any ambitions to succeed Stalin, and that Beria may not have been e cuted at all, but given a new identity and allowed to live out his life in scurity in a remote province Her misinterpretations range from the me dubious that Brezhnev's merit lay in becoming a figurehead rather tha real leader, to the ridiculous that Brezhnev came from a Ukrainian farm family (p 85), and that Chernenko was chosen to follow Andropov in orde demonstrate to the Americans that the top leader was unimportant, a urehead, and that collective leadership was the reality

Narkiewicz assures us that frequent Western allegations of a power stru in the Kremlin following the deaths of leaders are unfounded, to qu " there was every indication . of complete harmony in the P bureau, and of all the supposed main contenders working harmoniousl gether" (p 145) We further learn that Andropov had been chosen as Br nev's successor as early as 1979, that he had Brezhnev's blessing in this . that there was no rivalry between Andropov and Chernenko We read t Andropov did not, after all, have the support of the military, the latter w distrustful of his leaning toward detente with the U S

She attributes Andropov's death to a bullet wound which necessitated or more kidney transplants, she doesn't seem to know that he had diabet

more direct contributor to kidney failure. Who shot Andropov? Not Yury Brezhnev, who was the supposed culprit when that rumor had currency. It was a shadowy military plot, with Marshal Ogarkov behind it, and we learn that this explains both Ogarkov's disappearance that fall, and also the downing of KAL 007. The latter was the military's effort to bring the American threat home to the Soviet people.

Incredibly, Narkiewicz seems to swallow whole the famous lie that Stalin had a third wife, namely Rosa Kaganovich, the sister of Lazar Kaganovich. She hypothesizes that it was her friendship with Khrushchev that saved him from being purged by Stalin. She cites as authority a book by Hearst (she says Randolph W.), who attributes it to an unnamed French governess in Stalin's household.

These are just the worst examples. I find no redeeming features, and I fear that I cannot recommend this book.

Kenneth C. Farmer, *Marquette University*

Max Weber and Political Commitment: Science, Politics and Personality. By Edward Bryan Portis. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. Pp. ix, 246. $29.95 cloth.)

In *Max Weber and Political Commitment* Edward Bryan Portis pursues two interrelated themes. The primary purpose of the book is to argue that "social science and politics are antithetical activities that cannot be seriously pursued by the same individuals" (p. vii). Secondarily, but integral to the first theme, is a reinterpretation of certain aspects of the life and thought of Max Weber, specifically the nature of Weber's nervous collapse of 1898–1903 and his views on the nature and potential of social science.

Portis takes issue with Arthur Mitzman's overly rigid Freudian interpretation of Weber's breakdown (in *The Iron Cage*, 1970). Mitzman applied a standard Oedipal framework to Weber's illness, attributing his collapse to the guilt resulting from repressed hatred of his father. Portis admits that the nature of Weber's relations with his neglectful father and his exceedingly moralistic mother lend a superficial plausibility to this sort of Oedipal explanation, but on closer analysis of the available evidence, he concludes that "Weber's breakdown was the result of frustrations caused by a logically contradictory self-identity rather than repressed guilt feelings occasioned by an unconscious superego" (p. 45). Weber suffered a nervous collapse because he was committed to two mutually exclusive vocations, that of politician and that of social scientist. His crisis came when he became fully conscious of their incompatibility. Only after that crisis and his conscious decision to completely withdraw from politics and pursue a scholarly career was he able to produce important and meaningful work. After about a decade Weber was

lured back into political activity by the coming of World War I, and his scholarship thereafter until his death in 1920 became "largely a matter of codification" (p. 166).

The biographical material in Portis's book serves the purpose of illustrating with a specific example "the intimate connection between personal commitment and scientific integrity" (p. 166) in the social sciences. The main argument of the book is that "science and politics are simply incompatible forms of activity, each requiring mutually exclusive personal characteristics" (p. 4). Portis's argument rests on the development of a particular notion of self-identity based on the work of Jean Piaget, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schutz, and Weber. Briefly, all human beings possess a unified self-concept composed of two elements—a conception of oneself as an agent with various capabilities and a conception of oneself as having a "function" or "functions." A person's self-concept develops and changes over time as a result of experience and as a result of the individual's beliefs about the nature and structure of social reality. A self-concept is normative and involves commitment. "The individual has no choice but to be committed to his or her self-concept" (p. 110). The average person simply commits to whatever "functions" are presented by everyday life in society; commitment is largely a matter of semiconscious socialization into roles. True personhood, however, involves moving beyond simple adapting to social roles to the conscious pursuit of a "hero ethic." Two heroic self-concepts that Weber discussed are the "politician" and the "scientist."

The activities of science and politics impose differing ethics upon their practitioners. "Only those with a definite set of personal characteristics are likely to conform consistently to the appropriate ethos" (p. 11). For Weber three personal characteristics were necessary for successful engagement with political life: a willingness to accept responsibility for the consequences of one's actions, a willingness to compromise, and "passion" for a cause. The scientific personality, on the other hand, manifests caution, humility, self-criticism, and, most importantly, a willingness to "bracket" the nature of reality itself. A true scientist must continually live with the knowledge that all empirical findings are tentative and cannot afford to be passionately committed to any particular scientific results, even though they were obtained through rigorous application of method. The passion of the politician and the tentativeness of the scientist lead them in incompatible, though equally heroic, paths.

For the social scientist, as opposed to the natural scientist, the dilemma is even greater. The reality that the social scientist deals with is known to be subjective; it is culturally defined and value-infused. Social or cultural science is a science of meaning and relies largely on interpretation. The individual social scientist must live with the knowledge that objectivity is simply

impossible except in the sense that "ideal-type" constructions can be used to aid systematic observation "Objectivity in social science is simply the *ability* to recognize unpleasant facts, the degree to which reality does not conform to our (ultimately) normative concepts" (p 81) Any attempt to engage in politics must instantly breach the thin skein of objectivity possible in the social sciences because of the passionate commitment required of a political actor. "Anyone incapable of at least suspending his or her commitment to changing or preserving his or her social environment cannot genuinely engage in social scientific work" (p 88)

In his penultimate chapter, in the course of explicating Weber's ideas on the potential political function of social science Portis provides the reader a bonus in the form of an excellent succinct examination of Weber's discussion of bureaucratic organization So often Weber's ideas on "ideal-type" bureaucracy are introduced in social science literature in a distorted way His tripartite classification of authority (traditional charismatic and rational-legal) is first presented, and then a leap is made to the idea that bureaucracy is the inevitable form of efficient effective and equitable rational-legal authority in modernity Portis locates Weber's theory of bureaucracy in its proper context, his lifelong concern with the possibility of meaningful politics Weber saw the ongoing rationalization of Western culture as a threat to meaningful political activity The cultural tendency to systematize and formalize social relations and institutions is hostile to communal values and undercuts the basis of politics itself, polity is replaced by administration Weber focused on bureaucracy as the primary carrier of the cultural rationalization that was leading to the "disenchantment of the world" As Portis makes crystal clear from Weber's standpoint the bureaucratization of the world might be an inevitable development, but its hegemony should be feared rather than welcomed

Weber did not think it possible to re-enchant the world Losses might be cut, however in two ways Weber perceived charismatic political leadership "as an anti-bureaucratic force that might divert the course of cultural rationalization toward the positive direction of deliberate formulation of ultimate values'" (p 129) Portis does a very fine job of revealing the reciprocal nature of charismatic leadership and followership as Weber conceives it Weber also believed that social science might come to have a very important political function that would mitigate the narrow focus of bureaucracy and the "passion" of the politician "A properly organized social science just because of its non-partisan stance can rationally criticize political positions from the general perspective of cultural values (pp 140-41)

It is difficult in a short review to do justice to the pithy arguments of *Max Weber and Political Commitment* It is a book that will appeal to specialists, but any graduate student in the social sciences would benefit greatly from reading it and pondering the dilemmas it explores It should be on the read-

ing list of seminars in research scope and methods and should certainly be required reading in a seminar devoted wholly (are such luxuries still permitted?) to the thought of Max Weber.

Edward M Wheat, *University of Southern Mississippi*

Revolutionary Iran Challenge and Response in the Middle East By R K Ramazani (Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 Pp xv, 311 $27.50)

The 1979 Iranian Revolution which deposed Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and Iran's subsequent metamorphosis into an Islamic Republic has altered the shape and substance of Middle Eastern politics Whether the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini is ultimately successful in establishing a stable and long-lived Islamic state is ultimately unimportant when one considers the effect it has had in redefining political expectations in the Muslim world Even if Khomeini's Islamic Republic were to perish tomorrow, in historical terms the revolution would be counted a success For all Middle Easterners and Muslims, the ultimate value in Iran's revolution has been achieved simply by its initial victory, its establishment of an Islamic Republic and by its success in overthrowing a valuable and well-supported ally of the United States

Professor R K Ramazani of the University of Virginia has written a penetrating study of the ramifications of the Iranian Islamic Revolution upon surrounding states in the Middle East He argues that U S policy has been based upon fallacious assumptions which have led to unqualified disasters taking of U S diplomatic hostages in the early days of the revolution, the bombing of U S Marine quarters in Lebanon, continued misadventures in the Persian Gulf and various other wrong-headed policies which if not apprehended and corrected threaten other catastrophes By setting the record straight about the dynamics governing actions of Iran, the Gulf Arab states and other nations and factions linked to Iran, Ramazani argues that a new basis for policy formation can be achieved

The analytical basis of the study is solid, in fact, the material presented in the first section of the book is an original and badly needed explication of geostrategic forces at work in the Gulf area. Ramazani ably situates Iran in the area, defines the security problems and petroleum concerns for the Gulf states, and emphasizes the centrality of Iran and Shiite populations in the area He then ties in the threads of the Iranian revolutionary appeal and the sociopolitical vulnerability of standing regimes to the Iranian call to reform The second section of the book lays out the dialectics of power in the Gulf area, the genesis and prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war, and the response of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to the conflict The third section of the book

takes on the extension of Iranian religious politics to the central Middle East and analyzes the political reactions and counterreactions of Egypt, Israel, and Iran's most volatile audience, the Shiites of Lebanon. The fourth section underlines the importance of oil and oil politics. The fifth section analyzes U.S. policy in the area and provides guidelines to future policy formation following the basis of Ramazani's thesis.

In general this book is a well-constructed, ably-reasoned contribution to the study of Iran, the dynamics of Gulf politics, and an elaboration of factors which underlie Middle Eastern politics. Ramazani has crafted a block of original research in the Gulf and united it with a superbly reasoned analysis of Iranian foreign policy dictates. His argument makes a great deal of sense and needs to be read widely by Washington policymakers as well as the academic community.

Nonetheless, the book has a few gaps. Ramazani contends that in determining the future of revolution in the area, the appeal of the revolutionary rhetoric of Khomeini is secondary in importance to socioeconomic realities in each country. He emphasizes that the crucial variable in acceptance of the revolutionary Islamic ideology lies in the inability of the Arab Gulf and Lebanese governments to deliver on their promises. He alludes to flaws in other nations' systems, but beyond a brief description does not follow through with solid analysis of each nation's vulnerability.

The analysis of the forces at play in the central Middle East suffers somewhat from brevity and from the limited scope of Ramazani's analysis. The situations involving Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt are part of larger dynamics. Ramazani outlines their interplay with Iran, but by virtue of the constraints of his argument, is not able to take up other reasons which might mitigate against the rationales he presents for these nations' alliances and actions. Nevertheless, the argument as it pertains to Iran is well worth consideration.

Ramazani emphasizes the rationality of Iranian actions and the logical dictates of its foreign policy given its operating procedure throughout his larger argument. At times this analysis oversteps into advocacy of a foreign policy more responsive to Iran. His points are well taken, but the emphasis of the book tends at times to be more of an incitement to policy formation than a dispassionate examination of the situation.

Other problems demand the attention of editors more than the author. The book lacks a solid introduction to situate the study and explain the basic assumptions upon which the book is predicated. Because this volume is designed for an audience including general readers without a comprehensive background in Gulf or Middle Eastern politics, as well as academics with such a background, an orientation into the complexities of the argument is vital. Two paragraphs in the preface (plus a conclusion to the third chapter) are all we are given, then the reader plunges into the excellent but highly

detailed chapter on geopolitics. A second critical problem is that chapter's need for better cartographic evidence to support Ramazani's detailed arguments. The only map furnished is a blurry representation of Southwest Asia. Clear illumination of Ramazani's text demands focused maps of each area under discussion.

Ramazani makes a strong argument that Iran's participation in international affairs is governed by a strong pragmatic streak and by considerable judicious restraint. His examples in support of this point are compelling. Unfortunately, the book was published in 1986, before the onset of four major challenges to U.S. and Gulf policy toward Iran: the Iran-Contra discoveries, the Shiite demonstrations and subsequent casualties during the pilgrimage to Mecca, the intensification of the tanker war, and allied to that, the pressure on the part of the Gulf states to involve the superpowers in protection of the Gulf from both combatants in the Iran-Iraq war. Ramazani's work sets up a schema which could well explain Iran's dealings with the United States—in fact, he anticipates this by a discussion of Israeli arm sales to Iran. His analysis of the Gulf states' participation in the Iran-Iraq war could, if expanded, well explain the intricacies of the intensification of conflict in that area and their ambivalence in dealing with superpowers. The question of the Iranian disruption of the Meccan pilgrimage cannot be easily explained by the criteria set up in this book and would need further elaboration of motivations. However, Ramazani has cast the politics of the Gulf in a new mode by his analysis, and his paradigms for analysis seem to hold for much of what happened after the publication of the book. Thus, one hopes to see future work which considers his theories in light of recent occurrences.

Ramazani has made a cogent analysis of forces at play in the Gulf region. He is particularly adept at focusing the attention of the reader on the tension generated by the sociopolitical changes at work in the Middle East. He emphasizes the continuing political instability in the Middle East as the crucial factor deserving attention. If he were well listened to, policymakers would concentrate on the problems of the area rather than seeing the Middle East as a theater for East-West conflict.

Donna Lee Bowen, *Brigham Young University*

National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America. By Lars Schoultz. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Pp. 377. $42.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.)

This insightful work sets itself three principal tasks, and completes them in a way that will make it a key resource in understanding inter-American relations. First, Lars Schoultz identifies influential beliefs and perceptions held by U.S. policymakers about the United States' national security in relation to

Latin America. In brief, he argues that Washington decision makers tend to focus upon Latin American political instability as a central concern but to disagree about the causes of that disequilibrium. Some policymakers are persuaded that communism causes instability in hemispheric nations, while others believe the cause lies in Latin American poverty. The views of many officials, Schoultz continues, may be further categorized according to whether they view Latin American instability as a significant threat to U.S. security. "Liberals" tend to attribute instability to poverty and to assess the threat as low, "conservatives" emphasize communism and usually view the threat as high, and "moderates" often inculpate poverty but see U.S. security as endangered by political change in hemispheric nations.

Second, the author carefully explores the details and implications of these contrasting views, drawing upon interviews with almost 300 policymakers and a diligent examination of officials' speeches, writings, and statements at Congressional hearings. A variety of subtle and sometimes ironic findings turn up in this analysis. For example, in an anatomy of "underlying beliefs about power" which U.S. policymakers tend to share in approaching Latin America, Schoultz points out that many critics of the Reagan administration's hemispheric policies implicitly agree that the United States should possess hegemonic regional power. These dissenters—including Ramsey Clark[1]—would simply prefer to use that power for what they view as more constructive ends.

Third, this work explores the relationship—where it can be ascertained—between policymakers' perceptions and the real world of national resources and international relations. Schoultz inquires, for example, how greatly the United States depends on strategic raw materials from Latin America and on sea lines of communication in the hemisphere, concluding that such dependence is often exaggerated though not wholly absent. He also examines whether the Soviet Union is likely to seek military bases in Latin America, together with the possible grounds for U.S. concern about such ambitions.

This book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on inter-American relations for several reasons. It is refreshing that from the outset it recognizes the present dissensus among the makers of U.S. hemispheric policy. Many works in the field—even analytic studies—minimize this near-polarization, either because it is historically novel or out of a desire to broaden the audience for their policy preferences. At the same time, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* seeks to apply empathy toward all policymakers' viewpoints, avoiding personalist theories by outlining the perceptual bases for policy stances. Though Schoultz's skepticism about an emphasis on communism and his dissent from many current official policies is unmistakable, he is not a petty or captious critic.

This is not, one should note, a book about the process of making foreign policy, nor does it contend that policymakers' beliefs are the only fac-

tor affecting policy actions. Readers with a bent for analyzing bureaucratic skirmishing, however, will find thought-provoking concepts here, e.g., in Schoultz's discussion of policymakers' general strain towards conceptual simplicity, both as a value and as a tool in policy debates.

The reader would do well to keep in mind that Schoultz defines "policymaker" quite broadly to include "all individuals who recently have had or who currently have a direct impact upon policy" (p. xii). He thus very consciously includes private persons and former officials in his circle of influential individuals. This approach provides a useful breadth of view in an era marked by controversy over U.S. hemispheric actions, and by a very vigorous interbranch process of foreign policymaking. But one sometimes has to pinch oneself to recall that a good many of those here ranked as policymakers have been out of the executive branch for nearly ten years, and have had to affect foreign policy from outside government, sometimes in alliance with Congressional politicians and staff.

This work may also provoke in the reader a set of questions about the role of the public—or of perceptions of public attitudes—in the making of U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere. Schoultz makes a vivid case that the general public is ignorant about and uninterested in inter-American affairs and that the policy debate takes place within a small circle. On the other hand, something quite interesting and important seems to be taking place in officials' evaluation of the public's propensities. The assumption among American policymakers, traditional since the "loss" of China and the McCarthyite backlash—that there is a strong and jingoistic "latent public" ever prepared to punish officials who are "soft" on communist expansion—appears to be receding. The beliefs of Schoultz's "conservatives" are usually held independently of domestic political considerations, while "liberals" have found they need not be concerned about public retaliation. This apparent change may influence how quickly policymakers update their own beliefs on how the United States should relate to its hemispheric neighbors, an improvement about which Schoultz is cautiously optimistic.

Christopher Mitchell, *New York University*

The Trial of Socrates. By I. F. Stone. (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown, 1988. Pp. 282.)

The thesis of Stone's vindication of Athenian democracy for being the judge and executioner of Socrates is best summarized in the following passage: ". . . Socrates used his . . . skills as a logician and philosopher . . . for a special political purpose, to make all the leading men of the city appear to be ignorant fools. The divine mission he claimed from Delphi turned out to be an exercise in self-glorification. . . . He thus undermined the polis, defamed

the men on whom it depended, and alienated the youth" (p. 81). The last sentence presents a problem. Stone states repeatedly that Athens put Socrates to death because his "wisdom" attracted and corrupted aristocratic disciples like Critias, a future dictator, and Alcibiades, a prototype of the city's golden youth. At any rate, the author leads us to the conclusion that Athens' handling of Socrates was, if not justified, at least excusable as an act of preserving democratic freedoms.

Stone undertakes a reconstruction of the missing case for the prosecution to show us "how Socrates appeared to his fellow citizens" (p. 5). His primary sources are the works of Xenophon, Plato, Aristophanes, and Aristotle (*ibid.*). The author sets out to prove that contrary to the Socratic view of democratic Athens as a "herd," it was a "free city" (p. 9). Xenophon's *Memorabilia* lists Socrates' opposition to all forms of the existing government; a detailed catalog can be found scattered throughout Plato's *oeuvre*. Both Xenophon and Plato quote Socrates on kingship: "Kings and rulers are those who *know* how to rule" (p. 12, my emphasis). Both disciples of Socrates agree that the gist of the power relationship in a polis should be the ruler ruling and the subject obeying" and thus the future rulers of his utopia (are limited) to those who could "let go of the eyes and the other senses and rise to the contemplation of pure being" (*Republic* 7.537D7 ff.; Stone, p. 13). Stone adds: "This would no doubt be a contemplative joy to the mystic but it hardly offers guidance to the statesman. Why? Because he is beset by tangled affairs and obdurate human nature." History has shown us that such a pragmatist view does not always meet with practically desirable results. Stone seems to ignore this.

We are further told that "in the several utopias sketched by Plato all but one of them, the *Laws*, were based on one form or another of monarchy." In *The Statesman* "the ideal rule [is] absolute monarchy" (p. 15). These insights offered by Stone reveal the real scope of his *Trial*: it is an indictment of the entire corpus of the Socratic heritage, from Plato to Antisthenes the Cynic all the way to other apologies written in Greece and Rome centuries after Socrates' death. Other statements by Stone give one pause. Contrary to the political equality in the polis, "the Socratic premise was a basic inequality; nobody was a citizen, all were subjects. A gulf separated the ruler from the ruled." Again, Stone ignores the selective process of guardians suggested in the *Republic*, based exclusively on excellence. He does concede that Xenophon quoted Socrates distinguishing between kingship and despotism (p. 16). As was to be expected, Stone adduces Aristotle's "there are no royalties, only tyrannies." If a "now" were added to Aristotle's statement, it would indeed be true of his time, i.e., of the fourth century B.C., but not of the century of Socrates. In an excursus into Homer's concepts of monarchies the kings of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* come off as much less autocratic rulers than those envisioned by Socrates and Plato. Only the Thersites incident in

which Odysseus thrashes an insubordinate common soldier, *mirrors* Homer's view of absolute royal power It shows a nefarious reaction to what is "the first attempt of the common man to exercise freedom of speech" (pp 32–35) Plato's own treatment of Thersites parallels that of Homer, in the *Republic* the clownlike Thersites chooses the body of a baboon for his next incarnation, whereas Agamemnon, the lot of an eagle (p. 36) And so it goes, the Socratic utopia is structured toward obedience "in the subject population on two levels. to be obedient (1) to the rulers (2) to be rulers of one's bodily appetites" (p 37) Such obedience seems hardly despotic, even in our "enlightened" times Next, the analogy between king-shepherd and subjects herd, taken a bit out of context, is declared to be false But most of Stone's ire is leveled at Socrates the teacher how can he take himself for a teacher if he taught that virtue, and, for that matter, knowledge (the two are unequivocally equated by Stone) cannot be taught? This, Stone thinks, only shows Socrates' animosity toward the Sophists, who provided the basic skills of oratory, necessary for the disenfranchised to hold their own against the aristocrats Some Sophists were the first to affirm the equality of man, while the Socratic view "demeaned man" (pp 40–43) The Sophist Antiphon defended the "common" man against Socratic elitism "Knowledge was teachable and all men could acquire it" (p 44) One of the chief architects of Athenian power and prosperity Pericles, is viciously downgraded by Plato's Socrates to a "pastry cook " This is done to a spiritual descendant of "the victors at Salamis men elevated and inspired by the freedom to speak their minds and govern themselves" (p 51)

As for virtue, which Stone for the first time traces with Socrates to "divine dispensation" (p 58), it cannot solely be found among the learned and the superior few Judged by its practitioners, namely Socrates aristocratic followers, "Socrates was a failure " However, Stone metes his harshest treatment to the theory of forms or, as he calls it, "a wild goose chase for absolute definitions" (pp 68–89) This search is a reaction against the worldview of Heraclitus, a customer for a pair of shoes is not interested in some metaphysically perfect definition of a shoe" (Why should he be?) "From the common sense point of view, metaphysics looks straight out of cloud cuckoo land." The Platonists not only made "things of universal concepts (i e forms), but claimed them to be "the only things truly real " Then there is the problem of the absolute maxim of always speaking the truth Stone worries about the insensitivity of such truth-speaking, yet in historic perspective this is more properly the problem of Kant's *Second Critique* and Molière's *Misanthrope*

Finally, in the chapter "What Socrates Should Have Said" (pp 210–24 Stone pits his own hubris against that of Socrates Had Socrates argued freedom of speech at his trial, "democratic" Athens would have had no choice

out to pardon him. The author actually outlines a rewrite of Plato's *Apology*. The final chapter concludes that "there was no witch-hunt in ancient Athens" (pp 231–47). It presents convincing evidence that, outside the trial of Socrates, there has not been a large or even small-scale persecution of thinkers and orators due to their convictions.

A few comments focusing on the above obtrude themselves. Stone does not deny the monumental corpus of ideas which Socratic Platonism gave the West, but he does his best to discredit its political principles—Athens became indeed a demagogue-led herd when the instinctively practiced principle of political freedom and transcendently grounded ethics of the Marathon generation became perverted at the end of the century, the same as reason had become rationalization.

Read in depth, the absolute royalty of the *Republic* is not of a despot, but the rule of irrefutable reason—whose?—of logical men, poor or aristocrats. As for Plato's utopias, the *Republic*, for one, is written in a dialectic conditional: if you want absolute justice (and most people do), then you would have to radically restructure society according to the Platonic pattern, like it or not. And there is always, between the lines, the suggestion: you and I know that though not impossible, it would be most likely never embodied. Utopia? What Utopian shows how the City *en logois* (in logical dialectic) *disintegrates*? As for the *Statesman*'s absolute monarch, Plato's Socrates was convinced that the Athenian state—not necessarily democracy—could only be saved by a Redeemer with a Sword. Was he so wrong in light of Greek history after Plato, or was that, too, Plato's (or Socrates') doing? As for Socrates denying learning as possible, the answer is in *Meno*, the *Republic*, etc., i.e., *anamnesis*—recollection. Learning through imitation is training, but the Socratic dredging-up dialectics is uncovering what one has always known. Likewise Stone mentions not one word about *participation* between objects as reflections of the eternal forms. The absolute definitions that Socrates demands are not of "shoes" but the basic intuitions of mankind: the good, truth, beauty, justice, and eros. Although the eternal form of "shoe" is present *behind* the Divided Line, it does not need an absolute definition: it simply is. What about the *psyche* as conduit of a transcendent yet universally shared experience of these insights: *Parmenides*? Plato did not assail Heraclitus' metaphysics; he incorporated them into his *Divided Line* of the *Republic*, giving it its due place as the base of finite reality. Sophists as propounders of equality? These well-paid purveyors of oratorical skills catered to the rich, and preached equality of truths, not people. Finally, the point of Socrates' refusal to continue living in the Athens of his last days is only grudgingly admitted by Stone. Only someone who had lost a beautiful and relatively just world can understand Socrates, who would not be saved by Stone's rewrite of the *Apology*. All things being equal, one might hope that

Stone's next book will be *The Trial of Jesus* Perhaps he can in it instruct the Nazarene of how to successfully sway the Passover crowd to avoid both crucifixion and resurrection

M J Hanak, *East Texas State University*

Political Ethics and Public Office By Dennis F Thompson. (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1987 Pp 263 $25 00)

This book is particularly timely in a year which has produced the following news stories. secret government operations revealed during the Iran-Contra hearings. Gary Hart exits from the Democratic presidential nomination contest after disclosures concerning extramarital affairs, Attorney General Edwin Meese is the subject of a series of investigations by Special Counsel Judge Douglas Ginsburg asks President Reagan to withdraw his name as a nominee to the Supreme Court after revelations that Ginsburg had smoked marijuana while a professor at Harvard Law School. Michael Deaver, former White House official, is indicted and convicted for lying to Congress While not referring to any of these cases specifically, Thompson touches on issues raised by all of them, and his discussion can help to clarify the core ethical concerns that these stories involve

The chapters in this book were written before any of the above events took place (and most of the chapters have appeared in print during the 1980s but these cases could easily have been incorporated into the body of Thompson's study, for he proceeds throughout by the analysis of examples In fact Thompson argues that political ethics cannot proceed without examples for it is through examples that "the general keeps in touch with the particular" (p 9) The mini-case studies are the real strength of this work, and make the book a valuable addition to the literature on ethics and politics bureaucratic ethics, and democratic accountability

The focus of this book is identified precisely by the second half of its title public office Thus, from various angles, Thompson looks at the ethical obligations of public officeholders in a democratic society Each of his seven chapters deals with a different aspect of the ethical questions confronting officials Who should bear responsibility when officials, in carrying out policies favored by the public, "take their duties to permit or even require them to lie, break promises, and manipulate citizens" (p 4)? This is the problem of "democratic dirty hands" (chap one) The second chapter, "The Moral Responsibility of Many Hands," deals with the impact of organizational hierarchy and specialization on decision making and implementation Who is responsible for "immoral" policies—the advisor, the official, the bureaucrat who carries out his orders?—all or none of the above?

Who bears responsibility, not when immoral policies are pursued, but when crimes are committed by the government? How far does the doctrine of sovereign immunity go in protecting a public official who breaks the law? These are the questions addressed in "Official Crime and Punishment." Structuralists argue that organizations rather than individual officials should be held accountable for criminal activities. Thompson disagrees, "because organizational responsibility distributes punishment beyond moral responsibility and because it encourages unjustified organizational autonomy." He concludes that "we should rely instead on personal responsibility to provide the foundation for the punishment of crimes in organizations" (p. 78), in spite of the "practical problems of enforcement and deterrence" that this approach must face (p. 89).

Thompson identifies three approaches to "Legislative Ethics" (chap. four). "Minimalist ethics" prohibits conflicts of financial interest, while "functionalist ethics" focuses on the proper role of the legislator (trustee or delegate). The third approach discussed by Thompson, "rationalist ethics," seeks to ground legislative activity "on substantive principles of political theory, such as justice, liberty, or the common good" (p. 102). All of these approaches are inadequate because they fail to understand "the collegial dimension of legislative life" (p. 97). Thompson also argues that "the ethical demands of the role of the legislator conflict with the generic requirements of ethics" (p. 96): legislators must look after the narrow interests of their constituents rather than concern themselves with universalized principles; legislators must pay attention to the electorate rather than acting autonomously; ethics calls for action on public principles, but legislators who always act publicly may act less generally and autonomously (p. 96).

Thompson's final three chapters deal with the procedural and substantive scope of privacy ("The Private Lives of Public Officials"), the nature, uses, and justification of "Paternalistic Power," and "The Ethics of Social Experiments," a case study of DIME, the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment.

This is an interesting study of the ins and outs of public conduct. While it succeeds admirably on the level of public administration and practical politics, primarily because it shows the complexity of the ethical issues under discussion, it is less successful at the philosophical level. This failure stems from Thompson's almost exclusive focus on the practical issues of official ethics to the neglect of any extended discussion of the philosophical foundation of ethics per se. Thompson himself might reject this criticism, for he argues that "political ethics consists of judgments or criteria for making judgments, not particular rules or general theories" (p. 7). But without some general understanding of the nature of ethics and the nature of politics, the "judgments or criteria" Thompson seeks can have no reasonable foundation.

Thompson seems to assume throughout this work that the Kantian triumvirate of generalizability, autonomy, and openness are an adequate framework for ethical discussion, but he nowhere establishes the validity of this standard

The philosophical limitations of this work can be seen in Thompson's statement that "the judgments of political ethics are in persistent danger of collapsing into pure prudence on the one side or pure principle on the other" (p 9). Thompson does not explain what he means by either "prudence" or "principle" here, but again he appears to be moving within a Kantian framework. The classical view of prudence attempts to achieve exactly what Thompson claims as his goal—relating particulars to the general—and would reject Thompson's confrontation of "prudence" and "principle" Prudence is a form of knowledge for Aristotle, that explicitly political judgment which allows man to relate natural right (the general) to specific practical cases under consideration (the particular) Unfortunately, this book provides no extended discussion of Aristotle's understanding of ethics and politics as forms of "practical science," *nor of any of the modern alternatives to the classical view.* This failure to provide any systematic analysis of the foundations of political ethics is the book's greatest weakness

Whatever the limitations of this work, however, it is well worth reading by those concerned with the practical questions of bureaucratic ethics "Political ethics resists the growing tendency to deny responsibility to persons and the complementary tendency to attribute it to collectivities of various kinds The aim is to preserve the essentials of the traditional idea of personal responsibility against the pressures of organizational life A political ethics of public office should bring out the moral significance of the routine in government" (pp 5, 7) These are lessons that need to be relearned by public officials and educators alike, and *Political Ethics and Public Office* is as good a place to begin reminding ourselves of the ethical dimensions of political life as any that I have recently encountered

Steven D Ealy, *Armstrong State College*

Latin America at the Crossroads Debt, Development, and the Future By Howard J Wiarda (Boulder Westview Press 1987 Pp 114)

In this brief analysis commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank, Professor Wiarda explores the roots of the current economic crisis in Latin America, and discusses its implications for the future stability of the region. He presents an ominous view of what may occur if current trends are not reversed In the worst-case scenario, social and political instability could lead to the end of the moderate, accommodative politics which have existed in most regional countries since the 1930s (p 5) A second focus is the huge amount of external debt which has become an integral part of the regional

crisis. Wiarda traces the complex sources of debt growth, and outlines the problems it has created for economic development. He argues that realistic solutions must recognize both the political and economic nature of the debt situation. A third focus of the analysis is U.S. policy toward the current crisis. Because of the serious threat posed to our interests in the region, a policy of "benign neglect" is no longer sufficient (p. 6). The author concludes with some recommendations for relieving the debt burden which would demand sacrifices from all parties involved.

Wiarda contends that several exogenous and internal factors must be considered in explaining the current crisis. The most important has been the world economic downturn which sent Latin American economies into a tailspin after 1979, and from which they have been unable to recover (p. 13). Internal factors include widespread corruption, bloated bureaucracies, and inefficient, wasteful parastatal sectors. Excessive borrowing by the latter from commercial banks in the 1970s was a major cause of external debt growth (p. 18). The author's brief analysis offers a serious challenge to those seeking solutions to Latin America's current woes. An inescapable fact is that recovery depends on sustained economic growth in the United States and other industrialized economies. Should this occur, there still would remain the problems of capital mobilization and efficient utilization in the face of continuing debt obligations. Wiarda correctly warns against the kinds of demands for internal reform and continuing austerity which would undermine and destabilize political systems in the region (p. 19). Much will depend also on how U.S. domestic politics influence protectionist demands, interest rates, and the huge budget deficit that soaks up international capital. It is hard to argue with Wiarda's assessment that the near-term prospects for improvement do not appear bright (p. 23). Although there is nothing new in this brief analysis, it does contain an excellent summary of the problems which U.S. policymakers must confront if they are to deal adequately with the regional crisis.

The more provocative part of the book deals with the causes of the external debt crisis, the manner in which it has been handled by U.S. policymakers, and recommendations for alleviating its burdens in the future. Unfortunately, the analysis does not extend beyond the Baker Plan of October 1985. Subsequent events have confirmed Wiarda's prediction that the situation would not likely improve in the short-run. If anything, the situation in most Latin debtor countries has deteriorated since then. The author's assessment of responsibility for the debt crisis seems sound (p. 29). Commercial bank loans in the 1970s seemed a good idea for all parties concerned until external economic events of 1979–1980 turned the situation toward crisis. An interesting point made by Wiarda concerning U.S. government responsibility seems questionable, however. He maintains that loans were encouraged as a substitute for dwindling foreign aid to further political stability in

the region and lessen the potential for revolutions from below (p. 29). It seems doubtful that there would have been anything approaching an official policy toward debt growth at that point. The more likely possibility is that U.S. policy reflected a combination of short-range domestic factors—primarily the slowing of domestic demand for capital and the absence of banking regulation. Whatever the cause, an important research task is to explain why U.S. policymakers were so short-sighted about the potential problems lurking in uncontrolled external debt growth.

Wiarda maintains that U.S. policy toward the debt crisis has been to "manage" it to avoid disaster for either the domestic financial system or Latin American governments. Although there is a recognition that the full debt will never be paid, the U.S. government has erected a series of myths that business must continue as usual (p. 31). All parties in the process, including Latin American governments, have become skilled players in the debt management game. But, as Wiarda points out, there has been no movement toward a resolution of the crisis. The situation remains as precarious and fraught with disaster as ever. In the meantime, the effects of the debt continue to devastate the economies of the region and place tremendous burdens on expanding populations (p. 38). The author's analysis is insightful and seems essentially accurate. The major goal of U.S. policy in the debt crisis has been to contain the potential for disaster from a series of loan defaults. What is not clear, however, is how such a short-sighted approach has continued to prevail in the face of a crisis that has refused to go away. Perhaps U.S. policymakers have accepted the idea that economic growth in creditor countries eventually will enable debtors to grow out of the situation. Whatever the reasons, there has been little support for the kinds of policies that have potential as long-range solutions. A more extensive study of the shaping of policy toward the debt is needed to show why the U.S. response has been such an inadequate one.

Wiarda's most important insight concerns the threat which external debt and its related economic ills pose to U.S. national security interests in Latin America. He discusses the growing social and economic pressures which make it unlikely that the current crisis can be managed indefinitely without major upheavals. In addition, he points out that it is in our interest to support the promising new democratic regimes which have appeared in the region over the past several years (p. 50). The Baker Plan was evidence that U.S. policymakers were finally coming to recognize the political as well as economic dimensions of the debt crisis. Policy debate since then has shown a greater awareness of the danger to U.S. interests in Latin America from the effects of continuing debt burdens. Research needs to explore further how considerations for national security have affected U.S. policy attitudes toward the crisis in recent years. External debt is one among several foreign policy issues which now have such a significance. Wiarda's policy recommen-

dations at the end are a useful starting point for the kind of positive involvement the United States must demonstrate if the economic and political problems of Latin America are to be solved. More importantly, his insightful analysis of the crucial link between economic change and U.S. security interests should become even more relevant for policymakers as pressures increase on Latin American societies in the years ahead.

Kenneth G. Hartman, *Louisiana State University*

Index to Volume 50

Index to Volume 50